

ASSOCIATED REPRINT : SIX

A
COMPREHENSIVE
HISTORY OF INDIA

Civil, Military and Social,

from

The first Landing of the English,
To the Suppression of the Sepoy Revolt;

including

An Outline of the Early History of Hindoostan

Volume II

Henry Beveridge

With an Introduction by

J. P. Guha



Associated Publishing House
New Delhi

Associated Publishing House
New Market, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005

© Associated Publishing House 1974
*(The editorial material included in this
volume is the copyright of the Publishers)*

First Published in 1862

SBN 336 00422 2

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY, NEW DELHI.

No. 57105
Date 18-2-1975
Sl No. 954/Ber

954.082/Ber

PRINTED IN INDIA

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY R.K. PAUL FOR
ASSOCIATED PUBLISHING HOUSE, NEW DELHI-110005

Contents

BOOK IV

Of The Institutions, Literature, Arts, And Manners of The Hindus

1. *Origin and Classification of the Hindus.* Page 3
2. *The Religion of the Hindus.* Page 23
3. *The Government of the Hindus.* Page 107
4. *Art, Literature and Science—Philosophy, Science, Literature, and Fine Arts of the Hindus.* Page 146
5. *Commerce and Agriculture—Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce of the Hindus.* Page 194
6. *Manners of the Hindus.* Page 215

BOOK V

From The Grant of the Dewani of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, to the Establishment of the Board of Control, in 1784

1. *Hyder Ali (I)*

Affairs of the Carnatic—The Manilla expedition— Relations with Muhammed Ali—The treaty of Paris—The Company's jaghir—Reduction of refractory polygars—Muhammed Issuff—Disputes between Muhammed Ali and the Raja of Tanjore—Relations with the Subahdar of the Deccan—The Northern Circars—The rise and progress of Hyder Ali. Page 265

2. *Hyder Ali (II)*

Alarm produced by Hyder Ali's progress—Difficulty of choosing between his alliance and that of the Marathas—Views of the Directors on the subject—Fruits of the treaty with Nizam Ali—War with Hyder Ali—Confederacy against him broken up—Subsequent events—The Company duped—Termination of the war.

Page 312

3. *The Dewani of Bengal*

Arrangements in Bengal consequent on the grant of the dewani—Verelst succeeds Clive as president—Comparative tranquillity—Financial difficulties—Home proceedings—Dividend—Interference of parliament—Cartier president—Dreadful famine—Discussions in parliament—A crown plenipotentiary—Shah Alam seated on the throne of Delhi—The Marathas in Rohilkhand.

Page 364

4. *Warren Hastings*

The early life of Warren Hastings—His appointment to a writership in Bengal—Important posts assigned to him—His return to England—He proceeds to Madras as the second member of council—His appointment as president of Bengal—The first acts of his administration—Double government abolished—The treaty of Benaras—The Rohilla war—Home proceedings—Financial difficulties—Clive put on his defence—His death by suicide—The Regulating Act.

Page 385

5. *Negotiations with the Marathas*

State of matters at Madras—Misunderstandings with Sir Robert Fletcher—New expedition against Tanjore—State of matters at Bombay—Expedition against the Nabob of Baroach—Negotiations with the Marathas—Capture of Salsette—Proclamation of the new government of Bengal—Dissensions in the council—Governor-general in a minority—Governor-general charged with corruption by Nanda Kumar—Nanda Kumar

accused of forgery, convicted, and hanged—Disturbances in Oudh—Violent dissensions at Madras—Arrest and death of Lord Pigot, the governor—Proceedings of the Bombay government—Capture of Salsette—Treaty with Raghoba—Treaty of Purandhar. Page 451

6. *Members of the Calcutta Council*

Financial and judicial arrangements in Bengal—Death of Colonel Monson gives the governor-general a majority in council—His supposed resignation—Proceedings thereupon in England and in Bengal—The supreme court decides as referee—General Clavering dies, and is succeeded by Sir Eyre Coote—Questions as to the jurisdiction of the supreme court—A new appointment given to Sir Elijah Impey—Parliament interferes—Sir Elijah Impey is recalled. Page 525

7. *Peace with the Marathas*

A rupture with the Marathas—A force sent overland from the Bengal to the Bombay presidency—Expedition from Bombay to assist Raghoba—Disastrous results—Negotiation with Mudaji Bhonsla, Raja of Berar—Goddard's campaign against the Marathas—Treaty with the Rana of Gohad—Campaign of Popham—Capture of Gwalior—Capture of Bassein—Hostilities with Sindhia—Peace with the Marathas. Page 566

8. *Tipu Sultan*

War with France—Capture of Pondicherry—Disputes with Nizam Ali and Basalat Jung—War with Hyder Ali—Detachment under Colonel Baillie destroyed—Sir Eyre Coote in command of the Madras army—Lord Macartney governor of Madras—Defeat of Hyder Ali—Military and naval operations—Death of Hyder Ali—Death of Sir Eyre Coote—Subsequent progress of the war—Peace with France—Peace with Tipu. Page 601

9. *Affairs of Chait Singh*

Visit of Mr. Hastings to Benaras—Proceedings against the raja—Parliamentary reports on Indian affairs—Proceedings in Oudh—Resignation of Mr. Hastings—Resignation of Lord Macartney—India bills of Mr. Dundas, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Pitt—Establishment of the Board of Control. Page 680

BOOK VI

*From the Establishment of the Board of Control to the Complete
Extinction of the Company's Trade*

1. *Lord Cornwallis*

Mr. Macpherson governor-general—The Nabob of Arcot's debts—Lord Macartney, proposed as governor-general, declines—Lord Cornwallis appointed—His civil and military reforms—The cession of Guntur—New agreement with Nizam Ali. Page 717

2. *Treaty of Seringapatam*

Tipu's tyranny and cruelty—His attack on the lines of Travancore—Confederacy against him—Progress of the war under General Medows—Lord Cornwallis assumes the command—Siege and capture of Bangalore—Operations in Coorg—Advance on Seringapatam—Siege of Seringapatam—Treaty of peace. Page 748

3. *The Trial of Warren Hastings*

The arrival of Marquis Cornwallis in England—Impeachment and trial of Warren Hastings—Indian administration of Sir John Shore. Page 818

4. *War between the Nizam and the Marathas*

Sir John Shore governor-general—Death of Mahadaji Sindhia—War between the Nizam and the Marathas—Death of the Peshwa—Disputed succession in Oudh—Death of Muhammed Ali—War with the Dutch. Page 837

5. *Marquis Wellesley*

Earl of Mornington, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, appointed governor-general—State of India on his arrival—Treaty with the Nizam—Disbandment of the French corps—War with Tipu—Siege and capture of Seringapatam—Settlement of Mysore. Page 862

6. *Nabob of Arcot*

Disputed succession in Tanjore—New settlement of this country—Proceedings in regard to Surat—Deposition of the Nabob of Arcot—Proceedings in Oudh—Subsidiary treaty with the Nizam—Expedition of Egypt. Page 908

7. *Peace with the Marathas*

New treaty with the Nizam—State of affairs among the Marathas—The treaty of Bassein—A new Maratha war—Operations in the Deccan—Victory of Assaye—Operations in Gujarat and Cuttack—Operations in Hindustan under General Lake—Storming of Aligarh—Battle and occupation of Delhi—Capture of Agra—Battle of Laswari—Conquest of Bundelkhand—Battle of Argaoim—Siege of Gawilgarh—Peace with Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsla. Page 940

8. *The Siege of Bharatpur*

War with Holkar—Amir Khan in Bundelkhand—Disastrous retreat and discomfiture of Colonel Monson—Holkar invades

Hindustan—His siege of Delhi—His depredations in the Doab—
 Battle of Dig—Rout at Farukhabad—Storming of Dig—
 Siege of Bharatpur—The failure of four assaults—Disputes
 with Sindhia. Page 980

9. *Cornwallis and Bentinck*


Marquis of Cornwallis again governor-general—His policy—
 His death—Sir George Barlow governor-general—His policy—
 Mutiny at Vellore—Lord William Bentinck, governor, and Sir
 John Cradock, commander-in-chief at Madras, recalled—
 Disputes as to the appointment of governor-general—Sir George
 Barlow recalled by the king's sign-manual. Page 1018


10. *Lord Minto*

Lord Minto governor-general—Disturbances in Bundelkhand—
 Arrangements with the Nizam—Embassies to Sind, Kabul,
 and Persia—Mutiny at Madras—Disturbances in Travancore—
 Capture of the French and Dutch islands—Misgovernment
 of Oudh—Revenue and judicial systems—The ryotwar settle-
 ment—Riot at Benaras—The Bengal missionaries—Discussions
 on the Company's charter—Close of Lord Minto's administra-
 tion. Page 1040

Index

Page 1080





BOOK IV

Origin and Classification of the Hindus

THE Hindus, though now forming the great body of the population of India, do not seem to have been its earliest inhabitants. These, it is probable, are still represented by some of the hill tribes, who after contending in vain against foreign invaders, quitted the plains, and found an asylum among mountains and forests, into which the conquering race could not or cared not to follow them. The tradition is that the Hindus entered India from the north-west, and had their first settlement in a small tract lying about 100 miles north-west of Delhi, between the Ghaggar and the Saraswati. In the *Institutes of Manu* this tract is said to have been named *Brahmavarta*, because it was "frequented by the gods," and the custom preserved in it by immemorial tradition is recommended as "approved usage." From this tract the Hindus appear to have spread eastward, and occupied the whole country north of the Jamuna and the Ganges. To distinguish this country from *Brahmavarta* it was called *Brahmarshi*, and from Brahmins born within it all men on earth are enjoined to learn their several usages. Besides these tracts Manu mentions two others—*Madhyadesa*, or the central region said to lie between Himayat (the Himalaya) and Vindhya; and *Aryavarta*, or the land of respectable men, described in rather indefinite terms, but meant apparently to include the countries stretching on each side of the central region, "as far as the eastern and the western oceans," in other words, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.

Assuming that at the time when the *Institutes of Manu* were compiled, the whole territory included under the names of

Brahmavarta, Brahmarshi, Madhyadesa, and Aryavarta, was in full and undisputed possession of the Hindus, we turn to their records in the hope of obtaining accounts more or less authentic of the manner in which they made their original conquests, and afterwards extended them into the Deccan, so as to bring the whole of India under their power. Unfortunately, on these important points the Hindu annals furnish no information, and we are presented, instead of historical details, with the most extravagant fables. Commencing at a period so remote that the mind is unable to form any definite conception of the years which have elapsed since its commencement, we arrive at last at four *yugas* or ages, evidently resembling those with which the literature of the Greeks and Romans has made us familiar. The first age, or *satya yuga*, lasted 1,728,000 years. During this age man existed in his most perfect form. The whole race was free from any taint of corruption; and each individual, besides being of gigantic stature, lived 100,000 years. In the second age, or *treta yuga*, one-third of the human race had become corrupt, and the duration of the whole period, as well as of human life, suffered a corresponding diminution, the former being reduced to 1,296,000 years, and the latter to 10,000 years. In the third age, or *dwapara yuga*, corruption still proceeding, the whole period was reduced to 864,000, and the life of man to 1,000 years. In the fourth age, or *kali yuga*, corruption became universal, and while human life has been restricted to its present maximum of 100 years, it has been predicted that the whole number of years now running their destined course will not exceed 432,000. The three first ages are evidently fabulous; but Hindu chronology, maintaining a kind of consistency in its extravagance, treats them all as equally authentic, and assigns historical events to each. In some instances, indeed, even the myriads of years included in the ages are deemed insufficient, and the *Institutes of Manu*, though certainly not older than the ninth century before our era, are fabled to have been written at a date, to reach which, in counting backwards, the 4,320,000 years of the four ages must be multiplied by six times seventy one. In a similar spirit the *Surya Sidhanta*, an astronomical work of the fifth or sixth century, is assigned to the *satya yuga*, and gravely declared to have been written more than two millions of years ago.

The *kali yuga* is the only age which can be regarded as historical. It commenced about 5,000 years ago, and thus falls within the period during which we know, from an infallible source, that men have lived upon the earth, and may have spread eastward from their original seat into the basin of the Ganges. Still, notwithstanding some remarkable coincidences, it is difficult in the extreme to unravel the web of Hindu fiction, and assign a real existence to beings who, though living and performing exploits in localities which are easily identified, figure as the familiar associates of supernal or infernal powers, as the descendants of the sun and moon, and even as incarnations of deity. Such are the heroes of the two celebrated epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*. That they were real human beings, and not mere creatures of the imagination, may easily be admitted; but in all the details respecting them the supernatural predominates so much over the historical, and is so interwoven with it, that the attempt to separate them is fruitless. To the vague information furnished by the *Institutes of Manu* scarcely anything is added, and we must be contented to know, as a general but unexplained fact, that Hindu supremacy, after being maintained by dynasties, the most important of which reigned in Ayodhya or Oudh, situated near the centre of Brahmarshi, was gradually extended over the whole length and breadth of the Indian peninsula, and even beyond it, into the island of Ceylon.

While it is impossible, in the absence of genuine annals, to trace the leading events in the early history of the Hindus, and present them in the form of a continuous narrative, there is another important branch of inquiry, as to which a similar complaint cannot be made. In several ancient works, and more especially in the *Institutes of Manu*, we obtain an intimate acquaintance with their internal condition, and are introduced to a state of society of a very extraordinary character. As its distinguishing features must now be passed in review, we begin with the one which lies at the foundation of all the social arrangements of the Hindus. From a very early date they have existed, not as one people, derived from a common origin and possessed of equal rights, but as distinct classes, separated from each other by impassable barriers, and destined to occupy very different social positions. This classification, to which

Europeans, borrowing a synonymous term from the Portuguese, generally give the name of caste, appears to have had its origin in a mythological fiction. According to Hindu theology, mankind are not the descendants of a single primeval pair, but were at first produced by Brahma, their imaginary creator, from four different parts of his body. From his mouth proceeded the Brahmin, from his arm the Kshatriya, from his thigh the Vaisya, and from his foot the Sudra. Each of these creations furnished the progenitors of a distinct class, whose social position and occupation were thus indelibly fixed in accordance with its origin. According to Manu, the Brahmin, since he sprang from the mouth, the most excellent part, "is by right the chief of this whole creation." Next in order, but at an immeasurable distance, stands the Kshatriya. His descent marks him out as a soldier, and his principal employment should be "to defend the people." The Vaisya represents the industrial class, and his proper duty therefore is to keep herds of cattle, to carry on trade, to lend at interest, and to cultivate land. To the Sudra, it is said, the supreme ruler assigns one principal duty, "namely, to serve the before mentioned classes without depreciating their worth."

In every description of the duties of the different classes, the elevation of the Brahmin is never overlooked. Though the Kshatriya and Vaisya are enjoined or permitted to read the *Veda* or Hindu scripture, the Brahmin alone is entitled to teach it. They too may sacrifice on their own account, but to him exclusively is assigned the duty "of assisting others to sacrifice." The Kshatriya is required to give alms, and the Vaisya to bestow largesses, whereas the Brahmin need not give unless he is rich, and on the contrary, if poor, has the special privilege of "receiving gifts." These privileges, however, give but a feeble idea of his dignity, and therefore we are distinctly told that "the very birth of Brahmins is a constant incarnation of Dharma, god of justice; for the Brahmin is born to promote justice, and to procure ultimate happiness;" that "when a Brahmin springs to light, he is born above the world, the chief of all creatures, assigned to guard the treasury of duties, religious and civil;" and that "whatever exists in the universe is all, in effect, the wealth of the Brahmin, since the Brahmin is entitled to it all

by his primogeniture and eminence of birth." To secure this pre-eminence of the Brahmins, and give practical effect to it, the principal places of authority and trust are reserved for them. The king, indeed, should properly belong to the Kshatriya class, but the requisite qualifications for his high office are to be acquired by listening with implicit deference to the instructions of Brahmins. From them he is continually to "learn habits of modesty and composure;" by their decision he is to "abide;" and though in choosing his counsellors he is only enjoined in general to appoint "men whose ancestors were servants of kings, who are versed in the holy books, who are personally brave, who are skilled in the use of weapons, and whose lineage is noble;" it is added, not that he is to act on the advice which they may give him, but simply that having ascertained their several opinions "let him impart his momentous counsel to one learned Brahmin distinguished among them all; to him, with full confidence, let him intrust all transactions, and with him having taken his final resolution, let him begin all his measures." Having thus a Brahmin for his prime minister, he is to select another of eminent learning for the office of chief judge, and leave it to him and three other Brahmins appointed to act with him as assessors, to investigate all causes brought into the king's court, and prepare them for decision either by himself in person, or by the chief judge as his deputy.

It is not so much, however, by the direct authority conferred upon them as ministers of state and judges that the ascendancy of the Brahmins is secured, as by the peculiar sacredness which is attached both to their persons and property, and which, while it permits them to commit crimes with comparative impunity, aggravates the guilt and increases the punishment of those who may dare to injure or offend them. A king, however much he may be pressed for money, must not "provoke Brahmins to anger, by taking their property; for they once enraged could immediately, by sacrifices and imprecations, destroy him with his troops, elephants, horses, and cars;" and in administering justice he "must not even form the idea of killing a priest," even though he may have been "convicted of all possible crimes." "He may be banished from the realm, but it must be with all his property secure and his body unhurt,"

for "no greater crime is known on earth than slaying a Brahmin." While the Brahmin may thus be guilty of all imaginable atrocities without putting his life in danger, the law carefully throws its shield around him, and punishes the slightest insults offered to him by the infliction of barbarous tortures and mutilations. Should a Sudra address him in contumelious terms, "an iron style, ten fingers long, shall be thrust red hot into his mouth;" should he "insolently place himself on the same seat," banishment is the mildest punishment that awaits him; "should he spit on him through pride, the king shall order both his lips to be gashed;" should he seize him by the locks, or other enumerated parts of his person, "let the king, without hesitation, cause incisions to be made in both his hands;" should he "through pride give instructions to priests concerning their duty, let the king order some hot oil to be dropped into his mouth and his ear."

Such is a specimen of the penalties which the code of Manu provides for the slightest premeditated insults offered to a Brahmin. Legal penalties, however, are insufficient to heal his wounded dignity or satisfy his vengeance, and therefore, to make the punishment complete, sanctions of a different kind are put in requisition. In some cases where the offence proceeds from momentary impulse, or is of so trivial a nature that the law has not deigned to deal with it, expiation by penance may suffice, and hence, he "who says *hush* or *pish* to a Brahmin" may purge the offence by bathing immediately, eating nothing for the rest of the day, and appease him whom he has offended "by clasping his feet with respectful salutation." In like manner, one offending a Brahmin by striking him, "even with a blade of grass," or by "overpowering him in argument, and adding contemptuous words," must "soothe him by falling prostrate." It would seem, however, that from the refusal of the Brahmin, or some other cause, the offered reparation may prove unavailing, and hence we are elsewhere told that he who has smitten a Brahmin in anger and by design, even with a blade of grass, "shall be born in one-and-twenty transmigrations from the wombs of impure quadrupeds." The crime may be committed, and a fearful penalty incurred, without actually smiting; for it is expressly declared that "a twice-born man," that is, one belonging to any one of the three first classes, if he "barely

assaults a Brahmin, with intention to hurt him, shall be whirled about for a century in the hell named *Tamisra*." Should there be not merely an intent to hurt or kill, but actual striking, the punishment shall be extended to a thousand years; and should blood be shed, then "as many pellets of dust as the blood of a Brahmin collects on the ground, for so many thousand years must the shedder of that blood be tormented in hell."

In the early age, when the *Institutes of Manu* were compiled, the Brahmin paid somewhat dearly for his honours by the strict discipline to which his whole life was subjected. Having been invested with the badge of his caste in his eighth, and, at all events, not later than his sixteenth year, he became a *Brahmachari*, or student in theology, took up his residence with a preceptor, and besides listening with the utmost deference to his instructions, spent a large part of every day in irksome observances, and even menial services. Among others, he behoved "to carry water-pots, flowers, cow-dung, fresh earth, and *kusa* grass, as much as may be useful to his preceptor;" to bring logs of wood from a distance, and with them "make an oblation to fire without remissness, both evening and morning," and to seek his daily food "by begging, with due care from the houses of persons renowned for discharging their duties," and where such houses could not be found, by "begging through the whole district round the village." If so disposed he might pass his whole life in this manner, induced by the consideration that "that Brahmin who has dutifully attended his preceptor till the dissolution of his body, passes directly to the eternal mansion of God;" but, in general, regarding studentship merely as a probationary stage, he passed to a second, in which, provided his rules as a student had not been violated, he was permitted to "assume the order of a married man," and "pass the second quarter of human life in his own house." During this stage, devoting himself chiefly to the study of the *Veda*, and living "with no injury, or with the least possible injury to animated beings," he might, "for the sole purpose of supporting life," acquire property "by those irreproachable occupations which are peculiar to his class, and unattended with bodily pain." Among the approved means of subsistence are enumerated gleanings, and gifts received, unasked, from worthy persons,

Next in order are alms obtained by asking, and tillage, and last of all, traffic and money-lending, "but service for hire is named *swavritti*, or *dog-living*, and of course he must by all means avoid it." In the latter part of this second stage, if the Brahmin "has paid, as the law directs, his debts to the sages, to the manes, and to the gods," that is, according to commentators, if he has duly read the scripture, begotten a son, and performed regular sacrifices, "he may resign all to his son, and reside in his family house, with no employment but that of an umpire."

The third stage of the Brahmin's life arrives when he "perceives his muscles become flaccid, and his hair gray, and sees the child of his child." He must now take up his consecrated fire, and the implements for making oblations to it, and departing from the town "repair to the lonely wood." During the second stage, when he was a householder, mortification was rather the exception than the rule. He was never, if able to procure food, to "waste himself with hunger," nor, possessing any substance, to "wear old or sordid clothes." On the contrary, with his hair, nails, and beard clipped, his passions subdued, his mantle white, his body pure, a staff of *venu*, a ewer with water in it, a bunch of *kusa* grass, or a copy of the *Veda*, in his hand, and a pair of bright golden rings in his ears, he was diligently to occupy himself in reading the *Veda*, and be constantly intent on such acts as might be salutary to him. Now, however, when retired to the forest, he was to "wear a black antelope's hide, or a vesture of bark," to "suffer the hair of his head, his beard, and his nails to grow continually," to eat "green herbs, flowers, roots, and fruits," breaking "hard fruits with a stone," or letting "his teeth serve as a pestle," and to torture himself by various inflictions, such as standing a whole day on tiptoe, in the hot season sitting exposed to five fires—that is, as the commentators explain it, *four blazing around him with the sun above*—in the rainy season standing uncovered while the clouds pour down showers, and in the cold season wearing a humid vesture. This discipline having been increased gradually by harsher and harsher mortifications, so as to "dry up his bodily frame," he concludes his third stage by living "without external fire, without a mansion, wholly silent, sleeping on the bare earth, in the haunts of pious hermits, without one selfish affection; dwelling

at the roots of trees, and meditating especially on those chapters of the *Veda* which treat of the essence and attributes of God. Should these austerities, as is certainly not improbable, destroy his health and terminate in an incurable disease, the injunction is that he is to "advance in a straight path toward the invincible point, feeding on water and air, till his mortal frame totally decay, and his soul become united with the Supreme," for, it is added, "a Brahmin having shuffled off his body by any of those modes which great sages practised, and becoming void of sorrow and fear, rises to exaltation in the divine essence."

If the Brahmin survived the rigours of the forest life, he entered upon the fourth and last stage, in which, without quitting his solitude, he was to be exempted from all external observances, and spend his remaining years in preparing, by pious meditation, for absorption into the divine essence. "Delighted with meditating on the Supreme Spirit, sitting fixed in such meditation, without needing anything earthly, without one sensual desire, without any companion but his own soul, let him live in this world, seeking the bliss of the next." "Let him not wish for death; let him not wish for life; let him expect his appointed time, as a hired servant expects his wages." His body, described as "a mansion with bones for its rafters and beams; with nerves and tendons for cords; with muscles and blood for mortar; with skin for its outward covering—a mansion infested by age and by sorrow, the seat of malady, harassed with pains, haunted with the quality of darkness, and incapable of standing long," let him cheerfully quit "as a tree leaves the bank of a river when it falls in, or as a bird leaves the branch of a tree at his pleasure."

Such was the approved discipline of the Brahmin caste at the date of the *Institutes of Manu*, but many changes have been introduced by the lapse of time, and few if any individuals now profess to carry out that discipline in all its integrity. Any one of the four stages is now thought sufficient for a whole life; and the devotee selecting that which accords best with his own inclination, uses it as the means of founding a reputation for extraordinary sanctity; but the whole community pay no regard to the ancient regulations, and in practice at least hold them to be obsolete. To the privileges which separate them

from other classes, and maintain their ascendancy as an aristocracy, they still adhere; and to prevent intermixtures with inferior classes, repudiate marriage as illegal in cases in which it was originally sanctioned. It is no longer, however, deemed necessary to depend for subsistence on voluntary gifts or alms, and Brahmins are found in all trades and professions. Even service, stigmatized by Manu as *dog-living*, is not repudiated, except under circumstances where it is supposed to carry personal degradation along with it. The army, which is in some respects the most absolute and rigorous of all forms of service, is full of Brahmins; and agriculture, though necessarily requiring a large amount of that bodily labour which they are recommended to shun, is a favourite employment. Still, a decided preference is given to occupations in which intellectual rather than physical exertion is required. Teaching continues to be the most honourable source of income to those not actually deriving their maintenance from services connected with religion; and much of the business, public and private, which requires some degree of intellectual training, is in their hands.

This general adoption of secular employments naturally tends to detract from the sacred character with which the Brahmins were originally invested; and hence, it appears that in various parts of India, and more especially in Bengal, their influence as an hierarchy is impaired, and they have been to some extent superseded in their religious functions by various monastic orders, in which as a general rule all the distinctions of caste are ignored, and nothing but a common brotherhood is recognized, Brahmin and Sudra living together as members on a footing of perfect equality. Still, notwithstanding the formidable rivalry to which they are thus subjected, the Brahmins continue to insist on the superiority which their fabled origin is supposed to give them, and find a ready acquiescence in the great body of their countrymen, who not only look up to them with veneration, but would regard it as a species of sacrilege to call any of their privileges in question. Full advantage has been taken of this slavish temper, and the whole business of life has been so arranged as to make the presence, and consequently the payment of a Brahmin indispensable on almost every occasion. Hence multitudes of the privileged class manage to

spend their days in luxurious idleness, maintained either by the rents of lands which have been alienated to form permanent endowments in their favour, or the countless offerings which pilgrims and other deluded votaries are constantly pouring into their treasury. Even where no formal service is rendered or expected, mere liberality to Brahmins is held so meritorious as to expiate the guilt of many offences, and large sums annually expended in feasting and otherwise entertaining them are thought to be amply recompensed by the honour which the presence of such guests confers, or the blessings temporal and spiritual which they have it in their power to bestow on those who befriend them. This extravagant deference to the Brahminical caste is sometimes manifested in ludicrous forms, and the water in which a Brahmin has dipped his toe, or the dust which has been gathered from his foot is not unfrequently set aside, and carefully preserved, under the idea that by such contact valuable properties have been conferred upon it.

Originally all Brahmins were, in accordance with their common origin, equal in privilege and dignity. Their superiority to the other classes was determined by the pre-eminence of that part of Brahma which produced them; but in regard to each other there were no primeval diversities on which claims of precedence could be founded. In course of time, however, this equality disappeared. Some individuals surpassing others in the qualities which were held in highest estimation were naturally looked up to as leaders, and became the founders of families, which boasting of their descent, considered themselves entitled to stand above the common level of their class. In this way all the usual distinctions of rank have been introduced, and the Brahmins, instead of continuing to form a single homogeneous class, have been broken up into numerous sections, which, if not actually hostile, differ so widely from each other, that they have no social intercourse. The first great distinction between Brahmins is of a religious nature. They are all under obligation to maintain a perpetual fire, but the great majority of them disregard the obligation, while the minority who perform it, pluming themselves on their superior sanctity, are distinguished by the name of Agnihotras. The next distinction is genealogical, and classes all Brahmins under the two great heads of

Gaur and Dravira, each of them composed of five distinct races, and located respectively in Hindustan and the Deccan. The five Gaur races, arranged according to the territories presumed to have been their original seats, stand thus:—

1. Kanyakubja, or Kanouj; 2. Saraswat, or the North-west of India; 3. Gaur, or Bengal; 4. Mithila, or North Bihar; and,
5. Utkala, or Orissa. Among the Draviras, in like manner, the whole of the Deccan, together with Gujarat, is parcelled out. Each of these races is again subdivided, and forms numerous ramifications, which it would be vain to attempt to trace. As a specimen it may suffice to mention that the Brahmins of Kanouj alone count 156 distinct families.

In practice, the most important of all the distinctions at present subsisting among Brahmins is that of rank, which, in so far as regards those of Bengal, has the following fabulous origin ascribed to it:—A king of the name of Ballal Sen, who reigned about six centuries ago, observing the strict fidelity of some Brahmins in performing the obligations of their class, and the comparative laxity or total neglect manifested by others, determined to give them rank corresponding to their merits, and with this view divided them into three orders. Those entitled to the first rank, and on this account distinguished by the name of Kulinas, or nobles, behoved to possess nine eminent qualifications. They were, first, to be strict in Brahminical observances; secondly, meek; thirdly, learned; fourthly, of good report; fifthly, frequenters of holy places; sixthly, repudiators of gifts from the impure; seventhly, without deceit; eighthly, addicted to devotional austerities; and, lastly, liberal. The second rank was assigned to those who, without possessing the qualifications of the first, had been regularly initiated into all the rites necessary to constitute a complete Brahmin, and were, moreover, well read in the *Vedas*. They were distinguished by the name of Shrotriyas. The third and lowest place was held, under the name of Vangshagas, by those who, though entitled to rank as Brahmins in respect of descent, had nothing else to recommend them.

If Ballal Sen was right in the original selection of the Kulinas, there must have been a great and rapid degeneracy in their descendants; for the modern Kulinas, while as a body they still

retain their precedence, are generally destitute of the qualifications by which their progenitors acquired it, and employ the influence and privileges of their rank, not in purifying, but in corrupting public morals. Placed, as it were, on the very pinnacle of society, and privileged on all occasions to occupy the seat of honour, they are naturally courted by all other ranks, and it becomes an object of the highest ambition to become connected with them by intermarriage. The Kulinas have managed to turn this feeling to good account. The more respectable of them disdain to make a traffic of affinity, and are generally contented with two wives; but the others are less scrupulous, and consider from fifteen to twenty as a moderate allowance. Forty to fifty is not uncommon, and Mr. Ward had heard of some who had 120. Were these wives taken to their husband's house to form a harem, the injury to public morals though great would not assume its most malignant form; but the remarkable peculiarity is, that after the ceremony is performed, they continue to reside in the homes of their parents, and see their husbands, if at all, only at distant intervals. Even then the visit is only for etiquette, or it may be for some mercenary purpose. On such occasions the father of the wife is expected to make a present to the husband, who, mean enough to take advantage of the custom, makes his round of visits from house to house where each wife resides, and in this way gains a subsistence. It is easy to conceive how much licentiousness and crime such a system must engender. The woman tied for life to a man to whom she owes no affection, because she receives none, takes advantage of the freedom from restraint which the nominal relation confers, and not unfrequently, with the full knowledge of her parents, admits a paramour. When concealment becomes necessary, infanticide, or the crime which anticipates it, are the usual means adopted. Often, from another cause, where no marriage has taken place, similar atrocities prevail.

The Kulina is permitted by the rules of his order to give his son in marriage to the daughter of a Shrotriya, and often has little difficulty in finding fathers-in-law, who value the honour so highly as to be willing to pay largely for it. By a strange perversion he can marry his daughter only to a person of his own rank, and hence, as in many cases such husbands cannot

be found, daughters are too often regarded as an incumbrance, and if not prematurely cut off by the crimes already referred to, are in thousands of instances left to seek a maintenance by the most infamous means. According to Mr. Ward, "the houses of ill-fame at Calcutta, and other large places, contain multitudes of the daughters of Kooleenu Bramhuns, so entirely degraded are these favourites of Bullalsanu!"

We have dwelt at some length on the Brahminical caste, not merely because it is the most important, but because it furnishes, both in theory and practice, a general model of the whole system. In treating of the other regular classes a few remarks will suffice. Indeed, if we are to believe the Brahmins, the Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, the only classes which, from the privileges possessed by them, could have been regarded as their rivals, have entirely disappeared. In the *Institutes of Manu* they hold a place which is distinctly marked, and are fully instructed in the peculiar duties and privileges belonging to them. The one was the representative of power, the other of wealth; and, though the Brahmin only could expound the *Veda*, both of them were entitled to read it, and to offer sacrifice. In regard to initiatory rites, too, the discipline to which they were subjected, if inferior to that of the Brahmins, bore a marked resemblance to it in its leading features. The ceremonies performed before birth were common to all the three classes; in due time, after birth, they all received the tonsure, and at a later period they had all the privilege of becoming *dwija*, or twice born, by being invested with the *poita*, or sacrificial thread. This thread, or rather triple cord, worn over the left shoulder, and, after crossing the back, tied into a knot under the right arm, is now regarded by Brahmins as their distinguishing badge, but was anciently common to them with the other two twice-born classes, the only difference being, that while that of a Brahmin was of cotton, that of a Kshatriya was of *sana* thread only, that of a Vaisya of woollen thread. The Brahmins, perhaps galled by the approach thus made to them by the two immediately inferior classes, have taken the most effectual means of suppressing them. The key of knowledge being exclusively in their hands, they have made it subservient to their own aggrandizement, by carefully preserving evidence sufficient to

establish the purity of their own descent, while they have allowed that which would have been available for the same purpose to the Kshatriyas and Vaisyas to perish. A great gap has thus been made in the social edifice. The intervening gradations having been destroyed, the Brahmin seated on the pinnacle seems to have attained a prouder elevation, while he looks down and sees nothing between him and the Sudra at its base.

The assertion that the classes of Kshatriyas and Vaisyas have become extinct by intermixtures which have destroyed their purity and reduced them all to the level of Sudras, has not been tamely acquiesced in. Some of the industrious classes still claim relation to the original Vaisyas; while the whole nation of Rajputs strenuously insist that the military spirit for which they continue to be distinguished, has been transmitted to them by uninterrupted succession from those who first derived it from the arm of Brahma. In one respect, however, the Brahmins have prevailed. Perhaps, by way of compromise, those claiming to be pure Kshatriyas have contented themselves with maintaining only those of their privileges which are strictly military. Those of an intellectual and spiritual nature, which gave them access to the *Vedas*, they have tacitly resigned, and the Brahmins have in consequence gained all for which they were disposed to contend, by becoming not only the authorized expounders, but the sole depositaries of all knowledge, human and divine.

The Sudras had less inducement than any of the other classes to guard the purity of their descent. They were, in fact, slaves, and having no privileges to maintain, must have been anxious only to escape from bondage. The existence of pure Sudras in the present day is therefore very questionable, though not only individual families in different parts of India, but the whole nation of the Marathas claim alliance with them. If the latter claim is correct they have not only overcome the disadvantages of their original position, but risen to be the founders of reigning dynasties. Nothing can be more humiliating than the terms applied to them throughout the *Institutes of Manu*. While "the first part of a Brahmin's compound name should indicate holiness—of a Kshatriya's, power—of a Vaisya's, wealth," that of a Sudra's should only indicate "contempt." He was to be excluded

"from every sacred observance of the twice-born classes." So full of pollution was he, that the very sight of him was to be carefully avoided when a youth of the twice-born classes was to be invested with the sacrificial cord; the *Veda* could not even be read while he was present; and the Brahmin who should presume to teach it to him committed an offence so heinous that it could only be expiated in hell. Though he had the power he was not to acquire wealth, "since a servile man who has amassed riches gives pain even to Brahmins." This prohibition, in fact, was only adding insult to injury, for it elsewhere appears that the thing here forbidden was to him absolutely impossible, since a Brahmin might, without hesitation, seize the goods of his Sudra slave, inasmuch as "that slave can have no property."

The same injustice and inhumanity are conspicuous in everything that concerns the Sudra. Even the possibility of ameliorating his condition is denied him, for it is expressly declared that "a Sudra, though emancipated by his master, is not released from a state of servitude; for of a state which is natural to him, by whom can he be divested?" This interminable bondage, however, has happily passed away, and the modern Sudra is no longer a slave. If in service, his master, even though a Brahmin, must pay him stipulated wages, and if he prefers a different mode of life other occupations are open to him. He may engage in agriculture, which seems to be regarded as his appropriate calling; if of a more martial temper he becomes a soldier; even intellectual employment is no longer beyond his reach, and individuals of his class, known by the name of Kayets, have long been successful rivals of the Brahmins in all kinds of business requiring the use of the pen.

Though the number of original castes was only four, it was impossible in the natural course of things that others should not be formed by intermarriages or less legitimate connections. The arrangements made for maintaining purity of descent, how minute soever they might be, could not provide for every imaginable case, and therefore even from the very first concessions were made, from which a mixture of castes necessarily followed. A Brahmin could only have the daughter of a Brahmin for his first wife, but he might choose to have a second. In that case a greater latitude was allowed, and a selection from either

of the two next classes was held to be legitimate. In like manner a Kshatriya might marry a Vaisya, and a Vaisya a Sudra; but in these cases the offspring did not take the full rank of the father, but were held to be degraded to a middle rank between that of both parents. In regard to females the prohibitions were more rigid, for a woman could never marry beneath her own rank, and a low man making "love to a damsel of high birth" was to be punished corporally. Still, however severe the penalty, inclination and passion would often disregard it, and thus while even from legitimate connections degraded races were produced, others in almost endless variety resulted from connections which the law refused to recognize. "A Brahmin," says Manu, "if he takes a Sudra to his bed, sinks to the regions of torment;" and a Brahmini or female Brahmin cohabiting with a Sudra could give birth only to Chandalas, stigmatized as "the lowest of mortals." Such connections, however, were in fact formed, and children were produced, who, in their turn, became the parents of "very many despicable and abject races, even more foul than their begetters."

The variety of castes originating in these and similar connections has in course of time been almost indefinitely multiplied. At first difference of caste served only to indicate difference of race; but now, though this object is not overlooked, the great purpose which it serves is to regulate the kind of employment which each individual is destined to follow. To every caste a particular occupation is exclusively assigned; and thus, all trades and professions being regarded as hereditary, are transmitted without interruption from father to son in the same tribes or families. It is hence easy to see that the number of castes being as unlimited as that of the modes of employment, an enumeration of them is as difficult as it would be superfluous. Mr. Ward, speaking only of those of Bengal, gives a detailed list of forty-one, and concludes by saying that more might be added. This is indeed perfectly obvious, as almost every name in the list is that of a genus including under it several subdivisions as species. For instance, the Tati caste, or weavers, forming the tenth in the list, and said to have originated from a male Sudra and a female Kshatriya, includes six divisions, which, notwithstanding their common progenitors, refuse either to eat or to inter-

marry with each other. In like manner we have castes with subdivisions under the names of Kasaris, or workers and dealers in brass; Aguris, or farmers; Napitas, or barbers; Modakas, or confectioners; Kumbhakaras, or potters; Malakalas, or sellers of flowers &c. All of these born to their trade must strictly adhere to it, however little they may be disposed to it by inclination or suited to it by capacity.

This system of caste, accompanied with hereditary occupation, may have the effect of securing superiority of workmanship. The whole mind being employed on one branch of trade, and not permitted to look beyond it, must in a manner concentrate its faculties so as to devise the best means of performing the appointed task, while the bodily powers constantly engaged in the same operation must, as in the ordinary case of a minute division of labour, attain to great mechanical skill. These advantages, however, poorly compensate for the numerous evils with which they are inseparably connected. The mechanical skill which an hereditary weaver acquires, and the beautiful fabric which he produces by means of a loom of the simplest and rudest structure, cannot be viewed without some degree of admiration; but how soon is that admiration turned into regret when it is considered that the same invariable routine has been followed for ages, and that improvement has not only not been attempted, but if attempted would have been fiercely and fanatically resisted. Every man's boast is, that he does exactly as his father did before him; and thus amid a general stagnation of intellect, society is not permitted to take a single step in advance. There may be some truth in the observation, that if caste is unfavourable to progress it also tends to prevent degeneracy, and that hence, while other nations without caste have retrograded, India has maintained its ancient civilization. Dubois adopting this idea goes so far as to say, "I consider the institution of caste among the Hindu nations as the happiest effort of their legislation; and I am well convinced that if the people of India never sunk into a state of barbarism, and if, when almost all Asia was plunged in that dreary gulf, India kept up her head, preserved and extended the sciences, the arts, and civilization, it is wholly to the distinction of castes that she is indebted for

that high celebrity."¹ Again, "I have found out no cause that can have prevented the Hindus from falling into the barbarous state in which all the nations bordering on them, as well as most others that are spread over the globe under the torrid zone remain, unless it be the division into castes, which, by assigning to every individual in the state his profession and employment, by perpetuating the system from father to son, from generation to generation, prevents the possibility of any member of the state or his descendants giving up the condition or pursuit which the law has assigned him for any other."² In this extravagant eulogy most readers will recognize the prejudices of the church to which Dubois belonged, and in which uniformity and perpetuity are too apt to be mistaken for perfection and infallibility. Mr. Ward, the Protestant missionary, spoke more wisely when he said, "The institution of the caste, so far from having contributed to the happiness of society, has been one of its greatest scourges. It is the formation of artificial orders, independently of merit or demerit, dooming nine-tenths of the people, before birth, to a state of mental and bodily degradation, in which they are for ever shut out from all the learning and honours of the country."³

It is impossible to believe that those doomed by the misfortune of their birth to the lowest castes can be satisfied with their social position, and yet it must be confessed that even in their estimation the loss of caste is the greatest calamity that could befall them. By every individual, high and low, the very idea of becoming an outcast is regarded with horror. It amounts in fact to civil death, and not unfrequently where the loss of caste has been incurred, actual death, by suicide, has been resorted to as a relief from the frightful consequences. Were the penalty inflicted as the punishment of crime, it might have operated as a kind of security for good behaviour, but unfortunately in the great majority of cases it is not crime that is thus punished, but acts perfectly innocent in themselves; acts, too, done, it may be, not of express design but unintentionally, through mere inadvertence, or perhaps through sheer

¹ Dubois, *Description of the Character, Manners, and Customs of India*, 4to page 14.

² *Ibid.*, page 15.

³ Ward, *Account of the Writings, Religion, and Manners of the Hindoos*, Serampore, 4to, vol. ii. page 125.

necessity. "What," asks Mr. Ward, "is the crime for which a person forfeits his caste, and becomes an exile and an outcast for ever? Perhaps he has been found eating with a virtuous friend; or he has married the woman of his choice; or he has resided in other countries on business, and has been compelled by the nature of his situation to eat food not cooked by persons of his own caste. For these, or other reasons, the caste proscribes him from his father's house, and if his mother consent to talk with him, it must be by stealth, or at a distance from what was once his home, into which he must never more enter. Hence the caste converts hospitality, friendship, and the very love of one's neighbour into crimes, and inflicts on the offender in some cases punishment worse than death itself."¹ It is true that the loss is not always final, and that by means of mummeries and mortifications, and more especially by a liberal expenditure in the form of gifts or bribes to those who have influence in the expelling caste, the offending member may be restored. Cases, however, occur which are deemed too heinous to admit of expiatory remedies. Among these it cannot be forgotten that an abandonment of the native superstitions holds a principal place, and consequently that it is impossible for a Hindu to embrace Christianity without becoming a martyr in the highest sense of the term. The sacrifices he must make equal, if they do not exceed those which were required from the converts of the primitive church, and hence the distinction of caste has raised up an almost insuperable barrier in the way of the Christian missionary. The practical consequence is, that among the outcasts of Hinduism are to be found some of the noblest specimens of humanity—men whom no fear of temporal loss has deterred from throwing off the shackles of a degrading superstition, and making an open profession of the gospel. It must be confessed, however, that hitherto such specimens have been rare, and that the great majority of those who have lost caste justify, by their utter worthlessness, the sentence of exclusion which has been passed upon them. As a general rule, on being expelled from the society of their fellows, they lose all self-respect, and abandon themselves without restraint to every species of wickedness.

¹ *Account of the writings, Religion, and Manners of the Hindoos*, ii. p. 129.

2

The Religion of the Hindus

OF ALL nations, ancient and modern, there is none among whom religion occupies so prominent a place as among the Hindus. Its language is constantly on their lips, and its ceremonies mingle with all their daily avocations. Almost every natural object on which their eye falls is in some way associated with it; and on every side are beheld shrines and pagodas, in which the objects of its worship are supposed to be more immediately present. Its whole theological system, too, instead of being transmitted by such an imperfect vehicle as oral tradition, has been consigned to written volumes, believed to have been communicated by divine revelation, and therefore to contain truth without any mixture of error. To these volumes of course the ultimate appeal must be made, and therefore, whenever the object is to ascertain what the Hindu religion is, at least in theory, it is only necessary to ask, What saith the *Veda*? By this name, meaning "science," the volumes composing the Hindu scriptures are designated. They are chiefly composed of four works, distinguished by the names of *Rig-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda*, *Sama-Veda*, and *Atharva-Veda*, written in a form of Sanskrit so ancient, and so different from its more modern form, that only the more learned of the Brahmins understand them. It is impossible to say when they were first committed to writing; but it is admitted that as they now exist they are a compilation made from the original materials by an individual who has ever since been known by the name of Vyasa, or Vedavyasa, meaning "compiler of the *Veda*." He is supposed to have flourished in the twelfth or fourteenth century before the Christian era. The contents of the *Vedas* have not yet been thoroughly examined, but

enough has been translated to prove that the system of religion which they teach does not countenance the numerous extravagances which have been engrafted on it, and which give to modern Hinduism many of its most revolting features. In several texts a pure monotheism seems to be taught, since it is repeatedly declared that "there is in truth but one Deity, the Supreme Spirit, the Lord of the universe, whose work is the universe." This monotheistic theory does not seem, however, to be consistently maintained, for mention is made of numerous gods who ought to be worshipped, and have power to reward their worshippers.

Next to the *Vedas*, as a source of religious information, are the *Institutes of Manu*, which, though later in date, must have been composed before the system taught in them had undergone any essential change, and are understood to contain a faithful abstract of it. From this work, therefore, till the contents of the *Vedas* are better known, the true character of the primitive Hindu theology will be best obtained. In its opening passage, Manu, who seems to be a personification of deity, rather than a real existence, is represented as sitting "reclined, with his attention fixed on one object." The divine sages approach, and "after mutual salutations in due form" thus address him, "Deign, sovereign Ruler, to apprise us of the sacred laws, in their order, as they must be followed by all the classes, and by each of them in their several degrees, together with the duties of every mixed class; for thou, Lord, only knowest the true sense, the first principle, the prescribed ceremonies of this universal, supernatural *Veda*, unlimited in extent, and unequalled in authority." Manu, complying with their request, begins thus:—"This universe existed only in darkness, imperceptible, undefinable, undiscoverable by reason, undiscovered, as if it were wholly immersed in sleep. Then the self-existing power, himself undiscerned, but making this world discernible, with five elements, and other principles, appeared with undiminished glory, dispelling the gloom. He, whom the mind alone can perceive, whose essence eludes the external organs, who has no visible parts, who exists from eternity, even He, the soul of all beings, whom no being can comprehend, shone forth in person. He having willed to produce

various beings from his own divine substance, first with a thought created the waters, and placed in them a productive seed, which became an egg, bright as gold, blazing like the luminary with a thousand beams, and in that egg he was born himself, the great forefather of all spirits."

Having proceeded thus far, Manu stops to explain that the waters were called *nara*, because they were the production of Nara (or the spirit of God), and that because they were his first *ayana* (or place of motion), he is named Narayana (or moving on the waters) and then continues:—"From that which is, the first cause, not the object of sense, existing, not existing, without beginning or end, was produced the divine male, famed in all worlds under the appellation of Brahma. In that egg the great power sat inactive a whole year, at the close of which, by his thought alone, he caused the egg to divide itself; and from its two divisions he framed the heaven and the earth; in the midst the subtile ether, the eight regions, and the permanent receptacle of waters." The material world having been thus created by Brahma, "from the supreme soul he drew forth mind, existing substantially, though unperceived by sense, immaterial, and consciousness, the internal monitor, the ruler."

What follows is so indistinct and elliptical that a gap in the original may be suspected; and therefore without continuing to quote, it will be sufficient to give the substance of what is most remarkable in the subsequent part of this account of the creation. Brahma having produced the great soul and all vital forms, the perceptions of sense, and the five organs of sensation, and pervaded "with emanations from the supreme Spirit, the minutest portion of six principles immensely operative," framed all creatures, and assigned to them "distinct names, distinct acts, and distinct occupations." Supreme over all, "he created an assemblage of inferior deities, with divine attributes and pure souls, and a number of genii exquisitely delicate." From fire, from air, and from the sun, he "milked out the three primordial *Vedas*," gave being "to time and the divisions of time, to the stars also, and to the planets, to rivers, oceans, and mountains, to level plains and uneven valleys; to devotion, speech, complacency, desire, and wrath," and to creation generally, for all came into existence simply because "He willed" it. Moreover,

for the sake of distinguishing actions, he "made a total difference between right and wrong," and inured sentient creatures "to pleasure and pain, and other opposite pairs." Thus all was "composed in fit order," for "in whatever occupation the supreme Lord first employed any vital soul, to that occupation the same soul attaches itself spontaneously, when it receives a new body again and again; whatever quality, noxious or innocent, harsh or mild, unjust or just, false or true, he conferred on any being the same quality enters it: as the seasons of the year attain respectively their peculiar marks, in due time and of their own accord, even so the several acts of each embodied spirit."

In the above account man is not distinctly mentioned, but the apparent omission is now supplied by the following abrupt announcement:—"That the human race might be multiplied, He caused the Brahmin, the Kshatriya, the Vaisya, and the Sudra to proceed from his mouth, his arm, his thigh, and his foot." In what shape they came forth, whether singly or in pairs of male and female, is not explained; but the latter may be inferred from its being immediately added, that "having divided his own substance, the mighty Power became half male half female." This statement, however, is not made for the purpose of accounting for the difference of sex in human beings, but of founding a very extraordinary claim by Manu himself. Brahma, we are told, from the female portion of him produced a male called Viraj, and this Viraj is solemnly declared to be Manu's own father. "Know me," says Manu, addressing the sages who were consulting him, "know me to be that person whom the male power, having performed austere devotion, produced by himself." This statement, startling as it is, is followed by another still more startling, in which Manu, ascribing to himself creative power, says, "It was I who, desirous of giving birth to a race of men, performed very difficult religious duties, and first produced ten lords of created beings eminent in holiness." After giving their names he continues thus:—"They, abundant in glory, produced seven other Manus, together with deities, and the mansions of deities, and *Maharshis*, or great sages unlimited in power; benevolent genii and fierce giants, bloodthirsty savages, heavenly quirksters, nymphs and

demons, huge serpents and snakes of smaller size, birds of mighty wing, and separate companies of *Pitris*, or progenitors of mankind; lightning and thunderbolts, clouds and coloured bows of Indra, falling meteors, earth-rending vapours, comets, and luminaries of various degrees; horse-faced sylvans, apes, fish, and a variety of birds, tame cattle, deer, men, and ravenous beasts with two rows of teeth; small and large reptiles, moths, lice, fleas, and common flies, with every biting gnat and immoveable substances of distinct sorts. Thus was this whole assembly of stationary and moveable bodies framed by those high-minded beings, through the force of their own devotion, and at my command, with separate actions allotted to each."

Having described two creations—a primary by Brahma, and a secondary by himself, Manu asserts that, what he calls "this tremendous world of beings," is always tending to decay, and gives an explanation of the mode in which its final dissolution is accomplished. "He whose powers are incomprehensible having thus created both me and this universe, was again absorbed in the supreme Spirit, changing time for time. When that Power awakes, then has this world its full expansion; but when he slumbers with a tranquil spirit, then the whole system fades away; for while he reposes in calm sleep, embodied spirits, endued with principles of action, depart from their several acts, and the mind itself becomes inert; and when they once are absorbed in that supreme essence, then the divine soul of all beings withdraws his energy and placidly slumbers; then, too, this vital soul, with all the organs of sense and of action, remains long immersed in darkness, and performs not its natural functions, but migrates from its corporeal frame; when being composed of minute elementary principles, it enters at once into vegetable or animal seed, it then assumes form. Thus that immutable Power, by waking and reposing alternately, revivifies and destroys in eternal succession this whole assemblage of locomotive and immoveable creatures."

Manu, after this description, prepares to quit the scene. His code of law, made known to him fully "in the beginning" by Brahma, he taught to the "ten lords of created beings" whom he had produced, and to one of those, Bhrigu, who had learned

to recite the whole of it, he assigns the task of communicating it to the sages "without omission." Bhṛigu accordingly becomes the narrator, and continues thus:—"From this Manu, named Swayambhuva, came six descendants, other Manus, each giving birth to a race of his own, all exalted in dignity, eminent in power." The duration of the reign of a Manu or his *Manwantara*, is calculated as follows:—The sun by his alternate presence and absence, gives mortals their day and night. A month of mortals is a day and a night of the *Pūris* (or inhabitants of the moon). The division being into two equal halves, "the half beginning from the full moon is their day for actions, and that beginning from the new moon is their night for slumber." A year of mortals "is a day and night of the gods," their day being "the northern, and their night the southern course of the sun." Four thousand years of the gods form a *yuga* or age of mortals; but the whole four *yugas*—the *satya*, *trēta*, *dwapara*, and *kali*—are necessary to form an age of the gods, which, of course, includes 12,000 divine years. Multiply this age of the gods by seventy-one, and you have the duration of a *Manwantara*. It is added that "there are numberless *Manwantaras*, creations also, and destructions of worlds." The Being "supremely exalted performs all this as if in sport again and again," and has ample scope for working, because it takes a thousand ages of the gods to form a single day, and another thousand to form a single night of Brahma.

In the above Hindu cosmogony there is much vagueness and extravagance, and we look in vain for anything so explicit as the first verse of Genesis:—"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth;" or so sublime as its third verse: "God said, Let there be light, and there was light." It is not to be denied, however, that it contrasts favourably with all other heathen cosmogonies, and in some instances so closely resembles the Mosaic record, not only in thought but in language, as to leave little doubt that it has incorporated with its fables fragments of the earliest truths communicated by primitive revelation to the human race. The one object on which Manu had his attention fixed when the divine sages accosted him, is explained by commentators to have been the supreme God, and must not be confounded with Brahma, who had not a formal existence till

he was born as a divine male in the mundane egg. If born, he was not himself the "self-existing power," "the first cause," "without beginning or end." To whom, then, or what do these epithets apply? The answer is, Not to Brahma, who at first male, afterwards subdivides so as to become female; but to Brahm, an antecedent mysterious essence not possessed of any gender, and therefore usually described as neuter. The existence of Brahm as the one sole universal Lord is undoubtedly taught in the *Vedas* as a fundamental article of the Hindu creed, and the Brahmins, who claim to be the exclusive expounders of this creed, confidently appeal to this article when they would prove that they are monotheists and not idolaters. This much may be conceded to them—that if they are idolaters, they sin against a clearer light, for it would be easy to produce passages in which the divine perfections are described in terms which even a Christian need not repudiate. Take the following specimen quoted by Sir William Jones, from a learned Brahmin:—"Perfect truth; perfect happiness; without equal; immortal; absolute unity; whom neither speech can describe, nor mind comprehend; all-pervading; all-transcending; delighted with his own boundless intelligence; not limited by space or time; without feet moving swiftly; without hands grasping all worlds; without eyes, all-surveying; without ears, all-hearing; without an intelligent guide, understanding all; without cause, the first of all causes; all ruling; all-powerful; the creator, preserver, transformer of all things; such is the Great One."

Striking as the above passage is, there is a very serious defect in it. The description is true so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. It speaks only of the natural perfections of God, and says nothing of His moral perfections, though it is by these alone that any practical relation between the Creator and his creatures is established. This is not an accidental omission, but forms an essential feature in Hindu theology; and hence, the only inference that can be drawn from its loftiest descriptions of deity is, that it would be vain to worship him. Seated at an immeasurable distance, and wholly absorbed in his own perfections, he regards the actions of men with perfect indifference. It is even doubtful if he has any proper personality, for when the language in which he is described is strictly analyzed,

many of the attributes ascribed to him prove to be abstract qualities and imaginary potentialities existing in some inexplicable manner apart from any essence. The universe itself, instead of being the voluntary production of Brahm, thus becomes identified with him, and the theory of monotheism is set aside to make way for that of pantheism.

The practical result is that, while individuals of a philosophical and contemplative turn of mind profess to adhere to the original doctrine of the *Vedas*, the great mass of the population have rushed headlong into idolatry of the most extravagant and grovelling description. Every thing animate and inanimate, real or fancied, has been converted into a god, and the Hindu pantheon now boasts of being able to muster 330,000,000 deities. It is almost needless to observe that multitudes of these are duplicates and endless repetitions of the same beings or objects, under a variety of names; and that it is possible, after discarding the common herd, to give a sufficient view of the polytheism of the Hindus by selecting for description only a few of the more celebrated divinities. The first place, of course, belongs to the Trimurti or Triad, consisting of Brahma, the creator; Vishnu, the preserver; and Siva, the destroyer. These three have sometimes been supposed to constitute a trinity in the ordinary sense of the term, and hence to present a singular coincidence with the Christian doctrine of one Godhead in three Persons or hypostases. It seems, however, to be established that the three are regarded as only separate forms, which the one supreme god assumes, according as he is employed in creating, preserving, or destroying. According to the Brahmins this is the orthodox view; but the popular idea is very different, and worshippers, so far from recognizing the identity or even the equality of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, have become ranged in hostile sects, among which the main distinction is the place which they assign to each as supreme or subordinate. In the contests which have thus arisen Brahma has fared worst. As creator, the primary place originally belonged to him, and in the usual representations of the triad, in which three heads are figured as rising from one body, he occupies the centre of the group, with the whole face displayed, while the other two, one on each side, are only in profile; but this barren honour is all that is left him, and while

his colleagues count their shrines by thousands and their votaries by millions, he cannot boast of a single temple dedicated to him. In the temples of others a place is occasionally assigned to him, and he is seen standing or squatted, with a body usually painted red, and differing from the human only by the possession of four heads and four arms. The heads are encircled with an aureola or glory, and in the hands are held respectively a book, understood to be the *Veda*, a spoon for sacrifice, a water-jug for ablution, and a rosary, used by Hindus just as in the Church of Rome, for counting prayers. Beside him often stands his *vahan* or vehicle, in the form of a goose.

Each of the triad gods is provided with a *sakti* or consort, through whom far more than by himself his energy is exerted. That of Brahma is Saraswati, who is figured as a white woman standing on a lotus, or riding on a peacock, with a lute in her hand. She is regarded as the goddess of learning, poetry, and music, and is more fortunate than her husband in worshippers, who hold an annual festival in her honour, and present at her shrine perfumes, flowers, and rice. Of the sons whom she bore to Brahma, the principal are—Viswakarma, who, as the architect of heaven, performs the same part as Vulcan among the Greeks; Narada, who, as the messenger of the gods, is the subject of many legends; and Swayambhuva, in whom, as the first and chief of the Manus, Sir Willam Jones finds traces of identity with Adam. A leading feature in Hindu mythology is the appearance of the gods in human form. Of this *avatar* or incarnation, Brahma furnishes only one remarkable example in Daksha, who gave his daughter in marriage to Siva, and having afterwards lost his head in a quarrel with his son-in-law had it replaced by that of a he-goat. In this monstrous form, brutish and human, he is still seen.

Vishnu, holding the second place in the triad, is usually represented as a comely placid youth, richly dressed. The only thing monstrous about him is his four arms. In one hand he holds a club, in another a discus or quoit, in another a chank or wreathed shell, and in another a lotus. His *vahan*, named Garuda, is in the form of a youth, with the wings and beak of a bird. He has two wives, Lakshmi and Satyavama. The former is his favourite, and he is sometimes seen sitting on a throne

of lotus, with one of his arms around her. His name occurs seldom in the *Veda*, and not at all in the *Institutes of Manu*; but he has myriads of worshippers in every quarter, and has furnished by his *avatars* the subject of many of the most remarkable legends in Hindu mythology and literature. According to what is called the orthodox view he ought to yield precedence to Brahma; but most of his worshippers, assuming in his honour the name of Vaishnavas, insist not only on giving him the first place, but in usurping for him the peculiar offices of the other members of the triad, and making them in fact not his equals but his creatures. He thus figures not only as preserver but as creator, destroyer, and renovator, and under names so numerous, that at least a thousand are counted as invested exclusively with all the attributes of the sole supreme deity. In one representation, while he floats on the surface of the primeval waters, reclining, with Lakshmi at his feet, on the serpent Shesha, or Ananta, a well-known symbol of eternity, he gives birth to Brahma, who is seen emerging from the centre of his body on the top of a lotus. The superiority thus claimed for him derives no countenance from the *Vedas*, but is fully developed in several of the mythological poems, called *Puranas*, which, though of later date and less venerable authority, are in much greater repute with modern Hindus. The legend on which the above representation is founded is given by Kennedy¹ from the *Kurma Purana*, and, as a specimen of the kind of fables by which the Vaishnavas establish the supremacy of their favourite divinity, deserves to be quoted. For explanation, it is necessary to mention that both Kurma, who narrates the legend, and the Narayana, with the mention of whom it opens, are here meant to be only different forms of Vishnu. Kurma in a long discourse, addressing three sages or Brahmins, continues thus:—

“All was one tremendous ocean in which Narayana, with a thousand heads and a thousand eyes, reposing on Shesha, slumbered profoundly; and while thus immersed in mysterious sleep the thought of creation arose in his mind. Instant, then, in divine and wondrous sport, a lotus sprang from his pure navel; expanding to the distance of 100 *yajans*, refulgent as the

¹ Colonel Vans Kennedy, *Researches into the Nature and Affinity of Ancient and Hindoo Mythology*, 4to, pages 206, 207.

young sun, blooming with sacred petals and filaments, and diffusing celestial fragrance; and from this lotus, after a long time had elapsed, was produced Brahma. Bewildered by illusion he immediately approached the universal Lord, and, awakening him with his hand, thus addressed him in gentle accents:—‘In this tremendous, unpeopled, and darkness-involved ocean, why, O Lord, dost thou repose solitary and alone?’ Vishnu smiling replied, in a voice loud as the clashing of clouds, ‘O excellent being! Know that I am Narayana, the one God, the Lord of all things; and behold in me the creator of the universe, and the great father of all animated beings; but who art thou?’ Brahma replied, ‘I am Dhata, Vidhata, Swayambhu, Brahma, the origin of the *Vedas*.’ On hearing these words, Vishnu, by means mysterious, entered the body of Brahma, and within it beheld comprised the three worlds, with angels, demons, and men, and having then issued from his mouth, Vishnu thus addressed Brahma: ‘Now, O Lord, enter within me, and behold thou also the three worlds.’ Having heard this agreeable speech, Brahma immediately entered within Vishnu, and there viewed with wonder this universe and all that it contains. But while he wandered, contemplating it, Vishnu closed the gates, and Brahma could find no exit except through the stem of the lotus, from which he had been produced; and then seated on its flower, he thus addressed Vishnu in a voice loud as the clashing of clouds: ‘What, O Lord! hast thou, desirous of victory, now done? but I am the sole omnipotent being: there is no other than me, and no one therefore can overcome me.’ To pacify him Vishnu thus replied in gentle words: ‘O Brahma! it was not through malice that I closed the gates, but merely through sport; for who can oppose Pitamaha, the god of gods? But since thou hast been produced by me, thou shalt be considered as my son, and shall be named the *Lotus-born*.’ Brahma replied: ‘There is but one God, the supreme Lord of all things; how then can there be two, and Narayana and Brahma be each that Lord?’ Vishnu then said: ‘Who can acknowledge the supremacy of Brahma, when I alone am without beginning and end, and the sole supreme being? Therefore, O Brahma! seek protection from me’. Pitamaha with anger thus replied: ‘O Lord! I know myself to be supreme, imperishable, the creator of the universe, the most

excellent recipient; and nowhere can there be found any other supreme God than me. Dispel therefore thy slumber, and know thyself.' Having heard these angry words, Vishnu thus spoke: 'O Brahma, why art thou thus deceived by illusion; and perceivest not the real truth that I alone am the supreme Lord?' "

Singularly enough, on this occasion neither of the contending deities proves victor, for, in the midst of the strife, Siva suddenly makes his appearance, and compels both to confess that in claiming supremacy they were trenching on his prerogative.

Vishnu is in many respects the most attractive deity of the triad. His heaven, called Vaikuntha, is 80,000 miles in circuit, and entirely of gold. Precious stones form its pillars as well as the ornaments of its buildings, which are constructed of jewels. Crystal showers descending upon it form a magnificent river, and feed numerous fine lakes, the surfaces of which are covered with water lilies—blue, red, and white, some of them with a hundred and others with a thousand petals. On a seat glorious as the meridian sun, sits Vishnu himself, and on his right hand Lakshmi, whose face shines like a continued blaze of lightning, and whose body diffuses the fragrance of the lotus for 800 miles. Glorified Vaishnavas are their ministering servants, and divine or angelic natures find constant employment in meditating on their perfections or singing their praise. On earth, too, there is less of a revolting nature in his worship than in that of most other gods of the pantheon. No bloody sacrifices are offered to him; and in all his *avatars* some beneficent or praiseworthy object has been contemplated. Of these *avatars* nine are already past, and a tenth is still to be realized. From the prominent place which they hold in Hindu mythology, they are entitled to more than a passing notice.

In the first, or *Matsya avatar*, Vishnu's object was to recover the *Veda*, which had been stolen by the demon Hayagriva. With this view he assumed the form of a small fish in the river Cretamala; and when a pious king, called Satyavrata, came to its banks to make a libation, thus accosted him:—"How canst thou leave me in this stream, exposed to its monsters who are my dread?" Compassionating its condition, Satyavrata removed it to a small vase full of water. In a single night it outgrew the vase, and was placed successively in a cistern, a tank, and

a lake. In each of these its dimensions increased so rapidly, that as a last resource it was thrown into the sea. Here it resumed its complaints, and asked to be delivered from horned sharks and other great monsters of the deep. Satyavrata, astonished above measure, began to suspect the truth, and asked, "Who art thou that beguilest me in this assumed shape? Surely thou art the great God whose dwelling was on the waves. Say for what cause thou hast thus appeared?" Vishnu, disclosing himself, replied, "Seven days hence the three worlds will be plunged in an ocean of death, but in the midst of the destroying waves a large vessel sent by me for thy use shall stand before thee. Then take all medicinal herbs, all the variety of seeds, and accompanied by seven saints, encircled by pairs of all brute animals, enter the spacious ark, and continue in it secure from the flood on an immense ocean, without light except the radiance of thy companions. When the ship shall be agitated by an impetuous wind, fasten it with a large sea serpent to my horn, for I will be near thee, drawing the vessel with thee and thy attendants. I will remain on the ocean till a day of Brahma shall be ended." In due time the flood came, and all mankind perished except Satyavrata and his companions, who sailed in safety within the ship attached to the horn of the fish, which again appeared blazing like gold, and extending a million of leagues. After this deliverance Vishnu accomplished the great object of his *Matsya avatar*, by slaying the demon and recovering the *Veda*.

The singular resemblance which the above account bears, notwithstanding many ludicrous and extravagant additions, to the Mosaic account of the deluge, will justify the full detail which has been given. The second, or *Varaha avatar*, not possessing a similar recommendation, may be more summarily dismissed. A powerful and malignant giant, after afflicting the earth in various ways, rolled it up into a shapeless mass, and plunged with it into the abyss. Vishnu in order to recover it issued from the side of Brahma in the shape of a *varaha* or boar, which at first of small dimensions became in the course of an hour as large as an elephant. After uttering a voice which sounded like thunder, and shook the universe, the boar-shaped god suddenly descended from the air, dived into the ocean,

which as if in terror rolled back on either side in huge billows, and on arriving at the bottom where the earth lay huge and barren, poised it on one of his tusks and brought it to the surface. There it still lies floating, spread out like a carpet.

In the third, or *Kurma avatar*, Vishnu assumed the form of a tortoise, for a very fantastic purpose. While the celestial inhabitants were seated on the summit of Mount Meru, their fabled heaven, in deep meditation, earnestly longing to discover the *amrita*, or water of immortality, Narayan (another name for Vishnu) suggested to Brahma that the true way of finding it was to churn the ocean like a pot of milk. The Suras, a kind of demigods, and the Asuras, a race of gigantic demons resembling the Titans, were to be the churners, and the implement was a mountain named Mandar. For this purpose it was lifted out of its place, with all its forests and streams, and rested for support on the back of the king of the tortoises, who it seems was none else than Vishnu. The churning shaft was thus provided, but another difficulty remained. How was it to be worked? The device fallen upon was to employ the huge serpent Vasuki as a rope. By twisting it round the mountain, while the Asuras and Suras pulled alternately at the head and tail, a circular motion was given, and the churning process commenced. Meanwhile, a continued stream of fire, smoke, and wind was belched forth by the serpent, the forests of the mountain were wrapped in flames, and its numerous products—vegetable, mineral, and apparently animal also, carried down by a heavy shower which the lord of the firmament sent down to quench the conflagration—mingled with the milk of the ocean. The butter formed was thus a very heterogeneous compound, which yielded among other extracts the *amrita*, destined thenceforth to be the favourite beverage of the gods. The good obtained was not unmingled with evil. The venomous breath of the serpent tainted the ocean butter, and a pestilential stench proceeding from it threatened to make the world uninhabitable. This fatality was only escaped by the aid of Siva, who at the command of Brahma swallowed the drug. The *amrita* itself was next in danger, for the Asuras had seized it, and were resolved to keep it to themselves. Its recovery was due to Vishnu, who assumed the form of a beautiful female, and so fascinated the Asuras by her

charms, that they voluntarily placed it in her hands. Thereafter a dreadful battle ensued, but the Asuras were defeated mainly by the prowess of Vishnu, to whose keeping the amrita has in consequence been intrusted.

The fourth, or *Nara-Singh avatar* took place under the following circumstances. The giant who buried the earth at the bottom of the sea was succeeded by a younger brother named Hiranyakasyapa, who resembled him in all his worst qualities, and in particular refused to do homage to Vishnu. His son Prahlad was, however, of a very different temper, and for expressing disapprobation of his father's conduct was banished, after narrowly escaping with his life. A reconciliation having afterwards taken place, the subject of Vishnu's supremacy was discussed between them. Hiranyakasyapa persisting in his impiety asserted that Vishnu was in no respect greater than himself, and when Prahlad, on the contrary, maintained that Vishnu was supreme over all, and present everywhere, tauntingly asked, "Is he in this pillar? (striking it with his sceptre); if he be, let him appear." The moment the words were spoken the pillar burst in twain, and Vishnu issuing from it in the form of a man with a lion's head tore the impious monarch in pieces, and placed Prahlad on the throne.

The fifth *avatar*, called *Vamana*, because in it Vishnu assumed the form of a dwarf, is evidently a Brahminical fiction. The narrative is as follows:—A king called Maha Bali gained so much power in the spiritual world by his sacrifices and austerities that the very gods became afraid of him. They had actually been compelled to yield him the dominion of the earth and sea, and were waiting in consternation for the result of his last sacrifice, which it was thought would put him in possession of the heavens also. Their only resource was to supplicate the aid of Vishnu, who adopted the following singular device to effect their deliverance:—Having assumed the form of a Brahmin dwarf, he appeared before the king with every appearance of poverty, and asked for ground on which to build a dwelling for himself and his books. So humble were his views, he would be satisfied with as much as he could measure by three steps. Maha Bali at once promised the grant, and confirmed it by an oath in the most solemn form, by pouring sacred water

from a vessel over the hands of the grantee. The moment the water reached his hands Vishnu started up, and at two successive steps strode over the earth and the ocean. There was no third place to plant his foot, and Maha Bali unable to perform the promise which he had so solemnly confirmed, was only released from it on condition of descending to the lower regions. In accordance with this fable, many of the most solemn acts of Hindu devotion commence with the words, "Thrice did Vishnu step," &c., and the god himself is frequently addressed as *Trivikrum*, or the Three-stepper.

In the *avatars* already described Vishnu has appeared under monstrous forms. That of the Brahmin dwarf can scarcely be considered as an exception, since in the very moment he begins to act, it is thrown aside never to be resumed. In the three following *avatars* he makes a nearer approach to humanity, and performing actions which, while they partake largely of the marvellous, are not unfrequently connected with events which occupy a place in genuine history. In the sixth *avatar* his form is that of a Brahmin hero, Parasa Rama, or more properly Parasu Ram, who makes war upon the Kshatriyas, and desists not till he has extirpated the whole race. The origin of his deadly enmity is thus explained. His parents, when they were childless, withdrew from the world, to pass their time in prayers, sacrifices, and religious austerities, in the hope that they might thus ingratiate themselves with Vishnu, and obtain through him the most earnest wish of their hearts, the gift of a son. They were successful, for in due time Parasu Ram was born. He was not only beautiful, but endowed with every great and noble quality, as he well might be, seeing he was nothing less than Vishnu himself in human form. Mahadeva, another name for Siva, was so pleased with him, that he carried him to his heaven on the summit of Mount Kailasa. Here he remained till his twelfth year, and then descended on earth to defend his father against Deeraj, a cruel and vindictive tyrant of the Kshatriya class. It was too late, for when he arrived it was only to see the remains of the funeral pile on which the bodies of both his parents had been consumed. His father, first oppressed, had at last been murdered by Deeraj; and his mother, refusing to survive him, had immolated herself by

suttee. Parasu Ram instantly vowed the destruction, not only of Deeraj, but of his whole class. To any mere mortal, or even to an inferior deity, the accomplishment of the vow would have been impossible, for Deeraj was in himself a mighty host, being possessed of a thousand arms, each wielding a destructive implement of war; but nothing could withstand an incarnate Vishnu, and Deeraj soon paid the penalty of his misdeeds.

The object of the seventh *avatar* is, like that of the sixth, to avenge oppression; but the means employed are different, and branch out into numerous details, often not devoid of interest, though we can hardly afford to glance at them. Here Vishnu appears as Rama Chandra, the warlike and virtuous son of a powerful Indian prince, whose capital was Ayodhya or Oudh. A monstrous giant of the name of Ravana, who reigned over Lanka, or the island of Ceylon, having partly by sorcery, and partly by an affectation of piety, extended his dominion over the whole world, threw off the mask, and openly avowed himself the enemy of the gods. Vishnu, as Rama Chandra, undertook to destroy him. This exploit forms the subject of the celebrated epic poem, *Ramayana*, and therefore properly belongs to the chapter in which the literature of the Hindus will be considered. At present a short explanation may suffice. A prince of the name of Janaka had a beautiful daughter Sita, and a bow which a thousand of his stoutest archers could not raise. Many sought Sita in marriage, but Janaka declared that only he who could wield the bow should be her husband. Ravana tried and failed. Rama succeeded and carried off the prize by a double merit, for besides performing the task assigned by the father, he had previously gained the affections of the daughter. Ravana was enraged, but having full knowledge of Rama's strength and prowess, determined to pursue his object by stratagem, and not by open force. Circumstances favoured him. Somehow Rama, though the heir to his father's throne, had been excluded from it, and retired with his beloved Sita into a forest, to lead a life of seclusion and austerity. Ravana followed them, and by devices, of which various accounts are given, succeeded at last in seizing Sita, and carrying her off through the air in triumph. Rama, inconsolable for his loss, and determined to avenge it, set out on an expedition to Lanka. He

obtained a powerful auxiliary in a sovereign of the name of Sugriva, who furnished him with an army of monkeys, headed by a renowned monkey general, called Hanuman. Some difficulty was experienced in bridging over the strait between India and Ceylon, but the skill and courage of Hanuman and his monkeys surmounted all obstacles, and a battle ensued, in which Ravana, though he had a charmed life, was slain. Rama returned along with Sita to Oudh, where he reigned prosperously some ten thousand years, and then ascended to Vishnu's heaven. The services rendered by Hanuman have never been forgotten; and not only to him and the monkeys who accompanied Rama, but to their living descendants divine honours are still paid.

The eighth *avatar* introduces to our notice Krishna, in whose form Vishnu has eclipsed all his other exploits, and made himself the most popular deity in the Hindu pantheon. The *Mahabharata*, an epic still more celebrated than the *Ramayana*, forms the subject of this *avatar*, which is in consequence scarcely less familiar to European than to Indian ears. The Brahmins, when speaking of it, seem unable to find language sufficiently hyperbolic, and gravely declare that "though all the seas were ink, and the whole earth paper, and all the inhabitants were to do nothing but write night and day for the space of 100,000 years, it would be impossible to describe all the wonders which Krishna performed." Though truly an incarnation of Vishnu, he was ostensibly the son of Vasudeva and Devaki, belonging to the royal family of Mathura on the Jamuna. The reigning prince at the time of his birth was Kansa, who, to prevent the fulfilment of a prophecy which foretold that one of the children of Vasudeva and Devaki would destroy him, had issued a decree that none of them should be permitted to live. To elude this inhuman decree, Krishna was secretly removed and brought up by a neighbouring herdsman. Every year of his life furnishes the subject of some legend. When a mere child he began his exploits, and signalized himself in particular by destroying serpents and giants. As time passed on he grew into a handsome youth, and spent his time among the *gopis* or milkmaids, captivating their hearts by playing on the pipe, dancing and sporting with them. Not satisfied with his conquests

among rural beauties, he lifted his eyes to the princesses of Hindustan and was equally successful. The whole of his early life, indeed, is filled with love adventures, in which, owing to the general admiration which he excites, it sometimes becomes necessary for him to resist the importunities of his fair votaries, and caution them against the inconveniences which their excessive ardour might produce. In general, however, he is free from scruple, and frankly returns all the love which is offered him, even by those who could not give it without being guilty of conjugal infidelity. The excuse made for them is that the intrigue which would have been criminal with an ordinary mortal, becomes meritorious when carried on with him. On this loose principle he consents to act, at the same time managing, by means of illusion, to convince every individual among the myriads of his lovers that she possesses his heart and person without a rival. As he advances in years his amours become less frequent, and he performs many heroic exploits. Having overthrown the tyrant who had sought to destroy him at his birth, he mounts the throne, but is driven from it by foreign enemies, and retires to Dwarika in Gujarat. Here his alliance is courted by the Pandus, who were contesting the sovereignty of Hastinapur, supposed to have been situated to the north-east of Delhi, with their relations, the Kurus. This war, of which the *Mahabharata* makes him the hero, having terminated in the triumph of the Pandus, he returns to his capital; not, however, to spend the residue of his human life in peace: civil discord ensues, and though he outlives it, it is only to die by the arrow of a hunter who, shooting unawares in a thicket, wounded him in the foot. The licentiousness generally characteristic of Krishna's career, and the gross indelicacy with which his amours are described in poetry or embodied in sculpture, perhaps furnish the best explanation of the fact that he counts among his worshippers all the opulent and luxurious, all the women, and a very large proportion of all ranks of Indian society. As a justification of the preference thus given him, it is often alleged that while in other *avatars* Vishnu exhibited only a portion of his godhead, in that of Krishna all his fulness was displayed, without diminution of power or splendour.

Buddha, whose worship though now almost banished from India has spread over countries of far wider area, is usually

ranked as the ninth *avatar* of Vishnu. This, however, is denied by the Buddhists, who claim for the object of their worship a more ancient and loftier origin, and also by most of the Brahmins, who, regarding Buddhism as an abominable heresy, and hating it for its hostility to their domination as a caste, hold it impossible that there could ever have been any identity of form or purpose between Buddha and Vishnu. The tenth or *Khalki avatar* is only expected, and will not take place till the end of the *kali yuga*, when Vishnu will appear in the form of a white horse to close the present order of things and dissolve the existing universe preparatory to a new creation. The horse is represented holding up the foot of his right fore leg. When the catastrophe takes place he will give the signal for it by stamping with that foot on the ground. In concluding this account of Vishnu, it is necessary to prevent misapprehension by observing that, when his *avatars* are spoken of as *ten*, the meaning is, or should be, only that in that number are included all whose importance entitles them to special notice. In point of fact, as observed by Mr. Elphinstone,¹ "his incarnations or emanations, even as acknowledged in books, are innumerable; and they all still more swelled by others, in which he is made to appear under the form of some local saint or hero whom his followers have been disposed to deify."

Siva, the destroyer, to whom the third place in the Hindu triad is usually assigned, is distinguished by numerous names and represented by various forms. Among the names those of Maha Dev or Mahadeva and Rudra, are of the most frequent occurrence. Among his forms the most characteristic are those that are most hideous, since thus only is it possible to portray the features of divinity whom the *Puranas* describe as "wandering about surrounded by ghosts and goblins, inebriated, naked, and with dishevelled hair, covered with the ashes of a funeral pile, ornamented with human skulls and bones, sometimes laughing and sometimes crying." His body, painted of a white or silver colour, differs from the human, chiefly in the head and arms. Instead of only one head, he has more frequently five, each of them with a third eye in the forehead; the arms vary from four to six. In his hands he usually holds a

¹ Elphinstone, *History of India*, vol. i. p. 180.

trident, one or more human heads, a cup supposed to contain human blood, and a sword or some other instrument of destruction. Occasionally he is mounted on his vahan, the bull called Nandi, while his wife, usually called Parvati, but known also as Devi, Bhavani, Durga, Kali, &c., sits on his knee. In his less revolting forms he is represented with his hair coiled up like a religious mendicant asking alms, or seated as if in profound thought. His heaven is Kailas, one of the most stupendous summits of the Himalaya, where he is enthroned on the edge of a yawning gulf among eternal snows and glaciers. In Parvati he has a mate every way worthy of him. In appearance she resembles a fury rather than a goddess; her skin is black and her features absolutely hideous; her body is encircled with snakes, and hung round with a chaplet of skulls and human heads, while her whole attitude indicates defiance and menace. She delights in blood, and it is a well-authenticated fact that at one time human victims were sacrificed to her.

Siva, like the other members of the triad, has advanced a claim to exclusive supremacy, and in the opinion of his more devoted worshippers, named Saivas, is believed to have established it. Of the many legends relating to this subject, the following is a specimen:—Siva, meeting with Brahma, insultingly asked him, “Whence camest thou, and who created thee?” Brahma had then five heads, and with the mouth of one of them replied, “And whence art thou? I know thee well, thou form of darkness.” After much contumelious language banded to and fro, Siva lost temper, and gave a practical proof of his superiority by seizing the head of Brahma which performed the part of spokesman, and cutting it off with his left thumb. The Saivas think themselves entitled, in consequence of this exploit, to address their favourite divinity as the one supreme lord.

Since the process of destruction is, as a general rule, preparatory to that of some form of renovation, Siva is conceived to preside over both, and hence the Linga and Yoni, as representing the productive and regenerating powers of nature, are the great emblems used in his worship. It is not difficult to understand how the idea of such emblems may have been suggested to contemplative minds unaccompanied by any approach to obscenity, but the great body of mankind are totally incapable

of allegorizing purely on such a subject. To them grossness is too familiar, even as an object of thought, and when exhibited in a visible form only fosters licentious feelings and leads in practice to innumerable abominations. For these the shrines of Siva are notorious, but not so notorious as those of his consort Parvati, who, under various names, and more especially those of Kali and Durga, receives a worship of the most disgusting and atrocious description. The kind of carnage in which she delights is significantly indicated in the *Kalika Purana*, which, after an enumeration of the animals to be offered to her in sacrifice, adds, that one human victim would please her for 1,000 years, and three human victims for 100,000 years. Circumstances do not allow her worshippers any longer to gratify her in this manner, but she has still full opportunity of satisfying her thirst for blood. In her temple at Kalighat, near Calcutta, 1,000 goats, besides various other animals, are sacrificed every month; and it used to be the boast of her priest at Bindabashni, where the Vindhya Hills abut on the Ganges, that the blood before her image was never allowed to dry. This profuse shedding of blood, disgusting as it is, is not the worst feature in her worship. During the great festival of Durga Puja, celebrated in her honour, the name of religion is employed as a cloak for secret orgies, in which parties of both sexes meet and give themselves up to unbounded licentiousness.

The properties and offices assigned to the members of the Hindu triad are so numerous and diversified that all the other gods of the pantheon seem to be little more than repetitions of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, under new names and forms. According to this view, the infinite multiplicity of gods disappears, and instead of hundreds of millions, only a few great names stand forth as representatives of the whole. However correct this view may be as a theory, there is too much reason to fear that it does not hold true in practice, and that in the opinion of the great mass of Hindus everything in the shape of a god to which a name has been given, and any act of worship is paid, has a separate and independent existence. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond the triad and to give some account of other deities, who could not without straining be included under it, and yet either from the nature of the worship

paid to them, or the number of their worshippers, cannot be left unnoticed. In the list of such gods, the two first places unquestionably belong to Agni, the god of fire, and Indra, the god of the firmament.

Agni is perhaps entitled, in so far as antiquity gives precedence, to stand at the head of all the gods of the Hindu pantheon. In the first four books of the *Rig Veda*—the portion of it now made accessible to English readers by the admirable labours of Professor Wilson—while the name of Siva is not once mentioned, and only two of the hymns of which the body of the work consists are addressed to Vishnu, no fewer than 147 are addressed to Agni. His domain embraces the heavens, where he appears in the sun and other celestial bodies as the great source of light and heat; the air, where he flashes in lightning and speaks in thunder; and the earth, where his presence is recognized in all kinds of artificial fire employed for common and sacred purposes. From the frequent use of fire in the religious services of the Hindus, the worship of Agni may be said to be universal throughout India. All Brahmins fulfilling the obligations of their class are Agnihotras, that is, have a consecrated fire which is never allowed to be extinguished; and though, from the general laxity which now prevails, the great majority fail to do so, Agni must, so long as Hinduism continues to exist, be one of its most influential divinities. Though worshipped chiefly as an element possessed of the highest efficacy in removing all kinds of impurity, moral as well as ceremonial, he is also personified in various forms. Most usually he is drawn with a forked representation of fire issuing from his mouth; but this is sometimes wanting, and he is figured as a mitred prince, seated on a ram, which he guides by one of his four hands, while in the other three he holds a spear, a lotus flower, and a chaplet of beads.

Indra, the god of the firmament, holds a prominent place in the *Rig Veda*, and, like Agni, forms the subject of a large portion of its hymns. He is supposed to preside over atmospheric phenomena generally, and more especially over those productive of humidity. Hence the formation of rain forms part of his peculiar province, and he is sometimes seen engaged in sending down fertilizing showers, while a cloud, represented

as a demon, combats his benevolent intentions by refusing to yield up its moisture. In his personified form Indra appears as a white man, seated on the elephant called Airavat, which is fabled to have been produced at the churning of the ocean. His wife, Indrani, usually accompanies him, but is sometimes represented separately, sitting on a lion with a child in her arms. Their heaven, called Swarga, situated on Mount Meru, is one of the masterpieces of Viswakarma, the architect of the gods, and so glistens with gold and gems as to outshine the radiance of a dozen of suns. In connection with Indra may be mentioned Pavana, the god of the winds. They are held to be independent divinities, but it is very difficult to assign distinct provinces to them, and prevent them from encroaching on each other. Pavana is represented riding on a deer or antelope, and holding in one hand a pennon, and in another an arrow. Deities of an inferior grade called Maruts, who are, in fact, only the winds personified, are his ministering servants, or rather perhaps the common messengers of all the higher gods. From the gods personifying the elements of fire and air, we naturally pass to another element, that of water, personified by a god of the name of Varuna, who may be regarded as the Indian Neptune, and is represented as a four-armed, white man, riding on a sea animal, with a rope in one hand and a club in another. He is much worshipped by fishermen; and being supposed capable of sending rain, is supplicated by husbandmen in seasons of drought.

The heavenly bodies form an important class of Hindu deities. The first place of course belongs to Surya, the sun, and Soma, the moon, in regard to both of which many wild fictions are current. Surya, however, has suffered by a kind of competition with Agni, who, by appropriating most of his attributes, has left him comparatively little room for separate agency. In the usual representation Surya, in the form of a crowned prince, his head encircled with golden rays, sits on a splendid car, drawn by a seven-headed horse. In front of him sits his charioteer, Arun, holding the reins. Sometimes he seems to be regarded as the supreme lord of the universe, and as such is addressed in the *Gayatri*, which is the most solemn and mysterious of all the texts of the *Veda*. A much lower position is,

however, usually assigned to him, and he even condescends so far as to become the parent, not merely of demigods, but of mortal men. His wife is Prabha, or brightness; but this form she has sometimes been obliged to exchange for that of its opposite, Chhaya, or shade, in consequence of being unable to endure his intense splendour. He has not been always faithful to her. On one occasion Parvati, the wife of Siva, met him in the shape of a mare, and being impregnated with sunbeams by his breathing through her nostrils, became the mother of the Aswini, two of whom are the Twins of the zodiac. By Chandri, the wife of the moon, or the moon himself, usually represented as a male, but capable apparently of being transformed into a female, he had a numerous family called Pulindas. The mortals to whom he has given birth are the original progenitors of the race of Suryabans, who are hence called, and, what is more, seriously believed by multitudes to be, children of the sun. His worshippers are numerous, and he has several temples exclusively dedicated to him, though often, when exhibited in a bodily form, he is obliged to content himself with a place in the temples of other deities.

The moon, designated indifferently Soma and Chandra, is usually represented as a beautiful youth, sitting in a chariot drawn by an antelope, and holding in his hands a club and a lotus. The influence which he is supposed to possess in this lower world has given him many worshippers, who imagine that the whole current of life depends on lucky and unlucky days, of which he is the great regulator. The planet Budh, our Mercury, is considered to be his son, and the first sovereign of the lunar race, distinguished by the name of Chandrabans. The other planets are in like manner deified; but though they thus hold a place in the Hindu pantheon, they are not entitled to a separate notice, as little more is expected from them than to furnish data for the calculation of nativities.

Among the gods who are conceived to exercise a more immediate influence on human affairs are Ganesa, the remover of difficulties, Kuvera, the god of wealth, Kartikeya, the god of war, and Kama, the god of love. It will be proper to describe them briefly in their order.

Ganesa, or Ganapati, is represented as a short round fat man, with four arms and the head of an elephant. He is usually seated

on a lotus, but sometimes rides on a rat, or has one near him, to indicate the prudence and foresight of which that animal is an emblem. In his hands he holds the *ankas*, or hook for guiding the elephant, a shell, for which a kind of battle-axe is sometimes substituted, a conical ball, and a cup with small cakes. He is much worshipped, particularly in the Deccan, where his temples probably outnumber those of any god except Siva. The Peshwa Baji Rao had an image of him in solid gold, with eyes of diamonds. Its value was estimated at £50,000. It is not thought prudent or safe to commence a journey, or a building, or even transact any ordinary matter of business, without invoking him, and hence, both to remind worshippers of this duty and furnish convenient means of performing it, his statues are set up on the public roads and other open places of resort. Not unfrequently, too, his image is placed over the doors of houses and shops, as a guarantee for the prosperity of those who occupy them. The god to whom all this homage is paid makes no pretensions to a very exalted origin. He had no father, and in the ordinary sense of the term, cannot be said to have had a mother, though that relationship is both claimed and gloried in by Parvati. The fable is, that while she was bathing, she collected all the scum and impurities of the bath, kneaded it into the human form, and gave it life by pouring water of the Ganges upon it. Accounts differ as to the mode in which he became possessed of the elephant's head. Some say that Parvati made him so at first; but the more generally received account is, that he had originally a human head, and was deprived of it by Siva, who, finding him placed as a sentinel at the door of Parvati's bath, and not knowing who he was, cut it off at a stroke. Afterwards, on seeing his wife overwhelmed with grief for the loss of her child, Siva seized an elephant's head, which happened to be the first that came in his way, and placed it on Ganesa's shoulders. One of the most remarkable circumstances connected with the mythology of Ganesa is the existence of a living incarnation of him at Chincore, near Poona. This incarnation was first realized in the form of a saint of the name of Maroba, who was removed to heaven, while Ganesa not only took his place but undertook to occupy it in the persons of Maroba's descendants to the seventh generation. This imposture, gross as it is, has found

multitudes credulous enough to be deceived by it, and the Brahmins, who profited by it, found little difficulty, even after the seventh generation elapsed, in continuing the farce of Ganesa's living incarnation. In 1809, Maria Graham paid a visit to the reputed deity. Her account of it is as follows:—"The whole place looked dirty, and every window was crowded with well-fed sleek Brahmins, who doubtless take great care of the Deo's revenues. We found his little godship seated in a mean verandah, on a low wooden seat, not any way distinguished from other children but by an anxious wildness of the eyes, said to be occasioned by the quantity of opium which he is daily made to swallow. He is not allowed to play with other boys: nor is he permitted to speak any language but Sanskrit, that he may not converse with any but the Brahmins. He received us very politely, and said he was always pleased to see English people. After some conversation, which a Brahmin interpreted, we took leave, and were presented by his divine hand with almonds and sugarcandy, perfumed with asafoetida, and he received in return a handful of rupees."

Kuvera, the god of wealth, has no temples dedicated to him, and no altars at which oblations are made, but is amply compensated by the practical homage which he receives from all ranks and conditions of men. His mythology possesses little interest. He resides in a splendid palace, and when he travels is borne through the air in a radiant car, or rather palanquin, by four attendants. On his head is a richly ornamented crown, and two of his four hands hold closed flowers of the lotus. In none of these particulars is it possible to discover felicity of invention, or any peculiar appropriateness. In short, the Indian Plutus, like too many of his most ardent and successful worshippers, is indifferent to everything but wealth, and while he possesses it, and has the power of bestowing it, can dispense with any other attraction.

Kartikeya, the god of war, is regarded as the son of Siva, and was brought into existence by some very extraordinary process, for the express purpose of combating a giant of the name of Tarika, who had become a terror even to the gods. Brahma had been induced by the giant's penances and austerities to promise him universal power and dominion. This promise could

not be recalled, and there seemed no means of escaping from the fatal consequences, for Tarika, abusing Brahma's blundering liberality, was threatening the whole creation with destruction: robbing the ocean of its riches, and the sun of its fire, commanding the moon to stand still, and subjecting all the other celestials to harsh and contumelious treatment. In this dilemma the gods assembled a council, and after full deliberation saw only one possible means of deliverance. By Brahma's grant Tarika was declared to be invincible except to a son of Siva. But where was such a son to be found? Siva was at this time childless, and was leading a life of austerity, which precluded the hope of offspring. Various devices, in which Parvati and the god of love bore the principal part, were adopted, and at last, Kartikeya, having been deposited as a germ and nourished in the bosom of Ganga or the Ganges, emerged in the form of a beautiful male infant. After due nursing by females who came to the river to bathe, he grew up, and becoming fit for martial exploits fulfilled the great end of his creation by slaying Tarika. When his character of god of war is considered, he might have been expected to take a prominent part in all the wars in which the gods figure as allies or auxiliaries. In general, however, only a secondary place is assigned to him, and it almost appears as if his merits had been purposely obscured by rivals jealous of his fame. For this apparent injustice he has some compensation in the number of his worshippers, and more especially in the honours paid to him during his annual festival. On that occasion images of him, to the number, in Calcutta alone, of 5,000, some of them of gigantic stature, are set up for worship, and at the conclusion of it thrown into the river. These images usually exhibit him as a young man of warlike appearance, situated very incongruously on a peacock, and holding a bow in one hand and an arrow in the other. Sometimes the peacock is treading on a serpent, and two additional hands are given him, in which he holds a spear and a trident.

Kama, called also Kamadeva or Kamdeo, the god of love, is the subject of many pleasing fictions, and occupies a prominent place in ancient tales, poems, and dramas. Singular enough, notwithstanding the sway which he is described as possessing over gods and men, he cannot boast of possessing a single

temple, or of being the object of any distinct and formal worship. Being thus more of an historical than an actually recognized divinity, little more need be said of him. The fables give him a double birth. By the first he is a son of Brahma, by the second a son of Vishnu and Lakshmi, during their *avatars* as Krishna and Rukmini. In both births the illusive prevailed over the real, and he is therefore designated the son of Maya, or illusion. His father Brahma, having promised that his dominion should not be confined to the hearts of the inhabitants of the world, but be felt even by the members of the triad, the youth was malicious enough to test his power by letting fly an arrow, which pierced Brāhma's own bosom. He appears to have been equally successful with Vishnu. Not so with Siva. This god, when it was desired that he might become the father of a son destined to slay Tarika, was living retired in the practice of religious austerities. Kama, notwithstanding, presumed to send a shaft at him. It took effect, but Siva, incensed at the interruption given to his devotion, turned his third eye upon the infatuated archer, and with it burned him to ashes. After his second birth a demon carried him off, and threw him into the sea, where he was swallowed by a fish. From this living tomb he was afterwards rescued, and delivered as an infant to the care of the demon's wife. She, by some strange metamorphosis, proved to be no other than Rati, or affection, the wife of Kama during his first life. After a time a mutual recognition took place, and the demon was destroyed. Kama is usually personified as a beautiful youth riding or kneeling on a parrot, and holding in his hands a bow ready bent and strung with bees, while a quiver of arrows, tipped with flowers, hangs behind his shoulder. His standard, adopted probably as a memorial of his marine adventure, is a fish. He is described as accompanied by Rati, and attended by the humming bee, the cuckoo, and gentle breezes. As he is constantly wandering over the world, no permanent locality can be assigned him, though his favourite haunt is with Krishna and his milkmaids, on the banks of the Yamuna or Jamuna.

From the god of love we pass to one of a very different description, Yama, the god of the infernal regions and judge of the dead. He has two distinct personifications. In the one called Dharmaraja he appears with a mild and benevolent countenance,

seen only by those to whom a place of happiness is to be awarded. In the other, as Yama, he is seated on a buffalo with a crown on his head and a club and a rope or *pasha* in his hands. His inflamed eyes, dreadful teeth, and grim aspect are well fitted to inspire terror. The road to his palace is long and painful, over burning sand and red-hot or sharp-pointed stones, amidst showers of burning cinders, scalding water, and molten metal, and through dark passages beset with snakes, tigers, enormous giants, and all other imaginable horrors. The road is 668,000 miles long, and at the end of it, after crossing the Vaitarini, or Indian Styx, Yama himself is seen. His stature is 240 miles, his eyes of a purple colour expand like lakes, his voice resembles thunder, and his breathing the roaring of a tempest, a flame proceeds from his mouth, and every hair on his body is as long as a palm tree. Attended by Chitra Gupta, a monster little less terrible than himself, he judges the trembling sinners as they come into his presence, and dooms them to their different hells. Though Yama has no temple dedicated to him, the terror which he inspires will not allow him to be forgotten. Oblations of water are made to him every day, and two annual festivals devoted to him are carefully observed.

In the above enumeration of gods, all those occupying the first rank have been more or less fully described. The subject, however, is of boundless extent, and to give anything like a complete view of Hindu theogony and mythology, it would be necessary to take some notice of numerous subordinate deities, many of them recognized only in particular localities, in which they are regarded either as a kind of patron saints to be courted for the blessings which they may confer, or malignant demons to be deprecated for the evils which they may inflict. Both the heavens and the infernal regions are peopled with such imaginary beings. They are also constantly moving in the air, on the earth, and in the waters, and acting as the willing messengers or unwilling thralls of the higher gods. To the better class belong the Brahmadikas, or sons of Brahma, the Manus, the Rishis, good angels and good genii, Apsaras and Gandharvas, or heavenly nymphs and choristers, by whose dances, songs, and music the inhabitants of celestial mansions are constantly entertained. To the malignant class belong the Asuras, who,

though of the race of gods, were disinherited and cast into darkness; the Daityas, a species of demons who have mustered armies and made war in heaven; Rakshasas, Pisachas, and still lower spirits, not unlike our nursery ghosts and goblins. By all of these much of the homage which is due only to the Supreme Power is practically monopolized.

Another series of imaginary beings which play an important part in the religion of the Hindus are personifications of sacred streams—above all, the Ganges, which figures as a female divinity under the name of Ganga, and is both honoured and worshipped. So highly esteemed is the honour of having given birth to Ganga, that Vishnu and Siva are represented by their respective votaries as laying claim to it. According to the Vaishnavas she had her first beginning in Vishnu's heaven, Vaikuntha, and sprung from his foot; according to the Saivas, Kailas, Siva's heaven, was the place of her birth. There she sprung from his head, and after long wandering among his matted locks descended at last upon the earth in a mighty stream, with all her train of fishes, snakes, turtles, and crocodiles. She is represented as a white woman with a crown on her head, either walking on the surface of the water or riding on a marine animal of rather nondescript form, though bearing some resemblance to an alligator, holding a water-jug in one of her four hands and a water-lily in another. After descending to the earth Ganga made a narrow escape, for a sage whom she disturbed in his devotions was so incensed that he swallowed her up. Having contrived ultimately to find an outlet, she divided herself into the numerous streams which now form a network across her delta. The modes in which homage is paid to her are countless. Her shrines exceed 3,000,000 in number; her banks are crowded with temples erected in her honour; long pilgrimages are made to obtain the privilege of bathing in her stream; for those who cannot make the pilgrimage, the water is transported to the remotest parts of the country and eagerly purchased; even the dying are carried to her banks to breathe their last, and in this way not infrequently accelerate the event which might have been deferred for days, or months, or years, by wiser and gentler treatment. In consequence of this practice the sacred stream can hardly be viewed without disgust, from the number of dead bodies which are floated down upon it.

The character of the Hindu religion may be legitimately inferred from that of the gods who are the objects of its worship; but a much more vivid impression may be obtained by passing from theory to practice, and viewing it under the forms it assumes both in daily life and on extraordinary occasions. In regard to all forms, private and public, one common remark may be made. The religious service performed is entirely of a ceremonial nature, and has nothing to do with the heart and conscience. If words of the *Veda* are repeated by rote as a kind of charm—if the breath is suppressed and made to pass in a peculiar manner through one nostril, while the other is stopped by the finger—if water is sipped, poured out, or used in bathing, while a number of minute regulations are carefully observed—by these, and such like mummeries, the worshipper considers himself cleansed from all impurity and entitled to claim the divine favour. If higher degrees of merit are aspired to, the means to be employed are not genuine sorrow for past sins and earnest endeavours to advance in holiness, but penances and austerities, the efficacy of which is estimated by the amount of bodily suffering which they inflict. The tortures to which multitudes submit with this view are often of the most barbarous and shocking description. The highest place in heaven is thus reserved for those who, from physical constitution or long training, possess most strength of bodily endurance, and the greatest villain on earth, without repenting of one of his crimes or forsaking one of his vices, may acquire the reputation and the privileges of a saint. Under such a system there is no inducement to virtuous practice. Every man has only to follow the bent of his own inclinations, assured that into whatever enormities passion or interest may lead him, it will always be easy to find some divinity who will accept his worship, and in return for it cancel all his guilt. In illustrating the highest form of religious observance required of a Hindu in the ordinary routine of life, we shall be sure not to understate the matter by selecting the Brahmin as an example.

Assuming that the Brahmin performs all that is required of him, his daily course will be as follows:—On rising from sleep the first thing he does is to clean his teeth with a twig of the racemiferous fig-tree, repeating to himself during the operation

the following prayer: "Attend, lord of the forest, Soma, king of herbs and plants, has approached thee; mayest thou and he cleanse my mouth with glory and good auspices, that I may eat abundant food. Lord of the forest! grant me life, strength, glory, splendour, offspring, cattle, abundant wealth, virtue, knowledge, and intelligence." The use of the twig, ordinarily deemed so indispensable that the omission of it would render all other religious services fruitless, is forbidden on certain specified days, when as a substitute for it the mouth must be twelve times rinsed with water. Having thrown away the twig into some place known to be free from impurity, he proceeds to perform his ablutions. In these it is necessary to be very circumspect, as there are a number of minute rules which he must not violate. The water should, if possible, be taken not from a depth, as a well, but from the surface, and not from a stagnant pool but from a running stream—a river of the number of those deemed holy. In this respect, the Ganges is of course to be preferred to all others, but when it cannot be had the want of it may be supplied by the following prayer: "O Ganga, hear my prayers; for my sake be included in this small quantity of water, with the other sacred streams." The ablution then proceeds, the Brahmin standing in the water, sipping it, sprinkling it, throwing it about on the crown of his head, on the earth, towards the sky, plunging thrice into it, and finally completing the process by washing his mantle in it. While thus engaged he repeats various prayers and texts of the *Vedas*, including the *Gayatri*, styled the holiest of all, though it contains no more than this, "We meditate on the adorable light of the resplendent Generator, which governs our intellects." Another mysterious utterance employed is that of O M, a contraction of the triliteral syllable A U M, the recognized symbol of the triad.

The ablutions performed, the Brahmin, supposed to have risen before the sun, prepares to worship that luminary as he emerges from the horizon. For this purpose various preliminary ceremonies are required. First, he ties the lock of hair on the crown of his head, takes up a bundle of *kusa* grass (*Poa cynosuroides*) in his left and three blades of it in his right hand, sips water, repeating the *Gayatri* and performing numerous

mummeries, and after exclaiming "May the waters preserve me," engages in deep meditation. The subject is curious, for he is only striving to realize the thought that "Brahma, with four faces and a red complexion, resides in his bosom; Vishnu, with four arms and a black complexion, in his heart, and Siva, with five faces and a white complexion, in his forehead." This meditation is followed by a suppression of breath, the mode of effecting which is minutely and even ludicrously regulated. Closing the left nostril by the two longest fingers of the right hand, he draws a breath through the right nostril, and then by stopping this nostril also with the thumb remains without respiring till he has internally repeated the *Gayatri*, the symbolical syllable O M, and a sacred text. This suppression of breath repeated thrice is followed by ablutions, a singular inhalation of water by the nose, and a sipping, at the end of which he exclaims, "Water, thou dost penetrate all beings; thou dost reach the deep recesses of the mountains; thou art the mouth of the universe; thou art the mystic word *vasha*; thou art light, taste, and the immortal fluid." He is now in a fit state to offer acceptable worship to the sun, which he addresses standing on one foot with his face to the east and his hands in a hollow form. Among other things, he says of him that "he is the soul of all which is fixed or locomotive," and apostrophizes him thus, "Thou art self-existent; thou art the most excellent ray; thou givest effulgence; grant it unto us." An oblation, consisting of *tela* or sesamum, flowers, barley-water, and red sandal-wood, is then made in a copper vessel shaped like a boat and placed on the head. With various other prayers and ceremonies, including an invocation of the *Gayatri* which is characterized as "light," as "seed," as "immortal life," as "the holiest sacrifice," and "the divine text who dost grant our best wishes," the daily morning devotion is brought to a close.

At noon and in the evening the service slightly varied ought to be repeated. Other portions of the day should be occupied with what are called "the five great sacraments." These are—1. The sacrament of the *Vedas*, or the teaching and studying of them. 2. The sacrament of the *Manes*, or an oblation of cakes and water to departed ancestors and progenitors generally. 3. The sacrament of the Deities, or prayers to all the gods of the

pantheon, accompanied with an oblation to fire. 4. The sacrament of Spirits, or an oblation of rice and other food to all animated creatures; and 5. The sacrament of Men, or the performance of the rites of hospitality. In all of these the observance must be accompanied with prayers, ceremonies, and gestures, still more minute, unmeaning, and fantastical than those required in morning devotion, the whole forming an irksome routine, in which neither the intellect nor the affections have any share, and the most solemn religious acts degenerate into mere mechanism. It is not to be wondered at that a great majority of the Brahmins have found means to evade the letter of these requirements, and to curtail them to such a degree that one hour suffices for rites for which, if fully performed, at least four hours would be necessary. Unfortunately, in curtailing frivolous and useless ceremonies, no care has been taken to supply their place by something better, and the only effect has consequently been to bring that class which ought to set the example to all other classes, nearer than before to practical atheism.

The great mass of the population, ever ready to take the law from those whom they regard as their superiors, select only those observances which are most agreeable, and thus make religion not a curb, but rather a stimulus to their natural depravity. In pursuing this course they are countenanced by a remarkable peculiarity in Hindu faith and practice. A fundamental axiom of the Christian religion is, that he who offends in one point is guilty of all; in other words, that every precept is of absolute obligation, and consequently that the habitual neglect of any one known duty makes him who is guilty of it virtually an infidel. The Hindu axiom, on the contrary, is, that all obedience is optional, and that within certain limits every individual is at liberty to lay down a rule for himself. He who aspires to the highest degree of future bliss will be contented with nothing short of perfection, and will consequently endeavour to fulfil every obligation to the very letter. He, on the other hand, who has no such exalted aims, and desires to be religious only so far as may be necessary to secure him against the loss of caste and the worst forms of future punishment, may easily adopt a course of religious observance suited to his taste. Both

the lofty aspirant and the lukewarm professor are, so to speak, within the pale, and both will be rewarded according to their deeds. When their final conditions are fixed, the difference between them will be not in kind but in degree. There will be no absolute condemnation, for however great the shortcomings of the one may be, his obedience, so far as it has gone, will be approved and accepted. The practical effect of such a rule is easily perceived. While the standard of obedience remains theoretically perfect, the great majority lower it till it becomes what they wish it to be. All duties felt to be irksome and disagreeable are carefully excluded, and every individual worshipper becomes in fact the maker of his own god, investing him only with such attributes as are pleasing to himself. The extent to which this is carried may be inferred from the well-known fact that every form of vice and crime—prostitution, theft, robbery, and murder—has found among the gods of the Hindu pantheon some one who has sanctioned it by his example, and is therefore presumed to welcome those who commit it as acceptable worshippers.

But though the accommodating spirit of Hinduism allows each individual great latitude in selecting the objects and manner of his worship, and by permitting him to lower the standard to suit his taste, virtually abolishes all religious and moral distinctions, it must be acknowledged that the effect has been not so much to produce religious indifference as to foster a perverse zeal and multiply useless forms. Even those who content themselves with such observances as are necessary to prevent the loss of caste and leave them a hope of escaping final reprobation, have a laborious task to perform, since the omission of any one among a multiplicity of rites and ceremonies might defeat their object. The observances, of course, increase in proportion as higher aspirations are entertained. Some, desirous of attaining a higher order of animated being in their new metempsychosis, must acquire the necessary merit by increasing the number and variety of ceremonial acts. Others would fain purchase even a temporary residence in one or other of the fabled heavens appropriated to the gods, but cannot hope to reach the object of their ambition without adding to the routine of ordinary observances numerous acts of will-worship and painful privation.

The highest object at which it is possible to aim is exemption from all future transmigrations, by what is called absorption into the divine essence. This, as it is the acme of felicity, is also presumed, as might be expected, to be the most difficult of attainment. How to accomplish it is the great problem which has for ages tasked the ingenuity of Hindu theologians, and cannot be said to be as yet satisfactorily solved. In one general principle, indeed, they are all agreed. The great obstacles to the final absorption of the soul by the supreme essence are its union with the body, and the various instincts, appetites, and passions which are supposed to be the result of this union. There is thus a thralldom from which the soul must be delivered. Only two modes seem practicable. By retiring within itself and engaging in profound meditation and contemplation, it may render itself insensible to the existence of the external world, and thus gradually prepare for becoming part of a pure, spiritual, uncompounded essence. Thus acting, the soul assumes the offensive, and in a manner achieves its own freedom. This is one of the modes, and is in high repute with those who are of a metaphysical turn, and fond of indulging in dreamy indolence. In the other mode the mind is more passive, and the same object is sought to be gained by weakening the powers of the body and thus rendering it incapable of exercising its wonted tyranny. This mode is suited to the taste of those who, incapable of abstract thought and long-continued meditation, excel in physical endurance, and are able, as they think, to keep the body under by subjecting it to attenuating processes of hunger and thirst, painful postures, nakedness, extremes of heat and cold, lacerations, gashes, mutilations, and numerous barbarities not the less shocking from being self-inflicted.

As a general rule, both modes of discipline are practised by the same individual, and hence while careful to prepare for contemplation by suppressions of breath and mysterious utterances, the Brahmin having, during the last portion of his life abandoned all sensual affections, is enjoined in the *Institutes of Manu* to "dry up his bodily frame" by means of "harsher and harsher mortifications," and in certain cases to feed "on water and air," till he has "shuffled off his body." The severest penances mentioned in the *Institutes* are to "slide backwards and

forwards on the ground," to "stand a whole day on tiptoe," and endure the extremes of heat, cold, and moisture; but superstition the longer it is indulged always becomes the stronger, and hence to give a list of the severities practised in modern times by the devotees called *yogis* and *fakirs*, were to enumerate almost all the imaginable modes of torture. Keeping the palms of the hands closed till the nails grow into the flesh on one side and re-appear on the other—creeping along in twisted forms till permanent and unnatural distortion is produced—holding the arms upright till they lose their power of motion and become shrivelled—lying on beds of iron spikes—hanging over slow fires—burying in a living grave with only a small aperture to prevent suffocation—such are only a few of the modes by which superstition proves how expert it is in the art of tormenting. Superstition, indeed, cannot lay claim to all the diabolical ingenuity displayed, but must share it with impostors of various grades who infest the country as mendicants, and extort alms either by the commiseration which their sufferings excite, or the desire to be rid of their filthy and disgusting presence. Naked bodies smeared with the ashes of cow-dung, hair hanging in locks matted together with filth, human skulls filled with the same material, and human bones strung around the neck, are among the more common devices used by those who, without practising self-denial, are ambitious of the honour or greedy of the profit which even a hypocritical semblance of it too often commands.

In order to obtain a full display of the Hindu religion, and the monstrous practices which it permits and encourages, it will be necessary after having seen how it operates in everyday life, to behold it when crowds are gathered to celebrate its greater festivals. As it would be difficult, if not impossible, to give a common description applicable to all, the advisable course will be to select as a specimen the festival of Kali, to whose delight in carnage reference has already been made, and the festival of Juggernaut, which, through the early attention which was drawn to it, is perhaps more familiar and interesting to the British mind than any other.

Kali or Maha Kali is, as will be remembered, identical with Parvati the wife of Siva, and is celebrated in an annual festival, which receives the name Charak Puja from the *chakra* or discus,

emblematical of the wheeling or swinging employed in its most characteristic performance. Owing to the savage character of Kali, and the numerous crimes of which she is regarded as the patroness, the Brahmins and more respectable native classes of Calcutta, in the neighbourhood of which the festival is held, keep aloof from an open participation in it, but at the same time show where their sympathies lie by contributing largely to the expense, and countenancing the proceedings by their presence as spectators. By the more zealous votaries a whole month before the festival, by others three days, are employed in initiatory ceremonies of purification and devotion. When the first day devoted to it arrives, and upright pole twenty to thirty feet in height is erected, and across its summit a horizontal beam is placed to move round on a pivot. From each end of the beam hangs a rope, the one loosely and the other with two hooks attached to it. The performance now begins. A devotee coming forward prostrates himself and is immediately fastened to the hooks, which for this purpose are run through the fleshy parts of his back near the shoulders. The end of the other rope is then seized by a number of persons, who commence running round with it at a rapid pace. This motion is of course communicated at once to the hooks, and the wretched devotee lifted up into the air is swung round in agony. Were the flesh to give way, the force with which he is whirled as well as the height would project him like a shot from a gun, and his death would be inevitable. The devotee by giving a signal may be relieved from peril and torture, but he is in no haste to give it, and usually remains suspended from ten minutes to half an hour, for, strange to say! this is a religious service, the merit of which is proportioned to the length of time the agony is endured. The moment he descends and is taken off the hooks, another steps forward to take his place, and the machine is kept wheeling till the day is far spent. In estimating the aggregate amount of suffering inflicted, it is necessary to remember that these horrid swings are not confined to the suburbs of Calcutta, where Kali's temple stands, but that in thousands of towns and villages throughout Bengal, they are in simultaneous operation, torturing the infatuated devotees, while multitudes of spectators stand around gaping with applause and wonder.

When the swinging terminates, another equally cruel and more murderous exhibition succeeds. A number of spikes or knives, with their points sloping outwards, are made to protrude from a large straw bag or mattress, and placed in front of a wall or scaffolding from twenty to thirty feet in height. The performance of the devotees is to leap from the scaffolding to the mattress. As the spikes are left somewhat loose, and there is room for the exercise of dexterity in taking the leap, the greater part escape uninjured, but several sustain serious injuries, and a few are killed on the spot. For the last, the spectators feel no pity, because the belief is that the fate which they have met is the punishment of some enormous crime, which they must have committed either in the present or in some former life. At night the devotees, seated in the open air, make an incision in the skin of their forehead as a receptacle for an iron wire to which they suspend a lamp. These lamps are kept burning till dawn, the wearers meanwhile celebrating the praises of their favourite divinity. It were easy to produce a long list of other self-inflicted tortures—of deluded wretches with their arms and breasts stuck full of pins—of others bound in a sitting posture to the rim of an enormous wheel, every revolution of which must reverse the natural position of head and heels—and of others, who, placing some mustard seeds on some mud with which they have covered the under lip, stretch themselves out on their backs, under a vow that they will lie there night and day, without change of position, till the seed shall germinate; but enough has been already said to show by what kind of works the favour of Hindu deities can be courted.

The observances already mentioned are rather the preliminaries of the festival than its actual celebration, which can only be seen with all its accompaniments in the vicinity of the temple itself, situated near the extremity of a plain immediately south-east of the capital of British India, and known by the name of Kali Ghat. It owes its site, and the veneration in which it is held, to a very singular legend. Siva's wife was Sati, the daughter of Brahma. After the marriage the two gods quarrelled. Brahma, who was the aggressor, not only insulted his son-in-law by leaving him uninvited to a banquet which he gave to the immortals, but stigmatized him as a wandering beggar, a

dweller among tombs, a carrier of human skulls. Sati took the quarrel so much to heart, that she proceeded to the banks of the Ganges and yielded up her life, thereby furnishing an example, on which the Brahmins for want of a better have eagerly seized, to justify the immolation of widows, hence called *satis* or *suttees*. Siva on beholding his wife's lifeless body was literally distracted, and thrusting his trident into it began whirling it in the air with frantic gestures. His violence shook the three worlds, and threatened the universe with destruction. Even the gods were in alarm, and Vishnu, as preserver, hastened to interpose. With the view of calming Siva he reminded him that the world has no real existence, and that everything in it is only *maya*, or illusion. This was but sorry comfort, and Siva in his frenzy continued to rage and gesticulate as furiously as before. It next occurred to Vishnu that his fellow-god would calm down if Sati's body was removed from his sight, and therefore while it was whirling on the trident, he took a scimitar and kept hacking it till the whole had disappeared. Siva was not aware of this hacking process till it was completed, but as soon as the object which made him frantic was removed, returned to a sound mind. He was afterwards completely consoled by the return of Sati to him under the form of Parvati, the daughter of Himalaya. From the rapidity with which her body was whirled when Vishnu hewed it in pieces, the fragments were carried to great distances, and have made all the places where they were found famous. The toes of the right foot fell at Kali Ghat and had lain in the ground undiscovered for ages, when a Brahmin, to whom their position had been revealed in a dream, dug them up, and erected on the site the temple which now bears the name of Kali. The hideous form usually borne by the idol has already been described, and it therefore only remains to give an account of the great day of the festival. The means have happily been provided by a most competent eye-witness, and we shall therefore do little more than abridge and occasionally quote verbatim from the graphic description given by Dr. Duff.¹

At early dawn the native population of Calcutta begin to move in myriads along the road leading to Kali Ghat—mere

¹ *India and Indian Missions.*

spectators, in promiscuous throngs, gaily dressed as for a holiday—and devotees in isolated groups, easily distinguished by their loose robes and their foreheads liberally besprinkled with vermilion. "Two or three of them are decked in speckled or party-coloured garments, uttering ludicrous unmeaning sounds, and playing off all sorts of antic gestures not unlike the merry-andrews on the stage of a country fair. Two or three with garlands of flowers hanging about their neck, or tied round the head, have their sides transpierced with iron rods, which project in front, and meet at an angular point, to which is affixed a small vessel in the form of a shovel. Two or three, covered with ashes, carry in their hands iron spits or rods of different lengths, small bamboo canes or hukah tubes, hard twisted cords or living snakes whose fangs have been extracted, bending their limbs into unsightly attitudes and chanting legendary songs. Two or three more are the bearers of musical instruments—horned trumpets, gongs, tinkling cymbals, and large hoarse drums, surmounted with towering bunches of black and white ostrich feathers." Then instruments blown or beaten lustily make loud and discordant music. Besides the groups of devotees who move along in succession as far as the eye can reach, others are seen advancing and spreading over the southern side of the plain where the temple stands, with flags and other pageants, and with portable stages "on which men and women are engaged in ridiculous, and often worse than ridiculous, pantomimic performances." The temple is surrounded by a high wall and a court, and the principal access to it is by a gate on the west side. Opposite to this gate stands a party of Brahmins distributing consecrated flowers, and receiving free-will offerings of money in return. After the gate is passed the temple "starts up full in view." The spectators keep moving along a narrow pathway on the south side between the temple and a portico, while the devotees pass on the outside of the portico itself towards the eastern side of the court. The proceedings which there take place are thus described:—

"Towards the wall there were stationed several blacksmiths with sharp instruments in their hands. Those of a particular group that carried the rods, canes, and other implements, now came forward. One would stretch out his hand, and getting it instantly pierced through, in would pass one of his rods

or canes. Another would hold out his arm, and getting it perforated, in would pass one of his iron spits or tubes. A third would protrude his tongue, and getting it also bored through, in would pass one of his cords or serpents. And thus all of a group that desired it, had themselves variously transpierced or perforated. When these groups had finished, another group was waiting in readiness to undergo the cruel operation; and so another and another apparently without end." Everything was now in readiness for the most solemn act of worship. It is thus described:—"Those of the different groups that carried in front the vessels already referred to, now ranged themselves all round the interior of the colonnade. All the rest assembled themselves within this living circle. On a sudden, at a signal given, commenced the bleating, and the lowing, and the struggling of the animals slaughtered in sacrifice at the farthest end of the portico; and speedily was the ground made to swim with sacrificial blood. At the same moment of time the vessel carriers threw upon the burning coals in their vessels handfuls of Indian pitch, composed of various combustible substances. Instantly ascended the smoke, and the flame, and the sulphureous smell. Those who had the musical instruments sent forth their loud, and jarring, and discordant sounds. And those who were transpierced began dancing in the most frantic manner—pulling backwards and forwards through their wounded members the rods and the canes, the spits and the tubes, the cords and the writhing serpents, till their bodies seemed streaming with their own blood." During this frightful scene the spectators looked on and applauded, ever and anon raising loud shouts of "Victory to Kali! Victory to the great Kali!" the grim idol which, seated within the temple, enveloped in a gloom artificially created by allowing no light to enter except by the door, was supposed to listen delighted to the homage thus offered.

Juggernaut, or Jagannath, justly designated as "that mighty pagoda, the mirror of all wickedness and idolatry," stands on the coast of Orissa, near the north-western shore of the Bay of Bengal, at the end of the principal street of the town of same name, every span of which, as well as a large adjoining district, is regarded as holy ground. Being the first object which meets the eye of the stranger, who, after a long voyage,

is approaching the mouth of the Hughli, it would be a welcome sight, were not its name associated with monstrous delusions and shocking barbarities. Seen from a distance, whether by sea or land, it has certainly an imposing appearance, and even a nearer approach in the latter direction does not destroy this impression, for the whole town is inclosed by luxuriant groves and gardens, which produce the best fruit of the province; but at last the filth and stench, the swarms of religious mendicants, and other objects offensive alike to the eye, the ear, and the nostril, dispel all illusion, and leave little room for any feeling but disgust.

The temple, erected A.D. 1198, stands in a square area, inclosed by a lofty stone wall, each side of which is about 650 feet in length. It is built chiefly of a coarse granite, resembling sandstone, and appears as a vast mass of masonry, surmounted by several lofty towers. Its architecture is rude and inelegant, and no taste has been displayed in the selection and execution of its ornaments. These defects are rendered still more prominent by the treatment which it has received in modern times. A coating of *chunam* with which it was covered has all been washed away, except a few stains and patches, and many parts of the sculpture, in order to stand out more prominently, have been barbarously bedaubed with red paint. After entering the inclosure by the principal gate of entrance on the east, a flight of steps leads to a terrace, twenty feet in height, inclosed by a second wall, 445 feet square. Within this inclosure most of the principal deities of the Hindu pantheon have temples. More especially under the great tower, which forms its sanctuary, stand idols of Balbhadrâ, identified with Siva—Subhadra, identified with Devi or Kali—as well as of Jagannath, or the lord of the universe, of whom some account must now be given. For this purpose it will be necessary to select from competing legends the one which is most generally received.

Krishna, it will be remembered, was accidentally killed in a thicket by an arrow. The hunter who shot the arrow left the body to rot under a tree, but some pious persons collected the bones and placed them in a box. Here they remained till the following incident took place:—Indra Dhuma, the King or Maharaja of Ujjain, distinguished for his piety, was supplicating

the favour of Vishnu, when the god appeared and assured him that he might gain the fruit of all his religious austerities, by putting the bones of Krishna into the belly of an image of Juggernaut. The king asked who should make the image, and was instructed to make application by prayer to Vishwakarma, the architect of the gods. Vishwakarma consented, but at the same time declared that if any one disturbed him while at work, he would leave the image unfinished. In one night he built a temple on what is called the Blue Mountain in Orissa, and then began with the image. After fifteen days had elapsed the king became impatient, and went to see what progress had been made. The architect thus interrupted put his threat in execution, and left the image without hands or feet. The king, greatly disconcerted, applied to Brahma, who promised to make the image famous in its present shape. Accordingly, when it was set up he not only invited all the gods to be present, but condescended to act as high-priest, and gave both eyes and soul to Juggernaut, whose fame was thus completely established.

The above legend is so far defective that it does not account for the fact that the temple, instead of being consecrated to Vishnu alone, under his form of Juggernaut, is held as a kind of joint tenancy between him and two other gods. The Brahmins of Orissa have availed themselves of this circumstance to maintain that the worship in that temple is more spiritual than what is generally practised elsewhere. Their explanation is that the deity worshipped at Juggernaut is not subordinate to any other but the supreme Spirit itself; that the images are shapeless because the *Vedas* declare that the deity has no particular form; and that their grotesque and hideous form has been given them in order to terrify the vulgar into the discharge of duty. It may be true that some allegorical meaning, far more rational than that which is generally received, may be hidden under both the shape and the number of the shapeless idol, but the only thing which can be asserted without contradiction is, that if the object was to produce terror, it has been accomplished.

The number of annual festivals celebrated at Juggernaut is thirteen, but two, called the Asnan and the Rath Jattras, are greatly distinguished above the rest, because then only the

monstrous idols are publicly exposed to view. The Rath Jatra, again, takes precedence of the Asnan, because on it alone the idols, besides being publicly exposed, pay a visit on their car to a place about a mile and a half distant. To the Rath, therefore, as the greatest of all the festivals, our attention will now be confined. In anticipation of the appointed day, vast numbers of pilgrims have assembled from all parts of the country. Many of these affecting superior sanctity, or desirous of acquiring superior merit, have measured the whole length of the way with their own bodies, and others of them suffer voluntarily or of necessity so many privations, that the pilgrimage is said to be every year the direct or indirect cause of from 2,000 to 3,000 deaths. This computation will not appear exaggerated when it is considered that the aggregate number of pilgrims is not less than 50,000, and that the roads leading to the temple are in many places literally strewed with the bones or other remains of human beings.

The festival is celebrated on the second day of the new moon in Asar, that is in the end of June or beginning of July. After various prayers and ceremonies within the temple, the idols are brought forth beyond the principal entrance, called the Lion Gate, from its being flanked with colossal figures of lions, or more properly griffins in a sitting posture. Balbhadra, Juggernaut, and Subhadra, the so-called deities, are nothing more than wooden busts, about six feet in height, fashioned into a rude resemblance of the human head, resting on a sort of pedestal. The first two, as representatives of Siva and Vishnu, or rather of their incarnations Bala Rama and Krishna, are considered brothers; the third as an incarnation of Devi or Kali is their sister. The brothers, painted respectively white and black, have arms projecting horizontally forward from the ears; the sister, painted yellow, is left devoid of similar appendages. All three have frightfully grim and distorted countenances, and wear a head-dress of cloth of different colours, shaped somewhat like a helmet. In bringing them out without the gate the priests, after placing them on a kind of litter, fasten a common rope round their necks. This done, some drag them down the steps, and through the mud, while others keep them erect, and help their movements by

shoving them from behind in the most uncereemonious manner. Balbhadra, as the elder brother, enjoys a kind of precedence which it would be dangerous to withhold, owing to the fanaticism of the Sivaites, who honour in him their favourite divinity. He is brought out first, occupies the largest car, and takes the lead in the procession which is to follow, but neither he nor his sister receives a tithe of the adoration which is paid to Juggernaut, whose appearance is hailed with an universal shout, to be likened only to that which at the council of Pandemonium "tore hell's concave." The cars, respectively 43, 41, and 40 feet high, move on ponderous wheels, of which Balbhadra's has sixteen, and each of the others fourteen wheels. To put them in motion strong cables have been provided, and the moment the signal is given, first the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts, whose peculiar duty and privilege it is, and then the multitudes generally, make a rush, and seizing the cables, drag forward the *raths* or cars. The shoutings which they raise, the clatter of hundreds of harsh-sounding instruments, and the creaking, crashing sound of the ponderous machines are absolutely deafening. The violent effort required in dragging cannot be continued without alternate pauses, at each of which the *dytaks*, or charioteers of the god, advance to a projecting part of the stage, and, by words and gestures, give utterance and display to gross obscenity. The multitude shout applause, and the dragging is resumed. At one period numerous instances of self-immolation occurred. Devotees, throwing themselves in front of the cars while in motion, were in a moment crushed to death beneath the wheels. Such cases are now so rare that they cannot be fairly represented as forming part of the regular celebration of the festival, but numerous other abominations and extravagances remain to justify the worst that can be said of it. The following description of an eye-witness, in June, 1814, is given in the *Asiatic Journal*:—

"The sights here beggar all description. Though Juggernaut made some progress on the 19th, and has travelled daily ever since, he has not yet reached the place of his destination. His brother is ahead of him, and the lady in the rear. One woman has devoted herself under the wheels, and a shocking sight it was. Another also intended to devote herself, missed the wheels

with her body, and had her arm broken. Three people lost their lives in the crowd. The place swarms with fakirs and mendicants, whose devices to attract attention are, in many instances, ingenious. You see some standing for half the day on their heads, bawling all the while for alms; some having their eyes filled with mud, and their mouths with straw; some lying in puddles of water; one man with his foot tied to his neck, another with a pot of fire on his belly, and a third enveloped in a network made of rope."

When the question is asked, At whose instigation, and for whose benefit is this monstrous festival celebrated? the answer must be, That of the Brahmins, who are maintained in idleness and luxury on the endowments of the temple, and the immense revenue obtained by levying a pilgrim tax. Upwards of 3,000 of their families subsist in this way, and manage to have not only lodging, but also board, free of expense. The appetite of the idol is so insatiable that he eats fifty-two times a day, and gives sufficient occupation to nearly 400 cooks. It is needless to say that their cookery goes to other mouths than that of Juggernaut, and that the voluntary presents of rice which pilgrims are encouraged to make as a means of propitiating his favour, besides sufficing for the priests, leaves a surplus, which, deriving additional value from having been consecrated, finds numerous and eager purchasers. Even such palpable imposture suffices not to satisfy the Brahminical avarice, and votaries are allured to the temple by means of a far more disgraceful nature. Among the regular attendants of the temple are 120 dancing girls. The nature of their employment is thus explained by Dubois:—"The service they perform consists of dancing and singing. The first they execute with grace, though with lascivious attitudes and motions. Their chanting is generally confined to the obscene songs which relate to some circumstance or other of the licentious lives of their gods. They perform these religious duties at the temple to which they belong twice a day—morning and evening. They are also obliged to assist at all the public ceremonies, which they enliven with their dance and merry song. As soon as their public business is over, they open their cells of infamy, and convert the temple of worship into a den of licentiousness."

In reading such descriptions as the above, one would fain forget how closely connected the British government once was with this very temple. When, in the course of conquest, the territory in which it was situated became an integral part of our Indian empire, it was necessary that some precautions should be taken against the disturbance of the public peace, by the vast crowds brought together from all parts of the country to celebrate the festivals. Had the East India Company, acting with the consent, or rather by the direct authority of the government at home, confined themselves to interference for this purpose alone, it could not have been misunderstood, and would in itself have been unobjectionable. Most unwisely, and we need not hesitate to add, impiously, they virtually took the grim and obscene idol under their protection, by undertaking to levy his revenues, and defray all the expenses of his establishment. In consequence of the connection thus formed they not only appointed one of their servants to collect the pilgrim tax, and pay over any residue which might accrue into their own treasury, but furnished part at least of the trappings used in the festival. There can be no doubt of the fact; and hence Stirling, in his excellent account of Orissa, inserted in volume xv. of the *Asiatic Researches*, when alluding incidentally to the appearance of the *raths* or cars, says, that "every part of the ornament is of the most mean and paltry description, *save only the covering of striped and spangled broadcloth furnished from the export warehouse of the British government, the splendour and gorgeous effect of which compensate in a great measure for other deficiencies of decoration.*" The cutting censure here implied is afterwards distinctly pronounced when he describes the difficulty of dragging the cars from the flagging zeal of the pilgrims; and then adds—"Even the gods' own proper servants will not labour zealously and effectually without the interposition of authority. I imagine the ceremony would soon cease to be conducted on its present scale and footing, if the institution were left entirely to its fate, and to its own resources, by the officers of the British government." In other words, a government professedly Christian was engaged in the unhallowed task of not only countenancing idolatry in its most abominable form, but of propping it up when it was falling by its own weight. It is

needless to examine the arguments, partly mercenary and partly Machiavellian, employed to justify this alliance with idolatry, since the moral sense revolts against it, and public opinion, once blinded, has become alive to its enormity, and extinguished it for ever.

The character of the gods and the kind of worship deemed acceptable to them having been explained, it will now be necessary to examine the other leading articles of the Hindu creed, and thus obtain a key to the motives by which those who profess it are influenced in their religious observances. Man never sinks so low as not to have some religion. The idea of the existence of a higher order of beings than himself is so natural that some have conceived it to be innate, and there is an easy transition from this idea to the conviction, that such beings, besides being cognizant of human affairs, exercise a direct and powerful influence over them. Hence the important question arises—According to what rule do they act in distributing their favours? or, By what course of conduct may these be most effectually secured? The importance of this question is greatly increased by the consideration of a future state. When the body dies, the spirit which animated it is not extinguished. It only departs from the tabernacle in which it dwelt, or escapes from the prison-house in which it was confined, and has thereby, in all probability, been rendered more susceptible than ever of pleasure and pain. The belief that these are not dispensed indiscriminately, but awarded according to desert, gives meaning, and is in fact the great incentive to religious observance. Some homage might indeed be paid to a higher nature from instinctive respect and veneration, without expectation of ulterior benefit, but formal and regular worship never would be performed by any one not persuaded that he might by means of it promote at once his present and his future welfare. All systems of religion, therefore, how widely soever they may differ in their particular features, must be based on certain fundamental beliefs—an over-ruling providence belonging exclusively to one Supreme Being, or ascribed by a foolish imagination to an indefinite series of so-called deities—a future state—and a distribution of rewards and punishments, according to some fixed rule of favour or supposed desert. In the Christian system each of

these is exhibited in its most perfect form—one only God, infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness—a future state, in which the destiny of every individual, the moment he quits the present life, is irrevocably fixed—and a distribution of happiness and misery, not indeed according to a desert of which human nature is incapable, but as the completion of a wondrous plan in which truth meets with mercy, and righteousness with peace. In all these respects Hinduism presents not a resemblance, but a hideous contrast. The nature of its gods has been seen. Turn now to its future state.

The great peculiarity of the Hindu creed in regard to a future state is its doctrine of a transmigration of souls, which, having been borrowed from them by the Greeks, has received the name of metempsychosis. According to this doctrine, the present life is intended not so much for probation as for transition. As a general rule, the soul on quitting the body passes into another, and thus commences a new life, no longer, it may be, in the form of a human being, but in that of a lower animal, or even of a vegetable. There is no necessity for confining this curious process to the future, and hence it is actually extended to both the present and the past. All the forms of life now existing are animated by beings who, though utterly unconscious of the fact, previously existed, and owe their present place in the scale of being to the course of conduct which they then pursued. Those in the lower and more degrading forms are paying the penalty of former misdeeds; those more favourably situated are entitled, besides congratulating themselves on their good fortune, to take credit for a fund of merit of which they are now reaping the reward. This strange doctrine leads directly to important practical results. Poverty, misfortune, and all the ills which flesh is heir to, we have been taught to regard as divine dispensations, sent more in mercy than in judgment, and designed for the moral improvement, both of the sufferers themselves, and of those who only witnessed their sufferings. While the former are invited to look upward, and aspire to a better happiness than this world can bestow, the latter are enjoined to sympathize with the distresses, and minister as stewards of the divine bounty to the necessities of their less fortunate brethren. The Hindu view does not allow any such lessons to be taught.

It first identifies misfortune with crime, committed in the present or in a former life, and then refuses to relieve it, on the hypocritical pretext that to do so were to thwart the design of the deity by whom the penalty is inflicted. This is not a theoretical inference, but a well ascertained fact; and hence, when, as not unfrequently happens, the flesh of one of the swinging devotees gives way, and he is dashed down to instant death, the spectators either look on with apathy, or give utterance to their belief that he would not have been killed in this way if he had not deserved it.

This hardness of heart, steeling a man against his fellow, and making him indifferent to his fate, is not the only pernicious consequence of the dogma of transmigration. While it destroys mutual sympathy, and thus deprives society of one of the strongest bonds by which its stability and good order are maintained, it operates still more injuriously on the individual. Life has an object truly worthy of the name, when it is regarded as the period during which immortal happiness must be gained, or for ever forfeited. On the contrary, when it is regarded as nothing more than one in a series of metamorphoses, of which many have already taken place and others are to follow in almost endless succession, its main interest is destroyed, and it becomes incapable of furnishing the necessary incentive to piety and virtue in the shape of a final and eternal reward. What the human soul longs for, after it has been made sensible of its original dignity and desirous of regaining it, is a haven of purity and felicity, where it may rest secure after all the toils and trials of the present life are ended; whereas Hinduism only offers a repetition of the same toils and trials under a new form—a repetition which indeed has some imaginary limits assigned to it, but those so remote, that it may after the lapse of ages give no signs of drawing to a close.

A less unfavourable view of the dogma of transmigration is sometimes taken, and it has been said that by it "hope seems denied to none; the most wicked man, after being purged of his crimes by ages of suffering and repeated transmigrations, may ascend in the scale of being, until he may enter into heaven, and even attain the highest reward of all the good, which is incorporation in the essence of God."¹ Such a result being

¹ Elphinstone's *History of India*, vol. i. pages 189-90.

certainly possible, it may be worth while to trace the steps of the process by which it is to be obtained. In the twelfth chapter of the *Institutes of Manu*, which treats at length of transmigration and final beatitude, the explanation of the dogma is as follows:—"A rational creature has a reward or a punishment for mental acts in his mind; for verbal acts in his organs of speech; for corporeal acts in his bodily frame. For sinful acts corporeal, a man shall assume a vegetable or mineral form; for such acts verbal, the form of a bird or a beast; for acts mental, the lowest of human conditions." Again: "Be it known, that the three qualities of the rational soul are a tendency to goodness, to passion, and to darkness; and endued with one or more of them, it remains incessantly attached to all these created substances." "When a man perceives in the reasonable soul a disposition tending to virtuous love, unclouded with any malignant passion, clear as the purest light, let him recognize it as the quality of goodness; a temper of mind which gives uneasiness, and produces disaffection, let him consider as the adverse quality of passion, ever agitating embodied spirits; that indistinct, inconceivable, unaccountable disposition of a mind naturally sensual and clouded with infatuation, let him know to be the quality of darkness." Each of these three qualities or dispositions of mind admits of three degrees—a highest, a middle, and a lowest. The corresponding transmigrations are thus described:—1. "Vegetable and mineral substances, worms, insects and reptiles, fish, snakes, tortoises, cattle, shakals, are the lowest forms to which the dark quality leads; elephants, horses, men of the servile class, and contemptible *Mlech'has* (barbarians), lions, tigers, and boars, are the mean states procured by the quality of darkness; dancers and singers, birds, and deceitful men, giants and blood-thirsty savages, are the highest conditions to which the dark quality can ascend." 2. *Jhallas* or cudgel-players, *mallas* or boxers and wrestlers, *natas* or actors, those who teach the use of weapons, and those who are addicted to gaming and drinking, are the lowest forms occasioned by the passionate quality; kings, men of the fighting class, domestic priests of kings, and men skilled in the war of controversy, are the middle states caused by the quality of passion; *gandharvas* or aerial musicians, *ghuyacas* and *yakshas* or servants and

companions of Kuvera, genii attending superior gods, as the *vidyadhara*s and others; together with various companies of *apsarases* or nymphs, are the highest of those forms which the quality of passion attains." 3. "Hermits, religious mendicants, other Brahmins, such orders of demigods as are wafted in airy cars, genii of the signs and lunar mansions, and *daityas*, are the lowest of the states procured by the quality of goodness; sacrificers, holy sages, deities of the lower heaven, genii of the *Vedas*, regents of stars, divinities of years, *pitris* or progenitors of mankind, and the demigods named *sadhyas*, are the middle forms to which the good quality conveys; Brahma with four faces, creators of worlds, as *Marichi*, the genius of virtue, the divinities presiding over *Mahat* or the *Mighty*, and *Ayacta* or *Unperceived*, are the highest conditions to which, by the good quality, souls are exalted."

In regard to those possessing the quality of goodness, it seems to be held that as soon as the present body dies, the soul rises at once to its destined elevation, and hence goodness in the highest degree exempts its possessor from transmigration of any kind, and gives him what is conceived to be the greatest of all possible rewards—immediate absorption into the divine essence. Where goodness is possessed in its middle and lowest, and passion in its highest degree, the reward, though immediate, requires a transmigration. Persons thus qualified are admitted to some kind of celestial mansion, where they either act as ministering servants in the form of aerial musicians, nymphs, and genii, or become demigods, wafted in airy cars, occupants of the lunar mansions, regents of stars, deities of the lower heaven, &c. Here doubtless their happiness is great, for Hindu imagination has done its best to furnish the habitations of the gods with everything that ministers to enjoyment—with palaces of gold resplendent with gems, magnificent gardens watered by crystal streams and producing all kinds of delicious fruits, lovely flowers and fragrant perfumes, music chanted by aerial choristers, and perpetual feasts, by which the appetite is always gratified and never cloyed. The abode of Yama must indeed be visited before these heavens can be reached; but for them it has no terrors, since their path lies along delightful meadows, under the shade of magnificent trees, and by the banks of

streams covered with the lotus. The mansions which those possessing only the lower degrees of goodness are taught to anticipate, are in fact far more attractive than the final reward of absorption, which, in any view that can be taken of it, looks very like annihilation. It is not therefore surprising that the number who would be contented with the former is far greater than that of those who aspire to the latter. In the Hindu system, however, even the happiness of heaven has a canker in it. It is not immortal. After a period, which, however long it may be, is so fixed and definite, that its days and years can be counted, a new cycle begins. The inhabitants, in the midst of their enjoyments, cannot forget the fact that they must sooner or later quit them, and be driven into exile, to enter on some new state of being, in which it may be their lot to sink to some unfathomable abyss of misery. When thus taught that blessedness, even when attained, is held by a precarious tenure, the worshipper does not reason very illogically when he resolves to give up all thoughts of the future, and confine his aspirations to the present life.

Besides those who are at once united to Brahma by absorption, without transmigration, and those who possess merit sufficient to obtain temporary admission into some kind of heaven, there are others—forming, it is to be suspected, the far greater number—to whom the future presents itself only as a period of fearful retribution. These consisting chiefly of those in whom the quality of darkness predominates, are not considered fit even for transmigration till they have, in part at least, expiated their guilt in one of the numerous hells provided for that purpose. When after death they set out for the court of Yama, who is to sit in judgment on them and fix their doom, they perform the journey amid inconceivable horrors, and rend the air with shrieks and wailing. The sentence passed consigns them to a hell where the torment is adapted to the guilt which it is meant to punish. One sticks in the mud with his head downward, another is plunged in boiling oil, another is being sawed in two; some stand among molten metal, some have their toe nails or tongues wrenched out, and numbers have their entrails perpetually gnawed by ravenous beasts, birds, and reptiles. It is only after “having passed,” as the *Institutes of*

Manu express it, "through terrible regions of torture for a great number of years," that they are condemned to new births. And what births? Some migrate "a hundred times into the forms of grasses, of shrubs with crowded stems, or of creeping and twining plants, of carnivorous animals, of beasts with sharp teeth, or of cruel brutes;" others "pass a thousand times into the bodies of spiders, of snakes and cameleons, of aquatic monsters, or of mischievous blood-sucking demons." Again, "If a man steal grain in the husk, he shall be born a rat; if a yellow mixed metal, a gander; if water, a *plava* or diver; if honey, a great stinging gnat; if milk, a crow; if expressed juice, a dog; if clarified butter, an ichneumon weasel," and so on through a long list, in some of which a congruity between the crime and the punishment may be detected, while in others the birth seems to have been selected at random by fancy run riot. It is added that "women who have committed similar thefts incur a similar taint, and shall be paired with those male beasts in the form of their females." Such, then, is the future state which Hinduism has prepared for those who embrace it. An absorption into the divine essence, destructive of personal identity, and consequently equivalent to annihilation, is the highest blessedness to which its greatest saints can aspire; a heaven furnished with all that is most captivating to the senses, but not destined for perpetuity, constitutes its next highest reward; and a hell of unspeakable misery, to be followed after thousands of years by reappearance in the world, under some degenerate form, is the only doom which the great majority of worshippers can anticipate. As even this doom is not fixed beyond the possibility of change, there is a sense in which it may be said, that "hope is denied to none;" but the truth of the case would be more accurately expressed by saying, that to all professing Hindus, with the exception of a comparatively small number, to whom peculiar favour is shown, the natural tendency of their creed is not to cherish hope, but to produce indifference or despair. This will be made manifest by attending to the mode in which its rewards and punishments are distributed.

All actions not indifferent, naturally range themselves under the two great heads of "virtuous" and "vicious." Every form of religion, false as well as true, recognizes this important

classification, and professes to distribute rewards and punishments in accordance with it. In this respect Hinduism follows the common rule, and presents a system of morality which, notwithstanding some glaring defects and excrescences, does not suffer by comparison with any other system derived from the mere light of nature. Thus, not only is the fundamental principle laid down, that, "for the sake of distinguishing actions, He (the supreme Ruler) made a total difference between right and wrong;" but the peculiar qualities belonging to each are enumerated with considerable accuracy and fulness. Even from the *Institutes of Manu*, though not specially intended to furnish a complete moral code, it would be possible to extract a series of precepts enjoining the observance of almost all individual and relative duties. The following quotations give a sufficient specimen. In regard to the natural tendencies of virtue and vice, it is declared that "even here below an unjust man attains no felicity;" and, therefore, though a man should be "oppressed by penury, in consequence of his righteous dealings, let him never give his mind to unrighteousness; for he may observe the speedy overthrow of iniquitous and sinful men. Yes; iniquity once committed, fails not of producing fruit to him that wrought it; if not in his own person, yet in his sons, or if not in his sons, yet in his grandsons. He grows rich for a while through unrighteousness; then he beholds good things; then it is that he vanquishes his foes; but he perishes at length from his root upwards." To these observations, equally sound in principle and confirmed by experience, it is immediately added, "Let a man continually take pleasure in truth, in justice, in laudable practices, and in purity; let him chastise those whom he may chastise in a legal mode; let him keep in subjection his speech, his arm, and his appetite; wealth and pleasures repugnant to law, let him shun; and even lawful acts, which may cause future pain or be offensive to mankind. Let him not have nimble hands, restless feet, or voluble eyes; let him not be crooked in his ways; let him not be flippant in his speech, nor intelligent in doing mischief; let him walk in the path of good men." Should the discharge of duty involve the loss of life, it is expressly decided that the former must be preferred. "On a comparison between death and vice, the learned pronounce vice

the more dreadful, since after death a vicious man sinks to regions lower and lower, while a man free from vice reaches heaven." In a similar spirit the superiority of moral obligations to ritual observances is thus declared—"A wise man should constantly discharge all the moral duties, though he perform not constantly the ceremonies of religion; since he falls low if, while he performs ceremonial acts only, he discharge not his moral duties." And again, "To a man contaminated by sensuality, neither the *Vedas*, nor liberality, nor sacrifices, nor strict observances, nor pious austerities, ever procure felicity."

It ought also to be observed, that the morality inculcated is not that which consists merely in outward act, but that which has its seat in the heart, and controls its secret purposes. Accordingly, it is forbidden to "injure another in deed or in thought;" and in several passages some approach is made to a celebrated declaration in the "Sermon on the Mount," by stigmatizing lascivious looks and thoughts as a species of adultery. A still more marked resemblance to the morality of the *New Testament* is observable in the homage paid to what are called the passive virtues. One of those specially recommended is "returning good for evil;" and in describing the course which a Brahmin ought to follow in the last stage of his appointed discipline, it is said, "Let him not wish for death; let him not wish for life; let him expect his appointed time, as a kind servant expects his wages; let him utter words purified by truth; let him by all means keep his heart purified." Again, "Let him bear a reproachful speech with patience; let him speak reproachfully to no man; let him not, on account of this frail and feverish body, engage in hostility with any one living. With an angry man let him not in his turn be angry; abused, let him speak mildly. Delighted with meditating on the supreme Spirit, sitting fixed in such meditation, without needing anything earthly, without one sensual desire, without any companion but his own soul, let him live in this world seeking the bliss of the next."

From the pure and elevated tone pervading these quotations, it might be supposed that Hinduism demands from all its votaries a strict observance of moral precepts, and confers its highest future rewards, without distinction of persons, on those who make the greatest progress in true piety and virtue. The rule

actually followed is very different. In the lives of the favourite deities, licentiousness prevails to such an extent as to counteract, by its example, the practical effect of any precepts opposed to it; and hence, while morality is in a great measure discarded, a substitute for it has been found in mummeries and austerities which, though dignified with the name of devotion, are merely mechanical, inasmuch as the performance of them does not require any act of the understanding or call forth any emotion of the heart. This so-called devotion is thus eulogized—"All the bliss of deities and of men is declared by sages who discern the sense of the *Veda*, to have in devotion its cause, in devotion its continuance, and in devotion its fulness." "Perfect health or unfailing medicines, divine learning, and the various mansions of deities, are acquired by devotion alone; their efficient cause is devotion. Whatever is hard to be traversed, whatever is hard to be acquired, whatever is hard to be visited, whatever is hard to be performed, all this may be accomplished by true devotion; for the difficulty of devotion is the greatest of all. Even sinners in the highest degree, and of course the other offenders, are absolved from guilt by austere devotion well practised. Worms and insects, serpents, moths, beasts, birds, and vegetables, attain heaven by the power of devotion. Whatever sin has been conceived in the hearts of men, uttered in their speech, or committed in their bodily acts, they speedily burn it away by devotion, if they preserve devotion as their best wealth."

In regard to this devotion, it is to be observed in the *first* place, that the portion of it which is conceived to constitute the highest perfection, and for which, consequently, the greatest rewards are reserved, is utterly impracticable to the great body of the Hindu population. It requires free access to the *Veda*, but in point of fact this access is so far from being free that it is fenced round by an impassable barrier. The whole Sudra class—in other words, the people generally—are strictly prohibited from forming any acquaintance with it. It must not be read in their presence; and the Brahmin presuming to teach it to them, commits a sin so heinous as to sink him to one of the lowest hells. Even the mode of expiating sin must not be taught to a Sudra; and in any religious act in which he may "imitate the practice of good men," he must not make

mention of "any holy text," though it is again and again declared that on such mention the efficacy of the act itself mainly depends. Hence it appears that Hinduism, so far from placing all men on an equal footing, and rewarding them according to their deserts, is a system of unvarnished and revolting favouritism, confining the means of attaining final felicity to the few, and consigning the many to a state of helpless ignorance, which makes their perdition all but inevitable.

It is to be observed, in the *second* place, with regard to this lauded devotion, that when it is closely examined the praises bestowed upon it are found to be undeserved. In some passages quoted above from the *Institutes of Manu*, the insufficiency of mere ritual observances is distinctly declared. The following passage goes still farther; for it declares that forgiveness cannot be obtained without a repentance proved genuine by its fruits:—"In proportion as a man who has committed a sin shall truly and voluntarily confess it, so far he is disengaged from that offence, like a snake from his slough; and in proportion as his heart sincerely loathes his evil deed, so far shall his vital spirit be freed from the taint of it. If he commit sin, and actually repent, that sin shall be removed from him; but if he merely say, 'I will sin thus no more,' he can only be released by an actual abstinence [from guilt." Such passages, however, prove only to be lights shining in a dark place. Many other passages breathe so different a spirit, that they look as if they had been introduced for the mere purpose of contradicting them or neutralizing their effect; and devotion, so far from depending for its efficacy on purity of heart and amendment of life, derives one of its chief recommendations from its supposed ability to act as a substitute for them. So little, indeed, does this devotion partake of the nature of a reasonable service; that in a passage which has been already quoted, the lower animals are supposed capable of performing and profiting by it. The chief ingredients in it are suppressions of the breath, inaudible utterances, repetitions by rote, irksome or painful postures, voluntary privations, and austerities.

In justification of the character thus ascribed to Hindu devotion, it will again be necessary to make a few quotations from the *Institutes of Manu*. "Even three suppressions of breath,

made according to the divine rule, accompanied with the triverbal phrase and the trilateral syllable, may be considered as the highest devotion of a Brahmin." The "triverbal phrase" consists of three Sanskrit words, *bhur*, *bhurah*, *swar*, meaning *earth*, *sky*, *heaven*. The trilateral syllable is A U M, contracted into *om*, and considered, as already mentioned, emblematic of the godhead. Again:—"A priest who shall know the *Veda*, and shall pronounce to himself, both morning and evening, that syllable (*om*), and that holy text (the *Gayatri*), preceded by the three words, shall attain the sanctity which the *Veda* confers." Lest the words, "know the *Veda*," used in this passage, should be supposed to mean a thorough practical knowledge, it is elsewhere said that "this holy scripture is a sure refuge even for those who understand not its meaning;" and that "a priest who should retain in his memory the whole *Rig Veda* would be absolved from guilt, even if he had slain the inhabitants of the three worlds, and had eaten food from the foulest hands." The same spirit prevails in all the various modes employed for the expiation of guilt, and whatever the offence, the offender may always purge away the guilt of it by some device which only touches him in his purse or his person, without tending in the least to purify his mind. It is true that many of the penances enjoined are not only severe, but horrible; and that by a kind of will-worship devotees have made a large addition to the number, so that there is scarcely a form of human suffering to which recourse is not had in the vain hope of thereby pacifying the conscience, and conciliating the divine favour. The number of persons engaged in this hopeless task, and the aggregate amount of suffering which they must endure, attest the existence of a deep religious feeling in the Hindu, since it is this alone which makes him so ingenious in the art of self-tormenting. The more melancholy, therefore, is the fact, that this religious feeling has only made him the prey of religious impostors, and bound him in the chains of a superstition so full of absurdity, obscenity, and cruelty. Considering the character of Hinduism, nothing seems so extraordinary as the hold which it takes of its votaries. The monstrosities of its beliefs, and the painful sacrifices which its worship demands, seem only additional inducements to cling to it with pertinacity; and while almost

on every other subject a general listlessness and apathy prevail, Hinduism, without one particle of rational evidence to support it, keeps its head erect, and stands its ground even when confronted with Christianity. This tenaciousness of life is doubtless owing in part to the way in which it gratifies the wishes of our fallen nature; but there is reason also to suspect that a nervous anxiety to avoid everything that might tend to awaken suspicion or alarm in the native mind has often operated as a direct encouragement to Hinduism, and placed it on a kind of vantage ground which it is not entitled to occupy.

Hinduism is precluded by its very nature from attempting to gain converts from other religions. Every individual who professes it must have been born a Hindu, and belong to one or other of its numerous castes. The admission of a foreigner is consequently impossible, and there can be no such thing as conversion in the ordinary sense of the term. Men not born Hindus cannot possibly become so by any other kind of process. Occasionally some eccentric European has renounced his own civilization, and become a professed worshipper of Brahma, Vishnu, Siva, and others of the multifarious gods of the Hindu pantheon; but nothing could remove the taint of his birth, or make him anything better than an outcast. From not attending to this fact, or drawing the proper inference from it, some writers have launched out in the praises of Hinduism as a tolerant system, and contrasted it in this respect with the intolerance and persecution which figure so frequently and prominently in the history of the Christian church. A Hindu, it is said, bears no enmity to a Muhammedan or a Christian. Neither to the one nor the other does he apply the opprobrious epithets of heretic and infidel. On the contrary, he liberally expresses his belief that the supreme Being who gave him his religion gave them theirs, and that each, therefore, does right in worshipping according to his own. This talk is specious but hollow. The Hindu, regarding his religion as his birthright, cannot think that any disparagement is cast upon it when those born without its pale, and consequently incapable of belonging to it, worship differently. The true way to test his toleration is to attend to the feelings with which he regards those who, born Hindus like himself, differ with him in regard to some of the essential points

of their common faith. Here only there is risk of collision, and therefore here only is there full scope for the exercise of toleration. Brought to this test, it will be found that Hindus are as illiberal, virulent, and blood-thirsty as the worst persecutors who have disgraced the Christian name.

Though the Hindus do not, like the Roman Catholics, pretend to be under the guidance of a living infallible head, who, by deciding points of faith, secures a species of external unity, they possess standards which they believe to be inspired, and to which, therefore, whenever questions arise, the ultimate appeal must be made. These are the writings of which some account has already been given. They are included under the general name of *Sastras* or *Shastras*, and are both voluminous in bulk and multifarious in contents, consisting of the *Vedas* and the *Puranas*. The latter are alleged to have been, like the former, compiled by Vyasa, but are evidently of various later dates, between the eighth and the sixteenth centuries of our era, and though regarded as authentic, disfigured by sectarian fables. Those who profess to receive all those *Shastras*, and to worship in conformity to them, are considered orthodox. Not being easily reconcilable with themselves or with each other, the *Sastras* afford large room for latitude of opinion, and for the selection of favourite divinities out of the long list of those to whom worship is authorized. To this latitude and this selection no objection is made, and the great body of the Brahmins, while holding their peculiar views and gratifying their particular fancies, treat each other with mutual forbearance. There are many, however, whom this kind of forbearance does not satisfy. It is not enough for them that they may be worshippers of Vishnu, or of Siva, or of any of the old recognized divinities, according as their choice may be; they also claim the right of insisting that their favourite divinity is supreme, and ought consequently to be worshipped to the exclusion of every other. Some go still farther, and introduce not only old gods under new forms, but new gods altogether. Here forbearance having reached its limit stops, collision becomes inevitable, and in the strife which ensues, though a body of so-called orthodox remains, a number of distinct sects are formed. The Hindu sects are usually ranged in four classes—Vaishnavas, or worship-

pers of Vishnu; Saivas, or worshippers of Siva; Saktas, or worshippers of Saktis, the consorts or energies of the male divinities; and Miscellaneous, including all who do not belong to any of the other three. A very complete account of these sects has been given by Professor Wilson, in the sixteenth and seventeenth volumes of the *Asiatic Researches*; and all that need be done here is to select from it a description of some features common to all the sects, and of the more remarkable opinions and practices by which some of the leading sects are distinguished.

Of the common features there is one which, as it strikes the eye, is the first that attracts notice. All sects are in the practice of discriminating themselves from the orthodox and from each other by various fantastical streaks on their faces, breasts, and arms. For this purpose all the Vaishnavas employ a white earth called *gopichandana*. To be of the purest form it should be taken from a pool in which the *gopis*, or milkmaids, are said to have drowned themselves when they heard of Krishna's death; but as this is not easily attainable, a substitute is found in a material to which the same name is given, though it is only a magnesian or calcareous clay. In using it, one sect draws two vertical lines from the root of the hair to the commencement of each eyebrow, and unites them by a transverse streak across the root of the nose; in the centre between the vertical lines a parallel streak of red is introduced. The breast and each upper arm are similarly marked. Some, not satisfied with these marks, have impressions of the shell, discus, club, and lotus, which Vishnu bears in his four hands, stamped on their bodies by carved wooden blocks, or sometimes even burned in by heated metallic plates. Such marks not only serve for distinction, but are supposed to possess great virtue; and hence it is asserted in the work called *Kasi Khand*, that Yama directs his ministers to avoid such as bear them, and that no sin can exist in the individuals who make use of them, be they of whatever caste. This mention of caste suggests another feature common though not universal among all sects. For the most part the distinction of caste is utterly disregarded by them, and the Brahmins as a class are eyed with hatred and treated with contempt, especially by the sectarian devotees of greatest pretensions.

Another more important feature common to the sects, is the subdivision of their members into various classes, especially into two, which Professor Wilson, for want of a better name, calls *clerical* and *lay*. The latter includes the great bulk of the votaries; the former are divided as in the Romish church into secular and regular, but without having the yoke of celibacy imposed on them. The unmarried, however, are in highest estimation as teachers, and as a general rule, the most influential members of each sect are solitaries and coenobites, who have secluded themselves from the ordinary cares and enjoyments of life, and live either by themselves as hermits, or in communities as monks. Convents are of course required, and under the name of *maths*, *asthals*, and *akharas*, are scattered over the whole country. Each *math* is under the control of a *mahant* or superior, with a certain number of resident *chelas* or disciples. By those, and from among their own number, he is usually elected; but in some instances, where the mahant marries, he transmits the office to his descendants. There is nothing like compulsory residence within the math, and hence most of the members spend the earlier part of their life wandering over the country singly or in bodies, and subsisting by alms, merchandise, or more questionable means. When old and infirm, they retire into some math previously existing, or found a new one. Among their mendicant and monastic orders of all sects, are certain devotees professing more than usual austerity, and distinguished by the names of *Sanyasis*, *Vairagis*, and *Nagas*. In a similar sense, the term *fakir* is also used by Hindus, though being of Muhammedan origin it is more properly descriptive of the mendicants of that faith. The only one of these classes which it is necessary particularly to notice are the Nagas, who, as their name implies, throw off every kind of covering and go naked. Having eradicated the sense of shame, they give free indulgence to all the vices which it might have helped them to cover, and are unquestionably the most worthless and profligate members of their respective religions. They always carry weapons—usually a matchlock, and sword, and shield, and wander in troops, soliciting alms, or rather levying contributions. The hatred which those of opposite sects bear to each other, has often led to sanguinary conflicts, in one of which, at Hardwar, it is said that 18,000 of the Vaishnava Nagas were left dead on the field.

The sects of Vaishnavas are ranked by Professor Wilson under twenty different heads, but as many of them are ramifications of a single sect, the whole number may be greatly reduced. The most ancient and respectable of all is the Sri Sampradaya, founded about the twelfth century by the Vaishnava reformer, Ramanuja Acharya, from whom the members take the name of Ramanujyas. Ramanuja was a native of the south of India, and is the subject of many legends. According to one of these, he is an incarnation of the serpent Sesha, and had for his chief companions and disciples the embodied discus, mace, lotus, and other insignia of Vishnu. His usual residence was at Sri Ranga or Seringham. Here he composed his principal works, and hither, after visiting various parts of India, and reclaiming to Vishnu various shrines which the Saivas had usurped, he returned. During his absence, the disputes between the Vaishnavas and Saivas had become extremely violent, and the King of Chola, attached to the latter sect, issued an order to all the Brahmins in his dominions, to sign an acknowledgment of Siva's supremacy. Ramanuja refused; and when armed men were sent to seize him, escaped to the Ghats. On the death of the Chola king, his persecutor, he wandered back to Seringham, and there ended his days as a recluse. His followers are numerous, particularly in the Deccan, where they have many establishments. Their worship is addressed to Vishnu and Lakshmi, and their respective incarnations either singly or conjointly; the most striking peculiarities in their practice are the individual preparation and scrupulous privacy of their meals. Each person cooks for himself, and if seen by a stranger while thus engaged, or while eating, would bury the viands in the ground. Beside the marks above mentioned, they wear a necklace of the wood of the *tulasi*, and carry a rosary composed of its seeds or those of the lotus. Their chief religious tenet is that Vishnu was before all worlds, and the creator of all, and is, in fact, Brahm, the one self-existent principle, not however devoid of form or quality, but endowed with all good qualities, and with a two-fold form—the supreme Spirit, or cause, and the universe or matter, the effect.

The most important branch of the Ramanujyas is the Ramawats or Ramanandis, so called from their founder,

Ramanand, who, though sometimes said to be an immediate disciple of Ramanuja, seems not to be earlier than the end of the fourteenth century. He was, however, of the sect of Ramanuja, till the scruples of some of its members drove him from its communion. As he had travelled much, they thought it impossible that he could have observed that privacy in his meals to which they attach so much importance. On this ground they condemned him to take his food by himself. He resented the treatment, and breaking off all connection with the Ramanujyas, founded a sect of his own. He resided at Benares, where he is said to have had a math which the Muhammedans destroyed, and where a stone platform bearing the supposed impression of his feet is still shown. In Benares, as well as in many parts of Upper Hindustan, his followers are numerous and influential. In their worship they recognize all the incarnations of Vishnu, but attach themselves particularly to that of Ramachandra. Hence their name of Ramawats. They also take the name of Aradhuta, or liberated, from discarding the peculiar strictness of the Ramanuja sect as to eating, leaving every one in this to follow his own inclination, or comply with common practice.

The most celebrated of Ramanand's disciples was Kabir, the founder of a Vaishnava sect known by the name of the Kabir Panthis. He is entitled to particular notice from the boldness with which he assailed the whole system of idolatrous worship, and ridiculed the learning of the Pundits and the doctrines of the *Shastras*. As usual, his followers have given him a divine origin, by making him an incarnation of Vishnu. The legend is—that Nima, the wife of Nuri, a weaver, found him when an infant floating on a lotus in a pond near Benares. From this circumstance he has received the surname of the "Weaver." It is not easy to fix the date when he flourished, because a life protracted to three hundred years is gravely claimed for him; but he probably belongs to the first half of the fifteenth century. The distinguishing feature of the sect is the refusal to worship any Hindu deity, or perform any Hindu rite. At the same time, the members enjoy considerable latitude, and if so disposed, may conform to the usages of the sect or caste to which they may happen to belong. This they justify on the ground, that

as the state of the mind and heart is alone important, all outward acts are matters of indifference. In all sects implicit submission to the *guru* or spiritual guide is considered indispensable; but even in this, the Kabir Panthis give proof of an independent spirit, by refusing to acknowledge the authority of the guru until by previous examination his fitness has been fully tested. In the simplicity of this sect, and the Quaker-like spirit and demeanour of its members, there is little to captivate the populace; and hence, though widely diffused, it plumes itself more upon the character than the number of its adherents. Few of these are within the limits of Bengal proper; but at Benares, where the sect originated, it has still its principal seat, and is said to have on one occasion mustered its members to the number of 35,000. The importance of the sect is greatly increased by the number of branches which it has thrown out, and of other sects which sometimes with, and oftener without acknowledgment, have borrowed from its doctrines and been emboldened by its example.

The above subdivisions of Vaishnavas have their chief adherents in professed ascetics, or among those of the general mass of society, who are of a bold and curious spirit; but the opulent and luxurious among the men, and the far greater part of the women, confine their worship to Krishna and his mistress Radha. The only worship which rivals it in popularity is that of the infant Krishna, or the Bala Gopala. It originated with Vallabha Acharya, the founder of a sect called after him Vallabhacharis, but better known under the two other names of Radra Sampradayis, or Gokulasta Gosains. One singular article of their creed is, that privation forms no part of sanctity, and that it is the duty of the teacher and his disciples to worship their deity "not in nudity and hunger, but in costly apparel and choice food—not in solitude and mortification, but in the pleasures of society and the enjoyment of the world." Their practice corresponds. Most of their Gosains or teachers are married, and possessing unlimited influence over their followers, whom they bind to subjection of *tan*, *man*, and *dhan*, or *body*, *mind*, and *wealth*, are maintained in ease and luxury. Great numbers of the mercantile class belong to this sect, and while constantly wandering over the country in the professed character

of pilgrims, have a keen eye to the profits of trade. One of their dogmas is, that Golaka, the residence of Krishna, is far above the three worlds—Vaikuntha, and Kailas, the respective heavens of Vishnu and Siva, being no less than 500,000,000 of *yoganas* below it. While all else is subject to annihilation, Golaka is indestructible, and in its centre dwells Krishna, “of the colour of a dark cloud, in the bloom of youth, clad in yellow raiment, splendidly adorned with celestial gems, and holding a flute. Radha was produced from his left side, and 300 *gopas*, or male companions, exuded from the pores of his skin. The pores of Radha were equally prolific, and produced the same number of *gopis*, or female companions. In the temples and houses of the sect are images of Gopal Krishna, and Radha, and other relative incarnations. The image of Krishna, not unfrequently of gold, represents him as a chubby boy, of a dark hue, richly decorated. In the temples he receives homage eight times a day. The nature of this homage is curious, and proceeds on the figment that the image is the living god, performing all the ordinary functions of life. Thus, in the morning, about half an hour after sunrise, the image, taken from the couch on which it is supposed to have slept, is washed and dressed, and being placed upon a seat is presented with light refreshments. About an hour and a half afterwards, being anointed, perfumed, and richly dressed, he holds his public court. A visit is again paid him, when he is supposed to attend his cattle; and at midday, when he is supposed to return, a dinner, composed of all sorts of delicacies, is placed before him. A *siesta* is now deemed necessary, and is followed at intervals by an afternoon meal, an evening toilet, and preparations for going to bed. This accomplished, the worshippers retire, and the temple is shut till the following morning, when the same routine begins. At stated times, festivals of great celebrity are held. One of these, in which Krishna, in his form of Juggernaut, holds the principal place, has already been described. Another commemorates his nativity, and a third his dance with sixteen *gopis*. Both of these, but particularly the latter, when celebrated at Benares, attract immense crowds. The sect has many subdivisions, which form separate communities, but agree with it in all essential particulars. The most celebrated of its shrines is that of Sri Nath

Dwara, in Ajmer. Hither the image is said to have transported itself from Mathura, when Aurangzeb ordered the temple there to be destroyed. All the members of the sect are bound annually to visit this shrine, and of course contribute to it, in return for a certificate of their visit; the high-priest, or chief Gosain, holds the office by descent, and to this alone is indebted for the veneration paid to him. So little are peculiar sanctity and learning required, that the office has been frequently held by individuals destitute of both. At the time when Professor Wilson drew up his sketch, the actual chief was said not to understand the certificate he signed.

The only other Vaishnavas whom it seems necessary to mention, are those entitled by way of distinction Vaishnavas of Bengal, where they are supposed to form at least one-fifth of the whole population. Their founder was Chaitanya, the son of a Brahmin originally from Silhet. He was born in 1485; but as he had been thirteen months in the womb, and was ushered into the world during an eclipse of the moon, his birth was regarded as a supernatural event. His followers accordingly regard him as an incarnation of Krishna, who assumed the form of Chaitanya, for the purpose of instructing mankind in the true mode of worshipping him in this age. Chaitanya, whose simplicity and enthusiasm fitted him for being a tool, had been put forward by two leading individuals of the names of Adwaitanand and Nityanand; and hence, in order to complete the connection, it has been deemed necessary that Krishna, besides incarnating Chaitanya, should also animate the other two as *ansas* or portions of himself. At the age of twenty-four, Chaitanya became a Vairagi, and spent six years wandering between Mathura and Juggernaut. At the end of this period, having appointed his two coadjutors to preside over the Vaishnavas of Bengal, he fixed his residence at Cuttack, and allowed his imagination to get so much the better of his judgment, that he was perpetually seeing beatific visions of Krishna, Radha, and the *gopis*. In one of these he mistook a river for the sea, and fancying that he saw Radha sporting in its blue waters, walked in till he was floated off his legs, and very narrowly escaped drowning by being dragged to shore in a fisherman's net. His death, of which there is no distinct account, may be presumed to have happened in some similar way.

The Chaitanyas regard Krishna as the Paramatma, or supreme Spirit, at once the cause and substance of creation. As creator, preserver, and destroyer, he is Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva; but besides these greater manifestations, has assumed specific shapes, as *avatars*, or descents; *ansas*, or portions; *ansansas*, or portions of portions; and so on, *ad infinitum*. His principal appearance as Krishna was renewed in Chaitanya, who is therefore worshipped as that deity himself. His other form, as Gopal the cow-herd, or Gopinath the lord of the milkmaids of Vrindaban, are not forgotten; and due prominence is given to his juvenile feats under the name of Lila, or sport. The whole religious and moral code of the sect is comprised in the word *bhakti*, "a term that signifies a union of implicit faith with incessant devotion," and "is the momentary repetition of the name of Krishna, under a firm belief that such a practice is sufficient for salvation." Hence Krishna himself declares in the *Bhagavat Gita* that the worship of him alone gives the worshipper "whatever he wishes—paradise, liberation, godhead, and is infinitely more efficacious than all or any observances, than abstraction, than knowledge of the divine nature, than the subjugation of the passions, than the practice of the *Yoga*, than charity, than virtue, or than anything that is deemed most meritorious." Besides the divisions which may be considered to belong to the sect, there are in Bengal three classes, which, though agreeing with it in many respects, differ so much in others, that they ought to be ranked as seceders from it. One of these, the Spashta Dayakas, presents two remarkable singularities—first, a denial of the divine character and despotic authority of the guru; and, secondly, the residence of male and female coenobites in the same math. The latter practice professes to be platonic. The male and female members regard each other as brothers and sisters, and have no other intercourse than that which arises from community of belief and interest, and the joint celebration of Krishna and Chaitanya, with song and dance. The sisters act as the spiritual instructors of the females of respectable families, to which they have unrestricted access. The effect of this influence is manifested in "the growing diffusion of the doctrines of this sect in Calcutta, where it is specially established."

The Saivas being far less numerous than the Vaishnavas, will not require to occupy so much space as has been given to their

rivals. To judge by the number of shrines dedicated to the Linga, the only form under which Siva is worshipped, it might seem to be the most prevalent of all modes of adoration; but these shrines have comparatively few votaries, and are not regarded with much veneration. The temple of Visweswara at Benares is indeed thronged with a never-ceasing crowd of worshippers; but even here, though the most celebrated resort of Siva's votaries, no enthusiasm is displayed, and the votive offerings of flowers or fruit are thrown before the image with no appearance of solemnity and veneration. Among the Brahmins, indeed, and the orthodox generally, Siva is a favourite divinity, and the Linga receives their adoration in temples, private houses, and by the banks of streams; but in Upper India he has never been a popular deity. His emblem, little understood or regarded by the uninitiated, neither interests the feelings nor excites the imagination, and none of the legends recorded of him are of a pleasing and poetical character. The number of the Saiva sects in Professor Wilson's list amounts to nine, but only a few of these are so important or independent as to require separate notice.

The Dandis, distinguished by carrying a small *dand* or wand, with several processes or projections, and attached to the wand a piece of cord dyed with red ochre, in which the sacrificial cord is supposed to be enshrined, are legitimate representatives of the last stage of Brahminical life. According to rule, they should live, not in but only near towns, as solitaries; but generally disregarding the rule, they live like other mendicants collected in maths. The worship of Siva as Bhairava is their prevailing form; and their common ceremony of initiation consists in inflicting a small incision on the inner part of the knee, and presenting the blood which flows as an acceptable offering. The use of fire being absolutely prohibited to them, they dispose of their dead by putting them into coffins, and burying them or committing them to some sacred stream. The Dasnami Dandis, regarded as descendants of the original fraternity, derive their origin from the celebrated teacher Sankara Acharya, who figures much in the religious history of Hindustan, though his influence has been overrated. The period when he flourished cannot be fixed with certainty, but seems to have been about

the eighth or ninth century. From him ten classes of mendicants have descended. Three of these and part of a fourth, regarded as the only genuine Sankara Dandis, are numerous at Benares and in its vicinity, and besides distinguishing themselves as able expounders of the *Vedanta*, have rendered important service to different branches of Sanskrit literature. Others of them are notorious as sturdy beggars, and claiming a close connection with the Brahmins, never fail, when a feast is given to them, to appear, and insist on a share of the good things which have been provided.

The *Yogis* are so called from the *Yoga* or Patanjala school of philosophy, which maintains the practicability of acquiring, even in this life, entire command over elementary matter. The modes of accomplishing this are very various, consisting chiefly "of long-continued suppressions of respiration; of inhaling and exhaling the breath in a particular manner; of sitting in eighty-four different attitudes; of fixing the eyes on the top of the nose, and endeavouring by the force of mental abstraction to effect a union between the portion of the vital spirit residing in the body and that which pervades all nature." On effecting this union, the *Yogi*, though in a human body, is liberated "from the clog of material incumbrance." He can make himself light or heavy, vast or minute, as he pleases; traverse all space, animate a dead body, render himself invisible, become equally acquainted with present, past, and future, and by final union with Siva exempt himself from all future transmigration. Few *Yogis* lay claim at present to this perfection, and therefore, as a substitute, most of them content themselves with mummeries and juggling tricks which cheat the vulgar into a belief of their powers. One of these tricks, of which the explanation has not been discovered, is *sitting in the air and remaining for a considerable period under water*. One individual has made extraordinary displays of this kind, but the secret has not been communicated to his fellow-devotees. As a popular sect the *Yogis* acknowledge Gorakhnath as their founder. He probably flourished in the beginning of the fifteenth century. They are usually called *Kanphatas*, from having their ears bored and rings inserted in them at the time of their initiation.

The next important sect of Saivas is that of the Lingayets or Jangamas, whose essential characteristic is the wearing a

representation of the Linga on some part of their dress or person. They are very numerous in the Deccan, but are rarely met with in Upper India except as mendicants, "leading about a bull, the living type of Nandi, the bull of Siva, decorated with housings of various colours, and strings of cowrie shells." Accompanying a conductor, who carries a bell in his hand, they go about from place to place, subsisting upon alms. The Paramahansas, another sect, pretend to be solely occupied with the investigation of Brahma, or spirit, and to be equally indifferent to pleasure or pain. Some, in proof of having acquired this perfection, go naked in all weathers, never speak, and never indicate any natural want. They are hence fed by their attendants, as if they were helpless as infants. Under this pretended helplessness much knavery is practised. But superstition assumes a still more offensive form in the Aghoris. Their original worship was paid to Devi, in some of her more terrific forms, and is said to have consisted partly in offering human victims. Hence they assumed a corresponding appearance, and carried about for a wand and water-pot a staff set with bones and the upper half of a human skull. The abominable worship has long been suppressed, but traces of it still exist in disgusting wretches who go about extorting alms. They eat and drink whatever is offered to them, should it be carrion or ordure. With the latter they smear their bodies, and carry it about with them in a wooden cup or skull, either to swallow it, if by so doing they can gain a few pice, or to throw it on the persons or into the houses of those who refuse to comply with their demands. They also inflict gashes on their limbs, that the crime of blood may rest on those who deny them charity; and by means of this and similar devices, work upon the timid and credulous Hindu. Other Saivas are distinguished by similar though less disgusting enormities, and practise the tortures which have been mentioned in describing the festivals of Kali and Juggernaut. Thus the Urdhabahus are the devotees who extend one or both arms above their heads till they remain of themselves thus elevated, and allow their nails to grow till they completely perforate the hand; and the Akasmukhis hold up their faces to the sky till the muscles of the back of the neck become contracted and retain it in that position.

The Saktas, or worshippers of the Sakti, the wives, or active energies of the male deities, are numerous among all classes. If their bias is in favour of the supremacy of Vishnu, their worship is offered to Lakshmi; on the other hand, if the bias is towards Siva, the worship is offered to Parvati, Bhavani, or Durga. In Bengal the latter worship is by far the more popular. Saraswati, also, is not so much forgotten as Brahma her lord; and among the populace generally a great number of malevolent and hideous demons are regularly worshipped. One great authority for the Sakti worship is the *Brahma Vaivarita Purana*, one section of which, the *Prakriti Khanda*, is devoted to the subject. According to it, Brahma having determined to create the universe, became twofold—the right half male, and the left half female. The latter was Prakriti, illusion, eternal and without end, and under her various forms, chiefly of Durga, Lakshmi, and Saraswati, has produced all other female existences. Besides her principal *avatars*, she has also subdivided herself into almost endless portions, and thus given rise not only to the whole body of goddesses, and nymphs of every order, but to every creature, human or brutal, of the female sex: while Purusha, the other half of Brahma, has in like manner given rise to all males. Another still more important series of authorities for the Sakti worship are an immense body of writings called the *Tantras*, which those who follow them regard as a fifth *Veda*, as ancient as the others, and even of superior authority. A few of them may have existed before the tenth century, but most of them are of recent origin, and appear to have been written chiefly in Bengal and the eastern districts. They are all in the form of a dialogue between Siva and his bride, the former in answer to questions proposed by the latter, explaining, under a strict injunction of secrecy to all but the initiated, the various ceremonies, prayers, and incantations that are to be employed.

The leading sect of the Saktas forms two branches, the Dakshinacharis and Vamacharis, or the followers of the right-hand and left-hand ritual. The Dakshinacharis, called also Bhaktas, have the credit of worshipping agreeably to Vaidik or Puranik ritual, and abstaining from the impure practices of other votaries of Sakti. Their *bali* or oblation should consist only of pulse, rice and milk, with what are called the three sweet articles—ghee, honey, and sugar; but many make offerings of

blood, particularly kids killed by decapitation, except where the still more barbarous practice is used of pummelling the animal to death with the fists. The immense carnage at the festival of Kali, already described, is part of the worship of the Dakshinacharis, and it is therefore difficult to draw the line of demarcation between them and the more heterodox branch of Vamis or Vamacharis. After what has been said, it is obvious that the shedding or non-shedding of blood cannot be the main distinction; and accordingly we learn that the left-hand worshippers are guilty of abominations which they dare not publicly avow, and practise in secret orgies. One of the least objectionable forms is where the adept goes alone at midnight to a place where dead bodies are buried or burned, or where criminals are executed, and then, seated on a corpse, makes the usual offerings to Siva's consort. If he does this without fear, the *Bhutas*, *Yoginis*, and other male and female goblins become his slaves. On other occasions, where a naked female is worshipped as a representative of the Sakti, men and women meet together, and are guilty of the most scandalous excesses. The Sakti Sodhana or Sri Chakra, at which these excesses are chiefly committed, is expressly prescribed by one of the *Tantras*; but Professor Wilson, while admitting that "it is said to be not uncommon, and by some of the more zealous Saktas it is scarcely concealed," differs from Mr. Ward as to its ordinary character, and asserts that "it is usually nothing more than a convivial party, consisting of the members of a single family, at which men only are assembled, and the company are glad to eat flesh and drink spirits under the pretence of a religious observance." Be this as it may, it is allowed on all hands that the Vamacharis, while admitting all classes indiscriminately, without distinction of caste, "are very numerous, especially among the Brahminical tribe." The worst suspicions of the real character of the sect are justified by the fact that many of its members, ashamed or afraid to avow their connection with it, "conceal their creed and observe its practices in privacy."

The only other sect of Saktas requiring notice is that of the Keraris who were at one time notorious for sacrificing human victims to some of the hideous personifications of Siva's consort. The only persons who can now be considered representatives of

the sect are "miscreants who, more for pay than devotion, inflict upon themselves bodily tortures, and pierce their flesh with hooks or spits, run sharp-pointed instruments through their tongues and cheeks, recline upon beds of spikes, or gash themselves with knives; all which practices are occasionally met with throughout India, and have become familiar to Europeans from the excess to which they are carried in Bengal at the Charak Pujas."

Of the sects classed as miscellaneous, our notice will be confined to the two most important—the Sikhs and the Jains. The former, indeed, as they will again make their appearance in a political character, may at present be disposed of summarily. They take the name of Nanak Shahis, from their founder Nanak Shah, who was born in 1469 at Talwandi, now Rayapur, situated in the Punjab, on the banks of the Beyah or Hyphasis. He had early shown strong devotional feeling, which increased as he grew up. Though a Hindu by birth, he was early brought into connection with the Muhammedans, and seemed at first disposed to embrace their faith by becoming a *fakir*; but neither the Hindu nor Mussulman creed satisfied him; and after a long course of travels, during which he visited the most celebrated places of worship of both religions, he became an independent religious reformer, took up his residence at Khutipur Dekra, on the banks of the Ravi, and died there, after performing numerous miracles. His great object is said to have been to reconcile the jarring principles of Hinduism and Muhammedanism, by recommending to the followers of both exclusive attention to the great principles of "devotion to God and peace towards men." The only means he employed for this purpose was "mild persuasion." His doctrines, after receiving many modifications from his successors, were moulded anew by Govind Singh, who succeeded his father, Tegh Bahadur, as *sat-guru* or chief spiritual leader, in 1675, and ranks as the tenth in descent from Nanak. The persecutions which the Sikhs had suffered from the Muhammedan rulers had changed their peaceful character, and converted their tenets into a kind of military code. Govind Singh followed out this policy, and placed it on a firmer basis. Nanak, in order to conciliate the Hindus, had left their civil institutions untouched. Govind Singh adopted a bolder course; and in order

to arm the whole population against the Muhammedans, with whom he and his followers were at open war, proclaimed his determination to admit converts from every tribe, and make worldly wealth and rank equally accessible to all. One of his sayings was, that the four classes—Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sudras, “would, like *pan* (betel-leaf), *chunam* (lime), *supari* (betel-nut), and *khat* (*terra japonica* or *catechu*), become all of one colour when chewed.” Instead of the peaceful spirit of Nanak, he made war the profession of all his followers, binding them “always to have *steel* about them in one shape or other.” Nanak admitted that Muhammad was a prophet “sent by God to this world to do good, and to disseminate the knowledge of one God through means of the *Koran*; but he, acting on the principle of free-will which all human beings exercise, introduced oppression and cruelty, and the slaughter of cows, for which he died.” He added—“I am now sent from heaven to publish unto mankind a book, which shall reduce all the names given unto God to one name which is God; and he who calls Him by any other, shall fall into the path of the devil, and have his feet bound in the chains of wretchedness.” After adverting to the hatred subsisting between Muhammedans and Hindus, he continues thus—“I am sent to reconcile your jarring faiths, and I implore you to read their scriptures as well as your own; but reading is useless without obedience to the doctrine taught; for God has said, No man shall be saved except he has performed good works. The Almighty will not ask to what tribe or persuasion he belongs. He will only ask, What has he done? Therefore, those violent and continued disputes which subsist between the Hindus and Mussalmans, are as impious as they are unjust.”¹

Govind Singh, while adopting the leading principle of Nanak as to the acceptableness of all sincere worship to the supreme Being, is chiefly distinguished from him by the abolition of the distinction of castes, the mode of admitting proselytes, and not only permitting the use of arms, but making it the religious duty of all his followers. As to the mode of admitting a proselyte, it may be sufficient to mention, that he required him to clothe himself from head to foot in a blue dress, to allow

¹ Sir John Malcolm’s “Sketch of the Sikhs,” *Asiatic Researches*, vol. xi, pp. 274-75.

his hair to grow, put into his hand five weapons—a sword, a firelock, a bow, an arrow, and a pike; and after reading some of the first chapters of a work composed by Nanak, and of another composed by himself, concluded the initiation by exclaiming—*Wa! Guruji ka Khalsa! Wa! Guruji ki Fateh (Success to the state of the Guru! Victory attend the Guru!)*. The forms still observed differ little from the above. At present, the Sikhs consist of seven distinct branches, all professing to follow the doctrines of Nanak, though separated by differences in practice or the choice of a teacher. The Ulasis, professing, as their name denotes, indifference to worldly vicissitudes, are purely religious characters, devote themselves to prayer and meditation, practise celibacy, and are usually collected in sanjats, colleges, or convents. They may be regarded as the genuine disciples of Nanak. The Suthrek Shahis, distinguished by wearing a perpendicular black streak down the forehead, and carrying two small black sticks, about half a yard long, which they clash together when they solicit alms, lead a vagabond life, begging and singing songs, mostly of a moral or mystic tendency. They bear a bad name, and must deserve it, as many of them are gamblers, drunkards, and thieves. The great body of the nation are both politically and religiously Govind Singhs, or followers of the celebrated chief of whom some account has been given. In addition to what has been said of their tenets, it will be sufficient here to observe, that though they have their own sacred books and eat all kinds of flesh, except that of kine, and treat the distinction of castes as imposture or delusion, they are still, to a certain extent, Hindus. They worship Hindu deities, celebrate Hindu festivals, and derive their legends and their literature from Hindu sources.

The religion of Buddha, who, as we have seen, is often ranked as one of the *avatars* of Vishnu, at one time gained an ascendancy in India, and has left in many parts of the country, and particularly in some of the rock caves, remarkable monuments of its power and popularity. These having brought it into collision with the Brahmins, a fierce contest ensued, and terminated in its expulsion. In many adjoining countries, it still holds undisputed sway, and counts its followers by hundreds of millions; but in India its extermination has been so complete, that it has

almost ceased to be one of its existing forms of religion. Before it fell, however, a kindred faith, exhibiting many of its peculiar features, had arisen, and after many vicissitudes it still maintains its ground. The faith referred to is that of the Jains, who form a large section of the Hindu population, and are still more influential by wealth than by numbers. Holding much in common with Brahmins and Buddhists, and at the same time differing with them in several important particulars, they may be regarded as intermediate to both. In all the three religions, the final blessedness aspired to is a state of perfect apathy, differing more in name than in reality from absolute annihilation, and the ordinary process of attaining it is by a series of transmigration, previous to which, or in the intervals between them, the good enjoy the solace of various heavens, and the bad suffer the torments of numerous hells. The only other prominent point in which they all agree, is in their tenderness of animal life. In regard to this point, however, the Jains and Buddhists take much higher ground than the Brahmins; and in order to guard against the accidents by which animal life might be unintentionally destroyed, employ numerous precautions of an extravagant and ludicrous nature. They must not drink water until it has been thrice strained; nor leave any liquor uncovered lest an insect should be drowned in it; nor eat in the dark lest they should swallow a fly. Their priests and devotees are still more scrupulous—wearing a piece of cloth over their mouths to prevent insects from flying into them, and carrying a brush to sweep any place on which they are about to sit down, and thus give ants, or any other living creatures that may be upon it, timely warning of their danger. Even this does not satisfy them; and as if to show the extreme absurdity to which scrupulosity, when it has taken a particular direction, may be carried, the Jains, in particular, have actually built and endowed hospitals for the reception of animals of all kinds. Fleas, maggots, and similar vermin, are specially favoured, and parts of the establishment are set apart for their habitation and maintenance. It is even said, though it is difficult to credit the statement, that the more zealous devotees occasionally pass the night in these places, in order to regale the inmates with a feast on their own persons.

The views which the Jains take of the divine nature border, like those of the Buddhists, on atheism. Without actually denying the existence of God, they render their belief of it unavailing, by denying his activity and providence, and by reserving their divine honours for deified saints. In this respect their system is peculiar. These saints, who by practices of self-denial and mortification, acquire a station superior to that of the gods, are called Tirthankars. Their aggregate number cannot be defined, but they are conceived to rule for a certain period only, and in classes, each of which consists of twenty-four individuals. There are thus twenty-four who presided over the past period or age, twenty-four actually presiding over the present, and twenty-four who are destined to preside over the future. The whole seventy-two are enumerated by name, but those only presiding over the present attract much attention. Even among them, for some reason not well explained, a choice has been made; and in Hindustan, the worship of the Jains is confined almost exclusively to Parswanath, the twenty-third, and Mahavira, the twenty-fourth, on the list of present Tirthankars. The statues of all, however, sometimes of colossal size, and usually of white or black marble, are placed in the temples, and receive such adoration as the Jains are disposed to bestow. This is very meagre; for while the *Natis* or devotees dispense with outward acts of worship at pleasure, the lay votaries are only bound daily to visit a temple in which Tirthankars are placed, walk round it three times, accompany an obeisance to the images with some trifling offering, and repeat some short form of prayer or salutation.

In regard to caste, the Jains act inconsistently. They have no hereditary priesthood, and leave it accessible to men of every class; but their members have distinctions among themselves, which, though they have not the name, are castes in effect, since the members of these different divisions avoid intermarriages and other intercourse with each other. Moreover, in the south and west of India, the distinction of caste is in full operation among them, in the same manner as among other Hindus; and even in the north-east, it is not so much abolished as in abeyance. This is proved by the fact, that a Jain becoming a convert to Hinduism takes his place in one of the castes, as if he had always belonged to it. This necessarily implies that he must all along have retained proofs of his descent.

The point which must have brought both Buddhists and Jains into most direct collision with the Brahmins, is their rejection of the authority of the *Vedas*, and of their fundamental doctrines in regard to worship. The rejection of the Buddhists is absolute, admitting of no compromise; but the Jains, according to their usual mode of proceeding, have taken an intermediate course. In so far as their tenets are countenanced by the *Vedas*, they readily avail themselves of their support, and appeal to them as if they were of infallible authority; but the moment a competition arises between the doctrines of the *Vedas* and their own practices, and either the one or the other must be abandoned, they have no difficulty in making their choice. For instance, the oblations by fire, which form so important a portion of the regular Hindu ritual, are regarded by the Jains as an abomination, both because they are often the prelude to bloody sacrifices, and also because the fire employed can hardly fail to occasion even unintentionally a destruction of animal life.

The Jains have no monastic establishments, and profess to follow a moral code of great simplicity, consisting of five *mahavratas* or great duties, four merits, and three restraints. The duties are, refraining from injury to life, truth, honesty, chastity, and freedom from worldly desires; the merits are, liberality, gentleness, piety, and penance; and the restraints are, government of the mind, government of the tongue, and government of the person. Their system seems to have originated about the sixth or seventh century, to have become powerful about the ninth, when Buddhism was suppressed, to have attained its greatest prosperity in the eleventh, and to have begun to decline in the twelfth. Its followers are still numerous, particularly in Gujarat, Rajputana, and Canara, and, numbering among them many bankers and opulent merchants, possess a large portion of the commercial wealth of the country.

In the course of this brief survey of the Hindu religion, it is impossible not to have been struck with the numerous changes of form which it has undergone. As it was originally brought into India by strangers, its very first introduction was a great and successful innovation on the beliefs of the earlier inhabitants. As unfolded in the *Vedas*, it assumes the form of an almost pure theism, or acknowledges only personifications of the

elements as emblems of deity. In course of time, the Hindu triad appears, and Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, recognized as three distinct forms of one God, or three distinct beings sharing the godhead among them, become the great objects of worship. The process of multiplication then begins to be rapidly carried on, and the pantheon becomes crowded with myriads of fabulous existences, male and female, embodying in their persons all imaginable qualities, virtuous as well as vicious. The old gods of the triad were then involved in a struggle for supremacy. Brahma first gave way, and ceased to have any external worship paid to him. Vishnu and Siva, though they at first seemed to fare better, ultimately shared a similar fate, their place being usurped partly by the consorts arbitrarily given to them, and partly by younger deities, who, though said to be only their *avatars* or incarnations, did, in fact, push them from their stools and reign in their stead. Idolatry now had full scope, and the mere image became, instead of a figurative representation of some spiritual nature, the very god himself, being lodged and clothed, and fed, and served, as if it were a living being. Amid this degeneracy, a so-called orthodoxy was still recognized; but numbers disdained to be bound by its rules, and sects, setting them at nought, sprung up in every quarter. Many of these sects, though of comparatively recent origin, have gained multitudes of converts; and Hinduism, instead of forming one compact whole, consists, in fact, of discordant religions in almost endless variety, battling with each other for supremacy or existence. Nothing, therefore, can be more erroneous than the representation often given. Hinduism, we are told, is one of the most ancient things now existing in the world; and while all around has been decaying, it has stood firm and unshaken. The inference meant to be drawn is, that it is equally hopeless and sacrilegious to attempt its overthrow. To this representation and inference it is sufficient to reply, that the whole history of Hinduism records only a series of changes, by means of which it has been deprived of all that ever gave it any claim to veneration. As it now exists, it is not one uniform system, but a thing of shreds and patches—not a religion bearing the impress of a high antiquity, but a grovelling superstition, full of monstrosities and abominations, many of them of a comparatively

recent date. It has thus neither the respectability nor the stability which great age might have given it; and therefore there is good reason to hope, that its power of resistance to the efforts made to overthrow it, becoming gradually weaker and weaker, it will at no distant period tumble into ruins. No one who desires the welfare of India can wish for any other result; and no one who confides, as he ought, in the power of divine truth, will despair of its accomplishment.

3

The Government of the Hindus

GOVERNMENT will in this chapter be taken in its most general acceptation, and will include not merely the form of government, properly so called, but the administration of it in its various departments, civil and military, judicial and fiscal. A subject so wide requires far more space than can be here allowed to it, and yet it seems necessary to make some apology for mentioning it at all. Since British supremacy was established in India, Hindu government has ceased to exist, and it may therefore be thought that any account given of it can only gratify curiosity without furnishing information of practical value. This inference is plausible—so plausible, indeed, that the East India Company, in the early management of the territories acquired by them, acted upon it, and thought they were giving their new subjects the best proof of their wisdom and justice by endeavouring to govern them in accordance with European ideas. It was not long, however, before they discovered their mistake, and learned, by an experience which cost them dear, that a thorough acquaintance with the principles on which government had previously been conducted was absolutely necessary, in order both to conciliate good-will and prevent gross mismanagement. Even after they had arrived at this conclusion, many serious mistakes were committed, and it would not be difficult to trace some of the worst grievances of which the population of India have had to complain, to rash tampering with the modes of government to which they had been accustomed, and the rights which they had acquired under them. After the lapse of nearly a century, there is reason

to suspect that, within the limits of the three provinces of which the dewanee was obtained by Clive from Shah Alam, abuses still exist, and much unintentional injustice is committed, merely because the tenures under which property was held and occupied in early Hindu times were imperfectly understood. So far, therefore, from thinking that the subject of the present chapter might have been omitted, our only regret is, that it must be treated within limits bearing no proportion to its intrinsic importance.

In form Hindu government was an absolute monarchy, the nature of which is fully described in the *Institutes of Manu*. The raja or king, though presumed to rule in accordance with a code of written laws, is represented as holding his power immediately from the Supreme Being, and subject to no restraint but that which his sense of duty or fear of the consequences of misgovernment might impose. As if he were of a different nature from his subjects, he is said to have been formed "of eternal particles drawn from the substance of Indra, and seven other named divinities;" and in consequence "surpasses all mortals in glory." "Like the sun, he burns eyes and hearts; nor can any human creature even gaze on him." "He is a powerful divinity, who appears in a human shape." He must not suppose, however, that he is born only for himself. He was created, because, "if the world had no king, it would quake on all sides through fear;" and because, if the guilty were not punished, "the stronger would roast the weaker, like fish on a spit." His great duty therefore is, to "prepare a just compensation for the good, and a just punishment for the bad." The latter of these two appears to be regarded as the more important and efficacious, and is hence eulogized in such terms as the following:—"Punishment governs all mankind; punishment alone preserves them; punishment wakes while their guards are asleep; the wise consider punishment as the perfection of justice."

Should the king, instead of faithfully discharging his duty, be "crafty, voluptuous, and wrathful," he must not hope to escape with impunity; for "criminal justice, the bright essence of majesty, . . . eradicates a king who swerves from his duty, together with all his race; punishment shall overtake his castles, his territories, his peopled land, with all fixed and moveable

things that exist on it; even the gods and the sages will be afflicted and ascend to the sky." In all this, however, he suffers only by a kind of divine retribution. His own will, if he chooses to make it so, may be his only law. No hint is given of the existence of any constitutional check on the abuse of his power, and it is hence left to be inferred that if he played the tyrant his subjects were entirely at his mercy. Having no recognized right to call him to account for misconduct, they had no alternative but to submit, and wait patiently for the vengeance which in some shape, human or divine, would sooner or later overtake him.

The unlimited power possessed by the king made it all the more necessary that he should be surrounded with every species of moral restraint; and accordingly the whole course of conduct which he ought to pursue is carefully prescribed. "Let the king, having risen at early dawn, respectfully attend to Brahmins, learned in the three *Vedas* and in the science of ethics." From Brahmins "who have grown old, who know the scriptures, who are pure, let him continually learn habits of modesty and composure." From Brahmins who know the three *Vedas*, "let him learn the triple doctrine comprised in them, together with the primeval science of criminal justice and sound policy, the subject of logic and metaphysics, and sublime theological truth; from the people he must learn the theory of practical arts." But mere knowledge will not suffice; and therefore "day and night must he strenuously exert himself to gain complete victory over his own organs," especially shunning the vices which proceed from love of pleasure and from wrath, and labouring to suppress "a selfish inclination which all wise men know to be the root of those two sets" of vices.

Having been thus instructed how to acquire the knowledge and self-command necessary for the discharge of his duty, the king is next told how to proceed in actually administering the government. Since "even an act easy in itself is hard sometimes to be performed by a single man, especially if he have no assistant near, how much harder a kingdom with great revenues;" he must appoint a council of "seven or eight ministers, who must be sworn—men whose ancestors were servants of kings, who are versed in the holy books, who are personally brave, who

are skilled in the use of weapons, and whose lineage is noble." The head or president of the council is to be a learned Brahmin; and though the king is constantly to be consulting with all its members "on peace and war, on his forces, on his revenues, on the protection of his people, and on the means of bestowing aptly the wealth which he has acquired," to the president alone as prime minister is he to give "full confidence" and "intrust all transactions."

Besides the council, whose business is to deliberate, various other functionaries are necessary. In particular, there must be an ambassador, to transact "the business by which kingdoms are at variance or in amity;" a commander-in-chief, by whom "the forces of the realm must be immediately regulated;" and "officers of criminal justice," for "the actual infliction of punishment." The ambassador being apparently regarded as the most important of all these functionaries, the qualities which he ought to possess, and the manner in which he ought to conduct himself, are specified. He must be "pure within and without, dexterous in business, and endued with an excellent memory;" one "who knows countries and times, is handsome, intrepid, and eloquent." In the transaction of affairs he must be able to "comprehend the visible signs and hints, and discover the acts of the foreign king, by the signs, hints, and acts of his confidential servants, and the measures which that king wishes to take, by his ministers."

After the appointment of proper officers, the next thing considered is the selection of a locality for the king's residence. On this subject a number of injunctions are given, of which the following are the most prominent:—"Let him fix his abode in a district containing open champaigns, abounding with grain, inhabited chiefly by the virtuous, not infected with maladies, beautiful to the sight, surrounded by submissive neighbours; a country in which the subjects may live at ease." Within this district he is to take up his residence, in a capital rendered difficult of access by natural or artificial barriers, as a desert, a mound of earth, water, trees, and above all, "a fortress of mountains," which is said to have "many transcendent properties." Here he may live secure, having built a fort, which he is recommended to do, because "one bowman

placed on a wall is a match in war for a hundred enemies; and a hundred for ten thousand." The centre of the fort is the proper site for the royal palace, which is to be "well finished in all its parts, completely defended, habitable in every season, brilliant, surrounded with water and trees." Such a palace having been prepared for his mansion, the king is to establish his household, beginning with the choice of "a consort, of the same class with himself, endued with all the bodily marks of excellence, born of an excellent race, captivating his heart, adorned with beauty and the best qualities." The only members of the royal household specially mentioned are "a domestic priest," and "a performer of sacrifices."

The ordinary routine of the king's life while he resides in his palace deserves to be described. Having risen "in the last watch of the night," or, as the same thing is elsewhere expressed, "at early dawn," and performed his religious duties, he is to enter his hall, and standing there, "gratify his subjects before he dismiss them with kind looks and words." After they are dismissed he is to "take secret counsel with his principal ministers." For this purpose, and that he may be able to consult with them unobserved, he climbs up the back of a mountain, or goes privately "to a terrace, a bower, a forest, or a lonely place." This secrecy is deemed of paramount importance; for it is declared that "that prince, of whose weighty secrets all assemblies of men are ignorant, shall obtain dominion over the whole earth." The other measures which the king takes to secure secrecy are rather curious. "At the time of consultation let him remove the stupid, the dumb, the blind, and the deaf, talking birds, decrepit old men, women, and infidels, the diseased and the maimed; since those who are disgraced (in this life by reason of sins formerly committed) are apt to betray secret counsel; so are talking birds; and so above all are women; them he must for that reason diligently remove." After the consultation, the king having taken exercise and bathed, retires at noon to his private apartment for the purpose of taking food. This favourite employment must have lost much of its relish from the precautions deemed necessary. "Let him," it is said, "eat lawful aliment, prepared by servants attached to his person, who know the difference of times and are incapable of perfidy, after it

has been proved innocent, and hallowed by texts of the *Veda* repulsive of poison. Together with all his food let him swallow such medical substances as resist venom; and let him constantly wear with attention such gems as are known to repel it. Let his females, well tried and attentive, their dress and ornaments having been examined (lest, says the commentator, some weapon should be concealed in them), do him humble service with fans, water, and perfumes." These precautions were not confined to the time of taking meals, for it is immediately added, "thus let him take diligent care, when he goes out in a carriage, or on horseback, when he lies down to rest, when he sits, when he takes food, when he bathes, anoints his body, and puts on all his habiliments." After eating, and "having idled a reasonable time" in the recesses of the palace among his women, public affairs again occupy his attention, and he comes forth completely dressed, to "review his armed men, with all their elephants, horses, and cars, their accoutrements, and weapons." The mode of spending the remainder of the day is thus described: "At sunset, having performed his religious duty, let him privately, but well armed, in his interior apartment, hear what has been done by his reporters and emissaries; then having dismissed those informers, and returning to another secret chamber, let him go, attended by women, to the inmost recess of his mansion, to his evening meal; then, having a second time eaten a little, and having been recreated with musical strains, let him take rest early, and rise refreshed from his labour." The king's day, as now described, has left several intervals not filled up, and it is therefore necessary to mention, that any leisure which may remain to him, and more especially at noon, or at midnight, when "his fatigues have ceased and his cares are dispersed," he is enjoined to employ partly on his private affairs, such as the marriage of his daughters, the education of his sons, and the behaviour of his women in the private apartment, and partly in meditating alone, or holding converse with his ministers on important questions of ethics and policy.

For administrative purposes the whole kingdom is portioned out into military and civil districts. Over two, three, five, or a hundred of the military districts, according to their extent, is placed a body of guards, commanded by an approved officer.

The management of the civil districts being rather more complicated is more fully detailed. Ascending by a regularly graduated scale, the officers are ranked as follows:—"A lord of one town with its district, a lord of ten towns, a lord of twenty, a lord of a hundred, and a lord of a thousand." Each of these, beginning with the lowest, is enjoined to report on the state of his district to his immediate superior; and in this way the actual condition of all the districts throughout the country being made known, the means necessary for the suppression of any evils existing in them could be provided. The salary or perquisite paid to the lord of one town consists of "such food, drink, wood, and other articles as should be given each day to the king by the inhabitants of the township." The payment of the other officers is arranged as follows:—To the lord of ten towns "the produce of two plough-lands"—that is, according to the commentator, the produce of as much ground as can be tilled with two ploughs, each drawn by six bulls; to the lord of twenty towns, the produce of ten plough-lands; to the lord of a hundred towns, the produce of a village; and to the lord of a thousand, the produce of a large town. It is easy to conceive the abuses to which such a system must give rise, and hence to understand the necessity of an additional appointment explained as follows:—"In every large town or city let him (the king) appoint one superintendent of all affairs, elevated in rank, formidable in power, distinguished as a planet among the stars; let that governor from time to time survey the rest in person, and by means of his emissaries, let him perfectly know their conduct in their several districts. Since the servants of the king whom he has appointed guardians of districts are generally knaves, who seize what belongs to other men, from such knaves let him defend his people; of such evil-minded servants as wring wealth from subjects attending them on business, let the king confiscate all the possessions, and banish them from his realm."

One of the principal duties assigned to these lords of towns was the collection of the public revenue, and to it therefore our attention must now be turned. The different sources from which it is derived are pointed out in the *Institutes of Manu*; but considerable changes have taken place since their date; and

it will therefore be necessary, after making an abstract of the information which the *Institutes* furnish, to render it more complete by having recourse to later authorities. According to the *Institutes* the public revenue consisted of taxes on all kinds of agricultural produce and merchandise, a trifling annual exaction from petty traffickers, a day's work every month from "low handicraftsmen, artificers, and servile men, who support themselves by labour;" and a twentieth part, or five per cent (not, as Elphinstone erroneously says, twenty per cent¹) on the estimated profit of all sales. The mode in which the revenue was to be levied is thus explained:—"As the leech, the suckling calf, and the bee take their natural food by little and little, thus must a king draw from his dominions an annual revenue." "Let him not cut up his own root, nor the root of other men by excess of covetousness; for by cutting up his own root he makes both himself and them wretched." The taxes on traffic were to be levied after "having ascertained the rates of purchase and sale, the length of the way, the expenses of food and of condiments, the charges of securing the goods carried, and the nett profits of trade." On produce, and various other specified articles, the taxes were to be as follows:—"Of cattle, of gems, of gold and silver, a fiftieth part may be taken by the king, of grain an eighth part, a sixth or a twelfth" (said by the commentator to be regulated according to the difference of the soil and the labour necessary to cultivate it). "He may also take a sixth part of the clear annual increase of trees, flesh meat, honey, clarified butter, perfumes, medical substances, liquids, flowers, roots and fruit, of gathered leaves, pot-herbs, grass, utensils made with leather or cane, earthen pots, and all things made of stone."

Agricultural produce, on which a maximum rate of a sixth might have been levied, must have been by far the most productive of these taxes, but it has been maintained that the tax on produce was by no means the only revenue derived from land, because the property of the soil belonged exclusively to the king, and must have yielded him an immense return in the shape of rent, or at least enabled him to meet the expenses of the public establishments, by paying the officers

¹ Elphinstone's *India*, vol. i, p. 41.

with grants of land, instead of giving them salaries in money. The question thus raised is of great importance, and having direct practical bearings on the actual administration of the government, has been discussed at great length and with much keenness. It would be out of place here to take part in the discussion further than to say, that the leading advocates on both sides have taken too high ground. By regarding India as if it were a single territory, they have first imagined that one uniform system of land tenure was practicable, and then, in support of the view which they advocate, have appealed to the kinds of tenure prevalent in particular provinces or districts. In this way it has been possible to maintain with almost equal plausibility that the property of the soil is in the sovereign, in zemindars, supposed to mean landed proprietors similar to those of Europe, and in the ryots or actual cultivators; whereas the only inference ought to have been, that the tenures were not uniform but various, and that the necessary consequence of recognizing any one of them as exclusive of the others was to commit wholesale injustice. The ryots, as the class least able to defend themselves, have been the greatest sufferers by this rage for uniformity on the part of their rulers; and Sir Thomas Munro did not describe the injustice which has been done in too strong terms when he said, "We have, in our anxiety to make everything as English as possible, in a country which resembles England in nothing, attempted to create at once throughout extensive provinces a kind of landed property which never existed in them; and in the pursuit of the object we have relinquished the rights which the sovereign always possessed in the soil; and we have in many cases deprived the real owners, the occupant ryots, of their proprietary rights, and bestowed them on zemindars and other imaginary landlords: changes like these never can effect a permanent settlement in any country; they are rather calculated to unsettle whatever was before deemed permanent."¹

Besides the sources of revenue above mentioned, the king had mines, in which he is recommended to employ "the brave,

¹ Minute on the *State of the Country, and Condition of the People under the Presidency of Fort St. George*, dated 31st December, 1824, and ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 17th May, 1830; p. 26.

the skilful, the well-born, and the honest;" and was moreover entitled, "by reason of his general protection, and because he is the lord paramount of the soil," to half "of old hoards and precious minerals in the earth." "Treasure anciently repositied in the ground" belonged to him, subject to two limitations in favour of Brahmins, who, if they were the discoverers of the treasure, took it all without deduction, and if others were the discoverers, received a half. The revenue was, moreover, occasionally increased by certain casualties, of which the most important was derived from property for which, after distinct proclamation, no owner appeared in three years. Even when an owner appeared, the king might, at his discretion, retain a twelfth, a tenth, or a sixth part of the value, as a compensation for having secured it. In the above system of taxation and revenue, a considerable degree of natural equity appears; and yet it must be admitted that little wisdom is displayed in the selection of the articles to be taxed, or the special percentages to which they are made liable. It would also seem that there must have been much injustice and oppression in the levying of taxation by means of the lords of towns above described. Accordingly, in a passage already quoted, the "appointed guardians of districts" are described as "generally knaves who seize what belongs to other men."

It is rather curious to find that this part of the system, though the only one of which any disapprobation is expressed, has survived all the revolutions which India has undergone. The higher lordships, indeed, with the exception of the still recognized *pargana*, or lordship of 100 towns, have left only traces of their existence; but the townships themselves "remain entire, and are the indestructible atoms, from an aggregate of which the most extensive Indian empires are composed." For a description of a township, we cannot do better than continue this quotation. "A township is a compact piece of land, varying in extent, inhabited by a single community. The boundaries are accurately defined and jealously guarded. The lands may be of all descriptions—those actually under cultivation and those neglected, arable lands never yet cultivated and land which is altogether incapable of cultivation. These lands are divided into portions, the boundaries of which are as carefully

marked as those of the township; and the names, qualities, extent, and proprietors of which are minutely entered in the records of the community. The inhabitants are all assembled in a village within the limits which, in many parts of India, is fortified or protected by a little castle or citadel. Each township conducts its own internal affairs. It levies on its members the revenue due to the state; and is collectively responsible for the payment of the full amount. It manages its police, and is answerable for any property plundered within its limits. It administers justice to its own members, as far as punishing small offences, and deciding disputes in the first instance. It taxes itself to provide funds for its own expenses; such as repairs of the walls and temple, and the cost of public sacrifices and charities, as well as of some ceremonies and amusements on festivals. It is provided with requisite officers for conducting all those duties, and with various others adapted to the wants of the inhabitants; and though entirely subject to the general government, is in many respects an organized commonwealth complete within itself.”¹

Mr. Elphinstone’s account is thus confirmed by Lord Metcalfe:—“The village communities are little republics, having nearly everything they can want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds to revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Mughul, Maratha, Sikh, English, are all masters in turn; but the village community remains the same. In times of trouble they arm and fortify themselves; an hostile army passes through the country; the village communities collect their cattle within their walls, and let the enemy pass unprovoked. If plunder and devastation be directed against themselves, and the force employed be irresistible, they flee to friendly villages at a distance; but when the storm has passed over, they return and resume their occupations. If a country remain for a series of years the scene of continued pillage and massacre, so that the villages cannot be inhabited, the scattered villagers nevertheless return whenever the power of peaceable possession revives. A generation may pass away, but the succeeding generation will return. The sons will take

¹ Elphinstone, *India*, vol. i, pp. 121-22.

the places of their fathers; the same site for the village, the same positions for the houses, the same lands will be reoccupied by the descendants of those who were driven out when the village was depopulated; and it is not a trifling matter that will drive them out, for they will often maintain their post through times of disturbance and convulsion, and acquire strength sufficient to resist pillage and oppression with success. This union of the village communities, each one forming a little separate state in itself, has, I conceive, contributed more than any other cause to the preservation of the people of India, through all the revolutions and changes which they have suffered, and is in a high degree conducive to their happiness and to the enjoyment of a great portion of freedom and independence."¹

The next important branch of internal government to be considered is the administration of justice. On this subject the *Institutes of Manu* treat largely, and continue, notwithstanding the changes introduced subsequently to its date, to be the most valuable text-book. The principal court of justice was held in the capital, and the king himself, if "desirous of inspecting judicial proceedings," presided over it in person. For this purpose he was to enter it each day, "together with Brahmins and counsellors, who knew how to give him advice;" and "there, either sitting or standing holding forth his right arm without ostentation, in his dress and ornaments," to "examine the affairs of litigant parties," and decide causes, "by arguments and rules drawn from local usages and from written codes." Where he could not preside himself, he was to appoint a Brahmin of eminent learning, who, sitting as "chief judge, accompanied by three assessors," should fully consider and dispose of all causes brought into the royal court. The mode of administering justice in places at a distance from the capital is not explained; but it appears from other sources, that in different parts of the country there were local judges who decided in the first instance, but whose decisions might be brought under review by appeal to the court of the capital. The defendant who, after allowing the action to be brought

¹ *Report of Select Committee of House of Commons, 1832, vol. iii, Appendix 84, p. 331.*

into court, admitted the debt, paid a fine of five per cent; if he continued to deny it, and it was proved against him, the fine was doubled. These fines being payable to the king, probably went to the judges, and formed part, if not the whole of their official income.

On the subject of judicial procedure, much sound advice is given. The king or his judge, while "understanding what is expedient or inexpedient," is to consider "only what is law or not law," and decide accordingly. He is at the same time to have an equitable jurisdiction, and consider himself as the guardian of those who, from nonage or their unprotected situation, labour totally or partially under legal incapacity. The persons thus entitled to his special protection are infants and students; women whose husbands have married other wives because they have proved barren, or had no sons; women without kindred, or whose husbands are in distant places; widows true to their lords; and women afflicted with illness. In examining witnesses and weighing evidence, he is to endeavour, "by external signs," to "see through the thoughts of men, by their voice, colour, countenance, limbs, eyes, and action." Neither "himself nor his officers must ever promote litigation, nor ever neglect a lawsuit instituted by others;" but "as a hunter traces the lair of a beast by the drops of blood, thus let a king investigate the true point of justice by deliberate argument; let him fully consider the nature of truth, the state of the case, and his own person; and next, the witnesses, the place, the mode, and the time; firmly adhering to all the rules of practice."

The plaintiff being bound, especially in a question of debt, to prove his case, may act in such a way as to justify a nonsuit. and thus render further proceedings unnecessary. He may, for instance, after having raised his action, delay to proceed with it, and thereby deserve to be fined or corporally punished. Or he may assert "confused and contradictory facts," change his ground after "having stated what he designs to prove," or when "questioned on a fact which he had before admitted, refuse to acknowledge that very fact." He may, moreover, have tampered with the witnesses, by conversing with them "in a place unfit for such conversation," or after alleging that he had witnesses, fail, when called upon, to produce them,

or stand mute on being "ordered to speak," or decline "answering a question properly put." A plaintiff thus behaving, the judge must "declare nonsuited." On the other hand, should the action proceed, great care is necessary in determining "what sort of witnesses must be produced," and "in what manner those witnesses must give true evidence." The good sense which characterizes many of the regulations of the Hindu code on this head, is sadly marred by others of an unreasonable and fantastical nature. The persons who are to be considered competent witnesses are "married housekeepers, men with male issue, inhabitants of the same district"—"just and sensible men of all the classes, men who know their whole duty and are free from covetousness." The persons to be rejected as incompetent are those "who have a pecuniary interest," "familiar friends," "menial servants," "enemies," "men formerly perjured," "persons grievously diseased," and "those who have committed heinous offences." Among the more fantastical arrangements are the exclusion of mean artificers, public dancers and singers, a priest of deep learning in Scripture, a student in theology, an anchorite secluded from all worldly connections, one who follows a cruel occupation, a decrepit old man, and a wretch of the lowest mixed class." Women also, though they "should regularly be witnesses for women," are excluded generally, on the ground that "female understandings are apt to waver". In a penury of witnesses, however, "evidence may be given by a woman, by a child, or by an aged man, by a pupil, by a houseman, by a slave, or by a hired servant;" and several of the more injudicious restrictions are virtually removed by an injunction to the judge not to "examine too strictly the competence of witnesses" in "all cases of violence, of theft and adultery, of defamation and assault;" and a declaration that "any person whatever who has positive knowledge of transactions in the private apartments of a house, or in a forest, or at a time of death, may give evidence between the parties." The weight of testimony is to be determined by the following rule:—"If there be contradictory evidence, let the king decide by the plurality of credible witnesses; if equality in number, by superiority in virtue; if parity in virtue, by the testimony of such twice-born men as have best performed public duties".

The proceedings in court are conducted with great decorum and solemnity. "The witnesses being assembled in the middle

of the court-room, in the presence of the plaintiff and defendant, let the judge examine them, after having addressed them in the following manner:—"What ye know to have been transacted in the matter before us, between the parties reciprocally, declare at large and with truth; for your evidence in this cause is required. A witness who gives testimony with truth shall attain exalted seats of beatitude above and the highest fame here below; such testimony is revered by Brahma himself; the witness who speaks falsely shall be fast bound in the cords of Varuna, and be wholly deprived of power during a hundred transmigrations; let mankind therefore give no false testimony. By truth is a witness cleared from sin; by truth is justice advanced; truth must therefore be spoken by witnesses of every class. The soul itself is its own witness; the soul itself is its own refuge; offend not thy conscious soul, the supreme internal witness of men. The sinful have said in their hearts, 'None sees us.' Yes; the gods distinctly see them, and so does the spirit within their breasts. The guardian deities of the firmament, of the earth, of the waters, of the human heart, of the moon, of the sun, and of fire, of punishment after death, of the winds, of night, of both twilights, and of justice, perfectly know the state of all spirits clothed with bodies." After this address the examination takes place, and is conducted in a manner in which the deference paid to the different classes is curiously marked. To a Brahmin, the judge must begin with simply saying, "Declare;" to a Kshatriya, with saying, "Declare the truth;" to a Vaisya, with comparing perjury to the crime of stealing kine, grain, or gold; to a Sudra, with comparing it to every crime that men can commit, and addressing him in such language as the following:—"Headlong, in utter darkness, shall the impious wretch tumble into hell, who, being interrogated in a judicial inquiry, answers one question falsely." "Marking well all the murders which are comprehended in the crime of perjury, declare thou the whole truth with precision as heard and seen by thee." Such adjurations go far to prove the prevalence of perjury in native Hindu courts in very early times; and indeed what else could be expected, when the code itself, immediately after inserting these adjurations, neutralizes them by adding—"In some cases, a giver of false evidence from a pious motive,

even though he know the truth, shall not lose a seat in heaven; such evidence wise men call the speech of the gods. Whenever the death of a man, either of the servile, the commercial, the military, or the sacerdotal class would be occasioned by true evidence, falsehood may be spoken; it is even preferable to truth. Such witnesses must offer, as oblations to Saraswati, cakes of rice and milk, addressed to the goddess of speech; and thus will they fully expiate that venial sin of benevolent falsehood." Commentators endeavour to qualify this lax morality by assuming that the falsehood sanctioned is only to favour a man "who had not been a grievous offender," and to deceive a king notorious for rigour, "even though the fault arose from inadvertence or error." While a false witness might avail himself of the above lax permission, a true witness might be subjected to gross injustice in consequence of the following absurd and superstitious provision:—"The witness who has given evidence, and to whom, within seven days after, happens disease, fire, or the death of a kinsman, shall be condemned to pay the debt and a fine."

Where no witness could be had, the judge might "acquire a knowledge of the truth by the oath of the parties." Here the great danger to be guarded against was false swearing; and hence, in order to maintain the sacredness of an oath, it is properly said—"Let no man of sense take an oath in vain; for the man who takes an oath in vain, shall be punished in this life and next." Unfortunately, as in the former case, however, the effect of the injunction is neutralized by the following strange declaration:—"To women, however, at a time of dalliance, or on a proposal of marriage, in the case of grass or fruit eaten by a cow, of wood taken for a sacrifice, or of a promise made for the preservation of a Brahmin, it is no deadly sin to take a light oath." Sometimes when the oath was not deemed satisfactory, another test might be employed—a test most absurd and nugatory, though used for ages, and not long ago abolished for the first time in our own country. It was what is called the trial by ordeal, with reference to which it is said—"Let him (the judge) cause the party to hold fire, or to dive under water, or severally to touch the hands of his children and wife; he whom the blazing fire burns not, whom the water soon

forces not up, or who meets with no speedy misfortune, must be held veracious in his testimony on oath."

The written codes, conformably to which the judge was to decide, contain a complete system of law arranged under distinct heads, and making it impossible to doubt, notwithstanding its numerous defects, that the people employing it were considerably advanced in civilization. In the *Institutes of Manu*, eighteen "titles of law" are enumerated, and said to be "settled as the groundwork of all judicial procedure in this world." These titles are classed in the following order:—1. Debt on loans for consumption; 2. Deposits and loans for use; 3. Sale without ownership; 4. Concerns among partners; 5. Subtraction of what has been given; 6. Non-payment of wages or hire; 7. Non-performance of agreements; 8. Rescission of sale and purchase; 9. Disputes between master and servant; 10. Contests on boundaries; 11 and 12. Assault and slander; 13. Larceny; 14. Robbery and other violence; 15. Adultery; 16. Altercation between man and wife, and their several duties; 17. The law of inheritance; 18. Gaming with dice, and living animals. A mere glance at these titles reveals a comprehensive and complicated course of jurisprudence; but the arrangement in not drawing a proper line of demarcation between civil and criminal matters is inconvenient; and it will therefore be proper, in pointing out some of the leading features of the Hindu code, to disregard this arrangement, and substitute for it our own more natural division of—1. Civil law; and 2. Criminal law.

One of the leading axioms of our law is, that no man is to seek redress at his own hand. The axiom of Hindu law is the very opposite; for it seems to be implied, that a creditor need not raise his action till other means of redress have failed. Artful management, the mediation of friends, distress, and other compulsory means, may be used by him; and if he thus succeed in retaking his property, the king must not only not rebuke him, but ratify his possession as "payment by the debtor." Among five modes of recovery which he may employ, "legal force" is mentioned last. "This law," says Mr. Elphinstone,¹ "still operates so strongly in some Hindu states, that a creditor imprisons his debtor in his private house, and even keeps him for a period

¹ Elphinstone's *India*, vol. i, pp. 61-2.

without food, and exposed to the sun, to compel him to produce the money he owes." The interest lent on money without security is to be proportioned to the risk, or "in the direct order of the classes." Thus, the monthly interest exigible from a Brahmin is 2 per cent; from a Kshatriya or soldier, 3; from a Vaisya or merchant, 4; and from a Sudra, 5 per cent. It is added, "never more," and, as one should think, superfluously, since this so-called maximum is at the enormous rate of 60 per cent per annum. Where a pledge has been taken as a security merely, the interest must not exceed $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent monthly, and where the pledge is beneficial—in other words, is used by the pawnee for his profit—he is not entitled to any interest at all. Interest must not be allowed to accumulate till it "be more than enough to double the debt;" but the rule as to a maximum will not apply in the case of extraordinary risks, and therefore "whatever interest shall be settled by men well acquainted with sea voyages or journeys by land, with times and with places, such interest shall have legal force." A prescriptive right to ordinary moveables may be established; and therefore "whatever chattel the owner sees enjoyed by others for ten years, while, though present, he says nothing, that chattel he shall not recover," provided he was at the time of legal capacity; but "a pledge, a boundary of land, the property of an infant, a deposit either open or in a chest sealed, female slaves, the wealth of a king, and of a learned Brahmin, are not lost in consequence of adverse enjoyment."

On the subject of obligations, many nice and important distinctions are made. A contract may be null from being entered into under the influence of force or fraud, or by parties labouring under incapacity; and the judge is bound, on discovering the flaw, to "annul the whole transaction." For the same reason, "that plaint can have no effect, though it may be supported by evidence, which contains a cause of action inconsistent with positive law or with settled usage." In some cases, however, a contract, which might not of itself be legally binding, will be enforced. Thus in the ordinary case, when a debtor dies without leaving the means of paying his debt, his family are not bound; but should it be proved that the money borrowed was expended for their use, then "it must be paid by that family,

divided or undivided, out of their own estate." In like manner, "should even a slave make a contract for the behoof of the family, the master, whether in his own country or abroad, shall not rescind it." On the other hand, there are cases in which an obligation which might have been enforced against the original obligant will not be binding on his representatives. For instance, money "idly promised, or lost at play, or due for spirituous liquors, the son shall not be obliged to pay." The same rule holds in cases of surety for appearance; but "if a surety for payment should die, the judge may compel even his heirs to discharge the debt."

Bargains of sale or purchase, though completed by delivery, may be rescinded at the wish of either seller or buyer within ten days; but after that period become so absolute, that the party attempting to rescind is subjected to a fine. It may happen that a seller is not the true owner. If he was aware of the fact, he is of course to be treated as a thief; but what becomes of the sale? The buyer may have paid full value, and been totally ignorant of the theft. Ought he in that case to be the loser? The question is one of some nicety, and is thus answered:—The purchaser, if he has bought "in open market," and "paid the price," is entitled to "the absolute property," provided he produce the seller; but if the seller is not produced, the purchaser, on proving the public sale, only escapes punishment, and the property returns to the original owner. In treating of bargains not fulfilled in terms of the agreement, some curious cases are mentioned. One of these is:—"After one damsel has been shown, another is offered to the bridegroom;" the decision is, that "he may become the husband of both for the same price." Another case of a similar nature is that of "a kinsman who gives a damsel in marriage", without having "told her blemishes." A third case is that of a hired servant or workman who "fails to perform his work according to his agreement." If the failure is owing to indolence, a fine shall be inflicted, and the wages or hire shall not be paid. On the other hand, if "he be really ill, and, when restored to health, shall perform his work according to his original bargain, he shall receive his pay even for a very long time."

The title relating to master and servant is very meagre, being confined almost entirely to questions "arising from the fault of

such as own herds of cattle, and of such as are hired to keep them." The general rule is, that "by day the blame falls on the herdsman, and by night on the owner," if the cattle are kept at home, but "if the place of their food and custody be different, the keeper bears the blame." As a specimen of the way in which the rule is applied, the following case may be mentioned:—"A flock of goats or of sheep being attacked by wolves, and the keeper not going to repel the attack, he shall be responsible for every one of them which a wolf shall violently kill; but if any one of them, while they graze together near a wood and the shepherd keeps them in order, shall be suddenly killed by a wolf springing on it, he shall not in that case be responsible."

On the subject of boundaries nothing of much interest occurs. The thing most necessary is to fix boundaries at first in such a manner as to make it almost impossible to mistake them. With this view they ought to be marked both above and below ground; above by natural object, as streams and lakes, or artificial objects, as pools and wells, temples, planted trees, and earthen mounds; and below by "large pieces of stone, bones, tails of cows, bran ashes, potsherds, dried cow-dung, bricks and ashes, charcoal, pebbles and sand, and substances of all sorts which the earth corrodes not even in a long time." In the event of a contest between two villages, such marks, and "long-continued possession," may enable the judge to find the limit; but "should there be a doubt," recourse must be had to the declarations of witnesses, who "must be examined concerning the landmarks in the presence of all the townsmen or villagers, or of both the contending parties." The evidence "must be recorded in writing," and when the witnesses are about to give it, "let them, putting earth on their heads, wearing chaplets of red flowers and clad in red mantles, be sworn by the reward of all their several good actions, to give correct evidence concerning the metes and bounds." If there be no witnesses, "four men who dwell on all the four sides of the two villages" must "make a decision concerning the boundary, being duly prepared, in the presence of the king." Should there be "no such neighbours on all sides, nor any men whose ancestors had lived there since the villages were built, nor other inhabitants of towns, who can give evidence on the limits, the judge must examine the following

men who inhabit the woods:—hunters, fowlers, herdsmen, fishers, diggers for roots, catchers of snakes, gleaners, and other foresters.” By such means the king may be able to fix the precise boundary between the two villages. When the dispute is between individuals “as to the bounds of arable fields, wells or pools, gardens and houses,” the testimony of next neighbours on every side will suffice. As a last resource, should all other means fail, “let the king, knowing what is just and consulting the future benefit of both parties, make a bound line.”

The subject of husband and wife, though in some respects the most important of all, is not treated with much judgment in the *Institutes of Manu*. The wife in particular is degraded from her natural position, and made to be the slave rather than the companion of her husband. The very first announcement of this part of the Hindu code is as follows:—“Day and night must women be held by their protectors in a state of dependence; but in recreations, though rather addicted to them, they may be left at their own disposal. Their fathers protect them in childhood, their husbands protect them in youth, their sons protect them in age; a woman is never fit for independence.” Again, “Women must, above all, be restrained from the smallest illicit gratification: for not being thus restrained, they bring sorrow on both families; let husbands consider this as the supreme law ordained for all classes, and let them, how weak soever, diligently keep their wives under lawful restrictions.” It is admitted indeed that “no man can wholly restrain woman by violent measures,” and that “those women are truly secure who are guarded by their own good inclinations.” Such inclinations, it would seem, they must have from nature, for they are precluded from the use of the means which, even the Brahmins, being judges, are best fitted to instil them, it being expressly declared that “women have no business with the texts of the *Veda*.” Their social position is only too significantly expressed by the classification adopted and the treatment enjoined in the following passage:—“For women, children, persons of crazy intellect, the old, the poor, and the infirm, the king shall order punishment with a small whip, a twig, or a rope.”

Eight forms of marriage are mentioned, but two of them only to be stigmatized. Of these two, the last and basest, called

paisacha, is where advantage is taken of a "damsel sleeping, or flushed with strong liquor, or disordered in her intellect;" the other, called *asura*, is vitiated by the mercenary spirit in which it is transacted, "the bridegroom having given as much wealth as he can afford to the father and paternal kinsmen, and to the damsel herself." In the four most approved forms the father simply gives his daughter away with certain prescribed ceremonies. One or other of these forms must be used when the bridegroom is a Brahmin. The fifth and sixth forms, called respectively *gandharvas* and *rakshshasas*, seem competent only to a soldier or member of the Kshatriya class. The former of these is the only one in which the inclinations of the bridegroom and bride receive effect, for it is defined to be "the reciprocal connection of a youth and a damsel, with mutual desire;" the latter not only requires no consent, but takes place in circumstances which preclude the possibility of it, since it is nothing less than "the seizure of a maiden by force from her home, while she weeps and calls for assistance, after her kinsmen and friends have been slain in battle, or wounded, and their houses broken open." As a general rule the father disposes of his daughter absolutely, and is under no obligation to consult her inclinations, though he is advised to give her "to an excellent and handsome youth of the same class," and reminded that though marriageable it is better she "should stay at home till her death than that he should ever give her in marriage to a bridegroom void of excellent qualities." The marriageable age was fixed at eight, but if after waiting three years beyond that period, she was not provided with a husband, she was entitled to choose for herself. In so acting "neither she nor the youth chosen commits any offence," though as a kind of penalty for the irregularity, she cannot without committing theft "carry with her the ornaments which she received from her father, nor those given by her mother or brethren." In all cases intermarriage between individuals of the same class is to preferred, but the rule of law is unequally applied, and while men may, women are absolutely interdicted from marrying into classes inferior to their own.

In married life the idea of equality is altogether scouted, and as Mrs. Speir justly says, "obedience is the beginning and the

middle and the end of female duty.”¹ Her proper business is to be “employed in the collection and expenditure of wealth, in purification and female duty, in the preparation of daily food, and the superintendence of household utensils,” but her person and rights are wholly sunk in those of her husband, and she is classed with a son and slave as one of the three persons “declared by law to have no wealth exclusively their own; the wealth which they may earn is acquired for the man to whom they may belong.” Marriage is said to be indissoluble, and what is called “the supreme law between husband and wife” is thus summarily expressed:—“Let mutual fidelity continue until death.” But even in this point gross inequality is apparent. A husband, though married in legal form, may abandon his wife on the ground of blemish or disease fraudulently concealed from him. He may also supersede her by another wife on the vague charges of drinking spirituous liquors, acting immorally, showing hatred, being mischievous and wasting his property, or speaking unkindly. In all these cases, indeed, some degree of blame attaches to her, but she may in like manner be superseded when the worst that can be said of her is that she is unfortunate. Thus she may be superseded in the eighth year if she has proved barren, or in the tenth if all her children are dead, and in the eleventh if she has borne only daughters. Should she resent this harsh usage, and depart in wrath from the house, “she must either instantly be confined, or abandoned in the presence of the whole family.” On the other hand, whatever be the husband’s faults, though “inobservant of approved usages, or enamoured of another woman, or devoid of good qualities,” he “must constantly be revered as a god by a virtuous wife.” Though addicted to gaming, fond of spirituous liquors, or diseased, she is liable, if she neglect him, to be “deprived of her ornaments and household furniture,” and cannot get quit of him except in the not very probable case of his not only deserting her, but living abroad without reasonable cause for at least three years. On the dissolution of marriage by death the woman is still made the principal sufferer. He, if the survivor, may immediately supply her place, but she, if once a widow, is expected to spend the remainder of her

¹ *Life in Ancient India*, p. 169.

life in the painful austerities "becoming a woman devoted to one only husband," and must not "even pronounce the name of another man." Nothing, indeed, is said of any obligation to submit to the horrible sacrifice of *sati*, but her second marriage, if not absolutely illegal, is stigmatized in such language as the following:—"The marriage of a widow" is not "even named in the laws concerning marriage." Another practice, however, not unknown to the Jewish law, that of raising up issue to a brother, appears, though not without considerable hesitation, to have been permitted, not only to the higher classes, in the special case of a husband dying "after troth verbally plighted, but before consummation," but to all Sudras, whenever the husband died without male issue. The practice, while permitted, being reprobated as "fit only for cattle," afterwards fell into desuetude.

Immediately connected with the law of husband and wife is that of inheritance. In the Hindu code the rights of succession are considered subservient to the due performance of obsequies to ancestors, and hence the heir to whom the performance of these obsequies properly belongs is always preferred. To this is to be ascribed the important place occupied by the eldest son as the representative of the family. "By the eldest, at the moment of his birth, the father, having begotten a son, discharges his debt to his own progenitors; the eldest son, therefore, ought to manage the whole patrimony," and the other sons "may live under him as under their father." If they do not choose so to live, a division takes place according to certain rules. Two modes of division are mentioned as being equally legal. According to the one, a deduction from the whole patrimony is first made—the eldest son receiving a twentieth, together with the best chattel, the youngest son an eightieth, and each intermediate son a fortieth—and then the residue is distributed in equal shares. If the division is made without any previous deduction, the eldest son receives a double share, the next born a share and a half, and the younger sons a share each. Married daughters appear to be excluded, but the unmarried daughters are provided for by their brothers, each of whom is bound to contribute for this purpose "a fourth part of his own distinct share," and "shall be degraded" if he

refuse. The existence of more wives than one gives rise to curious complications. One of these is stated as follows:—"A younger son being born of a first married wife, after an elder son had been born of a wife last married, it may be a doubt, in that case, how the division shall be made." The decision is that the son of the elder wife is to be preferred, but in a less degree than he would have been if he had been also the eldest born.

A man who has no son may appoint his daughter to raise up a son for him, by saying "the male child who shall be born from her in wedlock shall be mine, for the purpose of performing my obsequies." In this case the son succeeds to all the wealth of his maternal grandfather: should she have no son she takes the succession in her own right, for, as it is justly asked, "How, if a man have no son, can any inherit his property but a daughter, who is closely united with his own soul?" Here, however, a question arises. Suppose that the father, after a son is thus raised up to him by his daughter, has a son of his own body, which of the two sons shall be his heir? The answer is, that they shall divide the heritage between them. Failing either of these sons, a man may obtain a son by adoption. Such a son enjoys all the rights of a son in the family into which he has been adopted, but "must never claim the family and estate of his natural father." In the event of there being no son, actual or adopted, and no son raised up by a brother or kinsman, as under the Jewish law, a series of substitutes, called sons only by an extraordinary legal fiction, are provided, "for the sake of preventing a failure of obsequies," such a failure being regarded by a Hindu as the greatest of all possible calamities. Instead of attending farther to these substitutes, it is of more consequence to trace the order of succession should there be no son of any kind nor daughter to take it. First in order come grandsons, then nephews, then parents, then brothers, then grandfathers and grandmothers, then kinsmen so near as to be entitled to perform obsequies to ancestors. On complete failure of kindred, the spiritual preceptor, the pupil, or the Brahmins succeed. Last of all comes the king, as *ultimus hoeres*, subject, however, to the important limitation, that the deceased was not a Brahmin, for "the property of a Brahmin

shall never be taken by the king:" this is a fixed law, but the wealth of all other classes, on the failure of all heirs, the king may take. It is rather singular, that though the right of a father to dispose absolutely of his property, or distribute it among his children, in his lifetime, is implied by various passages in the *Institutes*, there is not the least hint of his being able to dispose of it by will.

The criminal law of the Hindus is much more defective than the civil, and is characterized throughout by partiality, caprice, and cruelty. Punishments are regulated not so much by the heinousness of the offence as the caste of the offender; and thus, while some of the worst crimes escape with comparative impunity, the most venial are visited with barbarous mutilations and tortures. The principal heads under which criminal law is arranged are, slander and assault, larceny, robbery and other violence, adultery, and gaming. This arrangement is arbitrary and incomplete, classing together crimes which have little in common, and omitting many by which the peace of society is disturbed and individuals are seriously injured. A few specimens selected from each head will show the spirit which pervades the whole.

Defamatory words are punished by fine if the offender belong to a superior class, and corporeally if he be a Sudra. In fixing the fine, the rule is to deal most leniently with the Brahmin who offends, and most severely with the person with whom he is offended. Thus, a Brahmin for slandering a soldier was fined fifty panas, for slandering a merchant twenty-five, and for slandering a Sudra twelve. If he was slandered, the fine imposed on the soldier was 100 panas, and on the merchant 150 or 200. For the very same offence "a mechanic or servile man" was whipped. He might even be glad to escape so easily, for, if convicted of insulting "the twice-born with gross invectives," or of mentioning "their names and classes with contumely," he is in the former case to "have his tongue slit," and in the latter to have "an iron style ten fingers long thrust red hot into his mouth." With regard to assault the general rule is, that "with whatever member a low-born man shall assault, or hurt a superior, even that member of his must be slit." Accordingly, "he who raises his hand or a staff against another shall have

his hand cut; and he who kicks another in wrath shall have an incision made in his foot." Even the meaning of the word "assault" is stretched, for the purpose of making it reach offences not properly included under it. In this way it is provided that "a man of the lowest class who shall insolently place himself on the same seat with one of the highest, shall either be banished with a mark on his hinder parts, or the king shall cause a gash to be made on his buttock." For a variety of insults in more aggravated forms, lips, hands, and other offending members are to be similarly gashed. In some cases treatment which might amount to assault, may be justified by the authority of the person who inflicts it, and be nothing more than legitimate chastisement. The only case mentioned, apparently by way of illustration, is so singular as to be worth quoting. It runs thus:—"A wife, a son, a servant, a pupil, and a whole brother may be corrected, when they commit faults, with a rope or the small shoot of a cane; but on the back part of their bodies, and not on a noble part by any means."

In introducing the subject of theft and robbery, the code labours to impress the king with the importance of the duty of restraining them, reminding him that "by restraining thieves and robbers his fame and domain are increased;" and that a king "who receives taxes in kind or in value, market duties and tolls, the small daily presents for his household, and fines for offences," without protecting his people by the punishment of offenders, "falls directly to a region of horror." On the other hand, it is gravely asserted, not only that "by restraining the bad and by encouraging the good, kings are perpetually made pure," but that "men who have committed offences, and have received from kings the punishment due to them, go pure to heaven, and become as clear as those who have done well." Minor thefts are punished by fine, and it is very remarkable that this is a penalty which the king himself may incur, for it is expressly said that "where another man of lower birth would be fined one *pana*¹, the king shall be fined a thousand." "This," it is added, "is a sacred rule." But who, it may be asked, was to enforce it? The commentator answers: "He shall give the

¹ The *pana* weighs about four dwts, and if of copper, is at present equal in value to eighty cowries.

fine to the priests, or cast it into the river." In more serious cases of theft a fine was not considered sufficient, and imprisonment, confinement by fetters, and various kinds of corporal punishment were added. These last, according to the usual practice, consisted of mutilations, such as the amputation of a hand or a limb. It deserves to be noticed, that in imposing fines for theft the rule adopted is much more equitable than in the case of assault, inasmuch as the amount is increased with the rank of the criminal, the fine of a Sudra being only eight fold, while that of a Vaisya is sixteen, that of a Kshatriya two-and-thirty, and that of a Brahmin four-and-sixty fold." The object, doubtless, was to deter the Brahmin from the commission of a crime by which, as it is essentially mean and despicable, he reflected disgrace on his order.

The next branch of criminal law considered in the code is that relating to crimes of violence. It is disposed of in a few sentences, and is only deserving of notice on account of the manner in which a just self-defence is sanctioned. While it is said that "neither on account of friendship, nor for the sake of great lucre, shall the king dismiss the perpetrators of violent acts, who spread terror on all creatures," it is distinctly intimated that "the twice-born may take arms when their duty is obstructed by force," and "in their own defence;" and that "in a war for a just cause and in defence of a woman or a priest, he who kills justly commits no crime." That there may be no mistake as to what is meant by killing justly, it is explained to be "killing an assassin who attempts to kill, whether in public or in private."

The subject of adultery is treated at large, and, it must be confessed, with more particularity than delicacy. One thing deserving of notice is the importance attached to what are called "overt acts of adulterous inclinations," such as talking with the wife of another man "at a place of pilgrimage, in a forest, or a grove, or at the confluence of rivers;" sending her "flowers or perfumes;" sporting and jesting with her; touching "her apparel and ornaments;" and sitting "with her on the same couch." In all such cases a fine is exigible. A very proper distinction, however, is made. If a man before noted for adultery "converses in secret with the wife of another," his guilt is

presumed and he incurs the penalty; but "a man, not before noted, who thus converses with her for some reasonable cause, shall pay no fine, since in him there is no transgression." In like manner it is intimated that husbands have themselves to blame if their wives are not "most especially guarded;" and that therefore the laws against adultery "relate not to the wives of public dancers and singers, or of such base men as live by intrigues of their wives; men who either carry women to others, or lying concealed at home, permit them to hold a culpable intercourse." The actual commission of the crime is punished with little regard to equity, the punishment being generally light in proportion to the rank of the male, and rigorous in proportion to the rank of the female offender. Hence a Brahmin, even for forcing a guarded woman, incurs only a fine, and at the very worst is subjected to "ignominious tonsure;" whereas, "should a wife, proud of her family, and the great qualities of her kinsmen, actually violate the duty which she owes to her lord," her sentence is "to be devoured by dogs in a place much frequented;" and that of her paramour to be placed "on an iron bed well heated, under which the executioners shall throw logs continually till the sinful wretch be there burned." When the crime is committed under similar circumstances by a soldier or a merchant, the form of the punishment is slightly varied, and the adulterer is "burned in a fire of dry grass or reeds." After treating of the subject of "gaming either with inanimate or animated things, and recommending the king to exclude it wholly from his realm, because "both those modes of play cause destruction to princes," and to "punish corporally at discretion both the gamester and the keeper of a gaming-house," the code enumerates various crimes not included under the previous titles, and specifies their punishments. Ministers "who are employed in public affairs, and, inflamed by the blaze of wealth, mar the business of any party concerned," are to be stripped of all their property. Such as "forge royal edicts, cause dissensions among the great ministers," or join the king's enemies, are to be put to death. Whatever business "has at any time been transacted according to law" is to be considered as "finally settled," and the king should refuse to re-open it; but when his ministers or a judge have

acted illegally it is his duty to re-examine the case, and fine them for their misconduct.

For the purpose of detecting crime, and bringing offenders to justice, a system of internal police must be established. In all communities there are "two sorts of rogues—the open and the concealed;" open, who "subsist by cheating in various marketable commodities;" and concealed, "who steal and rob in forests and the like secret places." There are also "receivers of bribes, extorters of money by threats, debasers of metals, gamesters, fortune-tellers, impostors, and professors of palmistry;" in short, "scoundrels with depraved souls, who secretly prowls over this earth"—worthless men, all the more dangerous from often "bearing the outward signs of the worthy". As a security against their machinations, and for the prevention of robberies, the king must employ soldiers, stationary and patrolling, as well as secret watchmen at "much-frequented places, cisterns of water, bake-houses, the lodging of harlots, taverns, and victualling shops, squares where four ways meet, large well-known trees, assemblies and public spectacles, old courtyards, thickets, the houses of artists, empty mansions, groves and gardens". It will also be requisite to employ "able spies." The description given of them is curious. They are to be men who were "once thieves," and thus "knowing the various machinations of rogues, associate with them and follow them," for the purpose of enabling the king to "detect and draw them forth." Even their mode of proceeding is detailed. On some pretext or other, such as the promise of "dainty food and gratifications," the spies are to procure an assembly of rogues. Being thus brought within the grasp of the law, the king is to seize them all at once, as well as any of their gang whose suspicions may have deterred them from joining the assembly, and do summary justice by putting them to death, "with their friends and kinsmen, paternal and maternal."

After recommending a number of other executions, conceived in the same sanguinary spirit, the code disposes of a variety of minor delinquencies, properly falling within the department of police; such as taking away the water of an ancient pool, obstructing a water-course, breaking down a foot-bridge, or removing a public flag. For all these fines are appointed. In other cases offenders are punished by imprisonment. Of course, prisons are

necessary, but the only information given with regard to them is, that they are to be placed "near a public road, where offenders may be seen wretched or disfigured." From the subject of police the code adverts to various forms, of meditated crime, which, though they may have failed of their effect, deserve punishment. Those particularly mentioned are, "sacrifices to destroy innocent men," "machinations with roots," and "witcheries". From these an abrupt transition is made to several fraudulent practices. After specifying the sale of bad grain for good, the placing of good seed at the top of the bag to conceal the bad below, and the removal of known landmarks, and declaring that those guilty of such offences "must suffer such corporal punishment as will disfigure them," the code concludes its denunciations of fraud with the following startling sentence:—"But the most pernicious of all deceivers is a goldsmith who commits frauds; the king shall order him to be cut piecemeal with razors." The barbarous punishment thus reserved for the goldsmith may be thought justifiable from the difficulty of detecting his frauds, and the value of the materials with which he is intrusted; but most persons will see in this shocking punishment, only an exemplification of the barbarous manner in which criminal justice was, and still is administered by Hindu sovereigns.

Another important branch of government, not yet considered, is its foreign policy, or the measures rendered necessary by the relations, peaceful or warlike, which it may bear to other states. For it must always be remembered that India did not form one single undivided empire, but was composed of a number of separate and independent sovereigns, always jealous of each other, and often engaged in open hostilities. The importance attached to the office of ambassador, and the qualifications necessary for the performance of its duties, have already been adverted to. Incidental notice has also been taken of the division of the kingdom into military districts, and the appointment of a commander-in-chief with a "company of guards," evidently of the nature of a standing army, to act as "the protectors of the realm." The leading principle by which the king is to be guided in his foreign policy is to be "always ready for action." While acting on all occasions "with-

out guile and never with insincerity," he is to keep himself "ever on his guard." In the exercise of this caution he is to consider "the power immediately beyond him, and the favourer of that power," as hostile, "the power next beyond" as amicable, and all powers still more remote as neutral. His troops are to be "constantly exercised; his prowess constantly displayed; what he ought to secure, constantly secured; and the weakness of his foe constantly investigated." At the same time he must be careful not to disclose his own "vulnerable part." On this subject the advice is, "Like a tortoise, let him draw in his members under the shell of concealment, and diligently let him repair any breach that may be made in it; like a heron, let him muse on gaining advantages; like a lion, let him put forth his strength; like a wolf, let him creep towards his prey; like a hare, let him double to secure his retreat." In short, "Let him so arrange all his affairs, that no ally, neutral prince, or enemy may obtain any advantage over him; this, in a few words, is the sum of political wisdom." He must not be satisfied, however, with acting on the defensive. Glory and conquest rather than peace must be his object, since "those rulers of the earth, who, desirous of defeating each other, exert their utmost strength in battle, without ever averting their faces, ascend after death directly to heaven." With such a stimulus added to the innate ambition of rulers, it is not strange that war seems to be contemplated as their natural and necessary employment. Accordingly, the principles on which the king is to act are thus inculcated: "What he has not gained, let him strive to gain; what he has acquired, let him preserve with care; what he preserves, let him augment; and what he has augmented, let him bestow on the deserving."

In accordance with these principles, the existence of war being assumed, a very minute and curious account is given of the manner in which it is to be carried on. The king having made all the necessary preparations for conquest, is to invade the enemy's country in the fine months when autumnal or vernal crops are on the ground. He may indeed set out "even in other seasons, when he has a clear prospect of victory, and when any disaster has befallen his foe." Having secured "the three sorts of ways," that is, over water, on plains, and through

forests, and placed what is called "his six-fold army" (elephants, cavalry, cars, infantry, officers, and attendants) in complete military form, he is to "proceed by fit journeys toward the metropolis of his enemy," keeping "much on his guard against every secret friend in the service of the hostile prince, and against emissaries who go and return." The line of march, as stated in the text, and explained by the commentator in the words here placed in brackets, is curious: "On his march let the king form his troops either like a staff (in an even column); like a wain (in a wedge with the apex foremost); like a boar (in a rhomb, with the van and rear narrow and the centre broad); like a *makara* (a sea monster, that is, in a double triangle with apices joined); like a needle (in a long line); or like the bird of Vishnu (in a rhomboid, with the wings far extended)." The king's own position, meanwhile, is more secure than dignified, for he is always to conceal himself "in the midst of a squadron like a lotus-flower."

Having arrived at the scene of action the king is to proceed thus:—"On all sides let him station troops of soldiers in whom he confides, distinguished by known colours and other marks, who are excellent both in sustaining a charge and in charging; who are fearless and incapable of desertion. Let him at his pleasure order a few men to engage in a close phalanx, or a large number of warriors in loose ranks; and having formed them in a needle or in a thunderbolt, let him give the orders for battle," fighting on a plain "with his armed cars and horses," on watery places "with manned boats and elephants," on ground full of trees and shrubs "with bows," and on cleared ground "with swords and targets and other weapons." When the troops are formed in array, he is to encourage them (with short animated speeches), and then "try them completely" by risking the encounter. Sometimes it may be more advisable to block up the enemy. In that case the king is to "sit encamped and lay waste the hostile country," spoiling its "grass, water, and wood;" destroying "the pools, wells, and trenches," harassing the foe by day and alarming him by night. Meanwhile he is secretly to bring over to his party as many of the enemy as he can, and acquaint himself by means of spies of all their movements, and "when a fortunate moment is offered by Heaven"

give battle, "pushing on to conquest and abandoning fear." This bold course, however, he is not to adopt till other expedients—negotiation, well-applied gifts, and creating divisions—have failed; since there is always hazard in a decisive action, "and victory or defeat are not surely foreseen on either side, when two armies engage in the field."

When a battle does take place the rules of honourable warfare must be observed. No combatant is to "smite his foe with weapons concealed, nor with arrows mischievously barbed, nor with poisoned arrows, nor with darts blazing with fire." Neither is one who is mounted "to strike his enemy alighted on the ground; nor an effeminate man; nor one with closed palms (suing for life); nor one whose hair is loose; nor one who sits down; nor one who says 'I am thy captive'." In these, and various similar cases which are enumerated, mercy is to be shown. With the exception of gold and silver, all the articles taken in war are "the lawful prizes of the man who takes them;" but he "must lay the most valuable before the king," and the king "should distribute among the whole army what has not been separately taken." Should the country against which the expedition was undertaken be conquered, the king must not play the tyrant in it, but conciliate favour by respecting "the deities adored in it and their virtuous priests, by distributing largesses, and by loudly proclaiming a full exemption from terror." In settling the future government of the country he may send a prince of the royal race to rule over it, not leaving him, however, to exercise his own discretion, but giving him "precise instructions," and taking care, moreover, that the laws previously in force shall be maintained. The confiscation of property causing hatred in those who lose it, and love in those to whom it is granted, "may be laudable or blamable on different occasions." Instead of ruling the conquered country as a province added to his former territories, the king may find it more expedient "to form an alliance with the vanquished prince, and proceed in union with him, using diligent circumspection," since "by gaining wealth and territory a king acquires not so great an increase of strength, as by obtaining a firm ally, who, though weak, may hereafter be powerful." It may happen that the expedition proves unfortunate, and the king, sustaining a serious

reverse, is obliged instead of attacking other territories to defend his own. In that event, the expediency of abandoning "even a salubrious and fertile country, where cattle continually increase," for the sake of preserving himself, is easily perceived, but some doubt may not unreasonably be felt as to the soundness and good taste of the following singular advice:—"Against misfortune let him preserve his wealth; at the expense of wealth let him preserve his wife; but let him at all events preserve himself even at the hazard of his wife and his riches."

Before quitting the subject of Hindu government, it may be necessary to refer to the more important changes which have been introduced into its different departments in comparatively modern times, and of which notice has not yet been taken. In its form the government remains as despotic as ever, while the administration of it has in some respects become more arbitrary. Instead of a regular council, composed of a fixed number of members, a prime minister, probably indebted for the appointment not so much to his qualifications as to caprice, favouritism, and court intrigue, rules almost as absolutely as his master over the heads of the different departments. The military divisions no longer exist, but the civil divisions bear a considerable resemblance to those of Manu's time, though the name of governments has been substituted for the highest lordships. The townships themselves, however, as already shown, still subsist. The burden of taxation has been greatly increased. The revenue exigible from land, which could not exceed a sixth, except in times of war or public distress, when it might be raised to a fourth, has been increased by means of taxes and cesses, falling chiefly on cultivators, till it amounts usually to a half, and seldom falls below a third of the whole produce. Worse than this, demands are made on frivolous pretexts, and the villagers thus exposed to arbitrary exactions can only evade them by concealing their income, bribing collectors, or throwing their lands out of cultivation. The only effect of this monstrous system is to produce oppression on the one hand, and fraud and wretchedness on the other. These evils are greatly aggravated by farming out the revenue to the highest bidder who offers sufficient security to the treasury. The contractor, by subletting, introduces a body of middlemen of different grades, each of whom

endeavours to squeeze out a larger amount than his immediate superior, till at last all their extortions fall with accumulated weight on the poor cultivator.

The law though still based on the code of Manu, has been much modified by the interpretations of commentators, who have thus become the founders of distinct law schools, named from the provinces in which their authority is recognized. There is thus the school of Bengal, of Mithila or North Bihar, of Benares, of Maharashtra or the Maratha country, and of Dravida or south of the peninsula. Many of the changes introduced are the natural result of a more complicated state of society; but others of them are very questionable improvements. Thus, marriage formerly allowed between unequal castes is now prohibited, and the power of a father over his property, particularly when it is ancestral, is greatly restricted if not wholly annulled. Indeed, the Dravida school, making no distinction between property which the father has inherited and property which he has himself acquired, places him in respect of the power of disposal on the same footing as his sons, and gives him no privilege superior to theirs, except that of present enjoyment. The power of making a will, of which no hint is given by Manu, is still denied by all the schools except that of Bengal, which admits it only in certain cases. The criminal law has fallen into desuetude, but unfortunately nothing better has been substituted for it; and punishments are regulated partly by custom and partly by arbitrary will. Regular law courts have also been in a great measure superseded by commissions, the members of which obtaining them by court favour, usually exercise their powers in accordance with the wishes of their patrons. They are therefore interested partizans rather than impartial judges. Almost the only cases in which justice can be impartially administered is by bodies of arbitrators called *panchayats*, when the parties themselves select them and agree to abide by their decision.

In no department have the changes been so great as in that of war. From the account given above it is manifest, that at the date of the code, the art itself was in a very rude state. Every expedition being limited to a few weeks' duration, when the weather was favourable, was an isolated inroad rather than

a campaign, and therefore could not form part of a systematic and comprehensive plan, to be pursued through a series of years till the object was accomplished. A marked improvement in this desultory mode of warfare was apparent in the resistance which the Hindus made to the early Muhammedan invaders. Besides forming extensive confederacies, they brought powerful armies into the field; and when one campaign ended, kept these armies ready to commence another as soon as the season for renewed operations should arrive. As yet, however, the implements of war were rude and ineffective. Any position strong by nature might by a little art be rendered impregnable. The use of ordnance, by introducing a new and powerful engine of destruction, made it impossible to act any longer on the previously received axiom that "one bowman placed on a wall is a match in war for a hundred enemies, and a hundred for ten thousand." For the last great improvement, the introduction of regular battalions, by which the whole face of war has been changed, the Hindus are indebted to their European conquerors.

Though a considerable advance has been made in the mere art of war, discipline has rather degenerated, and the generosity and mercy so strongly inculcated on the victor by Manu are seldom experienced by the vanquished. Owing to the longer duration of campaigns the wants of armies are greatly increased, and the numbers assembled are out of all proportion to the effective force. On the march they form a disorderly crowd spread over the country for ten or twelve miles in length, by two in breadth, while parties scattered to greater distances scour the fields and villages for forage and plunder. "The main body," to borrow Mr. Elphinstone's graphic description, "is in some places dense, and in others rare, composed of elephants and camels, horse and foot, carts, palanquins, and bullock-carriages, loaded oxen, porters, women, children, droves of cattle, goats, sheep, and asses, all in the greatest conceivable disorder, and all enveloped in a thick cloud of dust that rises high into the atmosphere, and may be seen for miles. When there are regular infantry they march in a body, or at least by regiments; and the guns form a long line, occasioning continual obstructions, from the badness of the roads or the breaking down of carriages. The rest of the troops straggle among the baggage. Two tall standards, accompanied by kettle-drums (all perhaps on

elephants), represent a body which ought to be from 500 to 5,000 horse, but are followed by from five to fifty. The other horsemen belonging to them are riding singly or in groups, each, perhaps, with his spear poised on his shoulder, to the imminent danger of those who press behind, while the owner is joking with his companion, or singing in a voice that may be heard amidst the surrounding din." With all this want of order, "good intelligence and numbers of light troops" prevent surprise; and "these apparently unwieldy masses," even when warring with European troops, "have often gained great advantages from the secrecy and celerity of their movements."¹

When the ground for encampment is reached, the place allotted to each chief or department is marked by conspicuous flags. The camp itself is thus described:—"The camp, when pitched, is a mixture of regularity and disorder. The bazaars are long and regular streets, with shops of all descriptions, as in a city. The guns and disciplined infantry are in lines, and the rest scattered about, without any visible regard to arrangement. The tents are mostly white, but often striped with red, green, or blue, and sometimes wholly of these colours. Those of the poor are low and of black woollen; sometimes merely a blanket of that description thrown over three spears stuck in the ground, though the owners of spears are seldom so ill-lodged. The tents of the great are splendid; they are disposed in courts formed of canvas screens, and some are large and lofty for public receptions, while others are low and of moderate size, with quilted, and sometimes double walls, that secure privacy, while they exclude the dust and wind. They are connected by covered passages, and contain every accommodation that would be met with in a palace." The Hindus excel particularly in artillery, and hence the most important part of their battles is a cannonade. Skirmishing is also a favourite mode of fighting; but the most characteristic mode, and usually also the most decisive, is a general charge of cavalry. When they move on at speed "the thunder of the ground, the flashing of their arms, the brandishing of their spears, the agitation of their banners rushing through the wind, and the rapid approach of such a countless multitude, produce sensations of grandeur which the

¹ Elphinstone's *India*, vol. i, p. 153.

imagination cannot surpass." At first the whole appear coming at full speed against their adversaries' front, but by a sudden and dexterous movement part wheel inwards so as to bring the charge at once on front and flanks. This manoeuvre, however, is more grand than effective, and is easily resisted by disciplined troops standing in regular array. In the art of conducting sieges the Hindus have made little progress; and when places of any strength fall, it is far less frequently by regular assault than by blockade, surprise, or an unsuccessful sally.

What may be called the commissary department is very efficient. Though the government scarcely interferes, the supplies of armies and camps are in general abundant. The *brinjaries* or carriers of grain, collecting from all quarters, and often in distant countries, sell it wholesale to the larger dealers, while smaller dealers buy from the inhabitants of the surrounding districts. These regular sources of supply are eked out by plundering, which is carried on in the most merciless manner. The inhabitants of the village, aware of what awaits them, flee with whatever property they can carry; the rest is pillaged. Doors and rafters are carried off for firewood; the ground is probed by iron rods to find the pits where grain is buried, or dug over in the hope of discovering treasure. Desolation spreads on every side. "In a tract often traversed by armies the villages are in ruins and deserted; and bushes of different ages scattered over the open country show that cultivated fields are rapidly turning into jungle."

In the code no information is given as to the pay of soldiers. By the present practice cavalry are sometimes paid by assignments of the rent or revenue of particular districts, but more frequently by direct payments from the treasury. These payments are made either to military leaders, who receive according to a fixed rate for each soldier serving under them, or to individual troopers, who, providing their own horse and accoutrements, and being generally fine men, well mounted, expect more than ordinary pay. Bodies of cavalry are sometimes raised, equipped, and maintained entirely at the expense of the government. Being thus entirely dependent on it, they rank lower than the single troopers, but often surpass them both in obedience and general efficiency. The best foot are also mercenaries, from the banks of the Jamuna, Ganges, and Indus.

4

Art, Literature and Science

QUESTIONS of an abstract and metaphysical nature being intimately connected with the theology of the Hindus, have at all times received a large share of attention from those among them who were most distinguished by acuteness and originality of mind. The existence of a Supreme Being; the mode of his existence; his creative power and agency; the nature of matter, whether created, uncreated, or merely illusive; the nature of mind, its capability of separate existence, its various faculties, and the laws according to which it exercises them; its volitions, whether free or necessitated; the distinctions between truth and falsehood, virtue and vice, whether essential and eternal, or only conventional and temporary;—these and kindred speculations form the great bulk of Hindu philosophy. In such matters where there was no proper recognition of any infallible authority to which the final appeal could be made, unanimity, or even the least approach to it, was impossible, and hence a great number of different schools have arisen, sometimes agreeing, but far more frequently at variance with each other in regard to fundamental principles. These schools, if their subdivisions and ramifications are included, are very numerous; but Mr. Colebrooke,¹ who is the highest authority on the subject, has limited those which seem entitled to special notice to the following six:—1. The prior *Mimansa*, founded by Jaimini. 2. The latter *Mimansa* or *Vedanta*, attributed to Vyasa. 3. The *Niyaya*, or logical school of Gotama. 4. The atomic school of Kanade. 5. The atheistical school of Kapila. 6. The theistical school of Patanjali. This number may be still further reduced; for the first and second, the third and fourth,

¹ *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. i, p. 19.

and the fifth and sixth, properly form only three separate schools, distinguished by the respective names of the *Vedānta*, the *Niyāya*, and the *Sāṅkhya*. Premising that all these schools have professedly one common object in view—to teach the art of attaining happiness by setting the soul free from corporeal incumbrances—we proceed to give a very summary account of them; an account all the more summary from its being given under the conviction, that while it is difficult to make it intelligible, it is scarcely possible to make it interesting.

The *Vedānta* is considered as the orthodox school, because it professes to teach nothing that is not contained expressly or inferentially in the *Veda*, and constantly endeavours to strengthen the reasonings employed by appealing to its texts. Indeed the prior or *Purva Mīmāṃsā* is rather a theological than a philosophical school, since its main object is to apply the art of reasoning to the Hindu scriptures, and ascertain the duties which they enjoin. The latter or *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* is the only *Vedānta* philosophical school properly so called. Vyāsa, the alleged compiler of the *Vedas*, is claimed as its founder. Were this claim good it would carry back its origin to twelve or fourteen centuries before the Christian era. This, however, seems to be a common Hindu exaggeration, since the writings in which this system is first explained under its present form are not earlier than the sixth century B.C., and none of the numerous treatises and commentaries written in defence or explanation of it appeared more than 900 years ago. The *Vedānta* system is pantheism in its plainest and most absolute form. It sets out with the important doctrine that “God is the omnipotent and omniscient cause of the existence, continuance, and dissolution of the universe; and then deprives the doctrine of all its importance by confounding him with his creatures. Individual souls, though created by an act of his will, have no separate existence. They issued from him like sparks from a flame, and being still portions of his substance, will return, and be finally absorbed by it. The separate activity of the soul is more apparent than real; for, though it acts conformably to its own volitions, these are only links in a chain of causes extending backwards to infinity.

The soul when struck off from the divine substance is “deposited in a succession of sheaths enveloping one another

like the coats of an onion." In the first sheath intellect is associated with the five senses; in the second mind; and in the third the organs of sense and the vital faculties are added. The fourth sheath is the gross external body, which is shuffled off at death, while the other three constitute a subtile body which is not affected by death, and accompanies the soul through all its transmigrations to its ultimate absorption. Preparatory to these transmigrations, the soul enveloped in its three sheaths goes to the moon, and being there clothed with an aqueous body, falls in rain. In this form it is absorbed by some vegetable, and is thence transferred, apparently by being used as food, into an animal embryo. The number of subsequent changes which it undergoes before final liberation by absorption depends on its deeds.

On the subject of matter there is some difference of opinion among the *Vedantis*. They all hold that it is not eternal, and that it is entirely a creation of the divine will; but they are not agreed whether it is in itself a real substance or merely a semblance and illusion. Those of the former opinion say, that the Supreme Being having created matter from his own essence, formed the world out of it, and left it to make its varied impressions on the mind; those of the latter opinion cannot admit the creation of matter, because they deny that matter exists, and maintain that the thing to which we give the name, instead of possessing inherent qualities, is nothing more than a series of impressions produced directly and immediately by divine agency. This latter view, with all its absurdities, is adopted by the great majority of the *Vedantis*, and hence their prevailing creed must be first, that the Supreme Being has divided himself into an infinite number of portions, and then by giving to each of these portions a consciousness of individual and separate existence, has deluded them with a host of imaginary beliefs. As human souls, according to this hypothesis, always remain integral parts of the Divinity, it necessarily follows that the Supreme Being must, while producing these delusions, share in them, and consequently be at once the deceived and the deceiver. Where all appearances are thus at variance with fact, an universal ignorance must prevail, and it is therefore easy to understand why the *Vedanta* school attach so much importance

to knowledge as the effectual means of working out the soul's liberation. In fact, the great object must be to unlearn as well as learn—unlearn by suppressing all natural beliefs, and learn by assuming that every thing is the very opposite of what it seems. The individual, whatever he imagines himself to be, has no separate existence, and all the world around him is illusion. Brahm, the Supreme Being, is the one only existence, and therefore so long as a man entertains any idea of his own individuality he is in ignorance. It is only when he has succeeded in identifying himself with Brahm, and in getting "rid of the habit of making himself even a subject of thought," that he becomes truly enlightened. The magnitude of the object at which he is thus to aim contrasts curiously with the means which he is instructed to employ in order to accomplish it. Meditation will do something, but much more may be expected from postures, and mutterings, and suppressions of breath.

The *Niyaya* school deals much more in dialectics than in metaphysics; and aims rather to furnish a system of rules for the investigation of truth, than to give a dogmatical exposition of the truth itself. It consists, as has already been observed, of two leading branches, headed respectively by Gotama and Kanade, and so closely connected that the one is usually considered to be the complement of the other. The agreement, however, is not so much in the subjects of which they treat as of the principles recognized in the treatment of them. Gotama's text, forming a system of logic, or what may be called the philosophy of reasoning, consists of a collection of *sutras* or aphorisms, divided into five books, on which his disciples have written many volumes of commentaries; Kanade's text, consisting also of *sutras*, similarly commented upon, assumes the existence of eternal atoms, by the aggregation of which a transient world has been constructed, and his system has therefore been designated by the names both of the atomic theory and the philosophy of individuality.

Gotama, confining himself chiefly to the investigation of truth, and the different kinds of evidence by which it is established, enumerates sixteen logical categories in the following order:—1. Proof; 2. The object of proof; 3. Doubt; 4. Motive; 5. Instance or example; 6. Demonstrated truth; 7. Regular

argument or syllogism; 8. Proof by negation or *reductio ad absurdum*; 9. Determination or certainty; 10. Thesis or discussion; 11. Controversy; 12. Objection; 13. Fallacy; 14. Perverse construction or sophism; 15. Futility or evasion; 16. Confutation. This list is very complete, and shows that Gotama had viewed his subject in all its principal bearings, but the heads are too numerous to be here separately explained, and a few must therefore be selected for illustration.

Proof or evidence is of four kinds—perception; inference, obtained either by analysis in ascending from the effect to the cause, or by synthesis in descending from the cause to the effect, or by analogy; comparison, and affirmation or testimony. The objects of proof are classed under twelve heads, each of which is discussed at length. Full scope is thus given for the enunciation and explanation of the peculiar views by which the *Niyaya* school is characterized. The objects of proof, indeed, must necessarily include all the possible subjects of knowledge, and accordingly we find in the enumerated list of them the soul, the body, the senses and the objects of them, the will, merit and demerit, reward, transmigration, and liberation. In treating of the soul as one of the objects of proof, not only is a full exposition given of its nature and faculties, but the existence of God as the one Supreme Soul, the seat of eternal knowledge, the Maker and Disposer of all things, is asserted, and his relations to other existences are explained. Here, however, many startling propositions are advanced, and the infinity and eternity ascribed to the Supreme Soul are virtually withdrawn, by asserting that they are shared by all other souls, since soul by its very nature is not only immaterial, but also infinite and eternal. In treating of the body the existence of matter naturally falls under consideration. The view taken is, that it is real, not illusive, and that the atoms of which it is composed, though aggregated and moulded into bodily shapes in time, existed from eternity. The cause of the aggregation and moulding is left in doubt, and it is difficult to say whether it is meant to be regarded as the result of divine agency or of properties originally inherent in themselves. The discussion of the subject of matter, and of the objects formed out of it, involves many points which properly belong to physics, and

which will therefore be noticed when Kanade's branch of the *Niyaya* school is considered. The only other category possessing particular interest is the seventh. Gotama's syllogism differs from that with which we are familiar, in being composed not of three but of five members, placed thus:—the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, the conclusion. The following specimen has been given:—1. The mountain burns; 2. For it smokes; 3. That which smokes burns, as the kitchen fire; 4. Accordingly the mountain smokes; 5. Therefore it burns. If the first two terms be omitted, the other three will form the common European syllogism. The effect will be the same if the last two terms be omitted, and starting from the third, as before, the process is continued backwards from the third to the second, and from the second to the first. What the Hindus construct as one is thus in fact two syllogisms, which, teaching no more than the one, only double the labour without giving any compensation. The example introduced into the third term cannot be considered as an improvement, since the extraneous fact, so far from making the proposition clearer, tends rather to cumber and perplex it. The best thing that can be said for the Hindu syllogism is, that it is an exact imitation of the process which the mind naturally pursues. Setting out with a particular proposition, it arrives by analysis at a general truth; and then assuming the general truth, descends from it by synthesis to the particular proposition.

Kanade, who was a pupil of Gotama, has been contented to follow his master in his leading doctrines, and is entitled to the honour of a founder chiefly on account of the larger development which he gave to some of them. On the subject of logic, in treating of the objects of the senses, which Gotama has ranked as the fourth of his objects of proof, he enumerates six categories or predicaments—substance, quality, action, community, particularity, and intimate relation or aggregation. There are nine different substances—earth, water, light, air, ether, time, place, soul, and mind. Material substances are composed of simple indivisible and eternal atoms, which of course were never created, and cannot be annihilated. The forms, however, which have been produced by their aggregation is transient. How this aggregation was effected, whether by native affinities

in the atoms themselves, or by a creative power in the Supreme Being, is not distinctly explained. The atomic theory of Kanade is not cumbered with some of the difficulties which perplexed Democritus and Epicurus, and obliged them not only to set their atoms in motion, but to give them a slanting direction in order that they might meet and form aggregates. By endowing the atoms themselves with peculiar properties he gave them, as it were, a power of choice, by which those of kindred nature approached each other of their own accord and amalgamated, while those of an opposite nature mutually repelled each other, and, of course, when brought accidentally into juxtaposition refused to coalesce. In a few points Kanade made some approach to modern discoveries in physics. Contrary to Aristotle, who made levity and gravity separate principles, the one being a tendency to rise and the other to descend, Kanade regarded levity as only the absence of gravity. He also held that there are seven primary colours, erroneously giving white and black a place among them. He was more correct in regard to sound, and distinctly taught that it is propagated by undulations, sent wave after wave in all directions from a central point. The *Niyaya* school, agreeing in many fundamental points with the *Vedas*, occupies an intermediate place between the *Vedanta* school, which claims to be orthodox, and the *Sankhya* school, which is stigmatized as heterodox; of this last some account must now be given.

The *Sankhya* school, as mentioned above, forms two leading branches, distinguished by the names of atheistical and theistical. These very names would seem to imply that a wide and deep gulf lies between them, and that the points which they hold in common dwindle into insignificance when compared with the momentous truth on which they differ. It can only be by a misnomer, or an extraordinary abuse of terms, that those who believe and those who deny a God can be classed as belonging to the same school of philosophy. Kapila, the founder of the atheistical branch, having endeavoured in vain to find the final liberation, which was his highest aim, by acting in accordance with the *Vedas*, became convinced that the fault was not so much in him as in them, and resolved to supply their deficiencies. With this view he promulgated six books of *sutras*.

These, or others which bear his name, are still extant, but are so oracular and obscure as to be unintelligible without the aid of the commentaries which have been written on them. One of them, a work in verse, called the *Sankhya Karika*, is the chief source from which a knowledge of Kapila's system is derived.

Kapila's fundamental position is, that final deliverance can only be gained by true and perfect knowledge, which consists in discriminating the principles, perceptible and imperceptible, of the material world, from the sensitive and cognitive principle, the immaterial soul. True knowledge is derived from three great sources—perception, inference, and affirmation or testimony; and comprehends twenty-five first principles:—1. Nature or *Prakriti*, the root or plastic origin of all, eternal matter, undiscete, destitute of parts, not produced but productive, the universal material cause; 2. Intelligence, the first production of nature, increate and prolific; 3. Consciousness, giving the sense of self-existence, and said to be a product of intelligence; 4 to 19, said to be products of consciousness, include five rudimentary perceptions, and eleven organs of sense and action; 20 to 24 are the five elements—space, air, fire, water, and earth. The 25th and last principle is soul, which is said to be multitudinous, individual, sensitive, unalterable, and immaterial, neither produced nor producing.

By the union between nature and the soul creation is effected; and in order to satisfy the longing of the soul for fruition or liberation, it is invested with a subtile person, such as was described in treating of the *Vedanta* school—a person unconfined, and free from all hindrance, but incapable of enjoyment until invested with a gross corporeal body. The corporeal creation, consisting of souls lodged in gross bodies, comprehends, besides man, thirteen orders of beings, eight superior and five inferior. The superior are gods and other spirits; the inferior are animals, plants, and inorganic substances. Besides the subtile and the gross corporeal there is an intellectual creation, consisting of the affections of the intellect, its sentiments and faculties. These are very numerous, and form four classes distinguished from each other by their tendency to obstruct, disable, content or perfect the understanding. The obstructions—error, conceit, passion, hatred, and fear—are explained under sixty-four

divisions. Disabilities arising from defect or injury of organs, as blindness, deafness, &c., are of twenty-eight kinds. The contentment of the intellect has its source in a total or partial omission of exertion producing some degree of tranquillity, but inadequate to work out final deliverance. The perfection of the intellect has eight sources. Three of these are merely preventive of evil. The remaining five are reasoning, oral instruction, study, friendly intercourse, and external and internal purity.

In the *Sankhya*, as in all the other Hindu philosophical schools, much attention is paid to three essential qualities or modifications of nature, distinguished by the names of goodness, passion, and darkness. Not merely living but inanimate beings also are affected by them. Thus, when fire ascends, and man acts virtuously, it is by *goodness*; when the tempest rages, and man is hurried into vice, it is by *passion*; and when heavy bodies descend, and man is affected by stolidity or sorrow, it is by *darkness*. These three qualities, though opposites, are represented as concurring to the same purpose, just as in a lamp, oil, wick, and flame concur in the production of light. It is difficult in the extreme to reconcile the discrepancies of the *Sankhya* school, and give its doctrines a systematic form. Nature (*prakriti*) and soul (*atma*) appear at first to be two real substances, equally distinct, independent and eternal. Nature by an inherent property puts forth certain principles, and soul by an inherent property uses these principles as a means of obtaining a knowledge of nature. Ultimately, however, when this knowledge has been attained, the soul, which has been made individual by its connection with a corporeal body, is released, and the connection between the individual soul and nature is dissolved. What then? "As a dancer, after exhibiting herself to the spectator, retires, so does nature retire, after manifesting herself to the soul." On this the soul is finally liberated. This liberation has been not inappropriately termed by Cousin "absolute nihilism," since the perfect knowledge which gives the liberation amounts to nothing more than a denial of individual existence, expressed by the soul in such terms as these, "I have nothing, and am nothing: I do not exist."

Kapila, while he admits the separate existence of souls, and represents intellect as employed in moulding matter into its

various forms, distinctly denies that there is any Supreme Being by whose will the universe was produced. "Such a Being," he says, "if detached from nature and unaffected by consciousness and the other principles, would have no motion, and if enchained in nature would not have the power to create." By this dogma he has earned the unenviable title of atheist, and is distinguished from his pupil Patanjali, who founded the second branch of the *Sankhya* school, and ranks as a theist, because he holds that distinct from other souls there is One who is infinite, eternal, and omniscient, and therefore truly God. He is, however, a god only in name, inasmuch as he is "indifferent to actions good or bad, and their consequences, and to the ephemeral thoughts of man, which are but as dreams." It might hence be supposed that a Supreme Being thus sitting aloof from his creatures, and beholding all their movements as an unconcerned spectator, would be neglected by them in their turn, and never become the object of serious thought. This inference, though reasonable, would be erroneous, for Patanjali and his followers plume themselves on devotion. There is thus a marked distinction between the practices of the so-called atheistical and theistical sects. The former, professing to aim only at the liberation of the soul from the bonds of nature, is occupied chiefly with abstruse reasonings on the nature of mind and matter; whereas the latter, aiming at absorption into the Supreme Being, gives the first place to devotional exercises and *yoga* or mental abstraction. By means of this *yoga*, which has procured for those who practise it the name of *yogis*, the adept raises himself far above the ordinary condition of humanity. All knowledge past and future is revealed to him, and he is able even to divine the thoughts of others. But his knowledge, wonderful as it is, is surpassed by his power. He possesses the strength of an elephant, the courage of a lion, and the swiftness of the winds. All the elements are subject to his control, and yield obedience to him. The air supports him as he wings his flight through it; he floats in water, and penetrates without resistance into the solid earth. All worlds are seen by him at a glance, and whatever he desires he has only to will and it is accomplished. These wonderful gifts are attained by comparatively simple means—prescribed postures, suppressions of breath, mortification,

and profound meditation. There may be fanatics who have deluded themselves into the belief that they may thus succeed in acquiring miraculous powers, or even that they have acquired them; but the greater number of the *yogis* are mere pretenders, and have no scruple in endeavouring to gain a reputation by gross imposture. In this way the Patanjali branch of the *Sankhya* school, though in some respects the better of the two, has suffered in character.

The Hindu presents many striking resemblances to the Greek philosophy. The professed object of Pythagoras was to teach how the soul might be freed from all incumbrances and assimilated to the divinity. In undergoing this process it was subjected to numerous purgations and transmigrations, and finally returned to its original source by a kind of absorption. The prohibition of animal food, except for sacrifice—the tenderness not only to animals but to plants as beings possessed of life—the long course of probation undergone by students, and followed by a mysterious initiation—are common to both philosophies, and evidently indicate not accidental coincidence but real affinity. In the same way the logical systems of Gotama and Kanade are closely allied to that of Aristotle. It is not impossible, however, that the resemblances might have been produced not directly by communication with one another, but indirectly from a more primeval source; hence some have imagined that Egypt, which stood as it were half way between India and Greece, when the commerce of Europe and the East was carried on across the Isthmus of Suez, furnished both of them with the dogmas in which they so remarkably agree. It would be presumptuous to decide positively between those competing claimants, but the presumption of originality is certainly in favour of the Hindus, and Mr. Colebrooke seems justified in asserting that in this instance they were “the teachers and not the learners.”

It was at one time supposed that the Hindus were entitled to take still higher ground in science than in mental philosophy, and that in astronomy in particular they were thousands of years in advance of all other nations. In the year 1687, M. de la Loubere, sent by Louis XIV on an embassy to Siam, procured a copy of the rules of the Brahmins for the calculation of

eclipses. These were submitted to the celebrated Cassini, who succeeded in unravelling them, and finding them accurate, hastily inferred that they must be as ancient as they professed to be. In 1772 a much more complete set of tables and rules was brought by M. le Gentil, from Trivatore, on the Coromandel coast. Two other sets of tables had been obtained by the Jesuits at an earlier date, but had been lost sight of from having been deposited in the Marine Depot of Charts and Plans at Paris. From these four sets of tables, Bailly composed his *Astronomie Indienne et Orientale*, and startled the world by claiming for them an antiquity which could not be reconciled with the history of the human race as recorded in the Sacred Volume. Bailly's view was adopted and maintained with equal zeal and ability by Professor Playfair, who, however, saw reason subsequently to modify his support of it in consequence of its rejection by La Place and Delambre, and the thorough examination to which it was subjected by some writers in the *Asiatic Researches*. The result at which they arrived was, that the earliest date in the Indian tables was assumed in order to correspond with a supposed conjunction of the heavenly bodies. La Place, whose authority on such a subject is decisive, says, "the Indian tables have two principal epochs, one 3,102 years before our era, the other 1,491. These epochs are connected by the motions of the sun, the moon, and the planets, in such a manner, that departing from the position which the Indian tables assign to the stars at the second epoch, and returning to the first by means of these tables, we find the general conjunction which is supposed at that epoch." He then adverts to Bailly's opinion that the "first epoch was founded on observations," and adds in opposition to it, "I consider it as very probable that it (the first epoch) has been imagined in order to give a common origin in the zodiac to the celestial motions. Our latest astronomical tables, improved by a comparison of theory with a great number of very precise observations, do not allow us to admit the supposed conjunction in the Indian tables." His conclusion is:—"The whole structure of the tables, and especially the impossibility of the conjunction which they suppose, prove that they have been formed, or at least rectified in modern times."

Still, after exaggeration is duly curtailed, it seems impossible to deny that the Hindus had made some progress in astronomy

in the fourteenth century before the Christian era. Their division of the belt of the heavens corresponding to our zodiac into twenty-seven equal portions, called lunar houses, and each marked by a group of stars or constellations, could not have been made when astronomy was in its infancy, and yet is admitted on all hands to be as early as 1442 B.C. Parasara, the first Hindu astronomer of whose writings any portion remains, must have flourished about the same date. Unfortunately, however, the part of astronomy which is most interesting in a scientific point of view has been almost entirely neglected by the Hindus. They give no theory, and confine themselves to the calculation of eclipses and other changes in the heavens, thus degrading astronomy from its proper place, and making it subservient to the dreams and impostures of astrologers. "The Brahmin," says Professor Wallace,¹ "seated on the ground with his shells before him, repeats the enigmatical verses which are to guide his procedure, and from his little tablets of palm leaves takes out the numbers which are to be employed in it. He obtains his result with certainty and expedition; but having little knowledge of the reason of his rules, and no wish to be better informed, he is perfectly satisfied if, as it usually happens, the actual commencement and duration of the eclipse agree within a few minutes with his prediction. Beyond this his inquiries do not extend; and his observations, if he make any, go no further than the determination of a meridian line, or the length of the day at the place of his residence."

The most complete ancient astronomical work of the Hindus is the *Surya Sidhanta*, fabled by the Brahmins to have been communicated by divine revelation above two millions of years ago, but now believed to be not older than the fifth or sixth century. From the practice of veiling everything in mystery, and making all kinds of knowledge subservient to Brahminical priestcraft, the information furnished by the *Surya Sidhanta*, and a commentary upon it called *Tika*, is unsatisfactory and obscure; but there is enough to show that some of the leading facts in astronomy were well understood. Among these may be mentioned the precession of the equinoxes, the rate of which estimated at 54" annually (it is only 50") led them to calculate

¹ *Historical and Descriptive Account of British India*, vol. iii, pp. 290-91.

a complete revolution of the equinoctial points and fix it at about 24,000 years—the revolution of the moon on her axis only once in a month, and the necessary consequence that she presents always the same side to the earth—and the globular form of the earth itself, which they hang in space, but erroneously imagine to be the centre of the universe.

The claim of the Hindus to original discovery is better established in regard to mathematics than in regard to astronomy. The *Surya Sidhanta* contains a very rational system of trigonometry. The circle is divided in the same manner as by the Greeks into 360 equal parts, each of which is subdivided into 60, as still practised. The common adoption of this division is remarkable, as there is nothing in the nature of the circle itself to suggest it, unless it be that in an early age the number of days in the sun's annual revolution may have been roughly estimated at 360. In another arrangement, also arbitrary, the superiority of the Hindu to the Greek mathematicians is apparent. The Greeks divided the radius of the circle into sixty equal parts, but did not in this division express any relation between the radius and the circumference. The Hindus, on the contrary, in a manner peculiar to themselves, adopt a common measure and unit for both, and by means of it express the relation between them with considerable nicety. The circumference, divided as has been seen into 360 equal parts, gives at the rate of 60 of these parts to a degree, 21,600 minutes. The radius, supposed to be in like manner calculated in minutes, is found by the Hindus to contain 3,438. The proportion of the radius to the circumference is thus said to be as 3,438 to 21,600, or 1 to 3.14136. This proportion is as near an approximation to the truth as can be made when no lower subdivision than minutes is employed, and is the proportion according to which the Hindu trigonometrical tables are framed. It appears, however, that the Brahmins, while considering this proportion as sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, were aware of the error in it, and supposed the true ratio to be that of 1 to 3.1416. This, it is almost needless to observe, is the greatest accuracy attainable when the calculation is not carried further than four decimal places. The use of sines in framing tables, and not of chords, as practised by the Greeks, is a striking distinction in

favour of the Indian trigonometry, and the rule for computing them justifies the remark of Professor Playfair, that "it has the appearance, like many other things in the science of those eastern nations, of being drawn up by one who was more deeply versed in the subject than may at first be imagined, and who knew much more than he thought it necessary to communicate." On the same point Professor Wallace observes, "He who first formed the idea of exhibiting in arithmetical tables the ratios of the sides and angles of all possible triangles must have been a man of profound thought and of extensive knowledge. However ancient, therefore, any book may be in which we meet with a system of trigonometry, we may be assured that it was not written in the infancy of the science. Hence we may conclude that geometry must have been known in India long before the writing of the *Surya Sidhanta*."

In arithmetic the Hindu claim to the invention of the decimal notation is generally acknowledged. The advantage which this discovery gave them over the Greeks is very striking, and is particularly manifested in the *Lilavati*, a work on arithmetic and practical geometry, written by Bhaskara Acharya in the twelfth century. This treatise not only gives the fundamental rules of arithmetic, but applies them to the subjects of interest, barter, mixtures, combination, permutation, progression, indeterminate problems, and the mensuration of surfaces and solids. In algebra, Hindu superiority, in respect both of priority of discovery and general excellence, is very decided. Arya Bhatta, who is proved to have lived as early as the fifth century, and may probably have been a contemporary of Diophantus, who wrote the first Greek work on algebra, and flourished about A.D. 360, was able to resolve equations containing several unknown quantities, and had a general method of resolving indeterminate equations of at least the first degree. Apparently in regard to both of these, and certainly in regard to the latter, he was far in advance of Diophantus. Indeed, Arya Bhatta's general method, called in Sanskrit *Kutaka*, and declared by Professor Wallace to be a "refined process," was not known in Europe till 1624. The work of Arya Bhatta does not exist, and what is known of it is learned from quotations by Brahma Gupta, who lived in the sixth century, and Bhaskara Acharya, already

mentioned. Their works, translated from the Sanskrit, have been published by Mr. Colebrooke. Those of Bhaskara consist of the *Lilavati*, of which some account has been given above, and the *Bija Ganita*, devoted expressly to algebra. From this treatise it appears that the Hindus at a very early period had made as near an approach to the general solution of indeterminate problems as was made to the time of La Grange. In attempting to solve equation of the higher orders they had not been successful, but they had learned to apply algebra to astronomy and geometry, and had, as Mr. Colebrooke expresses it, "hit upon some matters which have been re-invented in modern times."

In discussing the date of Hindu discoveries in algebra, Playfair and Delambre take opposite sides. Playfair says, "It is generally acknowledged that Diophantus cannot have been himself the inventor of all the rules and methods which he delivers; much less is Arya Bhatta to be held the sole inventor of a system that was still more perfect than that of Diophantus. Indeed, before an author could think of embodying a treatise of algebra in the heart of a system of astronomy, and turning the researches of the one science to the purposes of the other, both must be in such a state of advancement, as the lapse of several ages and many repeated efforts of invention were required to produce." Delambre endavours to take off the force of this observation by saying, that when an author has created a new science among a people considerably advanced in civilization, men of genius will not be long in acquiring the new notions, in order to extend and multiply their application. There is something in this, but Delambre makes too much of it, and Professor Wallace seems to place the matter on its proper footing, when, after adverting to the fact "that algebra made little or no progress among the Arabians, though an ingenious people, and particularly devoted to the study of the sciences, and that centuries elapsed from its first introduction into Europe before it reached any considerable degree of perfection," he concludes that "this branch of arithmetic may have existed among the Hindus, in one form or another, long prior to the time of Arya Bhatta."

Under the head of science many other branches of knowledge, in addition to those which have been considered, are

included; but the proficiency which the Hindus have made in them is in general so small that it is scarcely entitled to a separate notice. Were an exception to be made, it would be in regard to one or two branches of physics. In referring to Kanade's work on this subject, his theories of gravity, colour, and sound, were mentioned as superior to those which were received in Europe at the same period. It may be added, that in botany and chemistry, not so much as speculative sciences, but as practical arts available in medicine, some considerable progress had been made. Their knowledge of simples was extensive, and Europe has, in several instances, been indebted to them for their application to purposes previously unknown. From Hindus was first learned the use of cowitch as a vermifuge, and the benefit of smoking *dhatura* in asthma. Their chemical skill is chiefly displayed in mineral and metallic preparations, obtained by processes, for the most part peculiar to themselves, and employed with much boldness in curing disease. Among these preparations may be enumerated sulphuric, nitric, and muriatic acid; oxides of copper, iron, lead, tin, and zinc; sulphuret of iron, copper, mercury, antimony, and arsenic; sulphate of copper, zinc, and iron; and carbonates of lead and iron. By cinnabar, in the form of fumigations, they produced speedy and safe salivation; and they were the first who administered mineral substances internally, employing not only mercury in this manner, but preparations of arsenic in intermittent fevers. Though precluded by their religious creed from acquiring a knowledge of anatomy by dissection, they performed various surgical operations, many of them with instruments invented by themselves. Inoculation they had long practised before it was superseded by vaccination. In general, however, both their surgery and medicine were merely empirical, and even proper rules of art have always been considered subordinate to astrology and magic. The supposed efficacy of mystical verses and charms have brought rational remedies into disrepute, and in waiting for lucky hours and days, diseases which might be removed by instantaneous applications, gain strength, and become fatal.

The literature of the Hindus is a subject of such boundless extent that it is impossible to do more than glance at a few of

its leading features. One of its most remarkable peculiarities is the language in which the far greater part of it is written. Sanskrit must at one time have been a vernacular tongue, but has long ceased to be spoken by any except the learned, and by them is spoken only as Latin used to be in Europe, when modern tongues were considered too rude and imperfect to serve as proper vehicles of thought. How Sanskrit, after being once a living, became a dead language, is a point still involved in mystery—a mystery all the more perplexing from the impossibility of discovering in Indian history any period corresponding to that of the great irruption which overthrew the Roman empire, broke it up into separate kingdoms, changed the whole face of Europe, and gave it, instead of one dominant language, a number of languages more or less engrafted upon it, but still so different from it, and from each other, that those who spoke them had no longer any common medium of oral communication. If Sanskrit was ever spoken, some exterminating process similar to that of our northern invaders must have been necessary, either to root out the races who spoke it, or so completely revolutionize them as to banish it from their lips and memories. This extinction of Sanskrit is the more wonderful when we consider the extent of the area over which its sway must have extended. Not only must it have penetrated far to the West, before the languages of Greece and Rome could have been so deeply imbued with it as they are now known to be, but the whole inhabitants of India, including races which have little else in common, must have either spoken it as their mother tongue, or been brought into such immediate contact with it as to borrow a large part of their speech from it. The five northern languages of India, those of the Punjab, Kanauj, Mithila or North Bihar, Bengal, and Gujarat, do not differ more from Sanskrit than Italian from Latin; and of the five languages of the Deccan, while two of them, those of Orissa and Maharashtra, are so full of Sanskrit words that their existence as languages would be destroyed by expunging them, the other three, the Tamil, Telugu, and Carnata, though so different in structure as to indicate a distinct origin from Sanskrit, have incorporated many of its words in the same way as English has borrowed from Latin.

While Sanskrit might thus have been expected to hold its ground in consequence of the vast area over which it was

spoken or understood, it had a strong additional security for its permanence as a living language from the exclusive use of it in all branches of knowledge, sacred and profane. Even when the selfishness and ambition of the Brahmins succeeded in excluding the other classes from access to the *Veda*, it might have been expected that the language in which they were written would still be kept alive among the great body of the people, by the numerous legends, hymns, and poems embodied in it, and made familiar to them from their earliest years by being rehearsed in ordinary life and at public festivals. Another guarantee for permanence was given in the excellence of the language itself, which is pronounced by Sir William Jones, perhaps with some degree of hyperbole, to be "more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either." All these circumstances, however, have proved unavailing, and the Sanskrit, banished from the tongues of Hindus, owes its preservation not to them but to the literary treasures which it contains.

Almost everything among the Hindus that deserves the name of literature is composed in verse; and therefore, without stopping to take any notice of their prose, we pass at once to their poetry. In forming an estimate of it it is necessary to remember that for poetical compositions, when viewed through the medium of translation, great allowance ought to be made. Homer and Virgil, if known only through the translations of Pope and Dryden, would not be thought worthy of a tithe of the encomiums which all who read them in the original are ready to pronounce upon them; and there is no ground to suppose that any of the translators from the Sanskrit have performed their task so well as Pope and Dryden. Where the two languages vary so much in structure as English and Sanskrit, and not merely the whole train of thought, but all the figures that can be used in the way of ornament and illustration, differ so widely, a translator cannot hope to do much more than give the sense. The reader consequently knows nothing of the melody of the versification, nor of the facility of forming compounds, which are said to give Sanskrit compositions a peculiar charm and add greatly to their richness, and is hence apt to be startled if not offended by combinations which cannot but seem to him

unnatural. Presented only with the bare ideas, stripped of everything that adorns them, he peruses a work designed by its author merely to captivate the imagination, as if it were some grave didactic treatise in prose, and thus feels somewhat like the mathematician, who after reading one of the finest passages of the *A Eneid* contemptuously asked, What does it prove? In common fairness we should endeavour to believe in the existence of graces and excellences which we know must have evaporated in the process of translation; and then, though we may still hesitate to speak in such rapturous terms as zealous orientalists employ, we will be ready to admit that there have been Hindu poets truly worthy of the name.

The earliest form of Hindu verse is to be found in the *Vedas*. In general it is of a very prosaic description, and never makes an approach to the dignity of poetry except in the hymns. Even these display little vigour of thought or fancy, and no felicity of diction, and deserve the character given by Mr. Colebrooke to the *Vedas* generally—their “general style is flat, diffuse, and no less deficient in ornament than abundant in repetitions.” Next in antiquity to the *Vedas* is the heroic poem or epic of the *Ramayana*. It has for its subject the conquest of Ceylon, by Rama, and was written by Valmiki, who, though believed by the Hindus to have been contemporary with the events which he celebrates, evidently belongs to a much later period. The leading details are as follows:—Dasaratha, King of Kosala, resided in his capital of Ayodhya, the ancient name of the modern Oudh. There surrounded by eight counsellors, such as Manu describes, he “shone resplendent as the sun irradiating the world.” One thing was wanting to complete his happiness—he had no son. To obtain one he had recourse to the *aswamedha*, or horse-sacrifice, which, when duly performed, never fails, and on this occasion proved more than successful, inasmuch as four sons were born to the king by his three wives, Kausalya, the first and favourite wife bearing two, Rama and Lakshman. Rama, thus regarded as the heir, was in his sixteenth year when a *rishi*, named Viswamitra, asked permission to take him with him to his hermitage in the hills, for the purpose of expelling *rakshasas*, or demons, who were haunting him, and polluting his sacrifices. The king offers to go in person, but refuses to

send Rama, "my Rama," begotten "by me, an old man," and "dearer to me than life itself." Viswamitra, offended, gives such portentous signs of wrath, that the king repents of his refusal, and all his four sons set out for the hermitage. As Rama is the destined hero, Viswamitra makes him proof against all fatal casualties, endues him with supernatural strength, and presents him with celestial weapons. The encounter then takes place, and the *rakshasas* are destroyed. After this exploit the young princes are conducted by Viswamitra to Mithila, situated four days' journey from Ayodhya. Janaka, the king, had a most lovely daughter, called Sita, whom he had promised to give to the man who should lift and bend his bow. This was no ordinary feat, for when it was sent for it required an eight-wheeled carriage, drawn by 800 men, to transport it. Rama, however, accomplished it. Lifting the bow with one hand, he snapped it in sunder with a noise like the crash of a falling mountain, and Sita became his bride. Three other princesses of the court were given to his brothers. The nuptials were celebrated with the greatest splendour, and the happy pairs were welcomed with acclamations on arriving at Ayodhya.

Dasaratha was preparing formally to acknowledge Rama as his successor, when a serious difficulty arose. Kaikeyi, the second wife, claimed the throne for her son Bharata. She had at one time obtained a promise from the king of any two boons she should ask, and was determined to use it in enforcing her son's claim. Accordingly, the first boon she asked was the banishment of Rama for fourteen years, and the second a public acknowledgment of Bharata as heir-apparent. Dasaratha could not refuse. Rama and Sita depart as exiles for the forest, and the king sits for six days pining and bewailing the banishment of his favourite son. On the seventh day a crime or rather misfortune of his youth rises to his remembrance, and believing it to be the cause of his present affliction, he narrates it at length to Kausalya. While hunting in the woods on the banks of the Sarayu or Goggra, he heard a sound which he supposed to be made by an elephant in drinking, and let fly an arrow, which mortally wounded a youth who had come to draw water. His parents were living as recluses in the neighbourhood, and he was their only support. The king, horror-struck at hearing a

moan, hastens to the spot. The youth, though his life-blood was flowing, recognizes the king, and is only anxious to save him from the consequences of being the innocent cause of his untimely end. His father's curse he knows to be irresistible, and he therefore begs Dasaratha to deprecate it by being himself the bearer of the dismal news. The father on hearing them is unable wholly to restrain his curse, and tells the king that he too shall one day sorrow for a son. The parents of the youth burn themselves on his funeral pile. The king, after divulging his secret, takes affectionate leave of Kausalya, and dies, exclaiming, "Ah, Rama! ah, my son!"

After Dasaratha's obsequies had been performed with great pomp, but without any *sati*, none of the wives except Kausalya expressing any wish to burn along with him, the council, summoned by Vasishta, the principal Brahmin, invite Bharata to occupy the vacant throne. He generously declines to usurp the rights of his brother Rama, and being told that as he refuses to reign it is his duty to find the lawful sovereign, he sets out in quest of him with a splendid retinue of soldiers and attendants. He meets with numerous adventures, and at length discovers Rama living with Sita and his brother Lakshman in the forests of the Deccan. The interview is affecting, and gives occasion to the utterance of many noble and generous sentiments. Rama refuses to accept a throne, which he could not occupy without breaking his father's vow. Bharata remonstrates, and not succeeding, has recourse to a curious device. He had brought a pair of golden shoes with him, and asks Rama to put them on and then return them. This done, Bharata says he will go back to Ayodhya, "not to reign, but to live without the city as a devotee, waiting till the fourteen years of Rama's exile should expire, meanwhile committing the kingdom to thy shoes."

After Bharata's departure, Rama incurred the hostility of the natives by barbarously cutting off the nose and ears of a princess who had presumed to make love to himself and his brother. She vowed revenge, and finding that in open warfare Rama could not be matched, called in the aid of sorcery, in which she appears to have been all but omnipotent, and bewitched her brother Ravana, the demon King of Lanka or Ceylon, to become enamoured of Sita, Rama's lovely wife. Ravana, who

had extended his power into the Indian peninsula, and ruled it like a cruel tyrant, had first recourse to force, but experienced the same reverses as his sister, and saw the necessity of having recourse to stratagem. Accordingly he took with him an assistant sorcerer disguised as a deer. Rama was fond of the chase, but, aware of the wiles of his enemy, took what he deemed a sufficient precaution against them, by committing Sita, while he was absent on his hunting excursions, to the protection of his brother Lakshman. One day the wily deer exposed itself to Rama's arrow, and being wounded, exclaimed in a voice resembling Rama's, "Oh, Lakshman, save me!" Sita, hearing the cry, begged Lakshman to flee to the rescue. Ravana's object was now gained. Assuming the dress of an ascetic, he came upon Sita sitting alone in tears, bewailing the supposed disaster which had befallen her lord. Thrown off her guard by Ravana's disguise, she hails him as a "holy Brahmin," and not only entertains him hospitably, but opens her whole heart and recounts the history of her life. Suddenly Ravana throws off his disguise, and announcing himself as the demon monarch of the earth, "at whose name heaven's armies flee," seizes her shrieking, and carries her aloft through the sky to Ceylon.

Rama, determined on recovering her, but knowing the power of the enemy with whom he had to deal, sought to strengthen himself by alliances. Strange to say, the woods of Dandaka, where he then dwelt, were inhabited, not by human beings, but by demons and monkeys. At the head of the latter was the monkey-king, Sugriva, who cordially espoused Rama's cause, and placed a mighty army of quadrumanous subjects at his disposal. Their general, Hanuman, was a host in himself. After ascertaining by emissaries that Sita was confined in a palace in Ceylon, he proceeded with Rama at the head of the allies to Cape Comorin, overcame all the difficulties of the passage by bridging the straits, defeated the armies of demons sent to oppose them, and slew Ravana himself. Sita was thus recovered. Rama was doubtless overjoyed, but his joy was alloyed by a suspicion which haunted him. Considering the kind of hands into which Sita had fallen, was it possible that she could have maintained her purity unsullied? He could not satisfy himself on this point till he had subjected her to the ordeal of a blazing fire. She

passed through it unscathed. Lest any suspicion might still have lurked, Brahma and the other gods attested her fidelity, and Rama again received her with all his former affection. The fourteen years of exile had now expired, and the whole party returned to Ayodhya. Bharata, faithful and generous as ever, at once resigned the government, but Rama, aware that he was not what he seemed to be, but of divine origin, in fact an incarnation of Vishnu, disdained to rule, and returned to heaven, his native seat.

The absurdities, incongruities, and extravagances which occur throughout the poem are so glaring as to be seen at a glance; and it is therefore less important to notice them than to advert to some of the many passages which are conceived and expressed in the spirit of genuine poetry. The descriptions of natural scenery are in general excellent, being distinguished both by beauty and accuracy, and many of the metaphors borrowed from it are striking and appropriate. Domestic feelings, particularly the attachment of husband and wife, and parent and child, are sometimes exhibited in their purest and most interesting form, and it would be difficult to find incidents more affecting than those which are presented where Dasaratha relates the death of which he had been the unhappy but innocent cause, when roaming the forest as a hunter "in youth's delicious prime." Seldom, too, have noble and generous sentiments received more emphatic utterance than at the interview between Rama and Bharata, while the latter declares his determination not to accept a throne which he could not occupy without usurping a brother's rights; and the former cheerfully resigns these rights, because he could not avail himself of them without injuring his father's memory. It would be easy to furnish extracts in illustration of all these enumerated excellences; but in order not to exceed due bounds our extracts must be few and brief. They are taken from Dasaratha's account of the tragical death of the youthful devotee; and, in order to come as near as possible to the spirit of the original, are borrowed from the admirable translations which Mr. Griffith has published under the title of *Specimens of Indian Poetry*.

The day on which Dasaratha set out on the hunting excursion which terminated so fatally is thus described:—

*A day of summer rain time, filling my young soul with love;
 The great sun had dried the earth-dews with his hot beams from
 above,
 And in highest heaven turning, journeyed on his southward road,
 Racing towards the gloomy region, the departed's sad abode;
 Balmy cool the air was breathing, welcome clouds were floating
 by,
 Humming bees with joyful music swell'd the glad wild peacock's
 cry.*

After the rash arrow was shot and the king had seen the unhappy youth expire, he proceeds to be the bearer of the dismal tidings to the parents, who were sitting helpless and sightless, waiting the return of their boy, and wondering what could detain him. Dasaratha's feelings, and the scene which awaited him, are thus described:—

*Sadly, slowly I approached them, by my rash deed left forlorn;
 Crushed with terror was my spirit, and my mind with anguish
 torn;
 At the sound of coming footsteps, thus I heard the old man say,
 'Dear son, bring me water quickly, thou hast been too long away,
 Bathing in the stream, or playing, thou hast stayed so long from
 home;
 Come, thy mother longeth for thee; come in quickly, dear child,
 come!'*

The dreadful truth being made known, the half-distracted father, hanging over the dead body, and as if forgetting the irreparable calamity which had befallen him, speaks thus:—

*Come, dear child, embrace thy father, put thy little hand in mine,
 Let me hear thee sweetly prattle some fond play-word of thine;*
 and then recalled to a sense of the reality, exclaims—

*Ah! who'll read me now the Vedas, filling my old heart with joy?
 Who, when evening rites are over, cheer me, mourning for my
 boy?
 Who will bring me fruits and water, roots and wild herbs from
 the wood?
 Who supply the helpless hermit, like a cherished guest, with
 food?
 Can I tend thine aged mother till her weary life is done?
 Can I feed her, soothe her sorrow, longing for her darling son?"*

The *Mahabharata*, the other great Sanskrit epic, though not believed to be so ancient as the *Ramayana*, bears the impress of a venerable antiquity. It is of enormous length, consisting of more than 100,000 verses, and contains various episodes, which, both from the nature of their subjects and the internal evidence they furnish of having been written by different authors and at distant periods, ought to be viewed as separate poems. Tradition makes Vyasa, the supposed compiler of the *Vedas*, the author of the whole; but there is in the poem itself an acknowledgment that not more than a fifth part of it was composed by him, and that its present form was given it by Sauti, who received it from Vyasa by a third hand. Without attempting to fix a precise date, the most competent authorities are agreed that both the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* were well known in India in the second century before our era.

The subject of the *Mahabharata*, or, as the word means, Great Battle, is the war waged between the Pandus and Kurus, two branches of what is called the Lunar race. The prize contended for was the right to rule in Hastinapur, a territory understood to be situated north-east of Delhi. In the course of the contest all the leading princes of India become engaged as allies. Krishna, now the most popular of Hindu deities, because fabled to have been an incarnation of Vishnu, takes part with the Pandus, and performs exploits which make him the great hero of the poem. The origin of the war is thus explained. The King of Hastinapur having been afflicted with leprosy, was obliged to abdicate. The five Pandus were his sons, but the government—perhaps because they were too young to undertake it—was given to their uncle, the father of a hundred Kurus. The cousins were brought up together at court under the guidance of a learned Brahmin named Drona, who was admirably qualified for the office, from being not only learned in the *Vedas*, but perfectly acquainted with all the accomplishments in which young princes ought to be instructed. Accordingly, he taught them “to rein the steed, to guide the elephant, to drive the chariot, launch the javelin, hurl the dart, wield the battle-axe, and whirl the mace.” When Drona deemed his pupils sufficiently expert, he proposed that a public trial of their skill should be made, and accordingly a splendid tournament was held for

this purpose. Many noble feats were performed, but Arjuna, the third of the Pandus and Drona's favourite pupil, far outstripped all the others. Next to him, however, were Yudhishthira, his eldest, and Bhima, his second brother. The Kurus had early conceived the idea of usurping the rights of their cousins, and, when mortified at the inferior position which they had held in the tournament, made an atrocious attempt to extirpate the whole race of Pandus, by setting fire to the house in which they resided. It was generally believed that they had accomplished their object; for, when the bodies of five males and one female were discovered among the ruins, they were at once concluded to be those of the Pandus and their mother. This, however, was a mistake. The persons who had perished were a woman of low caste and her five sons who chanced to be passing the night in the house. All the Pandus had made their escape. Being aware of the deadly hate with which they were pursued, they allowed the belief of their death to remain uncontradicted, and sought an asylum in the woods. Here they continued to live, subsisting on the produce of the chase, till they accidentally learned that the King of Panchala, situated somewhere between Delhi and the Punjab, was about to hold a *swayambara*, in other words, was inviting visitors to his court, with the view of selecting from among them a husband for his daughter Draupadi, whose surpassing loveliness was the theme of all tongues.

The information respecting the *swayambara* had been given to the Pandus by a party of Brahmins, who were on the way to share in the festivities of the occasion. On being invited, the Pandus resolved to accompany them; and, assuming the character of mendicants, took up their residence at Panchala, in the house of a potter. The king had many years before given mortal offence to Drona. They had once been sworn friends, and Drona, presuming on ancient intimacy, made his appearance at the court of Panchala. Having announced himself without ceremony, he had the mortification to find that the king, elated with the new dignity which the throne had conferred upon him, was no longer disposed to treat him as an equal, or even recognize him as an acquaintance. Drona departed in wrath, and the King of Panchala, aware how fearful the vengeance of a Brahmin might prove, was anxious, in wedding his

daughter, to choose a son-in-law on whose aid he might rely. It would seem that, notwithstanding the rumoured destruction of the Pandus, the king believed some of them to be still alive; for he desired above all things to give his daughter to a Pandu. The race was famous for prowess, and he was convinced that with a Pandu to defend him, he might set even Drona at defiance. But how was a Pandu to be obtained? The king, as the best way of answering this question, had recourse to the following device:—He caused a ponderous bow to be made by magic art, and set up for a mark a plate of metal which revolved on an axle, feeling assured that none but a Pandu would have strength to wield the one and hit the other.

On the day fixed for the *swayambara* a magnificent scene presented itself. Within a vast area, inclosed by a deep ditch and lofty walls, myriads from all quarters were assembled. Around the king, who was mounted on his throne, sat neighbouring potentates on seats emblazoned with gems and gold. Princes, among them the hundred Kurus of Hastinapur, and other illustrious chiefs, occupied glittering pavilions as candidates, while temporary scaffolds, housetops, and every vacant space without the barriers were crowded by spectators. The king, hoping to the last that the Pandus would appear, spun out the time by preliminary entertainments, music, dancing, dramatic exhibitions, and games; but after sixteen days had thus elapsed further delay became impossible, and the great prize to be competed for, the lovely Draupadi, took her place in the arena. The bow which the king had prepared was now brought forth; but none succeeded in bending it except a youth named Karna. To him, however, there was a fatal objection. Though in fact one of the children of the sun, his reputed birth was low, and on this ground his other merits were disregarded. Draupadi herself burst forth with the exclamation—"I wed not with the base-born!" On this Karna, after glancing upwards to his sire, cast down the bow and shafts, and sternly walked away.

The list of competitors being exhausted it seemed that the *swayambara* was to prove a failure. Suddenly Arjuna advanced. He was dressed like a Brahmin student, and many Brahmins believing him to be so, and afraid of the disgrace which his failure would bring upon their order, endeavoured to dissuade him

from entering the lists. He stood unmoved, and then going up to the bow, lifted it, bent it, and placing an arrow on the string, sent it right into the mark. Being a Brahmin, there could be no objection to him on the score of birth. Both Draupadi and her father liked his appearance, and the prize was about to be awarded to him. On the other hand, the baffled suitors set no limits to their rage. Was royalty to be insulted in order that a Brahmin boy might be preferred? Sooner than permit it, they would slay the king and all his race, and burn his daughter in the flames. The scene of festivity was thus suddenly converted into a battlefield. Mainly by the prowess of Arjuna and his brothers, the princely suitors are defeated, and Draupadi becomes his bride.

The Pandus having declared themselves, were reinstated in their hereditary kingdom, and Yudhisthira, who, as the eldest brother, held the sovereignty, built a beautiful city called Indraprastha, on the site now occupied by Delhi. After a period of peace and prosperity a change took place. Yudhisthira, forgetting his former moderation, became inflated with pride, and insisted that the neighbouring kings should do homage to him as their lord paramount. When they refused, he sent forth his brothers to compel them by force. He thus succeeded in his object, and a day was fixed on which the kings were to bring tribute, and acknowledge their inferiority, by doing some act of menial service. The Kurus professed acquiescence in these proceedings, but the old enmity was rankling in their hearts. Not venturing to manifest it by open hostility, they adopted a method which was at once safer and more effective. Yudhisthira had a propensity for gambling, and the Kurus taking advantage of it, led him on from stake to stake, till he pledged his kingdom for twelve years. He lost, and he and his brothers were in consequence forced into exile.

When the twelve years had elapsed, the Pandus claimed restitution of their kingdom, but were answered with scorn, and told that they should not have as much as would cover the point of a needle. There was therefore no alternative but force. As this was meant to be the decisive struggle, alliances were sought in the most distant quarters, and there was not a king between the Himalaya and the ocean who was not enlisted on one or other of the sides. The Kurus had gained one great

advantage. Drona's hatred to the King of Panchala was greater than his attachment to his old favourite pupils; and therefore, since the Pandus, by the marriage of Draupadi, had made common cause with her father, the Kurus had little difficulty in persuading Drona to become the leader of their host. This advantage was more than counterbalanced by another which the Pandus had gained. Krishna was their steady friend, and, when the battle was about to be waged, took his place beside Arjuna as his charioteer. Wonderful displays of prowess were made on both sides. Drona, disdaining the place of safety which his position allotted to him, appeared in front, on a car framed by immortal art, and, supported by the redoubtable Karna, drove back the Pandus "like clouds before the gale." Arjuna and his charioteer did equal execution upon the Kurus. At last, after the struggle had been maintained for eighteen days, the Pandus proved victors, but at a very heavy loss, which so grieved Yudhishthira, that after placing the younger members of the family on the thrones of Hastinapur and Indraprastha, he set out with his brothers and Draupadi for Mount Meru, expecting that he might thus reach Indra's heaven, and there find the repose which had been denied them on earth. The journey was long and disastrous. After coming in sight of the lofty Himavat, crossing it, and getting a distant view of rocky Meru, lying beyond a sea of sand, Draupadi was killed by falling on the face of the earth. By a similar fate, or "pierced through with sorrow," four of the brothers perished, and Yudhishthira was left alone, followed by his faithful dog. He moves on, never casting a look behind, and at last Indra appears, and bids him ascend. The king refuses, unless Draupadi and his brothers who had died go with him. On being assured that he will find them there before him, he asks that his dog may accompany him. Indra, scandalized at such a request, answers, "My heaven is no place for dogs." The king, however, insists, and the difficulty, after it had become apparently insurmountable, is removed by the dog himself. He was not what he seemed to be, but Yama in disguise, and now assumes his proper form. Even in heaven Yudhishthira is disappointed. On looking round, he not only misses Draupadi and his brothers, but sees his cousins, the hated and hating Kurus. This was no

heaven for him; and he has made up his mind to exchange its joys for the gloom of the shades below, when the scene suddenly changes. All that he had yet beheld was illusion, designed to try his faith. The illusion vanished, he suddenly finds himself with his friends, in the possession of immortal bliss.

As an epic, judged by the strict rules of art, the *Mahabharata* is still more defective than the *Ramayana*. Not only does it sin more against unity, and present simultaneously a series of subjects which distract the reader, and make it often difficult for him to ascertain which of them is principal and which only subordinate; but many of the episodes introduced have no visible connection with the main story, and are much more allied to didactic than to epic poetry. One of them, the *Bhagavat Gita*, is an exposition of the doctrines of a particular school of theology; and though in itself a work of great merit, has no title to the place which it now occupies, since it must have been written in the seventh or eighth century, and therefore in all probability seven or eight hundred years later than the main body of the poem. The poetry of the *Mahabharata* is loudly praised, not merely by oriental scholars, but by such competent judges as Milman and Schlegel, who have furnished specimens which justify their encomiums. The only extract which we can afford to introduce here is from the description of the last great battle between the Pandus and Kurus. The translation is by Professor Wilson:—

*Now, as on either side the hosts advanced,
A sudden tumult filled the sky; earth shook;
Chafed by wild winds, the sands upcurled to heaven,
And spread a veil before the sun. Blood fell
In showers; shrill-screaming kites and vultures winged
The darkling air, while howling jackals hung
Around the march, impatient for their meal;
And ever and anon the thunder roar'd,
And angry lightnings flash'd across the gloom,
Or blazing meteors fearful shot to earth.
Regardless of these awful signs, the chiefs
Rushed on to mutual slaughter, and the peal
Of shouting hosts commingling shook the world.
Contending warriors, emulous for victory
And great in arms, wielded the sharp-edged sword,*

*And hurled the javelin; frequent flew the dart,
And countless arrows canopied the combat.*

The Hindus boast of many other poets of more modern date, and make mention in particular of nine who lived at Ujjain, under a celebrated prince, of the name of Vikramaditya, and are said, in oriental hyperbole, to have shone like jewels around his throne. It is evident from the wide difference in the dates of the transactions ascribed to his reign that there must have been several sovereigns of the name; but the one who appears, from the splendour of his court, and the number of distinguished literary men whom he gathered around him, and liberally patronized, to have made the strongest impression on his own age, and also on posterity, flourished about the middle of the first century before the Christian era. Of the nine jewels, the most celebrated is Kalidasa, whose *Meghdoot*, or "Cloud Messenger," and *Ritusanhara*, or "Circle of the Seasons," are characterized as excellent specimens of descriptive poetry. The former, founded on the very fanciful idea that a spirit banished from heaven sends a message to his consort, has long been a special favourite in India. The messenger employed is a cloud, and the spirit in directing his course describes the various countries over which it will be necessary to pass. In this way full scope is given for introducing all the varieties of landscape, the most renowned cities, the characters of their inhabitants, and even many of the legends connected with their history. The exiled spirit, at the same time, often calling to mind the happiness he had once enjoyed, and lamenting the loss of it, ever and anon indulges in early remembrance, and draws splendid pictures of the heavenly mansions.

The Hindus appear not to have possessed any poetry to which the name of pastoral could be properly applied, till a comparatively recent period. The *Gita Gavinda*, a collection of songs in which the loves of Krishna are celebrated, was written in the fourteenth century; but the author, Jaya Deva, has succeeded so well in accommodating his muse to the superstitious spirit, as well as the voluptuous tastes of his countrymen, that he is, perhaps, the most popular of all their authors. His merits, however, are not equal to his popularity, and his luxuriant imagery often fails to compensate for his feebleness and conceits.

There is another species of literature in which the Hindus may more justly boast both of excellence and originality. Their fables and tales are undoubtedly the sources from which the nations both of the East and West have derived almost all that they possess in this department. The most ancient known fables, those of Bidpai, occur almost entire in the Sanskrit *Hitopadesa*, which was published by Mr. Wilkins; and the invention of the scheme of story-telling exemplified in the *Arabian Nights*, as well as the subject and materials of many of the most celebrated tales, are justly claimed for India.

The only other species of literature which remains to be noticed, is that of the drama. In this department the two most celebrated names are those of Kalidasa, mentioned above as one of the ornaments of Vikramaditya's court, though he probably lived some centuries later, and of Bhavabhuti, who flourished in the eighth century. To each of them only three dramas are ascribed, and of four of these excellent English translations have appeared. The *Sakuntala*, the most celebrated production of Kalidasa, was early made familiar to Europe by the translation of Sir William Jones, and has recently been translated anew by Monier Williams, from a much more accurate copy of the original. It abounds in fine poetical description, and in many of its scenes displays the utmost tenderness and delicacy. The *Mikramorvasi*, or the "Hero and the Nymph," also by Kalidasa, has been translated by Professor Wilson, and is distinguished by the same qualities, though perhaps in an inferior degree. Bhavabhuti, in addition to Kalidasa's tenderness and exuberant fancy, possesses a vigour and sublimity which are exceedingly rare in Hindu literature. His most celebrated drama is *Malati and Madhava*. Malati, the heroine, is daughter of the prime minister of Malwa; Madhava, the hero, is son of the King of Bihar, who sends him to Ujjain, the capital of Malwa, to study logic under a celebrated female Buddhist, who had been Malati's nurse, and still continues to be her confidante. Her logic soon becomes the least attractive of Madhava's studies, and a mutual attachment is formed, which gives rise to incidents of a singular and interesting nature. Ujjain, as seen from a neighbouring height, is thus described under its ancient name of Padmavati:—

*How wide the prospect spreads—mountain and rock,
Towns, villages, and woods, and glittering streams.*

*There where the Para and the Sindhu wind,
 The towers, and pinnacles, and gates,
 And spires of Padmavati, like a city
 Precipitated from the skies, appear
 Inverted in the pure translucent wave.
 There flows Lavana's frolic stream, whose groves,
 By early rains refreshed, afford the youth
 Of Padmavati pleasant haunts, and where,
 Upon the herbage brightening in the shower,
 The heavy-udder'd kine contented browse.*

As a specimen of the darker colouring which Bhavabhuti frequently employs, the following passage from a wild goblin scene will bear quotation:—

*And now I see the goblin host; each stalks
 On legs like palm-trees—a gaunt skeleton,
 Whose fleshless bones are bound by starting sinews'
 And scantily cased in black and shrivell'd skin;
 Like tall and wither'd trees, by lightning scathed,
 They move, and, as amidst their sapless trunks
 The mighty serpent curls, so in each mouth,
 Wide-yawning, rolls the vast blood-dripping tongue.*

These extracts are taken from Professor Wilson's *Hindu Theatre*, which contains translations of most of the other Hindu dramas possessed of any interest, and furnishes full information on the whole subject in the introduction and the explanatory notes. One circumstance on which the drama, considered as a representation of national character, depends, is unfortunately wanting in the case of Hindu plays. With the exception of occasional passages, they were composed in Sanskrit at a time when it had ceased to be a living language, and had of course become unintelligible to the great body of the people. From this fact we may easily infer another—that the plays were intended only for select audiences, and for a single performance on some special occasion. There was no stage, as with us, where the same piece might be again and again repeated, and where every one who chose to pay the fee for admission had a right to be present, but only some temporary stage erected within the great hall or inner court of a palace, into which none but invited guests durst presume to enter. The author having thus no public taste to

consult, could very imperfectly perform the office which Hamlet attributes to the player, to show "the very age and body of the time his form and pressure." If he succeeded in pleasing his patron his object was gained, and it was superfluous to look beyond it. It may be owing to this want of the popular element, and the encouragement which would have accompanied it, that though some Hindu plays certainly were written before the Christian era, and during the eighteen hundred years which have since elapsed many more must have been demanded by grandees, to form part of particular festivities, the whole number now extant does not exceed sixty. The drama, therefore, how important soever it may have been deemed in early times, does not hold any prominent place in modern Hindu literature.

In the fine arts, comprehending music, painting, sculpture, and architecture, the Hindus cannot take high ground. The science of music was in early times reduced to a system, and the Hindus themselves are so satisfied with their proficiency in it as to affirm, "that the Europeans are superior to them in everything except music."¹ Few who have listened to it subscribe to this opinion. Their melodies are distinguished by a peculiar sweetness and plaintiveness, and when sung by a single voice or accompanied only by the *vina*, or Indian lyre, are very pleasing; but unfortunately, when a concert is given, the usual accompaniments are fiddles, and drums beaten with the fingers, which would completely drown the voices of the singers, if they did not have recourse to a kind of unnatural screeching. This at least is the only music which the Europeans are in the way of hearing; but it is said that it is not a fair specimen, and that the performers "are regarded by their scientific brethren in much the same light as a ballad-singer at the corner of the street by the primo soprano of the Italian opera."

The mythology of the Hindus furnishing innumerable subjects for painting and sculpture, it might have been expected that these arts would be in great demand, and would consequently have made rapid progress. This is not the case. The productions are numerous, but they display no proficiency. "Painting," to use the language of Mr. Elphinstone,² "is still in the lowest stage.

¹ Von Orlich's *Travels in India*, vol. i, page 226.

² Elphinstone's *India*, vol. i, page 305.

Walls of houses are often painted in water colours, and sometimes in oils. The subjects are mythology, battles, processions, wrestlers, male and female figures, and animals, with no landscape, or at best a tree or two, or a building, stuck in without any knowledge of perspective, or any attention to light and shade." They are more successful with pictures of a smaller size, painted in a sort of destemper, in which likenesses or the scenes of daily life are exhibited with accuracy, as well as with some freedom both of design and expression. Sculptures, executed in connection with prevailing superstitions, are innumerable. Besides images standing apart, all temples are covered internally, and, when not caves, externally also, with statues and high reliefs. Some of the latter are spirited, and display taste in their figures, attitudes, and expressions. In none of these, however, is there the least knowledge of anatomical skill indicated; even the external appearance of the muscles and limbs is disregarded, and the proportions are so inaccurate that it would be ludicrous to institute any comparison between the best of Indian sculptures and those which in Europe rank only as second-rate. One great obstacle in India has arisen from the nature of the objects represented. In Greece, the deities, however great the attributes ascribed to them, had human shapes, and the artist had only to select from models which were constantly under his eye, and make them ideally perfect. The Indian artist had a very different task. The objects which he had to represent were mere monsters of incongruous shapes, and often of hideous aspects. To give them an attractive appearance was impossible, and he was not even permitted to attempt it, since the more repulsive they were the better did they accord with the popular belief. The Hindu artist, obliged to gratify this depraved taste, must have been strongly tempted to substitute mere mechanical dexterity for all other kinds of excellence.

On the subject of Hindu architecture opinions are much divided. Some, denying that it has any just claim to originality, think that they have discovered in Egypt the models of the most venerable of Indian structures; while others, allowing themselves to be imposed upon by a fabulous chronology, assign dates which the structures themselves, and the historical events visibly stamped on them, completely disprove. Avoiding

both extremes, we may readily admit that the Hindus have from a very early period possessed an architecture which is peculiarly their own, and is embodied in written treatises as a regular system. These treatises, bearing collectively the name of *Silpa Sastra*, or "Science of Manual Arts," are said to have been sixty-four in number, and were supposed by Sir William Jones to furnish instruction in as many distinct trades. It would seem, however, from the *Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus*, published by Ram Raz, under the auspices of the Royal Asiatic Society, that several of the treatises are devoted to the same subject, and more especially to architecture, to which various other arts were held to be subservient. As has happened in India in other instances, the progress of architecture from earlier to more recent times has been retrograde, and the Sanskrit works which treated of it have in a great measure disappeared. After careful search, Ram Raz was only able to recover portions of a few, and these so mutilated and full of errors that he does not venture to describe them as anything better than "shattered remains." By far the most complete was a work entitled *Manasara*; but of the fifty-eight chapters into which it appears from the table of contents to be divided, the copy which he procured contains only forty-one. From these, and fragmentary portions of those other works, all the information given in his essay was derived, and therefore, in the use of it, some degree of caution is necessary. He has not been able to fix the date either of his manuscripts or of the originals, in a satisfactory manner; and there is necessarily a lurking suspicion that a more thorough acquaintance with their history might not raise them in our estimation. Still, they are certainly sufficient for the purpose for which they are here adduced. Taken in connection with the structures which have been actually reared in accordance with their rules, they make it impossible to doubt that among the Hindus architecture early attained great proficiency, and besides being practised as an art, was studied as a science. The systematic form which it assumed cannot be better explained than by giving a short account of the manner in which it is treated in the *Manasara*.

After a series of introductory chapters on mensuration—on the qualifications of a *silpi*, or manual artist—on the kinds of soils

to be preferred as building sites—on the mode of ascertaining the four cardinal points by means of a sun-dial, so as to make the walls astronomically true—on the laying out of ground plans for cities, towns, temples, palaces, and private dwellings—on the sacrifices and other religious acts to be performed before any building is actually undertaken—and on the ceremonies which ought to be observed in laying the foundation stone—the subject of architecture, properly so called, is entered upon, and all the separate parts of which a building is composed, their forms, their dimensions, and the proportions which these ought to bear to each other, are minutely explained. Thus one chapter is devoted to pedestals, another to basements, another to pillars or shafts, and another to entablatures. In determining these four principal parts, a great variety of forms is recognized; but the measure invariably used in fixing their relative heights is the diameter of the shaft. Thus it is said that the base may be the height of a whole, or of three-fourths, or of one-half of a diameter; and that pillars, besides being of various forms, as square, round, or octagonal, plain or variously fluted, may be of seven different kinds, according as they measure in height any number of diameters from six to twelve. No proper orders of architecture are recognized. The above varying proportions between the thickness and the height of pillars constitute the only essential differences; while the capitals and other ornaments, instead of being subjected to strict rules, as in Grecian and Roman architecture, are left in a great measure optional. After describing the principal parts of every building, the *Manasara* proceeds to treat of complete structures, as temples and palaces. No fewer than twelve successive chapters are devoted to descriptions of temples surmounted by pyramidal domes, and consisting of from one to twelve stories. In another work called the *Kasyapa*, the number of stories is extended to sixteen. These pyramidal temples or *vimanas* are constructed on the plan of diminishing in breadth at each successive story, and terminating in a cupola surmounted by a pinnacle. All the stories may be uniformly square, oblong, circular, oval, or polygonal, or they may be of a mixed nature, part of one form and part of another. They may also be of the same, or of different materials, and receive different names accordingly—a *vimana* of a single material, as

brick or stone, being called *shuddha*, or pure—of two materials, as stone and brick, or stone and metal, *misra*, or mixed—and of three or more kinds of materials, *sankirna*, or anomalous. Other more minute distinctions are recognized, and different names are given, according as the idol of the temple receives a standing, a sitting, or a recumbent posture.

Temples generally consist of the *garb'hagriha*, literally the womb of the house, the *antarala*, or ante-temple, and the *ard'ha mandapa*, or front portico. In fixing their respective dimensions, the whole length of the building is divided into four and a half, or six parts—two, two and a half, or three of these being given to the *garb'hagriha*, one and a half or two to the *antarala*, and one or one and a half to the *ard'ha mandapa*. The heights of the *vimanas* bear a certain fixed proportion to these breadths. Thus, when there is only one story, the height measured from the base to the apex, exclusive of the pedestal, is equal to one and a half of the breadth, and when there are two or three stories, the height is twice the breadth. In apportioning the different parts of the whole heights many subdivisions are made. Thus, in a *vimana* of twelve stories, the whole height is divided into eighty-seven parts. Of these four are given to the base, eight to the pillar, and four to the entablature of the first story—seven to the pillar, and three and a half to the entablature of the second story—six to the pillar, and three to the entablature of the third story; and so on, gradually diminishing in each successive story. On arriving at the last story, one part is to be given to the upper base, two to the *kant'ha* or neck of the cupola, three to the cupola itself, and one and a half to the pinnacle.

In subsequent chapters of the *Manasara* various adjuncts and appendages of temples are described with equal minuteness. Thus one chapter is devoted to outer courts, another to *gopuras* or pyramidal gateways, another to *sulas* or halls, another to porticoes, and another to stances for deities. The concluding chapters are somewhat miscellaneous in their contents, and seem to follow each other without any distinct principle of arrangement. Hence, after several chapters properly enough devoted to cities, private dwellings, gates and door ways, palaces and their appendages, the fortieth abruptly announces its subject to be “of princes, with their titles.” This is followed by chapters

treating in succession of the building of cars and other vehicles of the gods, couches and cushions, and thrones for the gods and for princes. The forty-fourth chapter bears more directly on the subject, for it treats of ornamental arches; but the next is completely away from it, and treats of the "Kalpataru, or the all-productive tree which is supposed to be planted in Indra's heaven, and to supply all the wants of those who have the happiness of taking shelter under it." It is needless to continue the detail of contents any further than to mention that the fifty-eighth chapter, the last of all, concludes "with rules for chiselling the eyes of the statue" of each god, and "the ceremonies to be performed on the occasion." From the rules of the art a natural transition leads to their exemplification in practice; and we shall therefore conclude the notice of the architecture of the Hindus with a brief account of some of their most celebrated structures.

As the earliest, and in some respects also the most interesting specimens of Indian architecture, the rock-cut temples and monasteries, the former called *chitayas* and the other *viharas*, first claim attention. Strictly speaking, they are not Hindu but Buddhist, the oldest of them having unquestionably originated with the worshippers of Buddha. Still, as on the expulsion of the Buddhists, their temples were appropriated by their persecutors, and also furnished the models of similar structures for Brahminical worship, there is no great inaccuracy in classing them as if they had originally been Hindu. They exist in so many localities that nearly fifty different groups are counted, and the number of distinct specimens has been estimated at not less than a thousand. Their geographical distribution is singular. Nine-tenths of the known groups are situated within the presidency of Bombay, while the other presidencies possess only three groups, of which one only, that of Mahabalipurani or Mahabalipur, belongs to Madras, and two, those of Bihar and Orissa, to Bengal. In this unequal distribution some have endeavoured to find a confirmation of the hypothesis that Egypt and Ethiopia, lying nearest to that part of India where the cave-temples are most numerous, furnished it with the original models of them; but Mr. Fergusson, though once inclined to this opinion, now thinks the localities of the caves sufficiently

accounted for by the nature of the strata. "The whole cave district of India," he says,¹ "is composed of horizontal strata of amygdaloid and other cognate trap formations, generally speaking of very considerable thickness and great uniformity of texture, and possessing, besides, the advantage of their edges being generally exposed in perfectly perpendicular cliffs, so that no rock in the world could either be more suited for the purpose, or more favourably situated than these formations are. They were easily accessible and easily worked. In the rarest possible instances are there any flaws or faults to disturb the uniformity of the design; and when complete, they afford a perfectly dry temple or abode, singularly uniform in temperature, and more durable than any class of temple found in any other part of the world. With these advantages, we need hardly look further for an explanation of the phenomenon, though some collateral points of explanation may perhaps reveal themselves to future explorers."

We now select for fuller description the cave at Karli, situated on the road between Bombay and Poona. It is not the oldest, for the date assigned to it is the first century of our era, but it has other important recommendations. It is the largest, as well as the most complete, and seems to have been executed when the style was in its greatest purity. It is approached by a narrow path, winding among trees, brushwood, and fragments of rocks, and entered by three doorways, the one in the centre leading to the main area or nave, and the others to the side aisles. Immediately above the doorways is a gallery, from the extremities of which springs an arch in the form of a horse-shoe. This arch left open forms the only window for the admission of light. The outer porch is closed in front by a screen, composed of two stout octagonal pillars, which support what is now only a plain mass of rock, but is understood to have once been faced with a richly ornamented wooden gallery. In advance of these pillars is a shaft with thirty-two faces or flutes, known by the name of the Lion Pillar, from having a capital surmounted by four lions. A space on the opposite side, where another similar pillar probably stood, is at present occupied by a little temple. The interior measures 126 feet in length, 45 feet 7 inches

¹ Fer usson, *The Illustrated Handbook of Architecture*, vol. i, page 23.

in breadth, and from 42 to 45 feet in height. It consists of a nave and two aisles, each of them separated from it by a row of fifteen pillars. Towards the extremity, opposite the entrance, is an apse or semi-dome, round which the aisles are continued by a curve of seven smaller pillars. Immediately under the semi-dome of the apse is the shrine, consisting of a plain dome, slightly stilted on a circular drum, and surmounted by a terminal, on which a wooden umbrella, decayed and distorted by age, still stands.

The pillars of the aisles have each "a tall base, an octagonal shaft, and a richly ornamented capital, on which kneel two elephants, each bearing two figures, generally a man and a woman, but sometimes two females, all very much better executed than such ornaments usually are." Four pillars, two on each side of the entrance-gallery, differ considerably from those forming the aisles, and the seven which curve behind the apse are plain octagonal shafts, without base or capital. The roof is semi-circular, but being somewhat stilted where it springs from the summit of the pillars, has a greater height than a semi-diameter. From a series of wooden ribs which still cross it, and appear to be as old as the whole excavation, it is inferred that the whole roof was originally of wood, and therefore the existing roof could not have been intended as a copy of a masonry arch. The general effect is thus described by Mr. Fergusson:¹—"The absence of wooden ornaments, as well as our ignorance of the mode in which this temple was finished laterally, and the porch joined to the main temple, prevents us from judging of the effect of the front in its perfect state. But the proportions of such parts as remain are so good, and the effect of the whole so pleasing, that there can be little hesitation in ascribing to such a design a tolerably high rank among architectural compositions. Of the interior we can judge perfectly, and it is certainly as solemn and grand as any interior can well be, and the mode of lighting the most perfect—one undivided volume of light coming through a single opening overhead, at a very favourable angle, and falling directly on the altar or principal object in the building, leaving the rest in comparative obscurity. The effect is considerably heightened

¹ Vol. i, page 27.

by the closely-set and thick columns that divide the three aisles from one another, as they suffice to prevent the boundary walls from ever being seen, and as there are no openings in the walls, the view between the pillars is practically unlimited."

The formation of temples out of the solid rock has not been confined to the process of excavation. In some cases the solid rock has not only been hollowed out, but hewn down into shape, and ornamented so as to present externally, as well as internally, all the features of a magnificent and gorgeous structure. Some remarkable specimens are furnished by what are called the Rathes, or Seven Pagodas of Mahabalipuram, situated near Sadras, about half-way between Madras and Pondicherry. The name is given to seven masses of granite which protrude from the sands near the seashore, and have been carved and hollowed by the Hindus into isolated structures. One of them is an exact representation of a Buddhist monastery of five stories. The lowest is occupied by a great square hall, and the other three by central halls, diminished in proportion to their height, and surrounded by cells on the outside, while the fifth and last story is crowned by a kind of dome. They are supposed to be not older than the thirteenth century, and yield, both in antiquity and interest, to the rock-cut temple at Ellora, generally known as the Kylas, which belongs to the ninth or tenth century, and is almost of unrivalled magnificence. Though wholly hewn out of the rock, it is in fact a complete temple, such as might have been erected on the plain. In a structure thus formed there is necessarily one great disadvantage. Its site is nothing else than a vast quarry or pit, in which it lies buried, and is not seen till it is approached. The depth of this pit at the inmost side is about 100 feet, and on the outer, where it is diminished by the slope of the hill, about 50 feet. The floor is 270 feet long by 150 wide, and in its centre stands the temple, properly so called. In approaching it, the first thing seen is a lofty *gopura* or gateway, connected by a bridge with a detached porch, which is flanked by two pillars and two elephants about the size of life. Another bridge behind this leads to a second porch of larger dimensions, supported by sixteen massive columns, and leading immediately to the *vimana*, which is between 80 and 90 feet in height. All around the

court is a cloister with cells and halls, "which give to the whole a complexity and, at the same time, a completeness which never fail to strike the beholder with astonishment and awe." Such is the remark of Mr. Fergusson, and yet he takes off the effect of it by a calculation in which he endeavours to show that the cost of the Kylas, as it now stands, is not nearly so much as would have been required to construct it of solid masonry. The whole length, breadth, and depth which have been excavated would, he says, form an area of 100,000 cubic yards. Of these only a half require to be removed, and therefore "the question is simply this—Whether is it easier to chip away 50,000 yards of rock, and shoot it to spoil (to borrow a railway term) down a hill-side, or to quarry 50,000 cubic yards of stone, remove it probably a mile at least to the place where the temple is to be built, and then to raise it and set it? The excavating process would probably have cost about one-tenth of the other. The sculpture and ornament would be the same in both instances, more especially in India, where buildings are always set up in block, and the carving executed *in situ*". If this calculation is correct, it places the claims of the Hindu architects to originality in a new light, since it proves that, by means of such structures as the Kylas, they have produced the greatest effect by the least expensive means. This is tacitly admitted by Mr. Fergusson, when he adds:—"Nevertheless, the impression produced on all spectators by these monolithic masses, their unalterable character and appearance of eternal durability, point to the process as one meriting more attention than it has hitherto received in modern times; and if any rock were found as uniform and as easily worked as the Indian amygdaloidal traps, we might hand down to posterity some more durable monument than many we are now erecting at far greater cost."

Other styles of architecture, differing essentially from the rock-cut temples, are seen in the temples regularly constructed of solid masonry. One of these, of vast extent, situated on the island of Seringham, was incidentally mentioned in a former part of the work. Many others are equally deserving of notice, but our limits admit of little more than a simple mention of a few of the most remarkable. The first of these is the *vimana*, or pyramidal temple, properly so called, exhibited in its most

splendid forms in the southern part of the peninsula, and above all in the great pagoda of Tanjore, which, rising from a square base, ascends through fourteen stories to the height of nearly 200 feet. Temples built on this plan usually receive their only light through the doorway, before which artificial obstructions are placed to deepen the gloom, and thereby enhance the mystery of the sanctuary. Thus in front of the doorway stands a single or double porch, nearly identical in plan with the *vimana*, but very much lower, and again in front of the porch a lofty pyramidal gate or *gopura*. One of the most remarkable of these is the twelve-storied *gopura* of the principal temple of Kombaconum, situated twenty miles north-east of Tanjore. Another appendage of these temples is the *choultry*, or pillared colonnade, occupying the spaces between the various inclosures, and varying in shape and size "from the little pavilion supported on four pillars, up to the magnificent hall numbering a thousand." One of the oldest and most elegant of these forms the porch of the pagoda of Chillambaram; another, displaying less taste, but more celebrated, is the hall built by Trimul Naik, at Madura. It is 333 feet long by 81 feet 10 inches wide, and is supported by 128 pillars, all differing from each other, and covered with the most elaborate and minute architectural ornaments. Twenty-two years, and nearly £1,000,000 sterling, were expended in its erection. A form of *vimana*, differing greatly from that usual in Southern India, is found within the presidency of Bengal, and more especially in Orissa. In this form the outline is no longer a pyramid composed of a definite number of stories, but a curve resembling a cone with divisions, not horizontal as in stories, but vertical. The earliest specimen of this style is the great temple of Bhubaneswar, built by Lelat Indra Kesari in 657. In the same vicinity more than 100 other temples, built on the same plan, and varying in height from 50 to 150 feet, still exist; but they are all eclipsed, at least in celebrity, by the temple of Juggernaut, which was built on the same model in 1198.

The only other temples to which it seems necessary to refer, are those of the Jains, who must at one time have established their ascendancy over a large part of both Northern and Southern India, but have now their principal seats in Mysore and

Gujarat. On the borders of the latter territory the granite mountain Abu rises abruptly from a sandy desert to the height of about 5,000 feet. On this mountain the Jains have a number of temples. Two of them, composed of white marble, are pre-eminently beautiful. The older of the two, built about 1032 by a merchant prince of the name of Vimala Shah, is said to have occupied fourteen years in its erection, and to have cost £18,000,000 sterling. Externally it is perfectly plain, but within nothing can exceed the magnificence and richness of decoration. The principal part of the temple is a cell, containing a cross-legged seated figure of Parswanath, to whom it is dedicated. It is lighted only from the door, and terminated upwards by a pyramidal spire-like roof. In front of the cell is a portico composed of forty-eight pillars, and inclosed, together with the cell, in an oblong court, surrounded by a double colonnade of smaller pillars. These form porticoes to a range of fifty-five cells, which are similar to those of a Buddhist *vihara*, but instead of being intended for monks, contain each a cross-legged image of Parswanath, the scenes of whose life are sculptured over the doors, or on the jambs. Eight great pillars of the portico support a magnificent dome, which forms the principal feature in the architecture. Fergusson's admiration of the porch may be estimated from his observation that the church of St. Stephen's, Walbrook, London, Sir Christopher Wren's masterpiece, "would have been greatly improved, had its resemblance to a Jain porch been more complete." In another place he says of the whole temple, that it is as "elaborate as good taste would allow in any purely architectural subject." The second temple, built by two rich merchant brothers between 1197 and 1247, is characterized by Colonel Todd, who employs it as the ornamental title-page of his *Travels in Western India*, as "beyond controversy the most superb of all the temples of India," and unapproached by any edifice except the Taj Mahal; and, by Mr. Fergusson, as standing, "for delicacy of carving and minute beauty of detail, almost unrivalled, even in this land of patient and lavish labour." The only other Jain temple which we shall notice is that of Sadru, situated in a deserted glen of the Aravalli range, below the fort of Komulmeer in Udaipur. It was built about the middle of

the fifteenth century by Khumbo Rana, whose long and prosperous reign was distinguished by the erection of numerous beautiful buildings, and is of large dimensions, covering an area of more than eight acres. Its effect is not imposing, in consequence of the minuteness and immense number of its parts, but nothing can surpass these in variety, beauty of detail, graceful arrangement, and the tasteful admixture of domes of different heights with flat ceilings. "Indeed," adds Mr. Fergusson, "I know of no other building in India of the same class that leaves so pleasing an impression, or affords so many hints for the graceful arrangement of columns in an interior."

Temples are not the only edifices in which the architectural magnificence of the Hindus has been displayed, and some notice therefore is due to their palaces, of which that of Deeg, in Bharatpur, surpasses all others in grandeur of conception and beauty of detail—their observatories, of which those of Jai Singh, erected at Delhi and Benares, are particularly distinguished, though, from having been erected under the Mughul dynasty, they present Muhammedan features, and therefore properly belong to what has been called the mixed Hindu style—their *ghats* or landing-places, which, in addition to a magnificent flight of steps, are always backed by a building more or less remarkable for architectural display, but are nowhere so numerous and splendid as at Benares—their wells or reservoirs, which, though necessarily devoid of external display, exhibit, in flights of steps often from 20 to 40 feet wide, and continued to the depth of 80 or 100 feet, as well as in the galleries and ornamental niches constructed in the adjoining walls, many elaborate and most expensive pieces of architecture—and their great tanks or artificial lakes, which, while furnishing the means of an irrigation on which the fertility of whole districts depends, are often as remarkable for magnificence and beauty as for utility, the embankments sometimes consisting of flights of steps composed of marble, and relieved of their monotonous appearance by the intervention of temples, choultries, fountains, and statues.

The result of all that has been here said on the subject of Hindu architecture cannot be given better than in the words of Mr. Fergusson—"It stands so completely alone, so entirely

separate from the other forms of architecture of the world, that it cannot well be compared with any of them, without the risk of false and erroneous impressions being conveyed, more likely to mislead than to instruct. It does not, however, possess either the solid grandeur and simple magnificence of the Egyptian styles, or any of that sublime aspiration after eternity that strikes with awe every visitor to the valley of the Nile. It would be as reasonable to compare the Indian epics and dramas with those of Homer and Sophocles, as to compare the Indian style of architecture with the refined elegance and intellectual superiority of the Parthenon and other great works of Greece. Probably a nearer comparison might be instituted with the Gothic styles of the middle ages; yet, while possessing the same rich irregularity and defiance of all rule, it wants that bold manliness of style and loftiness of aspiration which dignifies even the rudest attempts of those enthusiastic religionists. Though deficient in these respects, the Indian styles are unrivalled for patient elaboration of the details, which are always designed with elegance, and always executed with care. The very extent of ornamentation produces feelings of astonishment, and the smaller examples are always pleasing, from the elegance of the parts and the appropriateness of the whole. In no styles is the last characteristic more marked than in those of India; for whether the architects had to uphold a mountain of rock, or the airiest dome, or merely an ornamental screen-work, in all instances the pillars are exactly proportioned to the work they have to do, and the ornaments are equally suited to the apparent strength or lightness of effect which the position of the mass seems to require. No affectation, and no imitation of other styles, ever interfere to prevent the purpose-like expression of every part, and the effect consequently is always satisfactory and pleasing, and, when the extent is sufficient, produces many of the best and highest modes of expression of which the art of architecture is anywhere capable."

5

Commerce and Agriculture

EXCEPT in the rudest states of society, when population is thinly scattered, the earth does not spontaneously yield a sufficient supply of food, and its produce must therefore be increased by artificial means. Under the spur of this necessity, the fundamental processes of ploughing, sowing, and reaping are soon learned, and have accordingly been practised in almost all countries from time immemorial. But though agriculture is thus one of the earliest of human arts, it is certainly not the first in which any great degree of proficiency is attained. So long as land can be procured without difficulty, and in consequence pays little or no rent, there is scarcely any inducement to bestow much care on the cultivation of it, and the imperfect routine once adopted is handed down unaltered from age to age. It is only when population has increased so as to press on the means of subsistence, that the importance of performing all the operations of husbandry in the most efficient manner is fully understood. Then necessity once more becomes the mother of invention, and various important improvements are introduced. By means of new implements and a more skilful application of the mechanical power employed in working them, the labours of the field are performed at once more perfectly, more expeditiously, and more cheaply; crops are made to succeed each other in the order best fitted to give the largest amount of profitable produce without exhausting the soil; and the various materials available as manures are not only carefully collected at home or imported from abroad, but applied in accordance with the laws of the vegetable economy, so as to furnish each plant which is raised with its most appropriate food. Agriculture, as thus understood, requires for its full

development a very advanced state of civilization; and hence some of its highest departments cannot be said to have made any approach to perfection till our own times. It is almost unnecessary to observe, that when Hindu agriculture is mentioned something very different is meant. Indeed, any attempt to test its merits by comparing it with British agriculture, tends only to mislead. Owing to the wide difference in climate, and in the course of the seasons, the deep ploughing and thorough draining to which we justly attach so much importance, would in India be wholly out of place. There nature co-operates much more powerfully than with us, and by abundant supplies of heat and moisture, the two great agents of vegetation, makes the task of the Hindu husbandman comparatively easy. After the inundation which flooded the lowlands in the rainy season has retired, the deposit of mud which it leaves behind often forms of itself a sufficient seed-bed, and grain, thrown broadcast into it without previous preparation, yields in due season a luxuriant harvest. In like manner, when, in grounds not regularly flooded, a plough of the simplest and rudest form has, by one or more scratchings, sufficiently pulverized a soil which is, for the most part, of light and porous texture, the seed, deposited usually in drills, quickly germinates, and when threatened with destruction by excessive drought, is easily carried with success through all its stages by artificial irrigation. This irrigation, without which a large part of the country would be doomed to absolute sterility, has been provided for in a manner which goes far to prove that Hindus, when urged by the stimulus of necessity, are not deficient in skill and enterprise. No people in the world have done more to overcome the difficulties of their position in respect of the moisture necessary to secure fertility; and when we see how much they have done for irrigation by means of embankments, raising the level or changing the course of streams, and by means of vast reservoirs, in which the superfluous water of the rainy season is carefully husbanded for future use, it seems only fair to infer that if they had encountered similar difficulties in other departments of agriculture, they would have been equally energetic and successful in surmounting them.

When due effect is given to such considerations as the above, it will be found that Hindu agriculture is not so deficient as it is generally supposed to be.

much praise, is not justly liable to all the censure which has been passed, or to the ridicule which has sometimes been thrown upon it. Several passages in the *Rig Veda* leave no room to doubt that in India more than three thousand years ago, the land was laid out in fields for regular cultivation; that ploughs and other implements, worked by animals which had been trained to the yoke, were in constant use; and that the principal crops consisted then, as now, partly of the plants whose seeds furnish the staple articles of human food, and partly of those whose fibres are best fitted for being woven into clothing. It is doubtful, however, if from that time to the present any very marked advance has been made. The plough, apparently, retains its primitive form, consisting mainly of a wooden beam bent at its lower extremity into a kind of share, usually, though not always, shod with iron, and totally unprovided either with coulter to cut a furrow, or with mould-board to turn it over. This plough is so light that the ploughman takes it to the field and brings it back on his shoulders; and yet, when a full day's work is done, it taxes the strength of three pairs of cattle, each pair working it in succession for only three hours. This enormous waste of animal power is owing partly to the unskilful manner in which it is applied, and still more to the wretched condition of the cattle, which, instead of being fully and properly fed, are left for the most part to extract a miserable subsistence from the merest husks. When the kind of crop intended to be raised requires a greater depth of soil than is attainable by the scratching of a single plough, there is no alternative but to make plough follow plough in the same furrow, each scratching a little deeper than that which preceded it.

When the soil has thus been stirred, it becomes necessary, at least when it is of tenacious texture, to pulverize it. For this purpose the harrow and roller would be the most efficient instruments, but nothing deserving the name being known to the Hindu husbandman, he supplies their place by two very clumsy substitutes. One of these is what is called the *moyi*, an implement which is made of two pieces of bamboo about six feet in length, and joined together by some cross bars like a ladder. When in operation, this ladder, to which a pair of oxen are

yoked, is drawn transversely across the field, while the driver stands upon it to give it weight. The other, a still ruder contrivance, is merely a thick narrow plank. It is in universal use both in Northern and Southern India, and though not always contrived so rudely and worked so clumsily as appears in the following description by Dr. Francis Buchanan, certainly deserves the character he gives it, when he calls it "the most awkward machine that I have ever beheld." Speaking of it in his report on the district of Purnea, he says,¹—"There is no handle to it, as there is to the planks used for a similar purpose in the south of India; nor have the natives had the ingenuity to fasten a beam to it, by which it might be drawn. They tie ropes to the necks of the cattle, usually two pair to each plank, while two men stand on this to give it weight, and to save themselves the trouble of walking; and they secure themselves from falling by holding an ox's tail in each hand; and by twisting this they can guide and accelerate the motions of the cattle. So totally devoid of ingenuity have they been, that they have not fallen upon any contrivance to fasten the rope to the upper side of the beam, so as to prevent it from rubbing on the earth; but fairly tie it round the plank, so that, owing to the friction, an ordinary rope would not last a moment. They therefore have been under the necessity of employing the tanners to make ropes of hide which resist the friction, but come high. The tanner is usually paid in grain, and the making these ropes is the chief employment that they have. This plank is called a *chauki*." The extreme stupidity thus manifested by the Hindus of Purnea is doubtless an exceptional case; but under no circumstances can the general use of such an implement as the *chauki*, as the main agent for pulverizing and smoothing the soil, indicate anything but a wretched system of culture.

The soil having been prepared for the seed, some ingenuity is displayed in the mode of depositing it. Sometimes it is sown broadcast, and afterwards formed into a kind of drills by means of a large rake, which, drawn by oxen, tears out the superfluous plants, and leaves the others standing apart in tolerably regular intervals; but more frequently it is drilled at once by a machine, which the Hindus claim, and apparently deserve the honour of

¹ Montgomery Martin's *Eastern India*, vol. iii, p. 266.

having invented. It consists principally of a transverse beam, pierced by a number of holes, in each of which a hollow bamboo is inserted. These bamboos are placed obliquely, so as to meet with their upper extremities in a cup containing the seed, which, descending through them, is deposited in the drills formed by their lower extremities, when the whole machine is in motion. The mechanical part displays little ingenuity, and the whole labours under serious defects; but the idea of a drilling-machine is certainly conveyed, and the purposes which it is designed to serve to some extent accomplished. In Europe, these purposes mainly are to secure economy of seed, and unoccupied intervals, which allow the weeding and cleaning processes to be effectually performed while the plants are growing. In India the intervals, though sometimes employed in the same way, are too often turned to a different account. From the nature of the climate, vegetation is never entirely suspended, as in higher latitudes, and hence, by making the necessary selection of crops, cultivation is carried on as successfully in the cold as in the hot season. There is thus a twofold produce, and the Hindu cultivator, in order to secure it, has recourse to the very injudicious practice of raising two or more crops simultaneously from the same ground. The intervals which ought to have been reserved for cleaning the principal crop of rice, or some other kind of grain, are sown, probably with pulse; and in this way, while the opportunity of effectually keeping down weeds is almost entirely lost, the plants, forced to contend with each other, are hampered in their growth, and yield only a scanty produce. If the different crops attain maturity about the same time, they must be reaped together, and can only form incongruous mixtures; if they are harvested separately, the evil is still worse, as the straw of the one which is first reaped must be sacrificed in order to prevent the irreparable injury which would be done by its removal to the other which is still growing. The greed of the husbandman is thus its own punishment; and the loss of one good crop is very inadequately compensated by two sickly and scanty crops, which, besides being of inferior quality, have robbed the soil, and impaired its future productiveness. Where the weeding process receives due attention, it is sometimes

performed by means of a weeding-plough, bearing some resemblance to our more perfect horse-hoe; but the more common implement is the ordinary hoe, which resembles our own in shape, but has a handle so absurdly short that the hoers in using it must take a sitting posture.

In all other farming operations similar slovenliness is exhibited. Grain when reaped is thrashed by the primitive mode of causing cattle to tread upon it, is winnowed by exposing it to the wind, and is freed from its husk, and prepared for use, by means of the pestle and mortar. The necessity of manure to maintain the fertility of the soil is well known, but owing to many concurrent circumstances, the supply is limited in the extreme. The straw which ought to have been used for litter is often lost through the preposterous mode of cultivation already referred to. Even where wood can easily be obtained in abundance, cow-dung, instead of being reserved for the fields, is employed chiefly as fuel; and owing to the disuse of animal food, stall-feeding, from which alone an adequate supply of manure could be obtained, is either unknown or abominated. Besides these obstacles, with which agriculture has to contend, through the habits and prejudices of the people, there are others for which government is more immediately responsible. Not only has the disturbed state of the country frequently left the husbandman without any reasonable hope that if he sowed the land he would be permitted to reap the crop, but the burdens to which he has been subjected have been rendered intolerable, both by their amount and their uncertainty. Under these circumstances his poverty has generally been so extreme as to leave him utterly destitute of the capital which might have at once prompted and enabled him to attempt improvement; and even when enjoying some degree of prosperity, he has too often found it necessary to assume an appearance of wretchedness as his best security against extortion.

Though India has many tracts which, if not absolutely sterile, would not repay the labour and expense of cultivation, there is no country of equal extent from which a greater variety and a larger amount of vegetable produce are obtained. Almost all plants possessed of economic value may be successfully raised within it—those of the tropics during its hot, and those of the

temperate zones during its cold season. Where the capabilities of cultivation are so great, the plants actually cultivated are, as might be expected, too numerous to allow any detailed account to be here given of them. It seems necessary, however, briefly to notice a few of the more important. Among culmiferous crops the first place belongs to rice, which, wherever the land admits of its successful cultivation, from being either inundated during the rains or easily irrigated, is the prevailing crop, and forms the principal food of the inhabitants. This is peculiarly the case in Bengal, in which the failure of the crop of rice has repeatedly proved far worse than that of the potato in Ireland, and cut off the population by millions and tens of millions. Such failures seem to imply that the cultivation, however well its details may be understood, is not conducted on the system best calculated to insure success; and that the husbandman, instead of calculating contingencies, and employing skill and industry in endeavouring to provide against them, is too much disposed to follow an indolent routine, which places him at the mercy of the seasons, and leaves him without resource when these prove unfavourable. Under the common name of *rice*, numerous varieties of the plant are cultivated, and require corresponding differences of treatment. Some of the varieties ripen in the hot and others in the cold season, and advantage is often taken of the circumstance to obtain two crops in a single year. The ground having been prepared as for a summer crop, both kinds are sown in the same field, and coming to maturity at different times are reaped successively. The best apology offered for this proceeding is, that it gives an additional security against famine, inasmuch as the weather which proves injurious to the one may be favourable to the other. The sacrifice, however, is necessarily great, since double seed is thus wasted to provide against a mere contingency; and the usual result is, as observed above, to substitute for one full crop two of scanty amount and indifferent quality. Another mode of cultivating often adopted, in the same parsimonious spirit, under the idea of economizing the ground, is by transplantation. The seed is at first sown thickly in beds, and when they have germinated and attained sufficient growth to admit of removal, are planted out at proper distances in the field for a regular crop. Could the removal be effected without

injuring the health of the plants, it would not only not be objectionable, but an important object might be gained by it. The field while left unoccupied might recruit its impaired powers, or receive, by means of repeated harrowings and ploughings, a more thorough preparation. Unfortunately, a different use is generally made of it. The land, instead of being allowed to rest, is kept in the interval under some other crop, and consequently when planted out for rice, is both foul and exhausted. When these objectionable modes of cultivation are avoided the crop raised is generally abundant, and besides supplying the wants of a dense population, leaves a considerable surplus for export. Accordingly, East India rice, particularly that of Patna, is well known in commerce.

Wheat and barley are chiefly grown in the north-western provinces, and upon the cultivable slopes of the Himalayas, and are not entitled to rank high among the culmiferous crops of Hindu agriculture. A far more important place is due to a grain of very inferior quality, cultivated almost universally throughout India, and to such an extent, more especially in the more southern districts, as to furnish the staple article of food. This culmiferous plant, *Eleusine coracana* of Lindley, known in Bengal by the name of *maruya*, and in the south by that of *ragi*, appears to attract far more attention than its intrinsic importance deserves, and hence furnishes perhaps the most favourable specimen of the skill and industry of which the Hindu husbandman is capable, when raising a crop which promises to repay him, and placed in circumstances which promise him a fair share in the fruits of his labours. Having already given from Dr. Buchanan's report an account of the slovenly husbandry practised in Purnea, it is only fair to produce as a contrast to it the following account of the culture of *ragi*, extracted from the work of Colonel Wilks:¹—"The whole world does not, perhaps, exhibit a cleaner system of husbandry than that of the cultivation of *ragi* (*Cynosurus coracanus* of Linnaeus) in the home-fields of Mysore. On the first shower of rain after harvest, the home-fields are again turned up with the plough, and this operation, as showers occur, is repeated six successive times during the dry season, at once destroying the weeds, and

¹ *Historical Sketches of the South of India*, vol. i, p. 209.

opening the ground to the influence of the sun, the decomposition of water and air, and the formation of new compounds. The manure of the village, which is carefully and skilfully prepared, is then spread out on the land, and incorporated with it by a seventh ploughing, and a harrowing with an instrument nearly resembling a large rake, drawn by oxen, and guided by a boy." When the field is completely pulverized, the drill-plough, of which some account has already been given, is put in requisition. Colonel Wilks, after describing it, and the mode in which it "performs the operation of sowing twelve rows at once," continues thus:—"If the crop threatens to be too early or too luxuriant, it is fed down with sheep. Two operations of a weeding-plough, of very simple construction, at proper intervals of time, loosen the earth about the roots, and destroy the weeds; and afterwards, during the growth of the crop, at least three hand-weedings are applied. This laborious process rewards the husbandman in good seasons with a crop of eighty-fold from the best land. The period between seedtime and harvest is five months." The only other culmiferous crops which it is necessary to mention are various species of millet, and maize, which, though not indigenous to India, has been successfully introduced, and promises, notwithstanding the obstinacy of native prejudice, to provide a valuable substitute for some inferior kinds of food.

The leguminous plants under regular culture are still more numerous than the culmiferous, and scarcely less important, though they are generally raised, in the way already mentioned, rather as supplementary than as principal crops. Those most in favour are gram (*Cicer arietinum*), various species of pease and beans, vetches, and lentils. Many plants also are cultivated for the oil extracted from their seeds, and are sometimes made subservient to the improvement of agriculture, by leaving a refuse, or oil-cake, which is partly used as food for cattle and partly for manure. It is needless, however, to dwell on these, or on the different plants which are more or less extensively cultivated for their bulbs or tubers; and we therefore hasten to notice several vegetable products which, besides holding an important place in Hindu agriculture, derive an adventitious interest from the extent to which they actually supply, or are deemed capable of supplying

some of the most pressing demands of our homemarket. At the head of the list stands cotton, which, furnishing the main articles of Hindo clothing, has been extensively cultivated throughout India from the remotest antiquity. It is repeatedly alluded to in the *Veda*, and is mentioned by Herodotus, who, speaking of it, according to the imperfect information which had reached him, as one of the remarkable products of India, says that "the wild trees there produce as fruit a wool, which is superior both in beauty and excellence to that of sheep, and the Indians use clothing obtained from these trees."¹ Long after the establishment of the East India Company, cotton was known in England only in its manufactured state; and little interest was felt in the raw material until the wondrous inventions of Arkwright and Cartwright had enabled the British manufacturer to supplant the Hindu, not only here, but in his own native market. The revolution thus produced having deprived the Company of a most important part of their investment, they were naturally desirous to adapt themselves to the altered circumstances; and, knowing the unlimited capabilities of India for the production of cotton, endeavoured to establish a new branch of trade, by importing it in a raw state. There were many obstacles in the way. Even in the depressed state to which the native manufacture was reduced by British competition, it was still carried on to such an extent that all the cotton raised within the Company's possessions barely sufficed to furnish it with the necessary supply. When at length a surplus for export was obtained, the quality, owing to the imperfect manner in which it had been prepared for market, proved indifferent. Under these discouraging circumstances the export of cotton from India was commenced, and to some extent, notwithstanding the efforts which have been made, it still continues to labour under them. The first object of the Hindu husbandman naturally is to raise the necessaries of life for his family. Very probably the small patch of land which forms his whole farm scarcely enables him to do more; and hence, when he attempts the cultivation of cotton at all, it is on so limited a scale as to make it scarcely worth his while to be very careful in the mode of conducting it. It is at best but a secondary object, and receives a very subordinate share of

¹ Herodotus, *book* iii, Cap. 106.

his attention. In some districts, however, where the soil is peculiarly adapted for its culture, cotton has always been regarded as a principal crop, and its culture might doubtless be almost indefinitely extended, if a remunerating price could be obtained. It is here that the great difficulty lies. After a long and expensive land carriage to the shipping port, Indian cotton, when it arrives at Liverpool, sells at not much more than half the price of cotton of the same description from the United States. Thus, in 1850, while New Orleans cotton was selling at 5½d. to 9d. per lb, that of Surat realized only 3½d. to 5½d. Were this immense difference owing to an intrinsic inferiority in quality, the idea of successful competition might be abandoned as hopeless, but as it has been clearly established that the present inferiority is accidental, rather than permanent, arising much more from imperfection of culture and of subsequent manipulation, more than from any other cause, the remedy is in a great measure in our own hands. By taking the necessary means to instruct the natives of India in the most approved modes of raising the crop, and preparing it for market—by convincing them how much their own interest may be promoted by adopting these modes—and by improving the navigation of rivers and constructing railroads, so as to afford a cheap and easy transit from all parts of the interior of the country—our possessions in India may soon compete more successfully in the cotton market, and deprive American slave-states of the monopoly which they have too long enjoyed. The progress already made, though less than was sanguinely anticipated, is not to be despised. In 1783, when the importation of cotton from the East Indies appears to have commenced, the amount was only 114,133 lbs; in 1793 it was 729,634 lbs; in 1803, 3,182,960 lbs; in 1813, from some accidental failure, only 497,350 lbs; but two years after (1815), 8,505,000 lbs; in 1823, 13,487,250 lbs; and in 1833, 33,139,050 lbs. Since then the progress has been equally rapid, the imports of the three years ending 1850 having been respectively 84,101,961 lbs, 70,838,515 lbs, and 118,872,742 lbs.

Another article which India cultivates on a very extensive scale, and in which she contributes to supply one of the most important demands of our home market, is sugar. In the cultivation of this article, indeed, she seems to have taken

precedence of all other countries, and hence not only the English name, but also those which designate it in other languages, are corruptions of the Sanskrit word *sarkara*. As there is nothing deserving of special notice in the Hindu mode of culture, it is necessary only to give some idea of the extent to which the culture is carried on, and the progress which it continues to make, by mentioning a few of the statistics of its export. In 1832, when the quantity of sugar entered for consumption in the United Kingdom amounted to 3,655,534 cwts, India furnished only 79,600, or little more than a forty-fifth part of the whole. In 1842, when, owing to injudicious taxation, the aggregate quantity imported was still short of 4,000,000 cwts, the supply furnished by India had risen to 935,948 cwts, or nearly one-fourth of the whole import. A great increase has since taken place, but the rate of one-fourth is still maintained, and hence in 1852, when the aggregate import was 6,898,867 cwts, the share furnished by India amounted to 1,532,012 cwts. It is impossible to doubt that, when new facilities of transport are given, Hindu agriculture will contribute still more largely to the supply of the British sugar market.

Silk, which, though not strictly speaking a vegetable product, can only be obtained intermediately by the aid of agriculture, is another of the articles for which the home market is largely indebted to the Hindu husbandman. The mulberry, on which the silkworm is fed, occupies an important place in his system of culture, and in several districts forms the crop on which he mainly depends for the payment of his rent. In a question of precedence as to the origin of the culture, the Hindu would probably be obliged to yield to the Chinese, who, having early established a decided superiority in the production of raw silk, still maintains it, and furnishes the United Kingdom with nearly a half of its annual import. Thus in 1852, when the aggregate of raw silk imported was 5,832,551 lbs, China furnished 2,418,343 lbs. India, however, holds the next place, having furnished in the same year 1,335,486 lbs. This position was not attained without considerable exertions on the part of the East India Company; and as many of the improvements introduced into the mode of winding the silk from the cocoons originated with agents which they employed for that purpose, the share of merit

still due to the Hindus in its production cannot easily be apportioned. The progress which has been made is, however, another striking proof of the success with which, by well-directed efforts, the productive resources of India may be developed. The first silk imported by the Company was what is now technically called "country wound," from being wound from the cocoons and reeled into skeins after the rude manner immemorially practised by the natives of India. Its quality was so indifferent that it could be used only for a few inferior purposes, and it gradually fell into such disrepute as to oblige the Directors to intimate to the Bengal government that unless its defects were remedied, the exportation of it must be abandoned. For a time improvement seems to have been considered hopeless, for only desultory and not very judicious efforts were made; but at length, about 1775, the Italian method of winding silk was in full operation in Bengal. At the same time strong inducements were held out to the extended cultivation of the mulberry plant. In this way the production of silk in India took a sudden start, and received a stimulus of which the effects are still felt. During the ten years ending with 1802, the quantity of raw silk annually imported into London from Bengal averaged about 400,000 lbs. From that time the quantity, though subject to considerable fluctuations, continued to increase, and amounted in 1830 to 1,186,163 lbs. As already observed, China is now the only country which, in the article of raw silk, still competes successfully with India in the British market.

In indigo, the next article claiming notice, India has so far outstripped other countries as almost to establish a monopoly. The native name of the dye extracted from the plant is *nil*, meaning *blue*; but the native seat of it is clearly indicated by the name indigo, which is believed to be a corruption of *indicum*, the term under which it was designated by Pliny, because in his day it was well understood to be a product of India. Many centuries before the Cape of Good Hope was doubled, it was imported into Europe by way of Alexandria; but it was only after that event that it began to attract much notice. At first this notice was not of a favourable kind. Woad was then extensively cultivated as a dye, particularly in Germany, and the growers of it perceiving how formidable a rival indigo might

prove, stigmatized it under the name of "devil's dye," and in 1654 procured an imperial edict prohibiting its importation, on the ground that through the use of it "the trade in woad is lessened, dyed articles injured, and money carried out of the country." These and similar prohibitions issued by other governments, proved unavailing to prevent the use of a commodity whose value was soon recognized. It is rather remarkable, however, that though the knowledge of it was first received from India, Europe long drew its chief supply, not from India, but from the islands and mainland of America. It had attracted the attention of the colonists in that continent, and was both cultivated and manufactured with much success by the British planters there. The East India Company, in consequence, withdrew from a competition which was perhaps thought to be invidious, and ceased to be importers of indigo. At a later period, when the West India planters had discovered a more profitable culture, and the American colonists had achieved their independence, the interest of the East India Company in indigo revived. Great efforts were accordingly made to encourage its cultivation. With this view the Company continued, from 1779 to 1788, to contract for the purchase of it, on terms so favourable to the producers as to be virtually equivalent to a bounty. The culture was greatly extended, and the quality of the dye much improved under this system; but the losses which it entailed on the Company were so heavy that they felt compelled to abandon it, and throw the trade open to their servants and persons under their protection, on payment of freight, duties, and charges. At the same time, to foster this rising trade, the Company continued for many years to make large advances on the security of indigo. The soundness of the practice may well be questioned; but whether by means of it, or in spite of it, the indigo of India has in a great measure superseded that of other countries. The principal seats of the culture are Bengal proper, the districts of Tirhut and Benares, and the kingdom of Oudh. The total quantity shipped from Calcutta in 1851-52 was 9,633,371 lbs, and had an estimated value of £1,821,653. Of this large sum, however, only a very small portion can be said to be realized by Hindu agriculture. The raising of the plant is all that properly belongs to its

province; the subsequent manufacture requires a considerable amount of capital, and though conducted in the same methods as have been known and practised in India from time immemorial, the works in which it is carried on belong, for the most part, to Europeans. Any quantity which the natives manufacture on their own account is usually reserved for internal consumption.

Since the establishment of the plantations in Assam, tea ought certainly to be included among the agricultural products of India; but as it is confined at present to a single remote province, and must still be regarded as an experimental rather than an established crop, we shall pass it without further notice. Pepper, too, though one of the most important articles in which the Company traded at their first establishment, and still cultivated to a large extent on the Malabar coast, will, in like manner, be omitted; and our list of articles of Hindu agriculture will be concluded with opium, which, from adventitious circumstances, has acquired an importance to which it has certainly no natural claim. The white poppy, which furnishes it, is probably a native of Asia, but is found in other parts of the world, and thrives well under considerable diversities of climate. In Europe, Turkey opium bears the highest name, and containing nearly three times as much *morphia*, is greatly superior to that of India, for which the great demand at present existing is factitious, and may therefore prove only temporary. The large consumption of the noxious drug in China, while both the cultivation and use of it in that country is strictly prohibited, was early taken advantage of by the East India Company, who, by stimulating the cultivation within their own territories and then monopolizing the sale of the produce, succeeded in deriving from it a large amount of revenue. The monopoly has since been abandoned, but only after providing an efficient substitute for it in the form of a fixed tax; and thus the British government in India exhibited itself in the disreputable position of fostering a species of cultivation the produce of which could only be disposed of by violating the laws of another country, and tempting its inhabitants to an indulgence known to be alike injurious to their health and to their morals. The recent treaty with China in removing the illegality of the opium traffic, will probably have the ultimate effect of suppres-

sing it altogether, since the Chinese, if once permitted, will soon be able to supply their own consumption. Meanwhile the Indian cultivation continues in full vigour, and over large tracts of the presidency of Bengal, particularly the districts of Patna and Benares, and throughout Malwa, or Central India, it forms one of the most important branches of husbandry. It seems more than questionable whether, independent of its other demerits, it ought not to be discouraged for the sake of the cultivators themselves. From the delicacy of the poppy plant, and the injuries which it may sustain from insects, storms of wind or hail, and deficiency as well as superfluity of moisture, the crop is one of the most precarious which can be raised, and hence is constantly either exceeding or mocking the hopes of the husbandman. His poverty induces him, often against his better judgment, to engage in the cultivation, not so much on its own account, as for the money which those who are ultimately to profit by the crop are ready to advance on the prospect of it, and he is thus too often led to exchange the habits of an industrious peasant for those of a gambling speculator. During the first ten years of the present century, the export of opium from India averaged only about 2,500 chests. The present export exceeds 50,000 chests, and yields government a free revenue of above three millions sterling. It is impossible to think of this enormous consumption without being horrified at the misery and crime which must follow in its train.

In the above account of Hindu agriculture, no mention has been made of one department which we are accustomed to regard as essential to every good system of husbandry. This department is the breeding and grazing of cattle, both for the shambles and the dairy. The former object, of course, is not to be thought of, since the Hindus regard it as an abomination; and the latter, notwithstanding the great use they make of milk, and the *ghee* or clarified butter prepared from it, is so little understood and attended to that it is impossible to say one word in praise of it. By this repudiation of stall-feeding and neglect of the dairy the Hindus are rendered incapable of availing themselves of the alternate system of husbandry, by which grain and grass are grown in succession, and a regular rotation of the crops least exhausting to the soil is established. Some

writers, indeed, assert that the Hindus are aware of the benefit of a rotation, and to some extent practise it; but we suspect that they have allowed themselves to be misled by the name, and when they speak of a rotation, mean only that bastard form of it which consists in raising several crops simultaneously or successively from the same field in the course of a single year. A rotation, properly so called, extends over a series of years, and arranges the crops in the order which both experience and theory suggest as the best calculated to obtain the largest amount of produce at the least expense. It is very questionable if the solution of any such problem has been attempted in India. On this subject the authority of Mr. Colebrooke should be conclusive. In his *Remarks on the Husbandry and Internal Commerce of Bengal*, he observes (p.39):—"The rotation of crops, which engages so much the attention of enlightened cultivators in Europe, and on which principally rests the success of a well-conducted husbandry, is not understood in India. A course extending beyond the year has never been dreamed of by a Bengal farmer." He goes still farther, and we rather think too far, when he adds that even "in the succession of crops within the year he is guided by no choice of an article adapted to restore the fertility of the land impoverished by a former crop." On the whole, there cannot be much error in holding that, though from time immemorial the Hindus have had an agriculture, and display a considerable degree of expertness in managing its details, and adapting them to the peculiar circumstances of soil and climate, they have never reduced it to a regular system, or learned to conduct it on scientific principles. In some important departments it is consequently still in its infancy, and requires many improvements which, as the natives themselves are not likely to introduce them, deserve—and even in a pecuniary point of view, by leading to an increase of revenue, would well repay—the interference of government. Without any direct exercise of authority, which might excite distrust or offend native prejudice, it surely might be possible to show how, by means of better-contrived implements, and an improved breed of cattle to work them, the labours of the field may be much more effectually performed; and how, by increasing the size and lengthening the leases of farms, a race of tenants might

be created, who, instead of being doomed, as the mere serfs of money-lenders, to maintain a constant struggle with poverty and wretchedness, would acquire an interest in the prosperity of their country, and thus become the best security for the stability of its government.

On the subject of the manufactures and commerce of the Hindus it will not be necessary to dwell long, as the latter, in consequence of a superstitious dislike to distant voyages, has never acquired much importance, and the former, after attaining, at least in one department, an excellence which has not been surpassed, has been all but extinguished by a competition not conducted on equitable terms. Before the manufactures of Great Britain had made the rapid strides which have astonished the world, the East India Company were large importers of the cottons and silks of India, and continued, even after a heavy duty was imposed upon them, to find in this branch of trade very lucrative returns. Year after year, however, home manufactures, which were not only untaxed but fostered by bounties, gained upon those which, besides being heavily taxed, were burdened with the expenses of a difficult inland transit and a sea voyage of nearly ten thousand miles. The issue of this struggle could not be doubtful; and ultimately, with the exception of some articles of luxury which British skill had not succeeded in equalling, the import of textile fabrics from the East entirely ceased. Nor was this all; not satisfied with excluding Indian cottons from his own market, first by loading them with oppressive duties, and afterwards by underselling them, the British manufacturer assumed the offensive, and appeared as seller in the markets of India. After a struggle his ascendancy was completely established, and the natives themselves have voluntarily become his best customers. In 1852 the imports into the British territories in the East Indies were—of plain and dyed cotton cloths 352,637,240 yards, and of cotton-twist and yarn 24,802,091 lbs, valued respectively at £4,242,272 and £1,070,068, or together at £5,312,340. The total declared value of cottons exported from the United Kingdom to all countries in the same year was £29,878,087, and consequently nearly a sixth of the whole export is taken by India. The change from exporters of cottons to that of importers to an enormous

amount, cannot have been effected without something equivalent to a vast social revolution among the Hindus, and accordingly it is notorious that many of their most celebrated seats of the cotton manufacture have undergone a great and rapid decay. Still, from the great difference between the quantity of cotton raised in India, and the comparatively small quantity exported from it, and still more from the quantity of cotton yarn which is either hand spun by the natives, or, as the above figures show, imported, it is plain that no inconsiderable part of the population must still be wholly or partially employed in weaving. The early introduction of the art into India, and the extent to which it was practised as a domestic employment, are attested by numerous passages of the *Vedas*. Thus we find it familiarly referred to in the way of proverb or illustration, as when an individual exclaims, "Cares consume me as a rat gnaws a weaver's thread," or when it is said that "Day and night, like two famous female weavers, interweave the extended thread." The antiquity of the art, however, is not so remarkable as the perfection to which it was carried by means apparently inadequate. The spinning-wheel, from which, from the rudeness of its structure, only the coarsest threads might be anticipated, produces them as fine as those of the gossamer; and the loom which seems even less fitted for the performance of any delicate operation, weaves the threads thus spun into a fabric of such aerial texture, that the Hindus themselves have designated it, without much extravagance of hyperbole, "as woven air." In the weaving of silk, similar excellence is displayed. This perfection of workmanship, by the use of a few simple instruments, is in fact the greatest achievement of the Hindus, and is strikingly exemplified in various other articles of manufacture, as trinkets, cabinet-work, and cutlery. The excellence of the last is perhaps more owing to the superiority of the steel known by the name of *wootz*, than to the skill of the workman; but, in other instances, it is impossible not to admire the wondrous dexterity which is displayed when the carpenter, for instance, seated awkwardly on the floor, and provided only with five tools—a hatchet, hammer, saw, gimblet, and knife—produces not only elegant furniture, but "the prettiest boxes of sandal-wood, inlaid with

steel and ivory, in the most delicate and elegant patterns."¹ Many other trades furnish equally remarkable instances of dexterity; but, for the purpose of illustrating mechanic skill, enough has been said. Partly from the peculiar frame of their society, and partly from their want of enterprise, the Hindus are not likely ever to form any of those great factories and manufacturing establishments which, combined with the remarkable cheapness of labour, might enable them to regain the position they have lost, and once more compete successfully with their European rivals. The cultivation of the soil, and the production of the articles for which their soil and climate are so admirably adapted, must henceforth be their chief resource; and in the development of these, seeing that British capital and enterprise have ruined their staple manufacture, they are certainly entitled to expect from the British government better encouragement than has yet been given them.

The internal resources of India being sufficient to supply its inhabitants with almost every article of necessity, comfort, and luxury, there was little to induce them to engage in foreign commerce. It would seem, however, that as early as the time of the *Rig Veda* they had heard of voyages made in waters where no land could be seen, and were acquainted with merchants whose ships were said, doubtless by a figure of speech, "to crowd the ocean." It is probable, however, that these were not native but foreign merchants; though it is scarcely to be presumed that the Hindus did not to some extent share in the traffic carried on in the commodities of their own country. Indeed, sufficient evidence of their having early engaged in foreign trade is furnished by the settlements which they are known to have established on the island of Java. We also learn from the Portuguese accounts of their early voyages to the East, that, after doubling the Cape of Good Hope, they fell in with Indian vessels trading to Africa from the coasts of Malabar and Gujarat. At the same time, where it was practicable, land transport was preferred, and an extensive trade with foreign countries was carried on by means of caravans. What the principal articles of traffic were can only be conjectured, but as the Greek word for ivory and elephant, as well as the Hebrew names

¹ Von Orlich's *Travels in India*, vol. i, p. 35.

employed to designate the apes and peacocks, and other items of the cargoes which King Hiram procured for Solomon, are of Sanskrit origin, it has been plausibly maintained that the country from which they were brought was India. A passage in the *Institutes of Manu*, which refers to "men well acquainted with sea voyages or journeys by land," seems to intimate that the ocean had at the date of their compilation become to the Hindus a well-known thoroughfare; but it has been maintained, on the other hand, that the sea voyages referred to were only to the different ports of India itself, and at the utmost amounted not to a foreign but only to a coasting trade. This opinion is strengthened by the fact that the Hindus, so far from being a seafaring people, have still an instinctive and superstitious dread of the ocean, and that though not a few of their wealthy merchants are shipowners, the vessels belonging to them are usually commanded by European officers.

6

Manners of the Hindus

MUCH OF what properly belongs to this head has been incidentally introduced in previous chapters, especially those which treat of religion and laws, and it is therefore only necessary here to refer to a few detached particulars. And first of all, it is important to remember that under the general name of Hindus is included a vast population, probably belonging to distinct races, and at all events presenting numerous diversities, both physical and mental. From this fact it necessarily follows, that almost every general observation respecting them must be received with some modification. The virtues or vices which may prevail to such an extent in certain districts as to form characteristic features, may be unknown or repudiated in others, and thus praise and censure indiscriminately applied may produce most erroneous impressions. This, however, is a danger against which it is very difficult to guard, since it would be impossible, without exceeding all due bounds, to enumerate all the exceptions by which every general statements would require to be modified in order to be rendered strictly accurate. It must suffice, then, to put the reader on his guard, by reminding him that in treating of the manners of the Hindus, nothing more is attempted than to select those which, whether exhibited by the great mass or only by particular sections of the population, present the greatest contrast to our own manners, and may hence be presumed to be the best fitted at once to gratify curiosity and convey useful instruction.

The best physical type of the Hindu is found in the upper basin of the Ganges. Here he is of tall stature, well formed, and of a complexion which, though tanned, may still be designated as fair. Here also he excels in those qualities which

seem to be in a great measure the result of physical constitution, and is of a bold, manly spirit. Occupying the tracts in which his race are understood to have fixed their earliest settlement, he may probably owe part of his superiority to his greater purity of descent from the original stock; but a more adequate cause of it may be found in the possession of a climate better fitted to develop the human frame, and in the intimate relations into which he was early brought with conquerors from the West. By these his martial spirit, even while it failed to secure his independence, was more stimulated than crushed, and he was made acquainted with a civilization which, however imperfect, was in several respects superior to his own. Thus, partly from natural and partly from artificial causes, the Hindu of the north-western provinces furnishes the most favourable specimen of his race. On descending from the upper to the lower basin of the Ganges, or the immense plain of Bengal proper, a striking contrast is observed. The Bengali, though undoubtedly belonging to the same original stock, looks as if he had been dwarfed. His stature is diminutive and slender, his complexion of a darker hue, and his whole appearance effeminate. As if conscious that in him a dignified and manly bearing would be altogether out of place, he seems to confess by his timidity that he stands in need of a protector, and by his insinuating manners that he is ready to make any sacrifice of independence that may be necessary to procure one. His features, perhaps even more regular than those of his more northern countryman, are of a thoughtful, intellectual cast, but indicate the possession of faculties more subtle than vigorous, and a disposition in which pliancy and obsequiousness are substituted for sterner and better qualities. The Hindu of the Deccan varies much in different localities, sometimes approaching the higher, but more frequently degenerating into the lower physical type, without compensating for its defects, like the Bengali, by a large development of mental subtlety.

The three great divisions of Hindu population just mentioned are distinguished by other differences than those of physical form. In the north, the principal food is unleavened wheaten bread—in Bengal, rice—and in the Deccan, at least when rice cannot be easily cultivated, a variety of pulse and inferior

grains, among which ragi holds a prominent place. In the north, again, the use of the turban, and of a dress resembling that of the Muhammedans, seems to separate the inhabitants from the great body of their Hindu countrymen, who, leaving the rest of the body uncovered, think it sufficient for comfort and decency to wrap one scarf round the body, and throw another over the shoulders. The ordinary dwellings of all the divisions are arranged nearly upon the same plan, and afford very indifferently different accommodation. Each dwelling contains, for the most part, only a single apartment, with the addition, perhaps, of a shed for cooking, and when it is intended to be used as a shop, of another shed open to the front for the exhibition of the wares. In general, the only aperture for light and air is the entrance, which is seldom provided with a door, and is only partially closed by means of a kind of hurdle. The furniture is of the most meagre description. A few mats and hurdles supply the place of beds and bedsteads, and a few paltry utensils, partly of brass, but mostly of earthenware, answer all other domestic purposes. This description of course applies only to the great body of the lower classes; but it is rather singular that in many parts of the country, where an individual possessed of some means seeks to enlarge his accommodation, instead of building a larger and more commodious house, he only builds one or more additional cottages, each consisting as before of a single apartment, and having a separate entrance. There being thus no internal communication, the different apartments, though occupied by the same family, cannot be reached by the inmates without passing into the open air. The inconveniences of this mode of building are, however, too apparent to allow it to be general; and the Hindu whose means enable him to possess something better than a single hut, usually accomplishes his object in the same way as in other countries, by having recourse to a larger, loftier, and more substantial erection. Though the plan of the ordinary dwellings is very similar, in respect of accommodation, in all parts of the country, the materials used in their construction, and the forms given to them are different. In the north the walls are formed of clay or unburned bricks, and the pent roofs are covered with tiles. In the Deccan, where stone is more abundant, it is much employed even in the humblest dwellings, which

thus are substantially built, but display little taste, having flat roofs, which are not seen, and in consequence cause every house to look as if it were an uncovered ruin. In the more southern districts of the peninsula the heaviness of this mode of building is relieved, and an appearance of neatness and cleanness imparted, by the practice of painting the walls externally in alternate broad and vertical belts of white and red. The Bengal cottage has only cane walls and a thatched roof. It is thus the flimsiest of all, and being formed throughout of combustible materials, seldom escapes from being sooner or later destroyed by fire. Still, with all its defects, it is, in external appearance, the most tastefully constructed cottage in India, and has so far captivated the fancy of resident Europeans that its name of *banggolo*, said to have been given to it from its being peculiar to Bengal, has by them been corrupted into *bungalow*, and applied indiscriminately to all their buildings in the cottage style.

The great body of the Hindu population has always been agricultural. Even when manufactures were flourishing, many of the weavers divided their time between the loom and the plough; and now that the foreign demand for the product of the former has in a great measure ceased, a larger proportion of the population than formerly must have become entirely dependent on the latter. The general appearance of the country, however, does not at first sight seem reconcilable with this conclusion. On whatever side the traveller turns his eye he looks in vain for farm homesteads, and sees only villages and towns. His natural inference is that the population must be thus congregated into masses, from being occupied with trades and other industrial labours, which are best carried on in communities of some extent. This inference, though natural, would be erroneous. The absence of rural dwellings indicates, not that the cultivators are few, but that it is more agreeable to their habits, and also more conducive to the security of their persons and property, to live grouped together in masses, rather than in families isolated from each other, and resident on the lands which they cultivate. This mode of living at some distance from the scene of their daily labours must be attended with many inconveniences, of which not the least serious is the

time that must be consumed in passing to and fro with the cattle and the implements of labour, in carting out manure, and bringing home the crops. On the other hand, both in the very early ages, when it must have been originally adopted, and during the periods of disturbance which have ever since been breaking out at comparatively brief intervals, this system presents advantages which more than compensate for its inconveniences, and it has accordingly proved the most durable of all Hindu institutions.

The villages thus occupied are of various descriptions. In the north they stand in open ground, and are built in close compact groups; in Bengal, on the contrary, they are not placed in juxtaposition, but scattered through woods of bamboos and palms. In some localities they are walled, so as to be capable of resisting any sudden inroad, and occasionally provided with still more effectual means of defence; in others they are open, or only inclosed with a fence sufficient to keep in cattle. All of them are provided with a bazaar, in which the ordinary articles of village consumption are sold; and most of them with one or more temples, and a *choultry* or shed, in which strangers are lodged. This choultry sometimes serves as a town-house, though all kinds of public business are usually transacted in the open air beneath some shady trees. Each village possesses many of the powers of self-government, and has a regular gradation of officers for the superintendence of its affairs. First in order is the headman, designated in the Deccan and in the west and centre of Hindustan by the name of *patel*, and in Bengal by that of *mandal*. Though regarded as an officer of government, and usually appointed by it, the selection is made from some family which claims it as an hereditary right. Sometimes the villages are permitted to select the particular individual of the family—a privilege the more readily conceded to them, because a headman not enjoying their confidence would be incapable of performing the duties of his office. These are numerous, and include all parts of municipal authority. He settles with the government the whole amount of revenue for the whole land belonging to the village, apportions it among the inhabitants according to the extent and value of the lands occupied by them, regulates the supplies of water for irrigation,

settles disputes, apprehends offenders, &c. In the performance of these duties he is not left to his own judgment, but is expected to act in free consultation with the villagers, especially in all matters of public interest. In settling private disputes he usually avails himself of the aid of a *panchayat*, or a kind of jury, composed of individuals who act as his assessors when they are chosen by himself, and as arbitrators when they have been selected by mutual agreement among the parties. The office of headman, though it evidently requires special qualifications, is saleable. The temptations to a purchase are not merely the respectability and influence which the possession of it implies, but the emoluments which accompany it. These consist, in addition to the land which may be held by hereditary right, of a small pension from government, and a considerable amount exigible from the villagers in regular or casual fees. Subordinate to the headman are the accountant, who keeps the village accounts, and the village register (in which all lands and rights of lands, as well as their liabilities, are entered), acts as a notary in executing legal deeds and other documents, and is generally employed in all kinds of business, public and private, in which the use of the pen is required; the watchman, who has charge of the boundaries, the crops, and all matters of police, and in particular, when any property has been stolen, is bound to capture the thief, if within the limits of the village, or trace him beyond them; the priest, who usually acts also as teacher; the astrologer, who casts nativities and determines the days which are lucky and unlucky; the minstrel, who, besides reciting or composing verses, traces pedigrees, for the purpose both of determining the succession to property and the restrictions on intermarriage; the money-changer, who assays all the money received in payment, and acts also in the ordinary capacity of silversmith; the barber, carpenter, and various other tradesmen, who, instead of living by their handicrafts in the ordinary way, are recognized as public servants, and paid a fixed amount, either of money or produce, levied proportionably from all the inhabitants. A common fund is also levied for religious and charitable purposes, such as the giving of alms to religious mendicants, and for the expenses occasioned by the celebration of public festivities. Each village, thus complete within itself, is truly a republic in miniature.

Besides the headman and his leading assistants, who may be considered as the aristocracy of the village, there are others of the inhabitants to whom the possession of wealth gives distinction. These, instead of retaining the lands in their own possession, may let them out to tenants; other lands, too, belonging to the village in common, may be similarly occupied; and thus in a lower grade than those who, possessing hereditary shares of land in their own right, constitute the only proper proprietors of the village, are the actual occupants distinguished as permanent tenants, temporary tenants, labourers, and shopkeepers, the last being mere householders, who have no connection with land, and have become voluntary residents in the village in order to follow their calling. These distinctions are important, and imply differences of right. From overlooking these differences, and confounding all classes of tenants and occupants under the common name of *ryots*, grave errors and gross injustice have been committed.

The condition of the villagers generally is not prosperous. Here and there indications of wealth appear, and dwellings of two stories with a court-yard intimate that the lot of their possessors is superior to that of those who occupy the surrounding huts. It is not impossible, however, that the prosperity of the former may be one main cause of the poverty of the latter, and that the houses which rise thus ostentatiously may belong to money-lenders, who draw enormous profits by taking advantage of the necessities of their neighbours. Few of the tenants are able to pay their rent and procure the necessary means of subsistence, without borrowing money on the security of their growing crop. They thus become involved in debt, and either suffer from extortion, or endeavouring to resist it, are tempted to engage in litigation, which proves still more disastrous. Many are thus kept constantly in bondage, while others who may have managed to escape from it seldom profit so much by the bitter lesson taught them, as to be able long to avoid a recurrence of similar entanglements. From a kind of childish improvidence, the passing day only is attended to, and what ought to have been treasured up as a provision for the future, is too often squandered in gratifying the whim of the moment, or on some ostentatious extravagance in the celebration of a festival, or it may be, the performance of a funeral.

Still, it is undeniable that humble life in India nowhere appears to so much advantage as among its rural population. Its ordinary routine is thus described by Mr. Elphinstone:¹—"The husbandman rises with the earliest dawn, washes and says a prayer, then sets out with his cattle to his distant field. After an hour or two he eats some remnants of his yesterday's fare for breakfast, and goes on with his labour till noon, when his wife brings out his hot dinner; he eats it by a brook, or under a tree, talks and sleeps till two o'clock, while his cattle also feed and repose. From two till sunset he labours again; then drives his cattle home, feeds them, bathes, eats some supper, smokes, and spends the rest of the evening in amusement with his wife and children, or his neighbours."

Hindu towns differ little from those of other eastern countries. The houses, generally of brick or stone, are lofty, and being lighted only by a few small and high-placed windows, have no architectural merit. The streets, along which they are ranged in long lines, are narrow, and either badly paved with large uneven stones, or not paved at all. When the population is great, the thoroughfares are crowded, and the passenger, with difficulty and some degree of danger, makes his way among carriages drawn by oxen, palanquins, running footmen, busy traffickers, and idle loungers. The shops, consisting of the lower part of the house, left entirely open for the purpose, or merely of the verandah in front of it, make little display, as the most showy articles, if of great value, are not exposed, and cloths, shawls, and other stuffs are kept in bales. Each town has a surrounding district, of which it is the capital, and is under the charge of a government agent, whose jurisdiction extends to all matters of revenue and police. In exercising it, he has the aid of assistants, who are always more numerous than the work allotted them requires, and too often, instead of administering justice, lend themselves, for bribes, to the perversion of it. Among the inhabitants, bankers and merchants, the same individuals usually acting in both capacities, take the lead. Both in transactions with government, to which they make loans, on the security or assignment of revenue, and in ordinary dealings with individuals, they stipulate for enormous

¹ Elphinstone's *History of India*, p. 335.

profit, and though, instead of fully realizing it, they are often obliged to accept of a compromise, enough still remains to enable them to accumulate rapidly, and acquire immense wealth. Meanwhile their ordinary expenditure is seldom increased, and they continue to live frugally, except when a marriage or some other domestic festival calls for ostentatious display. On such occasions the sums expended are sometimes of almost fabulous amount. Occasionally the expenditure of the wealthy capitalist is more judicious, and the erection of some work of general utility transmits his name to posterity as a public benefactor. The lower classes in towns are inferior to those of the country, and seldom lead lives so simple and blameless as that above ascribed to the village husbandman. Surrounded by temptations which they have never been trained to resist, they soon become a prey to them, and give free indulgence to their passions. Still, there are forms of vice from which they are in a great measure exempt. Drunkenness is almost unknown among them, and the use of other stimulants, though practised, is seldom carried so far as to produce intoxication. Naturally submissive to authority, they are not easily provoked to resistance, even when it has become justifiable, and hence never proceed to breaches of the peace, unless on very extraordinary occasions. Their ignorance and credulity, no doubt, give great facilities to those who have an interest in imposing upon them and their childish fears and superstitions have often been worked upon by designing men to such an extent, as not only to tempt them into open resistance against regular authority, but to make them guilty of horrible atrocities. Mr. Elphinstone says, that "there is no set of people among the Hindus so depraved as the dregs of our great towns;" but it may be doubted if he would have continued to retain this opinion had he lived to be a witness of recent events. It must now be considered proved, that beneath the exterior mildness of the Hindu, a savage and vindictive temper too often lurks, and that at the very moment when he is making the strongest protestations of attachment and unalterable fidelity, he may be meditating treachery, murder, and every form of abominable wickedness.

Having taken a general survey of the Hindus as they appear congregated in masses, whether in villages or in towns, we may

now proceed to view them in their more private and domestic relations. The family arrangements of the Hindus present many remarkable peculiarities. One of these is the very early age at which the family relation is formed. Mere boys and girls, who probably had never met before, are brought together as man and wife, by no act of choice on their own parts, but merely by the arbitrary determination of their parents. Previous mutual attachment is, of course, impossible. The parents, influenced merely by family pride, or some equally selfish motive, cause the marriage to be celebrated with a pomp which taxes their means to the utmost, and perhaps involves them deeply in debt; and the young couple are left to commence married life under the most untoward circumstances. It is true, indeed, that the youth of the parties makes it very unlikely that the affections of either of them have been otherwise engaged, and hence there is no room for the kind of misery which is entailed when, in our own country, forced or ill-assorted marriages take place. The Hindu bride, in receiving a husband for better or for worse, without being consulted, only follows the custom of her country, and is unconscious of the injustice she sustains when the happiness of all her future life is thus sported with. If kindly treated by her husband, she soon becomes reconciled to her lot, and often repays his kindness by an ardour of attachment which errs only in excess. The misfortune is, that from the marked inequality of the parties, this kind treatment must be regarded as the exception rather than the rule. The wife of a Hindu is rather the slave than the companion of her husband. She must not sit with him at meals, but remain standing ready to obey his commands. However harsh his usage may be, patient endurance is her only remedy. The law, so far from affording any legal relief, expressly declares that no degree of worthlessness on his part can either dissolve the marriage, or justify her in refusing to yield him the utmost deference as her lord and master. It must not, however, be supposed that the marriage is indissoluble. On the contrary, when the husband wishes to be free, frivolous pretexts are sufficient, and the wife may either be unceremoniously turned adrift, or subjected to the cruel degradation of seeing herself supplanted. Polygamy being legalized, the husband may choose wife after wife till his caprice or voluptuousness is

satisfied, or indulge to an unlimited extent in illicit connections. It is impossible that, under such circumstances, any domestic virtue can flourish, or domestic happiness be enjoyed; and though many have been found ready to vouch that the evils which may be anticipated are not realized, there cannot be a doubt that the purity and peace of Hindu families are sadly marred by the jealousies of rival wives and the jarring interests of their rival families.

The degradation to which the Hindu wife is subjected is only part of a general system of treatment, adopted throughout India, towards all the female sex. Practically they are regarded as an inferior part of the creation. The birth of a son is hailed with delight, that of a daughter is not unfrequently received as a disappointment. At the proper period, most parents endeavour to give their sons some kind of elementary instruction, and hence reading, writing, and arithmetic are common attainments; daughters, on the contrary, are systematically excluded from them, on the barbarous principle, that knowledge in a woman is not only superfluous, but dangerous, inasmuch as it only puts her in possession of additional means of mischief. Under this idea it has even grown into a maxim, that an educated wife is unlucky. The consequence is, that even women who have received education are shy of owning it, and deem it necessary to protect their reputation by feigning ignorance. The degradation thus tyrannically inflicted on the female sex carries its punishment along with it, and all the more important domestic duties are imperfectly performed. Mothers, confined almost entirely to domestic drudgery, are unable to take an efficient part in the training of their offspring. The studied ignorance in which they have been brought up, leaves them destitute of the necessary qualifications; while the contemptuous treatment which they too often receive from the head of the family, weakens the authority which they ought to possess over its younger members. For a time nature may assert her rights, and give the mother the largest share in her children's affections; but the bad example set them will be sooner or later imitated, and they will cease to obey her commands on perceiving that she has no power to enforce them. A tyrannical father, a degraded mother, and ill-trained children, are thus the natural results and just punish-

ments of the barbarism which Hindus display in depriving woman of her proper place in the family. It may, indeed, happen that the tendency to produce these evils is not realized. Many husbands may have the good sense to disclaim the superiority which they might legally assert; others, without directly renouncing it, may yield to an influence which renders it inoperative; and cases will even occur where the supposed superiority is reversed, and the husband is obliged to be satisfied with something less than equality. The history of India furnishes many examples of Hindu women who, by the ascendancy obtained over their husbands or sons, have made themselves virtually the rulers of kingdoms; and it is not to be doubted that ordinary life furnishes numerous analogous cases, in which the wife, if not the actual head of the household, has at least her full share of authority. Still the general rule is unquestionable. Both by Hindu law and Hindu custom, woman is defrauded of her proper rights, and treated in every relation of life as if she were an inferior. When married, the inequality between her and her husband is marked, even though she should be his only wife, and it is almost needless to say how much this inequality and consequent maltreatment must be increased when polygamy introduces its abominations.

Before quitting this subject, it is necessary to mention, that among the Nairs on the coast of Malabar, a custom still more brutalizing than polygamy prevails. There marriage cannot be said to exist even in name, and the intercourse between the sexes is nearly as promiscuous as that of the brutes. Tipu Sultan did not inaccurately describe the nature and effects of this enormity when, in a proclamation addressed to the Nairs, ordering them to abandon it and "live like the rest of mankind," he said, "It is a practice with you for one woman to associate with ten men, and you leave your mothers and sisters unconstrained in their obscene practices, and are thence all born in adultery, and are more shameless in your connections than the beasts of the field."¹ Not unfrequently, by a form of marriage, the same woman becomes the common wife of a whole family of brothers, and even then is under no restraint in regard to other lovers, provided their rank be equal or superior to her own. Colonel Wilks, whose leanings

¹ Wilks, *Historical Sketches of the South of India*, vol. iii, p.4.

are decidedly Hindu, endeavours to qualify the common account "by the explanations of several highly enlightened correspondents, who have favoured the author with the result of their personal observations, after a long residence in Malabar, and who bear honourable testimony to the respectable conduct of the Nair ladies of Northern Malabar." This honourable testimony, however, does not amount to much, since it is accompanied with the admission of an "occasional prevalence of lax morals, and a tendency to various intercourse;" while it is not attempted to deny that in Southern Malabar the worst that has been said is completely substantiated. The account given by Colonel Wilks (vol. iii, p. 7) is as follows:—"The parties are betrothed in childhood, and united at the age of puberty; but if, after a short cohabitation, the lady disapproves the choice of her parents, she is at liberty to make her own, by accepting a cloth (a dress) from the man of her own selection, and declaring, in the presence of four witnesses, that she discards her husband, and accepts the donor of the cloth; and this she may repeat as often as the donor of a new cloth can be found." This attempt to give a veil to shameless profligacy is not successful. So little are the women accustomed to confine their favours to any single donor of the cloth, that the very idea of paternity is suppressed, and no child born is understood to have any certain father. The consequence is that the ordinary rules of succession cannot be observed. Hence we are told that "the natural marks of tenderness and affection to children are lavished by the men on nephews and nieces, and scarcely ever on reputed sons and daughters." While the latter are in all probability spurious, there cannot be any mistake as to the former, since the mother is always known. Succession, accordingly, takes place, not in the paternal, but the maternal line, and in order to secure something like continuity and purity of descent, the children of sisters are recognized as heirs. After contemplating a state of society so extraordinary and so revolting, one is startled at being assured by Colonel Wilks, that the "Nairs, or military class, are perhaps not exceeded by any nation on earth in a high spirit of independence and military honour."¹ Human nature is certainly full of contradictions, and the most opposite qualities are sometimes possessed by the same

¹ Wilks, *Historical Account of India*, vol. i, p. 470.

individual; but in such a monstrous state as that of the Nairs, even the inferior virtues designated by "a high spirit of independence and military honour," must be of a bastard description. In them this high spirit seems only to be another name for pride; and we are therefore inclined to correct the eulogy of Colonel Wilks by the more credible statements of Dr. Francis Buchanan when he says:¹—"Their chief delight is in arms, but they are more inclined to use them for assassination or surprise than in the open field." And again:—"A Nair was expected to cut down a Tiar or Mucria who presumed to defile him by touching his person; and a similar fate awaited a slave who did not turn out of the road as a Nair passed." It thus appears that the barbarism of the Nair was not confined to his family arrangements, but was conspicuous in all parts of his conduct. It has always been, and ever will be so. The degradation of the female sex may be regarded as the invariable indication of a state of society bordering on barbarism; and therefore, notwithstanding the high authority of Sir Thomas Munro, we cannot help thinking that he drew far too flattering a picture, when he described the treatment of the female sex in India as "full of confidence, respect, and delicacy," and committed himself to the still bolder asseveration, that "if civilization is to become an article of trade between the two countries, I am convinced that this country will gain by the import cargo." To show how ill this opinion accords with fact, it will be proper to notice other enormities caused or fostered by the place assigned to woman in the social arrangements of the Hindus.

We begin with female infanticide. In almost all nations, before the light of Christianity has dawned upon them, the sacrifice of children to some grim and bloody idol has prevailed. India has certainly not been an exception; but the infanticide to which we now refer is of a different, and it must be added, of a still more revolting description, since the demands of religion are not pleaded in defence of it, and the only justification offered is an alleged expediency, in compliance with which infants who would have been carefully nurtured if they had been males, no sooner see the light than they are barbarously

¹ Buchanan, *Journey from Madras, through Mysore, Canara, and Malabar*, vol. ii, p. 44.

murdered, merely because they happen to be females. This horrid crime, of which parents themselves were usually the actual, and always the consenting perpetrators, has, we trust, been extirpated within the limits of the British Indian empire, government having to its honour turned a deaf ear to all the precautions which selfish policy suggested, and put it down by main force, where its own authority was paramount, and by means of persuasion and legitimate influence, where it had to deal with independent native states. Strange to say, the practice of female infanticide prevailed, not among the mere dregs of the population, but among the Rajputs, who plume themselves on their chivalrous spirit, and are admitted on all hands to furnish the finest specimens of the Hindu race. For thus systematically stifling one of the strongest instincts of our nature, the Rajput had no excuse to offer but the anticipated difficulty of finding a husband for his daughter when she should become marriageable. By the absurd and tyrannical rules of caste she could not be married within her own tribe, nor without it in any tribe of inferior rank. While the field of choice was thus artificially limited, she could not be permitted to remain unmarried, because a family with an unmarried marriageable daughter in it was held to be disgraced. Even if a suitable husband could be found another serious difficulty remained. The expenditure of the father of the bride, when the marriage ceremony took place, behoved to be proportionate to the position which he held in society, or to which ambition inclined him to aspire, and he was thus tempted to make a display which bore hard upon his means, or perhaps involved him permanently in debt, since, in addition to the expense of the ceremony, a handsome dowry was always expected. Hence both pride and poverty being arrayed against daughters, proved an overmatch for all better feelings, and female infants no sooner saw the light than the hand of the murderer was upon them. A bath of milk sufficient for immersion, or a bit of opium fixed on the palate to be sucked, were the means usually employed. It is scarcely credible that this inhuman practice could become established, without calling in the aid of some religious sanction, and accordingly in some districts the murder was represented as a sacrifice acceptable to "the evil powers." In general,

however, the plea of expediency was found sufficient, and Colonel Walker, who stands distinguished among those who have contributed to the suppression of the crime, found nothing stronger in support of it than such a legend as the following:—

“The Jharighs,” he says, “relate that a powerful raja of their caste, who had a daughter of singular beauty and accomplishments, desired his *rajguru* or family priest to affiance her to a prince of rank and descent equal to her own. The *rajguru* travelled over many countries without discovering a chief possessed of the requisite qualities. In this dilemma the raja consulted the *rajguru*, and he advised him to avoid the disgrace which would attend the princess’s remaining unmarried by having recourse to the desperate expedient of putting his daughter to death. The raja was long averse to this expedient. The *rajguru* at length removed his scruples by consenting to load himself with the guilt, and to become in his own person responsible for all the consequences of the sin. Accordingly the princess was put to death, and female infanticide was from that time practised by the Jharighs.”

The first official notice of this horrid crime took place in 1789, when Jonathan Duncan, afterwards governor of Bombay, but then resident at Benares, wrote to Lord Cornwallis—“I am well assured, and it is, indeed, here generally believed (and being so, it is my duty not to keep such enormities, however sanctioned by usage, from the knowledge of the government) that it is no unfrequent practice among the tribe of Rajkumar to destroy their daughters, by causing the mothers to refuse them nurture.” Not satisfied with announcing and denouncing the atrocity, he lost no time in taking steps against it, and succeeded in obtaining from those of the tribe within the British frontier a formal renunciation of female infanticide, by their signature of the following singular document:—“Whereas it hath become known to the government of the Honourable East India Company, that we of the tribe of Rajkumar do not suffer our female children to live; and whereas this is a great crime, as mentioned in the *Brahma Bywant Purana*, where it is said that killing even a foetus is as criminal as killing a Brahmin; and that for killing a female or woman, the punishment is to suffer in the *naraka* or hell called *Kat Shutala*,

for as many years as there are hairs on the female's body, and that afterwards such person shall be born again, and successively become a leper, and afflicted with the *jakhima*; and whereas the British government, whose subjects we are, hold in detestation such murderous practices, and we do ourselves acknowledge that although customary among us they are highly sinful: we do therefore hereby agree not to commit any longer such detestable acts, and any among us who shall (which God forbid) be hereafter guilty thereof, or who shall not bring up and get our daughters married to the best of our abilities among those of our own caste, shall be expelled from our tribe, and shall neither eat nor keep society with us, besides suffering hereafter the punishments denounced in the above *Purana* and *Shastra*. We have therefore entered into this engagement."

Such an engagement, though certainly a step in the right direction, could not be very effective, and at all events could not be of any avail except in the tribe which had become bound by it. The subject, however, was lost sight of, and when again brought prominently into notice, owed it to the interference of Mr. Duncan. He had become governor of Bombay, and believing that the means he had employed for the suppression of infanticide when he was at Benares had proved successful, felt naturally desirous to use the higher influence which he now possessed in suppressing it among the Jharigahs of Kutch and Kathiawar. In this philanthropic work he found a zealous and able agent in Colonel, then Major Walker, who entered upon his task with sanguine expectations that the practice as a deed of darkness would not bear the light, and that the fear of exposure would of itself induce a voluntary and speedy abandonment of it. He soon found that in cherishing such a hope he only showed how little he had sounded the depths of human depravity, and was obliged to confess that "sentiments of nature and humanity have no influence with the Jharigah." When urged on the subject they had the effrontery to reply—"Pay our daughters' marriage portions and they shall live." Mr. Duncan was rather inclined to entertain this proposal, but the court of directors at once negatived it, justly inferring that the prospect of such a dower might tempt other tribes to acquire a title to it by the same atrocious means. Ultimately,

not without reluctance, and after much mercenary higgling, a document similar to that above given was signed.

It was mere delusion to imagine that, because such documents had been signed and regulations passed for the prevention and punishment of female infanticide, the unnatural crime was suppressed. From time to time new disclosures of the frightful extent to which it prevailed were brought to light, and it was proved by statistical returns, that partly by murder perpetrated at the time of birth, and partly by the still more cruel practice of allowing female infants to perish through neglect, the proportion of female to male children was a mere fraction of what it ought to have been according to the well-known law of births. According to that law the number of each sex born is nearly equal; whereas among the whole Jharigah population of Kathiawar, though exceeding 8,000, not more than sixty-three female children had been preserved in the course of ten years. On some of the largest estates only one, and on others containing more than 400 families, not one female child was found.

The iniquity was too shocking to be longer neglected; but in what way was it to be successfully encountered? It was the deed of a moment, done for the most part in Rajput forts, in the recesses of female chambers to which no access could be had. By what kind of evidence, then, could guilt be substantiated? It was proposed to employ hired informers, but it was feared that such a cure might prove worse than the disease; and one of the ablest of Indian statesmen, while admitting that "no effectual check can be imposed on this atrocious practice, so long as it is so congenial to the general feelings of the people, unless by employing hired agents," saw so many abuses in such a measure, as well as danger of disaffection from the intrusion to which it would lead "into the most private and domestic proceedings of the inferior castes (among whom alone infanticide prevails)" that he could only counsel patience. "We must therefore," he says, "be content to follow the footsteps of our predecessors (without attempting to go beyond them), in their most meritorious endeavours to discountenance this enormity; and we may safely flatter ourselves, that as the manners of the people become softened by a continuance of tranquillity and good order, they will gradually discontinue a practice which

is not more inconsistent with reason than repugnant to natural instinct." There is reason to suspect that if this advice had been acquiesced in, the enormity would never have been sensibly diminished. A softening of the manners of men systematically murdering their infant offspring, never could have been effected by such inadequate means as "a continuance of tranquillity and good order." The absence of these had not originated the abominable practice, and the presence of them had no direct tendency to abolish it. It is true that force could not be used, as the guiltiest of the Rajput tribes were not the subjects but the allies of the East India Company. This distinction, however, was technical rather than practical, and when the task of suppression was once undertaken in earnest many difficulties disappeared. As soon as the Rajput chiefs were made to understand that they must either renounce the practice, or be scouted by the Company as barbarians with whom they could hold no friendship, they became forward in offering promises and pledges, and not a few of them issued proclamations denouncing infanticide, and threatening it with punishment as a heinous crime. Something, however, was still wanting; and it is mortifying to think that these so-called chivalrous Rajputs were never recalled to feelings of humanity and natural affection till they found that their interests would not suffer by indulging them.

The first great triumph over infanticide was gained in Western India, mainly through the judicious and energetic measures carried out by Mr. J. P. Willoughby, after his appointment as political agent in Kathiawar. By obtaining an accurate census of the Jharigah population, to form a standard from which the progress made in future years in eradicating the evil might be calculated—by obliging the Jharigah chiefs, under a severe penalty, to furnish a half-yearly register of all marriages, births, and deaths within their districts—by issuing a proclamation enforcing the written obligation which had been given for the suppression of infanticide, and guaranteeing protection and reward to all who should inform against those who were guilty of it—by enjoining every father, on giving his daughter in marriage to a Jharigah chief, to stipulate in the contract that all the children born should be preserved—and by establishing an infanticide fund, out of which presents, pecuniary assistance

on the marriage of daughters, and other benefits are bestowed on chiefs who preserve their children, the crying iniquity has been successfully combated. To prove that government was no longer to be trifled with in regard to this matter, several offenders have been tried and convicted. One chief was fined 12,000 rupees, and another, besides being fined 3,000 rupees, was sentenced to a year's imprisonment. Thus, both the hope of reward and the dread of punishment have been brought to bear powerfully on this great cause of humanity. In the "Infanticide Report for Kathiawar," in 1849, it is stated, that "The proportion of female children to males in all the tribes is now so nearly equal, and the progressive increase of the female population so regular, that if the returns can be depended upon in other respects, there would appear to be every ground for believing that the practice of infanticide must have become almost entirely extinct in this province." From other quarters satisfactory results have been obtained. One monster crime, which, from the secrecy with which it was perpetrated, seemed destined to baffle all measures adopted for its suppression, has thus been grappled with, and if not wholly extirpated, been confined within comparatively narrow limits. At one time it carried on its murders by wholesale, and must annually have slain its hundreds, whereas now, if it ever finds a victim, it can only be by shrouding itself in the deepest darkness, and doing the horrid deed while trembling at the punishment with which it will certainly be visited if it be discovered. Here, then, is one point in which India has certainly been benefited by British ascendancy. Murder in the most revolting form which it could assume—murder committed by a parent on his own offspring at the very moment when nature was pleading most powerfully in its behalf—was systematically perpetrated throughout whole provinces, by a class of the population to which, from its chivalrous character, such a crime might have been supposed to be most abhorrent. This atrocious system of murder, though fostered by pride and rendered inveterate by custom, has been all but extirpated by British firmness and philanthropy. The fact should teach valuable lessons. It should both moderate the eulogies of those who see so much excellence in Hinduism

that they would have no objection to perpetuate it; and also encourage those who, aware of the enormities which it sanctions or overlooks, are labouring to effect its overthrow.

Another Hindu enormity, only less shocking than infanticide, and of which, as before, woman was the victim, is *suttee*, or the burning of widows on the funeral pile of their husbands. Happily, through the interference of our Indian government, it is an historical fact rather than an existing practice; but it formed so remarkable a feature in Hindu manners while it existed, and still excites so much interest, that some account of it is indispensable. The word *suttee* is a corruption of the Sanskrit *sati*, meaning wife or consort, and there is thus little difficulty in explaining how it came to be applied by way of eminence to the last and, as it had come to be considered, the most meritorious act of woman's life; but the origin of the practice itself is variously explained. According to one tradition, the wife of Siva, and according to another, the wives of Brahma, set the example; the wives of some great rajas imitated it, and the Brahmins, ever on the alert to turn every practice, however abominable, to profitable account, gave it the character of a religious act, by promising immediate bliss in heaven to those who performed it. In this way it became a vulgar belief that there was no mode in which a woman could so effectually honour the memory of her husband, and secure her own future felicity, as by refusing to survive him. This act of suicide receives no countenance either from the *Veda* or from the *Institutes of Manu*. On the contrary, there are passages in both in which the survivance of widows is evidently assumed, and in the latter work in particular the kind of life which they are to lead is distinctly prescribed. Still it cannot be denied that the practice of *sati* is of very ancient date, since an instance of it is distinctly described by Diodorus Siculus, who wrote before the Christian era. At a later period it began to figure in the *Puranas* as one of the most meritorious acts of devotion, and thus resting on the same authority as many of the other superstitions of the Hindus, undoubtedly formed an integral part of their religious creed. Though thus sanctioned, the practice of *sati* never became universal throughout India. It is said to have been

unknown south of the Krishna, and to have very rarely occurred in any other part of the Deccan. In the north-western provinces it was not uncommon, but its chosen seat was Bengal. Here, as if it meant at once to court the inspection and defy the censure of the British government, it was openly practised in the immediate vicinity of Calcutta.

Sati by burning is impracticable where, as with us, the bodies of the dead are committed to the grave. This mode of funeral is not unknown among Hindus. Men of the religious orders are buried in a sitting posture, cross-legged; and Professor Wilson has declared it to be "almost certain" that the ancient Hindus "did not burn but bury their dead." Hence *sati* was sometimes performed, not by burning the widow, but by burying her alive. In modern times, however, the body is usually disposed of by burning. A man supposed to be dying is placed in the open air on a bed of sacred grass, or, if near the Ganges, carried to its banks; often in the latter locality, if death does not immediately follow, the relatives becoming impatient, depart and leave the body unconsumed, to be carried down the stream; but in general more humanity and natural affection are displayed. The sufferer is soothed in his last moments by the recital of hymns and prayers. As soon as death takes place, the body, after being bathed, perfumed, and decked with flowers, is carried to the funeral pile and stretched upon it, carefully covered up in all parts except the face, which is painted with crimson powder. In the south of India the procession is accompanied by music; elsewhere the attendants only utter their grief in short exclamations. The pile, usually from four to five feet high, and composed of the most combustible materials, is lighted, after many ceremonies, by a relation. Clarified butter and scented oils thrown upon the flames increase their energy, and the whole process is soon over. In a case of *sati* the ceremonial was at once more minute and ostentatious. Its nature, and all the accompanying circumstances will be best understood from the following graphic description which Mr. Holwell has given of a *sati* of which he was an eye-witness at Cossimbazar, when Sir Francis Russell was chief of the Company's factory there, and Ali Vardi Khan was *Soubahdar* of Bengal.

"At five of the clock, on the morning of the 4th of February, 1742-43, died Ram Chand Pandit, of the Maratha tribe, aged

twenty-eight years; his widow (for he had but one wife), aged between seventeen and eighteen, as soon as he expired, disdainingly to wait the time allowed her for reflection, immediately declared to the Brahmins and witnesses present her resolution to burn. As the family was of no small consideration in Cossimbazar, and her relations left no argument to dissuade her from it, Lady Russell, with the tenderest humanity, sent her several messages to the same purpose; the infant state of her children (two girls and a boy, the eldest not four years of age), and the terrors and pain of the death she sought, were painted to her in the strongest and liveliest colouring. She was deaf to all. She gratefully thanked Lady Russell, and sent her word she had now nothing to live for, but recommended her children to her protection. When the torments of burning were urged *in terrorem* to her, she, with a resolved and calm countenance, put her finger into the fire, and held it there a considerable time; she then, with one hand, put fire in the palm of the other, sprinkled incense on it, and fumigated the Brahmins. The consideration of her children left destitute was again urged to her. She replied that 'He who made them would take care of them.' She was at last given to understand she would not be permitted to burn. This, for a short space, seemed to give her deep affliction; but soon recollecting herself, she told them death was in her power, and that if she was not allowed to burn, according to the principles of her caste, she would starve herself. Her friends, finding her thus peremptory and resolved, were obliged at last to assent. The body of the deceased was carried down to the water side early the following morning. The widow followed about ten o'clock, accompanied by three very principal Brahmins, her children, parents, and relations, and a numerous concourse of people. The order of leave for her burning did not arrive till after one o'clock, and it was then brought down by one of the *soubah's* own officers, who had orders to see that she burned voluntarily. The time they waited for the order was employed in praying with the Brahmins, and washing in the Ganges. As soon as it arrived, she retired, and stayed for the space of half an hour in the midst of her female relations, amongst whom was her mother. She then divested herself of her bracelets and other ornaments,

and tied them in a cloth which hung like an apron before her, and was conducted by her female relations to one corner of the pile. On the pile was an arched arbour, formed of dry sticks, boughs, and leaves, open only at one end to admit her entrance. In this the body of the deceased was deposited, his head at the end opposite the opening. At the corner of the pile to which she had been conducted, the Brahmins had made a small fire, round which she and the three Brahmins sat for some minutes. One of them gave into her hand a leaf of the bale-tree (the wood commonly consecrated to form part of the funeral pile), with sundry things on it, which she threw into the fire; one of the others gave her a second leaf, which she held over the flame, while he dropped three times some ghee on it, which fell and melted into the fire (these two operations were preparatory symbols of her approaching dissolution by fire); and whilst they were performing this, the third Brahmin read to her some portions of the *Aughtorrah Bhade*, and asked her some questions, to which she answered with a steady and serene countenance; but the noise was so great that we could not understand what she said, although we were within a yard of her. These over, she was led with great solemnity three times round the pile, the Brahmins reading before her; when she came the third time to the small fire, she stopped, took the rings off her toes and fingers, and put them to her other ornaments. Here she took a solemn, majestic leave of her children, parents, and relations; after which one of the Brahmins dipped a large wick of cotton in some ghee, and gave it ready lighted into her hand, and led her to the open side of the arbour. There all the Brahmins fell at her feet. After she had blessed them, they retired weeping. By two steps she ascended the pile, and entered the arbour. On her entrance she made a profound reverence at the feet of the deceased, and advanced and seated herself by his head. She looked, in silent meditation, on his face for the space of a minute, then set fire to the arbour in three places. Observing that she had set fire to leeward, and that the flames blew from her, instantly seeing her error she rose, set fire to windward, and resumed her station. Ensign Daniel, with his cane, separated the grass and leaves on the windward side, by which means we had a distinct view of her as she sat. With what dignity and

undaunted a countenance she set fire to the pile the last time, and assumed her seat, can only be conceived, for words cannot convey a just idea of her. The pile being of combustible materials, the supporters of the roof were presently consumed, and tumbled in upon her."

Another case in which equal resolution was shown, and the circumstances were in some respects still more affecting, is mentioned by Sir John Malcolm, in his account of Ahilya Bai, a Maratha princess, who was daughter-in-law to the founder of the Holkar family; and, after the death of her husband and son, ruled their dominions for thirty years—from 1765 to 1795—with the greatest ability and success. Beside the son, who had died insane, she had an only daughter, Muchta Bai, who was married, and had a son, an only child. Muchta Bai, after she had been rendered childless, by the death of her son, became a widow, and immediately declared her resolution to burn with the corpse of her husband. After stating the circumstances, Sir John Malcolm continues thus¹—"No efforts (short of coercion) that a mother and a sovereign could use were untried by the virtuous Ahilya Bai to dissuade her daughter from the fatal resolution. She humbled herself to the dust before her, and entreated her, as she revered her god, not to leave her desolate and alone upon earth. Muchta Bai, though affectionate, was calm and resolved. 'You are old, mother (she said), and a few years will end your pious life. My only child and husband are gone, and when you follow, life, I feel, will be insupportable; but the opportunity of terminating it with honour will then have passed.' Ahilya Bai, when she found all dissuasion unavailing, determined to witness the last dreadful scene. She walked in the procession, and stood near the pile, where she was supported by two Brahmins, who held her arms. Although obviously suffering great agony of mind, she remained tolerably firm till the first blaze of the flame made her lose all self-command; and while her shrieks increased the noise made by the exulting shouts of the immense multitude that stood around, she was seen to gnaw in anguish those hands she could not liberate from the persons by whom she was held. After some convulsive efforts, she so far recovered as to join in the ceremony of

¹ Malcolm's *Central India*, vol. i, pp. 190-91.

bathing in the Narbudda, when the bodies were consumed. She then retired to her palace, where for three days, having taken hardly any sustenance, she remained so absorbed in grief that she never uttered a word. When recovered from this state, she seemed to find consolation in building a beautiful monument to the memory of those she lamented."

In the above two cases there can be no doubt that the immolation was voluntary. The unhappy women, deluded into the belief that they could not perform a more meritorious act, courted death, and met it, without shrinking, in its most terrific form. This, according to ordinary ideas, was heroism, though, in strict propriety, there cannot be true heroism where the object aimed at is delusive, and the sacrifice made to obtain it is truly a crime. It is difficult, therefore, to admit the justice of the comparison made by Mr. Kaye¹, when he says that "No martyr, in the grand old times of apostolic Christianity, died with a nobler fortitude, than often did these unhappy women, under the curse of a degrading superstition;" or to sympathize with the indignation of Colonel Wilks when he asks²—"What judgment should we pronounce on the Hindu, who (if our institutions admitted the parallel) should *forcibly* pretend to stand between a Christian and the hope of eternal salvation? And shall we not hold him to be a driveller in politics and morals, a fanatic in religion, and a pretender in humanity, who would *forcibly* wrest this hope from the Hindu widow?" Mr. Holwell uses language which is, if possible, still more extravagant; and after insisting that widows who destroy themselves by *sati*, "act upon heroic as well as upon rational and pious principles," and have their ideas "raised to a soothing degree of dignity befitting angelic beings," appeals to the "natural goodness of heart, generosity, and candour" of his "fair country-women," in the confident expectation "that they will in future look on these, their Gentoo sisters of the creation, in a more favourable and consistent light than probably they have hitherto done; and not deem that action an infatuation which results from principle." In short, Mr. Holwell seems to insinuate that his "fair country-women," so far from condemning or

¹ Kaye, *Administration of the East India Company*, p. 524.

² Wilks, *Historical Sketches*, vol. i, p. 499.

deploring *satism*, might do worse than put it in practice. It was absurd to speak thus, even on the assumption that the self-immolation was always deliberate and voluntary; but the general eulogy becomes monstrous when it is considered that it frequently took place under circumstances which made it murder. Even in the above cases the active part taken by the Brahmins, who ought to have known that their own so-called sacred books gave no sanction to their conduct, and the exulting shouts of the populace during a scene which ought, at all events, to have filled them with pity, and awed them into silence, afford strong ground for suspicion; and it has been ascertained that in numerous other cases the most iniquitous means were employed to gain or force consent. Often by the use of opium the woman was kept in a state of stupor or intoxication by relations desirous to relieve themselves from the burden of her future maintenance, or seize upon the succession to her property. The consent to burn was thus extorted from her when she had been rendered incapable of acting rationally. Not unfrequently, too, when awakened to the dreadful reality by being brought to the pile, she not only hesitated, but endeavoured to escape; screaming for mercy, she was thrust into the flames by those about her, and violently held down, while the noise of drums and shouting multitudes drowned her cries.

The perpetration of murder under the form of *sati* was so well known, that under the Muhammedan government, though the burning of widows was not absolutely prohibited, restrictions were imposed upon it, and it could not take place till a written permission, presumed not to be granted without due inquiry, was obtained. The exaction of a fee for this permission was not unreasonable, but unfortunately, from the rapacity of the Muhammedan officials, the temptation offered by the fee was seldom resisted. In practice the payment of the money superseded the inquiry which ought to have preceded it, and the permission followed almost as a matter of course. Such was the state of the law when the East India Company obtained the grant of the dewani. For many years no change was attempted, or rather the subject was in a great measure overlooked, and the prohibition was enforced with

even more laxity than in Muhammedan times. Meanwhile the practice had never been expressly legalized, and it remained doubtful in what light *sati* was viewed by the government. In an evil hour it was resolved to clear up this doubt, and a circular was issued, specifying the cases in which it would be held to be illegal, and punished as a crime. The inference was too obvious not to be soon drawn. If only certain special cases were prohibited, all others must by necessary implication be permitted. Under this injudicious sanction *sati* increased. In 1815, the reported cases from Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa were 378. In 1819, those reported for Calcutta alone amounted to 421, and those for Bengal to 650. The fact was at once astounding and humiliating, and public feeling, thoroughly awakened by the exposure which had been made, was no longer to be satisfied without the application of some stringent remedy. It was deemed necessary, however, to use caution. Some Europeans had, during a long residence in India, become, as Sir James Mackintosh expressed it, *brahminized*, and like Mr. Holwell hung, as it were, in a trembling balance, unable to decide between Christianity and Hinduism, and therefore not inclined to go further than to admit that each might be best for the countries which had adopted them. If the Hindu widow thought she could gain eternal life by burning herself with her husband's corpse, by all means let her have her own way. To prevent her by force would be intolerant and cruel. Others, unable to carry absurdity so far, did not propose the continuance of *sati* as a benefit to the widow, but feared that by consenting to the abolition of it they might do serious damage to themselves, and to all who like them had a serious stake in Indian revenue. The women might perhaps not be displeased at the abolition of a practice which doomed them in a certain event to a violent and excruciating death, but what would the Brahmins say, and how would those men feel who expected by burning the widow to enrich themselves by her property, or at all events escape from the burden of maintaining her?

Alarmed at these and similar bugbears, the court of directors were afraid to give explicit orders on the subject, and though decidedly in favour of the abolition, shrunk from the responsibility of pronouncing for it. Governors-general could not

reasonably be expected to be more resolute, and one of them, in 1827, when the subject was keenly agitated, returned to the stale advice which had been given in 1821 on the subject of infanticide, "I must frankly confess, though at the risk of being considered insensible to the enormity of the evil, that I am inclined to recommend our trusting to the progress now making in the diffusion of knowledge among the natives, for the gradual suppression of this detestable superstition. I cannot believe that the burning or burying alive of widows will long survive the advancement which every year brings with it in useful and rational learning." Had this opinion been acquiesced in, Hindu widows would have waited long for relief from a crying iniquity; but the next governor-general was animated by a more energetic spirit, and a regulation was issued, "declaring the practice of *sati*, or of burning or burying alive the widows of Hindus, illegal, and punishable by the criminal courts" throughout British India. As might have been anticipated, the regulation produced a strong sensation; and those who had prophesied mischief thought they were on the eve of seeing it realized, when a number of natives at Calcutta formed themselves into a society for restoring *sati*, described by them as a sacred rite which had been continued millions of years under the four successive *yugas*. It proved, however, only an expiring effort, and was moreover counteracted by an address from a body of natives far surpassing the others, if not in wealth at least in intelligence, cordially approving of the suppression of *sati*, and declaring that it formed no part of their ancient and genuine religious system. The native states still remained to be dealt with, and as nothing stronger than persuasion and influence could be used, the process of suppression was retarded by many obstacles. In these states proclamations have been issued condemnatory of *sati*, and steps more or less active have been taken to suppress it. It were too sanguine to believe that they have always been effectual; it may even be questioned whether the princes who issued them have in all cases been sincere. Still, much has been gained by impressing on *sati* the stamp of criminality. It cannot now be practised in the face of the sun, amid crowds of admiring spectators, nor be extolled by Hinduized Europeans as an act done "upon heroic as well

as upon rational and pious principles," but must shun the light as a deed of darkness—a deed which when voluntary is mere suicide, and when compulsory is murder.

A third practice of a very singular and atrocious character—*Thuggi*—may here be mentioned, though, while it prevailed, it was not confined to Hindus, but common both to them and to Muhammedans. Indeed, according to the traditions of the *Thugs* themselves, they derived their origin from seven tribes who lived in the vicinity of Delhi, and were all of the Muhammedan faith; but in whatever way the change was produced, the *Koran* was laid aside, and all their legends, as well as the superstitions founded upon them, savoured decidedly of Hinduism. There cannot, therefore, be any great error in giving a brief account of them in a chapter of which the manners of Hindus is the special subject. Their patron goddess is Kali, the blood thirsty consort of Siva. According to the legend, Kali encountered a monstrous giant, every drop of whose blood as it fell became a destructive demon. The blood of each demon thus produced possessed the same property, and an enormous brood was generated, threatening the world with destruction. The evil would have been without remedy—for the more they were slain the more they multiplied—had not Kali fallen upon the notable device of creating two men, and giving them handkerchiefs or waistbands with which they were able to strangle the demons. As by this process not a drop of blood was shed, the race of demons, which could only be propagated by blood, was extinguished. The instruments of strangulation became the property of the men who had used them so successfully; and to make this gift of value, the goddess authorized them and their descendants to make strangulation their trade.

In accordance with this strange legend, the *Thugs* became hereditary murderers, and spread throughout Central India and into part of the Deccan. Though formed into fraternities by initiatory rites, and able to recognize each other by the use of particular signs, they lived as the ordinary inhabitants of the country, following the peaceful occupations of agriculture or trade. At the same time they had spies in all quarters, and were constantly on the outlook to entrap unwary travellers. When an expedition was resolved on, they quitted their homes, in bands

more or less numerous, and, concealing their true character by various disguises, fell in, as if by accident, with the persons whom they had previously marked out for their victims. Being adepts in the art of lulling suspicion and winning confidence, they had seldom much difficulty in finding a favourable opportunity for effecting their purpose. On a sudden a strip of cloth or an unfolded turban was thrown round the neck of the unsuspecting traveller, tightened, and held fast till he was suffocated. Every one of his companions was murdered in the same way, and to remove all evidence of the crime, the bodies, after being plundered of everything of value, were carefully buried out of sight. Many other precautions, to insure secrecy, were employed. Possessing the most extensive means of information, they endeavoured, as much as possible, to avoid the risk of detection, by murdering persons who they had learned were not likely to be much inquired after, or soon missed, or whose disappearance would probably be attributed to voluntary flight. A soldier on leave was a safe victim. His family, not expecting him, could not be surprised at his not arriving; and when the leave had expired, his continued absence from his regiment would perhaps be attributed to desertion. It is true that the whole plunder anticipated was only the small sum saved from his pay, and wrapped up in his waistband; but it was enough to tempt a *Thug*, and the poor soldier was never again heard of. In the same way, a servant intrusted with treasure was considered a safe victim, because, though he would certainly be soon missed and inquired after, the conclusion would probably be, when no trace of him could be discovered, that the money had tempted him to betray his trust and run off.

The *Thugs* were not like ordinary bands of robbers, who, having committed crimes against society, or broken loose from its restraints, were brought together perhaps by accident, and have no common tie except the love of plunder. They formed a regular confederacy of criminality, and though not all of one caste, considered themselves entitled, and even bound, to follow murder as their hereditary trade. The feeling of guilt, and its accompanying remorse, was eradicated from their minds; and, at all events, if it happened momentarily to arise, was easily suppressed by the conviction that they could not avoid their

destiny. With them, therefore, murder and robbery were not iniquities to be confessed and repented of, but achievements to be gloried in and merits to be rewarded. The more atrocious their deeds, the more approvingly did Kali smile upon them. The very name of religion was thus employed to give a sanction to *Thuggi*, and those who practised it were regular and zealous worshippers of their patron goddess, under one or other of her hideous and terrific forms. They held special feasts in her honour, and by making liberal offerings at her shrines, had little difficulty in bribing the connivance, and even purchasing the active co-operation of the priests who ministered at them. Before undertaking any expedition, they waited for some sign or omen which was thought to intimate that Kali approved of it; and when the atrocity was permitted, no time was lost in sending her an offering by the hand of the person who had thrown the fatal noose, and was therefore deemed to be for the time her special favourite. The greatest criminals have sometimes been known carefully to guard the purity of their own families, by keeping them in ignorance of the kind of life they were leading, or at least prohibiting them from becoming sharers in their crimes. Not so the *Thug*. His occupation had come to him by descent, and the son must do as the father had done before him. Accordingly, the domestic hearth of every *Thug* was a school of murder. The training commenced at the earliest possible period, and was continued without interruption till the course of education was completed. At first, the boy, kept aloof from the scene of action, was employed only as a scout. The next stage was to allow him to see the corpse of the victim, to handle it, and assist in burying it. By and by he accompanied the gangs, took part in the deceptions employed to insnare the traveller, and when the deed was done, was permitted to display his strength and resolution, by taking some subordinate part in it. Last of all, what had now become the great object of his ambition was attained, and he was intrusted with the application of the noose. Before he was thus recognized as a member of the fraternity, he received a formal initiation from some elder of the gang, who acted as his *guru* or spiritual guide. A kind of sacrament was administered, by giving the novice a species of coarse sugar, which was supposed to have changed

its natural properties by a transubstantiating consecration, and become an embodiment of Kali herself. Its efficacy was irresistible, and the recipient could no more contend against it than he could against fate. "Let any one once taste of that sugar," exclaimed one of them, "and he will be a *Thug*, though he know all the trades and have all the wealth in the world." "My father," said another, "made me taste of that fatal sugar, when I was yet a mere boy; and if I were to live a thousand years, I should never be able to follow any other trade."

The *Thugs*, besides gaining over priests and Brahmins to their interests, provided still more effectually for their escape from the hands of justice, by bribing the officers of government. In Western India especially, the subordinate chiefs and officials not only connived at their crimes, but regularly shared in their spoils. These often formed a considerable item in the revenue which they derived from their offices, and in order to obtain it, they even encouraged the *Thugs* to settle within their jurisdictions. The only stipulation was, that they should pay well for this protection, and not compromise their protectors by committing murders and depredations within the district. Provided they preyed at a distance, their return with the fruits of their atrocities was heartily welcomed by all classes. Bankers did not scruple to make advances on the security of the pillage which they knew could be obtained only by murder, and merchants regularly paid their visits to *Thug* villages at the period when the gangs, engaged in distant expeditions, were expected to return. All classes, from the highest to the lowest, were thus leagued together, and shared without remorse in the proceeds of heinous crimes. In such circumstances, the detection of the actual criminals was difficult, and their conviction all but impossible. Those who, from their connection with *Thugs*, best knew the facts, intentionally concealed them, while those who would otherwise have been willing witnesses, were intimidated by threats of vengeance. Extensive tracts of country were hence roamed over with comparative impunity, by bands of professed murderers; and it was not until British ascendancy was established, [that any effectual measures could be taken to suppress them. It is impossible, from the nature of the case, to form an accurate estimate of the number of persons who must have been

annually strangled. A native writer conjectures that it cannot have been less than 10,000. This seems almost too horrible to be credited, and yet well-authenticated facts will not allow us to assume a lower number. In the course of six years, during which our Indian government made strenuous exertions for the suppression of *Thuggi*, both within its own dominions and in native states, 2,000 *Thugs* were arrested and tried at Indore, Hyderabad, Saugar, and Jabalpur. Of these, no fewer than 1,500 were convicted and sentenced to death, transportation, or imprisonment. These formed only a portion of the whole fraternities, and there is, therefore, little extravagance in believing that they must have counted their victims by thousands. Happily, this other monster evil has also been successfully grappled with, and *Thuggi*, as a regularly organized fraternity of murderers, no longer exists.

Dacoity, another form of crime, strongly resembling *Thuggi*, and only less atrocious, inasmuch as simple robbery was contemplated, and murder was not perpetrated when robbery could be effected without it, has in like manner been all but extirpated. The Dacoits, like the *Thugs*, formed a regular fraternity, and belonged to certain castes, which practised robbery as their hereditary privilege or destiny. It may easily be supposed that in such a state of society as usually existed in India under its native princes, these castes were not allowed to make robbery a monopoly. Many robbers from other castes were accordingly associated with them; and the gangs, thus composed, being somewhat heterogeneous, were not so strict in their superstitious observances, nor so systematic in committing crime, as the *Thugs*. Still, however, there were regular tribes who considered themselves born to robbery, and regularly trained their children to the practice of it. In their preliminary arrangements, they proceeded very much in the same way as the *Thugs*. When, after a number of religious observances, they had satisfied themselves that the omens were favourable, they set out in gangs, under various disguises. Their principal weapon was the spear, the head of which they carried concealed about their persons, while they were able to carry the handle openly, by giving it the appearance of a walking-staff. The object of their attack was not a travelling party, but some house, or it might

be whole village, when it had been ascertained by previous inquiry that a rich spoil might be anticipated. On arriving near the locality, they separated for a time to avoid suspicion, and met again after night at some fixed place of rendezvous. At the appointed hour, usually at the dead of the night, they sallied forth, and suddenly appeared with flaming torches and glittering spears. Their measures were so well concerted that resistance was seldom possible, and the work of plunder went on without interruption. The utmost that the unhappy victims could attempt was concealment of property; but the only effect was to add bodily suffering to pecuniary loss, because the Dacoits were always ready, on the least suspicion of concealment, to employ any means, however violent, in order to extort disclosure. These midnight robberies, committed as it were in defiance of government, could not remain unknown; but from the connivance of officials who shared in the spoil, and the reluctance of witnesses, conviction could seldom be obtained. Ultimately, however, when by the establishment of British authority justice was more efficiently administered, Dacoity yielded to the same means of suppression as were used against *Thuggi*, and its robber castes were broken up and dispersed. Robbery itself will of course always exist to a greater or less degree in every state of society, and in India derives particular facilities from the number of lawless characters who wander over the country as mendicants and pilgrims; but even in India it no longer ventures to indulge in wholesale rapine and in wanton cruelty. Though Dacoity was understood to be sparing of bloodshed, it was at one period carried on with horrible barbarities. Torture of the most excruciating kind was frequently employed, and instances occurred where the victims who had been subjected to it were afterwards hewn to pieces, and suspended piecemeal as bloody trophies on the adjoining trees. Such atrocities serve to indicate the fearful cruelty which too often lurks in the heart of the Hindu, and may be expected to display itself whenever, from any cause, his bad passions are fully roused; but it is certainly one of the greatest triumphs of our Indian government, that under it these atrocities, which were once common events, are now of rare occurrence, and that in many districts which used to be regularly pillaged by gangs of Dacoits, life and property have been made perfectly secure.

Infanticide, *Sati*, *Thuggi*, and Dacoity, the four forms of heinous crime which have now been described, though never universal throughout India, prevailed to such an extent in many of its provinces, that it was impossible to pass them unnoticed while taking a survey of Hindu manners. Great injustice, indeed, would be done by hasty generalization, and yet it may, without any breach of charity, be concluded that the people among whom such crimes can take deep root, and be committed not only without remorse, but with some kind of religious sanction, are deficient in that moral sensitiveness which revolts at every outrage on humanity, and is quick to resent and punish it. Whether from natural temper or habit, cruelty in its most savage forms does not seem to be viewed by the Hindu with any great degree of abhorrence. When he cannot be charged as an actual participator in the crime, he speaks of it in a way which shows that he neither is indignant against him who commits it, nor feels much pity for him who suffers by it. The doctrine of fate, carried to its absurdest extreme, destroys all moral distinctions, and reconciles him to every abomination as soon as he gives it the name of destiny. With this for an excuse, the Dacoit robbed and the *Thug* murdered without any feeling of compunction. Human life, too, was regarded with comparative indifference, and the loss of it, therefore, did not seem an evil of any great magnitude. If extinguished by natural causes, there was little occasion for survivors to lament it; if taken away by violence, it was perhaps viewed as an expiation which some god had appointed, and thus the crime of the murder was palliated by the imagination of some other crime of which it was presumed to be the just punishment. Suicide was in the same way not only justified but deemed meritorious, and the wife who lost her husband was deluded into the belief that she could not survive him without dishonour. Hence *sati* was not only lauded as the noblest act of heroism, but even when submitted to with visible reluctance, or accomplished by open violence, was witnessed with delight by myriads of spectators. The deprivation of life assumed a still guiltier and more revolting form in female infanticide; but the transition to it from the other murders which custom or religion sanctioned was easily made, and the most chivalrous of Hindu tribes were habitual perpetrators of the

most diabolical crime of which the hand of man is capable. When all these things are considered it is difficult to resist the conclusion that whatever the Hindu may be externally, his character is not accurately described when gentleness is said to be its most distinguishing feature. When from any cause his passions have been inflamed, and he sees a safe opportunity of resenting real or imaginary wrongs, he has repeatedly shown that no savage can surpass him in perfidy and fiendish cruelty.

It would be unfair, however, to found an estimate of national character on occasional outbreaks. During times of revolution, when great crimes are committed in any country, it is not so much the particular inhabitants as human nature itself that is in fault. At such times all self-restraint ceases, and in the course of violence pursued, there is little difference between the most civilized and the most barbarous nations. The worst atrocities perpetrated by the natives of India have been paralleled in countries which boast of being at the head of European civilization. It is necessary, therefore, to look at the other side of the picture, and after contemplating some of the darker spots in the life of the Hindu, to see how he conducts himself at ordinary times, when no undue influence is brought to bear upon him.

Owing partly to physical temperament and the enervating influence of climate, Hindus are generally listless and indolent. There is nothing of which they are more sparing than bodily labour, and hence every kind of work is portioned out as if for the express purpose of employing the greatest possible number of hands, and of course leaving very little for each to do. Examples of this minute subdivision are seen in all kinds of trades and professions, and are rendered especially familiar to European residents, by the number of native servants whom they are obliged to maintain for the performance of household duties. Distinctions of caste, prohibiting one individual from taking any part in what is regarded as the hereditary occupation of another, are made the pretext; but there can be little doubt that many of these distinctions are carefully kept up merely because they are favourable to slothful indulgence. As a necessary consequence of this disinclination to endure fatigue, the wages earned by each barely supply the means of subsistence. Lavish expenditure is hence entirely out of the question, since it is only by the habitual

exercise of the most rigid economy that the Hindu labourer and his family can manage to live. In their case, therefore, frugality, being compulsory rather than voluntary, cannot rank high among the virtues; and yet credit is certainly due to the lower classes of Hindus for limiting their wants so as to make them proportionate to their circumstances. Instead of grumbling at their lot, or endeavouring to better it by dishonest means, they live contented in their humble huts, feeding scantily on coarse unleavened bread, with boiled vegetables, ghee or oil, and a few spices. Chewing of betel and smoking are their only luxuries, and drunkenness is of rare occurrence.

In the upper classes, where the means of indulgence are not limited by necessity, frugality is commonly practised from choice. The food is nearly the same, differing from that of the poorer classes only in the greater number of kinds of vegetables and spices, and in the cookery, in which asafoetida figures as a favourite ingredient, from giving to the richer dishes something of the flavour of flesh. On extraordinary occasions, however, the frugality usually practised is forgotten, and ostentatious entertainments are given. The apartments are then decked out in the gaudiest style, and the floor which, from the squatting posture of the guests, is the only dining table required, is decorated with patterns of flowers, formed by lively-coloured sorts of sand. When, on the approach of night, illumination becomes necessary, it is supplied by numerous attendants, who hold flaming torches in their hands, and keep them burning by pouring oil upon them from a kind of bottles with which they are provided for the purpose. Such entertainments would be considered incomplete without the introduction of *nautch* or singing and dancing girls, whose performances though of an insipid and monotonous character, furnish the most attractive of all popular amusements. One of the heaviest items of expenditure is the number of valuable presents distributed among the guests. It is very questionable whether, from all the expense thus incurred, either those who give or those who partake of the entertainment have much enjoyment in it. So much importance is attached to ceremony, that it is difficult, without giving serious offence, to assign to each guest the place to which his rank entitles him; and even when this has been successfully

accomplished, the rigid adherence to caste raises up so many obstacles to unconstrained intercourse, that social enjoyment is almost impossible.

On public festivals, when vast multitudes of all classes are brought together, a good idea of popular manners may be obtained. The misfortune is, that most of these festivals are more or less intimately connected with prevailing superstitions, and hence are seldom unaccompanied with exhibitions of a cruel and disgusting nature, such as have already been described in the chapter treating of religion. Apart from these exhibitions, which offend both the ear and the eye, the impression produced is decidedly favourable; and it is impossible to witness the happy looks and peaceable demeanour of the almost countless multitudes—their delight at the gaudy shows and processions—the keen relish with which they enter into the various amusements—and the total absence, not only of drunkenness, but of every appearance of riot and rudeness—without believing that they possess many good qualities, and if freed from sinister influences, would be simple-hearted, gentle, good-natured, and easily governed. As a specimen of the kind of festivals in which they delight, the Hoolee or Holi, as the most prominent, though by no means the least exceptionable, may be selected. Mr. Elphinstone, after referring to the sports “in which all descriptions of people eagerly join,” continues thus:—“Perhaps the chief of these is the Holi, a festival in honour of the spring, at which the common people, especially the boys, dance round fires, sing licentious and satirical songs, and give vent to all sorts of ribaldry against their superiors, by whom it is always taken in good part. The great sport of the occasion, however, consists in sprinkling each other with a yellow liquid, and throwing a crimson powder over each other’s persons. The liquid is also squirted through syringes, and the powder is sometimes made up in large balls covered with isinglass, which break as soon as they come in contact with the body. All ranks engage in this sport with enthusiasm, and get more and more into the spirit of the contest, till all parties are completely drenched with the liquid, and so covered with the red powder that they can scarcely be recognized. A grave prime minister will invite a foreign ambassador to play the Holi at his house, and will take his share in

the most riotous parts of it with the ardour of a schoolboy."¹ This description is undoubtedly accurate, so far as it goes; but to make it complete, it ought to be added, that it too frequently presents grosser features than any which Mr. Elphinstone has introduced into his picture, and that in addition to licentious songs there is much licentious practice. Drunkenness, though not an habitual Hindu vice, begins to show itself for some days before the festival commences, and is more or less prevalent during its continuance. Bishop Heber says² that, "during all the time of the Holi, drunkenness is common among the Hindus;" and in another passage (vol. ii, p. 66), thus alludes to a still more disgusting practice:—"I had seen very few drunken men in India before; but the time of Holi is now coming on, which is the Hindu carnival, and in which the people of Central India more particularly indulge in all kinds of riot and festivity. The sepoys of my guard have begun to assail the women whom they pass on their march, with singing and indecent language—a thing seldom practised at other times."

Some account has already been given of the domestic arrangements of the Hindus, and it has been seen how injuriously the inferior position assigned to the wife, and the introduction of rival families by the sanction given to polygamy, must operate. It is alleged, however, that many of the evils which might be anticipated are not realized. Polygamy, though permitted, is too hazardous as a speculation, and too expensive as a luxury, to become a common practice; and in most Hindu families marriage is just what it is among overselves—the indissoluble union of a single pair. The superiority allowed to the husband is also said to exist only in theory, and the wife seldom fails to obtain her full share of influence. When the evils of domestic inequality and rivalry in the heads of the family are thus prevented or counteracted, the home of the Hindu is happy, and many of the domestic virtues are fully developed. He treats his wife with a gentleness, and even delicacy, seldom equalled by individuals of the same class in any other country; dotes on his children, often carrying his fondness beyond due bounds, and spoiling them by excessive indulgence; and, perfectly satis-

¹ Elphinstone's *India*, vol. i, pp. 351-52.

² Heber, *Indian Journal*, vol. ii, p. 80 of *Colonial and Home Library*,

fied with his own hearth, has no idea of seeking pleasure beyond it. Often, when the business of the day is done, he assumes the office of teacher, and is generally sufficiently qualified to give his children at least a smattering of reading, writing, and arithmetic. When, either from want of qualification or opportunity, he does not himself act as teacher, he is often sufficiently alive to the value of education to be willing to expend part of his very limited income in giving his children the benefit of public schooling. The means, though far from adequate, have to some extent been provided. In all towns, and in some villages, there are schools, where the teachers are paid by small fees, either in money or in grain and uncooked vegetables. The system of education pursued in these schools, so long at least as they were entirely in the hands of the natives, was indeed extremely defective, and aimed at nothing more than to communicate the lowest possible amount of human knowledge by a very rude process. No books were used. The boy (not the girl, for it must be remembered that the male sex only was deemed fit to be instructed), learned his letters by copying them from a board on sand, or on palm leaves. Reading and writing were thus taught simultaneously. Spelling and the rudiments of arithmetic were acquired by repeating syllables and figures aloud, after the teacher or monitor. In such a process, the exercise of memory alone was required, and all the other faculties were left dormant. Miserably imperfect as this instruction was, careful statistical inquiries proved that the number of boys receiving it was only a fraction of those of the proper age for school. In the Madras presidency, where the monitorial system, with which the labours of Bell and Lancaster have made us familiar, was in full operation, the number of children educated at public schools was estimated by Sir Thomas Monro at less than one in three. In Lower Bengal, the proportion was nearly the same. Thus, in those parts of the country which were admitted to be the best educated, two-thirds of the children capable of receiving instruction were left absolutely destitute of it. This, however, was the most favourable view. In Upper Bengal, the proportion of boys receiving instruction amounted only to one in twenty, and in the presidency of Bombay varied from one in eight to one in fourteen.

Assuming that in such a Hindu family as that referred to above, the children were privileged to receive this amount of elementary instruction, either at home or abroad, the domestic happiness which we have supposed might exist for some years without alloy, but sooner or later a change for the worse would, in all probability, supervene. In respect both of physical and mental qualities, the Hindu appears to most advantage in the first stage of his life. As a child or boy he is often remarkably handsome, and in quickness of intellect is usually superior to Europeans of his own age. Unfortunately his passions also are more precocious, and are fostered by native customs, which force on him a premature manhood. He is married when a mere boy, and, becoming his own master before he can have learned the art of self-restraint, too often gives way to vicious indulgence. The promise of his boyhood is thus belied. The enervating influences to which he is subjected suddenly arrest all further progress, and he settles down to take part in all the ordinary duties of life while destitute of the qualifications necessary to perform them aright. It is probable that, for a time at least, even after he has become the head of a family, he may continue to reside under the paternal roof; but his position is entirely changed, and new interests arise by which the former peace of the family is broken up. He was previously treated as a child, and could repay all his father's fondness; whereas, he is now a man, possessed of rights which he is desirous to maintain, or it may be to overstretch. Family feuds consequently ensue. The father sees a rival in his son, the mother in her daughter-in-law; and what was formerly a peaceful home becomes a scene of brawling and intrigue. While the grown-up son insists on his legal right of control over the family property, and the father resents an interference which, if legal, does not seem the less harsh and ungrateful, it is well if the alienation is not carried so far as to hurry one or other of them into crime.

In conducting the ordinary intercourse of life with his fellows, the Hindu does not differ much from individuals of his own class in other countries. It has been already observed that his natural timidity disposes him to pursue his ends by peaceful and too often by tortuous means. Where force might

effect his object, he prefers persuasion; and where persuasion, fairly employed, proves unavailing, he has no scruple in resorting to any kind of cunning which promises to be effectual. One of the most singular methods, in which a species of compulsion less violent than open force, and yet stronger than mere persuasion, gains more than either of these singly would be able to effect, is known by the name of *dharna*. It is founded on the superstitious sacredness which attaches to the persons of Brahmins, and the consequent horror of being directly or indirectly the cause of their death. When a demand is not complied with, some Brahmin, either because he is himself the party interested, or it may be because he has been hired for the purpose, seats himself in *dharna* before the door of the person against whom the demand is made; in other words, appears with poison or a dagger in his hand, and intimates his determination to commit suicide if that person presumes to taste food before he has satisfied the claim. The only alternative thus left him is either to comply or commence a course of fasting. He might, indeed, set the Brahmin's threat at defiance, but this seems too impious ever to be thought of. There is every reason to believe that the Brahmin would put his threat in execution, and would, in consequence, be honoured as a martyr, while his presumed murderer would be covered with infamy. Such a risk is too fearful to be encountered, and hence the almost invariable result is that *dharna* proves effectual. A mitigated form of *dharna* is sometimes employed to enforce payment of an ordinary debt. The creditor appears as before at the door of his debtor; but instead of threatening self-murder, simply intimates that he means to remain there without food till the debt is paid. As a point of honour, which it is deemed impossible to violate, the debtor must in like manner remain without food; and if payment is not made, the parties immediately begin to put their mutual power of enduring hunger to the test. This trial might sometimes prove elusory, and therefore the creditor usually makes sure that the fasting of the debtor is real, by cutting off his supplies. This kind of *dharna*, employed by troops against their paymaster, or the prime minister, or the sovereign himself, has often been effectual in obtaining their arrears of pay.

Dharna is, from its very nature, an extraordinary remedy. On ordinary occasions, when disputes arise, other means of

settlement must be employed. Before British ascendancy was established, the ordinary method of obtaining redress, more especially when the village system was in full operation, was by calling in the aid of *panchayats*, a kind of courts so called from consisting originally of five members, and in which the judges, selected by the mutual consent of the parties, were truly arbitrators. As such they were not bound down by formal rules, and were understood to decide in accordance with the principles of natural equity. Different opinions have been given as to the expediency of these courts, and the mode in which they performed the duties intrusted to them. As they were undoubtedly popular, it may be fairly inferred that they were on the whole entitled to public confidence, and probably better accommodated to native customs than any of the more regularly constituted courts by which they have been supplanted. It has, indeed, been alleged that they were open to undue influences; and, more especially in questions which affected the interests and inflamed the passions of the communities to which they belonged, were apt to disregard the claims of justice, and decide arbitrarily in the spirit of mere partizans. This, however, is not saying more than may be said of every institution under the management of Hindus. One of the greatest defects in their character is a comparative indifference to moral obligations. Where they have an end to serve, they lose sight of everything but the means of promoting it. Truth and falsehood are thus regarded by them as mere names, and they will utter the one or the other with equal composure. This deadness of the moral sense operates disastrously in all the relations of life, and opposes serious obstacles to the administration of justice.

Though the Hindu is not naturally rude or quarrelsome, and on the contrary is rather chargeable with carrying the forms of courtesy to excess, he is always keenly alive to his own interests, and when suspicious of any encroachment on them, is not slow in giving utterance to his feelings, both by words and by overt acts. If the supposed encroachment is made by one invested with authority, or greatly his superior in rank, fear of the hazard he might incur by boldly asserting his right will probably induce him to conceal his resentment, and seek redress by appealing to the justice and compassion, or otherwise work-

ing on the feelings of his antagonist. When not thus restrained by prudential considerations, as when he considers himself insulted or injured by an individual of his own class, the tongue is his favourite weapon, and there is no limit to the intemperance of his language and the violence of his gesticulations. His opponent probably defends himself in the same manner, and a war of words ensues. A spectator unacquainted with native habits would expect it to terminate in blows, but this is a mode of settlement not suited to the taste of the combatants, and they separate, each probably satisfied that his volubility has given him the victory. If the ground of quarrel involves some interest of which the law takes cognizance, vituperation is only a preliminary to a more serious contest, and a course of obstinate litigation ensues. In the mode of conducting it all the worst passions are brought into play, and too often everything like honour and honesty is thrown aside. The spirit of litigiousness once evoked gathers strength by continuance; and when at last the paltry question at issue has been decided, one, or probably both parties find that, partly by the expense incurred, and partly by the neglect of their proper business, they are hopelessly involved in debt.

Nor is debt the worst of it. An action at law in the manner in which the natives of India carry it on is little better than a public nuisance. In the statements made not the least regard is paid to truth, and the whole process degenerates into mere chicanery. For very paltry bribes witnesses are always ready to come forward and testify, with the utmost effrontery, in favour of the party who pays them. Even where the testimony is not venal, it is so conflicting that no dependence can be placed upon it. Each party is prepared with a most circumstantial detail of facts, and will swear without scruple to the truth of every iota of it, though carrying falsehood, and consequently, perjury, on its very face. This enormous lying probably finds its fullest scope in legal proceedings, but is by no means confined to them. At all times truth seems to have but a feeble hold of the Hindu mind, and any temptation, however slight, is thought to justify a deviation from it. So well, indeed, is this understood, that the imputation of falsehood is scarcely regarded as a reproach, and as Mr. Elphinstone expresses it, "the same man

would calmly answer to a doubt by saying, 'Why should I tell a lie?' who would shed blood for what he regarded as the slightest infringement of his honour." So many other witnesses, whose competency is indubitable, bear similar testimony, that this want of veracity must be regarded as one of the most prominent vices, or rather as the very besetting sin of Hindus.


This vice, certainly one of the most contemptible of which human beings can be guilty, is to a certain extent the natural result of a bodily and mental constitution in which feebleness and timidity predominate. To speak the truth regardless of consequences is an act of moral courage, and where this courage is wanting, an attempt is usually made to supply its place by studying concealment. If by telling the whole truth offence would be given, or the risk of loss incurred, the objectionable part is kept back, and the rest is disguised in such a way as is expected to make it palatable. A vicious habit is thus formed, and continues to grow, till at last the lie comes to be in a manner loved for its own sake, and language, conferred as a crowning gift for the purpose of enabling us mutually to communicate our thoughts, is not unfrequently used as a means of disguising them. In so far, therefore, as falsehood is engendered and fostered by timidity, the Hindu is, from natural temperament, under strong temptation to indulge in it; but this of itself is a very inadequate account of the matter. The want of veracity never could have prevailed among Hindus to such an extent as to become a most glaring national defect, had they not learned it from their religious teachers, and been in a manner forced to resort to it as a means of self-defence against the tyranny and extortion of their rulers. In passages quoted in a previous chapter from the *Institutes of Manu*, we have seen it authoritatively declared that, "in some cases, the giver of false evidence from a pious motive, even though he know the truth, shall not lose a seat in heaven;" that falsehood may not only be spoken, but "is even preferable to truth," and that on certain specified occasions "it is no deadly sin to take a light oath." Such teaching, enforced by numerous examples in the lives of popular deities, and instilled into disciples only too much disposed to act upon it, cannot have failed to exert a disastrous influence on public morals. In like manner the despotic form of

government, the frequent change of masters by sudden and violent revolutions, the rapacity of rulers, the venality of judges, and the general insecurity of property made the whole body of the population virtually slaves. As a necessary consequence they habitually practised slavish vices—dissimulation, fraud, perfidy, and falsehood. When nothing could be gained by adherence to the truth, and lying in some form, direct or indirect, was found to be the only resource against oppression and injustice, it is easy to understand how all the manly virtues disappeared, and a state of morals similar to that which prevails among Hindus was produced. It is to be feared that, even under British government, the vices to which they became habituated under native and Muhammedan rulers have not been materially diminished. The changes in the mode of administering justice have in some instances, by increasing the number and strictness of technical forms, given additional facilities to a spirit of litigiousness; while Europeans, most familiar with the proceedings of native courts, are almost unanimous in denouncing the venality of native officials, and the prevalence of falsehood in its most aggravated form of false swearing.

In concluding the survey of Hindu manners, it is proper to advert for a moment to the singular contrast which they present, not only in different localities, but sometimes in the very same individual. The man who accepts a bribe will often, from a sense of honour, endure any amount of punishment sooner than betray him from whom he has received it; the servant who cheats his master in his accounts will faithfully return the last farthing intrusted to him in deposit; the Rajput, pluming himself on his chivalry and nice sense of honour, will, without scruple, and merely to avoid a contingent inconvenience, rid himself by violence of his infant daughters; the husband who treats his wife with harshness or indifference, as if she were an inferior being, will not only resent the slightest conventional insult which may be offered to her by another, but shed blood like water in avenging her dishonour; the coward who flees at the first sight of danger will, when a violent death becomes inevitable, prepare for it with calmness, and meet it with heroism. The number of singular contrasts thus presented is perhaps one great cause of the very different colours in which the native character

has been portrayed. According to some, it includes almost everything that is amiable; according to others, it is little better than a compound of all that is diabolical. Proceeding on the ground that human nature, however much it may be modified by circumstances, possesses certain essential properties, we may safely conclude that both pictures are exaggerations, and that while nothing can be more absurd than to speak of Hindus as if they were models of primeval innocence, there are many points in which they contrast favourably with other heathen nations, and even a few in which Europeans might profit by imitating them. The comparative facility with which some of their worst practices have already been suppressed certainly gives good ground to hope that the barriers to improvement, once supposed to be insurmountable, have been at least partially broken down, and that the degrading superstition which still holds their minds in thralldom, and is directly or indirectly the cause of all that is most offensive in their conduct, will itself be at length overthrown.

BOOK V



Hyder Ali (I)

PREVIOUS to the interruption of the narrative, for the purpose of introducing the preceding account of the Hindus, our attention was occupied with the important transactions which took place in Bengal during the second government of Lord Clive, and with the reception given to him on his return to England. In the meantime events of considerable moment occurred in the presidency of Madras, and it will therefore now be necessary, on resuming the narrative, to give some explanation of them.

When, by the capture of Pondicherry, the ascendancy which the French had endeavoured to establish in India was completely overthrown, the British government, who were anxious to strike a blow at the power of the Spaniards in the East, thought that a fitting opportunity had arrived, and resolved to attempt the capture of Manila, the capital of the Philippine Isles. Hitherto when military or naval operations were contemplated, the East India Company had been accustomed to receive assistance from government; but they were now able to render it, and furnished about 2,000 men to the expedition. It sailed from Madras in the summer of 1762, and was successful. In less than a fortnight after operations commenced Manila was taken. As the event does not properly belong to the history of India, it is needless to enter into details, any further than to state, that it ultimately proved little better than a barren conquest. Instead of retaining permanent possession of it, it was agreed to accept of a ransom. The sum stipulated was about £500,000 sterling, but not more than the half of this was ever received.

From the alacrity with which the presidency had entered into the expedition, and the large share which their army took

in it, they doubtless anticipated advantages which would more than compensate them, and must therefore have been grievously disappointed when they found that the only effect had been to increase the severe pecuniary pressure under which they were previously suffering. During the great struggle with the French, nearly the whole burden had lain on their shoulders. Muhammad Ali, in whose cause they were ostensibly fighting, was unable to give them any effectual aid. On the contrary, his pretensions and intrigues often threw obstacles in their way, and more than once involved them in quarrels from which they were afterwards unable to disentangle themselves without suffering both in their interests and their reputation. It is true that he was wholly in their power, and could not act in any matter of the least importance without their sanction or support; but it was long before either he or they were fully alive to the true position in which they stood. At all events, they had so long been accustomed to pay him all the external homage due to sovereignty, that they did not venture to act openly on any denial of it, and were often in consequence betrayed into ludicrous inconsistencies. At one time they addressed him as petitioners, and supplicated his favour with mock humility; at another time they threw off all disguise, and rebuked him in the rudest terms for presuming to act as if he possessed a particle of independence. The nabob, who clung to the name perhaps all the more tenaciously from having lost the reality, was deep if not loud in his complaints of the humiliations to which he was subjected, and surrounded himself by a host of dependants, many of them European adventurers, who played upon his weaknesses, and turned them to profit. In this way misunderstandings were constantly arising, and it required little sagacity to foresee that sooner or later a rupture would take place, and transfer the name as well as the reality of power to the hands which were actually wielding it.

Though this was the crisis to which matters were evidently tending, an event took place which seemed calculated, if not designed, to produce an opposite result. The war which had been raging furiously in all quarters of the globe was terminated by the treaty of Paris, definitively signed on the 10th of February, 1763. When peace was only in prospect, Clive

volunteered his advice, by transmitting a memorial to Lord Bute, in which he called attention particularly to India. After a narrative, in which he showed how the Company, though at the time "wholly attached to mercantile ideas," had been obliged by Dupleix's projects, "to draw the sword," and how "our successes have been so great that we have accomplished for ourselves, and against the French, exactly everything that the French intended to accomplish for themselves, and against us," he urged the necessity of introducing into the proposed treaty provisions that would effectually preclude them from attempting to regain their ascendancy. Lord Bute, in acknowledging the receipt of Clive's communication, thanked him for the "very clear and masterly manner" in which he had offered his sentiments "on the interests of this country with respect to our possessions in the East Indies," and promised to "make a proper use of them." Sir John Malcolm says that "every attention possible was given to Clive's suggestions," and that a very blundering clause which the minister had inserted into the preliminary treaty, from "consulting only his friend Mr. Sullivan and the directors," was afterwards modified, though not completely cured by the interference of Clive, who, having "only heard by accident" of the extraordinary clause, hastened to the under-secretary of state, and convinced him "of the embarrassment and danger it might produce." Ultimately the eleventh article of the treaty, in which the mutual rights of the two nations in India are defined, stood as follows:—

"Great Britain shall restore to France, in the condition they now are, the different factories which that crown possessed, as well on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, as on that of Malabar, as also in Bengal, at the beginning of the year 1749. And France renounces all pretensions to the acquisitions which she has made on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa. And his most Christian majesty shall restore, on his part, all that he may have conquered from Great Britain in the East Indies, and will expressly cause Natal and Tapanouly, in the island of Sumatra, to be restored. And he further engages not to erect fortifications, or to keep troops, in any part of the dominions of the Subahdar of Bengal; and in order to preserve future peace on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, the English and

French shall acknowledge Muhammad Ali Khan for lawful Nabob of the Carnatic, and Salabat Jung for lawful Subahdar of the Deccan; and both parties shall renounce all demands and pretensions of satisfaction, with which they might charge each other, or their Indian allies, for the depredations or pillage committed on either side during the war."

The language of this article is both inaccurate and indefinite, and if really intended to accomplish the objects which Clive had urged on Lord Bute's attention, employs very inadequate means. The only important concession made by the French, is their engagement "not to erect fortifications, or to keep troops, in any part of the dominions of the Subahdar of Bengal." In thus binding themselves, without imposing a similar restriction on the British, they tacitly acquiesced in all the advantages which the latter obtained by the victory of Plassey, and left them at full liberty to continue the course by which they were evidently preparing to become absolute masters of the whole country. This concession, if obtained, as is alleged, because Clive suggested it, is certainly not the least meritorious of his services. It must, however, be remembered that the express abandonment of a power in a certain portion of India was equivalent to a reservation of it in every other portion of it, and that consequently the French were left as free as ever to resume the ambitious schemes into which they had been initiated by Dupleix. The concluding clause of the article was, perhaps, supposed to lay an effectual check on both nations, by the mutual obligation to "acknowledge Muhammad Ali Khan for lawful Nabob of the Carnatic, and Salabat Jung for lawful Subahdar of the Deccan;" but as Sir John Malcolm justly observes, "Nothing could be more preposterous than this guarantee (for to such it amounted) of the title of two Indian princes standing in the relations the Subahdar of the Deccan and the Nabob of Arcot did to each other, and to their European allies." The subahdar was in strict language nothing more than the deputy of the Mughul, and the nabob nothing more than the sub-deputy of this deputy. Their titles were worth nothing except in so far as they were recognized by their superiors. The acknowledgment of such titles by two foreign powers was therefore either a mere absurdity, or an

unjustifiable interference with the rights of a third power placed altogether beyond their control. The folly of the clause is even greater than appears on the face of it. The treaty, as Colonel Wilks observes, "*acknowledged Salabat Jung as lawful Subahdar of the Deccan*, at a time when that office had, for upwards of a year and a half, been publicly and formally assumed by his brother; for Nizam Ali, who murdered Salabat Jung in September, 1763, had imprisoned him, and ascended the musnud on the 18th of July, 1761." The fact was well known at Madras, where it had been announced in a letter from Nizam Ali himself, who, so far from affecting to rule in his brother's name, had distinctly intimated that "the King of Delhi had displaced Salabat Jung for misconduct."

Blundering as the clause was, it was not destined to be treated as a dead letter. At a later period the British government used it as a pretext for certain extraordinary proceedings, of which the details will afterwards be given, and from the very first was eagerly seized upon by one of the parties acknowledged as furnishing him with new claims to homage, and opening new prospects of further aggrandizement. The nabob, listening to the sycophants who surrounded him, was told that he was henceforth to regard himself as a sovereign potentate, equal in rank to the greatest monarchs of Europe, and of course infinitely superior to all the governors of the Company, since they could not deny that they were only subjects. How he was to turn this new dignity to account, so long as the shadow of power only was left him, was indeed a difficult and delicate problem; but he was determined at all events to make the most of it; for by a strange coincidence the presidency of Madras took a step which looked as if it were intended to proclaim to all the world that they were willing henceforth to conduct themselves as the nabob's humble and grateful servants. When they originally espoused his cause they made various stipulations, by which Madras and its adjoining territory became a kind of fee simple, and was in future to be enjoyed rent free. To meet the expenses of the war they had obtained assignments to various districts, and while drawing the rents in the nabob's name, applied them to account of their debts, which were rapidly accumulating against him. Under this form of

assignment the presidency might easily have made all the lands within the nabobship available for payment. It occurred to them, however, that districts of which they could draw the revenue, without any liability to account, might form a desirable addition to their resources; and under this idea they made a formal application to the nabob for what they called a *jaghir*. The homage and service implied in such a tenure could not but be agreeable to the nabob's feelings; but, perhaps to enhance the apparent value of the grant, or it may be, merely because the arrears which the Company already claimed made it most desirable for him not to diminish any of the sources from which revenue could be drawn, he at first manifested great reluctance to grant the *jaghir*, and did not consent to it till he had been made aware that a refusal would not avail him. This, at least, is his own account of the matter; and it may be received as substantially correct, as in the answer which was given to it, it was rather evaded than denied. He says that no means were spared to obtain his consent to the grant, and that the president in particular assured him "that if four districts were given, the Company would be extremely pleased and obliged to him, and would ever assist him and his children with a proper force of Europeans, without desiring anything further; that till he had cleared off his debts to the Company, the revenues of those districts, after defraying the expense of the soldiers, should be placed to the credit of his account." Having little option in the matter, he was disposed to accept these terms; and in order that there might be no mistake, took the precaution of causing them to be committed to writing. But this cautious mode of procedure gave offence to the president, who, after refusing to subscribe the document, addressed a letter to the nabob, in which he was told how ill it became him to attempt to impose conditions upon the Company, since in all their intercourse with him they had been truly the givers, and he only a receiver.

After the question of the *jaghir* was settled, the presidency, as much for their own sakes as that of the nabob, were not indisposed to assist him in collecting the revenue, which had fallen into arrear in almost every district. The ravages of hostile armies in a country not naturally fertile had converted many

parts of it into a desert, and many of the governors of districts only stated the simple truth when they declared their inability to pay. Others, again, were avowedly contumacious, and withheld their tribute because they felt confident that payment could not be enforced. It was now necessary, therefore, to make an example of a few of the most refractory. The effect was almost instantaneous; and most of the chiefs within the limits of the nabobship hastened to make their submission, by compounding for arrears, and promising punctuality in future payments. Among the exceptions was Murtaz Ali, governor of Vellore, with whose treachery and villainy some acquaintance was formed in an earlier part of the history. The treasures which he was reputed to possess were sufficient inducement to Muhammad Ali to attempt his reduction; but he was partly influenced by other motives, which to a mind like his were scarcely less powerful. Murtaz Ali had at one time been formally leagued with the French, and was indeed the very last of the puppet nabobs whom Dupleix had set up. He had thus not only thrown off his allegiance, but aspired to sovereign rule; and Muhammad Ali hoped to be able, on gaining possession of the fort, at once to replenish his treasury, and take vengeance on a hated rival. The result was not very satisfactory. Owing either to the strength of the place, or the imperfect means employed to capture it, it held out successfully for three months against the whole army, and when taken did not yield as much treasure as repaid the expense.

Not satisfied with reducing the refractory chiefs belonging to the nabobship properly so called, Muhammad Ali turned his eyes southward, where he expected to reap a more abundant harvest. Tanjore, governed by its raja, and Tinneveli and Madura, of which Mahmud Yusuf had been appointed renter, were the localities in which the next grand effort for the recovery of revenue was to be made. The quarrel with the raja was of long standing, and involved a question of still more importance than mere revenue. Tanjore claimed to be an independent kingdom, and its sovereign therefore considered himself entitled to demand tribute rather than to pay it. Accordingly, when the long struggle was carried on at Trichinopoly, both the contending parties were seen courting the alliance of the raja;

while he, on the other hand, after balancing opposing interests, countenanced the one or the other as seemed to himself most expedient. In general, however, he took the side of the Company and their protegee; and it was probably for this reason that on a former occasion, when Muhammad Ali advanced the claim of tribute, and spoke of enforcing it by violent means, Governor Pigot proposed negotiation, and offered to act as umpire, justifying his interference on the ground that the Raja of Tanjore was an independent prince, and was entitled to have all questions in dispute adjudicated by a neutral party. The proposal, and more especially the ground on which it was put, were most obnoxious to Muhammad Ali; but as the governor insisted, he could not help himself, and a kind of decree arbitral was pronounced, by which the raja became bound to pay the nabob twenty-two lacs of rupees, by five instalments, as arrears, four lacs as a present, and four as annual tribute; but was compensated to some extent by the cession of two districts which improved his frontier. This settlement, which made Tanjore tributary to Arcot, ought to have satisfied the nabob, but as he had submitted to it with ill-disguised reluctance, he was not long in discovering a new ground of dispute. The fertility for which Tanjore is celebrated depended, as was formerly explained, on an artificial mound, by which the Coleroon, after branching off from the Cauveri, was prevented from again joining it, and thus rendered available for irrigation. The nabob claimed the property of the mound, and, as a consequence, the sole right of keeping it in repair. His object was as apparent as it was malicious. For any honest purpose the right to repair the mound was worse than useless. It was not a privilege, but a burden. It was not so to the raja, and he therefore strenuously insisted that even if the property of the mound was in the nabob, the right of repairing it belonged by immemorial usage to him. The presidency were again obliged to interfere, and ultimately, after long discussion, frustrated the malevolent intentions of the nabob, by deciding, in accordance with equity, that the right of repairing the mound belonged to the raja.

The expedition to Tinneveli and Madura was both of a painful and of a formidable description—painful, because directed against a man who had formerly deserved well of the

Company, and was therefore entitled to some degree of indulgence—and formidable, because there was good ground to apprehend that on finding himself treated as an enemy he would make a vigorous and protracted, perhaps even a successful defence against any force that could be mustered to attack him. Mahmud Yusuf was a soldier of Clive's training, and "a worthy disciple," says Colonel Wilks,¹ "of the school in which he was reared. His perfect fidelity, intelligence, and military talents had deservedly obtained the confidence of Major Lawrence, and he was promoted to the rank of commandant of all the English sepoys, and continued to perform the service of the convoys with admirable vigilance and address." Indeed, it may be affirmed without exaggeration, that the successes which ultimately terminated in the relief of Trichinopoly, and the capitulation of the French in the island of Seringham, could scarcely have been possible, but for the dexterity displayed by Mahmud Yusuf in furnishing supplies, often in the face of a very superior force. He afterwards rendered important aid in the subsequent campaigns in the Carnatic. Latterly he had been stationed in Tinneveli and Madura, which were kept in a state of constant disturbance by restless and rebellious polygars. Under such circumstances the collection of revenue was a very difficult task, the expenses seldom falling short of the gross sum obtained. Mahmud Yusuf, however, was confident of better times, and in the hope of profiting by them, offered to take the burden of collection upon himself, and to pay a fixed sum in the name of rent. The nabob, who had no liking for Mahmud Yusuf, would at once have rejected the offer, but the presidency approved of it, and it was accepted. It is not improbable that Mahmud Yusuf, in making the offer, was not sincere. His success in life had been great, and having from a very subordinate station raised himself to an important command, he perhaps only became the renter of Madura and Tinneveli in the belief that he thus took the most effective method of acquiring an independent sovereignty. Such at least was the suspicion of the nabob, and circumstances seemed to justify it, for the rent, moderate as it was, was not paid. The excuse was that no revenue could be levied. The presidency, whose pecuniary

¹ Wilks, *Historical Sketches*, vol. i, p. 324.

difficulties had been constantly increasing, were not satisfied, and, after remonstrance had failed, determined to proceed against Mahmud Yusuf, as if he had now himself become the most refractory and formidable of the polygars. Before this determination was declared he had endeavoured to prevent it by the intercession of influential friends, who, knowing how faithfully he had served the Company, could not believe that he now meant to turn traitor. When influence failed, and it was plain that nothing but force would avail him, he began to prepare for the worst, and when the nabob and his allies appeared, met them with defiance. The struggle was severe, and its issue was by no means decided, when an act of treachery made the nabob triumphant. A person of the name of Marchand, belonging to a body of French mercenaries whom Mahmud Yusuf had taken into his service, betrayed him into the hands of his enemies. At the conclusion of the contest the presidency found that it had saddled them with a new debt of £1,000,000 sterling.

The Northern Circars, consisting of the five districts of Chicacole, Rajahmundri, Ellore, Condapilli, and Guntur, had remained, after the expulsion of the French by Colonel Forde, in a very unsettled condition. As they originally belonged to the subah of the Deccan, they properly reverted to it as soon as the French ceased to render the service in consideration of which the grant to them had been made. The subahdar had accordingly claimed them; and when negotiating a treaty with the Company, had made them an offer of them on the same terms on which they had been held by the French. This offer, which would have bound the Company to furnish troops for any hostilities in which the subahdar might engage, was prudently declined. After the treaty of Paris, the possession of the Circars acquired new importance. M. Law, who formerly made some figure in Bengal, became governor at Pondicherry, and showed an inclination to stretch the French rights under the treaty to the utmost. From the vagueness of the terms used it was difficult to say what these rights were, and it was more than doubtful whether the French might not under them comply with the original conditions of the grant of the Circars, and thus, by furnishing troops to the subahdar, regain their ancient

footing. Meanwhile, though the offer of the Circars made by Nizam Ali, after he had imprisoned his brother and usurped his office, was declined, the presidency of Madras had taken an active interest in the management of them. Nizam Ali had granted them, under conditions, to one of his servants of the name of Hussain Ali. The first step necessary for him was to reduce them to subjection; and for this purpose the presidency did not hesitate to furnish him with troops. Three of the Circars were thus reconquered, and were held by Hussain Ali, on an understanding that on being secured in a reasonable maintenance, he was to put the Company in possession of them.

When Clive arrived at Madras on the outward voyage, to take possession of the government of Bengal, Mr. Palk, who had succeeded Mr. Pigot as governor, called his attention particularly to the Northern Circars. Accordingly, they were not forgotten in the formal grants subsequently obtained from the emperor, and were conveyed to the Company in the following terms:—"In these happy times, our *firman*, full of splendour and worthy obedience, is descended, purporting that whereas Salabat Jung Bahadur, Subahdar of the Deccan, conferred the Circar of Sicacole, &c., on the French Company, and that, in consequence of its not being confirmed by us, either by *firman* or otherwise, the high, mighty, and glorious chiefs of the Khans, chosen of the Omrahs, Sepoy Sardars, truly faithful, worthy of receiving favours and obligations, our invariable and never-failing friends and well-wishers, the English Company (having sent a large force for that purpose) did expel the French therefrom: We, therefore, in consideration of the fidelity and good wishes of the high, mighty, &c., &c., English Company, have from our throne, the basis of the world, given them the aforementioned Circars by way of *inaam*, or free gift (without the least participation of any person whatever in the same) from the beginning of the Phussul of Tuccacooul, in the year of Phaly 1172, equal to the month of April, 1762. It is incumbent, therefore, upon you, our sons, omrahs, vizirs, governors, mutseders for the affairs of our dewanship, moolecophils for those of our kingdom, jagirdars and croories, both now and hereafter, for ever and ever, to use your endeavours in the strengthening and carrying into execution this our most high

command, and to cede and give up to the above-mentioned English Company, their heirs and descendants, for ever and ever, the aforesaid Circars; and esteeming them likewise free, exempt, and safe from all displacing and removal, by no means whatever either molest or trouble them on account of the demands of the dewan's office, or those of our imperial court. Looking upon this high *firman* as an absolute and positive order, obey it implicitly. Dated the 24th of the moon Sophar (12th August, 1765, the same day as the grant of the dewani of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa) in the sixth year of our reign."

Nothing can be more explicit than this document. It prevents the opposition of the French, and declares their right to have been always null; while, by carrying the right of the Company as far back as 1762, it includes the Circars and the possessions belonging to them previous to the treaty of Paris. The claims of the subahdar, though the Company had repeatedly recognized them, are simply ignored. It was not to be supposed that such an unceremonious encroachment on his alleged rights would be for a moment acquiesced in, and it is therefore easy to understand why Clive urged that no time should be lost in entering into actual possession. The conduct of the presidency of Madras on this occasion was so feeble, vacillating, and contradictory, that it is impossible to explain it on any rational principle. In a letter to the directors, dated 14th October, 1765, they state that the *sanads* granting the five Northern Circars had been obtained from the Mughul by Lord Clive at the instance of their governor, Mr. Palk, and then add that they have judged it prudent to defer taking immediate possession, because not aware how far they might be required to send aid in troops to Bengal. In the meantime, they continue, the possession of the *sanads* would prevent the French from regaining a footing in the Circars, and nothing was lost by delaying to act upon them, because the revenue for the next year had been anticipated by Hussain Ali. These views, announced in October, were totally abandoned in January following, and General Calliaud was ordered to prepare for taking military occupation. On the 3rd of March the grant of the Circars was formally proclaimed at Masulipatam; on the 7th of March the fort of Condapilli, which secured the leading pass into the country,

was taken by storm; and the presidency immediately thereafter proceeded to take the administration directly into their own hands; to receive from the *zemindars* the outstanding balances, and to use every means for discharging Hussain Ali's troops. These measures were far too bold to be fully carried out by Mr. Palk and his council; and on the first appearance of opposition from the quarter from which they must certainly have anticipated it, they became as irresolute as ever.

Nizam Ali, who had some ground for suspecting the nabob of a design to supplant him, had, at the time when the presidency of Madras were preparing to assist Hussain Ali, made a sudden incursion into the Carnatic, with the avowed purpose of calling the nabob to account for some claims which he had against him; but, after committing great ravages, suddenly retraced his steps on finding that he was to be opposed, and made his peace with the presidency by sending Governor Palk a friendly letter and the present of an elephant. When General Calliaud entered the Circars he was absent on an expedition to Berar against the Marathas, and immediately on learning how advantage had been taken of his absence, hastened back to Hyderabad in great indignation. Making no secret of his intentions, he began to prepare for another irruption into the Carnatic. The courage of the presidency fell at once, and they sent orders to Calliaud to hasten to Hyderabad, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty. Even before this, they had induced the nabob to send a messenger to the subahdar, for the purpose of appeasing him, and assuring him that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, the governor and council were truly desirous to cultivate his friendship. Nizam Ali refused to listen to the messenger, or to any proposition which seemed to come directly or indirectly from the nabob. The mission of Calliaud was more acceptable, and could hardly have failed of success, as he was prepared to concede almost everything that Nizam Ali could ask, whether to satisfy his offended dignity or secure his interest. The Mughul had granted the Circars to the Company, to be held immediately of himself, free of every kind of claim; the presidency of Madras entered into a treaty by which they agreed to hold them of Nizam Ali, subject to an annual tribute of nine lacs of rupees. As if to

make his sovereignty and their humiliation still more manifest, the diamond mines were specially reserved to him.

The worst has not yet been told. The Circars were, as we have seen, formerly offered to the Company on the same terms on which they were held by the French, and declined on the express ground that they must thus have been obliged to take part in all the military undertakings of the subahdar; and yet in the treaty they bound themselves to do this very thing in its most objectionable form, by engaging to have a body of troops ready "to settle, in everything right and proper, the affairs of his highness's government." In other words, his highness was to have full power to call upon them for troops to an indefinite extent, and drag them into every war in which his tyranny or ambition might involve him. In attempting to justify the monstrous provisions of this so-called "treaty of alliance and friendship between the Company and the Nizam," they appealed to the authority of Lord Clive, who, regarding the Marathas as the most dangerous enemies to the peace of India, proposed to form a general confederacy against them, and had suggested, in a letter to Mr. Palk, that the Nizam might be induced to join it, by an offer to support him with a body of 200 infantry, 100 artillery, and three battalions of sepoys. Another part of his lordship's plan was to gain possession from the Marathas of the part of Orissa between Ganjam and Balasore, and thus form a continuous communication between the presidencies of Madras and Bengal. Without entering into the merits of the plan, it is obvious that it gives no countenance to an indefinite supply of troops for any purpose which Nizam Ali might consider right and proper. Well might the directors, in commenting on the treaty, and pointing out the inconsistencies apparent throughout in all that the presidency had done respecting the Circars, commence with saying, "We have taken the negotiations and treaty with the Subah of the Deccan into our most serious consideration, and are much alarmed at the state of your affairs." There was, indeed, greater ground for alarm than the directors suspected; for at the very time when the treaty was signed, Nizam Ali was actually preparing to involve the Company in a war which was not to cease till it had brought them to the brink of ruin.

The enemy to be encountered was the celebrated Hyder Ali, who had now made himself one of the leading powers of India. He has already, in the course of the history, attracted incidental notice; but as he is about to become a principal figure, this seems the proper place to give some account of his rise and progress.

Mahmud Buhlul, a devotee from the Punjab, quitted it with his two sons for the Deccan, and settled at the town of Alund, in the district of Gulbarga, about 100 miles west of Hyderabad. Here he subsisted on the profits of a fakir's *mokan*, a place where Muhammedan travellers of moderate fortune usually lodge. His sons, Mahmud Ali and Mahmud Welli, continued to reside with him after their marriage, till the hope of improving their fortunes induced them to proceed southward into the Mysore. At first they fixed their residence at Sera, where they were engaged as peons in collecting the town customs; at a later period they removed to Colar, about 100 miles north-east of Seringapatam. Here Mahmud Ali died, leaving a widow and a son, Fateh Mahmud, whom she had born to him at Sera. Mahmud Welli was ungenerous enough to take advantage of their misfortune, and, seizing upon the whole family property, turned them out of doors. They found a protector in an officer who commanded a small number of peons, and at the proper age enrolled the youth among them. Fateh Mahmud, thus trained to be a soldier, gained the favour of the governor of Sera by his gallantry, and was made a *naik* or petty officer, with the command of twenty peons. This humble appointment sufficed to change his name to Fateh Naik, and pave the way to further advancement. After the death of his first wife, by whom he had three sons, he married the daughter of a *nevayet* of respectable family. Under ordinary circumstances it would have been considered presumptuous in a *naik* to aspire to such an alliance, but the father having been robbed and murdered as he was travelling with his family from the Concan to Arcot, the widow, who had arrived with a son, Ibrahim Sahib, and two daughters at Colar, in the utmost distress, was induced to give the elder in marriage to Fateh Naik. At a later period, the younger, her sister having previously died without issue, became his third wife. By her, when he had become *foujdar* or

provincial commandant of Colar, and was residing at Budicuta, which was his *jaghir*, he had two sons. The elder was named Shabaz; the younger was Hyder. Fateh Naik, who, in consequence of his appointment as *foujdar*, had obtained the title of Fateh Mahmud Khan, fell with one of the sons of his first marriage, in a bloody battle fought to decide the right to the office of Subahdar of Sera. Previous to the battle, Abdul Rasul, the son of Fateh Mahmud's original patron, had, according to a practice which prevailed in similar cases, endeavoured to make sure of the fidelity of his principal officers, by confining their families in the fort of Great Balipur, which was his *jaghir*. Though he lost both the battle and his life, the *jaghir* was secured to his son Abbas Kuli Khan, who had the meanness to take advantage of the imprisonment of the families of his father's officers, and plundered them under various pretexts. The widow of Fateh Mahmud, and her two boys—Shabaz, nine, and Hyder, seven years of age—were not permitted to escape. A sum alleged to be due by their father, as *foujdar* of Colar, was demanded from them, and when they declared their inability to pay, was extorted from them by torture.

Thus cruelly plundered, the widow repaired with her sons to Bangalore, where her brother, Ibrahim Sahib, in the service of the *killadar* of the place, commanded a few peons. He took them under his protection, and when Shabaz was sufficiently grown, procured his admission into the military service at Seringapatam. The youth was not long in distinguishing himself, and gradually rose to the command of 200 horse and 1,000 peons. Hyder gave less promise. At the age of twenty-seven he remained unemployed, and so uneducated that he was then, and indeed ever after, unacquainted with the first elements of reading and writing. His habits were very irregular, and he would frequently absent himself for weeks from his home, living sometimes in the woods, in his favourite pursuit of the chase, amid danger and privation, and sometimes far less creditably, in riot and licentious pleasure. In 1749, when the troops of Mysore were besieging the fort of Deonhulli, situated twenty-four miles north-east of Bangalore, he joined his brother's corps as a volunteer horseman, and seemed for the first time to have

found his true vocation. By taking the lead in every service of danger, he gained the particular favour of Nunjiraj, the Mysore commander, who was conducting the siege, and at its close by capitulation, was appointed to the command of fifty horse and 200 infantry, and to the charge of one of the gates of the fort.

The Mysore troops had scarcely marched from Deonhulli to Seringapatam, when they were ordered off to the plains of Arcot to join Nazir Jung, who had succeeded his father Nizam-ul-Mulk, as Subahdar of the Deccan. Hyder and his brother took part in this expedition, under the command of Berki Venkat Rao, one of the best of the Mysore generals. The events which followed have been detailed in an earlier part of this work. When Nazir Jung was, through the intrigues of Dupleix, treacherously abandoned by a large portion of his army, the Mysore troops remained faithful, and Hyder distinguished himself in an attack on the flank of the French column. When the day was lost, and Nazir Jung had fallen by the hands of the Nabob of Kurpa or Cuddapah, under circumstances amounting to assassination, Hyder managed to turn the event to his own profit. He had in pay a body of 300 select Bedar peons, briefly described as brave and faithful thieves, who usually repaid more than the expenses of their establishment by means of plunder, levied without scruple, as opportunity occurred, from friends as well as foes. On the first alarm of a disastrous issue, the person in charge of Nazir Jung's treasure began to load it on camels. Two of these, laden with gold coins, were dexterously separated from the crowd by Hyder's peons, and carried off to his station at Deonhulli. With this spoil, and a considerable number of horses and muskets afterwards picked up and brought home to the fort, the foundation of his fortunes was laid. During the operations before Trichinopoly, where the Mysoreans under Nunjiraj acted at first as the allies of the French, Hyder continued to rise in that commander's favour. He was accordingly enabled to augment the number of his Bedar peons, and enrich himself by their plunder, which by the aid of Kundi Rao, a talented Brahmin accountant, whom he had early taken into his service, was reduced to a regular system, which is thus described by Colonel Wilks:¹—"The

¹ *Historical Sketches*, vol. i, p. 251.

plunderers received, besides their direct pay, one-half of the booty which was realized; the other half was appropriated by Hyder, under a combination of checks which rendered it nearly impossible to secrete any portion of the plunder. Moveable property of every description was their object; and, as already noticed, they did not hesitate to acquire it by simple theft from friends, when that could be done without suspicion, and with more convenience than from enemies. Nothing was unseasonable or unacceptable, from convoys of grain, down to the clothes, turbans, and ear-rings of travellers or villagers, whether men, women, or children. Cattle and sheep were among the most profitable heads of plunder; muskets and horses were sometimes obtained in booty, sometimes by purchase." A man who like Hyder could neither read nor write, might seem devoid of the qualification necessary to carry out such a system; but, besides the assistance of Kundi Rao, he had a most extraordinary memory, and could perform long arithmetical calculations more quickly and not less accurately than the most expert accountant. Accordingly, with the number of his followers his wealth and consequence rapidly increased. In 1755, when he left Trichinopoly, he had all the usual appendages of a chief of rank, and received pay for 1,500 horse, 3,000 regular infantry, 2,000 peons, and four guns, with their equipments.

When Hyder removed from Trichinopoly, it was to occupy the higher position of *foujdar* of Dindigul. This fort, situated sixty miles south-west of Trichinopoly, crowns a rock which rises in the midst of a valley, bounded on the west by a range of mountains separating it from the Malabar coast, and on the east by a lower range separating it from Madura. It had been seized by Mysore in 1745, but might have been claimed by Muhammad Ali, as belonging to the province of Madura. It was therefore deemed necessary to guard against any attempt which he and his English allies might make to recover possession of it, and Nunjiraj, in whose favour Hyder had continued to rise, saw no one so well qualified to be intrusted with this important charge. The polygars of the adjoining districts were, moreover, leagued together to resist the payment of tribute, and this was an additional reason for conferring the *foujdari* of the fort on an officer of proved ability.

Hyder set out for Dindigul at the head of 5,000 regular infantry, 2,500 horse, 2,000 peons, and six guns. Kundi Rao he left behind, to watch over his interests. On approaching the districts of the refractory polygars, Hyder lulled them into security by insidious offers of compromise, and was allowed to pass through their country as a friend, till he had reached a position which gave him the command of it. In this way he was able first to sweep off all the cattle, which according to his system were sold off at high prices, generally to their former owners, and then, though not without an obstinate contest, to crush all opposition. Hyder, to make the most of this exploit, sent a despatch with a very exaggerated account of it, and a long list of his killed and wounded, to Nunjiraj, who, delighted with the news, sent a special commissioner with rich presents to Hyder and the officers who had distinguished themselves, and an allowance called *zakham patti*, given to the wounded, to compensate for their wounds and defray the expenses of their cure. The true number of wounded was sixty-seven, but Hyder, who had purchased the connivance of the commissioner, managed to muster 700, who appeared with their legs or arms bandaged. The *zakham patti* allowed was at the rate of fourteen rupees monthly to each man while under cure. To the really wounded he gave seven, the surplus of course going into his own pocket, or into the common stock of plunder. Meanwhile, Kundi Rao was busy at court sounding the praises of his master, exaggerating the disturbed state of the country, urging the necessity of augmented forces, and obtaining assignments of territorial revenue for their maintenance. It would seem that Hyder's design of attempting to usurp sovereignty was now fully formed, for he had begun, by means of skilful artificers, procured from Seringham, Trichinopoly, and Pondicherry, and directed by French masters, to organize a regular artillery, arsenal, and laboratory.

The state of the government of Mysore greatly favoured Hyder's ambition. Nunjiraj and his brother Dev Raj had made themselves absolute masters, and left to the raja only such appendages of royalty as were necessary to enable them to use him as a tool. Hitherto this had been accomplished without much difficulty, but latterly the raja, who had attained the age

of twenty-seven, had shown symptoms of impatience, and had even talked of imprisoning the usurpers. They were fully on their guard, but deeming it impolitic to use open violence, at first simply remonstrated, and requested him to dismiss his evil counsellors. On his refusal, Nunjiraj, whose daughter was married to the raja, did not scruple to propose that she should be induced to poison him. Dev Raj refused his sanction to this scheme, and the lady herself, when it was suggested to her, rejected it with abhorrence. Nunjiraj in this dilemma determined to take his own way. Having forced an entrance into the palace, by blowing open the gates which had been barricaded against him, he caused the raja to take his seat in the hall of audience, and look on in silent terror while the noses and ears of his most faithful attendants were cut off. Thus horribly mutilated, they were turned into the street, while Nunjiraj replaced them with his own creatures, whom he presented to the raja with an insulting mockery of respect.

This outrageous proceeding gave such offence and disgust to Dev Raj that he broke off all intercourse with his brother, and in February, 1757, quitted Seringapatam with his family and a small body of troops, to fix his residence at Sattimungalum, on the banks of the Bhovani. After taking this step, Dev Raj sent orders to the *aumils* or collectors of several districts to pay the revenues in future to himself. On some of these districts Hyder had assignments, and he was thus in danger of being drawn into the quarrel between the two brothers. As he was not yet prepared to carry matters with a high hand, he resolved to take a peaceful course, and on the recommendation of Kundi Rao, he prepared to try the effect of his personal presence at the Mysore capital. Before he reached it an important event had taken place. In March, 1757, Balaji Rao, with his Marathas, appeared in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and demanded a contribution. Nunjiraj first pleaded inability, and then attempted resistance. Neither availed him, and he was obliged to buy off the enemy by agreeing to a payment of thirty-five lacs of rupees. All the cash and jewels which he could raise for this purpose amounted only to five lacs, and he had no alternative but to surrender a large tract of territory as security for the balance.

When Hyder arrived, the Marathas had departed, but he found their agents engaged in collecting the revenue, and a body of 6,000 horse in possession of the districts which had been pledged. At his interview with Nunjiraj he expressed his surprise that on so great an emergency the troops at Dindigul had not been sent for, hinting that their presence might have led to a very different result. As the best thing that now remained, his advice was, that the Maratha troops should be expelled as soon as the setting in of the rains would make it impossible for them to receive any assistance from their countrymen. Their return in the following season might certainly be expected, but this was one great reason of the advice which he gave, as it assured him that his services would then be required. The more immediate object of his visit to the capital was then discussed, and it was arranged that he should, in company with Kundi Rao, visit Dev Raj at his retreat. He was greatly aided in his negotiation by circumstances which had occurred before he left Dindigul. The Nair Raja of Palghat, a district situated on the eastern frontier of Malabar, where a great depression in the Ghats opens a communication between the two sides of the Indian peninsula, was at war with the Rajas of Cochin and Calicut, and being sore pressed, applied for aid to Hyder. He saw his advantage in granting it, and detached his brother-in-law, Makhdum Sahib, with 2,000 horse, 5,000 infantry, and five guns. This powerful force completely turned the scale, and the enemy, after Makhdum Sahib had carried his arms to the sea-coast, agreed to restore all their conquests from Palghat, and pay twelve lacs of rupees by instalments. Hyder's detachment remained to receive payment. From what has been said of the character of the troops, it is easy to understand how anxious the inhabitants were to be rid of them. Accordingly, they made secret application to Dev Raj, offering to make payment to him if he would send Hindus to receive it, and free them from the presence of Mussalmans. This transaction furnished an easy means of adjustment between Dev Raj and Hyder, the former agreeing to withdraw his claim on Hyder's assigned districts, and give security for the payment of three lacs of rupees, as the expenses of the expedition to Malabar, and the latter agreeing to recall the detachment, and permit Dev Raj to levy the

contribution from the Rajas of Cochin and Calicut by his own agents.

Shortly after his return to Dindigul, Hyder, who had been repeatedly urged by the French to make a diversion in their favour, by taking advantage of the disturbances in Madura and Tinneveli, and wresting these provinces from Muhammad Ali and his English allies, was convinced that his large body of unoccupied troops could not be employed to better purpose. He commenced with seizing the post of Sholavandan, in the pass between Dindigul and Madura, and advancing to the vicinity of the latter, swept off the whole of the cattle and moveables of the surrounding country. Madura itself was too strong to be taken by a sudden effort, and before he could prepare to besiege it, he learned that Mahmud Yusuf was marching from Trichinopoly with a small body of veteran troops, to its relief. Hyder resolved to intercept him. Had he taken proper advantage of his great superiority in numbers he must have been successful; but, by a blunder, he huddled them together in the mouth of a pass, where the greater part of them were prevented from acting. Mahmud Yusuf was too skilful not to perceive his advantage, and hastening forward, succeeded by a vigorous attack in gaining a complete victory. Hyder made no effort to redeem the disgrace, and returned to Dindigul.

Meanwhile, the misgovernment which prevailed at Seringapatam was producing its bitter fruits. The troops, in order to obtain their arrears of pay, had employed the ceremony of *dharna* against Nunjiraj, and reduced him to the necessity of selling the provision stores of the capital as a means of appeasing them. On receiving this information, Hyder quitted Dindigul, with all his disposable troops, and desired Kundi Rao again to meet him at Sattimungalum. On his arrival here he waited on Dev Raj, and by representing the fatal effects of his quarrel with Nunjiraj, prevailed upon him to accompany him in the direction of the capital. So great, however, was his reluctance to the journey, that he made repeated halts, and on arriving at the town of Mysore refused to proceed further. Hyder and Kundi Rao proceeded to Seringapatam. One condition, declared by Dev Raj to be indispensable, was, that Nunjiraj should make some atonement for his proceedings at the palace. This was

arranged without difficulty; and Nunjiraj having submitted to some humiliations, a salute was fired from all the guns of the citadel, to announce the raja's forgiveness and favour. The public reconciliation of the brothers followed; and after Nunjiraj had gone to Mysore, and made the most abject apologies, Dev Raj allowed himself to be conducted in a kind of triumphal procession to Seringapatam. He had been six days there when he died. The death appears to have been natural, though a suspicion of poison was, without any great breach of charity, entertained by many.

The army had not received full payment of arrears, and continued to clamour for the balance. It was a sore subject with Nunjiraj; and as he had no idea of again submitting to the rigours of the *dharna*, he begged Hyder and Kundi Rao to make the best arrangement in their power. This was the very thing which Hyder had all along desired, and he managed so craftily, that while he was only maturing his own ambitious designs, all parties regarded him as a common benefactor. There were some, however, whose suspicions were strongly roused, and even openly declared. Among these the most formidable was Hari Singh, a Rajput officer of cavalry, in the service of Mysore. He stood as high in the favour of Dev Raj as Hyder in that of Nunjiraj. The two had repeatedly crossed each other's path, and made no secret of their mutual enmity. Hari Singh, indeed, who piqued himself on his pure descent and chivalrous spirit, always spoke of Hyder contemptuously, and refused to give him a higher title than that of *naik*. Hyder watched his opportunity, and took his revenge. Hari Singh had been selected by Dev Raj to collect the military contribution in Malabar. He found it almost a hopeless task; and on hearing of the sudden death of his patron, hastened back to the province of Coimbatore, and halted near a frontier village of Tanjore, ostensibly to refresh his troops, but really to negotiate with the raja the terms on which he was to enter his service. Hyder may have represented this intention as treason against Mysore; but it is more probable that he regarded his own enmity as a sufficient ground for any procedure however violent. On pretence of sending back a portion of his followers to Dindigul, he detached Makhdum Sahib with 1,000 horse and 2,000 infantry. The nature of his

instructions may be learned from the event. In the dead of the night, when Hari Singh was carelessly encamped, without any suspicion of danger, he was surprised by Makhdum, and massacred, with a large portion of his troops. Hyder, so far from denying his share in the atrocity, gloried in it, and even selected out of the spoil three guns and fifteen beautiful horses as a present to the raja. It must have been graciously received, for he immediately after received an assignment on Coimbatore for the three lacs of rupees promised him as the expenses of the Malabar war, and was put in possession of the fort and district of Bangalore as his personal *jaghir*.

The Marathas did not tamely submit to the expulsion of their troops and the gross violation of the agreement, on the faith of which they had retired from Seringapatam when they had every prospect of capturing it. Early in 1759, a large force, under Gopal Hari and Anand Rao Rastea, invaded Mysore. It was difficult to muster any force to oppose them. The soldiers as well as chiefs were still clamorous for the arrears, which had been only partially discharged, and refused to move till full payment was made. In this dilemma, Hyder, who had ascertained that the arrears were more fictitious than real, took the responsibility of payment upon himself, and was in consequence appointed to the chief command in the field. Many of the old officers resigned, sooner than submit to what they called the indignity of serving under the *naik*; but Hyder steadily pursued his course, determined to show that what he wanted in birth he possessed in talent. His dispositions were made with so much ability that Gopal Hari, after a series of indecisive actions, in which he was generally worsted, proposed negotiation. The terms ultimately agreed to were, that the Marathas should receive present payment of thirty-two lacs of rupees, in full of all demands, and renounce all claim on the districts formerly pledged to Balaji Rao. The great difficulty was the present payment; but Hyder, by means of a *nazrana*, a kind of compulsory benevolence, levied on the principal inhabitants, succeeded in raising the half of the whole amount: for the other half, so great was his influence with the *soucars* or bankers of the enemy's camp, his own security was taken, they themselves becoming responsible, on an understanding, ratified by all parties, that

Hyder should have the direct management of the revenues of the pledged districts as the fund from which payment was to be drawn. On completing these arrangements, and seeing the Marathas in full march for their own country, he returned in triumph to Seringapatam. The raja, on receiving him at the most splendid durbar which had been held during his reign, saluted him as Fateh Hyder Bahadur,¹ while Nunjiraj, apparently proud of having discerned his merit, paid him the high compliment of rising on his approach, and embracing him.

Hitherto Nunjiraj, using the raja as a pageant, wielded the whole power of the state, and perfectly satisfied that he would always find Hyder an obedient and zealous adherent, had sanctioned, if not procured, his appointment as commander-in-chief. A very decided change in their relations was soon to take place. Late events having made Kundi Rao a frequent visitor to the palace, he became thoroughly acquainted with the state of feeling in it, and after confidential communication with the old dowager consort of a previous raja, arranged with her that means should be taken to compel Nunjiraj to retire from public life. Hyder was, of course, privy to the intrigue. The means to be employed was a new demand of the arrears still due to the troops. Accordingly, some officers, instructed by Kundi Rao in the part they were to act, waited on Hyder, and asked in a moderate tone that their arrears should be paid. He answered in a similar tone that his own corps was regularly paid, but that

¹ On this subject Colonel Wilks has the following curious note (vol. i, pp. 372-73) :—"Nunjiraj and Dev Raj had been in the habit of addressing Hyder in public durbar by the name of Naik: *Bennée Naick re*, 'Come hither, Naik.' As Hyder's fortunes began to unfold, he thought this appellation not sufficiently respectful; and, by means of a third person, prevailed on Nunjiraj to address him by the name of Bahadur: *Bennée Bahadur*, 'Come hither, hero.' For many years afterwards Dev Raj continued the appellation of Naik; and Hyder, when accompanying him from Sattimungul, remonstrated in a friendly manner. Dev Raj excused himself by pretending that the mistake was of habit and not of intention; and gave orders in Hyder's presence that all letters to him should be in future addressed Bahadur. Hyder was always more gratified by the single title of Bahadur than by any other title. His original signet was *Futte Hyder*, the former being the name of his father; and this he never changed except on those extraordinary occasions which required the great official seal."

he was not the paymaster of the rest of the army. Admitting this, they requested that he would apply to Nunjiraj on their behalf, and he promised to use his best offices. The visit of the officers was daily repeated, each time with greater urgency, till at last they insisted that he should go at their head and sit in *dharna* at Nunjiraj's gate. He professed the greatest aversion to this proceeding; but under the pretence of acting under compulsion, he at last accompanied them. Nunjiraj, who had some knowledge of Kundi Rao's behaviour at the palace, was not to be thus imposed on, and the moment Hyder appeared, saw through the whole plot. As he had no present means of defeating it, he made a merit of necessity, and after adjusting preliminaries in a separate interview with Hyder, came out and announced to the troops that the raja had assumed the principal direction of his own affairs, and permitted him to retire. It would therefore be unjust to continue any longer sitting in *dharna* upon him, as he was no longer responsible for their arrears. "Then," exclaimed a voice, "remove the *dharna* to the gate of the raja." This was carried by acclamation; and Hyder, still under apparent compulsion, accompanied them as before.

This second *dharna*, forming part of the intrigue, caused no alarm at the palace, and a message from the raja requested that Kundi Rao should be sent to him. After a sham conference Kundi Rao came out and intimated to the troops that the raja would find means to satisfy their demand, provided Hyder would take a solemn oath to obey his orders, and have nothing more to do with the usurper Nunjiraj, for whose retirement, however, a liberal provision would be made. Hyder, of course, took the oath, though with hypocritical reluctance, from its binding him to abandon his old master; and, after a short visit to the palace, returned to say, that as a few days would be required to complete the arrangements, he was himself ready, in the meantime, to be personally responsible for the liquidation of the arrears. With this assurance the troops withdrew, perfectly satisfied.

Under these arrangements, Hyder received new assignments of revenue, which, added to those formerly received, gave him direct possession of more than a half of the raja's whole territory. The remainder was also under his immediate control, as

Kundi Rao had been appointed dewan. The only exception was the *jaghir* given as a provision to Nunjiraj. Its annual produce was three lacs of pagodas (about £120,000); but out of this he was bound to maintain, for the service of the state, 1,000 horse and 3,000 infantry. Nunjiraj left the capital in June, 1759, with the professed intention of visiting a celebrated temple, about twenty-five miles southward, but was, or affected to be taken ill at Mysore. Here he fixed his residence, only nine miles from Seringapatam. As this was deemed a dangerous proximity, it was intimated to him, that in consideration of his being relieved from the maintenance of troops two-thirds of his *jaghir*, assumed to be their annual expense, was to be assigned to Hyder, and that he must remove to a greater distance. Indignant at this treatment, he addressed a letter to Hyder in the following terms:—"I have made you what you are, and now you refuse me a place in which to hide my head. Do what you please, or what you can; I move not from Mysore." Hyder made no scruple of using compulsion, and commenced a regular siege. From ignorance or design the operations were conducted so sluggishly that three months were wasted before Nunjiraj consented to capitulate, and to remove to Cumnur, about twenty-five miles further west. To magnify the importance of this success, and delude the raja into the belief that he was now his own master, he was invited to Mysore, to inspect the approaches and batteries which had been raised for its reduction. This was the first time he had been allowed to visit the ancient residence of his predecessors. Hyder did not forget himself on the occasion, and partly on the ground of the expense incurred in the siege, asked and obtained assignments on the revenues of four additional districts. This demand was opposed even by Kundi Rao, and so disgusted him as to become the cause of a coolness between him and his master. The effects of this coolness will afterwards be seen.

The French governor, Lally, when disaster after disaster was overtaking him, entered into communication with Hyder, and in 1760 concluded with him a treaty, the nature and consequences of which have already been described. Hyder had previously contemplated the conquest of the Baramahal, a province situated on the east of Mysore, and taking its name

from twelve mountain forts forming the capitals of so many districts. It had formerly belonged to Mysore, but been wrested from it by the Patan Nabob of Kurpa of Cuddapah. An officer who had been governor of it, having been dismissed, pointed out to Hyder that it might easily be reconquered, and it was accordingly determined to attempt it. On the direct road between the Baramahal and Seringapatam lay the fort and district of Anikul, belonging to a polygar. As he might thus have been able to interrupt the communication, it was deemed a necessary preliminary to wrest it from him. This was successfully accomplished by Makhdum, Hyder's brother-in-law, and to him the subjugation of the Baramahal was also intrusted. He had again been successful, and there was now nothing to prevent Hyder from making his way to the very heart of the Carnatic. It was probably the knowledge of this fact that induced Lally to propose an alliance with Hyder, and grant him the favourable terms stipulated in the treaty. The results were at first promising, and when Hyder at the very outset succeeded in defeating the corps which Coote had detached under Major Moore, he was so elated that he resolved to exceed the number of troops which he had agreed to furnish. He was thus taking an active part in the Carnatic war, and indulging the hope of securing a permanent footing within its limits, when an event occurred which brought him to the verge of ruin.

The old dowager princess who had planned the expulsion of Nunjiraj, soon began to perceive that the person substituted for him was likely to prove a more dangerous usurper. The alienation of Kundi Rao from Hyder had not escaped her notice, and she therefore ventured to make him again her confidant. She pointed out to him how the greater part of Hyder's troops were engaged at a distance in the assigned district, in the Baramahal and in the Carnatic. Hyder himself was cantoned under the fire of the garrison, with only 100 horse and 1,500 infantry. The rest of his disposable troops, and the greater part of the artillery were on the other side of the river, which was then full. How easy, then, would it be, by taking possession of the fort, and preventing him from receiving any reinforcement, to shut him up within the island, and make him prisoner? A body of Maratha horse, 20,000 strong, were hovering on the north

frontier of Mysore, ready to sell their services, and there would, therefore, be no difficulty in purchasing their aid. Kundi Rao heard the proposal with contending emotions. He would rather not have taken part in a plot which aimed at nothing less than the destruction of a master whom he had long served, and to whom, though he now regarded him with altered feelings, he had at one time been devotedly attached. On the other hand, as he could have no doubt as to what the ultimate aims of Hyder were, was he, a Brahmin, to refuse his co-operation when asked to save a Hindu dynasty from extinction and prevent a Muhammedan dynasty from usurping its place? Then why should he overlook the contingent advantages to himself? Might he not one day gain possession of the very seat to which Hyder was aspiring? The temptation was too great for Kundi Rao, and he accompanied the raja and the dowager to the great temple of the capital, to take an oath of mutual fidelity.

In execution of the scheme a negotiation was concluded with Visaji Pundit, the Maratha leader, who engaged to approach Seringapatam with 6,000 horse. Early in the morning of the day on which they were expected, a tremendous cannonade from the fort was suddenly opened on Hyder and his troops. Utterly astonished, he called for Kundi Rao, but it was only to learn that he might see him on the works directing the fire of the guns. The full extent of the danger was now disclosed, and Hyder made every possible preparation to meet it. Having placed his troops under the cover of ravines and hollows, and removed his family to a hut beyond the reach of the fire, he secured all the boats and boatmen of the adjoining ferry, and stationed them where they could not be seen from the fort. His troops on the other side, so far from being able to give him assistance, had been surprised by a portion of the garrison previously placed in ambuscade, and completely dispersed. Had the Marathas appeared at the appointed time, nothing could have saved him. As usual, however, they were too late, and Kundi Rao did not venture to make his final attack without them. While waiting their arrival he endeavoured to amuse Hyder with negotiation. It is said that in the course of it he laboured to convince his old master that he was obliged to act against him, as he was now the raja's servant, but retained so

much of his old attachment that he would wink at his escape during the night. Be this as it may, Hyder did escape with about 100 horsemen, and a considerable quantity of treasure, by crossing in the boats and swimming over the horses and two camels. On reaching the north bank they loaded the camels and hurried off. Hyder's family, including the afterwards celebrated Tipu, then in his ninth year, were left behind and made prisoners. He himself continued his flight to the north-east, and arrived before daybreak at Anikul, a distance of seventy-five miles, with only forty horses, all the rest having broken down from fatigue. From Anikul, which, from being in the charge of his brother-in-law Ismael Ali, was easily secured, he proceeded to Bangalore, which had been nearly lost to him, in consequence of a message from Kundi Rao announcing the change which had taken place. Dindigul, at the opposite extremity of Mysore, also was preserved; but these towns, and the Baramahal posts, were all the places on whose fidelity he could calculate. Makhdum was still at Pondicherry with a considerable force; but it was more than doubtful if he would ever be able to obey the order given him to hasten across the country with the least possible delay. Besides the obstacles which Kundi Rao would interpose, he was encumbered with the plunder collected in Arcot.

Meanwhile Hyder exerted himself to the utmost to recover from his almost desperate position. From the bankers of Bangalore he raised a loan of £40,000, many small detachments of his old followers arrived, and adventurers from all quarters flocked to his standard. The most distinguished of these, both in rank and reputation, was Fazal Ulla Khan, belonging to an eminent family in Delhi, and son of Dilawar Khan, who had been Nabob of Sera before the Marathas under Balaji Rao made a conquest of it. The value at which he rated himself, and was also rated by Hyder, appears from the terms of the stipulation which he concluded with the latter on entering his service. One primary condition was, "that whether on a saddle cloth, a carpet, or a musnud, his place should be on the same seat with Hyder, his officer but his equal; and that he should have the distinction of two honorary attendants standing behind

him, holding fans composed of the feathers of the *humma*, according to the practice of his family."¹

Makhdum, about the end of September, 1760, entered the Baramahal, through the pass of Changama, and spent some time in disencumbering himself of his plunder, and collecting the disposable troops of the garrison. Kundi Rao, fully alive to the importance of preventing his junction with Hyder, had for this purpose placed his best troops under Gopal Hari, who commanded the 6,000 horse that arrived a day too late at Seringapatam, and had moreover been joined by a detachment of 4,000 more. These had been sent to him by Visaji Pundit, who was himself encamped at the summit of the pass of Cudapanatam, leading directly to Vellore. Makhdum, opposed by all these troops, was compelled to take post under Anchittydrug, situated near the verge of the descent into the Baramahal, about forty-eight miles south-east of Bangalore. Here he was completely blockaded. Hyder, to whom he reported his critical position, mustered about 4,000 men and five guns, all that could be spared from the defence of Bangalore, and placed them under the command of Fazal Ulla Khan, who, in attempting to force the blockade, sustained a severe repulse, which obliged him to retreat to Anikul. Makhdum was in consequence reduced to extremity, and Hyder's ruin seemed inevitable, when his good fortune again saved him.

Visaji Pundit had been playing as usual a Maratha game, and selling himself successively to all the contending parties—first to Kundi Rao, as we have seen, at Seringapatam; next to Lally, who was to give him five lacs of rupees as soon as his

¹ Wilks, *Historical Sketches*, vol. i, p. 423. In explanation of the above terms, the colonel subjoins the two following notes relative to the *saddle-cloth* and the *humma*:—"To persons whose habitual seat is exactly that of an English tailor, a chair is an useless annoyance, and the large double or quilted cloth which covers the saddle is a commodious seat for one or two, and a relief from fatigue always ready without a moment's preparation:—I am not certain what the feathers really were; they are described to have been white and of a downy appearance. The *humma* is a fabulous bird. The head over which its shadow once passes will assuredly be encircled with a crown. The splendid little bird suspended over the throne of Tipu Sultan, found at Seringapatam in 1799, was intended to represent this poetical fancy."

army should appear in sight of Pondicherry; and next to Muhammad Ali, who, alarmed at this French alliance, agreed in January, 1761, to purchase his immediate departure to Poona for the large sum of twenty lacs, payable by instalments. Being thus under an obligation to quit the country, Visaji Pundit very readily listened to an overture to the same effect from Hyder, and offered to be contented with the trifling payment of three lacs and the cession of the Baramahal. On payment of the lacs Visaji Pundit hastened off to the northward. Hyder was astonished, and learned with delight that the cession of the Baramahal, which he had delayed, might now be wholly evaded. The great battle of Panipat had been fought, and the Marathas, as if they already saw the Abdalis at their gates, were concentrating all their forces for the defence of Poona. Makhdum, thus relieved from blockade, proceeded to Bangalore. Kundi Rao, after the expulsion of Hyder from Seringapatam, had, in his own name and that of the raja, addressed letters explanatory of the transaction to all the neighbouring powers, among others to the presidency of Madras, who, in retaliation of Hyder's assistance to the French, and attack upon Madura, had sent a detachment from Trichinopoly to besiege Carur, a frontier fort of Mysore, situated about forty miles westward. The presidency, scarcely, knowing what to make of Kundi Rao's letter, and the contradictory reports which reached them, agreed to a capitulation, which allowed the garrison to depart on giving up possession of the place, and in the meantime refrained from further hostilities. The contest for supremacy in Mysore was now actively carried on. Kundi Rao made himself master of the whole of the lower country from the Baramahal to Dindigul, with the single exception of this fort. Hyder's exertions were scarcely less successful. On the very day when Makhdum joined him he took the field with a force so superior that he was able to send a detachment to Salem and Coimbatore, for the purpose of recovering their revenues. This detachment considerably reduced the numbers of his troops, but he had improved their quality by taking into his pay a French detachment of 200 cavalry and 100 infantry, who, having been stationed in the vicinity of Thiagur, deemed it useless to continue in the service of their own Company after the fall of Pondicherry.

Kundi Rao and Hyder, once related as servant and master, but now placed at the head of hostile armies, prepared for the decisive encounter. Hyder's force amounted to 6,000 horse and 5,000 foot, with twenty guns; Kundi Rao's, to 7,000 horse and 6,000 foot, with twenty-eight guns. After some days spent in skirmishing and manoeuvring, Hyder felt his inferiority, and would fain have waited for reinforcements. Kundi Rao, on the other hand, confident of his advantage, forced on an engagement, and gained the victory. Hyder sustained a very heavy loss; and though he had managed to retreat in tolerable order, despaired of being able, with his present means, to carry on the campaign. In this extremity he adopted a very singular expedient. Having retreated to Hurdanhulli, about forty miles S.S.E. of Seringapatam, he selected 200 horse, including seventy French hussars, and, stealing off by night, arrived next morning at Cunnur. Unattended, he made his appearance as a supplicant at the door of Nunjiraj, and on being admitted threw himself at his feet, confessed his ingratitude, attributed all his misfortunes to it, and with the utmost earnestness implored his old master to resume the direction of affairs, and take him once more under his protection. Nunjiraj was completely duped, and causing letters to be issued in all quarters, announcing his return to power, not only made Hyder his commander-in-chief, but gave him a body of troops whom he had in his pay, amounting to about 2,000 horse and 2,000 infantry. There was no doubt that Kundi Rao, on hearing of the visit to Cunnur, would immediately set out in that direction. Calculating on this, Hyder had left orders to his army to hang on Kundi Rao's rear and retard his movements. He endeavoured in the meantime to effect a junction. This, Kundi Rao, by superior manoeuvring, prevented, and Hyder's ruin was again imminent, when stratagem once more came to his aid, and effected a deliverance which prowess could not have achieved. While Hyder was retiring, closely pursued, he prepared letters in the name and with the seal of Nunjiraj, and addressed them to Kundi Rao's principal officers. Their purport was to remind them of their engagement to deliver Kundi Rao into his hands, and urge them to lose no time in earning the promised reward. The bearer of the letters was instructed to allow himself to be

apprehended with them in his possession. The conspiracy to betray and seize Kundi Rao was of course a fiction; but he believed it, and consulting only his fears, hastened off at full speed for Seringapatam. His unexplained flight threw his army into disorder. Hyder, in anticipation of this result, had stopped short in front, and had ordered his other division to approach as near as possible in the rear. He thus placed the enemy between two fires, and drove them in confusion from the field, capturing all their infantry, guns, stores, and baggage. The horse, indeed, saved themselves by an early flight, but the infantry, indifferent to everything but pay, were easily induced to change sides, and swell the victor's army.

Hyder's way was now clear; but he always trusted more to stratagem than manly warfare. Hearing that a great number of the fugitives had collected, he halted for several days under pretence of collecting the revenue, till he lulled them into security, and cut most of them to pieces during a midnight surprise. This exploit took place on the very island of Seringapatam; but, as he was unwilling to risk an encounter with the garrison, he immediately retired to the opposite bank, and, while amusing Kundi Rao with negotiations, watched his opportunity. The force opposed to him was still formidable, consisting of about 6,000 horse, chiefly Marathas, and a body of infantry encamped so near the fort as to be partly under its guns. During seven days of tacit armistice, Hyder, encamped without the island, on the opposite bank, made a show of exercising his troops till after sunset. On the eighth day, as if still continuing his evolutions, he made a sudden dash into the river, which was then fordable, and effected a complete surprise. All the heavy equipment and most of the horses fell into his hands, and his whole troops passed over into the island. It only remained to dictate terms, and he sent a message to the raja. Its substance was, "that Kundi Rao was the servant of Hyder, and ought to be given up to him; that large balances were due to Hyder by the state, and ought to be liquidated. If, after payment, the raja would be pleased to continue him in his service, it was well; if not, he would depart and seek his fortune elsewhere." The meaning of this language, notwithstanding its affected moderation, was too easily understood,

and the terms arranged were, that districts to the amount of three lacs for the raja and one lac for Nunjiraj should be reserved; that the management of the remainder of the country should be assumed by Hyder, who would provide for the arrears and pay of the army, and all other charges; and that Kundi Rao should be given up.

The interview with Nunjiraj, and stipulations which followed upon it, were forgotten, or occasionally reacted in ridiculous forms for Hyder's amusement during his hours of low conviviality. Before Kundi Rao was delivered, intercession was made for him by the raja and the ladies of the palace; and Hyder, ever ready with a promise to the ear, replied, that "he would not only spare the life of his old servant, but cherish him like a parroquet"—a pet bird in Muhammedan harems. When afterwards remonstrated with for severity of treatment, he affirmed that he had kept his word. "If they had any doubt on the subject they were at liberty to see his iron cage and the rice and milk allotted for his food." The events which made Hyder absolute master of Mysore took place in the latter part of the year 1761.

Basalat Jung, one of the brothers of Salabat Jung, held the government of Adoni, but had begun, like his other brother, Nizam Ali, to aspire to independence. After the battle of Panipat, in 1761, the Marathas, who had previously kept him in check, left the field open for his ambition, and in June, 1761, he planned the reduction of Sera, then in their possession, though formerly a nabobship dependent on the Subahdar of the Deccan. The enterprise seemed to him, after reconnoitring the citadel, too formidable, and he continued his march southward. Hyder, on hearing of his approach, appointed Makhdum, now Makhdum Ali Khan, *killadar* of Seringapatam, and hastened off early in September to Bangalore. When he arrived he found Basalat Jung engaged in the siege of Uscota, a fort situated only eighteen miles to the north-east. Though of little real strength, the Maratha garrison derided the feeble efforts of Basalat Jung to take it, and he was preparing to abandon it with an empty military chest when he received a friendly communication from Hyder. Nothing could be more opportune; and, after a negotiation conducted by Fazal Ulla Khan, an

agreement was entered into, by which he undertook, for a present of three lacs, to invest Hyder with the office of Nabob of Sera. Nothing could be more ludicrous, as both giver and receiver were destitute of the least shadow of title whether by right or possession. This, however, was no obstacle; and regular *sanads* or deeds of investiture were executed, in virtue of which Hyder assumed the title of *nabob*, and the name of Hyder Ali Khan Bahadur. By this name, or rather the two first words of it, Hyder Ali, he was henceforth usually designated. Fazal Ulla Khan was at the same time rewarded for his share in the negotiation by the title of Haibat Jung. A few days after these transactions the two armies united their forces, and Uscota was captured.

Great Balipur, belonging to the nabobship of Sera, was of course included in the fictitious grant. Basalat Jung had wished to exclude it, but Hyder declared that he would break off the negotiation altogether sooner than consent. This place, it will be recollected, was the *jaghir* of Abbas Kuli Khan, who so basely plundered and tortured Hyder himself and his widowed mother and brother. He had vowed a full and deep revenge, and was now in hope of being able to gratify it. Abbas Kuli Khan, as soon as he heard of the junction of the two armies, saw his danger, and lost no time in escaping to Madras, a distance of above 200 miles. As he had left his family to their fate, revenge was still possible; and it must be mentioned as one of the few occasions on which Hyder showed himself capable of generous feelings, that, forgetting the injury, and remembering only some kindnesses which he had received in childhood, he presented himself at the gate of the fugitive's mother, and assured her of his gratitude and respect. He was as good as his word, and ever after treated her and the unoffending members of her family with generosity. The united armies proceeded to Sera, which yielded without much difficulty. Hyder thus succeeded in converting his futile title into a real and substantial possession. About the beginning of 1762 the armies separated, Basalat Jung going north to Adoni, where his presence was required in consequence of the usurpation of supreme power in the Deccan by his brother Nizam; while Hyder moved southward to attempt a new conquest.

Little Balipur was in the hands of a polygar. Its situation, fourteen miles east of Great Balipur, and twelve north of Deonhulli, made it a very desirable possession for Hyder, who had early set his heart upon it. Immediately north of it lay the territories of the Maratha chief, Murari Rao, who was not likely to acquiesce in a conquest which would bring him into immediate proximity to a powerful neighbour. As the place was almost open, Hyder commenced the siege in the belief that he was about to make a speedy capture, but the polygar for a long time baffled all his efforts, by contesting every inch of ground. In this vigorous defence he was encouraged by the promise of Murari Rao to come to his relief. The Maratha chief, indeed, made the attempt, but failed, and sustained a severe repulse. Disappointed in this hope, the polygar professed to treat, and agreed to pay nine lacs as ransom. On the conclusion of this agreement, Hyder, who had been suffering as much from pestilence as from war, drew off and encamped in the plain near Deonhulli, there to remain till the ransom should be paid. Strange to say, he had been foiled at his own favourite weapon. The polygar, after baffling him in fair fight, had proved an overmatch for him even in duplicity, by retiring into the impenetrable fort of Nundidrug, only three miles distant, and allowing Murari Rao to throw a body of troops into Little Balipur. Hyder, enraged beyond measure at finding himself a dupe, commenced the siege anew, and in about ten days carried the place by assault. Murari Rao acknowledged that he was beaten, by retiring to Gooti, and allowing Hyder to prosecute his victorious career. Place after place submitted, and a large tract of country to the north and north-east of Sera fell into his hands.

Hyder's attention was in the meantime called to another conquest of still greater importance. The Nabob of Chittaldrug, one of those who had made their submission, informed him that he had a singular visitor in his camp. Buswapa Naik, Raja of Bednore, had died in 1755, leaving, as his heir, an adopted son, Chen Busveia, about seventeen years of age, under the guardianship of his widow, as rani. She formed a connection with a person of the name of Nimbeia, and caused so much scandal by her misconduct that the youth ventured to remon-

strate with her. The effect was to cost him his life; for in 1757 the widow and her paramour hired a *jetti*, a kind of athlete, to dislocate his neck while shampooing him in the bath. The visitor in the Chittaldrug camp claimed to be this very Chen Busveia. The *jetti*, he said, instead of destroying, had preserved him concealed in his house for five years, and he himself was seeking aid in the recovery of his rights. Hyder saw the use that might be made of him, and entered into an agreement to attempt his restoration. Accordingly, in the beginning of 1763, he set out for Bednore, the central district of which, including the capital, extended along the summit of the Western Ghats, overlooking Canara and Malabar. Here, from the quantity of moisture attracted by the mountains, rain falls during nine months in the year, and vegetation is remarkable for its luxuriance. The forests of teak are magnificent, and the undergrowth forms tangled thickets which are almost impenetrable. The capital and fort of Bednore occupied the centre of a basin, inclosed by hills at the distance of three to six miles. These constituted its real strength, as only a few of the weakest points had been fortified. In addition to the central district, the territories of Bednore extended both eastward over a considerable tract of table-land, and west to the sea-coast of Canara.

On entering the province, Hyder issued a proclamation, calling upon the inhabitants to return to their allegiance. At Simoga, which was situated on the skirts of the woods about forty-three miles from the capital, and became an easy capture, he found a lac of pagodas of four rupees each, and was offered four lacs of pagodas by the rani as the purchase of his retreat. He continued his advance, and at Cumpsi released Lingana, the minister of the late raja, from imprisonment. Lingana at once gave in his adherence to Hyder, and gave him important information in regard both to the condition and the resources of the country. He also undertook to conduct him by a secret path to the city, without being obliged to encounter the fortifications. Thus instructed, he continued to advance without difficulty, striking terror by cutting off the ears and noses of a small garrison that presumed to fire upon him, and rejecting successive offers from the rani of twelve lacs of pagodas (£480,000), and eighteen lacs (£720,000). When the rani and her paramour

despaired of accommodation, they fled to the hill-fort of Bellalroydrug, about seventy miles to the southward, leaving orders for the immediate removal of the treasure, and if that proved impracticable, for setting the palace and treasury on fire. The secret path pointed out by Lingana enabled Hyder to defeat these desperate orders, and while his main body made a feigned attack on the forts in front, he was within the city at the head of a select column before his approach was suspected.

Bednore, which is said to have been eight miles in circuit, and had hitherto been exempted from the miseries of war, was one of the richest commercial towns of the East, and must have yielded an immense amount in plunder. In collecting it Hyder was perfectly in his element. In a few hours his official seals were placed on every public and private dwelling above the condition of a hovel, and guards were stationed to prevent any removal of property either by the inhabitants or by his soldiers. The value actually realized in money, jewels, and other available articles, can only be guessed at; but Colonel Wilks says (vol. i, p. 452), that "it may, without risk of exaggeration, be estimated at £12,000,000 sterling, and was throughout life habitually spoken of by Hyder as the foundation of all his subsequent greatness." The rest of the Bednore territory was easily conquered. Two principal detachments took possession of the seaports of Mangalore and Onore, or Honawar, with Bussu Raj Drug, or Fortified Island, in front of it; while a third gained Bellalroydrug by the capitulation of the rani, who surrendered on the general assurance of due consideration for her rank and dignity. She probably expected to be reinstated in the sovereignty; and as an additional inducement to Hyder to grant it, declared her conversion to Islam. He had no such intention, and confined her with her paramour and an adopted son in the hill-fort of Mudgherri, situated among the mountains, fifty-six miles north-west of Bangalore. The pseudo-*raja* Chen Busveia was sent to share their prison. Hyder, though aware from the first that he was an impostor, treated him with the greatest external respect till the rani fell into his power. After that, when he could no longer be of any use, he left him to become the standing joke of the camp, the soldiers amusing themselves by saluting him as the Ghobu Raja, or Raja of the Resurrection. He could not

have been dangerous if left at large, but a prison was perhaps the proper place for him.

Bednore was from the first treated by Hyder as a separate kingdom. Seringapatam and its dependencies belonged, he said, to the Raja of Mysore, but Bednore was his own. Hence he not only administered its affairs by a distinct minister, but changed its name. Having been informed, a few days after the capture, that it had been intended to increase the houses to 90,000, the number which constitutes a *nagar*, he exclaimed—"We will not mar the project; it shall be called Hyder Nagar." He even contemplated making it his capital, and with that view commenced a splendid palace, and established a mint, in which he struck coins in his own name for the first time. He also ordered the construction of a naval arsenal and dockyard at Honawar. While Hyder was busily occupied with these schemes the rains set in, and the endemic disease, which strangers seldom escape at that season, so seriously impaired his health that he was unable to appear in the public durbar. The servants of the former dynasty, dissatisfied with their new position, entered into a conspiracy to assassinate him. Having received some hints which put him on his guard, he ordered an investigation to be made by a commission composed of persons in whom he placed the greatest confidence. They were themselves accomplices in the conspiracy, and of course reported that his suspicions were groundless. When the report was read to him he was lying shivering in a paroxysm of ague. The true state of matters, however, did not escape him, and the moment the fit was over, he entered the durbar, re-examined the witnesses, and laid bare the whole plot. The commissioners were instantly hanged in his presence, in front of the hall of audience; and before the day closed, above 300 of the principal conspirators were hanging in the leading thoroughfares.

In December, 1763, Fazal Ulla Khan was detached for the conquest of Sunda, a small principality north of Bednore, and effected it with facility. About the same time, Reza Ali Khan, son of the late Chanda Sahib, who had retired to Ceylon on the capture of Pondicherry, landed in Canara. On arriving at Hyder's court he was received with distinction, presented with a *jaghir* yielding annually a lac of rupees, and employed in several important services. From his long intercourse with the

French he was able to assist Hyder in re-organizing his army, which was now clothed in a uniform manner for the first time, and classed into *avvul* and *duum*, first and second, or grenadiers and troops of the line. The former, selected not merely for superior strength and stature, but tried steadiness and courage, received higher pay. The system of police was also strictly regulated, and more attention was paid to courtly equipments and etiquette.

Knowing that the conquest of Sera must have given great offence both to the Subahdar of the Deccan, who claimed it as a dependency, and to the Marathas, from whom it was wrested, Hyder made soothing applications to both, and sent to their respective capitals deputies provided with rich gifts, and *soucar* or bank credit for large sums of money. At Hyderabad, where the want of money was extreme, and everything was venal, the object was easily accomplished, but at Poona great difficulty was experienced. The Peshwa Balaji Rao had died of a broken heart in consequence of the defeat at Panipat, and been succeeded by his son, Madho Rao, who, intent on regaining all that had been lost, refused to make a formal cession of any part of his dominions. Hyder, thus made aware that from that quarter an invasion might sooner or later be expected, lost no time in strengthening his frontier. By the annexation of Sera the northern frontier was brought to the river Tungabhadra; the conquest of Bednore and Sunda had carried it still further, but left a deep gap or indentation formed by Savanur. Could this province, and also those of Kurnool and Kurpa, or Cuddapah, be included within Hyder's dominions, he might establish a sort of defensive cordon, extending continuously from the western coast to the Eastern Ghats, where they are traversed by the Pennar. The accomplishment of this object was now seriously contemplated, though it was foreseen that it could only be realized by either conquering the Pathan nabobs of these three provinces, or converting them into sincere and trustworthy allies.

Hyder began with the Nabob of Savanur, and found it impossible to convince him that an alliance with himself would be more conducive to his interests than that which now bound him to the Marathas. The only alternative, therefore, was to employ force; and Fazal Ulla Khan, after completing the

conquest of Sunda, was instructed to enter Savanur, and, without actual hostility, try the effect of his presence in the way of terror or persuasion. The nabob Abdul Hakim Khan disdained to conceal his intentions, and positively refused the proffered alliance. Hyder hereupon hastened to join Fazal Ulla Khan, with his army from Bednore. The rashness of the nabob in risking an action in the field, led to his complete discomfiture, and he not only submitted to all that he had previously refused, but to a military contribution of two lacs of rupees. Circumstances recalled Hyder to Bednore, but Fazal Ulla Khan, left with a large division of the army, pursued his conquests northward with so much success that several places of strength, including Dharwar, belonging to the Marathas, fell into his hands, and the Mysore frontier was extended nearly to the banks of the Krishna.

The Marathas had never contemplated an attack of their territories from the south, and were therefore the more astonished and alarmed at Fazal Ulla Khan's approach. For some time Madho Rao had been engaged in active hostility with Nizam Ali, who, at the outset of his usurpation, gave some promise of military talent, and besides recovering Daulatabad by negotiation in 1762, had, in 1763, captured Poona, and reduced it to ashes. During this struggle Madho Rao could offer no effectual opposition to Hyder's proceedings, but in the beginning of 1764 he found himself at leisure to make preparations on a scale proportioned to the greatness of the emergency. Gopal Rao, the Maratha chief of Meritch, or Miruj, situated immediately north of the Krishna, was furnished with a strong reinforcement, and ordered to cross the river, and keep the enemy in check till the main army should arrive. He adopted a less prudent course, and on finding his numbers superior to those of Fazal Ulla Khan, risked a general engagement, in which he was signally defeated. This battle was fought in April. In May, Madho Rao appeared at the head of an immense host. Fazal Ulla Khan fell back as he advanced, and at last joined Hyder, who had taken up a position at Rettehulli, fifty-six miles north-east of Bednore. Woods, extending without interruption between these two places, gave cover to his infantry against cavalry, in which the enemy was far superior in numbers. His army mustered 20,000 horse, 20,000 regular infantry, 20,000 irregular foot, or peons, armed chiefly

with matchlocks, and a respectable train of artillery. Madho Rao had at least double this force in all the branches of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. The Marathas, approaching in their usual way, covered the whole country with their cavalry, and were able, by their numerical superiority, to invest Hyder's camp, and cut off his supplies. He was satisfied at first to remain on the defensive, in the hope that the enemy might be tempted to attack him; but when he found that they declined this, and were in the meantime, by sending out detachments, wresting from him all his conquests, he determined to bring on a general action, while still keeping so near his position as not to lose the advantages of it. With this view, leaving Fazal Ulla Khan in command of the camp, he descended into the plain with 20,000 chosen troops, and commenced a series of manoeuvres. By these he hoped to entrap the enemy, but the result was that he only entrapped himself, and when at the distance of six or seven miles from his encampment, discovered Madho Rao with his whole army closing upon him in every direction. Hyder fought his way back with much skill and courage, but did not reach Rettehulli without a severe loss in the flower of his army. The next day the want of supplies obliged him to fall back, and he again sustained a new loss while manoeuvring to gain an advantage. Hitherto the campaign had been to him only a series of disasters; and before any more could be attempted the rains set in.

Madho Rao cantoned his troops to the eastward of Savanur, and as soon as the rains began to subside, employed himself in sending detachments across the Tungabhadra, and reducing the whole of the eastern parts of Bednore, and the adjacent parts of Mysore. Hyder's army, dispirited and sickly, had no inclination to resume active operations. No choice, however, was given them, as Madho Rao, in the beginning of 1765, began to make preparations for assailing their entrenched camp at Anawutti. With this view he commenced cutting a wide opening in the woods to the south of the encampment, and to form a line of circumvallation around it, by felling the gigantic forests. The object evidently was to hem in Hyder on every side, cut off his communication with Bednore, and reduce him to the necessity of surrendering at discretion. His only escape was a speedy retreat, and this he immediately commenced. Madho Rao

followed close in pursuit, and by interposing between him and a point which he was endeavouring to gain, forced him to a general action, under circumstances so unfavourable that it terminated in a disorderly rout. His troops, afraid to keep the field, retired into the woods, and the garrisons, sharing their terror, surrendered without venturing to stand a siege. By the end of January he had been driven back to the heights around Bednore. Experience had now proved that he committed a great blunder in selecting Bednore for a capital. Its woods had proved a trap rather than an asylum, and he commenced removing his family and treasure to Seringapatam. No longer dreaming of conquest, or even of a continuance of hostilities, he made private advances for negotiation, and procured terms which, though severe, were more favourable than his circumstances entitled him to expect. The leading conditions were, that he should restore all conquests made from Murari Rao, abandon all claims on the Nabob and country of Savanur, and pay thirty-two lacs to Madho Rao, who agreed on receipt to retire.

During this disastrous campaign in the west, all Hyder's acquisitions in the east were in a state of revolt. The flames of rebellion had spread over Sera, the two Balipurs, Uscota, Bangalore, and Deonhulli. By the exertions of Hyder's brother-in-law, Mir Ali Reza, most of these flames were speedily quenched. The polygar of Little Balipur was also starved out of his mountain fastness of Nundidrug, and obliged to enter into an equivocal capitulation, which ultimately consigned him to perpetual imprisonment in the fort of Coimbatore. Further to the south-east, Fazal Ulla Khan exerted himself in restoring order and levying revenue. Hyder, even in the midst of reverses, had his ear ever open to any ambitious scheme, and on finding a favourable opening, readily turned his attention to the coast of Malabar. The expedition of Makhдум Sahib, in 1757, had made him well acquainted with its southern districts, and Ali Raja, who held the fort of Cananore, as a dependency of the Raja of Colastri, or Chericul, had, while claiming his protection at Bednore, given him important information with regard to the more northerly portion. The subdivision of the country into little clanships, subject to incessant revolution, made him believe that the conquest would not be difficult; and therefore, after

spending the greater part of 1765 in repairing the disasters of the late campaign, he made a descent into Canara, in the beginning of 1766, with the avowed intention of adding Malabar to his dominions.

Proceeding southward from Mangalore, under the guidance of Ali Raja, and with Ali Reza Khan, Chanda Sahib's son, as his second in command, he crossed the Malabar frontier, and commenced operations by issuing the atrocious mandate to grant no quarter. The Nairs, or military class of the inhabitants, though guilty in their domestic arrangements of very brutal practices, have a proud, independent spirit, and are always ready to die in defence of their freedom. Their want of discipline placed them at a great disadvantage, but their courage compensated for other defects, and Hyder was soon obliged to confess that he had seldom, if ever, encountered so formidable an enemy. Their concealed fire from the woods could not be returned with effect, and whenever a favourable moment occurred, they were on the alert to rush out and inflict serious loss on moving columns. Hyder was able, notwithstanding, by his superior discipline, to advance gradually through the territory of the five northern chiefs, and approach Calicut. Maan Vicran Raj, the zamorin, convinced that resistance would prove unavailing, and being assured that early submission would procure for him special favour, made his appearance in Hyder's camp on the 11th of April, 1766; and, after a most flattering reception, and a present of valuable jewels, was confirmed in his territories as Hyder's tributary, on agreeing to pay a military contribution of four lacs of Venetian sequins. Mutual suspicions of insincerity soon arose, and as the monsoon was approaching, while the contribution was unpaid, Hyder believed that it was intended to delay payment till the season would make it impossible for him to enforce it. In this belief he placed both the zamorin and his ministers under restraint, and endeavoured to extort treasure from the latter by subjecting them to torture. The zamorin, to avoid similar indignity and cruelty, barricaded the doors of the house in which he was confined, and setting fire to it, perished in the flames, with many of his attendants; several of those who happened to be excluded rushing in to seek a voluntary death with their master.

Scenes like these, though they increased Hyder's difficulties, did not awaken in him any feelings of humanity, and he continued to torture as often as he thought treasure could be extracted by it. At the same time he proceeded with the utmost coolness in securing and consolidating his conquest. The fort of Calicut was enlarged and improved, strong posts were stationed in different parts of the country, and the civil administration was intrusted to Madana, an experienced revenue officer. So widely had Hyder spread the terror of his name, that even after he had quitted the country, and was on the way to Coimbatore, the Rajas of Cochin and Palghat sent messengers after him to make their submission and pay tribute. The subjugation of the country was, however, more apparent than real. Under no circumstances would the natives of Malabar have tamely acquiesced in the loss of freedom; and Madana, though a skilful financier, was little acquainted with the means of conciliating favour. His harsh and injudicious proceedings increased the discontent which generally prevailed, and within three months after Hyder's arrival at Coimbatore the Nairs were in open rebellion. Taking advantage of the swollen rivers, which cut off all communication between the isolated posts or block-houses which had been established throughout the province, they attacked and destroyed them in detail. Hyder lost no time in retracing his steps, and the work of retaliation commenced. At first he hanged or beheaded all his prisoners; but on finding that their numbers continually increased, he conceived the idea of carrying them off and settling them in other parts of his dominions which the ravages of war had depopulated. In carrying out this scheme, the most obvious provisions which humanity dictated were neglected; and disease, famine, and mental misery made fearful ravages. Of 15,000 persons transported, not more than 200 are said to have survived.

When, by these cruel measures, Hyder had rid himself of those whom he believed to be most disaffected, he proclaimed an amnesty to all who should forthwith declare their submission. Many who had taken refuge in the woods were thus induced to return. On this appearance of restored tranquillity, Hyder again departed. As he was continuing his march, the propriety of securing a place of strength, which might serve as a central

depot, and keep open the communication between his new and his old conquests, occurred to him, and he gave orders for the erection of the fort of Palghat, situated in the great depression of the Western Ghats, and admirably adapted for the purpose which he had in view. In April, 1766, while Hyder was absent in Malabar, the pageant Raja of Mysore died. It was deemed good policy to give him a successor; and accordingly orders were sent to place his son, Nunjiraj Wadeyar, a youth of eighteen, on the musnud. In the beginning of 1767 Hyder returned to Seringapatam. One of his first acts was to perform the mock ceremony of doing homage to the new raja. How little was meant by it soon appeared; for on learning that the young man had expressed some impatience at his degraded position, the three lacs of pagodas allotted for his maintenance were withheld, his palace was even plundered of all its cash and valuables, and his household reduced to the lowest scale. While occupying himself with such niggardly cares, Hyder did not forget that business of greater moment demanded his immediate attention. A most formidable confederacy had been formed against him. Very recently Madho Rao, single-handed, had compelled him to succumb. What could he hope for on learning that Madho Rao, Nizam Ali, and the Company were leagued together for his destruction? Such was his position, and it was to prepare for what seemed to be the crisis of his fate, that he had hastened back to the capital. The details must be reserved for another chapter.

Hyder Ali (I I)

HYDER ALI, so long as his ambition was confined within the limits of Mysore, attracted little attention. He was regarded as a mere adventurer, whose fall would probably be as sudden as his rise had been, and whose proceedings, however much they might excite curiosity, could not be supposed capable of seriously affecting the future fortunes of the East India Company. As early, indeed, as 1757, some alarm had been excited in the presidency of Bombay, by the intelligence that a Muhammedan corps had for the first time entered Malabar. It was commanded, as has been already related, by Makhдум Sahib, Hyder's brother-in-law, and was directed against the Rajas of Cochin and Calicut, who were ultimately compelled to buy off the invader, by promising a military contribution of twelve lacs of rupees. Again, in 1760, when the presidency of Madras, in retaliation for the assistance given to the French, laid siege to the Mysore fort of Karur, Kundi Rao wrote to them, in the name of the raja, to explain that that assistance had been given, not by him, but by one of his officers, Hyder Naik, who was actually in rebellion against him. After these passing notices, Hyder did not again become an object of much concern to the Company, till 1763, after he had made the conquest of Bednore, captured Mangalore and Honawar, and openly avowed his intention of reducing all the other forts of the sea-coast. In several of these the Company had factories, and it was therefore obvious that they must either make some arrangement, or be forced into direct collision with him. As he professed an anxious desire for friendship, peaceful measures were of course preferred; and the presidency of Bombay, on the 27th of May, 1763, concluded a treaty, by which he

permitted them to erect a factory at Onore (Honawar) and to enjoy various commercial privileges. He expected something in return, and applied for 7,000 stand of arms. The presidency, unwilling to offend by a complete refusal, sent only 500. In March, 1764, they became less reserved in their support, and in the belief that he might check the Marathas and other freebooters on the coast, allowed him to purchase some cannon and build a fighting vessel at Bombay.

While granting these favours to Hyder, the Bombay council were by no means free from doubts as to their propriety. Hyder, they remarked, might yet become "a very formidable enemy, unless he should be cut off, which his enterprising spirit rendered very probable." Accordingly, when he would have committed them more deeply, by applying to them for succour during his struggle with Madho Rao, they declined taking any part, "unless satisfied that their interference was essential to promote the Company's interests." Their agent at Tellicherry spoke still more plainly; and when Hyder, during a new application for aid, avowed his intention of making the whole of Malabar tributary, he expostulated with him, representing that the Company, being on terms of friendship with most of the native powers on the coast, could not remain neuter, unless he guaranteed full security for the Company's interests.¹ As this was the key to the policy which the Bombay presidency were attempting—though not with much skill and decision—to pursue, Hyder endeavoured to meet their views by offering, in return for aid in troops, stores, and guns, not only to defray every charge, but to grant the Company all the pepper trade on the coast. The bait so far took that the presidency, says Auber, almost ludicrously, "feeling it equally important to avoid giving umbrage to the Marathas, and to prevent their subduing the Bednore and Sunda countries, resolved to supply Hyder with 400 stand of arms and 100 barrels of gunpowder." To give arms and ammunition to one of two contending parties was certainly a curious mode of avoiding to give umbrage to the other.

The directors were by no means satisfied with these proceedings, and in their letter to Bombay, dated 22nd March, 1765, disapproving of the inclination of the council to support Hyder,

¹ Auber's *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, vol. i, p. 110.

observed, that a man of his aspiring genius "is more likely to become a formidable enemy than a friend." The directors were at this time very much in the dark as to this new adventurer who was filling them with alarm. "These transactions," they say, "render it extremely necessary that we should be informed of Hyder Naigue or Hyder Ali Khan, in which your advices hitherto have been very deficient; you are, therefore, hereby directed to send us, by the first conveyances, an account of his rise, what particular countries he possesses, by what means he is become so powerful, his genius and character, and every other material circumstance necessary for our information."¹ The directors continue thus: "In the foregoing part of this letter we forbade your supplying any of the country powers with muskets, which we again, and positively direct, be strictly adhered to, unless to the King of Travancore, for the reasons there mentioned. Cannon we absolutely forbid you supplying any one of the country powers with; and should not have thought there ever would have been a necessity for this, it appearing so remarkably inconsistent with our interest and policy. We also positively forbid your supplying the country powers with any other warlike stores whatsoever, or by whatever name they are distinguished (the King of Travancore, excepted, as observed in other parts of this letter)". In explanation of this reservation in favour of the King of Travancore, it is stated that he "had applied for aid to the Dutch, in case Hyder should invade his territory; but that his chief reliance was on the Company, to whom he was prepared to transfer the 3,000 candies of pepper, at the same price at which it was taken by the Dutch, provided the Company would supply him with warlike stores, and defend his kingdom, he defraying the expense of such aid." If this was the ground of reservation, the directors were not acting very consistently, since at the very time they were censuring the Bombay council for not preserving neutrality, they were passing to the opposite extreme, and committing themselves, in a certain event, to a contest with Hyder.

The Bombay presidency, about a month after the date of the directors' letter, and consequently some time before they could

¹ The council shortly after furnished the full account thus ordered, but the letter containing it, though an important historical document, has somehow disappeared.

have received it, had taken a more decided part with Hyder, by addressing a letter to Madho Rao, in which they pointed out the privileges granted by Hyder to the Company, and stated "that they could not sit down tame spectators, and see him deprived of the means of continuing them." Had the Marathas resented this interference, the council could scarcely have avoided coming to an open rupture with them, and taking the field as Hyder's allies. Fortunately the effects of the disaster at Panipat inclined the Marathas to moderation; and partly, it is said, through the good offices of the presidency, Hyder, when at the mercy of his enemies, made peace, in April, 1765, on the comparatively favourable terms which have already been described.

Gratitude was no part of Hyder's character; and hence, no sooner was he relieved from his difficulties, than he set at nought the known wishes of his benefactors, and commenced the subjugation of Malabar. The presidency were both offended and alarmed, and directed their agent at Honawar to withhold from Hyder all further supply of firearms. They even took measures for opposing him, under the apprehension that in his indiscriminate depredations he would not spare the Company's property, and considered an open rupture so imminent, that they requested the co-operation of the presidency of Madras. From the vacillating policy which the presidency had been for some time pursuing, it must have been difficult to anticipate their answer. On the present occasion they deprecated the rupture. Hyder, they said, having the command of all the passes leading into the Carnatic, might with ease send his cavalry forward, and do great mischief before effectual measures could be taken against him. He was, moreover, an important check to the power of the Marathas. Nizam Ali, they further observed, was offended at the grant of the Northern Circars, which they had obtained from the Mughul; and were Hyder and he to unite, the grant might be rendered abortive.

In consequence of this answer, the Bombay presidency abandoned their warlike ideas, and instead of fighting Hyder Ali, transmitted to him a treaty composed of fourteen articles, the first of which declared that "there shall be peace and friendship for ever." Others of them stipulated that Hyder should not form

a treaty with any European power contrary to the interests of the Company; that he should not attack any power in alliance with them, more particularly the Nabob of Arcot; that he should pay any debts due to them by the rulers of the countries of which he had taken possession; that he should give them facilities for trade; and supply them with pepper. This document, sent on the 11th July, 1766, was not answered till the 28th September. Hyder had new-modelled all the articles. The first began thus: "Thanks be to God, I have subdued the coast of Malabar from Cape Ramo to Ponany! Since there is so firm a friendship between the honourable Company and this state, how can my people join with the honourable Company's enemies? As there is a fair friendship between the honourable Company and this Circar, they shall always receive more compliments than others." Other articles stipulated for a supply of 3,000 to 4,000 muskets, and provided that whenever the Company might want troops, he would furnish them with 10,000 to 15,000, and that they would, in like manner, furnish him when his enemies rendered it necessary. In answer to the letter of the president, which had accompanied the proposed treaty, Hyder said, "I have received your honour's esteemed letter. Thanks be to God, there is no separation or difference between your honour, the honourable Company, and the Circar, and it is my desire that our friendships may be firm, and increase daily more and more. Muhammad Ali Khan, of Arcot, has also an intention, through the persuasion of low people, to have some disputes with me; but I also take no notice of it, out of regard to your honour."

The contemptuous allusion here made to Muhammad Ali throws some light on the course of negotiation at this period. Muhammad Ali, presumptuous enough to aspire to the sovereignty of the Deccan, and the whole of the Indian peninsula to the south of it, was plotting against both Nizam Ali and Hyder; they, on the other hand, had a counterplot for his deposition; the Marathas were, as usual, intent on the two great objects which they contemplate when they enter into a confederacy—plunder during its existence, and exclusive conquest after its close; the Company was very incompetently represented at this time by the Madras council, who imagined that they were playing

the rival parties against each other, whereas they were only their dupes. Only a short time ago we saw this council arguing strenuously against a rupture with Hyder, because, among other reasons, they regarded him as "an important check" on the Marathas. This was in June, 1766. In November, only four months later, they bound themselves by treaty to furnish Nizam with an indefinite number of troops, for any purpose to which he might be pleased to apply them, the main inducement being that he had formed a league with the Marathas for the purpose of crushing Hyder. The curious process by which they were converted to this new policy deserves to be described.

In July, while negotiations with Hyder were pending, he informed the Madras council that he had sent for his vakil or ambassador. This created suspicions, and the more because it was at the same time reported that he had obtained from the Nizam (the title now usually applied to Nizam Ali), a *sanad* or grant of the Carnatic. This report seemed to receive confirmation from the fact that he had suddenly quitted his conquests on the Malabar coast, and proceeded to Seringapatam, where it was stated that he had placed a child upon the throne, and then posted his army at Coimbatore, near the confines of Karur, bordering on the Carnatic. Another vakil from Hyder had, on the other hand, assured the council that his master desired nothing more than to live in perfect friendship with the Company, and, for this purpose, requested an English gentleman might be sent to him to settle terms. Mr. Bouchier, a member of the council, was deputed accordingly, and set out with the vakil. At Arcot he was desired to wait for a message from Hyder fixing the place of interview, and shortly after informed by the vakil that he had received a letter from his master recalling him, and disapproving of an English gentleman coming to him. "The council," says Mr. Auber,¹ "considered the whole conduct of Hyder to be very questionable." This, though undoubtedly a correct, seems but a lame and impotent conclusion, till we read further, and find it followed up thus vigorously: "When they reflected upon his immense conquests, his great riches, and the power which he had established, added to his pride and ambition, they felt that

¹ *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, vol. i, pp. 218-19.

no opportunity should be lost to reduce that power within its ancient and proper bounds, and to check the intentions of a man who, by his violence and oppression, had rendered himself obnoxious to all the country governments, and dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of the Carnatic. They therefore viewed the resolution taken by the Nizam (to make war upon Hyder) a very important circumstance, and resolved to assist him with such a force as would insure success, and, at the same time, satisfy the Nizam of the sincerity of their intentions." All this grandiloquence is merely a kind of smoke raised for the purpose of hiding the ridiculous figure which Governor Palk and his council were now cutting. As if for the purpose of making their inconsistency more manifest, it is added, "Information of the bearing of the Nizam towards Hyder was despatched to Bombay, that the president and council there might take the necessary measures for securing the Company's possessions on that side, and be prepared to make use of their forces in the event of a rupture, in which case they concluded that many of the powers of the Malabar coast would be ready to embrace the opportunity of recovering their ancient possessions." Such were the views and aspirations with which the Madras presidency rushed headlong into the very war which they had previously deprecated and condemned.

In preparing for the coming struggle, Hyder Ali's first measure was to set up a rival to Muhammad Ali in the person of his elder brother, Maphaz Khan. This person, in respect of succession, had certainly the better title of the two to the nabobship, and though he had been constrained to renounce his claim, was still hankering after it. As fortune had not favoured him, he professed to renounce the world, and took leave of his brother, ostensibly for the purpose of making the pilgrimage to Mecca. While he was proceeding to embark at Mangalore, he passed near the camp of Hyder Ali, then engaged in his Malabar conquest, and on visiting him, was easily induced to exchange his pilgrim vows for a *jaghir* and public employment. He was now sent into the Deccan, to act in the double capacity of Hyder's agent and his brother's rival. Hyder's next attempt was to purchase the retreat of Madho Rao and his Marathas. When it failed, he took what seemed the most effectual defence

against the threatened invasion, by interposing a desert between himself and his formidable foe. For this purpose he issued orders to all his officers, civil and military, on the approach of the Marathas, to break down the embankments of the tanks, to poison the wells, to burn the forage even to the thatch of the houses, to bury the grain, and drive both the cattle and the inhabitants into the woods. The barbarous expedient, though it retarded, could not stop the progress of an army so dexterous in marauding, and Hyder Ali, almost driven to desperation by the steady advance of the enemy whom of all others he most dreaded, and by the treachery of his brother-in-law, Mir Sahib, who delivered up the fort and district of Sera in exchange for a *jaghir* given him 150 miles to the eastward, determined once more to try negotiation. It succeeded, and Hyder had the satisfaction, early in the month of May, 1767, to see Madho Rao's departure for Poona. He had purchased it by thirty-five lacs of rupees and the cession of all the districts of Mysore lying south-east of Sera.

During this negotiation, Nizam Ali, with a large but ill-disciplined host, was approaching Mysore by an eastern route, and Colonel Joseph Smith, at the head of a formidable British force, was moving to form a junction with him on its northern frontier. It had been settled by compact with Madho Rao, that the country through which Nizam Ali was to pass should be left untouched, in order to furnish his supplies; but the Marathas, in disregard of the compact, had completely rifled it. Nizam Ali's army thus advanced with the greatest difficulty, and did not reach the Tungabhadra till the 9th of March, 1767. On the 24th of the same month intelligence arrived that the retreat of the Marathas was purchased. Colonel Smith, who had suspected from the first that the presidency had engaged in "a disjointed expedition," urged on them the necessity of adjusting "some reasonable plan of action." Nizam Ali had already begun to talk of retracing his steps, and returning in the ensuing year. It is believed, indeed, that the only thing which now induced him to advance was the hope of concluding an agreement, by which Hyder was to give him a present of twenty lacs of rupees, and pay him an annual tribute of six lacs for making common cause with him against the

Company. Since his purchase of the Marathas, Hyder had continued to urge the treachery, but said nothing of the bribe, and Nizam Ali had some hopes of being able to extort it by going forward and working on Hyder's fears. While the armies of Nizam Ali and the Company, though from very different motives, continued their march, Madho Rao was encamped at Kolar, waiting the payment of Hyder's second instalment of money, and it was thought advisable to send a deputy, in the hope that he might be induced either to prosecute the war according to the original plan, or share the bribe which he had received for abandoning it. Colonel Tod, employed on this unpromising mission, states in his report, "that when he declared to Madho Rao that he had come to talk on business, they (the Maratha *darbar*) could not keep their countenances, but burst out a laughing in his face."

Colonel Smith—whose suspicions of an understanding between Nizam Ali and Hyder were confirmed when he saw that the former, after entering Mysore, treated it as a friendly country—urged upon the presidency the necessity of vigorous preparations against a hostile invasion of their own territory. Mr. Bouchier, a member of council, who had been sent, Mr. Auber says, "to strengthen his hands," but who in fact only hampered his movements, was less alarmed; and therefore the utmost they granted in reply to his representations was permission to return to the lower countries with his troops as soon as Mr. Bouchier agreed with him in thinking it proper. Before taking such a decisive step, it was agreed to demand a satisfactory explanation of Nizam Ali's actual intentions. Vague declarations of inviolable fidelity, mysterious hints of an advantageous negotiation with Hyder, which would be defeated if the Company's force departed, and pressing entreaties to join Nizam Ali's camp near Bangalore, were accepted as a substitute for the satisfactory explanation; and it was agreed that the two armies should show how firmly they were united, by occupying the same ground. The British troops arrived; but what was their astonishment when, on entering the encampment at one point, they saw Nizam Ali's troops departing at another, to take up a new position twelve miles distant. It afterwards appeared that this insult had been contrived for the purpose of

removing some suspicions which Hyder had expressed, and convincing him that Nizam Ali was really determined to break with the Company.

The Nizam's treachery being now manifest, Colonel Smith withdrew indignantly towards his own frontier. Strange to say, the Madras government refused to see what was now as clear as noon-day, and Mr. Bouchier continued to hope that something might yet be done by diplomacy. His credulity made it easy to impose upon him by new excuses; and when the rest of the British troops were withdrawn, three battalions, with their field-pieces, were, at Nizam Ali's urgent request, to remain in his camp, as a demonstration of friendship and alliance! Mr. Auber remarks that "these events present a true picture of eastern intrigue and deception;" and he might have added, that they at the same time furnish a rare specimen of western folly and stupidity. While Hyder was playing his part in these intrigues, his attention was called to a domestic danger. Nunjiraj had been permitted to live in some state at Mysore, and might have spent the remainder of his days in ease and luxury, had not his old love of power tempted him to plot Hyder's overthrow, by entering into a secret correspondence with Madho Rao and Nizam Ali. On the discovery of it, Hyder sent repeated messages to Nunjiraj to come to Seringapatam, and give him the benefit of his counsel in present emergencies. The old man, though easily flattered, had remembrances which made him suspicious, and he did not consent without stipulating that his guard should accompany and remain with him, that he should still draw the revenue of his *jaghir*, and that no change should be made, except in the place of his abode. Hyder not only consented to these stipulations, but sent two of his leading officers, authorized to bind him to them in the most sacred of Mussulman forms, by swearing in his name on the Koran. The moment Nunjiraj arrived at Seringapatam his guard was seized, his *jaghir* was resumed, and he was thenceforth restricted, as a state prisoner, to the bare necessities of life. He was in this instance the victim of a trick which had repeatedly been played before. Beneath the splendid cover supposed to contain the Koran, only a volume of blank paper was concealed.

While Hyder was completing his preparations for active hostilities, the game of duplicity continued to be played. When

it became unnecessary, the mask was thrown off, and the new alliance was celebrated at Kenapatam with great demonstrations. From some chivalrous feeling, not easily explained, Nizam Ali not only permitted the Company's brigade to depart, but furnished five companies, which he had retained, with a safe conduct only three days before hostilities actually commenced. An act which might also have seemed chivalrous, had they not expressly disclaimed any such feeling, was at the same time performed by the Madras government, who positively ordered Colonel Smith to pass to the enemy a supply of provisions, of which his own troops were in the greatest want. Nor was this the limit of their absurdity. Nizam Ali had encamped on the crest of the hills which overlook the Baramahal, and Hyder was following at the interval of two days' march; but, says Colonel Smith in a letter to Lord Clive, "although it was quite as plain as noon-day to every person (except the council), that they were preparing to enter the Carnatic jointly, no measures were taken to establish magazines of provisions in proper places, nor any steps to supply our army in time of need." Instead of attending to such paltry matters, the council were, it seems, engrossed by the more important business of obtaining from Nizam Ali a remission of two lacs of rupees, which they had agreed to pay as tribute for Chicacole, one of the Northern Circars, and "bills for a fifth of what Hyder was to pay" for being left unmolested.

The strength of the armies now about to engage in open warfare shows a vast preponderance on the part of Nizam Ali and Hyder, who must henceforth be designated as allies. Colonel Smith's estimate of the enemy is as follows: cavalry, Nizam Ali's 30,000, Hyder's 12,860—total 42,860; infantry, Nizam Ali's 10,000; Hyder's 18,000—total 28,000; guns, Nizam Ali's 60, Hyder's 49—total 109. His own force amounted only to 1,030 cavalry, of whom only 30, and 5,800 infantry, of whom only 800, were European. He had sixteen guns. The act of hostility, which opened the campaign on the 25th of August, 1767, was to him not only unpromising, but disastrous. Having a very imperfect knowledge of the topography of the mountainous district in which he was encamped, he erected a defensive work in the eastern gorge of

a pass, supposing that the enemy must force it to gain the low ground, and stood waiting for the encounter, when he was first made aware of his error by seeing his cattle, which were quietly grazing in the rear, suddenly driven off. The cavalry, hastening to the rescue, were assailed on all sides by superior numbers, and did not regain the encampment till nearly a third of them were slain. Thus crippled, Colonel Smith was unable to move till the 28th, and Hyder, taking advantage of his inaction, attacked the fort of Kaveripatam, and carried it in two days. A British reinforcement, under Colonel Wood, was expected from Trichinopoly. Hyder was well aware of its approach in the direction of Trinomali, and might have intercepted it by occupying the pass of Singarpetta or Changama, through which alone a junction with the main body could be effected. By some blunder, Colonel Smith was allowed to take possession of it without opposition. Nizam Ali, disappointed at Hyder's dilatoriness, did not hesitate to upbraid him with it, and give a significant hint that if the war was to be thus conducted, he would settle his differences with the Company in his own way. From this moment Hyder assumed greater activity, and in the hope of still preventing the junction, pressed close with predatory horse on Colonel Smith's flanks and rear, and harassed him when he encamped at night with flights of rockets. On one occasion, when he thought he had brought the British into an unfavourable position, he ventured on a direct attack, but paid dearly for it, and was obliged with his confederate to retire in disorder, with a loss of nearly 2,000 men. Colonel Smith lost only 170; but unfortunately was not able to follow up his advantage, as the enemy during the action had broken in upon the baggage, and carried off his scanty store of rice. Famine consequently obliged him to hasten off—as if he had lost instead of having gained the battle—for Trinomali, which he reached on the 4th of September, after a march of twenty-seven hours, during which his troops had neither refreshment nor repose.

Colonel Smith had made his rapid and fatiguing march to Trinomali, trusting to the assurance of Muhammad Ali, that he should there find an abundant depot of provisions. Grievous was his disappointment. There was no rice, and not more

paddy (the unprepared grain) could be procured in the town and neighbouring villages than sufficed to supply the most immediate necessities of the troops. Some idea of the dreadful prospect which opened up on them may be inferred from an event which, Colonel Wilks says, "is unexampled in English-Indian warfare—the *desertion of an officer*." The despicable traitor, Lieutenant Hitchcock, was not allowed to profit by his infamy. Falling under suspicion, he was thrown into prison, where he lingered and died. Colonel Smith was obliged to quit Trinomali in search of food, leaving in it, though a place of little strength, his sick, wounded, and military stores. The allies, however, were too much discouraged by their recent defeat, and too much occupied in fixing the blame of it, to give much annoyance; and he was not only permitted without further molestation to form the junction with Colonel Wood, but to return and find Trinomali still safe. The enemy had, indeed, begun to erect a battery against it, and brought forward 10,000 horse to cover this operation; but on his reappearance they hurried with their whole army to the north-west, and encamped at the distance of only six miles.

Being now reinforced by his junction with Colonel Wood and the arrival of other detachments, Colonel Smith resolved to assume the offensive. With this view he marched out to attack the allies, but found their position, with an impassable morass in front, too strong to be forced. Meanwhile, his provisions were again exhausted, and he was obliged to move eastward in search of food. The difficulties with which he had thus to contend continually increasing, he called a council of war, who gave it as their unanimous opinion, that it was necessary to evacuate Trinomali, remove the wounded and stores to the stronger fort of Chittapet, and place the troops in cantonments at Arcot, Vellore, or wherever they could find food. The Madras council, who had caused this decision by their neglect to provide the necessary supplies, had discernment enough to foresee the disastrous results which might follow from it. As matters stood, the cavalry of the allies were ravaging the whole country, up to the very gates of Madras. How much worse would it be, if, from the removal of the Company's army into cantonments, their power of mischief was indefinitely

increased? Influenced by these considerations, they put their veto on the decision of the council of war, and insisted that Colonel Smith should still keep the field. The result proved that in this instance they had judged wisely.

Hyder Ali's system of espionage was so perfect, that he was soon in possession of the decision of the council of war. When it was not carried into immediate effect, he concluded that Colonel Smith was only postponing it in the hope that the north-east monsoon would compel the allies to move into the upper country, and leave him at liberty to execute his plan. On this assumption, his determination was to protract the departure of the allies to the very last, and delay the final attack on the Company's army, till, enfeebled by hunger and disheartened, they should fall an easy prey. In this he miscalculated. Colonel Smith, by judicious combinations, received reinforcements of troops, and small convoys of provisions and stores, and by careful search discovered large depositories of hidden grain, which enabled his troops to live in tolerable comfort. Thus during a fortnight, which, according to the view of the allies, was to have reduced them to wretchedness, they had improved in health, strength, and spirits. The allies, still proceeding on their own hypothesis, thought it not improbable that the Company's force, driven to desperation, might attempt some desperate remedy, and force their way through all the obstacles which might be opposed to them. Accordingly, as a necessary precaution against any such attempt, they had not only taken up a strong position, but fortified it with strong redoubts, commanding every point and avenue from which it might have been assailed. It was in vain, therefore, that Colonel Smith attempted to lure them into the plain. The more he manoeuvred for this purpose, the less they seemed inclined to encounter him.

It is difficult to say what the result of this Fabian policy might have been, if fully carried out. Happily, Nizam Ali's impatience compelled its abandonment. He had gone to the wars full of the hope of unresisted plunder, and had hitherto met only with disastrous defeats. Anything seemed to him better than the present inaction; and sooner than continue it, he would put everything in stake. By all means, he insisted,

try the effect of a general engagement. Hyder, though he would have preferred a different line of tactics, was obliged to yield; and thus a decisive battle becoming the earnest desire of both armies, could not be long delayed. The Company's force now amounted to 10,400 effective infantry, thirty European and 1,500 bad native cavalry, and thirty-four guns. The strength of the allies was nearly the same as before.

At noon on the 26th of September, the allies brought a column, with sixteen of their heaviest guns, in front of Colonel Smith's left, and commenced a heavy cannonade. A morass, not perceptible without close examination, intervened. Hyder's plan was to entangle his opponent in this morass. Even should he succeed in passing it, the redoubts were still in front, and the main body of the allies ready to fall upon his right. Colonel Smith, ignorant of the morass, made a movement on the left, which made him for the first time aware of its existence. On the right it seemed to be terminated by a hill, behind which the greater part of the allied army lay concealed from view; and Colonel Smith therefore concluded that by making a circuit in that direction he would be brought in contact with the enemy's left. No sooner, however, had he begun this movement, than the allies, still under the impression that his troops were in absolute want, and only anxious to escape to the north-east in the direction of Arcot, put their troops in instant motion, for the purpose of preventing it. The two armies were thus marching round the hill, concealed from each other—that of the Company from the south-east, and that of the allies from the south-west—to a common point of convergence. The consequence was that, to their mutual surprise, they were suddenly brought face to face on rounding the hill. The encounter was now inevitable. In the hurried arrangements which became necessary, the superior discipline of the Company's troops gave them greatly the advantage; and they coolly gained a superior position, while the confusion of the allies, huddled together and unable to extricate themselves, increased. They had 100 guns; but so many of these were stationed in the redoubts, that not more than thirty of them could be brought into action, and being far less skilfully served, were soon silenced. The Company's artillery, thus left

free to act against the masses of the enemy's cavalry, made dreadful havoc, and reduced them to a disorderly rabble, fleeing in all directions to get beyond reach of the fire. On this Colonel Smith ordered a general advance of his line.

Hyder had seen, almost as soon as the encounter took place at the rounding of the hill, that the day was lost; and drawing in his own guns within the redoubts, urged Nizam Ali to follow his example, and thus make a stand on fortified ground. He at first rejected the proposal with disdain, as timid and spiritless; but when the British line was seen advancing, his courage failed him. According to his invariable practice, he had been "accompanied to the field by his favourite wives, with all the splendid and cumbersome appendages of rank. They were mounted on elephants, which stood in line at a short distance in the rear. When Nizam Ali made up his mind to retire the guns, his first orders were that the elephants should instantly turn. "This elephant," replied a female voice from one of the howdahs, "has not been taught so to turn; he follows the standard of the empire." The damsel made good her point, and did not turn till the standard had passed, and the shot were flying thick about her. Nizam Ali had none of her courage. An hour after he had declared that he would sooner die than submit to dishonourable flight, the redoubt, though still untouched, and capable of resisting any attack that could have been made upon it, did not seem sufficiently safe; and he was seen fleeing at his utmost speed, with a select body of cavalry, toward the west. He never drew bridle till he was fairly through the pass of Changama. Hyder behaved more manfully. After providing for the security of his army, and despatching his field-train on the only practicable road, he employed the night in clearing out the fortified position and putting his baggage in motion.

The victors encamped on the ground which had been occupied by the enemy, within a mile of the redoubts. Though the result was decisive, only nine guns had yet been captured, and an attempt to take advantage, by a night attack, of the confusion in the enemy's camp, failed by the treachery of one of the guides, who turned out to be one of Hyder's spies. At daylight the redoubts were found to be abandoned, but on ascending a height the whole of the allied army was seen extending along

the road as far as the eye could reach. The pursuit was immediately commenced. Forty-one pieces of artillery, all belonging to Nizam Ali, were captured; fourteen more, which had been overset for concealment, were afterwards discovered. Hyder was seen in the rear, attended by his retinue of state, a troop of European cavalry, and 3,000 select horse. His retinue, which he seemed to take a pride in displaying in the view of his pursuers, is thus described by Colonel Wilks—"It consisted of 300 select men on foot, clothed in scarlet, and armed with lances or pikes of light bamboo, about eighteen feet long, twisted round from bottom to top with thin plates of silver in a spiral form: the equal intervals of polished silver, and the dark brown of the seasoned bamboo, give a splendid and not inelegant appearance to this ornamental but formidable weapon." Before the decisive results anticipated from a continuance of the pursuit could be realized, want of food compelled Colonel Smith to retrace his steps. His loss in the action was only 150 men killed and wounded; that of the enemy exceeded 4,000 men, sixty-four guns, with their tumbrils, and a large quantity of stores of all kinds except rice, which would have been by far the most valuable.

Tipu Sultan, then seventeen years of age, had been sent eastward under the guidance of Ghazi Khan, the best partizan officer in Hyder's service, and was actually plundering the country houses of the Madras council on the 29th of September, when intelligence of the battle of Trinomali arrived, and made him suddenly decamp. His detachment, and the others connected with it, amounted to about 4,000 horse. They advanced to the Choultry Plain, and pillaged St. Thome and the adjacent villages. The council could give no relief. The condition to which they were reduced is thus explained in their letter to the court—"The continual reinforcements we had sent to camp had reduced our garrison so low, we were obliged to confine our attention entirely to the preservation of the fort and the Black Town, for which purpose it was necessary to arm all the Company's civil servants, the European inhabitants, Armenians, and Portuguese." Such were the first-fruits of the war into which they had inconsiderately plunged. Worse, they feared, was in store for them, for they add, "As it is uncertain when the troubles we are engaged in will end, and as we must, in the

course of the war, expect to have many Europeans sick, we must earnestly request you to send out as large reinforcements as possible."

As the battle of Trinomali had cleared the country of invaders, and the monsoon was approaching, Colonel Smith placed his army in cantonments, and set out for Madras, in the hope of being able to make some arrangement for regular supplies when he should again take the field. Nizam Ali and Hyder retired to the Baramahal, so dissatisfied with themselves and with each other, that a month passed without an interview, and without any attempt to sketch out the plan of a future campaign. Hyder, who, besides having more sense than his ally, had also more at stake, seems to have made the first overtures of reconciliation; and it was agreed, instead of idly and angrily discussing past events, to devote all their energies to the future. The previous misunderstanding must have been well known in their camps, and to do away with the effect, it was deemed politic to give public evidence of re-established cordiality. A series of splendid festivals and ostentatious visits of ceremony accordingly took place, during one of which, when Hyder was the entertainer, he placed his guest on a seat or musnud, formed of bags of silver coin to the amount of a lac of rupees, and covered with cushions of embroidered silver. The whole, together with the other presents, were, according to established etiquette, carried off by the attendants as perquisites. The time, however, was now approaching for more serious occupations.

Hyder was the first to move. Kanjivaram, Wandiwash, and Trichinopoly, the places selected for the cantonments of the Company's army, were extremely objectionable, on account of their distance from each other. The defect was apparent, but little danger from it was apprehended, because it was presumed that the three rainy months of October, November, and December would necessarily be a season of inaction. In this calculation Hyder's activity and enterprise had been underrated. He had started as early as the beginning of November, 1767, and by the 7th had recaptured Tripatore and Veniambadi, situated in the northern part of the Baramahal. These places, being indefensible, were easily taken; not so the next. Continuing his progress northward for other ten miles, he was brought

in front of the strong fort of Ambur, crowning a mountain of smooth granite, which terminates the valley of the Baramahal on the north, and overlooks on the east the fertile vale of the Palar, stretching away in the direction of Vellore and Arcot. It was accessible only on one side, and had for its principal defences two forts, a lower and an upper. Hyder arrived on the 10th of November, and on the 15th had so dismantled the lower fort as to make it no longer tenable. He was trusting, however, not so much to warlike operations without as to treachery within. Muckhlis Khan, the *killadar* or governor, who had received his appointment from Anwar-ud-din, Muhammad Ali's father, took advantage of the troubles of the times, and without formally throwing off his allegiance, assumed a kind of independence. In the beginning of the war the Company wished to occupy Ambur as a depot, but Muckhlis Khan refused to admit any troops but his own. On this recourse was had to stratagem, and by surreptitious means troops had been introduced till they formed a body of troops in the Company's interest amounting to 500 sepoys, an officer, a sergeant, and fifteen Europeans. Hyder, whose intelligence never failed him, was perfectly aware of the circumstances, and had undertaken the siege either because he had actually established, or felt sure of being able to establish, an understanding with Muckhlis Khan. The command of Ambur had been intrusted to Captain Calvert, a brave and rough officer, who had been wounded at the battle of Trinomali. Fortunately, at the very time when he was obliged to abandon the lower fort and retire to the summit of the hill, he discovered the intrigue in which Muckhlis Khan was engaged, and dexterously managed to imprison him and his chief officers, and to disarm all his troops. These he turned to good account by compelling them to labour in the defence.

The siege made little progress. At first little more was done than to give a decent pretext to the *killadar* for capitulating. When the original scheme of bribery failed, Hyder resolved to try it in a different form. Having sent a flag of truce to summon the garrison to surrender, he took occasion to eulogize the brave defence. Calvert replied that he had not yet given him an opportunity of deserving the compliment. Under cover of a second flag of truce, he offered a direct bribe and the command

of half his army as the price of voluntary surrender. In answer to this ignominious proposal, Calvert simply admonished Hyder to spare the lives of his servants, as the next bearer of such a message would be hanged in his sight. On the 6th of December the Company's army approached, and the siege was raised. In thus attempting to bribe Captain Calvert, Hyder, though he failed, gave proof of that instinctive knowledge of human character for which he was distinguished. Subsequent events proved that he had not mistaken his man. Calvert was not the blunt and honourable soldier for which his conduct on this occasion entitled him to credit; for it is painful to state, that at a later period he was brought to a court-martial, and found guilty of defrauding the Company by false returns.

The new campaign having been commenced, in consequence of the operations of Hyder, much sooner than had been anticipated, little progress had been made in arranging for the supplies of the army. The vague promises of Muhammad Ali, though his falsehood and faithlessness were notorious, were made the pretext for not forming a plain, practical, and independent system of commissariat; and there is even reason to suspect that the council, or at least some members of it, were not unwilling, from a petty jealousy of the commander, to endanger his success by throwing obstructions in his way. The relief of Ambur had been effected by the main body of the army, which had been assembled under Colonel Smith at Vellore. Colonel Wood's division, which had been cantoned at Trichinopoly, was ordered to move to Trinomali, and thereafter enter the Baramahal through the pass of Singarpetta. Hyder, when foiled at Ambur, had marched off to Veniambadi, and was found here on the 8th of December by Colonel Smith, who had set out in pursuit of him. Nizam Ali had moved further south into the Baramahal. Hyder was preparing to join him, and had sent off his heavy artillery; but, to cover his design, took up a position which seemed to indicate that he meant to risk a battle. As this was not his real intention, he made only a show of resistance, and moved off after a loss which was slight in killed and wounded, but was serious in another respect, for he had the mortification to see his troop of European horse, under Monsieur Aumont, move off and join his enemies. This preconcerted treachery had

wholly escaped him, and he saw himself foiled by his own favourite weapon. He was pursued for a short distance, but the main body of the army was obliged, as in the former campaign, to halt for supplies. The advance, under Colonel Tod, moved forward to Tripatore, which was abandoned. It must have been hastily; for, contrary to Hyder's usual precaution, some grain and cattle were found in it.

Colonel Wood effected his junction without opposition, and the whole of the Company's army approached Kaveripatam, towards which the allies had retired. This place had been taken by Hyder in 1767, and to strengthen the position under its cover, some field-works had been thrown up. Nothing more was done till Hyder, seeing that he would be compelled to raise the siege of Ambur, sent some of his French officers to improve and extend the works, so as to form a safe camp for the allied armies. On reconnoitring the position, Colonel Smith was deterred by its strength from risking an attack, and was therefore the more delighted when circumstances occurred which rendered it unnecessary. Before detailing these, an affair of some importance must be described.

While occupying the strong position of Kaveripatam, Hyder was constantly sending out detachments of light troops, who scoured the country, and made it impossible for Colonel Smith to obtain supplies without supporting the most unimportant convoys by strong detachments. Against one of these, which was expected by the pass of Singarpetta, and was protected only by a single battalion, Hyder set out in person, at the head of 4,000 select horse, 2,000 infantry, and five guns, calculating on an easy capture. Colonel Smith, aware of his departure, divined the object, and reinforced the convoy by two companies of grenadiers, a battalion of sepoys, and two field-pieces. Hyder, in ignorance of the fact, made a sudden onset at the head of his cavalry, and narrowly escaped with his life. He had a horse shot under him, and a bullet passed through his turban. After a short struggle he was obliged to acknowledge himself defeated, and return crestfallen to his headquarters at Kaveripatam.

Before undertaking the above unsuccessful foray, Hyder was aware that his strong position at Kaveripatam could not be maintained. With a view to a retreat to the westward, he had

despatched Tipu and Ghazi Khan with his baggage and heavy guns on the 14th of December; four days later Nizam Ali quitted him with the main body of his army, and moved to the northward. He was on his way home, no longer dreaming of conquests in the south, and intent only on securing his own capital. An expedition from Bengal, under the command of Colonel Peach, had landed on the coast of the Northern Circars, and after a series of successful operations, was reported to be on the highway to Hyderabad. Alarmed beyond measure, Nizam Ali had opened a secret communication with Colonel Smith, and made overtures for peace. Hyder was too shortsighted not to be aware of it, and determined to make a merit of necessity. He thought that it might still be possible to make some use of Nizam Ali; and therefore, instead of finally breaking with him, and upbraiding him with his treachery, he simply deplored the events which had led to a change of counsels, and admitting that his confederate could not well avoid coming to a temporary accommodation with the Company, expressed the hope that the time might not be distant when the Mussulman interests might again be united for the final expulsion of the foreign infidels. Nizam Ali was relieved beyond measure by the friendly leave-taking. He had been perplexed how he could effect a separation from Hyder, and was now at perfect liberty to take his own course. Such is the explanation of his movement to the north, already mentioned. The secret correspondence with Colonel Smith assumed the form of an open negotiation, which terminated in the conclusion of a treaty, on the 23rd of February, 1768. Being made under very different circumstances from that of 1766, in which he rather dictated terms than accepted them, it exhibits him in a less dignified position, though it undoubtedly left him abundant cause for self-gratulation. Hyder, too, would at this time have willingly entered into a treaty; but when Colonel Smith, to whom he had made pacific overtures, simply referred him to the government of Madras, he understood it as a civil but distinct rejection of his advances, and therefore did not repeat them.

In the new treaty the influence of Muhammad Ali is very apparent. In that of 1766, Nizam Ali would not allow his name to be at all mentioned, but he was now formally recognized as one

of the contracting parties. The authenticity and validity of a grant of the Carnatic Payin Ghat to Muhammad Ali, on the 26th of August, 1765, are distinctly recognized. The effect of this recognition was to free him from all dependence on the Deccan, and yet, by a singular confusion of ideas, he is made to declare that he holds this very Carnatic Payin Ghat as a free gift from Nizam Ali. The absurdity is obvious enough, but the effect is to make him absolute sovereign of the Carnatic, with the consent both of the Mughul and the subahdar. In regard to the Northern Circars, Nizam Ali made an important concession, by admitting the validity of the grant from the Mughul, but this was more apparent than real, as for these very Circars he was to receive a yearly payment of five lacs of rupees. It is true that of this sum only two lacs was to be paid, the other three lacs being deducted to meet the payment of twenty-five lacs, for which Nizam Ali became bound as his share of the expenses of the war. Still, whether paid or deducted, the five lacs were to all intents a tribute payable for the Circars, notwithstanding the ludicrous statement by Auber, that "care was taken so to word the treaty, that the payment of the sum should not appear to be by virtue of the Company's holding the Circars from the Nizam, but only in consideration of the friendship existing between them."

In regard to Hyder, Nizam Ali made no scruple of denouncing him as a rebel and usurper, with whom no correspondence was to be maintained. Still less objection could he have, in consideration of a further tribute of seven lacs, to assign to the Company the whole territory of Mysore—a territory which, as Colonel Wilks justly observes, "he neither possessed, nor had the most distant hope of ever possessing." In stipulating for this grant, the Madras council seem to have been desirous of emulating Clive's successes in Bengal. They do not claim the property of Mysore, but are contented to rest satisfied with the *dewani*, or power of drawing the revenue for their own behoof. By another article of the treaty Nizam Ali was compensated for the easy liberality of his grants, by an obligation on the part of the Company to assist him with two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of cannon as often as required. By a still more singular article, the Marathas, who were no parties to the treaty, and

had made no claim, were promised payment of the *chauth*, or a fourth of the whole revenue.

The directors had from the first disapproved of the war, and refused to attach the least weight to the flimsy pleas by which the council of Madras sought to justify it. In answering the letter of the council, setting forth the deplorable condition to which Madras had been reduced by the ravages of Hyder's horse in their immediate vicinity, they give a clear and full explanation of the policy which they were at this time disposed to adopt. After observing that the "quick succession of important events in Indian wars puts it out of our power to direct your measures," they proceed as follows: "We can only give you the outlines of the system which we judge most conducive to give permanency and tranquillity to our possessions. We should have hoped that the experience of what has passed in Bengal would have suggested the proper conduct to you; we mean, when our servants, after the battle of Buxar, projected the extirpation of Shuja Daulah from his dominions, and the giving them up to the king. Lord Clive soon discerned the king would have been unable to maintain them, and that it would have broken down the strongest barriers against the Marathas and the northern powers, and therefore restored Shuja Daulah to his dominions. Such, too, should be your conduct with respect to the Nizam and Hyder Ali, neither of whom it is our interest should be totally crushed. The dewani of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, with the possessions we hold in those provinces, are the utmost limits of our views on that side of India; on the coast the protection of the Carnatic, and the possession of the Circars, free from all engagements to support the Subah of the Deccan, or even with the Circars, preserving only influence enough over any country power who may hold them, to keep the French from settling in them; and on the Bombay side, the dependencies thereon, the possessions of Salsette, Bassein, and the castle of Surat. The protection of these is easily within the reach of our power, and may mutually support each other, without any country alliance whatever. If we pass these bounds, we shall be led on from one acquisition to another, till we shall find no security but in the subjection of the whole, which, by dividing your force, would lose us the whole, and end in our extirpation

from Hindustan. Much has been wrote from you and our servants in Bengal on the necessity of checking the Marathas, which may in some degree be proper; but it is not for the Company to take the part of umpires of Hindustan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance of power among themselves, and their divisions would have left you in peace; but if at any time the thirst for plunder should urge the Marathas to invade our possessions, they can be checked only by carrying the war into their own country. It is with this view that we last year sent out field-officers to Bombay, and put their military force on a respectable footing; and when once the Marathas understand that to be our plan, we have reason to think they will not wantonly attack us."

This important letter concludes thus:—"You will observe by the whole tenor of these despatches, that our views are not to enter into effensive wars in India, or to make further acquisition beyond our present possessions. We do not wish to enter into any engagements which may be productive of enormous expenses, and which are seldom calculated to promote the Company's essential interests. On the contrary, we wish to see the present Indian powers remain as a check one upon another, without our interfering; therefore we recommend to you, so soon as possible, to bring about a peace upon terms of the most perfect moderation on the part of the Company, and when made, to adhere to it upon all future occasions, except when the Company's possessions are actually attacked; and not to be provoked by fresh disturbances of the country powers to enter into new wars."

After expressing their views thus explicitly, it was not to be supposed that the directors would approve of the treaty with Nizam Ali, in which they were evidently disregarded. Accordingly, they not only condemned it, but also appointed a select committee to carry into effect their instructions to the Madras presidency. In a letter commenting on the treaty they say, "In whatever light we view the 10th article of your treaty with the subah" (the one relating to the grant of Mysore), "we see nothing but weakness, danger, and instability to our affairs." Again: "Instead of pursuing pacific measures with Hyder Ali—as we

think you ought to have done, knowing, as you did, our sentiments with respect to extending our territories—you have brought us into such a labyrinth of difficulties, that we do not know how we shall be extricated from them. But if it should have happened, when these advices reach you, that Hyder Ali should be extirpated, and if it should not be inconsistent with any engagements you may have entered into, our wish would be, to have restored to the ancient rajas and powers to whom they belonged, the several districts and countries taken from Hyder Ali, after reserving to us the passes and forts which serve as a barrier between Mysore and the Carnatic. Such a step must demonstrate to all the Indian powers with whom we are connected, that we mean to distribute to every man his own, and by a just, mild, and prudent conduct towards them, to evince that conquest and plunder are not the objects of our pursuit; but that we mean to confine ourselves to the branches of our commercial interest, and the benefit of such revenues as have been granted to us by Muhammad Ali. When we reflect on the vast length of country from the northern parts of Chicacole (one of the Northern Circars) to the southern districts of Madura and Tinneveli, the number of garrisons to be maintained, and the wild independence of most of the rajas and polygars, from whom nothing can be collected but by a standing force, we regret our ever having passed the boundaries of the Carnatic, even for the possession of the Circars; for we have great doubts whether the charges will not always exceed the collections, and apprehend many ill consequences from so great a division of our forces. The preservation of the advantages we hold in the Bengal provinces, is the great object of our attention."

In another letter, dated about six weeks after the above, the directors say, "Upon principles of policy, we wish for a peace with Hyder Naik, whenever it can be obtained upon the most moderate terms." To leave no doubt as to what these "principles of policy" are, they say, "Our policy is to avoid everything that tends to the increase of the Maratha power, which is evidently the misfortune of this war." The Marathas, it is added, "will make the most use they can of the embroils of others. It is by this conduct they have arrived to their present degree of power;

and our best policy is to check their growth by every opportunity, or at least lending our own force to their aggrandizement, which we certainly do as often as we engage in wars with the few remaining chiefs of India, who are yet capable of coping with them. Nizam Ali and Hyder Naik are two of those chiefs, and it is our true interest to preserve a good understanding with them." As the Madras presidency had shown how easily they could run from one extreme to its opposite, and be as rash in patching up a peace as they had been in rushing into war, the following caution is subjoined:—"We do not mean by this, that after the long and expensive war which you have been most unfortunately engaged in, you should yield to Hyder Naik, and accept of dishonourable terms; but whenever he shows a disposition to peace, we would have you meet him half-way; and if a reasonable compensation can be obtained for our expenses, we desire no increase of territory, nor fresh grants and privileges of any kind." Before concluding, the directors again advert to what was now their main object:—"We have possessions enough in Bengal and the Carnatic to yield all the advantages the Company expect. What we want is, attention in our servants to their improvement and good management, and a time of peace and leisure to establish plans of economy and frugality, both in our own affairs and those of the Nabob of Arcot, whose debts and embarrassments will have no end till he confines his views to the Carnatic."

Had the above letters been in the hands of the Madras government when Hyder, abandoned by his confederate, made pacific overtures to Colonel Smith, it is to be presumed a very different reception would have been given to them; but the idea of securing the sovereignty of Mysore to Muhammad Ali, and the dewani of it to themselves, was now uppermost in their minds, and the last thing they were inclined to do was "to meet him half-way," and grant him peace "on moderate terms." His complete destruction was openly avowed to be the object at which they were aiming, and he was made perfectly aware that in the struggle he was henceforth to maintain single-handed, his all was at stake. Viewed only as a question of political expediency, few will now be disposed to maintain that the Madras council did right in telling such a man as Hyder that the only alternative left to him was victory or despair.

When Hyder abandoned his strong position at Kaveripatam, and hastened westward, the departure of Nizam Ali, and consequent diminution of his force, was not the main cause. Intelligence had reached him that his conquests in Malabar were in imminent danger. An expedition had sailed from Bombay, and made its appearance off the coast of Honawar. At that port, as has been mentioned, Hyder had begun to prepare a fleet. He had even appointed a lord high-admiral. This was Lutf Ali Bey, an officer of cavalry, but so totally ignorant of naval matters that his interference alienated and disgusted those who, as practical seamen, had the actual command of the ships. The consequence was, that when the expedition appeared, Hyder's fleet, consisting of two ships, two grabs of two masts, and about ten gallivats, sailed out and joined it. Mangalore, Fortified Island, and Honawar were thus easily captured. Tipu, who had been sent forward with a light corps, shortly after arrived, but being too feeble to attempt any important operation, determined to wait the arrival of his father, who having, about the 20th of January, 1768, refitted his equipments at Bangalore, and intrusted the defence of that place to Fazal Ulla Khan, was now hastening westward by forced marches with his whole army. The British were, in the meanwhile, totally unaware of his approach, Tipu having carefully adopted every precaution to conceal it from them. They were thus lulled into security, when early in the month of May, without a previous note of warning, Hyder's whole army suddenly made its appearance before Mangalore. The consternation was extreme, and the result disgraceful. After a wretched defence, the garrison, consisting of 41 artillery, 200 European infantry, and 1,200 sepoys, made a hurried embarkation, shamefully abandoning their sick and wounded, consisting of 80 Europeans and 180 sepoys, and all their field-pieces and stores. Honawar and Fortified Island yielded almost without resistance; and Hyder, after recovering all that had been wrested from him in Canara, was able to reascend the Ghats before the monsoon set in.

Having ordered the body of the army, with all the heavy equipments, to proceed by easy marches for Bangalore, Hyder himself, with a select corps, hastened northward to Bednore. Intelligence had reached him that the principal landholders,

offended at his exactions, had given encouragement to the British invaders; and he knew well how to turn it to account. Under the pretext of arranging the revenue for the ensuing year, he brought the landholders together from all parts of the country, and then coolly announced to them that he knew their treasons. Death was, of course, the penalty; but he meant to inflict a punishment which would cost them less and yield him more. A list of names, with an amount of fine attached to each, was then produced; and effectual means were forthwith taken to secure payment, by handing over such as were present to the department of torture, and ordering the immediate apprehension of such as were absent. A similar, but still more perfidious measure, was resorted to in procuring a large contribution from Malabar. There the Nairs had again rebelled, attacked and carried, or compelled the evacuation of most of the block-houses which had been erected as military posts, and seemed in a fair way of recovering their independence. Madana, the Muhammedan governor, was unable to stem the torrent; and, on applying to Hyder for advice, was instructed how to proceed. Having opened negotiations with most of the chiefs, he intimated that the acquisition of Malabar having proved a burden rather than an advantage, his master was inclined to withdraw from it, and was therefore willing to restore their possessions on being reimbursed the heavy charges he had incurred. The terms were at once assented to; and Hyder's provincial troops, who had been so completely hemmed in that they must have surrendered at discretion, departed not only in peace, but loaded with treasure. The independence thus purchased by the Nairs was held by a most precarious tenure. By making it a special condition that Ali Raja, through whom he had first obtained a footing in the country, should not be disturbed, and studiously omitting all mention of Palghat, Hyder secured two points, one in the south-east and the other in the north-west, from which it would be easy at any future period to introduce an invading army and repeat his conquest.

The month of August, 1768, had now arrived, and consequently seven months had elapsed since the December of the previous year, when Hyder, by moving off from Kaveripatam, had left the Company's army in complete possession of the field.

brilliant results; but it must be confessed that they did not duly improve it. A rumour prevailed that Hyder, with his usual cunning, had only changed the plan of the war, and that he had a twofold object in view—to lure the Company's army into his own territory, where he would starve them by surrounding them with a desert; and to hasten back into the Carnatic while they were thus entangled, and lay it waste with fire and sword. This rumour made Colonel Smith unwilling to penetrate into the interior, with the view of striking a blow at the enemy's capital. With the present defective commissariat he could not march fifty miles beyond the frontier without running a risk of starvation; and he therefore proposed, in the meantime, to occupy the fertile country contiguous to the frontier, from Veniambaddi in the north, to Dindigul in the south, and Palghat or Palghautcherry in the south-west. In the meanwhile, depots of provisions and stores might be formed for the eventual operations of the war. The Madras government preferred a single concentrated effort in the direction of Bangalore, from which, in the event of success, an advance might be made on Seringapatam. It seems now to be admitted that the plan of the government was the more judicious of the two, but the difference of opinion prevented the full adoption of either. The result was an awkward intermediate course, composed partly of both.

The army was formed into two divisions. The one under Colonel Smith moved north to intimidate Nizam Ali, and quicken his negotiations for peace, and after accomplishing this object returned south to Kistnagherri. It was blockaded, and did not surrender till the 2nd of May. The importance of the capture poorly compensated for the time wasted upon it. The other division, under Colonel Wood, after capturing all the remaining forts of the Baramahal, rapidly reduced those of Tingrecotta, Darampuri, Salem, Ahtur, Namkul, Erode, Satimangalam, Denaikankota, Coimbatore, Palghat, Darapuram, Aravacourchi, and Dindigul. All of these places, some of them of considerable strength, were taken without difficulty, but the value of the capture was diminished by subsequent blunders. Under the idea that there were only three practicable passes into Mysore, Colonel Wood believed he could secure the whole country by fortifying them; and, even after he

had discovered the mistake, weakened his force by placing detachments in isolated positions, so remote from the main body and from each other, that they could not but fall an easy prey.

In other quarters the mismanagement was of a still more serious description. In virtue of a preposterous resolution of the Madras council, it was officially promulgated that Colonel Smith was in future to be aided by the advice and direction of two of their members as *field-deputies*. It was added that the council had prevailed upon the nabob Muhammad Ali to accompany them, for the purpose of assuming the fiscal management of the territorial conquests, garrisoning the minor forts with irregulars, conducting the negotiations for drawing off Hyder's adherents, and generally for advising in all other matters. As if to complete the absurdity of their arrangements, one of the field-deputies was appointed commissary-general to the army, and thus, in his threefold character of member of council, field-deputy, and commissary, was at once the superior, the colleague, and the inferior of the commander-in-chief. To crown all, a Chevalier St. Lubin accompanied the deputies as privy-councillor and guide. He ultimately proved to be a mere impostor, but was in the meantime believed, on his own assertion, to have lived with distinction at Hyder's court, to be intimately acquainted with his plans and resources, and to have extensive influence among his officers, native and European. While making these arrangements, the council were so ignorant of Hyder's movements that, on the 7th of April, three months after he had begun his march to the west coast, they gave it as a special instruction to the field-deputies to watch the motions of Hyder, in order to prevent his marching to Bednore, and overpowering the troops from Bombay.

On the 8th of June, Colonel Donald Campbell, commanding the advanced division of the British army, led it through the pass of Budicota to Venkatigherri. It surrendered on the 16th, and he shortly after proceeded to the fort of Mulwagul, which, after he had despaired of taking it by force, was captured by stratagem and the treachery of the governor. His next movement was on Colar, which surrendered at discretion after he had carried regular approaches to the crest of the glaxis. In the

meantime the main army was following slowly in the same direction, and arrived at Arlier in time to hear of the fall of Colar. On this event Colonel Campbell was ordered to return with his detachment to headquarters. Makhdum Sahib, who had been plundering in the low countries, on receiving intelligence of Colonel Campbell's success, had returned and taken post under the walls of Bauglur, twelve miles south-east of Bangalore. An attempt to surprise him failed; and the army moved on to Ussur, which, after a short siege, was taken on the 11th of July. Shortly after both Anicul and Denkanicotta fell. During all his operations Colonel Smith had been seriously hampered by a total want of cavalry. During his visit to Madras he had recommended that some of Muhammad Ali's irregular horse should be disciplined by English officers. In this way a small body of useful cavalry had been obtained. Many, however, were still wanted; and an agreement was made with Murari Rao for his personal service with a body of his select troops. He was preceded by an advanced guard, and, on the 4th of August, joined the army, which had then proceeded to Uscota, with a nominal force of 3,000 horse and 2,000 irregular infantry. A period of inaction now took place, partly because the battering train intended for the siege of Bangalore had been stupidly left behind on the first stage from Madras to Vellore, and partly because Muhammad Ali had fallen sick.

On the same day when Murari Rao joined the British camp at Uscota, Hyder entered Bangalore with the light troops of his advance. On the 9th of August they appeared to reconnoitre, and thereafter continued harassing the skirts of the camp. Murari Rao had been urged by Colonel Smith to encamp within the protection of the British pickets, but he answered with a smile that he knew how to manage the *Naik*; and took up his station about a mile to the right. During the delay caused by Muhammad Ali's illness, he threw up a slight line of works, but the protection they afforded was so imperfect that Hyder thought he ought not to lose the opportunity of attacking them. Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd of August, two columns of infantry set out, preceded by 6,000 horse and some elephants, to beat up Murari Rao's camp, while Hyder remained in reserve with the main body of his army, to support the

attack and counteract any movement by the British. The different localities of the camp were well known to the officers commanding the attack, and special instructions had been given to the cavalry to proceed directly to Murari Rao's tent, and bring off his head as a trophy. It was scarcely possible to take so experienced a Maratha chief entirely off his guard. The moment he found he was attacked by cavalry, he had the singular presence of mind to order that not a man of his should mount; and that, as the best means of distinguishing friends from foes, each man should remain at his horse's head, and cut down every person on horseback. The irregularity with which the tents were fixed greatly impeded the movements of Hyder's cavalry, and the confusion was increased by Murari Rao's state elephant, who, on receiving an accidental wound, broke loose, seized his chain in his trunk, and struck with it at a mass of advancing cavalry. This strange onset threw these back on the columns of infantry, while just entering, and under the apprehension that the attack had failed, a hasty retreat ensued. The noise had reached the British camp, and Hyder, fearful of the consequences, could take no part in the fight. His loss in killed and wounded was about 300; that of Murari Rao not more than 18.

Hyder, though foiled in this movement, was not discouraged, and immediately resolved on another of still greater promise. Leaving Bangalore in the charge of Tipu, and his maternal uncle Ibrahim Sahib, he set out on the 3rd September, by a circuitous march, for the south, in the hope of cutting off the division of Colonel Wood, which was known to be ascending from the Baramahal, and was expected to reach Budicota on the 5th. The route of the division was through a long defile, which pointed north-west for a few miles, and then, at a comparatively open spot, where it was met by a road from the north-east, turned at an obtuse angle nearly due west. Hyder, presuming that Colonel Smith would wait the arrival of the expected division at Malur, had selected a position north-eastward of the angle of the defile, from which he might open an enfilading fire on it, and avail himself of the consequent confusion to overpower it completely; at the same time, the open road in his rear would secure a retreat in the event of

failure. Colonel Wood, unable to learn the course of Hyder's motions, had thrown his baggage into Malur on the 5th, and continuing his march in the same direction, was, early on the morning of the 6th, moving towards Budicota. The hills which form the defiles concealed the three bodies of troops which were thus, unconsciously to each other, converging towards the same point. Some scouts sent out by Colonel Smith having climbed to the top of the hills, reported that they had seen Hyder's army and Colonel Wood's division approaching as above described. Seeing that he would be able to clear the defile before Hyder, and take him at an advantage, he quickened his pace, and had just, after reaching the angle, begun to make his formations on the open ground, when, to his amazement, he heard a regular salute from the south-east. He had sent scouts to inform Colonel Wood how matters stood, and this officer had taken this method of testifying his joy. Hyder, as much surprised as Colonel Smith at the salute, was able to make a better use of it, and was soon beyond all reach of pursuit. One can scarcely wonder that Colonel Smith, thus balked of a victory at the moment when he had almost made sure of it, expressed himself so strongly that Colonel Wood resigned his command, and was succeeded by Colonel Long, who followed with the division in the direction which Hyder had taken, while the main body moved towards Colar.

Hyder moved much farther to the north than was necessary to elude his pursuers. He had an important object in view. His brother-in-law Mir Sahib had, it will be remembered, treacherously delivered up Sera to the Marathas, and been rewarded by them with the government of Gurumconda, which had originally belonged to his ancestors. By his desertion Hyder was deprived of the best corps of his army, and he was therefore anxious for a reconciliation which would restore it to him. For this purpose he called in the aid of his wife, who pled his cause with her brother so ably, that she at last carried her point. The reconciliation thus effected was never after interrupted; and Hyder, after availing himself of an opportunity to ravage the territory of Murari, returned with a valuable reinforcement towards Colar, where the Company's battering train was drawn out, and the field-deputies were talking confidently of the early investment of Bangalore.

Hyder's position looked critical. Half his territory and several of his strongholds had been wrested from him—a chain of posts had been established—the place next in importance to the capital was threatened with a siege—and the army opposed to him was commanded by an officer of distinguished ability. On the other hand, these advantages of the Company were more imposing than solid. The captured places were not adequately garrisoned—the territory occupied was held by a precarious tenure—the siege of Bangalore, if protracted by a respectable defence, would starve out the besiegers, and swarms of light troops might, as before, spread like locusts over all the lower part of the Carnatic, and carry devastation and terror to the very gates of Madras. All these things were perfectly understood by Hyder; and he was, moreover, perfectly aware of the folly, ignorance, and conceit which presided at headquarters, and rendered Colonel Smith's abilities of little avail to the Company. Weighing all these things in an even balance, Hyder, if he had much to fear, had also something to hope, from a continuance of the war. There was one great danger which he could not have overlooked. The Marathas had more than once brought him to the brink of destruction, and he had every reason to believe that they were watching their opportunity. This consideration probably had more influence than any other in the resolution which he now took to make advances for peace. Had the Madras government been 'actuated by the spirit of moderation which, as has been seen, prevailed at this time among the directors, he would not have made them in vain, since at the very outset he offered greater sacrifices than they were disposed to demand. His own proposal was to cede the Baramahal and pay ten lacs of rupees. The Madras government, as if they had thought that the idea of peace was the very last which they ought to entertain, or that they had so humbled their adversary that he had no alternative but to accept any terms, however humiliating, which they were pleased to dictate, set no limits to their extravagance, and demanded an enormous reimbursement for the expenses of the war—a line of territory which should include the forts of Kistnagherri and Dindigul, and numerous concessions on the Malabar coast. Not satisfied with asking for themselves, they

insisted that Hyder should pay Nizam Ali the tribute which they had promised him in the event of their having conquered Mysore, and that he should make important cessions of territory to Murari Rao. The negotiation was finally broken off about the end of September, 1768, and the contest, which had never been entirely suspended, became more inveterate than ever.

The fort of Mulwagul had been garrisoned by Colonel Smith with his own troops, but during his absence the field-deputies had, on their own responsibility, substituted for this garrison a single company of the troops of Muhammad Ali. Hyder, aware of the change, took advantage of it as he was returning from Gurumconda, and by practising on the officer in command, gained possession of the place as if by surprise. Colonel Wood, again in command of his division, had hastened on the first alarm to its relief. On finding he was too late, he attempted to recover it. The lower fort was easily gained, but an attempt to carry the upper fort by a night escalade failed. On the next day, the 4th of October, Colonel Wood, observing a light body of troops moving, as if for the purpose of throwing a convoy into the garrison, set out with two companies and a gun to reconnoitre. He had no idea that Hyder's army was near, and had allowed himself to be enticed two miles from his camp, when he observed 3,000 horse and a heavy column of infantry moving to surround him. He galloped to the nearest picket, consisting of other two companies and a gun, and sending orders for his line to be formed and his baggage secured in the lower fort, hastened back to the support of the party he had left. Though it was completely surrounded, he forced through and joined it. Hyder, with his whole army, now appeared advancing over a height about a mile in front, and forwarding reinforcements. Flight was Colonel Wood's only chance of safety; and abandoning his two guns, he formed his companies into a square, and commenced a speedy retreat. It would not have availed him; and he was only saved from destruction by a battalion under Captain Matthews, who had been detached to his support, and succeeded in joining him. The united corps, after successive stands, were able to retreat till the line could give them more support. A desperate struggle now ensued. The enemy, in overpowering numbers, pushed forward with the utmost confidence;

the British resisted with the energy of despair, but every moment was increasing their difficulties, and confusion had begun to spread in their ranks. Captain Brooke, who had received a severe contusion in the escalade of the previous night, was left in the lower fort in charge of the baggage. He had with him four companies of his battalion. Seeing the impending peril, he took every man he could muster, including sick, wounded, and camp-followers, and with two guns, dragged along by volunteers and mounted by wounded artillery, moved by a circuitous and concealed path to the summit of a flat rock in the vicinity. The moment he reached it he commenced a brisk fire with his guns on the densest masses of the enemy's left flank, and at the same time ordered every man to shout, "Huzza! huzza! Smith! Smith!" The shout, heard by the main body, was re-echoed by them, in the belief that Colonel Smith had really arrived. The enemy, similarly deceived, gave way in every direction, and Colonel Wood had time to restore order among his troops and gain an improved position. Hyder was not long in discovering the stratagem; and, full of rage at the escape of his destined victims, furiously resumed the attack. He even attempted to charge with his cavalry up the hill on which the British were now posted, but had effected nothing when night closed and left Colonel Wood in possession of the field of battle. The British loss amounted to eight officers, 229 rank and file, and two guns; that of the enemy was estimated at 1,000. As both sides had exhausted their ammunition, there was a necessary interruption of hostilities, and Colonel Wood was finally relieved from his perilous position on the 6th of October, by the arrival of Colonel Smith from Colar.

Hyder, single-handed though he now was, had assembled so formidable an army that Colonel Smith told the field-deputies that, with the relative force of the contending parties, the siege of Bangalore could not be undertaken unless Hyder was previously beaten in a general action, and that the only chance of bringing on such action, supposing him disinclined to it, was to continue moving in two divisions, and endeavouring to entrap him into some position where it would be impossible for him to avoid it. A council of his officers, to whom he submitted these views, concurred in them, and it was resolved to

strengthen the divisions by collecting every disposable man for this purpose. In letters to the Madras government, desiring them to interpose their authority to these measures, Colonel Smith, who now felt that he had submitted too long to an ignominious thralldom, complained bitterly of the insufficiency of supplies, notwithstanding his incessant remonstrances, and hinted that Muhammad Ali's presence might be more useful than at Colar, where, for his protection and that of the field-deputies, a force little inferior in strength to one of the divisions of the army was detained. These letters, and the discouraging appearance which affairs were assuming, helped to open the eyes of the council to the preposterous course which they had pursued. They had formerly taken credit for "*prevailing* on Muhammad Ali to accompany the army," but on the 15th October they addressed two letters, one to Colonel Smith, in which they expressed a hope that "*he will be disburdened of the nabob;*" and another to the field-deputies in which, referring to the abandonment of the proposed siege of Bangalore, they plainly show that, whatever the amount of mismanagement might have been, they were determined not to bear the blame of it. "We cannot help," they say, "expressing our amazement and just disappointment that so unexpected an obstacle should now be discovered. The laying in magazines of grain was to be one great object of your attention, and we have always understood that a sufficient store to supply you during the intended stage had been laid in at Colar and other places. If that has not been done, to what end have we been put to the expense of sending such quantities of artillery and ammunition for the siege of Bangalore? To what end have all operations been suspended, Colonel Wood recalled from the southward, and our whole attention drawn to that object, when it is most certain neither that nor any essential service could be undertaken without ample supplies of grain? If you have been deceived in this respect, why have we not been advised from time to time? We can hardly say we hope it is not so, because Colonel Smith's assertion is positive. We desire you will explain this to us immediately, for our anxieties are too great to admit of delay; and we cannot help remarking with sorrow, that never army met with more impediments; at one time the want of artillery and stores for the

siege keeps it inactive, then the nabob's sickness fixes it immovably in its camp; at another time the rains prevent all operations; and, last of all, it is rendered useless by the want of provisions." Such was the language to which the council were reduced, only six weeks after disdainfully rejecting a favourable peace.

On the 5th of November, before the nabob and the deputies could have digested the contents of the above letter, Hyder, while constantly keeping out of reach of attack, and harassing the two British divisions by his light troops, started off, and, by a circuitous movement, suddenly appeared before Colar. His main object was to draw off Colonel Smith, who was threatening Deonhulli; but he was also prepared, if he saw an opportunity, to attempt Colar by escalade. He accomplished the former object; and on being disappointed in the latter, revenged himself by burning the villages and devastating the country for several miles around. After the letter and the alarm the deputies had no longer any relish for campaigning, and were permitted, on hinting the wish, to return home. Colonel Smith was now told that if he could submit a plan for more successful operations, with his present means, he might have "the direction of the war;" if he had no such plan, he was to repair to Madras and aid the deliberations of the government. He adopted the latter alternative, and set out on the 14th of November, accompanied by the nabob and the deputies, under the escort of a division. The general opinion was, that the desire for Colonel Smith's presence at Madras was prompted by a wish to try the effect of a change of command. Colonel Wood had made himself the favourite of the nabob, the deputies, and the government, and his campaign in the south was appealed to as evidence of his transcendent military talents.

Immediately after Colonel Smith's departure, intelligence having been received that Hyder was besieging Ussur, Colonel Wood marched, on the 16th of November, to its relief, at the head of about 700 Europeans and 4,000 sepoys, with their usual field-pieces. He had also two brass 18-pounders; but, as he was meditating a night attack on Hyder's camp, and wished to relieve himself of all incumbrances, he left them, with the whole of his baggage, camp equipage, and surplus stores, at

Bauglur, where he had arrived on the 17th. He set out the same evening, but was obliged to abandon his proposed night attack, as he did not reach Ussur till seven next morning. Hyder had made suitable preparations for Colonel Wood's fondly-imagined surprise. On the previous evening he had desisted from siege operations, and remained encamped north-west of Ussur till the British advance was entering it. In the hurried march only a small portion of the provisions and stores intended for the relief of the garrison had been brought up. While these were entering Hyder was not idle. His cavalry were making demonstrations in various directions, and his infantry were moving by a circuitous route to turn the British flank, and cut off the communication with Bauglur. The outposts had observed clouds of dust, indicating the movement of troops in that direction, and reported them to Colonel Wood, who, however, took no steps in consequence, and was first aroused to the danger by hearing repeated and heavy discharges of cannon and musketry. He lost not a moment in making a precipitate retreat. Hyder had outstripped him. Bauglur consisted of a fort, and a *pettah* or walled town connected with it on one side. When Colonel Wood left his so-called incumbrances behind him, the two brass eighteen-pounders had been found too wide for the narrow gate of the *pettah*, and had remained outside; the mass of the stores and baggage were deposited in the streets, and the draught and carriage cattle had mostly taken shelter under the walls. The garrison consisted of one of the best corps in Muhammad Ali's service, and was commanded by Captain Alexander, who, on the first alarm of Hyder's appearance, made an attempt to save the eighteen-pounders. He found himself instantly assailed on both his flanks, and retreated towards the fort. Hyder's troops were now within the *pettah*, whose mud walls formed no defence against columns preceded by cannon, and attended by pioneers and ladders, and were proceeding for the fort, in the hope of either entering it along with Captain Alexander or of cutting off his retreat. Fortunately the officer in charge of the fort had closed the gate, and the few sepoy left within commenced a brisk fire, which kept the enemy at bay till Captain Alexander and his party were drawn up into the fort by ropes. Meanwhile, a dreadful

scene was passing in the pettah. Men, women, and children, camels, horses, and oxen were pressing forward to escape the enemy, by gaining admission into the fort. The shutting of the gate made this impossible, and the avenues to it became completely blocked up. As the pressure continued, the stronger trampled down the weaker, and masses of dead and dying were piled in heaps. Two thousand human beings are said to have perished. When Colonel Wood arrived, it was only to find that the enemy were already out of sight, carrying with them his two eighteen-pounders, about 2,000 draught and carriage bullocks, and nearly the whole of the stores, baggage, and camp equipage of his army.

After viewing the desolation caused by gross mismanagement, Colonel Wood returned on the 20th to Ussur, to repair one of the errors of his former precipitation, by throwing some ammunition and stores into it; and on the 22nd was returning, after quitting Bangalore, which could no longer supply his troops, in the direction of Colar. He had reached the intermediate post of Arlier, and believed Hyder to be twenty-five miles distant, when he saw him suddenly appear, driving in the outposts with his cavalry and light troops, as a mask for the movements of his infantry. Soon after two batteries opened from a height. This cannonade, which the superior weight of Hyder's ordnance, including the two brass guns, made effective on his part, was very imperfectly answered by the British field-pieces. Colonel Wood had two resources. He might have moved out of the reach of the enemy's guns, or he might have adopted the more rational and spirited course of advancing on them. He did neither; and remained a whole day wasting ammunition in returning a fire which cost him in killed and wounded, one captain, six subalterns, twenty Europeans, and 200 sepoys. At ten at night, as the enemy had made a show of moving off to a distant encampment, Colonel Wood resumed his march; but the ground was scarcely cleared when he was startled by a fire of musketry on his rear and right flank. Similar attacks, obliging him to make repeated halts, were continued throughout the night. At daylight on the 23rd, just as his advance had passed an opening in the hills, Hyder's army was seen pressing through it, with a view to cut off the British columns, and

destroy them in detail. The bayonet relieved them from this danger, and they pressed on, though still harassed both on the right and left. Two miles further on, one of Hyder's columns having arrested the British front, he brought forward his whole infantry, and made a furious attack. Ultimately the contest looked ominous indeed. The British ammunition had begun to fail, and the sepoys to despond. At this very moment the attack ceased, and Hyder commenced his retreat. At first Colonel Wood could only wonder at this unexpected deliverance, but ere long an approaching column of dust explained it. Major Fitzgerald, who, as the next superior officer, had succeeded to the command of Colonel Smith's division, started off from Venkatigherri the moment he heard of the disaster at Bangalore, and was now in sight. In another hour he would have been too late. The field-pieces had only five rounds of ammunition remaining. Hyder had taken the direction of Bangalore, and it was therefore necessary to hasten to its relief. Major Fitzgerald volunteered to proceed on this expedition after receiving a small reinforcement to his division, while the rest of the army might repair its losses, and recover from its fatigues at Colar. Colonel Wood, who had at one time been bold even to rashness, was now so timorous and desponding that he would not allow the divisions to be separated, because his fixed opinion was, that united they were not a match for Hyder. His subsequent proceedings did nothing to redeem his honour, and he was ordered to Madras under arrest. He was afterwards tried, but escaped, as incapacity, the chief fault with which he was charged, has no punishment annexed to it by the articles of war. In this command he was superseded by Colonel Lang.

On returning from the west Hyder had sent Fazal Ulla Khan to Seringapatam, to collect levies and organize them. By the zealous and skilful discharge of this duty, he was able, early in November, to take the field with 7,000 regular cavalry and infantry, a great number of irregulars, and ten guns. His object was to descend into the low country. This, the absurd arrangements of Colonel Wood, who had stationed a number of isolated posts, incapable either of separate defence or mutual assistance, rendered comparatively easy. By open attack or treachery, fort after fort fell into his hands, and he announced

to Hyder that he would complete his descent by the Guejhutti pass, by the 4th of December. On the 6th, Hyder descended eastward into the Baramahal, by the passes of Palicode and Topur. Colonel Lang, who had foreseen this movement, despatched Major Fitzgerald, on the 10th, in the same direction, with an efficient corps of 5,000. As no adequate means had been used to recruit the sepoy ranks after the casualties of last campaign, he was left under the walls of Venkatigherri, with a force which amounted, exclusively of garrisons and detachments, to no more than 370 Europeans and 900 sepoys. The first service required of him was to remove the battering train from Colar, where Colonel Smith had allowed the field-deputies to deposit it, notwithstanding his declared opinion that it was no safe place for stores, without an army in its vicinity. With the removal of the train, the dream of conquests which it was to have assisted in effecting, fled.

In descending into the Carnatic, Hyder despatched emissaries in all directions, to announce that he had destroyed the English army, and was about to resume possession of his posts in the low country, preparatory to the conquest of Madras. For a time, indeed, his progress, like that of Fazal Ulla Khan, was more like a triumph than a campaign. The forts, says Colonel Wilks, yielded "as if a magic wand had accompanied the summons." Major Fitzgerald, following by rapid marches, had the mortification, at every halt, to hear of the fall of the place he next hoped to relieve. Thus he reports the fall, on the 6th of December, of Darampuri, on the 7th of Tingrecotta, on the 12th of Umalur, on the 15th of Selim, on the 17th of Namkul, on the 19th of Karur, on the 25th of Erode, and on the 31st of Dindigul; Kaveripuram and Palghat, which also fell, are not reported. Some incidents connected with the captures of Erode and Kaveripuram are not unworthy of being detailed.

Colonel Freschman, who had succeeded Colonel Wood on his departure from the south, retired sick to Trichinopoly shortly after Fazal Ulla's descent, leaving the command to Captain Orton, who concentrated his force at Erode. The district in which it stands is remarkable for fertility, but the cruel rapacity of Muhammad Ali's government had exhausted its resources. The provisions of Erode were in consequence insufficient for a short

siege; and a detachment of fifty Europeans, 200 sepoys, and two three-pounders, was sent, under Captain Nixon, to escort a supply from Karur, about forty miles to the south-east. Hyder's approach was known, but it was supposed that two more convoys could be brought up before he arrived, and that, in the meantime, the detachment would be strong enough to oppose any force that Fazal Ulla Khan might be able to bring against it. These were gross miscalculations. The detachment had been little more than an hour upon its march when about 1,000 horse were observed to the eastward. These, after reconnoitring the detachment, withdrew. Captain Nixon had arrived within two miles of an intermediate post, at which he intended to halt; but, on mounting the summit of a rising ground, was startled by three well-directed cannon-shot, which plunged from some masked guns into the head of his column. Before he had time to unlimber his three-pounders, he found ten field-pieces playing on him at little more than point-blank distance. After forming, he retired a few paces for cover behind the crest of the hill, to consider how he might best make for the post, which, he conceived, might still be in the hands of his own people. How astonished was he on finding that, instead of a detachment sent by Fazal Ulla Khan, Hyder's whole army was opposed to him. In a few minutes he saw two deep columns of infantry advancing to attack his little party, while about 12,000 horse were rushing on at full speed to envelope them on every side. The fifty Europeans stood firm, and reserving their fire till the enemy's column was within twenty yards, gave a volley and drove it back at the point of the bayonet. It was an unavailing effort, for the cavalry at the same moment charged the left and rear of the sepoys. A horrible carnage ensued. Not an individual of the detachment escaped without a wound except Lieutenant Goreham. From speaking the language, he was able to explain himself to an officer of rank, who saved him by giving him a seat on his horse behind him.

Placing the wounded in conveyances, Hyder hurried to Erode to display his trophies, and, to make the nature of them understood, sent in a flag of truce to ask the aid of an English surgeon. Shortly after he sent a summons, translated into English by Lieutenant Goreham, demanding the surrender of the place,

and inviting Captain Orton to repair to his tent, under the assurance that, if a capitulation was not agreed to, he would be at perfect liberty to return. Strange to say, Captain Orton accepted this invitation, perhaps because he had been making too free at dinner. His next in command was Captain Robinson, who had been taken prisoner the year before, and released on his parole not to serve again during the war. He was of course now serving in violation of his parole, and this not without the knowledge, but with the sanction of his government. It was the knowledge of this fact that had mainly induced Hyder to request the conference with Captain Orton, as he meant to retaliate in a manner which, if not justifiable, certainly taught a useful lesson. Affecting to have become acquainted with the breach of parole for the first time during the conference, he expressed his astonishment at such dishonourable conduct, and declared that he considered himself free from his promise of a safe-conduct. He offered, however, that if Captain Orton would sign an order for the surrender of the place he would permit the whole garrison to retire with their property to Trichinopoly. Captain Orton, after standing out the first day, yielding on the second, and wrote the order. The more remarkable part follows. Captain Robinson was bound by duty, and had the strongest of all personal motives, to disobey the order, and yet, under no other compulsion, surrendered the same evening. Shortly after Kaveripuram, which had long been gallantly defended by Captain Faisan, was compelled to capitulate under a similar promise of safe conduct to Trichinopoly. Neither promise was kept, and both garrisons were thrown into prison, where Captain Robinson afterwards died. Hyder's faithlessness was almost proverbial, and it may be presumed, without any breach of charity, that he would have acted in the same way, though he had no plausible pretext for it. The Madras government, however, had set the bad example, and had only themselves to blame when they found it turned against them.

With these events the year 1768 closed. In the course of little more than two months, Hyder recovered every place which had been wrested from him except Colar, Venkatigherri and Kistnagherri—the former two untenable posts; the last strongly seated on the summit of a rock, but in a locality where it could

scarcely influence the course of the war. After the capture of Dindigul, Fazal Ulla Khan was sent to operate upon the provinces of Madura and Tinneveli. Hyder, re-crossing the Cauvery, marched eastward along its northern bank. Major Fitzgerald, who was in the vicinity of Trichinopoly, and suspected that Madras was his object, hastened northward to interpose between him and this capital. Hyder on this turned south-east, so as to place himself in the rear of Major Fitzgerald's track, and left no doubt as to his locality by the flaming villages which marked his course. His arrival at the Coleroon brought him to the frontiers of Tanjore, which he agreed to spare in return for four lacs of rupees. He then proceeded northward, and occupied the very position which Major Fitzgerald had at first taken up, but been obliged to abandon, in order to seek for food at Cuddalore, on the sea-coast. The road to Madras had thus been left open, and the presidency were in consternation at the prospect of a visit which might be expected to be far more disastrous than that of Tipu Sahib, which was still fresh in their memories. The council had formerly disdained to listen to any terms of accommodation, unless everything they chose to ask was conceded to them. In a few short months all their dreams of conquest had vanished, and it was now their turn to make pacific overtures. Hyder was perfectly aware of the advantageous position he had acquired, and acted with more moderation than he had experienced in similar circumstances. In answer to the governor's communication, he expressed his readiness to conclude a peace, and requested that an officer might be sent to his camp, to whom he might explain the terms. Captain Brooke, the officer who made the sudden and successful diversion during the action at Mulwagul, was employed for this purpose, and furnishes an interesting report of his interview. Hyder began by complaining that though for many years he had kept an envoy at Madras for the purpose of establishing a solid and lasting friendship with the English, all his efforts had proved unavailing, chiefly in consequence of the intrigues of Muhammad Ali. Twice during the present war—once to Colonel Smith at Kistnagherri, and the second time to the field-deputies at Colar—he had made overtures of accommodation, only to see them ignominiously rejected; but he was still willing to

make peace with the English, if they would look to their own interests, exclude Muhammad Ali from their counsels, and send a person to his camp with full power to treat. He next observed that the Marathas periodically invaded his country to levy plunder, and would certainly not rest there if the opposition they had hitherto experienced should from any cause be withdrawn. At present Mysore was a barrier interposed between them and Arcot, but they had frequently proposed to him a partition of the nabobship. He had refused to enter into their views, because he believed them adverse to his interests; but they were preparing an invasion on a very formidable scale, and, as he did not feel strong enough to fight both Marathas and English at once, it would soon be absolutely necessary for him to make sure of the friendship of one of them. He preferred the English, and it was now for them to say whether he was to make good that preference.

On receiving this report, the Madras government ordered Captain Brooke to repair again to Hyder's camp, with an outline of the terms to which they were willing to agree. Hyder rejected them at once, declaring them unsuitable to the relative positions of the parties, but, at the same time, expressed his readiness still to receive Colonel Smith or any gentleman of rank charged with reasonable proposals and possessed of full powers. Only one of two courses remained open to the government—to prosecute the war with renewed vigour, or accept of peace on the best terms on which it could be obtained. With their usual inconsistency and vacillation, they did not adopt either, but preferred a course which attempted ludicrously to combine both. To proclaim their determination for war, Colonel Smith, whom they had so long kept idle at Madras, was again placed at the head of the army, which was concentrated at Chittapet; and to indicate their longing for peace, Mr. Andrews, a member of council, was appointed to repair to Hyder's camp. Colonel Smith arrived at Chittapet on the 1st of February, and on the 14th Mr. Andrews, who had accompanied him, set out on his pacific mission.

Hyder, in the meantime, was communicating with another party, of whom the presidency had good ground for being apprehensive. The French, who had for some time almost entire-

ly disappeared from the scene, were ambitious of again appearing upon it. Under pretence of securing Pondicherry from any attack by native powers, they were busily employed in renewing its fortifications; and M. Law, who had formerly figured in the war which terminated so fatally, was evidently buoyed with the hope of figuring more gloriously as a restorer of French ascendancy in the East. Hyder was, of course, to be his great coadjutor. Nothing could have been more acceptable to him than the following letter from Hyder:—"It is a long time since I had the pleasure of receiving any letters from you, advising of your health, the news of these parts, and that of the French in Europe. Considering the friendship and regard which the French Company and the sirdars of their king in Europe bear to me, I am very glad to hear of the increase of their happiness and power, also of your health. You have doubtless heard from them the repeated victories which, by the blessing of God, have attended the Circars troops; also the defeat of the English, and my laying waste the Trichinopoly, Arcot, &c., countries. My victorious armies are now gone toward Madras, near to which place they will proceed, when you will certainly send to me a person of distinction to inform me as well of certain affairs of your country of Europe as these parts; and till then be constant in writing me very particular letters, advising of the above matters, the situation of affairs in Europe, the English seaports, and their sirdars—all which will be the means of increasing our friendship and regard."

The council, seeing the danger thickening around them, endeavoured to obtain a respite by proposing a truce of forty days. Hyder cut down the number of days to twelve, which began to run from the 22nd of February. As soon as this truce was signed, Mr. Andrews hastened back to Madras to lay Hyder's ultimatum before the council, and receive further orders. Hyder, relieved for the time from actual warfare, employed part of his leisure in receiving a pompous deputation from the council of Pondicherry. The truce expired on the 6th of March; and, as no proper use had been made of the interval which it furnished for concluding peace, hostilities immediately recommenced. The abilities of Colonel Smith began to tell in the Company's favour; and a series of movements took place, during

which Hyder more than once found himself critically placed. He determined, therefore, to avoid similar risks in future, and with that view, returning to his old tactics, drew off gradually to the south. In this way the two armies were carried to about 140 miles to the south of Madras—Hyder in advance, as if retreating, and Colonel Smith following in his wake. Hyder's object was now gained. Sending off the whole body of his infantry, guns, and baggage of every description, and the great mass of his cavalry, with orders to retire by the pass of Ahtur, he started off at the head of 6,000 chosen horse and 200 foot. In three days and a half he moved 130 miles, and on the 29th of March arrived within five miles of Madras. In the evening of the same day Hyder acquainted the governor with his arrival, and the object of it, in a very characteristic letter. After referring to the previous steps which had been taken to terminate the war, and the various movements he had been obliged to make in consequence of Colonel Smith's approach with the evident design of attacking him, he continues thus:—"Colonel Smith, notwithstanding the negotiation of peace being on foot, again arriving within two or three coss of my army with the same design as before, I immediately decamped, and with a view to settle a lasting peace the soonest possible, am arrived at the Mount (St. Thome). My regard to our friendship and the intercourse of letters which has passed between us, made me decline coming to blows with the colonel; and the same consideration has made me entirely forbid the burning the villages and seizing the cattle, on which heads I have given proper orders throughout my army. I now write this, therefore, to desire you will send to me Mr. Du Pre, who is a wise sirdar and one of the councillors, and with whom, moreover, I have maintained a correspondence since the first arrival of Mr. Andrews. To him I shall impart my thoughts respecting the establishing a peace and sincere friendship between us; which, having fully understood, he may return and acquaint you with; in which case that foundation of a lasting peace which we are both desirous of will be established. In case of any delay therein, I am not to be blamed: let me hope, therefore, that you will send the said gentleman with all possible expedition. Entertain no apprehensions whatever, but be pleased to send him with a contented heart."

This letter, though couched in terms which evidently imply that Hyder considered himself in a position to dictate the terms, did not assume more than the council were now ready to concede. Listening only to their fears, they abandoned all idea of resistance, and were determined to purchase the departure of the enemy from their gates at any cost. Colonel Smith, though he had always counselled peace when it could have been obtained honourably, was indignant at the pusillanimous spirit now displayed by the council, and endeavoured to convince them that Hyder's present attack was by no means formidable, and might easily be turned to his disadvantage. Nothing, however, would now satisfy them but immediate peace, which was accordingly concluded on the 2nd, and executed by both parties on the 3rd of April. There was little difficulty in adjusting the terms, as Hyder, who was master of the position, dictated them, and refused to recede; but some demur took place as to the parties who were to sign the treaty. Hyder scorned to have anything to do, directly or indirectly, with Muhammad Ali, who, on his part, affecting equal contempt, declared that he would be no party to any agreement in which Hyder Naik was styled Nabob. As the only way of settling this knotty point, it was arranged that the Company should negotiate in their own name "for their own possessions and for the Carnatic Payin Ghat," and that Muhammad Ali's consent to this procedure should be officially signified by letter to the governor.

Hyder's first demand was for an alliance, offensive and defensive, but this seemed so objectionable, that Mr. Du Pre declared it would be necessary to break off the negotiation if it were persisted in. With strange inconsistency, the very thing thus refused was substantially conceded, by an article which stipulated "that in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall from their respective countries mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out," the party demanding assistance defraying the pay of the auxiliaries at fixed rates. There were only two other articles in the treaty. The one of them gave the benefit of the treaty to "all the friends and allies of the contracting parties," subject, however, to the very vague proviso, that "they do not become aggressors;" the other article stipulated for a mutual restitution of all conquests that had

been made during the war. Even the fort and district of Karur, though captured by the Company before the war commenced, and still in their possession, were claimed by Hyder, as originally belonging to Mysore, and given up to him. The only effect of the struggle had thus been to entail disgrace on the Company, and add enormously to their debt. During the negotiation Hyder had strenuously demanded the release of the wife and family of Chanda Sahib, and of a long list of Nevayets,¹ who, as the descendants and adherents of the former dynasty of nabobs, were imprisoned in various forts by Muhammad Ali. Mr. Du Pre evaded the demand by observing that they were in the custody of one who was not a party to the treaty. The subject was in consequence dropped, but not forgotten; for the moment the treaty was executed Hyder reiterated the demand, and declared

¹ The Nevayets, supposed to be so called from a corruption of the Hindustani and Maratha terms for "new comer," are of Persian origin. In the beginning of the eighth century, the governor of Irak—a monster abhorred for his cruelties—drove some respectable and opulent members of the house of Hashim to the resolution of exiling themselves for ever from their native country. They accordingly embarked with their families and effects in the Persian Gulf, and landed some of them on the Concan, in the west of India, and others to the eastward of Cape Comorin. The descendants of the former are the Nevayets, and of the latter the Lubbe. The Lubbe thus claim a common origin with the Nevayets, though their colour and other physical features are not Persian but Abyssinian. This fact strongly confirms the account of the Nevayets, who maintain that the Lubbe are only the descendants of their domestic slaves. By avoiding intermarriage with the Indians, and even with the highest Mussulman families, the Nevayets have preserved the purity of their original blood, and there are still some of them with complexions almost as fair as those of Europeans. Colonel Wilks, in concluding a long note respecting them, says: "Their adherence to each other as members of the same family preserved their respectability; and they were famed at the Muhammedan courts of the Deccan for uniting the rare qualities of the soldier, the scholar, and the gentleman. I have seen nothing in India to approach the dignified manners, the graceful and almost affectionate politeness of an old gentleman of this family, who resided at Avilcunda, about thirty miles north of Arcot. I became accidentally known to him at an early period of my residence in India, from having lost my way in a dark night, and wandered into a village about a mile from his habitation, when I received an immediate invitation, conveyed by two of his sons, and a reception which might grace a castle of romance."—*Historical Sketches*, vol. i, pp. 242-43.

that unless every Nevayet in his list were allowed to accompany him to Mysore, not a single English prisoner would be restored. His inflexibility on this occasion was dictated partly by family pride, as his mother was a Nevayet, and partly by his hatred of Muhammad Ali, who was both mortified and alarmed when ordered to part with prisoners who had once been, and might again become, dangerous rivals. It was necessary, however, to yield, and Hyder carried his point. The objects of his favour did not, however, greatly profit by it. His allowance for their maintenance was niggardly; but gross habits of his court accorded ill with their polished manners; and, as one of their own sect expressed it, "they almost all died of hardship, broken hearts, and repentance." As the Madras government could not bind the Company beyond the limits of their own presidency, Hyder deemed it necessary to have it supplemented by a treaty of similar import with the government of Bombay.

3

The Dewani of Bengal

WHEN Clive was preparing finally to quit Bengal, he availed himself of the authority which he had received from the directors to arrange the mode in which the government should in future be conducted. It had been left to his option to restore the council to their original powers, or to prolong the existence of the select committee. He preferred the latter course; and his friend, Mr. Verelst, accordingly succeeded him as president, while the other places in the committee were filled by Mr. Cartier, Colonel Richard Smith, Mr. Sykes, and Mr. Beecher. As the whole power of the government now centred in the Company, the wisest course probably would have been to throw off all disguises, and openly assume the character which belonged to them as the real sovereigns of the country. A less ingenuous course was followed, and all administrative proceedings continued to be conducted, as before, in the nabob's name. This double government, if not originally suggested by Clive, was strongly eulogized by him, not so much for its own intrinsic merits, as for certain relative advantages which it seemed to him would be secured by it. Thus, in a letter of instructions addressed to the select committee, on the eve of his departure, he says, "The first point in politics which I offer to your consideration is the form of government. We are sensible that, since the acquisition of the dewani, the power formerly belonging to the *subah* of these provinces is totally, in fact, vested in the East India Company. Nothing remains to him but the name and shadow of authority. This name, however, this shadow, it is indispensably necessary we should seem to venerate. Under the sanction of a *subah*, every encroachment that may be attempted by foreign powers can effectually be crushed, without any

apparent interposition of our own authority; and all real grievances complained of by them can, through the same channel, be examined into and redressed. Be it therefore always remembered, that there is a *subah*; and that though the revenues belong to the Company, the territorial jurisdictions must still rest in the chiefs of the country, acting under him and this presidency in conjunction. To appoint the Company's servants to the offices of collectors, or indeed to do any act by any exertion of the English power, which can easily be done by the nabob at our instance, would be throwing off the mask, would be declaring the Company *subah* of the provinces. Foreign nations would immediately take umbrage; and complaints preferred to the British court might be attended with very embarrassing consequences. Nor can it be supposed that either the French, Dutch, or Danes, would readily acknowledge the Company's *subahship*, and pay into the hands of their servants the duties upon trade, or the quit-rents of those districts which they may have been long possessed of by virtue of the royal *phirmans*, or grants from former nabobs."

On such grounds as these it was determined to pursue a dissembling policy, and merely levy the revenues of the country, without undertaking to discharge any of the other proper functions of government. Innumerable abuses, which ought to have been foreseen, immediately followed. Europeans, again permitted to engage in private trade, put down all fair competition by intimidation and violence, and made rapid fortunes by means of real or virtual monopolies; justice ceased to be administered even in form; and the great body of the people, subjected to endless extortion and oppression, became incapable of paying their rents, or endeavoured to compensate themselves by evading the payment of them. According to Clive's calculation, the Company's income in Bengal exceeded £2,000,000 per annum; and their civil and military expenses would in future never exceed £700,000 per annum in time of peace, and £1,000,000 in time of war. A clear surplus of at least £1,000,000 sterling ought thus to have been annually poured into the Company's treasury. If ever such a surplus was to be realized, it ought to have been during the government of Verelst. Though it was necessary to maintain a body of troops on the frontiers to

watch the movements of the Marathas, and counteract the ambitious designs which the Nabob of Oudh was gradually developing, there was no actual war during his government, with the exception of a short and ill-judged expedition to Nepal, to extricate its king from the consequences of hostilities in which he had become involved with the Gurkhas. The anticipated surplus, however, had never been realized; and at the termination of Mr. Verelst's government, in the end of 1769, it was found that the revenues had even failed to meet the current expenses. To defray these the government had borrowed to a large amount, and granted bills payable by the directors in England. These could only be met when due by the proceeds of the Company's investment; but even this was miserably curtailed, as on more than one occasion the funds which were intended to purchase the investment were appropriated by the government of Madras to defray the expenses of their ruinous war.

In the beginning of 1770, when Mr. Cartier succeeded Mr. Verelst, the financial difficulties of the Company were greatly increased by frightful calamities. The crop of rice had failed, and small-pox had begun to rage with the fury of a pestilence. Famine and disease, the two worst scourges of humanity, were thus let loose at once upon the natives of Bengal, who perished by thousands and tens of thousands. The streets and waysides were covered with the dead and dying, till the very air was tainted. It has been calculated that nearly a third of the whole population was destroyed. It would be absurd to blame government for these natural calamities, and yet it is impossible entirely to exculpate them. The failure of the rice crop, in consequence of excessive drought, must have been foreseen; and it was therefore the duty of government, while aware that famine to some extent was inevitable, to have taken the means in their power to mitigate it by storing their granaries. They appear, on the contrary, to have overlooked their duty as a government, and to have speculated as individual merchants on the enormous profits which the foreseen calamity would enable them to realize. Before the famine reached its height, almost all the rice in the country was bought up by the servants of the Company, and when the pressure came, they found little difficulty in selling at ten times the original cost. It has been said that in this way

they caused, or at least aggravated the famine. This doubtless is a mistake. As the supply of rice was deficient, the increase of price occasioned by their forestalling was beneficial, inasmuch as it obliged the consumers to practise economy and place themselves on short allowance sooner than they might otherwise have deemed it necessary. In this way their conduct, however selfish and heartless the motives which dictated it, could not be injurious, though it would certainly have been more to their honour had they in a common calamity thought only of the means of mitigating its horrors. Among the victims of disease was the actual Nabob of Bengal, Saif-ud-Daulah, who died of the small-pox, and was succeeded by a younger brother, Mubarak-ud-Daulah, about ten years of age. The event was too unimportant to attract much notice; and the new appointment appears to have been regarded by the Bengal presidency as a matter of course. The directors, however, actuated by a more mercenary spirit, were not unwilling to take advantage of the circumstance. In a letter to the president and council, after expressing their astonishment that "an event of so much importance as the death of the Nabob Saif-ud-Daulah and the establishment of a successor in so great a degree of nonage, should not have been attended with those advantages for the Company which such a circumstance offered to your view," they continue thus: "Convinced as we are that an allowance of sixteen lacs per annum will be sufficient for the support of the nabob's state and rank, while a minor, we must consider every addition thereto as so much wasted on a herd of parasites and sycophants, who will continually surround him; or at least be hoarded up, a consequence still more pernicious to the Company. You are, therefore, during the nonage of the nabob, to reduce his annual stipend to sixteen lacs of rupees." Thus, by a single stroke of the pen, they unceremoniously relieved themselves of an annual payment of £100,000, which they were under a formal obligation to pay, and to which the nabob's title was at least as good as theirs was to the grant of the *dewani*. The only thing that can be said in excuse for them is, that all their dreams of prosperity had vanished, and their financial difficulties had reached a crisis.

When the grant of the *dewani* was obtained, the general belief was that the Company had obtained a clear addition to their

income of at least a million sterling. As a necessary consequence the value of their stock rose rapidly in the market, and with it the expectation of a largely-increased dividend. On this subject, however, the directors and the proprietors were not agreed. The former, aware of the heavy obligations which they had incurred, counselled delay, at least till the anticipated addition to their income should be actually realized; the latter were too impatient to wait, and on finding their wishes thwarted, took the initiative into their own hands, and at a single bound raised the dividend from six to ten per cent. Meanwhile the public were not unconcerned spectators of the strife. The right of the Company to make territorial acquisitions for their own behoof was denied, and the directors received a significant intimation from the Duke of Grafton, then prime minister, that the affairs of the East India Company would probably occupy the attention of parliament in the approaching session. Accordingly, on the 25th of November, 1766, about a fortnight after parliament met, a committee of the whole House of Commons was appointed to inquire into the state and condition of the Company; and on the 10th of December the court were ordered to furnish a variety of papers, including copies of all treaties and grants from any native powers, between 1756 and 1766 inclusive, as well as all correspondence relating thereto, and an account of the state of the Company's territorial revenues, together with a statement of all expenses incurred by government on account of the East India Company during the period to which the order for copies of the treaties and grants applied.

The object of these parliamentary proceedings could not be misunderstood. On the supposition that the *dewani* was as valuable as had been represented, the ministry were determined to share in the profits. It was even hinted that the rich acquisitions of the Company in the East might be legitimately employed in relieving the people of England of some of their burdens. This idea, preposterous as it now seems, appears to have been suggested by Clive himself, who, in a letter to Lord Chatham, from which we formerly quoted at some length, wrote as follows:—"I flatter myself I have made it pretty clear to you that there will be little or no difficulty in obtaining the absolute possession of these rich kingdoms, and that with the Mughul's own consent,

on paying him less than a fifth of the revenues thereof. Now, I leave you to judge whether an income yearly of upwards of two millions sterling, with the possession of three provinces abounding in the most valuable productions of nature and art, be an object deserving the public attention; and whether it be worth the nation's while to take the proper measures to secure such an acquisition—an acquisition which, under the management of so able and disinterested a minister, would prove a source of immense wealth to the kingdom, and might in time be appropriated in part as a fund towards diminishing the heavy load of debt under which we at present labour." Some such idea was probably entertained by the government; and hence, when the proprietors, undeterred by the opposition of the directors, and the interference of parliament, resolved, on the 6th of May, 1767, that the dividend for the ensuing half year should be at the rate of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum, the ministry at once put a veto on their extravagance, by bringing in a Bill which restrained the Company from increasing their dividend beyond 10 per cent till the next session of parliament, and prohibited the voting of dividends, except by ballot, in general courts specially summoned for that purpose. As this was the first instance in which parliament directly interfered with the Company in the management of their revenues, the Bill was strenuously opposed in all its stages, especially in the House of Lords, where the celebrated judge, Lord Mansfield, headed the opposition, and stigmatized the Bill as an arbitrary and unjustifiable interference with the rights of property. It was carried notwithstanding, and when about to expire, was continued in force for another year.

The proprietors, thus defeated, were glad to listen to a compromise. Tacitly admitting the claim of the crown to their territorial acquisitions, the Company ultimately became bound, in terms of two successive acts of parliament, to pay over into the public treasury the sum of £400,000 per annum, first for two successive years, and afterwards for five years, commencing in February, 1769. They agreed, moreover, annually to export British merchandise to the amount of £380,837, not to augment their dividends beyond $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, by augmentations not exceeding 1 per cent in one year and after paying their simple

contract debts, bearing interest, and reducing their bonded debt to the sum lent to government, to furnish an additional loan to government of their surplus receipts at 2 per cent interest. These arrangements were obviously made under the influence of the golden dreams which were at this time almost universally indulged. The only thing in the act which indicates some degree of distrust, is a proviso that if the dividend should fall below 10 per cent the payment into the exchequer should be proportionably reduced, and that if the dividend should fall to 6 per cent the payment should entirely cease. A still more unequivocal expression of distrust was given by the directors when, mainly on the ground of the unsatisfactory state of their finances, they adopted the extraordinary measure of sending out to India a commission of supervisors, with complete powers to suspend, if necessary, even the presidents and councils, to investigate every department of affairs on the spot, and frame regulations adapted to the exigency of circumstances. The supervisors appointed were Mr. Vansittart, Colonel Forde, and Mr. Scrafton. They sailed in the *Aurora* frigate, and reached the Cape of Good Hope in safety, but were never heard of after they left it.

Government, after they had once begun to interfere with the management of the East India Company, seem to have had some difficulty in fixing the point at which they ought to stop. Not satisfied with objecting to the proposed appointment of supervisors on some alleged ground of illegality, they endeavoured, at first openly, and thereafter surreptitiously, to obtain a direct share in the political government of India. The Company had applied to them for two ships of the line and some frigates. The application was favourably received, and the directors were exulting in the addition about to be made to their naval strength, when they were startled by a communication from the ministry, to the effect that the naval officer appointed by the crown to command in India should be invested with full powers as a plenipotentiary, to transact with native states, and decide on all questions of peace and war. This claim on the part of the government was represented as a necessary result of an article in the treaty of Paris, by which his majesty had agreed to acknowledge the legal title of the Subahdar of the

Deccan, and of the Nabob of the Carnatic. Being thus bound by treaty, how could his majesty, it was argued, allow his troops to be at the disposal of third parties, who might choose to employ them in undertakings directly at variance both with the letter and the spirit of the treaty?

The claim thus put forward by the ministry excited the utmost alarm in the Company, who could not fail to perceive that the real question at issue was whether they were to be entirely superseded in their political capacity, and reduced to their original condition of merchants. The opposition to the proposal was so strong and decided, that the ministry expressed a willingness to modify it, and Lord Weymouth, in their name, while requesting that the sense of the general court should be taken on the subject, volunteered the following explanation:—"The difficulty of a sole plenipotentiary, if it ever existed, is removed; the crown does not wish to interfere with the powers of the commission (the supervisors); wants no authority over your servants, nor any direction or inspection of your commercial affairs; disclaims even a recommendation of any person to be employed in it; in short, only wishes to be enabled to assist you effectually; and, in order to that, finds it necessary to have a share in the resolutions and deliberations of the Company, merely with regard to the two objects of peace and war, when his majesty's forces are to be employed." The explanation was not satisfactory, and the general court, after long debate, refused to grant even the modified powers thus requested. Sir John Lindsay, on being appointed commander-in-chief of the king's ships in India, was also appointed by the Company to the command of their ships, and specially authorized to settle some disputes in the Persian Gulf; but authority to interfere in questions of peace and war in India was distinctly refused. As the ministry ceased to insist, the fair inference undoubtedly was, that they acquiesced in the refusal. Nothing, however, was further from their intention. Having failed to accomplish their object with the consent of the Company, they secretly resolved to proceed without it, and stooped to something very like a trick.

The treaty of Paris, by its acknowledgment of Muhammad Ali as lawful Nabob of the Carnatic, seemed to open a wide

field to his ambition, and he began to aspire to the sovereignty of all Southern India. While cherishing this extravagant aspiration, he felt galled beyond measure at the control which the Company exercised over all his movements, and he was therefore prepared to hail a proposal which promised to reinstate him in what he conceived to be his sovereign rights. Among his advisers was a Mr. Macpherson, the son of Dr. Macpherson, minister of Sleat, in the Isle of Skye. He had arrived at Madras in 1767, as purser of the Company's ship *Mansfield*, commanded by his uncle, Captain Macleod, and having been introduced to the nabob, soon acquired so much of his confidence that he engaged him as his agent, and sent him home to England to prosecute his interests. With this view he was furnished with letters to the prime minister. The course of his proceedings is detailed in a paper which was afterwards drawn up by himself, and entitled "Memorial of Services rendered to the Nabob." "The object of his commission was," he says, "to procure relief from the oppressions under which the nabob was labouring; to procure this wished-for relief the means to be employed were, if possible, to raise in the breast of the prime minister a favourable respect for the nabob; then to lay before him the distress of the prince; likewise to show the advantage which would arise to the state from granting him the proper protection." "Fortunately," adds Mr. Macpherson, "the favourite and minister (the Duke of Grafton) was a personage of the first distinction—of the noblest and most steady principles; every consideration pointed out his grace as the member of the British empire whose friendship and support, next to those of the sovereign, were the most desirable to the cause of the nabob." Having been admitted to an interview, Mr. Macpherson proved himself a zealous and unscrupulous advocate. "I expatiated," he says, "upon the superior merits of the nabob; showed that he was the person to whom Britain owed the rise of her power in India; that his attachment and unsullied honour to the English were unparalleled. I then dwelt upon his personal merits as a statesman and a gentleman; and showed that though he had assurances of protection under the sovereign hand, he was treated with indignity, and even tyranny." To give force to his eloquence, Mr. Macpherson was

emboldened to offer presents, first to the minister and then to his secretary. Both of them, it seems, had virtue enough to refuse them, but the duke, so far from being offended, spoke "feelingly of the oppression under which the princes of India laboured from the usurped authority of the commercial subjects of the state," and declared his determination to use all his influence as minister in support of Muhammad Ali. While thus pledging himself to the nabob, the Duke of Grafton was generous enough not to overlook the merits of his agent, and rewarded him for his attempt to undermine the Company by sending him back to India, in the beginning of 1770, with the appointment of a writer in their service. To this contemptible intrigue the conduct of the ministry in stealthily carrying out the scheme which they had professedly abandoned, must be ascribed.

Sir John Lindsay, on arriving at Madras, lost no time in acquainting the council with the extraordinary powers with which he had been invested. He had come, he said, as the plenipotentiary of the crown, and had not only full authority to treat with the native powers, but to inquire into the conduct of the late war. He therefore peremptorily ordered them to furnish him with whatever papers and documents he might require in conducting the inquiry. Nor was this all. They had hitherto thought themselves supreme within their own presidency, but they must henceforth content themselves with a subordinate position. The crown had intrusted him with letters and presents to the Nabob of Arcot; and as in delivering them he was about to act as the representative of majesty, it was obviously their duty to follow in his train. The council were taken completely by surprise, but soon recovered from it, and acquainted Sir John Lindsay with their determination not "to degrade themselves." In their letter to the court they observed—"We must either have delivered to him our papers and records, or not; we must either have rendered him an account of our transactions, or not; we must have admitted him to have shared in our deliberations, or not. There appeared to be no room for hesitation. We were charged with the Company's affairs—we had no instructions from our constituents. Their rights were attacked; we must either have supported or basely surrendered

them. Our fortunes may be at stake in the issue; but were our lives at equal hazards, we should, without a moment's hesitation, have taken the part we have taken. The die is cast; we must stand the issue."

This letter, which reached the directors on the 22nd March, 1771, was the first intimation they received of Sir John Lindsay's surreptitious commission. On the 8th of April they addressed a letter to the Earl of Rochford, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, in which—after stating that "Sir John Lindsay, in express contradiction to the assurance given to the Company by his majesty's secretary of state, your lordship's predecessor in office, has, under his hand, insisted that he has his majesty's authority, and plenipotentiary powers from the crown, to execute any treaty with the princes of the country which may be judged necessary to procure peace in India"—they drew a dismal picture of the probable results, and concluded with declaring their apprehensions "that unless some speedy remedy be applied, the ruin of the Company, from the loss of their consequence, influence, and credit, will infallibly ensue." Lord Rochford's answer was far from satisfactory. "I must inform you," he says, "that the repeated complaints made by the Company of the mismanagement and disobedience of their servants in India, which caused them to desire from the legislature more extensive powers for their coercion, and induced them to send out supervisors invested with the highest authority, first suggested to his majesty the expediency of giving his commission to a person of confidence, to procure the fullest information on the spot of the manner in which affairs had been conducted in that country; the thorough knowledge of which the king could not but consider as a principal national concern, as well as of the greatest consequence to the interest of the Company. His majesty was the more called upon in this case, as his honour, pledged for the performance of the engagements entered into by him in the last definitive treaty, was in the hands of the Company's servants carrying on the government in India." On the serious charge of having granted the commission "in express contradiction to the assurance granted to the Company," his lordship deemed it prudent to say nothing, but he plainly intimated the determination of the

ministry to persevere in the course which they had commenced. Sir John Lindsay had indeed been recalled, but his commission was to remain in force, for Sir Robert Harland had been appointed to succeed to it. If there was any idea of a contest between the king and the Company, the governor and council of Madras had themselves given rise to it, "by their improper reception of Sir John Lindsay, and their refusal to do the usual honours to the delivery of his majesty's letter and presents." On the whole, the Company had no reasonable ground for apprehension. Positive instructions had been given to Sir John Lindsay "to avoid, as far as possible, even the appearance of any dispute;" the king, "in his last letter to the nabob, has been pleased to express his confidence in the Company, and his desire to connect them inseparably with that prince;" and Sir Robert Harland, "beside the particular orders given him to promote, as far as possible, a strict union between the nabob and the servants of the Company, and to remove every suspicion of the Company's lying under the king's displeasure, received instructions to make the support of their importance and honour in the eyes of all the powers in India a principal point of his attention." These instructions had been repeated, and accompanied with explanations which ought to satisfy the Company that Sir Robert Harland's powers "will, whenever they shall be executed, be a convincing proof of his majesty's paternal care and regard for their interests, by showing them to be the object of his protection and support." Such were the vague assurances by which ministers endeavoured to justify a course of policy which they had commenced in fraud, and had not the manliness to abandon when its folly was made manifest.

Whatever may have been the positive instructions given to Sir John Lindsay, he appears to have forgotten them before he reached his destination, and took an early opportunity of showing that he was determined to push his powers to the utmost. By the treaty of perpetual friendship with Hyder, the Company were bound to assist him with troops against any attack that might be made upon him. In reliance on this article, Hyder intimated to the Madras government that he was threatened with an invasion by the Marathas, and requested their promised aid. The council were sorely perplexed. They had

scarcely begun to recover from the effects of a most disastrous war, and now they were called upon to involve themselves in another war, which would bring them into direct collision with the Marathas. As the only means of extricating themselves from the dilemma, they had recourse to a very paltry evasion, and endeavoured to justify their refusal of assistance to Hyder on the ground that he had not been attacked, but had himself provoked the hostilities of the Marathas by his own aggressions. This proposed neutrality did not satisfy Muhammad Ali. An implacable enmity existed between him and Hyder, and therefore his proposal was that the Company, instead of remaining neutral, would regard Hyder as the common enemy, and assist the Marathas in crushing him. This was too gross a violation of the treaty to be sanctioned by the council; but Sir John Lindsay had no such scruples, and, either in gross ignorance or utter disregard of existing obligations, openly declared himself on the side of Muhammad Ali.

Sir Robert Harland arrived at Madras, with a squadron of his majesty's ships, on the 2nd September, 1771, and immediately showed that he was prepared to indorse every measure which Sir John Lindsay had sanctioned. The nabob immediately availed himself of his assistance, and had little difficulty in convincing him that the true policy of the Company was to make common cause with the Marathas. Sir Robert accordingly addressed the council; and, in urging compliance with the nabob's view, stated that, should a peace be refused to the Marathas on the terms which they proposed, they threatened to destroy the whole of the Carnatic with fire and sword, and had a great army on the frontiers to carry their threats into execution. In conclusion, he called upon them to explain particularly what were their reasons "for refusing to acquiesce in what the nabob thinks the only measure for the preservation of his country, and what appears to me to offer the only prospect of security in the present circumstances to the British interests in this part of India."

The council, in answering this communication, adopted the rather singular expedient of sending two separate letters to Sir Robert Harland—the one addressed to him as plenipotentiary, and the other addressed to him as admiral. In the former,

improving upon a remark of the directors, that the rights and privileges of the Company "rested upon as high authority as the king's commission—royal charters confirmed by repeated acts of parliament," they observed that though it was their most anxious desire to manifest unfeigned allegiance and inviolable attachment to his majesty's most sacred person and government, yet they could not render an account of their conduct to any one but a constitutional authority, such as the parliament of Great Britain, and the courts of civil judicature. In the other letter they showed some dexterity in turning Sir Robert Harland's statement against himself:—"We have it now in the most authentic manner from you, his majesty's minister plenipotentiary, that they (the Marathas) threaten to destroy the whole Carnatic with fire and sword, if certain conditions which they require are not submitted to; which conditions are, as you express it, and as we believe they express it, friendship with the English and the nabob, and a certain assistance from both against Hyder Ali, who is their enemy. Words are only used to convey ideas; and the same words may convey different and even contrary ideas, according to the circumstances that attend them. Thus, if the Marathas were to propose friendship with the English and the nabob in the way that states generally propose treaties of friendship, for mutual advantage, we should understand by it what the word in its primitive and natural sense implies, and should most gladly embrace it in any way that might be advantageous to the Company's commerce, productive of security to their possessions, and consistent with the rights and powers granted to them by charter; but when they require friendship and assistance and denounce threats of fire and sword if their demands are not complied with, the words change their meaning. It is no more friendship they propose; it is an abject submission they demand to their imperious will—such a submission as is conformable to the usage of the country. The subjected powers are always compelled to attend the haughty conquerors with a certain number of troops. This is not all. It is not only a demand of servile submission they require; they mean to render it still more humiliating: it must be accompanied with the most flagrant breach of national faith. A formal treaty of peace and

amity was concluded between this presidency, on the part of the Company, and Hyder Ali Khan, in the year 1769. He hath committed no act that can give the least attain to that engagement—at least, that we know of; but, on the contrary, he hath granted to the Company all the privileges and advantages of trade in his country which they enjoyed before the late war with him. The Marathas add to their haughty demand this specific condition—that the assistance to be given them by the English and the nabob be expressly employed, in open violation of the faith of that treaty, against Hyder Ali Khan. We therefore offer it as our opinion, that a submission to such a demand would be in the highest degree derogatory to the honour of the British nation, and contrary to the interests of the Company.”

These arguments could not be answered; and Sir Robert Harland, apparently conscious that he had placed himself in a false position, made a very blustering reply. “Your charge of an unconstitutional act,” he says, “cannot be against me; I do no more than my duty. But it seems to me to be directly pointed at the royal authority and the undoubted rights of the crown; and when you take upon you to censure a measure which is the sacred privilege of majesty and the constitutional rights of your sovereign, let me tell you it is very unbecoming, it is presumptuous, it is arrogant; and I know not whether it may not be looked upon as criminal in the eye of the law, as it is an undoubted maxim in the British government that the privileges of the prince are equally sacred with the liberty of the subject.” While thus blustering, Sir Robert clung tenaciously to his purpose, and announced his intention to enter into a negotiation with the Marathas through Madho Rao, or any one he might appoint. Ultimately he announced that he had proposed to the Marathas, in the name of the King of England, a cessation of hostilities between their nation, the English, and the Nabob of the Carnatic, until such time as his majesty’s pleasure should be known; and that he understood the Marathas had acceded to the proposal, and withdrawn their troops from the frontiers. This was a very curious kind of armistice. The Marathas cross the frontiers of the Carnatic, and commence plundering; the English, who would have marched against them, are held

back by the nabob, in the hope that he may yet be able to make them friends, and a British plenipotentiary, yielding to the same pusillanimous spirit, sends them a civil message, simply proposing that they should desist from hostilities till such time as his majesty's pleasure should be known! The council wisely refused to connect themselves in any way with his absurd proceedings, till he began to seize many of the Company's European soldiers, on the ground of their being deserters from his majesty's service. On being interrupted in this petty strife, he denounced their conduct as "diabolically mischievous and flagrantly unjust," and shortly after, without taking formal leave, sailed away suddenly from the coast.

Though the council had refused to be dragged by the nabob into a new war with Hyder, they did not refuse their assistance to him in a case where they thought he had more justice on his side, and their own revenues were more immediately concerned. The Raja of Tanjore, during the war with Hyder, had shown great reluctance in assisting the Company with a quota of horse which he was bound to furnish, and made no suitable return for the tranquillity which his territories had enjoyed under the Company's protection. He was therefore regarded as little better than an enemy in disguise; and accordingly, when the nabob complained that the raja had marched into the Marwar country, and attacked some polygars who were dependants of the Carnatic, the council at once interfered, and remonstrated with him on the impropriety of his conduct. He answered with disdain—"If I suffer Moravi to take possession of my country, Nalcuti to take my elephants, and Tondeman to injure my country, it will be a dishonour to me among the people to see such compulsions used by the polygars. You are a protector of my government; notwithstanding, you have not settled a single affair. I have finished the affairs relating to Moravi, and confirmed him in his business; the affair with Nalcuti remains to be finished, which I shall also finish." Though this answer gave little hope of an amicable arrangement, it was resolved to attempt negotiation, and, at the same time, despatch troops and stores to Trichinopoly. The negotiation, conducted by Omdut-ul-Omrah, the eldest son of Muhammad Ali, who had deputed him for that purpose, failed; and General Smith, setting out

from Trichinopoly at the head of a force, arrived, on the 16th of September, 1771, before the fort of Vellum, situated eight miles south-west of Tanjore. The siege was immediately commenced; but at midnight of the 20th, after a battery had been opened, the place was evacuated. General Smith immediately invested Tanjore, and had effected a breach which was reported to be practicable, when his operations were suddenly arrested by an intimation from Omdut-ul-Omrah that the raja had come to terms. In this transaction the nabob, acting on the new ideas of sovereignty with which the British ministers had impressed him, treated the Company with very little ceremony, and concluded a treaty with the raja in his own name, without their intervention. He simply intimated to the council that Vellum had been ceded to him, and requested them to place a garrison in it, in order to render it an effectual check on the raja's conduct.

The proceedings of the Emperor Shah Alam had for some time occasioned considerable uneasiness. The districts of Allahabad and Korah, which had been wrested from the Nabob of Oudh, had been conferred upon him; and he was, moreover, entitled to the annual sum of twenty-six lacs of rupees (£260,000), as the portion of revenue which he had reserved, and the Company had become bound to pay him on receiving the grant of the *dewani*. It had been hoped that he would sit down contented with these provisions, and cease to dream of regaining the throne of his ancestors at Delhi. He soon showed that his views were of a very different description, and began to intrigue for the possession of his capital. His first application for aid was to the Bengal presidency, from whom he asked two battalions of sepoys and some field-pieces, in virtue, as he alleged, of a promise which Lord Clive had given him. The council, though they had previously resolved not to allow their troops to cross the Karamnasa, somewhat inconsistently resolved to grant his application. They saw they had not influence sufficient to prevent him from making the attempt, and they feared that if he made it without their assistance, any hold which they now had upon him might be lost. When the enterprise was about to be commenced a double mutiny broke out, the one among Shah Alam's own troops, and the other among the three best battalions of his vizir, the Nabob of Oudh. The enterprise was in consequ

ence postponed; but Shah Alam, still bent on executing it, continued to watch for a favourable opportunity. It occurred sooner than was expected.

For some time after the fatal field of Panipat the Marathas were too much employed at home to be able to interfere with the politics of Hindustan; but in 1769 the Peshwa Madho Rao assembled a powerful army, and sent it northward across the Narmada. It consisted of about 50,000 horse, and a large body of infantry, with a numerous artillery. It was headed by celebrated leaders—Visaji Kishen, who held the chief command, Mahadaji Sindhia, and Tukaji Holkar. Their first operations were directed against the Rajput princes, from whom they extorted ten lacs of rupees, as arrears of tribute. They next invaded the territory of the Jauts or Jats, a powerful tribe, who dwelt to the west of the Jumna, and had been compelled, in self-defence, to abandon the peaceful pursuits of agriculture for that of arms. Though they had gradually extended their territories, and made themselves masters even of Agra, they were unable to cope with the Marathas, who defeated them in a pitched battle near Bharatpur, overran their country, and compelled them to pay a sum of sixty-four lacs of rupees, ten in ready money, and the rest by instalments. Nujit-ud-Daulah, a Rohilla chief, who had made himself master of Delhi, where he administered the government in the name of Prince Jawan Bakht, Shah Alam's eldest son, suspected that his turn would come next, and endeavoured to save himself by negotiation. This was difficult, as he had incurred the deadly enmity of the Marathas, by fighting against them at the battle of Panipat. On this ground Mahadaji Sindhia, the moment negotiation was proposed, called loud for vengeance; but Visaji Kishen referred the matter to the Peishwa, who, while admitting that they could never regard Nujit-ud-Daulah as a friend, judged it politic to listen to his overtures. The Marathas were now intriguing for the withdrawal of the emperor from the protection of the British, and believed that in this object Nujit-ud-Daulah might render them valuable assistance. In this, however, they were disappointed; for before the negotiation had made any progress, Nujit-ud-Daulah died in October, 1770, and was succeeded in his situation at the capital by his son, Zabita Khan.

The Marathas, thus disappointed in the use they expected to make of Nujit-ud-Daulah, broke off all friendly relations with the Rohillas, and determined to gratify their revenge. Accordingly, in the beginning of 1771, they proceeded directly into Rohilkhand, and meeting with little opposition, overran the whole country. The strong fortress of Etawah fell into their hands, and every place in the Doab, except Farrukhabad, yielded almost without a struggle. As their successes increased, their views seemed to expand, and they began to make irruptions into Korah. At the same time they made demands on Sujah Daulah, the Nabob of Oudh, and left little room to doubt that they were prepared, if necessary, to risk a collision with the Company.

The Bengal presidency were very awkwardly situated. Their great object was to stop the progress of the Marathas, and yet the very parties in whose name alone they could ostensibly interfere, were actually leagued with them. Shah Alam, convinced that the Marathas alone were able to establish him in Delhi, made no secret of his intention to throw himself upon their protection; and Sujah Daulah, to whom a tortuous policy was always the most attractive, was known to be in secret communication with them. In these circumstances the presidency made a last effort to induce Shah Alam to throw off his new connections. With this view they pointed out to him the imprudence and danger of quitting their protection, and even employed tempting offers to induce him to fix his residence within Bengal, at Rajamaharaj or Monghyr. When they found it impossible to move him from his purpose, they were so unwilling to part with him, that they even consented to unite their forces with those of Oudh and the Rohillas, and march without delay on Delhi, for the purpose of placing him on the throne. At an earlier period he would have closed with this proposal, but it now seemed to him too late. The Marathas, after returning from Delhi, had possessed themselves of every part of it except the citadel. This was still in the possession of the Shahzada Jawan Bakht, and the great fear of Shah Alam was, that if he joined the proposed confederacy against the Marathas, they would at once declare the throne vacant, and give it to his son. This fear seemed so well founded, that the council declined the responsibility of continuing to thwart the wishes of the emperor. His

friendship still seemed of consequence to them; and therefore, making a merit of necessity, they resolved, as a mark of gratitude and respect, that Sir Robert Barker, the commander-in-chief, should attend him to the frontier of his province, and pay him every mark of attention. At his own request he was permitted to take with him the three four-pounder pieces attached to his troops, while he left in the hands of the council two of the young princes, as the best pledge of his faith. Sir Robert Barker attended the emperor to within a few miles of his boundary, and on taking his final leave, on the 30th of June, 1771, received from him the strongest assurances of friendship for the English nation, and of the grateful sense he entertained of the support and assistance they had at all times afforded him. The council entreated his majesty to be convinced of the attachment which they felt towards him, and of the readiness with which the Company would receive and protect him should any reverse of fortune compel him once more to return to his province. Shortly after this friendly parting, Shah Alam was met by Mahadaji Sindhia, and escorted to the camp of Visaji Kishen, with whom he entered his capital, and took possession of the ancient Mughul throne in the end of December, 1771.

The Marathas, leaving the emperor at Delhi, prepared to gratify their revenge by the destruction of Zabita Khan. In this they were greatly aided by two parties who were actuated by very different motives. The emperor bore a personal enmity to Zabita Khan, and had, moreover, an agreement with the Marathas, who had promised, in the event of success, to share a portion of their conquests with him. The Nabob of Oudh had also long set his affections on the main portion of Rohilkhand, lying between his western frontier and the eastern bank of the Ganges. The possession of this tract would place that river between him and the Marathas, and thus afford him the best security against their incursions. He was not unwilling, therefore, to see the Rohillas so weakened by Maratha devastation as to be unable to resist any attack which he might afterwards make upon them, or reduced to so desperate a condition as to compel them to throw themselves upon him for protection. In either case he would have his advantage. The Rohillas, thus left to contend single-handed both with the Marathas and with the emperor's troops, commanded by Nujif Khan, were incapable of offering any effectual resistance. The seeds of the

Ganges were forced, in the very face of the army which they had stationed to guard them, and they fled, as if panic-struck, after suffering immense slaughter. Zabita Khan personally escaped, but all his territory was wrested from him, and the complete conquest of the whole Rohilla territory seemed inevitable. The Nabob of Oudh now deemed it high time to step forward. The conquest of Rohilkhand would have brought the Marathas to his very frontier, and been only the prelude to his own destruction. Gladly, therefore, did he embrace the proposal of the Rohillas for a defensive alliance. Nothing but despair could have induced them to make this proposal, for they had good cause both to hate and fear him. Even in their extremity they refused to give any credit to his professions, till they obtained from Sir Robert Barker a kind of guarantee that the articles agreed to would be faithfully observed. The main stipulation was that the nabob, in return for protecting them against the Marathas, would be paid a sum of forty lacs. How he was to perform his part of the agreement does not clearly appear, but the probability is, that he was aware of the death of Madho Rao, which had recently taken place in the neighbourhood of Poona, at the early age of twenty-eight, and calculated that the dissensions which might arise in consequence of this event, would give the Marathas sufficient employment at home. According to another account, the Marathas had agreed to depart on the promise of a payment of forty lacs. The nabob, acting as mediator, became guarantee for this payment, and secured himself against loss by taking a bond for the amount from the celebrated Hafiz Rahmat Khan, who acted in his own name and that of the other Rohilla sirdars or chiefs. Hafiz actually paid five lacs to the nabob, but the other sirdars refused to pay their quotas. The nabob, however, had little reason to complain, as he never paid the Marathas, and therefore had no right, so long as he was merely a surety, to demand actual payment from the principal obligants. On this ground Hafiz Rahmat insisted that the bond should be cancelled. This the nabob decidedly refused. The departure of the Marathas seemed to furnish the opportunity for which he had long been anxiously waiting, and the non-payment of the bond furnished a plausible pretext for charging the Rohillas with a breach of faith, and thus justifying the exterminating war which he was meditating

Warren Hastings

WHEN treating of the early exploits of Clive in Bengal, the name of Warren Hastings was repeatedly mentioned. At that period he was only pushing his way into notice; but as he is now about to occupy a foremost place, and become one of the most distinguished characters in the history of India, it will be necessary to introduce him more formally to the notice of the reader, by giving a brief account of his previous career.

The manor of Daylesford, in Worcestershire, had for centuries been in possession of the main branch of the family of Hastings. During the great civil war the actual possessor was a zealous cavalier, and suffered accordingly. After spending half his estate in the cause of Charles I, he was glad to secure his personal safety by compounding with the Commonwealth for the greater part of the remainder. Little was now left except the old family mansion, but as there were no means of keeping it up, it was sold to a London merchant. The connection of the family with Daylesford would thus have been entirely dissolved, had not the last proprietor, previous to the sale, presented his second son to the rectory of the parish. The living was of little value, and was more than consumed in lawsuits about tithes with the new lord of the manor. The rector was thus reduced to a state bordering on destitution. He had two sons, Howard and Pynaston. Howard obtained a place in the customs; Pynaston, when only sixteen, married the daughter of a small proprietor of the name of Warren. The issue of this marriage was a son, who was born in the beginning of December, 1732, and called, after the family name of his mother, Warren Hastings. She survived his birth only a few days. His father shortly afterwards entered into a second marriage with the daughter of a butcher,

took orders, and sailed for the West Indies, where he died. Warren Hastings was thus thrown as an orphan on the care of his paternal grandfather, who kept him at the rectory, and, unable to make any better provision for his education, sent him to the village school. He is said to have taken kindly to his book; and though there was little in his appearance to distinguish him from his rustic schoolfellows, it appears that he had begun to cherish thoughts far beyond his years. Late in life, referring to this early period, he thus expressed himself to a friend, "To lie beside the margin of that stream (a small tributary of the Isis), and muse, was one of my most favourite recreations; and there, one bright summer's day, when I was scarcely seven years old, I well remember that I first formed the determination to purchase back Daylesford. I was then literally dependent upon those whose condition scarcely raised them above the pressure of absolute want; yet, somehow or another, the child's dream, as it did not appear unreasonable at the moment, so in after years it never faded away."¹

When he was eight years of age, his uncle Howard took him to London, and resolved to give him a liberal education. With this view he was boarded at a school at Newington, where the teaching was good, but the fare was so scanty that he used to say it stunted his growth, and made his stature smaller than it would otherwise have been. At the age of ten he was removed to Westminster School, where he greatly distinguished himself; and in his fourteenth year stood first in the examination for the foundation, though he had many older competitors. He continued two years longer at the school, and was looking forward to a studentship at Christ Church, when the death of his uncle Howard entirely changed his prospects. By his uncle's will, a Mr. Chiswick, a friend and distant relation, was appointed his guardian. He accepted the office, and thought he could not discharge it better than by procuring for his pupil an appointment as writer in the service of the East India Company. Great was the disappointment of Dr. Nichols, head-master of Westminster School, on learning that his favourite and most promising scholar was about to be taken from him. He was even generous enough to offer to bear the expense of his resid-

¹ Gleig's *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, vol. i, pp. 8-9.

ence at Oxford; but a writership in India was, in those days, regarded as the highroad to fortune, and Warren Hastings, who had not forgotten his resolution to recover possession of the family estate, appears not to have been dissatisfied when his guardian proved inflexible. Accordingly, after spending a short time at a commercial academy, in acquiring a knowledge of arithmetic and book-keeping, he sailed for Bengal, and arrived in October, 1750, when he was within two months of completing his eighteenth year.

After remaining two years in the secretary's office at Calcutta, Hastings was appointed to the factory of Cossimbazar, and had been employed for several years in the ordinary commercial business of the Company, when Siraj-ud-daulah suddenly stopped short of his expedition to Purnea, and turned south, to execute his threat of expelling the English from Bengal. Cossimbazar, situated in the immediate vicinity of Murshidabad, first felt his vengeance. It was instantly taken and pillaged, and the inmates, of whom Hastings was one, were made prisoners. The nabob meanwhile continued his march, and, owing to a series of wretched blunders, which have already been detailed, made an easy capture of Calcutta. The governor and other English refugees, who had sought an asylum at Falta, near the mouth of the Hughli, found an opportunity of opening a correspondence with Hastings, who was still detained as a prisoner at the capital, and were indebted to him for much valuable information. His position, however, was full of danger, and he did not deem himself safe till he made his escape from Murshidabad, and joined his countrymen at Falta. He had not been long here when Clive arrived from Madras at the head of the troops which, by the victory of Plassey, effected a complete revolution in the government of Bengal. Hastings served on this occasion, like many of the other civil servants of the Company, as a volunteer. In so doing he evinced both zeal and courage under rather trying circumstances. He had just before married the widow of Captain Campbell, and was of course obliged to leave her behind at Falta, while he exposed himself to the fatigue and dangers of a campaign, the success of which was regarded by many as very doubtful. The marriage, which took place in 1756, was dissolved by the death

of Mrs. Hastings in 1759. She had borne him two children, a daughter and a son. The former died in infancy, but the son lived till he was about six years old, and then died in England, to which he had been sent for his education.

In August, 1758, Hastings, who had attracted the notice of Clive, was appointed to reside at Murshidabad, as the agent of the Company. He continued to act in this capacity till 1761, and must have had ample opportunity to make his fortune, had he chosen to imitate the example of many who ranked higher in the service. It must be mentioned, to his honour, that he is nowhere named as a participator in the enormous sums obtained, or rather extorted, from the native government under the name of presents. On removing from Murshidabad, he was rewarded for his services with the still higher appointment of a seat in the Bengal council. At this period, when the majority of his colleagues were blindly following their insatiable thirst for gain, under the most hypocritical pretences, and practising all sorts of oppression against the natives, Hastings was repeatedly the only other member of council who supported Governor Vansittart, and joined him in protesting against the abominable selfishness of their colleagues, and the ruin with which the interests of the Company were in consequence threatened.

Hastings returned to England in 1764. He had been thirteen years in the service of the Company, and must have been able, by honest means, to acquire some degree of wealth. The great bulk of it was left in Bengal, where the temptation of a high interest appears to have blinded him to the insufficiency of the security, and was ultimately lost. In the employment of the comparatively small portion which he brought home with him, he displayed great liberality, making a present of £1,000 to a sister, and settling an annuity of £200 on an aunt. The latter he continued punctually to pay, though he was obliged to borrow money for the purpose after his losses in Bengal. These losses had made it absolutely necessary for him to resume his service with the Company. It was some time, however, before a suitable appointment could be obtained. Vansittart's pusillanimous administration had greatly disappointed Lord Clive. They had previously been steady friends, but a breach was now made, and continued to widen till it produced a complete

alienation. Vansittart in consequence adopted the politics of Sullivan, and Hastings, though he never displayed much of the spirit of a partizan, was understood to belong to the same party. So long, therefore, as Clive's party had the ascendancy at the India House, Hastings could hardly hope to be patronized. His friend Mr. Sykes, aware of this, believed that he would most effectually serve his interest by appealing to Clive's generosity. He accordingly addressed a letter to him, dated Calcutta, 28th March, 1768, in which he observed, "Your lordship knows my regard for Mr. Hastings, and the intimacy which we have maintained for so many years. I have now brought his affairs nearly to a conclusion, and sorry I am to say, they turn out more to the credit of his moderation than knowledge of the world. He is almost literally worth nothing, and must return to India or want bread. I therefore make it my earnest request to your lordship, that even if you cannot consistently promote his reappointment to the Company's service, you will at least not give any opposition thereto." In answer to this appeal, Clive replied, "Mr. Hastings' connection with Vansittart subjects him to many inconveniences. The opposition given the directors this year prevented my obtaining his return to Bengal in council. Indeed, he is so great a dupe to Vansittart's politics, that I think it would be improper that he should go to Bengal in any station, and I am endeavouring to get him out to Madras, high in council there, in which I believe I shall succeed." He did succeed; and Hastings, appointed the second member of council, and of course the next in succession to the chair, then occupied by Mr. Du Pre, set sail in the *Duke of Grafton* for Madras, in the spring of 1769.

Among the passengers in the *Duke of Grafton*, was a German family of the name of Imhoff, consisting of the husband, who called himself a baron, though he was only going out to Madras to follow his profession as a portrait painter—of the wife, who is said to have been a native of Archangel, and to have possessed both personal attractions and high accomplishments—and of two or more children. Hastings was now of the mature age of thirty-seven, and having been deprived by death both of his wife and the two children she had borne him, might have been supposed proof against any new attachment which he knew he

could not lawfully gratify. It turned out otherwise. Before the voyage was completed, not only had Hastings and the baroness avowed a mutual attachment, but come to an understanding with the baron in regard to it. Money was his object, and he was not unwilling to gain it by the sale of his wife. A regular bargain was accordingly concluded. Imhoff was to apply for a divorce in some German court, where the marriage tie was most easily dissolved, and Hastings, when the lady should thus be set free, was not only to make her his wife, but to adopt her children. The baron, of course, was to be rewarded with a sum of money far larger in amount than he could ever have hoped to acquire by taking portraits. This transaction, utterly disgraceful to all the parties connected with it, was ultimately carried out. It was necessary, however, that a considerable period should elapse between the application for the divorce and the decree. How were the impatient lovers to endure this interval? Mr. Gleig vouches for the fact, that they conducted themselves with the utmost propriety, and never exceeded the limits of a pure platonism. The baron and baroness continued to live in Madras as man and wife, and Mr. Hastings had nothing but the pleasure of defraying the expenses of their establishment. The same plan was followed when, about a year after, he became president of Bengal. They removed thither along with him, and were maintained, as before, at his expense, till the decree of divorce permitted the baron to depart with a well-filled purse, the wages of dishonour, and the baroness, now become Mrs. Hastings, to hold her levees as the wife of the first Governor-general of India. The children also seem not to have been forgotten, for one of them is afterwards met with bearing the rank and title of Lieutenant-general Sir Charles Imhoff.

While a member of the council of Madras, Hastings suggested and carried out an important improvement in the mode of providing the investment. This gave him a new claim on his employers, and accordingly to him all eyes were turned, when the chair of the Bengal council was about to become vacant by the resignation of Mr. Cartier. A conviction had been gaining ground that the plan of the double government had failed, and that it would be necessary for the Company to stand forth ostensibly as dewan. Indeed, as early as 1769 the directors had

suggested an important modification of the existing system. The Parganas of Calcutta, as well as the districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, which had been assigned for the maintenance of the Company's troops, had long been under their own immediate management. In all these, the directors observe, the revenues "have been considerably augmented; and this increase gives us a sensible pleasure, because we perceive the number of inhabitants has increased at the same time, which we regard as a proof that they have found in those provinces a better security of their property and relief from oppressions." The Company's management having thus stood the test, the fair inference was that it might be advantageously extended to all other parts of the country. Abuses similar to those which had been corrected in the above districts, "are still severely felt through all the provinces of Bengal and Bihar, where the numerous tribes of foudjars, aumils, sirdars, &c., practise all the various modes of oppression which have been in use so long as the Moorish government has subsisted." It was absolutely necessary, therefore, to reduce "that immense number of idle sycophants, who, for their own emolument and that of their principals, are placed between the tenant and the public treasury, and of which every one gets his share of plunder, the whole mass of which must amount to an enormous sum."

The mode in which the directors proposed to carry out this extensive plan of reform was as follows:—"We have resolved to establish a committee of some of our ablest servants for the management of the dewani revenues, at Murshidabad for the Bengal province, and at Patna for that of Bihar." These committees or councils were, subject however to the direction of the presidency, to have the control of all the business relating to the revenue, and were to be assisted by so many of the junior covenanted servants "as from time to time may be found necessary to be sent into the several provinces, to correct abuses and maintain the intended reformation." The great object of the councils is thus explained. They are "first to inform themselves of the real state of the collections in every part; that is to say, what rents are at this time actually paid by the tenants, and what was paid formerly; what is the nature of the cultivation, and what the chief produce of each district, and whether in that respect

there seems a prospect of improvement. They are next to inform themselves of the amount of the charges of collection for some years past, in as particular a manner as possible; and you are then to judge how many of the aumils and other officers, among whom those immense sums have been divided, may be spared. This saving, as far it can reasonably be carried, at the same time that it will be a profit to the Company in point of revenue, will likewise be a relief to the tenant; for it cannot be doubted but that these numerous instruments of power lay the inhabitants under contribution in various secret ways, over and above what appears on the face of the accounts."

It was not meant, however, "by any violent and sudden reform to change the constitution, but to remove the evil by degrees." A kind of double government was still to be kept up, and it is accordingly expressly enjoined that "Muhammed Reza Khan, or some other principal person of the country, must be appointed naib dewan for the Bengal province (that is the Company's deputy), and all the business must be carried on through the naib, and under his seal and signing; and, in like manner, Shitab Roy, or some other principal person, at Patna, for the Bihar provinces." At the same time the duties of these naibs were to be almost entirely ministerial. They were to give their advice as to the measures necessary to be taken, but they were not to be permitted to make any appointments, nor to put their seals to any orders without previous sanction. All such appointments were to be made, and all such orders given were to proceed from the councils of revenue alone, and copies of them were "to be entered upon their diary, or a book apart, and to be transmitted regularly to England." This reformed system was to have been introduced by the supervisors; but in 1770, when there was no room to doubt that they had perished in the *Aurora*, the Bengal council took the task upon themselves, and appointed the two councils of revenue.

Such were the extreme limits to which the directors carried their views of reform in 1769; but new light had since been thrown on the subject, and the conclusion at which they had arrived in 1771 was, that a total change of system was necessary, and that they ought to stand forth openly and immediately in their own name as dewan. In giving the above instructions with

regard to the councils of revenue, they had said, "In this reformation you are to proceed with a moderate, steady, and persevering spirit of inquiry, looking rather to the prevention of frauds for the future than the punishment of those offences which have already passed, and which, if not justified, are at least much palliated, by the immemorial custom of the Moorish government." They were now animated by a different spirit. Their financial difficulties were thickening around them; the fearful famine, which has already been described, had left Bengal a perfect wreck, and horrid tales of oppression had been brought to them both from public and private sources. It was necessary, therefore, that some one able and willing to carry out their designs resolutely should forthwith be placed at the head of the Bengal government. Hastings was evidently the proper man. Clive alone could have successfully opposed his appointment; but as Vansittart was now for ever removed from the field, the high opinion which he early entertained of Hastings appears to have overborne all other considerations, and he gave him his strongest support. Accordingly, in April, 1771, Hastings was appointed second member of council at Calcutta, with succession as president and governor of Bengal. Though thus appointed in form only to the second place, it was perfectly understood that the first was awaiting him. He reached Calcutta on the 17th February, 1772, and, on the 13th of April following, when Mr. Cartier resigned, assumed actual charge of the government.

The appointment, though it could not but flatter him, did not blind him to the difficulties which he would have to encounter. The nature of these difficulties will be best explained by two letters which had been despatched from England in August, 1771, but only reached him ten days after he had taken possession of the chair. One of the letters was from Clive, who, after congratulating him on his removal to Bengal, and explaining the kind of government which he had recommended to the directors, continued thus, "The situation of affairs requires that you should be very circumspect and active. You are appointed governor at a very critical time, when things are suspected to be almost at the worst, and when a general misapprehension prevails of the mismanagement of the Company's affairs. The last parliamentary inquiry has thrown the whole state of India

before the public, and every man sees clearly that, as matters are now conducted abroad, the Company will not be long able to pay the £400,000 to government. The late dreadful famine, or a war either with Sujah Daulah or the Marathas, will plunge us into still deeper distress. A discontented nation and disappointed minister will then call to account a weak and pusillanimous court of directors, who will turn the blow from themselves upon their agents abroad, and the consequences must be ruinous both to the Company and the servants. In this situation, you see the necessity of exerting yourself in time, provided the directors give you proper powers, without which, I confess, you can do nothing; for self-interest or ignorance will obstruct every plan you can form for the public." After a little self-laudation, in which he says, "I wish your government to be attended, as mine was, with success to the Company, and with the consciousness of having discharged every duty with firmness and fidelity," Clive continues thus, "Be impartial and just to the public, regardless of the interest of individuals, where the honour of the nation and the real advantage of the Company are at stake, and resolute in carrying into execution your determination, which, I hope, will at all times be rather founded upon your own opinion than that of others."

Clive, whose self-reliance never failed him in the greatest emergency, was ready to suspect a want of it in most other men. He was certainly in error when he singled out this want as if it were the besetting sin of Hastings, whose tenacity of purpose was little, if at all, inferior to his own. The whole passage is, notwithstanding, well worthy of quotation—"From the little knowledge I have of you, I am convinced that you have not only abilities and personal resolution, but integrity and moderation with regard to riches; but I thought I discovered in you a diffidence in your own judgment, and too great an easiness of disposition, which may subject you insensibly to be *led* where you ought to *guide*. Another evil which may arise from it is, that you may pay too great an attention to the reports of the natives, and be inclined to look upon things in the worst instead of the best light. A proper confidence in yourself, and never-failing hope of success, will be a bar to this and every other ill that your situation is liable to; and as I am

sure that you are not wanting in abilities for the great office of governor, I must add that an opportunity is now given you of making yourself one of the most distinguished characters of this country."

The above letter, while candidly setting forth the difficulties of his new position, was full of encouragement, and must have been extremely gratifying to Hastings. The other letter was from the directors, and furnished a first specimen of the disagreeable duties which they expected him to perform. Muhammed Reza Khan, it will be remembered, had been appointed to the joint office of naib dewan and naib nazim, the former giving him complete control in the collection of the revenues for the behoof of the Company, and the latter enabling him to wield the whole executive authority in the name of the nabob. He had thus enjoyed the sovereignty of the province for about seven years, and in addition to an annual stipend of nine lacs of rupees (£90,000) paid to himself, had the uncontrolled disposal of the thirty-two lacs (£320,000) intrusted to him for the use of the nabob. Great as was the power and influence which were thus concentrated in his hands, his character stood high, and the general belief was that he had displayed equal ability and fidelity in discharging the duties of his important trusts. Rumours to the contrary, however, began to be circulated, and when the revenues began to fall short of what had been too sanguinely anticipated, the council of Bengal, glad of any means of exculpating themselves, did not scruple to insinuate that Muhammed Reza Khan's management was in fault. Without venturing to bring a specific charge, they pointed out a number of sources from which it was supposed that corruption might arise and be practised with impunity, and concluded their letter to the directors, dated 30th September, 1769, in the following terms—"Power without control, knowledge without participation, and influence without any effectual counteraction, was a state of things too important and replete with consequences to be vested in any three ministers, or rather one single man, who, allowing him the clearest preference for integrity, ability, and attachment among his countrymen, could not be supposed superior to temptation, and at least ought not to be trusted so extensively and independently as has been necessarily the consequence of the present system."

While the council were thus pouring their suspicions into the ears of the directors, direct charges of mismanagement and corruption were made against Muhammed Reza Khan from suspicious quarters. Native jealousy and malignity had found access to the inmost recesses of Leadenhall Street, and agents in their employ were constantly insinuating that an inquiry into the management of the naib, in his double capacity of dewan and nazim, would disclose frightful scenes of iniquity and oppression. The Hindu Nanda Kumar was well understood to be the prime mover in bringing forward these charges; and the directors, thoroughly acquainted as they were with his despicable character, ought to have refused to give any heed to him. Instead of this they considered his assertions, coupled with the above insinuations of the Bengal council, a presumptive evidence of guilt. Accordingly, in their general letter, dated 28th August, 1771—after alluding to the recent famine, and expressing “the greatest indignation on finding a charge exhibited against any persons whatever (but especially natives of England) for monopolizing grain, and thereby aggravating the woes, and no doubt increasing the number of wretched mortals, labouring under the most awful circumstances which could possibly happen to any people whatsoever”—they continued thus: “As we have further reasons to suspect that large sums have, by violent and oppressive means, been actually collected by Muhammed Reza Khan, on account of the dewani revenues, great part of which he has appropriated to his own use, or distributed amongst the creatures of his power and the instruments of his oppressions, we should not think ourselves justified to the Company or the public were we to leave him in future the management of the dewani collections; and as transferring the like trust to any other minister could yield us little prospect of reaping any benefit from the change, we are necessitated to seek by other means the full advantage we have to expect from the dewani. It is therefore our determination to stand forth as dewan, and, by the agency of the Company’s servants, to take upon ourselves the entire care and management of the revenues. In confidence, therefore, of your abilities to plan and execute this important work, we hereby authorize and require you to divest Muhammed Reza Khan,

and every person employed by or in conjunction with him, or acting under his influence, of any charge or direction in the business of the collections." Assuming that his guilt was as great as the directors suspected it to be, a simple dismissal did not at all meet the justice of the case, and they accordingly add, "We deem insufficient the depriving him of a station which may be made subservient to the most corrupt purposes. It is therefore our pleasure and command, that you enter into a minute investigation, not only of the causes to which the decrease of revenue may be ascribed, but also into Muhammed Reza Khan's general conduct during the time the dewani revenues have been under his charge; and as the several complaints and accusations already noticed to you are of a nature too serious to be suffered to pass over without the most rigid inquiry, we have directed our president to order him to repair to Calcutta, there to answer the facts which shall be alleged against him, both in respect to his public administration and private conduct."

The direction referred to was contained in a separate letter, addressed to Hastings alone, by the secret committee of directors. It was more peremptory than the above account of it indicates. After referring him to the above general letter for an account "of the reasons we have to be dissatisfied with the administration of Muhammed Reza Khan," and for "divesting him of the rank and influence he holds as naib dewan of the kingdom of Bengal," it enjoins him to "issue positive orders for securing the person of Muhammed Reza Khan, together with his whole family and his known partizans and adherents," and bring them under arrest to Calcutta. This letter reached Hastings on the 24th of April, 1772, only ten days after his instalment as president. The very next morning a messenger was on the way with instructions to Mr. Middleton to take immediate steps for carrying these orders into effect. It was feared that the sudden arrest of a person so powerful and so much respected might not have been effected without tumult; but Muhammed Reza Khan, on being made acquainted with the nature of Mr. Middleton's instructions, yielded with the utmost dignity and composure, and commenced his journey to Calcutta under a sufficient guard. These proceedings, and the authority for adopting them, were made known by Mr. Hastings to the council for the first time

on the 28th of April, and immediately became the subject of deliberation. It was at once admitted that they could not receive their naib dewan "with the usual honours;" but it was moved that, in respect of his rank and station, a member of council should be sent forward to wait upon him, and give a verbal explanation of the articles laid to his charge. This motion, though objected to by Hastings and three other members as incongruous, was adopted; and Mr. Graham, deputed for the purpose, met Muhammed Reza Khan at Chitpore. On hearing the nature of the charges, he merely expressed his eager desire that no time should be lost in deciding upon them. As the charges brought against the naib dewan of Bengal seemed to apply equally to the naib dewan of Bihar, Shitab Roy, who held that office, was subjected to similar treatment, and sent down to Calcutta on the 7th of May.

In the letter of the secret committee Hastings received a curious recommendation as to the kind of evidence by which he might be able to establish the delinquency of Muhammed Reza Khan. "Your own judgment," they say, "will direct you to all such means of information as may be likely to bring to light the most secret of his transactions. We cannot, however, forbear recommending to you to avail yourself of the intelligence which Nanda Kumar may be able to give respecting the naib's administration; and, while the envy which Nanda Kumar is supposed to bear this minister may prompt him to a ready communication of all proceedings which have come to his knowledge, we are persuaded that no scrutable part of the naib's conduct can have escaped the watchful eye of his jealous and penetrating rival." The iniquity of a judge (for in this capacity the Company were ostensibly acting) in thus endeavouring to obtain the conviction of the party accused by suborning his most inveterate enemy, appears not to have occurred to the directors, and was so far from producing any scruple in the mind of Hastings, that he improved upon the suggestion, and, not contented with employing him, actually bribed him to give evidence.

The moment Muhammed Reza Khan was arrested, it was well understood that the high offices which he held were abolished, and would never be revived. Several important appointments were in consequence rendered necessary, and among them that

of dewan, or superintendent of the nabob's household. At the meeting of council on the 11th of July, 1772, it was proposed that this office should be conferred on Raja Gurdass, the son of Maharaja Nanda Kumar. Several of the members, holding that this was equivalent to the appointment of Nanda Kumar himself, recoiled from the very idea, and enumerated villainies sufficient to prove how utterly unfit he was to be trusted. In 1761, in consequence of false and injurious allegations which he had made, he was confined a prisoner to his house as a dangerous character; in 1762 he assisted the Shahzada in carrying on a correspondence with the French governor of Pondicherry; at a later date he was proved to have forged letters for the purpose of ruining a native, named Ram Charan, who had acted as banyan to Lord Clive, General Calliaud, and Mr. Vansittart; in 1764 he was found to have been in treaty to furnish Mir Kassim with full accounts of all the movements of the English army, on condition of being appointed to the dewani of Bengal; in 1765 Mr. Vansittart had reported his treasonable correspondence; and finally, the directors themselves had recorded their opinion of him in the following terms:—"In short, it appears he is of that wicked and turbulent disposition that no harmony can subsist in society where he has the opportunity of interfering. We therefore most readily concur with you that Nanda Kumar is a person improper to be trusted with his liberty in our settlements, and capable of doing mischief if he is permitted to go out of the province, either to the northward or to the Deccan." To these charges Hastings has no answer except that with which the directors had previously furnished him. "The inveterate and rooted enmity which has long subsisted between Muhammed Reza Khan and Nanda Kumar, and the necessity of employing the vigilance and activity of so penetrating a rival to counteract the designs of Muhammed Reza Khan, and to eradicate that influence which he still retains in the government of this province, and more especially in the family of the nabob, are the sole motives of this recommendation of Raja Gurdass." On these grounds alone his appointment was carried.

On the same day another important place in the nabob's establishment was filled up. He was still a minor, and behoved to have a guardian. Ahteram-ul-Daulah, the brother of the late

Mir Jafar, and consequently paternal uncle of the young nabob, had probably the best legal title; but there were good reasons for setting him aside. He was the father of a large family, and might have been tempted to make way for one of his own sons by the death of his pupil. As the office was only to be of temporary duration, and it was not desired to give much *eclat* to it, a female was preferred. The nabob's own mother was said to be still alive, and it is not easy to understand why she was overlooked or postponed to another surviving widow of Mir Jafar, known by the name of the Munni Begum. She had originally been a dancing girl, and cannot, therefore, be supposed to have been peculiarly qualified. She had, however, one qualification, which seems at this time to have been paramount in the opinion of Hastings—she was “the declared enemy of Muhammed Reza Khan.” He gives a still more forcible reason when he adds—“The truth is, that the affairs of the Company stand at present on a footing which can neither last as it is, nor be maintained on the rigid principles of private justice; you must establish your own power, or you must hold it dependent on a superior, which I deem to be impossible. The Begum, as a woman, is incapable of passing the bounds assigned to her. Her ambition cannot aspire to higher dignity. She has no children to provide for or mislead her fidelity. Her actual authority rests on the nabob's life, and therefore cannot endanger it: it must cease with his minority, when she must depend absolutely on the Company for support against her ward and pupil, who will then become her master.” These reasons are certainly far stronger than the declared enmity to Muhammed Reza Khan, which ought never to have been mentioned along with them; and they ought, we think, to have saved Hastings from much of the clamour which was raised and the calumny which was uttered against him in consequence of having recommended this appointment. The objections to it, which would have been unanswerable had it been intended that the nabob, on attaining majority, should actually administer the executive power of the government, cease to have any weight as soon as it is understood that he was henceforth to disappear entirely from public life, and that the Company had fully resolved to take the whole conduct of government into their own hands, and so accustom the natives to the visible exercise of British sovereignty.

When the directors adopted this resolution, and began to take steps to carry it into effect, they seem to have had a very imperfect idea of the extent of the revolution it implied. Muhammed Reza Khan concentrated in himself, as we have seen, the whole administrative and executive power of the government; and consequently, the moment he was arrested and sent off to Calcutta, the whole machinery of government in Bengal was suddenly stopped. Some attempt, indeed, was made to meet the emergency, in the revenue department, by ordering Mr. Middleton to take charge of the office of dewan, until a proper plan should be digested by the council. It is also true that in the formation of such a plan some progress had been made under the new revenue arrangements suggested by the directors in 1769. The council of revenue had, in terms of these arrangements, stationed servants of the Company in the different districts of the country, for the purpose of superintending the native officers, and suppressing any manifest abuses which might fall under their notice. They were also instructed to obtain information in regard to a number of important heads, which were specified; and they had accordingly furnished a series of reports tending to throw light on the state of the country, and thereby facilitate the task which the governor and council were about to undertake. The general tone of these reports, however, was far from encouraging. Indeed, society seemed to be fast retrograding to a state of barbarism. The nazims exacted what they could from the zamindars and great farmers of the revenue; these in their turn plundered those immediately below them; and the work of extortion continued to descend by successive steps, till it fell with accumulated weight on the ryots, or actual cultivators, who were thus kept in a state bordering on beggary, unless when they were able to cheat the revenue by making false returns, and bribing the connivance of government officials.

The administration of justice was still more defective than that of the revenue department. With regard to it the report of the superintendents or supervisors was, that "the regular course was everywhere suspended; but every man exercised it who had the power of compelling others to submit to his decisions." At this time the Company had been seven years in

possession of the dewani, and it is certainly most discreditable to them and their officials, that during so long an interval so little had been done to protect the weak against the strong, and put down the most clamant injustice. It was now determined, however, manfully to grapple with difficulties; and the only danger was, lest in making up for past delays there might be an undue anxiety for despatch. On the 16th of April, only three days after Hastings began to preside in the council, the subject was formally brought forward, and it was resolved, that the simplest, cheapest, and most effectual mode of raising the revenue, was to let the lands in future on leases of considerable duration. On the 14th of May the plan was completely chalked out. The lands were to be let for a period of five years. For this purpose a committee of council, consisting of the president and four members, were to make a circuit throughout the country: the covenanted servants, who, since 1769, had superintended the collections in the several districts, under the name of supervisors, were henceforth to be called collectors; and with the collection of each district a native was to be associated, with the title of *dewan*. No banyan or servant of a collector was to be permitted to farm any portion of the revenue. All modes of extortion, particularly by so-called presents from ryots to middlemen, from middlemen to zamindars, and zamindars to collectors, were to be carefully prevented. Extravagant rates of interest, by which the ryots were held in bondage, were, if possible, to be reduced, and as a means conducive to this end, collectors and their servants were forbidden to lend to middlemen, and middlemen to lend to ryots.

All these precautions indicate a sincere desire on the part of the council to give protection in the quarter where it was most required; and additional security was taken against the oppression of the ryots, by granting them new pottahs or leases, in which the full amount of their obligations was distinctly specified, and making it penal for any zamindar or middleman to exact a single farthing beyond it. It may be questioned, however, whether the council were yet in possession of the facts necessary to enable them to carry out a complete revenue system, and whether the system actually adopted had been duly considered. The time, too, was not well chosen. The whole country had

just been ravaged by a dreadful famine, and yet so effectually had the screw been applied by those employed in the collection of the revenue, that its amount in the following year (1771) exceeded that which had been raised in the year before the famine commenced. It is perfectly obvious that this result could not have been obtained by taking a fair share of the actual produce. Some violent process must have been employed. Its nature is thus explained by Auber:¹—"There was one tax which the council described as accounting for the equality preserved in the past collections. It was called *najaihy*, or an assessment upon the actual inhabitants of every inferior division of the lands, to make up for the loss sustained in the rents of their neighbours, who were either dead or had fled the country. This tax, equally impolitic and oppressive, had been authorized by the ancient and general usage of the country. It had not the sanction of government, but took place as a matter of course. In ordinary cases, and while the lands were in a state of cultivation, it was scarcely felt, and never, or rarely complained of. However irreconcilable with strict justice, it afforded a reparation to the state for occasional deficiencies; it was a kind of security against desertion, by making the inhabitants mutually responsible for each other; and precluded the inferior collector from availing himself of the pretext of waste or deserted lands to withhold any part of his collections. But the same practice, which under different circumstances might have been beneficial, became, under the affliction of famine, an intolerable burden, and fell with peculiar severity on those villages which had suffered the greatest depopulation. It also afforded opportunity to the farmers and others to levy under colour of it contributions on the people, and even to increase it to whatever magnitude they pleased, being themselves the judges of the loss sustained, and of the proportion which the inhabitants were to pay to replace it." It was thus, when the inhabitants were only recovering from a famine, the evils of which must have been greatly aggravated by a ruthless tax, imposed in opposition to all our ordinary ideas of humanity and justice, that the committee of circuit set out to make a new settlement of the lands of the country. The scenes of desolation which

¹ Mill's *History of British India*, vol. i, pp. 414-15.

must have met them on every side might have produced some misgivings as to the appropriateness of the time they had chosen, and they had soon sufficient proof that their proposals would not be voluntarily accepted by the great body of those to whom they were more immediately directed. On arriving at Krishnagar, sixty-four miles north of Calcutta, they commenced operations by intimating their readiness to receive offers for new leases; but these came in so slowly, and were so much beneath the previous valuations which had been made, that it became necessary either to abandon the plan altogether, or to adopt some means of quickening the process, by which effect might be given to it. It was therefore resolved, that instead of receiving offers from the former renters, the lands should be let by auction to the highest bidder. This was a fearful innovation, fraught with hardship and misery, of which it is charitable to believe that the committee of circuit had only a dim conception. Hosts of adventurers immediately appeared, and entered into competition with the old zamindars, in whose families the collection of revenue, and either fixed salaries or a percentage on the amount collected, had long been hereditary. There was no longer any ground to complain of the amount of the offers. Many of the old renters, naturally anxious to retain a position which carried both emolument and dignity with it, were determined not to be ousted, even though they should offer far more than they would be able to pay, and thus laid a burden on their shoulders under which they must ultimately sink. The new men were still less scrupulous. With them the whole transaction was a greedy speculation. If they could manage to extract any profit from it, good and well; if not, they had only to dissolve the bargain by a sudden disappearance. Though some precaution was used in favour of previous possessors, and pensions were even granted to many of those who were dispossessed, from not having made what was deemed a reasonable offer, the changes produced by this system of rack-renting are said to have amounted to a social revolution.

It has been already observed, that "the regular course of justice was everywhere suspended." Against this state of anarchy it was necessary to provide. The means employed were as follows:—In each district two courts were erected—a civil

and a criminal. The civil court, styled *mofussal dewani adalat*, was presided over by the collector, assisted by the provincial dewan; the criminal court, styled *foujdari adalat*, was also presided over by the collector, not so much, however, as actual judge, as to overlook the proceedings, and see that they were regularly and impartially conducted. The officers by whom the business was actually conducted were the kazi and mufti of the district, and two *moulvis*, or expounders of the law. At Calcutta, two supreme courts were established for the review of the proceedings of the provincial courts by appeal. The supreme civil court, styled *dewani sadar adalat*, was presided over by the president, with two members of council, assisted by the dewan of the *khalsa*, or chief revenue officer, and some other native judges. The supreme criminal court, styled *nizamat sadar adalat*, consisted of a presiding judge, designated *daroga-i-adalat*, the chief kazi, the chief mufti, and three *moulvis*. The presiding judge was nominated by the president and council, and was understood to occupy the place of the original nazim. All capital cases were reviewed by his court, but not ultimately disposed of till they had been referred to the Bengal council. At a later period, however, this reference was dispensed with, and the court itself, removed to Murshidabad, was restored to the nabob as part of the nizamat. For Calcutta itself and its *Parganas* two courts similar to those of the other districts were established, and presided over by the members of council in rotation. In all these courts the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the forms in use before the British supremacy was established.

In a letter addressed to the directors in September, 1772, Hastings gave a full account of his proceedings. The extent of business which it was necessary to despatch is thus described:—"I beg leave to call to your recollection, that by a strange concurrence of unforeseen causes, your administration had at this time every object that could engage the care of government (war only excepted), all demanding their instant attention. The settlement of the revenue of Bengal—the dismissal of the naib dewan and naib subah of the provinces—the inquiry into his conduct for a course of years preceding—the dismissal of the naib dewan of Bihar, and inquiry into his conduct—the

establishment of the dewani on the plan directed by the honourable Company—the arrangement of the nabob's household—the reduction of his allowance and expenses—the establishment of a regular administration of justice throughout the provinces—the inspection and reformation of the public offices—and, independent of all these, the ordinary duties of the presidency, which, from the amazing growth of your affairs, were of themselves sufficient to occupy the whole time and application which we could bestow upon them, and even more than we could bestow, from the want of a regular system, the natural consequence of the rapidity with which these affairs have accumulated." He then states that, in arranging the above business, "the settlement of the revenues," as "the first in consequence," claimed immediate attention. "It was late in the season. The lands had suffered unheard of depopulation by the famine and mortality of 1769. The collections, violently kept up to their former standard, had added to the distress of the country, and threatened a general decay of the revenue, unless immediate remedies were applied to prevent it. The farming system—for a course of years subjected to the proper checks and regulations—seemed the most likely to afford relief to the country, and both to ascertain and produce the real value of the lands, without violence to the ryots." After referring to the appointments in the nabob's household, the letter concludes with a kind of apology for the delay which had taken place in investigating the charges against Muhammed Reza Khan and Shitab Roy.

The answer of the court, dated 16th April, 1773, was most complimentary:—"The whole of your conduct seems fully to have justified the choice of the secret committee, who intrusted to your management the execution of a plan of the utmost importance. Although you will observe that sundry changes have lately taken place in the direction of the Company's affairs at home, those changes will not in the least affect the measures in which you are engaged; on the contrary, we take this early opportunity, not only of testifying our entire approbation of your conduct, but of assuring you of our firmest support in accomplishing the work you have so successfully commenced; and we doubt not but it will issue in the deliverance of Bengal

from oppression, in the establishment of our credit, influence, and interest in India, and consequently, in every advantage which the Company or the nation may justly expect from so important a transaction." All the other parts of the letter are in the same strain. "Your attention to the settlement of the revenues, as a primary object, has our entire approbation; and it is with the utmost satisfaction we observe that the farming system will be generally adopted." Again, "Your choice of the Begum for guardian to the nabob we entirely approve. The use you intend making of Nanda Kumar is very proper; and it affords us great satisfaction to find that you could at once determine to suppress all personal resentment, when the public welfare seemed to clash with your private sentiments relative to him." To show that these flattering testimonials were intended not for the council in general, but for the president individually, he is told in conclusion, "Notwithstanding this letter is signed by us (the court of directors), we mean it as secret, and transmit it confidentially to you only; and we leave it to your discretion to lay the contents, or any part thereof, before the council, if circumstances should, in your opinion, render it necessary, or if you should judge it for our interest so to do, and not otherwise."

The charges against Shitab Roy and Muhammed Reza Khan were now investigated. Against the former there was not even the shadow of proof of embezzlement or mismanagement during the period of his administration, and after more than a year's detention at Calcutta, the council not only pronounced him honourably acquitted, but sent him back to Bihar, to act as *roy-royan*, the highest appointment in the revenue which remained since his previous office had been abolished, and to preside as naib nizam over the administration of criminal justice. His spirit was too deeply wounded to allow him to find any compensation in these appointments for the odious accusations to which he had been so unworthily subjected. His health had given way before he left Calcutta, and in about a month after he was in his grave. As the only return that could now be made, his new appointments, fiscal and judicial, were at once conferred upon his son, Kalyan Singh, "from an entire conviction of the merits and faithful services, and in consideration of the late sufferings of his deceased father."

The case of Muhammed Reza Khan was not so quickly disposed of. The inquiry was not to be confined to the period when he held the nizamat, but to be carried back to an earlier time, when he collected the revenues of Dacca; and so numerous and confident were the charges of his accusers, that the directors not only believed his conviction certain, but were buoyed up with the idea of giving some relief to their finances from the large balances which he would be obliged to pay into their treasury. Hastings was very unwilling to disappoint their expectations. One blunder with regard to the Dacca charge had early been discovered. The name of Muhammed Reza Khan had been erroneously substituted for that of his predecessor, Muhammed Ali Khan, and he had in consequence been charged, during the two years he held the collectorate, with an annual payment of thirty-eight lacs instead of twenty-seven lacs, the sum for which he had actually agreed. A sum of eleven lacs per annum, or of twenty-two lacs for the two years, was thus at once cut off from the balance supposed to be due by him. Still, in communicating this fact to the directors, the council added, "We have great reason to believe that on a strict scrutiny there will appear a balance against him of seventeen lacs" (£170,000). This balance, too, was ultimately found to be a myth, and the Dacca charge proved utterly groundless. A similar conclusion with regard to the charge of monopolizing grain for profit during the famine having been arrived at, the council resolved, fourteen months after Muhammed Reza Khan's arrest, to remove the guard which had been placed over him, on his engaging not to depart from Calcutta till the inquiry was completed. After another interval the council became satisfied that he was entitled to a general acquittal; but by a gross dereliction of the duty assigned to them, declined to pronounce it till they should obtain the sanction of the directors.

In the whole of these proceedings the council were evidently impressed with a belief that a conviction was expected from them; and accordingly, on the termination of the inquiry, in March, 1774, Hastings, in announcing the result to the directors, seemed to think it necessary to make a long apology for having done a simple act of justice:—"Notwithstanding the consciousness which I possess of my own integrity, and the certainty

that my conduct throughout this ungrateful business will do me credit, yet I am not without my fears; I am aware of the violent prejudices which were taken up at once against Muhammed Reza Khan, by all ranks of people, both here and at home. I am also aware that in England, where the very name of inquiry into the past management of affairs in India flatters the passion of the times, and raises expectations of great and important detections, the result may balk those expectations, and turn the torrent of clamour another way. In many of the private letters which I received from England I was warned to act with great caution in this inquiry, as the confirmation of my credit with the public, and (forgive me for adding) with your honourable court, depended upon it. The magnitude of the charges which were alleged against Muhammed Reza Khan, his reputed wealth, the means which that afforded him both of suppressing evidence and even of influencing his judges in his favour, and the natural conclusion deducible from so many exaggerated accusations, that some part of them at least was true, gave additional force to these cautionary intimations, and made me fear for the consequences, not only as they might affect my reputation, which it has been the study of my life to maintain unblemished, but as they might blast all my hopes from the continuation of your favour, which I hold solely on the credit of my integrity."

In the same letter Hastings furnished some strong specimens of Nanda Kumar's duplicity. "Before my departure from Fort St. George, when my appointment to this presidency was known, a messenger, expressly deputed from Munni Begum, came to me there with letters from her entreating my protection, in the most earnest terms, against Muhammed Reza Khan, and referring for further information to Maharaja Nanda Kumar, from whom I received similar addresses on the same subject, and by the same hand. The Munni Begum has since solemnly disavowed having written such letters, or authorized such a communication. A short time after the elevation of his son as dewan to the nabob, Nanda Kumar sent draughts of letters to the Begum, which he recommended her to write to me, enumerating the many encroachments which had been made by the English government on the rights of the nizamat, and reclaiming them

on behalf of the nabob. I trust to his own genius to furnish you with newer proofs in the representations which he has already made, or which he may at this time convey to your knowledge." The directors, in their answer, approved of all that had been done respecting Muhammed Reza Khan and Shitab Roy, but added, in their own vindication, that "the general and alarming accounts of the oppressions rendered a scrutiny into their conduct indispensable. The governor and council had expressed a belief that the inquiry would issue in proving a large balance to be due; the court, therefore, felt authorized to conclude, that there must have been such public and general appearances of mal-administration as warranted the course they had adopted." Their conclusion is rather singular:—"As we wish Muhammed Reza Khan to remain under no obligations than those of *gratitude*, we do not object to his total enlargement." It is rather ludicrous to talk of gratitude as being due to those who had not only not conferred any obligation, but committed a gross injustice. Hastings spoke more reasonably in his letter, when he hinted at reparation, though he deemed it expedient to add, "Whatever your resolution may be concerning the future fate of Muhammed Reza Khan, it is my duty (although I believe it unnecessary) to represent that whatever reparation you may think due for his past sufferings, the restoration of any part of the power which he possessed will inevitably tend to the injury of the Company's affairs, and the diminution of your influence and authority. There can be but one government and one power in the province. Even the pretensions of the nabob may prove a source of embarrassment, when he is of age to claim his release from the present state of pupillage which prevents his asserting them."

Before the above proceedings were closed, Hastings and his council had become involved in transactions of a very questionable character. We have seen Shah Alam escorted to his capital and seated on his throne by the Marathas. Their object, of course, was only to use him as a tool; and he soon found that while he was dreaming of reviving in his own person the splendour of the Mughul dynasty, he had only made himself the slave of very imperious masters. By an agreement which he had made with them he was to have an equal share in all

conquests, and on the faith of it he had assisted them in their wars with the Rohillas; but when he claimed his share they only laughed him to scorn, and made him aware that his business in future would be to lend them the authority of his name, and grant them new sanads as often as they were pleased to demand them. Incensed above measure, he took advantage of a quarrel among the Maratha confederates, and even ventured to take the field against them; but, instead of freeing himself from their galling yoke, he sustained a defeat which rivetted it more closely, and left him entirely at their mercy. Among other exactions, he was obliged to make a formal cession to them of the districts of Allahabad and Kora. These, it will be remembered, had been wrested from the Nabob of Oudh during the disastrous war which he waged with the Company, and were assigned to the emperor at the time when he made the grant of the dewani of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, under the express reservation of the annual payment of twenty-six lacs of rupees out of the revenues. The cession of these districts to the Marathas was naturally objected to by the Bengal presidency, and their opposition to it was strongly confirmed and fully justified, when, in a communication from Shah Alam himself, they learned that they had been ceded under compulsion, and were requested to take possession of them in his name, and hold them for his behoof. Sir Robert Barker, the British commander-in-chief, was accordingly ordered to include the two districts within the line of his defensive operations.

In thus stepping beyond what had long been recognized as the proper frontier of the Company's territory, the troops could scarcely be said to have made an aggressive movement. The districts which they occupied they held only in trust, and when the proper owner should appear they would be ready to yield them up. Such at least were the grounds at first ostensibly taken up; but there is too much reason to suspect that they were not the real grounds, but only pretexts, under cover of which they meant to alienate the districts entirely from the emperor, and re-annex them to Oudh, for a large pecuniary consideration. This was not honest, and yet it was not so glaringly iniquitous as another act of spoliation which the Company had long been meditating. As early as 1768, the directors, referring to the desire

of the emperor to set out for Delhi, wrote as follows:—"If he flings himself into the hands of the Marathas, or any other power, we are disengaged from him, and it may be a fair opportunity of withholding the twenty-six lacs we now pay him." Two years after, when urging the Bengal council to advise the emperor to take up his residence within the British territory, on the ground that his personal safety would thereby be best secured, they say, "To this plea must be added the ill effects of the continual drains of the specie of Bengal, on account of his annual tribute, which, when carried beyond our possessions, must in a great degree be lost to the necessary circulation, and may prevent that punctuality in our remittances which we have hitherto maintained, and may in time wholly incapacitate us from fulfilling the stipulations we are so desirous to preserve inviolate." In other words, the council were to hold out a kind of menace, that if the emperor declined to place himself entirely in their hands, and abandon all idea of sitting on the throne of Delhi, the Company might find it convenient to forget the obligation they had undertaken, and cheat him out of the price they had solemnly promised to pay him in return for the grant of the dewani. About the very time when the directors were thus preparing the council for committing a gross breach of faith, Sir Robert Barker was by their orders escorting Shah Alam to the frontier of the province, "as a mark of gratitude and respect," and entreating him, on the eve of his departure for Delhi, in the name of the council, and in words which have been already quoted, "of the attachment which they felt towards him, and of the readiness with which the Company would receive and protect him, should any reverse of fortune compel him once more to return to their provinces." It is needless to say of the quotations given above, that their professions were utterly hollow, and that the directors, so far from entertaining friendly feelings toward the emperor, were only thinking how they might recruit their finances by taking a sordid and ungenerous advantage of his necessities.

The views thus expressed by the directors were not lost upon Hastings, who, seeing that nothing would please his employers so much as money, by whatever means obtained, had little difficulty in devising a scheme which could not fail to bring a

large sum into their treasury. The Rohillas, when threatened with destruction by the Marathas, had, as we have seen, thrown themselves, in a kind of despair, into the hands of the Nabob of Oudh, and agreed to pay forty lacs of rupees as the price of their deliverance from Maratha oppression. It is not quite clear to whom they were to pay this sum—whether to the Marathas, who agreed to depart on the nabob's undertaking to guarantee the payment, or to the nabob, who claimed it as a stipulated price which was to be paid him for procuring the departure of the Marathas, whether by peace or war. This much is certain—the nabob gave his guarantee, the Rohilla chiefs gave him their bond, and the Marathas departed. In point of fact, however, none of the parties to the transaction performed their proper part in it. The Marathas departed, not because they had been bought off, but because domestic dissensions, consequent on the death of the Peshwa Madho Rao, required their presence nearer home. The nabob consequently had done nothing to procure their departure, and having made no payment to them under his guarantee, had no right to keep up the bond against the Rohilla chiefs. Hafiz Rahmat, therefore, who had transacted with him in their name, and who had actually paid him five lacs to account, made only a reasonable demand when he requested that the bond should be cancelled. The nabob, however, was not disposed to act fairly in the matter. He had long been bent on annexing to Oudh the whole of Rohilkhand, or at least that part of it which extended from the left bank of the Ganges eastward to his own frontier, and he was determined to use the non-payment of the bond as a pretext for carrying out this scheme of gross spoliation. The absence of the Marathas seemed to furnish the opportunity for which he had long been on the watch, and he could never strike the blow so effectually as when they could not interfere. Still there was one great obstacle. The Rohillas were descendants of one of the bravest of the Afghan tribes, and owed the high position which they had acquired in the country to the manifest superiority they displayed in the arts both of peace and of war. Their lands were the best cultivated in Hindustan; and though, from the number of petty chiefs among whom they were divided, internal feuds were frequent, they were ever ready in a common danger to rally round their

national standard. It was said that when thus united they could bring 80,000 fighting men into the field. Such a host, animated with the genuine spirit of freedom, the Nabob of Oudh durst not encounter; and therefore his only hope of accomplishing their destruction was by means of the assistance which he might be able to obtain from the veteran troops of the Company. To this object, therefore, all his efforts were directed.

When the Marathas had extorted the cession of Kora and Allahabad from the emperor, and were threatening an invasion of Oudh, the nabob in alarm applied to the Bengal presidency, and was relieved from his fears by the arrival of the first brigade, which had been ordered to cross the Karamnasa and effect a junction with him. He was at the same time told that their operations would be entirely defensive; and accordingly the council, in explaining this movement to the directors, declared it to be their unanimous resolution that nothing should either tempt or compel them to overstep the strict line of defence, or allow their army to pass beyond the nabob's frontier. "To this resolution," they added, "we shall strictly adhere." The nabob, though thus discouraged, did not despair. He was well aware of the financial difficulties with which the Company were contending, and had great confidence in the potency of a bribe. He therefore proposed a personal interview with the president at Benares; and the council, convinced that such a meeting might prove advantageous to the Company's affairs, not only consented to it, but left Hastings very much at liberty to follow his own course, because they felt it impossible to mark out any precise line for his guidance, and reposed the most entire confidence in his experience and abilities. He reached Benares on the 19th of August, 1773, and on the 7th of September concluded what has been called the treaty of Benares. Its leading articles were, that the districts of Kora and Allahabad, which less than three months before had been formally taken possession of by one of the members of the Calcutta council, "in the name of the Company, acting as allies to the King Shah Alam," should be ceded to the nabob for fifty lacs of rupees, payable to the Company, twenty in ready money, and the remainder in two years, by equal instalments; and that for whatever of the Company's forces the nabob might require, he would pay at the fixed rate of 210,000 rupees per month for a brigade.

In regard to the former of these articles, it is only necessary to observe that it bore injustice on the very face of it, inasmuch as it engaged the Company to sell for their own behoof territories which, according to their own showing, were held by them in trust. The latter article looked harmless enough, but it soon appeared that more was meant than its words implied, and it was accompanied by a secret understanding which bound the Company to accept of money as the price of blood, and hire out their troops as mercenaries for the perpetration of abominable wickedness. Hastings, on resuming his seat at the Calcutta board, on the 4th of October, gave a detailed report of his proceedings, but seems not to have thought it prudent to mention how far he had committed himself in regard to the furnishing of troops. "The vizir," he said, "was at first very desirous of the assistance of an English force to put him in possession of the Rohilla country lying north of his dominions and east of the Ganges. This has long been a favourite object of his wishes." Referring to the same subject on another occasion, he says, "I found him (the *vizir* or nabob) still equally bent on the design of reducing the Rohillas, which I encouraged, as I had done before, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its success." It may, therefore, be assumed, without the least breach of charity, that in the article fixing the monthly pay of a Company's brigade, the project which lay nearest the nabob's heart, and which Hastings says that he encouraged, was distinctly understood to be the special service on which the brigade was to be employed. It was probably from some kind of consciousness that the transactions in which he had been engaged would not bear the light, that Hastings at this time applied to the council, and found them complacent enough to delegate to him a very important part of their authority. This was the appointment of an agent to reside at the *vizir's* court, and be the medium of communication between him and the president in regard to all matters which seemed to require secrecy. Hastings' own account of the matter is as follows:—"In the course of our conversation the vizier frequently expressed the satisfaction which he had received from our meeting, and from the friendly and confidential intercourse which had taken place between us. Though such professions are not always to be

received in their literal sense, I took occasion from them to ask him whether it would be agreeable to him that a person in whom I confided should be appointed by me to reside near his person, for the sake of perpetuating and strengthening the good understanding so happily begun, as well as for the transaction of such ordinary affairs as might not suit the formality of a correspondence by letter, but which in their amount are always found to be productive of important effects." The nabob of course declared that "it would be entirely pleasing to him." "It now rests with you, gentlemen," said Mr. Hastings, addressing the board, "to determine on the propriety of this appointment. I will offer it frankly as my opinion, that if you shall think it proper to intrust with me the sole nomination of such a resident, and the power of recalling him whenever I shall judge his presence to be no longer necessary, it may be attended with good effects; in any other mode I fear the appointment would exclude me from being the channel of communication between this government and the vizier, and prevent my availing myself of that influence with him which I have taken much pains to establish, and I hope not altogether unsuccessfully."

The irresponsible and secret power which the president thus asked for himself was perhaps not more than it was expedient that he should possess, but it is very questionable whether, as implying a delegation of power, the council had any authority to grant it. Their duty, as the government of the Company was then constituted, was to act along with the president, and even dictate his proceedings by outvoting him when they disapproved them. This they could not do while they left him free to act without their knowledge in matters of the utmost delicacy; and it therefore cannot be denied that this appointment of an agent implied both a stretch of power on the part of the president, and a dereliction of duty on the part of the council. It appears, however, that all the members were not disposed tamely to acquiesce in the proceedings of the president. Sir Robert Barker, as commander-in-chief, had a seat in the council, and having arrived at Calcutta from the army, on the 7th of October, no sooner took his seat than he recorded his dissent from the treaty of Benares, as inconsistent with that of Allahabad in 1765. Mr. Hastings defended his treaty with great boldness. Kora and

Allahabad, he contended, had been bestowed on Shah Alam for the support of his dignity and expenses, and he had no right to alienate them, at least to such dangerous neighbours as the Marathas. Still, by such alienation his property and rights were annulled, and he had no title to question the subsequent disposal. In this arguing, Mr. Hastings chose to forget that the king was at the time of the alienation under duress, and that the council on this ground had taken possession of the districts in his name and as his allies. When the sanads for the dewani were mentioned, Mr. Hastings insisted that they could in no way be considered dependent on the emperor's possession of Kora and Allahabad; and in reply to the remark by Sir Robert Barker, that "it was more than probable we should soon see these sanads in the hands of other nations," exclaimed, "What will they avail them? It was not the want of the *sanads* of Shah Alam which defeated the long-concerted projects of the Duc de Choiseul, nor will the possession of them quicken the designs of the Marathas against us. The sword, which gave us the dominion of Bengal, must be the instrument of its preservation; and if (which God forbid) it shall ever cease to be ours, the next proprietor will derive his right and possession from the same natural charter." However true this might be in substance, Mr. Hastings ought not to have forgotten that the possessions of the Company had hitherto been held by a very different tenure, and that having accepted of the dewani as a grant from the emperor, on certain stipulated terms, it was the height of injustice to violate these terms, under the pretext that possession had been originally secured, and was henceforth to be maintained only by the sword.

The new policy which Mr. Hastings had inaugurated at Benares, was soon developed. On the 18th of November, the Nabob of Oudh informed the Bengal council that Hafiz Rahmat Khan and other Rohilla chiefs intended to take possession of Etawah, and the rest of the country belonging to the Marathas in the Doab. It is not easy to see what title he had to object to this. The territory in question was not his; and if the Rohillas could succeed in wresting it from the Marathas, to whom he said it belonged, he could not fail to be a gainer, as the immediate effect would be to remove the Marathas to a

greater distance from his frontier. His determination, however, was to quarrel with the Rohillas at all events; and therefore, without attempting to prove the reasonableness of his complaint, he continued thus:—"I therefore write to inform you, that if such is their intention, I will not put up with it, but shall undoubtedly undertake an expedition against them; for, in the first place, they have not made good a single *daum* (the fortieth part of a rupee) of the forty lacs of rupees, according to their agreement; and in the next, they are now going to take possession of another country. This I will never submit to, and I am therefore determined to punish them." To this tirade the council might and ought to have answered, that they had no right or interest to interfere between him and the Rohillas; if he was determined, as he said, to punish them, they would only advise him to count the cost before provoking a war of which it was impossible to foresee the issue, and in which he could not expect any assistance from them, as they had pledged themselves again and again to engage only in defensive operations. The nabob perhaps anticipated such an answer, and therefore prepares to avert it by the following abrupt proposal:—"On condition of the entire expulsion of the Rohillas, I will pay to the Company the sum of forty lacs of rupees in ready money, whenever I shall discharge the English troops; and until the expulsion of the Rohillas shall be effected I will pay the expenses of the English troops, that is to say, I will pay them the sum of 210,000 rupees monthly."

Had the council acted aright, they would at once have indignantly rejected this proposal, as insulting to the Company. Stripped of all disguise, it was in fact nothing else than a proposal to them to hire out their troops as mercenaries, and send them to deal death and ruin among a people distinguished above all the others of Hindustan for noble qualities—a people whose possession of the soil was as ancient, and title to it as valid, as that of Sujah Daulah to any portion of Oudh, and a people against whom the Company had not even a shadow of complaint. Strange to say, this proposal, instead of being scouted, was seriously entertained. Why? Simply because the sum offered as blood-money was large in amount, and the Company's treasury was sadly in want of it. In their consultations on this subject

the council show that they had many misgivings. The president himself, though the prime mover in the business, doubted if the time was seasonable, "the Company being exposed at home to popular clamour—all their measures being liable to be canvassed in parliament—their charter drawing to a close—and his majesty's ministers being unquestionably ready to take advantage of every favourable circumstance in the negotiation for its renewal. In this situation," he concluded, "there appears an unusual degree of responsibility annexed to such an undertaking." On the other hand, he did not lose sight of what he called the advantages; and confessed, more candidly than he had done before, how much he felt embarrassed by what had passed at Benares, and the assurance he had given the *vizir* of aid in the enterprise.

The council, according to their own account, were sadly perplexed. They "concurred heartily in wishing to avoid the expedition," and even "agreed upon a letter to the *vizir*, couched in terms rather calculated to produce a refusal on his part to accept of aid, than to promote the undertaking." At the same time, with strange inconsistency, they proceeded to act as if they had actually sanctioned it, by sending an order to one of their brigades to await the requisition of the *vizier*. The meaning of all these vague and contradictory statements must therefore be, that they had pledged themselves to take part in the enterprise, should the *vizir* choose to insist upon it, but continued to cherish a lingering hope that something might occur to change his views. If so, all their doubts were soon set at rest. The requisition from the *vizir* arrived, and the infamous transaction being formally completed, Colonel Champion received orders to advance from Patna at the head of a brigade. There was no longer any disguise as to the kind of service in which he was to be engaged, and he was distinctly told that the object of the campaign was the reduction of the Rohilla country lying between the Ganges and the mountains. On entering the *vizir's* country he was to acquaint his excellency that he was at his service, and seek a personal interview, for the purpose "of concerting the intended operations in which the Company's troops were to be employed." In these arrangements the claims of humanity and justice were altogether forgotten. Nothing

was said about mitigating the horrors of war to the unhappy people about to be sacrificed; but the money question was kept prominently in view, and an order given to march the brigade back to Benares in the event of its pay being allowed to fall a month in arrear.

Colonel Champion having commenced his march on the 21st of February, 1774, crossed the Karamnasa on the 24th of March, and was advancing toward the Rohilla frontier, when the celebrated leader, Hafiz Rahmat, sent a letter, earnestly urging an accommodation. This was found to be impossible, as the *vizir*, who had formerly made the non-payment of forty lacs of rupees the pretext for the war, now demanded two crores, equivalent to two millions sterling. The Rohillas, thus aware that their destruction was determined on, and that the Company, in whose equity they had hitherto placed some confidence, had left them entirely at the mercy of their cruel and vindictive foe, prepared to defend themselves as they best could. Hafiz Rahmat, at the head of about 40,000 men, had taken up a strong position; and when the brigade was seen advancing, on the morning of the 23rd of April, did not decline the encounter. The result cannot be better given than in Colonel Champion's own words:—"It is impossible to describe a more obstinate firmness of resolution than the enemy displayed. Numerous were their gallant men who advanced, and often pitched their colours between both armies, in order to encourage their men to follow them; and it was not till they saw our whole army advancing briskly to charge them, after a severe cannonade of two hours and twenty minutes, and a smart fire of musketry for some minutes on both flanks, that they fairly turned their backs. Of the enemy above 2,000 fell in the field, and among them many sirdars (chiefs). But what renders the victory most decisive is the death of Hafiz Rahmat, who was killed while rallying his people to battle. One of his sons was also killed, one taken prisoner, and a third returned from fight to-day, and is in the hands of Sujah Daulah."

While the Rohillas were thus displaying a prowess which unhappily did not avail them, how was the Company's favourite ally and liberal paymaster behaving? Again let Colonel Champion tell:—"I wish I could pay the *vizir* any compliment

on this occasion, or that I were not under the indispensable necessity of expressing my highest indignation at his shameful pusillanimity; indispensable, I say, because it is necessary that administration should clearly know how little to be depended on is this their ally. The night before the battle I applied to him for some particular pieces of cannon, which I thought might prove of great service in the action; but he declined giving the use of them. He promised solemnly to support me with all his force, and particularly engaged to be near at hand with a large body of cavalry, to be used as I should direct. But instead of being nigh me, he remained beyond the Gurrah, on the ground which I had left in the morning, surrounded by his cavalry, and a large train of artillery, and did not move thence till the news of the enemy's defeat reached him." Then, indeed, there was no want of activity, and his troops rushed without a moment's delay to the Rohilla camp, which they completely plundered, "while the Company's troops, in regular order in their ranks, most justly observed, 'We have the honour of the day, and these banditti the profit'."

While reading these two accounts it is impossible not to feel indignation and disgust—indignation at the inhuman butchery of a brave people fighting manfully for all that was dear to them, and disgust, both at the dastardly wretch at whose bidding the butchery was done, and at the conduct of the Bengal presidency, who stooped to do his bidding from a base and mercenary motive. Faizulla Khan, another of the Rohilla chiefs, made his escape to the mountains, with the remains of the army and a considerable amount of treasure; but the defeat and death of Hafiz Rahmat had decided the fate of the country and its inhabitants, who were forthwith pillaged without mercy, and subjected to every species of barbarity. The Company's brigade having gained the victory, were obliged to remain mere spectators of the use which was made of it. As mere hirelings they were entitled only to their wages, and had no right to interfere any farther. The conquest was made for Sujah Daulah, and he alone was the proper judge of what he ought to do with his own. What he did choose to do is on record. In another letter, written by Colonel Champion, within three weeks of his victory, he says, "The inhumanity and dishonour with which

the late proprietors of this country and their families have been used, is known over all these parts; a relation of them would swell this letter to an immense size. I could not help compassionating such unparalleled misery; and my requests to the *vizir* to show lenity were frequent, but as fruitless as even those advices which I almost hourly gave him regarding the destruction of the villages, with respect to which I am now constrained to declare, that though he always promised as fairly as I could wish, yet he did not observe one of his promises, nor cease to overspread the country with flames, till three days after the fate of Hafiz Rahmat was decided." In another letter he says, "The whole army were witnesses of scenes that cannot be described." Various attempts have been made either to deny these atrocities, or to palliate them. Thus, Professor Wilson, in a long note to Mill's *British India* (vol. iii, pp. 575-76), not satisfied with exposing the gross exaggeration of a writer who affirmed that "500,000 families of husbandmen and artists had been driven across the Jumna, and that the Rohilla provinces were a barren and uninhabited waste," becomes a zealous apologist for Mr. Hastings, and says, "The only extirpation proposed was that of the power of one or two Rohilla chiefs. It was not a war against the people, but against a few military adventurers, who had gained their possessions with the sword, who were constantly at war with their neighbours and each other, and whose forcible suppression was the legitimate object of the King of Delhi or the Nabob of Oudh." Again, he says that none were "included in the spirit of the treaty excepting such as were actually found in arms," and that "the Hindu inhabitants, consisting of about 700,000, were not otherwise affected by it than by experiencing a change of masters, to which they had been frequently accustomed." These statements are gratuitous and unsupported contradictions of the testimony borne by the most competent of eye-witnesses. Colonel Champion distinctly says that amongst the 2,000 who fell in the field were "many sirdars" or chiefs. Those who fell could not have been a very large proportion of those who were engaged, and escaped by flight. On what ground, then, does Professor Wilson limit their whole number to "one or two Rohilla chiefs," or to "a few military adventurers?" Again, Colonel Champion represents the misery as "un-

paralleled," describes the country as "overspread with flames," and distinctly asserts, in a letter not yet quoted, that "above a lac of people (100,000) have deserted their homes in consequence of the defeat of Hafiz." When a ruthless soldiery, doubtless cruel and rapacious in proportion to the cowardice they had shown on the field of battle, were let loose upon the country, and continued for days devastating it with fire and sword, is it possible that the Hindu inhabitants could have escaped without experiencing more than a "change of masters, to which they had been frequently accustomed?" There is nothing gained either by understating or exaggerating the case. It must be admitted on all hands that numerous lives were sacrificed, and a fearful amount of misery inflicted in the Rohilla war; and the question ever and anon returns, Had the Bengal presidency any right to take part in this war, and sell the services of their troops for money to a cruel and dastardly tyrant? So long as this question must be answered in the negative their conduct remains without excuse.

Before the Rohilla war was finished, Najif Khan, who commanded Shah Alam's army, arrived to claim a share of the spoil! Sujah Daulah, who held and piqued himself on the title of *vizier* or prime minister of the Great Mughul, felt it to be decent, if not necessary, in most of his expeditions, to act with the emperor's sanction. He was thus brought into frequent communication with the court of Delhi, and had even on a recent occasion taken part in a campaign in which Agra was wrested from the Jats, and annexed once more to the so-called Mughul empire, of which it had long been the capital. During this campaign the nabob had explained his designs against the Rohillas, and entered into a treaty, by which Shah Alam, in return for assisting him with his army, was to share half his conquests. It was in terms of this treaty that Najif Khan had now made his appearance. As the conquest was already achieved, the nabob was most reluctant to part with any of its advantages. Unable to deny the treaty, he endeavoured to evade it, by asserting that in his copy of it Shah Alam was bound to take the field in person. When the copy was produced, it contained no such stipulation, and Colonel Champion, not knowing how to decide between the claimants, consulted the governor and

council. The case was puzzling. If the nabob was bound by treaty to share his conquests with the emperor, how could they set the treaty at nought by conquering for the nabob alone? and, on the other hand, if they did not conquer for him alone, how could they demand from him the whole hire for which they had stipulated, and for which, moreover, they could scarcely help feeling that they had made sacrifices which money's worth could not compensate? At first they refused to "entertain so bad an opinion of the *vizir* as to suppose him capable of acting in avowed breach of a treaty." When the facts proved too stubborn, and the treaty could not be denied, they seemed inclined to do the honest thing, and instructed Colonel Champion, that "if he should acknowledge such a treaty, you must undoubtedly abstain from further hostilities in abetment of his breach of faith." At last, on further consideration, they managed to get quit of their scruples, and announced their decision in the following terms:—"It is our intention to persevere in pursuit of the object which originally engaged us in the present enterprise, and to adhere strictly to our engagements with the *vizir*, without suffering our attention to be diverted by foreign incidents or occurrences." In other words, the transaction of the *vizir* was of a kind which would not allow them to be very fastidious, and without inquiring whether it was consistent with his other obligations, they were determined to perform their part of it to the very letter, and thereby establish an indefeasible right to all for which they had stipulated in return.

The Rohilla war was still to be subjected to a severe ordeal. The council had embarked in it on their own responsibility, not only without consulting the directors, but in direct opposition to the course of policy which they had repeatedly enjoined. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, in communicating their proceedings to the court, to strengthen their case by every plea that could be urged in its justification. Accordingly, in their letter of explanation, dated 17th October, 1774, setting out with the general affirmation that "every circumstance that could possibly favour this enterprise, by an uncommon combination of political considerations and fortuitous events, operated in support of the measure," they arrange their pleas under eight distinct heads. These we shall allow them to state in their own words:—

"1. Justice to the *vizier* for the aggravated breach of treaty in the Rohilla chiefs. 2. The honour of the Company, pledged implicitly by General Barker's attestation for the accomplishment of this treaty, and which, added to their alliance with the *vizier*, engaged us to see redress obtained for the perfidy of the Rohillas. 3. The completion of the line of defence of the *vizier's* dominions, by extending the boundary to the natural barrier formed by the northern chain of hills and the Ganges, and their junction. 4. The acquisition of forty lacs of rupees, and of so much specie added to the exhausted currency of these provinces. 5. The subsidy of 210,000 rupees per month, for defraying the charges of one-third of our army employed with the *vizier*. 6. The urgent and recent orders of the Company for reducing charges, and procuring the means to discharge the heavy debt at interest, heightened by the advices of their great distresses at home. 7. The absence of the Marathas from Hindustan, which left an open field for carrying the proposed plan into execution. 8. The intestine divisions and dissensions in their state, which, by engaging them fully at home, would prevent interruptions from their incursions, and leave a moral certainty of success to the enterprise."

All these pleas have already been weighed and found wanting, and therefore a very few additional remarks will suffice. On a slight inspection it will be seen that all the above pleas admit of being reduced to three general heads:—1. The obligation to engage in the war. 2. The advantages, partly to the nabob and partly to the Company. 3. The circumstances favourable to success. The obligation embraces the two first pleas, and is founded on an alleged breach of treaty by the Rohillas, and a real or implied guarantee of the terms of that treaty by the Company. Now, it is almost needless to observe, that the breach of a treaty, however aggravated, does not necessarily call for the interference of a third party. The Nabob of Oudh and the Rohillas were two independent Indian states, and perfectly entitled to transact with each other. If an injustice was committed, the aggrieved party had the remedy in his own hands. What right, then, had the Company, to set themselves up as redressers of grievances? On general grounds, therefore, the interference of the Company was totally unautho-

rized. But then, it is said, the honour of the Company was "pledged implicitly, by General Barker's attestation, for the accomplishment of this treaty." It is difficult to give a meaning to these words, which are evidently made vague for the very purpose of darkening the subject. The Company either guaranteed this treaty or they did not. If they did, why not say so at once, and produce evidence of the fact, instead of using such indefinite verbiage as an "attestation for the accomplishment of the treaty?" If they did not guarantee it, how could the violation of it be any ground for their engaging in an exterminating war? The treaty was, as we have already seen, rendered inoperative by a change of circumstances, and none of the parties to it were to be blamed for not performing conditions which had become impracticable. If any one of them was more culpable than another, it was the nabob, who, having obtained a bond for a sum of money, merely to cover his guarantee, insisted on payment, without having done anything to entitle him to it. But even granting that the Rohillas had violated the treaty, and that the Company had a right to call upon them to fulfil it, it ought to be remembered that the Rohillas offered terms of accommodation, and were rudely repulsed by the nabob, who, instead of the original claim of forty lacs, refused to be satisfied with less than two crores. Surely if the Company were only interfering to enforce the treaty, it was their duty to have stepped forward then, and accepted performance as payment in full of all demands. As they declined to do so, it is plain that all they say about the obligation of the treaty is mere pretence. In fact, they interfered not from any sense of obligation, but for the purpose of realizing certain advantages.

These advantages form the subject of the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth pleas. The third states the advantage to the *vizir*. By taking possession of the Rohilla territory situated east of the Ganges, he improved the line of defence. What then? Is the benefit which you may derive from the possession of your neighbour's property a sufficient justification for seizing it, and expelling him by fire and sword? Unless this is maintained, it is vain to talk of the nabob's right to improve his line of defence. But then think of the advantages to the Company. While ostensibly

avenging the wrongs of the nabob, they were replenishing their exhausted treasury, maintaining a third part of their army free of expense, and helping to reduce debt and relieve distresses, by which they were in danger of being overwhelmed. These are the advantages which, when hypocritical pretences are thrown aside, must stand forth as the only real inducements to take part with the nabob. It was a mere mercenary bargain, by which the lives and freedom of thousands of human beings were shamefully bartered for money. Until the distinctions between right and wrong are abolished, there cannot be a successful vindication of the Rohilla war.

The tone of the remarks subjoined to the above pleas indicate that the council had great doubts whether the directors would hold them to be sufficient. "These," they say, "were the inducements which determined us to adopt this new plan of conduct; in opposition to which, one powerful objection, and only one, occurred, namely, the personal hazard we ran in undertaking so uncommon a measure without positive instructions, at our own risk, with the eyes of the whole nation on the affairs of the Company, and the passions and prejudices of almost every man in England inflamed against the conduct of the Company and the characters of their servants. Notwithstanding which, we yielded to the strong necessity imposed upon us by the inducements above mentioned, in spite of the suggestions and the checks of self-interest, which set continually before our eyes the dread of forfeiting the favour of our employers and becoming the objects of popular invective, and made us involuntarily rejoice in every change in the *vizir's* advices which protracted the execution of the measure. At length, however, his resolution coinciding with our opinions, the enterprise was undertaken." There is evidently more rhetoric than logic in these remarks. To obey the clear call of duty in the face of popular clamour, and even at the risk of offending their employers, would undoubtedly have been a meritorious act. But wherein lay the "strong necessity" of which they speak? In nothing but the desire of money. It was the knowledge of this desire that first emboldened the nabob to make his iniquitous proposal; it was the prospect of gratifying this desire that tempted the council to listen to it, and finally accede to it, though they must

have foreseen the cruelty and injustice of which it was to make them the mercenary and guilty agents; and when the deed was done, it is still money that is placed in the foreground, and paraded before the eyes of the directors, as the most effectual apology for their proceedings. Accordingly they conclude thus:—"We shall, then, again return to the state of peace from which we emerged when we first engaged in the Rohilla expedition, with the actual possession or acknowledged right (which the power of this government can amply and effectually assert) of nearly seventy lacs of rupees, acquired by the monthly subsidy and the stipulation; and it rests with you to pass the ultimate judgment on our conduct."

Considered merely in a pecuniary point of view, the Company had good cause to be satisfied with the results of Mr. Hastings' administration. He had not been able materially to improve any of the regular sources of revenue. On the contrary, the plan which had been adopted, of letting the lands on leases of five years was threatening to prove a failure, in consequence of the inability of the lessees to fulfil their engagements; and the annual expenditure had increased. Still, however, large sums had been brought into the treasury, or been saved to it. Besides the seventy lacs (£700,000) above mentioned, an annual sum of forty-two lacs (£420,000) had been gained by cutting off sixteen lacs from the nabob's allowance, on the ground of his minority, and repudiating the obligation to pay twenty-six lacs to the emperor as his reserved revenue from Bengal. The districts of Allahabad and Kora, after being occupied in his name, had been sold by the Company for their own behoof, to the Nabob of Oudh. From this transaction alone a slump sum of fifty lacs (£500,000) had been obtained. The sums thus acquired or saved, though certainly by more than questionable means, exceeded £1,500,000 sterling, and must have greatly lightened the severe pecuniary pressure under which the Company were labouring. At the utmost, however, they only served to put off the evil day, but could not avert it. After a dream of prosperity, and even of relief to the British finances from the surplus revenues of Bengal, the directors were unable any longer to conceal the fact that they could not meet the demands upon them.

On the 17th of March, 1772, the directors recommended, and the proprietors resolved, that the dividend for the current half year should be $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, or at the rate of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum. So large a dividend was equivalent to an announcement to the public that the affairs of the Company were in a most flourishing condition. Great, then, was the surprise as well as indignation when it began to ooze out in the beginning of July that the Company, having no prospect of being able to meet their current obligations, would be obliged to borrow to a large amount. On the 15th of July they obtained from the Bank a loan of £400,000, and on the 29th another loan of £200,000. These sums, however, fell far short of their wants; and on the 10th of August the chairman and deputy waited upon the minister, and informed him that a loan of at least £1,000,000 sterling from the public was absolutely necessary.

Before these facts were generally known, the directors had seen the necessity of setting their house in order, and endeavouring to escape from the responsibility which they had incurred, by fixing the blame on any shoulders but their own. Mr. Sullivan, after a long contest, had regained his ascendancy at the India House, and was now deputy-chairman. One of the first uses which he made of his victory was to display his old enmity to Clive. Accordingly, in January, 1772, just a fortnight before the meeting of parliament, his lordship, without any previous communication, received a dry official letter from the Company's secretary inclosing copies of several papers which the court of directors had lately received, and acquainting him that if he had any observations to make, they would be glad to receive them as expeditiously as might be convenient. The papers accused him of misconduct in Bengal, and specified in particular four charges against him, as preposterous in their nature as absurd in their expression. The first was a monopoly of cotton, the second a monopoly of diamonds, and the third frauds in the exchange and in the gold coinage. The fourth deserves to be quoted verbatim:—"A monopoly of salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, and other commodities, which occasioned the late famine." Clive answered, with becoming dignity, "You have not been pleased to inform me from whom you received these papers, to what end they were laid before you, what resolution you have come to

concerning them, nor for what purpose you expect my observations upon them. I shall, however, observe to you, that upon the public records of the Company, where the whole of my conduct is stated, you may find a sufficient confutation of the charges which you have transmitted to me; and I cannot but suppose that if any part of my conduct had been injurious to the service, contradictory to my engagements with the Company, or even mysterious to you, four years and a half since my arrival in England would not have elapsed before your duty would have impelled you to call me to account."

On the 30th of March, Mr. Sullivan, who, besides being deputy-chairman, had a seat in parliament, moved for leave to bring in a bill "for the better regulation of the affairs of the East India Company, and of their servants in India, and for the due administration of justice in Bengal." In the debate on the motion several of the speakers threw out insinuations, or brought direct charges, which made Clive feel that he was put upon his defence; and he delivered a speech which proves that under a different course of training he might have been as great an orator as he was a soldier. After adverting to his second appointment as governor of Bengal, and to the facility with which he might have conducted the government, by winking at abuses and leaving matters as he found them, he continued thus:—"The third path was intricate. Dangers and difficulties were on every side. But I resolved to pursue it. In short, I was determined to do my duty to the public, although I should incur the odium of the whole settlement. The welfare of the Company required a vigorous exertion, and I took the resolution of cleansing the Augean stable. It was that conduct which had occasioned the public papers to teem with scurrility and abuse against me ever since my return to England. It was that conduct which occasioned these charges. It was that conduct which enables me now to lay my hand upon my heart, and most solemnly to declare to the house, to the gallery, and to the whole world at large, that I never in a single instance lost sight of what I thought the honour and true interest of my country and the Company; that I was never guilty of any acts of violence or oppression, unless the bringing offenders to justice can be deemed so; that as to extortion, such an idea never

entered my mind; that I did not suffer those under me to commit acts of violence, oppression, or extortion; that my influence was never employed for the advantage of any man, contrary to the strict principles of honour and justice; and that, so far from reaping any benefit myself from the expedition (his second government), I returned to England many thousand pounds out of pocket."

After thus vindicating his second government, and answering the four specific charges mentioned above, Clive entered on the general subject of the Company's management, and told several important though rather unpalatable truths. The deplorable condition of Bengal he ascribed to mismanagement. "The public or foreign trade had more than doubled since the grant of the dewani; but the inland trade, on which the prosperity and happiness of the people must chiefly depend, had, by a change of system, and under pretence of freedom of trade, been thrown into total confusion. The Company's servants and their agents had in reality taken it into their own hands, and by trading, not only as merchants, but as sovereigns, had taken the bread out of the mouth of thousands of native merchants, whom they reduced to beggary. There was little decrease in the revenue of the dewani, but the increase of the military and civil charges had been rapid and enormous. This was caused not so much by the simple pay of officers and men, as by the contingent bills of contractors, commissioners, engineers, &c. Every man now who is permitted to make a bill, makes a fortune." He attributed the distressed state of the Company's affairs to four causes—relaxation of government in those who had succeeded him, neglect on the part of ministers, misconduct on the part of the directors, contested elections, and the outrageous proceedings of general courts. When the dewani was obtained, ministers ought, either of their own motion, or in concert with the directors, to have established some fixed plan of government. Instead of this they thought only of the passing day, and were so eager to share in the immediate profit, as to league with temporary proprietors in bullying the directors into their terms. The directors, again, instead of supporting the select committee, who had extricated their affairs from anarchy and confusion, had counteracted their efforts, and destroyed their own power, by dropping the prosecutions against those

whom the committee had denounced as delinquents. Not satisfied with this, they had restored almost every civil and military transgressor who had been dismissed. The effect of these proceedings was to convert their covenants into mere blank paper, and encourage a hope of impunity for all offences. All these evils were aggravated by the violent proceedings of general courts, and the system of annual elections. "One half of the year," he said, "was employed by the directors in freeing themselves from the obligations contracted at last election; and the second half wasted in incurring new obligations, and securing their election for next year, by daily sacrifices of some interest of the Company."

Clive had undoubtedly good ground for the reproof he administered to ministers, directors, and proprietors; but it must be confessed that in administering it he displayed more valour than discretion. In some of his earliest proceedings in Bengal he had done several things on which we found it necessary to animadvert with some freedom; and it would therefore, to say the least, have been both more seemly and more prudent to have admitted it as probable that he himself, too, might occasionally have gone astray. By insisting that he alone was right, while others were wrong, he threw out a challenge which was at once accepted by his avowed enemies, and even in a manner forced upon others, who would willingly have forgiven him many errors, in consideration of the important services he had rendered. The consequence was, that an ordeal more painful than any to which he had yet been subjected, was prepared for him. On the same day, when Mr. Sullivan, who had been allowed to bring in his bill, moved the second reading, Colonel Burgoyne moved the appointment of a select committee, to inquire into the nature, state, and condition of the East India Company, and of the British affairs in the East Indies. This motion, made on the 30th of April, was carried without a division; and the committee, consisting of thirty-one members, appointed by ballot, was deemed of so much importance, that it was directed, as the session was far spent, to sit during the summer.

From the general terms in which the motion for the select committee was worded, and the appointment of the members by ballot, it might have been expected to be free from party spirit, and to be in no danger of losing sight of the leading

subject of inquiry, in order to indulge in personalities. Unfortunately some of Clive's most inveterate enemies had been balloted, and managed, almost at the very outset, to give the investigation a direction which could not have been originally intended, and, at all events, was not avowed when the committee was appointed. His proceedings were made the great object of attack, and he himself, when called as a witness, was examined, to use his own emphatic description, "as if he had been a sheep-stealer." With such precipitation were the first and second reports hurried on, that they were presented to the house on the 26th of May, just before the rising of the session, and printed in the journals. Their contents—relating mainly to the revolutions of 1757 and 1760, the presents given or extorted, Clive's *jaghir*, and the abuses of the inland trade—made the public generally acquainted for the first time with many startling facts, and prevented the interest which had been excited in Indian affairs from flagging.

It is singular that at this very time, when Clive's enemies seemed to be gaining the ascendant, honours were showered upon him. On the 15th of June, a few days after parliament rose, he was installed as a knight of the Bath; on the 9th of October he kissed the king's hand, upon being appointed lord-lieutenant of Salop, and had the honour of talking with his majesty on Indian affairs for nearly half an hour; and in December he was appointed lord-lieutenant of Montgomeryshire. Meanwhile, the financial difficulties of the Company, their loans from the Bank, and their application to the minister for a loan of at least £1,000,000 from the public, had been the general topic of conversation; and parliament was summoned to meet on 26th November, before the holidays, for the express purpose of taking their affairs into immediate consideration. The king's speech accordingly contained the following passage:—"When I received information of the difficulties in which the Company appears to be involved, I determined to give you an early opportunity of informing yourselves fully of the true state of their affairs, and of making such provisions for the common benefit and security of all the various interests concerned, as you shall find best adapted to the exigencies of the case." When the address in answer to the speech was voted, Lord North,

the prime minister, in adverting to the distress of the Company, attributed it chiefly to the complicated union of civil and political power with their commercial affairs. He felt confident, however, that though embarrassed for the moment, they would be fully able, with a temporary assistance, to meet all their engagements. He concluded with moving that a committee of secrecy should be appointed, to inquire into the state and management of the Company. Colonel Burgoyne, under the impression that the committee of secrecy was meant to displace his select committee, thought it necessary to defend the latter from the charge of having forgotten the object of its original appointment, and affirmed, with much warmth, from his own knowledge, that its inquiries would disclose such a scene of iniquity, rapine, and injustice—such unheard-of cruelties, such violations of every rule of morality, religion, and good government—as were never before discovered; that in the whole investigation he could not find a sound spot whereon to lay his finger, it being all one mass of the most unheard-of villainies, and the most notorious corruption. Ultimately the select committee of thirty-one was revived, and a new committee of secrecy, of thirteen members, was appointed.

The committee of secrecy, in addition to the proper business committed to them, were directed to report on the steps taken by the Company to send out supervisors to India. It will be remembered that the three supervisors formerly sent out had perished at sea, but the idea had never been abandoned; and though parliament, by throwing out Mr. Sullivan's bill on the second reading, had sufficiently expressed their determination not to allow of any interference with the remedial measures which they were contemplating, the directors, unwilling to be ousted from what they held to be their proper sphere of management, had, at the very time they were supplicating the government for aid, taken the bold step of appointing six individuals as supervisors, "with full powers for the regulation of their affairs abroad." This was regarded as an interference with parliament while busily engaged in investigating the abuses which the commission was professedly intended to correct, and hence the committee of secrecy made a special report, recommending that a bill should be brought

in to prohibit the sailing of the supervisors. This was resisted by the Company as oppressive and unconstitutional, but the ministry had no difficulty in carrying their point, and the prohibitory act was passed. Clive took part in the debate against the Company. "I consider this bill," he said, "as an exertion, indeed, of parliamentary authority, yet extremely necessary; and I could wish that the Company had met this house half-way, instead of petitioning and quarrelling with the mouth that is to feed them. With respect to the gentlemen nominated for the supervision, they are themselves the best judges whether their abilities and integrity are equal to the important service in which they were to engage. Had they known the East Indies as well as I do, they would shudder at the bare idea of such a perplexing and difficult service. The most rigid integrity, with the greatest disinterestedness—the greatest abilities, with resolution and perseverance—must be united in the man or men who undertake to reform the accumulating evils which exist in Bengal, and which threaten to involve the nation and the Company in one common ruin."

On the 9th of March, the Company, unable longer to resist the pressure upon their finances, petitioned parliament for the loan of £1,500,000 at 4 per cent. The minister offered £1,400,000 at that rate, but coupled it with conditions which the Company denounced as harsh, arbitrary, and illegal. The conditions were, that the government should forego their claim of £400,000 a year from the territorial revenue till the loan was repaid; that till then the Company should not make a dividend above 6 per cent, nor afterwards above 7 per cent, till their bond debt was reduced to £1,500,000; that thereafter the public should receive three-fourths of the surplus receipts at home, the other fourth being appropriated either to the further reduction of the bond debt, or as a fund to meet contingencies; and that the Company's territorial acquisitions should be permitted to remain with them during the six years of their charter still unexpired. As before, the opposition of the Company proved unavailing, and the bill was passed. A bill much more deeply affecting the constitution of the Company, and destined to become law under the name of the Regulating Act, was at the same time brought in by government; but it will be proper,

before considering it, to give a short account of the result of the great struggle which took place in the same session of parliament, when Clive was put finally upon his defence.

The directors, who seem to have been willing to sacrifice decency and consistency to vindictiveness, had renewed their attacks upon Clive, by sending him, on the 4th of November, about three weeks before the meeting of parliament, an intimation that they had taken the opinion of counsel relative to the loss sustained by the Company from the payment of balances due to the renters of salt-pans in Bengal out of their treasury; the commission received by him on the revenues of Bengal after his departure thence; and the interest due on sums paid for duties on salt, betel-nut, and tobacco; and were advised that he, and others who had shared with him, were liable to make good that loss. To give a colour to the miserable spirit by which they were actuated, they professed an earnest wish for an amicable adjustment. Clive at once met them in this spirit, and, as they had mentioned arbitration, intimated that he had selected Mr. Madocks, an eminent counsel, as his referee. On this the directors pretended that mercantile referees only were admissible, and on Clive refusing to take this view, gave a plain indication of what had all along been their aim, by commencing a lawsuit, on the 2nd of February, 1773.

With such zealous and unscrupulous coadjutors, the select committee, which, since the appointment of the secret committee, was very thinly attended, and had fallen under the management of some of Clive's most virulent enemies, were furnished with ample materials for a plausible charge against him. On the 8th and 21st of April, the second and third reports of the select committee were brought up, and on the 10th of May, the chairman, Colonel Burgoyne, concluded a long speech by moving the following resolutions:— "1. That all acquisitions made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with foreign princes, do of right belong to the state. 2. That to appropriate acquisitions so made to the private emolument of persons intrusted with any civil or military power of the state, is illegal. 3. That very great sums of money and other valuable property have been acquired in Bengal, from princes and others of that country, by persons intrusted with the civil

and military powers of the state; which sums of money and valuable property have been appropriated to the private use of such persons." The dexterity with which these resolutions had been framed, made it difficult to gainsay them. The first two were carried without a division, and the third after some opposition. The general principle being thus recognized, there was little difficulty in making a practical application of it. On the 17th of May, Colonel Burgoyne again delivered a long speech on the subject, and converting his abstract resolutions into specific charges, concluded by moving, "That it appears to this house that the Right Hon. Robert Lord Clive, Baron of Plassey, in the kingdom of Ireland, about the time of the deposition of Siraj-ud-Daulah, and the establishment of Mir Jafar on the musnud, through the influence of the powers with which he was intrusted as a member of the select committee, and commander-in-chief of the British forces, did obtain and possess himself of the sum of two lacs and 80,000 rupees, as member of the select committee, and a farther sum of sixteen lacs or more, under the denomination of a private donation; which sums, amounting together to twenty lacs and 80,000 rupees, were of the value, in English money, of £234,000; and that, in so doing, the said Robert Clive abused the power with which he was intrusted, to the evil example of the servants of the public, and to the dishonour and detriment of the state."

Though public spirit was pretended to be the motive for bringing these charges, there cannot be a doubt that they were mainly instigated by mere vindictiveness. The culprits whose misdeeds he had exposed and punished had freely spent part of their ill-gotten gains in poisoning the public mind against him, and the ignominy and ruin with which he was now threatened were owing, not as the above motion asserted, to his having "abused the power with which he was intrusted," but to his having used it faithfully in punishing rapacity and injustice. Even, therefore, while admitting that Clive did many things at variance both with morality and sound policy, it is impossible to have any sympathy with those whose chief motive in accusing him was either to gratify an insatiable revenge, or to lighten the load of their own infamy, by compelling him to share it with them.

When thus brought face to face with his accusers, Clive again defended himself with great spirit and ability. "After rendering my country the service which I think I may, without any degree of vanity, claim the merit of, and after having nearly exhausted a life full of employment, for the public welfare, and the particular benefit of the East India Company, I little thought that such transactions would have agitated the minds of my countrymen in proceedings like the present, tending to deprive me not only of my property and the fortune which I have fairly acquired, but of that which is more dear to me—my honour and reputation." "I have served my country and the Company faithfully; and had it been my fortune to be employed by the crown, I should have been differently rewarded. Not a stone has been left unturned where the least probability could arise of discovering something of a criminal nature against me. I am sure if I had any sore places about me they would have been found. The public records have been ransacked for proofs against me, and the late deputy-chairman of the Company, a member of this house, has been so assiduous in my affairs, that it appears he has neglected his own." After giving a rapid sketch of his whole career, and referring to the honours and rewards conferred upon him, both by the Company and the crown, as proofs that his conduct was approved, he concluded thus:—"To be called upon, after sixteen years have elapsed, to account for my conduct in this manner, and, after an uninterrupted enjoyment of my property, to be questioned, and considered as obtaining it unwarrantably, is hard indeed, and a treatment I should not think the British senate capable of. But if such should be the case, I have a conscious innocence within me, that tells me my conduct is irreproachable. *Frangas, non flectes*. My enemies may take from me what I have; they may, as they think, make me poor, but I will be happy! Before I sit down, I have one request to the house, and it is, that when they come to decide upon my honour, they will not forget their own."

After several other speeches, the farther consideration of the motion was deferred, in order that evidence might be heard at the bar, as Clive's supporters had argued that that which had been taken by the select committee, and appended to their reports, was incompetent. On the 21st of May several witnesses

were examined, and Clive, after a short speech, concluding with the words, "Take my fortune, but save my honour," left the house. The consideration of Colonel Burgoyne's motion was then resumed. In the interval some reaction had taken place, and not a few began to suspect that by affirming the whole motion as it stood they would do the very thing against which he had cautioned them—destroy his honour by forgetting their own. Hitherto the British nation had been proud of the conquests made in India, and regarded them as furnishing a bright page in their annals; but their representatives were now about to declare that they had derived from them nothing but disgrace, and were preparing publicly to attest their shame and remorse, by destroying the reputation and confiscating the property of the man by whose skill and prowess mainly the conquests had been made. At the same time, while repudiating the conquests, they were to proclaim their own inconsistency and hypocrisy, by clinging to the possession of them, instead of restoring them to those who had been wrongfully ousted. Such a procedure would not bear a moment's examination; and hence, as soon as the debate was resumed, it was seen that the motion as it stood could not be carried. It consisted of two distinct parts—the one containing a statement of facts as to which there was no dispute, and the other affixing a stigma. The statement of facts, freed from some innuendoes with which it was unnecessarily incumbered, was reduced to the form of a distinct motion, in the following terms:—"That it appears to this house, that the Right Hon. Robert Lord Clive, Baron of Plassey, in the kingdom of Ireland, about the time of the deposition of Siraj-ud-Daulah, and the establishment of Mir Jafar on the musnud, did obtain and possess himself of two lacs of rupees as commander-in-chief, a farther sum of two lacs and 80,000 rupees as member of the select committee, and a farther sum of sixteen lacs or more under the denomination of a private donation; which sums, amounting together to twenty lacs and 80,000 rupees, were of the value, in English money, of £234,000." This motion was put as an amendment on the original motion containing both the statement of facts and the stigma, and finally carried by a majority of 155 to 95. The stigma, thus virtually excluded, was then put as a separate motion, and negatived without a division. Ultimately,

at five in the morning of the 22nd May, 1773, a motion "that Robert Lord Clive did, at the same time, render great and meritorious services to his country," passed unanimously.

In this great parliamentary contest, though the victory remained with Clive, many things occurred which must have been galling in the extreme to his proud spirit. The mere fact of having been put upon his trial was degrading, and the acquittal was not pronounced in decisive and unqualified terms. Taken in connection with the resolutions to which the house had previously assented, it in fact amounted simply to this—that though Robert Lord Clive had possessed himself of an enormous sum, which properly belonged to the state, he had at the same time compensated for the delinquency by great and meritorious services. This certainly fell far short of the approbation to which he conceived himself to be entitled. He professed, however, to be satisfied, and in a letter written to Mr. Hastings on the 14th of October, 1773, nearly five months after, thus expressed himself:—"All the reports of the committees are published, and will of course be transmitted to you. A few envious and resentful individuals turned the whole attack upon me, and aimed at the ruin of my fortune and reputation. But the justice of the House of Commons defeated their intentions, and, by a great majority, passed a vote that I had rendered great and essential services to this country." This was doubtless the light in which he wished to view the matter, but during the seasons of gloom and depression, to which he was constitutionally subject, the darker side of the picture presented itself, and he saw nothing but the degradation to which ingratitude and injustice had subjected him. These seasons of depression had unfortunately become more frequent, in consequence of miserable health, and an excruciating disease, which he sought to alleviate by an excessive use of opium. He had begun to use this drug when first in India, and had continued it ever since. In November, 1774, a violent return of his complaint obliged him to have recourse to his habitual remedy. As his agony was extreme, the medicine was probably used to an extent which impaired his reason, and made him no longer accountable for his actions. Certain it is, that on the 22nd of the above month he died by his own hand. He had only in the end of the previous September completed his forty-ninth year.

While parliament was discussing and disposing of the charges against Clive, the general concerns of the Company had not been forgotten. The loan of £1,400,000 was agreed to by the government, but the terms were so obnoxious to the Company, that they presented a subsequent petition, in which they declared "their determination to depend on the laws of their country, and submit to the temporary difficulties which may attend the present situation of their affairs, rather than receive the loan offered to them upon the conditions prescribed." Ministers were not to be thus balked. Since the Company would not voluntarily receive the loan, they determined to force it upon them, and brought in a bill, in which, after stating the above declinature, it was declared that it seemed absolutely necessary to give assistance, "without leaving it in the power of the general court of proprietors, by withholding their consent," to produce all the mischiefs that would inevitably result. The application of the loan was therefore not left to the Company, but expressly specified in the bill, while the directors were prohibited from accepting bills of exchange beyond a certain amount without the consent of the treasury. This bill was passed, and forms the Act 13 George III chapter 64. The Regulating Act, passed in the same session, takes precedence of it, and ranks as Act 13 George III chapter 63. Taken together, the two acts completely establish the supremacy of parliament, and leave the Company almost without a shadow of the independence for which they had so long and so strenuously contended. The Regulating Act in particular was represented by them as a direct attack on all chartered rights, and on this ground the city of London was induced to make common cause with them, and petition against it. In the House of Lords, also, where the rights of property are supposed to be most jealously guarded, it was strongly opposed. All this opposition, however, proved unavailing, and the Company had no alternative but to accept of a new constitution, not desired by themselves, but thrust upon them by the legislature.

The Regulating Act, so called from its being entitled, "An act for establishing certain regulations for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company, as well in India as in Europe," proceeding on the preamble that the several

powers and authorities granted by charters to the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies, have been found by experience insufficient to prevent various abuses which have prevailed in the government and administration of their affairs, as well at home as in India, begins in its first section by striking at what was regarded by many as the very root of the evil, by making an important change in the constitution of the courts both of directors and proprietors. Hitherto the directors were elected only for a year, and might consequently have undergone a complete change at each annual election. One obvious result was, that in a body so fluctuating and so apt to be revolutionized, no regular and continuous system of policy could be adopted. Another result, equally obvious, and perhaps still more pernicious, was that the directors, knowing how precarious their seats were, too often yielded to the temptation of securing them by bartering their patronage for votes. In this way, as Clive justly and graphically described it, they spent the first half of their year in discharging the obligations by which they had purchased their seats, and the other half in canvassing and preparing for a new election. For these evils an important remedy was now provided by the very first section, which enacted that at the next general election of directors, "instead of an election of twenty-four directors, to serve for the space of one year only," there should be chosen six directors for one year, six for two years, six for three years, and six for four years; and that thenceforth, at every subsequent annual election, only six new directors should be chosen to supply the place of those whose term of service had expired. Coupled with this enactment were two provisos of questionable utility. The one was that the six retiring directors should not be capable of immediate re-election; and the other was that no servant of the Company should be eligible as a director after his arrival in England, till he had resided in it two years. The effect of the former rule was to deprive the Company of the services of a director at the very time when they had become most valuable, in consequence of the experience which he had acquired. If his conduct had been such as to obtain the confidence of the proprietors, it is not easy to see why they should have been prohibited from reappointing him.

Besides, the rule was rendered in a great measure futile by a private arrangement, which was generally acquiesced in by all parties. The six retiring directors only remained excluded for a single year, and were then proposed for re-election. In this way a kind of regular rotation was kept up; and there might be said to be, in fact, thirty directors—twenty-four actually in office, and six waiting to be re-elected as soon as their year of exclusion should expire. The other rule, requiring a residence of two years in England, was evidently intended to prevent an abuse of which there had been several noted examples. Some servant of the Company, gorged with ill-gotten wealth, arrived from the East, and by a free expenditure of it, or large purchases of stock, secured a seat in the direction merely as a means of sheltering his own delinquency. Still it could hardly be necessary, in order to defeat the aims of a stray delinquent, to disqualify all the other servants of the Company during the two years when their knowledge and experience were most fresh, and hence, it is to be presumed, most available.

The other important change in the constitution of the home courts regarded the qualification of voters. Hitherto every proprietor of £500 of stock had a vote; only six months' possession was required, and no amount of stock, however large, gave more than a single vote. The new enactment was, that though £500 of stock would entitle the proprietor to attend the general courts, £1,000 of stock was necessary to give one vote, while £3,000 gave two, £6,000 three, and £10,000 or more, four votes. Possession for twelve months was, moreover, required; and in addition to the sanction of an oath, many stringent regulations were made for the purpose of preventing the multiplication of votes by means of collusive transfers—a practice which, though illegal, was notorious, and had been productive of many scandalous abuses. The £500 proprietors clamoured loudly against the wholesale confiscation of what they called their rights and privileges; but little sympathy was felt for them, as it was generally believed that those who held them cared far less for the dividends which they yielded than for the patronage which they enabled them to command. It was supposed, though not on very solid grounds, that by raising the qualification, the speculation in votes for corrupt purposes would be

rendered more expensive, and consequently less tempting. On the other hand, it seems to have been overlooked that the more numerous the constituency, the greater was the difficulty of bribing their consent, and that the tendency of a rule which at a single stroke disqualified more than a half of the actual voters, threw the management of the Company into the hands of a minority, which, though composed of individuals who were wealthier and more aristocratic, might not on that account be one whit more scrupulous.

Such were the changes made with a view to improve the management at home. Those affecting management abroad were principally as follows. By section 7 it was enacted, "that for the government of the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, there shall be appointed a governor-general and four councillors," in whom was to be vested "the whole civil and military government of the said presidency, and also the ordinary management and government of all the territorial acquisitions and revenues in the kingdom of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa," as long as "the territorial possessions and revenues shall remain in the hands of the said united Company." By section 8 it was enacted, "that in all cases whatsoever, whenever any difference of opinion shall arise upon any question proposed in any consultation," the governor and council "shall be bound and concluded by the opinion and decision of the majority of those present." In the case of an equality, the governor-general, or in his absence the councillor next in order presiding in his stead, was to have a casting vote.

Hitherto all the presidencies of India, including that of Benculen, which then ranked as one of them, were on an equal footing, and independent of each other. An important change in this respect was made by section 9, which enacted, "that the said governor-general and council, or the major part of them, shall have, and they are hereby authorized to have power of superintending and controlling the government and management of the presidencies of Madras, Bombay, and Benculen, so far and in so much that it shall not be lawful for any president and council of Madras, Bombay, and Benculen, for the time being, to make any orders for commencing hostilities, or declaring or making war against any Indian princes or powers, without the consent

and approbation of the said governor-general and council first had and obtained, except in such cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such hostilities or treaties until the orders from the governor-general and council might arrive; and except in such cases where the said presidents and councils respectively shall have received special orders from the said united Company." Any president and council offending in any of the cases aforesaid would be liable to be suspended from office, by the order of the governor-general and council; and every president and council was required not only "to pay due obedience to such orders as they shall receive, touching the premises," from the governor-general and council, but constantly and diligently to transmit to them "advice and intelligence of all transactions and matters whatsoever that shall come to their knowledge, relating to the government, revenues, or interest of the said united Company." The governor-general and council were in like manner directed and required "to pay due obedience to all such orders as they shall receive from the court of directors," and "to correspond from time to time, and constantly and diligently transmit to the said court an exact particular of all advices or intelligence, and of all transactions and matters whatsoever that shall come to their knowledge relating to the government, commerce, revenues, or interest" of the Company. The concluding part of this section laid a similar obligation on the Company themselves in relation to the government, enjoining the court of directors, "from time to time, before the expiration of fourteen days after the receiving any such letters and advices, to give in and deliver unto the high treasurer or commissioners of his majesty's treasury for the time being, a true and exact copy of such parts of the said letters or advices as shall in any way relate to the management of the revenues" of the Company; and, in like manner, to deliver to one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state exact copies of such letter or advices as shall in any way relate to their civil or military affairs and government.

In the 10th section the legislature exercised the power, which more properly belonged to the executive, of nominating the individuals who were to hold office in the Bengal presidency in terms of the above enactment, declaring Warren Hastings,

Esq., the first governor-general, and Lieutenant-general John Clavering, the Honourable George Monson, Richard Barwell, Esq., and Philip Francis, Esq., the four first councillors. These offices they were to hold for five years from the time of their arrival at Fort William, in Bengal, and taking upon them the government of the presidency; and they were not to be removable "except by his majesty, his heirs and successors, upon representation made by the court of directors." In case of the avoidance of the office of said governor-general by death, resignation, or removal, his place during the remainder of the first year unexpired was to be supplied by the councillor next in rank; and in like manner, on the avoidance of office by any of the councillors the Company were to nominate to the vacancy for the part of five years unexpired, subject, however, to the consent of his majesty, signified by his sign-manual. Before this nomination should take place, the governor-general and councillors of state holding office were to exercise all its powers and authorities as fully as if their number were complete. On the expiry of the five years the appointment of the governor-general and council was to be vested entirely in the Company. By section 11, all the above provisions as to governor-general and council were to commence and take effect immediately after public proclamation of the arrival at Fort William of the governor-general and council, or any three of them; which proclamation the governor-general and council were expressly required to make.

Sections 13 to 20 inclusive relate to the erection of a supreme court of judicature at Fort William. After referring to the charter by which George II, in the twenty-sixth year of his reign, did, *inter alia*, establish courts of civil, criminal, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction at the settlements of Madras, Bombay, and Fort William, and asserting that the said charter "does not sufficiently provide for the due administration of justice in such manner as the state and condition of the Company's presidency of Fort William, in Bengal, do and must require," section 13 enacts that it "may be lawful for his majesty, by charter or letters-patent under the great seal of Great Britain, to erect and establish a supreme court of judicature at Fort William aforesaid, to consist of a chief-justice and three other judges, being barristers in England or Ireland, of not less than five years' standing, to be

named from time to time by his majesty, his heirs and successors." This supreme court is declared "to have full power and authority to exercise and perform all civil, criminal, admiralty, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and to appoint such clerks, and other ministerial officers of the said court, with such reasonable salaries, as shall be approved of by the said governor-general and council, and to form and establish such rules of practice, and such rules for the process of the said court, and to do all such other things as shall be found necessary for the administration of justice, and the due execution of all or any of the powers which by the said charter shall or may be committed to the said court," which it is declared shall be at all times a "court of record," and "a court of oyer and terminer and jail-delivery, in and for the said town of Calcutta and factory of Fort William, in Bengal aforesaid, and the limits thereof, and the factories subordinate thereto."

By section 14 it is enacted that the new charter which his majesty is empowered to grant, and the jurisdiction, powers, and authorities to be thereby established, shall extend "to all British subjects who shall reside in the kingdoms or provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, or any of them, under the protection of the said united Company," and "the supreme court of judicature," therein and thereby to be established, shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all complaints against any of his majesty's subjects in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, and any suit, action, or complaint against any person who shall, at the time when such debt or cause of action or complaint shall have arisen, have been employed by, or shall then have been directly or indirectly in the service of the said united Company, or any of his majesty's subjects. By section 15, the court is declared not competent to take cognizance of any indictment or information against the governor-general or any member of council, for any offence (not being treason or felony) which they may be charged with having committed within the presidency; and by section 17, the persons of the governor-general, councillors, chief-justice, and judges, are declared exempt from arrest or imprisonment upon any action, suit, or proceeding in the court. By section 18, a right of appeal is given to his majesty in council.

Section 21 fixes the salaries of the governor-general at £25,000 per annum, of each councillor at £10,000, of the chief-justice at £8,000, and of each judge of the supreme court at £6,000, and orders these salaries to be paid out of the revenues of the territorial acquisitions; and the next two sections, 22 and 23, expressly enact that these salaries "shall be in lieu of all fees of office, perquisites, emoluments, and advantages whatsoever," and that none of the persons to whom they are payable "shall, directly or indirectly, by themselves or by any other person or persons, for his or their use, or on his or their behalf, accept, receive, or take, of or from any person or persons, in any manner, or on any account whatsoever, any present, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwise." The same prohibition of accepting presents "from any of the Indian princes or powers, or their ministers or agents (or any of the natives of Asia)," is extended, by subsequent sections, to all persons holding any civil or military office under the crown or the Company in the East Indies, with the exception, however, that lawyers, medical men, and chaplains are not prohibited from receiving "fees, gratuities, or reward, in the way of their profession." By another section all supervisors, collectors, and other persons engaged in the collection of the revenue, or the administration of justice within the Bengal presidency, were prohibited from buying or selling goods by way of traffic, and no British subject was to engage in the inland trade in salt, betel-nut, tobacco, or rice. The only other enactments which it seems necessary to mention are, an attempt to regulate the rate of interest, by prohibiting all British subjects in the East Indies from taking more than 12 per cent; the trial of all offences and misdemeanours brought before the supreme court "by a jury of British subjects resident in the town of Calcutta;" the power given to the courts of judicature in any of the presidencies to fine and imprison, and dismiss from the Company's service persons convicted of breach of trust, fraud, or embezzlement, and the incompetency of the directors to compound or discharge sentences pronounced upon such servants, or to put a stop to any prosecution for carrying on any illicit trade, or for any debt or penalty due to the Company, or to restore any servants dismissed for misbehaviour, without the

consent of three-fourths of the directors and three-fourths of the proprietors, the consent of the latter to be ascertained by ballot, at a general court, specially called for that purpose, after fourteen days' notice.

The important changes made by the regulating act justify the lengthened analysis of it which has now been given. Not a few of these changes were valuable improvements, and either suppressed clamant abuses, or materially checked them; but several of the enactments had not been duly weighed, and it will be seen that ere the act had been long in operation, serious flaws were discovered. Perhaps the greatest novelty in the act is the appropriation of patronage by parliament. Their appointment of the first governor-general and council was objectionable on constitutional grounds. It belonged naturally to the directors, and if they were deemed incapable of exercising it properly, ought to have been transferred to the crown. In either case there would have been a responsible party, who might have been called to account for the appointment if it was wrongly made; whereas, when the parliament appointed, there was no possibility of redress. Some justification of this procedure might have been discovered in the actual nominations. If the persons selected had been peculiarly fitted for the important offices conferred upon them, the irregularity of the appointment might have been compensated by the wisdom of it; but with the exception of Mr. Hastings, and perhaps also of Mr. Barwell, whose experience in Indian affairs could not be disputed, nothing is seen in the other three appointments, though constituting a majority of the whole, than acts of patronage exercised arbitrarily, and without any regard to personal fitness. It might, at least, have been expected that when persons totally unacquainted with India were to be sent out to form the majority of a board which was to rule its destinies, care would have been taken to ascertain beforehand the nature of the course which they were disposed to pursue, and to secure the harmonious working of the new council. Every precaution of this nature appears to have been disregarded, and it was left to a mere peradventure whether the new councillors from Europe would, on their arrival, coalesce or come into collision with their colleagues in India. The result

will soon be seen; but in the meantime, while the vessel which sailed from England on the 1st of April, 1774—carrying out the three members of council, together with Sir Elijah Impey, the chief-justice, and Robert Chambers, Stephen le Maistre, and John Hyde, Esqs., the three other judges of the supreme court—is at sea, it will be proper to glance at the state of matters in the presidencies of Madras and Bombay.

5

Negotiations with the Marathas

SIR Robert Fletcher had, as we have seen, been dismissed from the service of the Company, by sentence of court-martial, for the countenance which he gave to the mutinous proceedings of the European officers in Bengal, when double batta was reduced. After his arrival in England he continued loudly to protest his innocence, and having very powerful connections, ultimately succeeded in inducing the general court of proprietors to recommend a reversal of his sentence. Generals Lawrence and Calliaud, rather unaccountably, accepted this invidious office, but had too much regard to their own military reputation to say that the sentence was wrong, and therefore only ventured to recommend his restoration on the ground of previous services. The main obstacle being thus overcome, he was not only restored, but appointed to the chief command of the army and to a seat in the council at Madras. The lessons of experience appear to have been lost upon him, and it was not long before he was at open rupture with a majority of his colleagues. The points in dispute, relating to some military arrangements, were not of much importance, but the discussions which they raised were so violent and unseemly as seriously to interrupt the public business. The only effectual remedy seemed to be to rid the council of Sir Robert Fletcher's presence; and accordingly, on the 12th of January, 1773, it was resolved, by a majority of seven to two, that he should be ordered to Trichinopoly, to take command of its garrison. He protested against the resolution as equivalent to dismissal from the service, and at the same time applied for a passage by the first ship to

England, that he might be able to give his attendance in parliament, in which, however incongruous the thing may appear, he had continued to retain a seat. The council replied that they would attend to his application as soon as he gave "the whole military establishment that example of obedience and attention" they had a right to expect. On second thoughts, he deemed it prudent to comply with the order to proceed to Trichinopoly, and the council, satisfied with having vindicated their authority, immediately declared that, "out of unfeigned respect and veneration for the honourable House of Commons, and their privileges, Sir Robert Fletcher, in consequence of his plea of privilege as a member of parliament, is, for so much as depends on this board, at full and free liberty to return to his duty in parliament, whenever and by whatever conveyance he shall think proper." He returned to England accordingly, and had once more the good fortune to escape the penalty due to his misconduct. The directors, while condemning him for disputing the authority of the governor as commandant of Fort St. George, restored him to the chief command of the Madras army, as soon as General Smith, who had resumed it on his departure, should resign. They may, perhaps, have been induced to take this extraordinary course from a charitable belief that as Mr. Du Pre, the governor, with whom he had so violently quarrelled, had been succeeded by Mr. Wynch, harmony would not again be interrupted.

The peace which the nabob's son so hastily concluded with the Raja of Tanjore was of short duration. In June, 1773, Muhammed Ali, in a conference with the governor, complained that the raja was not only ten lacs in arrear of the sum which he had engaged to pay him, but had applied for a body of troops, both to the Marathas and Hyder Ali, and had also instigated some marauders to ravage part of the Carnatic. At this time he merely intimated his intention to call the raja to account; but a few days after, at another conference, he not only urged an expedition against Tanjore, but offered to pay the Company, in the event of their success, ten lacs of pagodas (about £350,000). The Madras council formally discussed the subject on the 22nd of June, and gave it as their candid opinion that the raja was scarcely, if at all, to blame. The conquest of Tanjore had long

been the aim of the nabob, and the council had no doubt that his main object in the treaty which he had lately made with the raja was to supersede and render inoperative the previous treaty of 1762, by which the integrity of his territory was guaranteed by the Company. Assuming that this latter treaty had been thus extinguished, the raja was left without a protector, and therefore could hardly be blamed if he had, as alleged, courted the assistance of the only other parties who seemed at once able and willing to afford it.

The council having given this opinion, we naturally conclude, as an obvious inference from it, that they acquainted the nabob with their determination not to countenance him in a war which they believed to be unjust. They did the very opposite, and attempted to justify their conduct by reasons which they must be allowed to state in their own words. "It is evident," they say, "that in the present system it is dangerous to have such a power in the heart of the province; for, as the honourable court have been repeatedly advised, unless the Company can engage the raja to their interest by a firm promise of support in all his just rights, we look upon it as certain, that should any troubles arise in the Carnatic, whether from the French or a country enemy, and present a favourable opportunity of freeing himself from his apprehensions of the nabob, he would take part against him, and at such a time might be a dangerous enemy in the south. The propriety and expediency therefore of reducing him entirely before such an event takes place, is evident." Put into fewer and simpler words, the argument is just this:—"Our relations with the nabob will not allow us to do the raja justice. It is therefore reasonable to presume that he will seek justice elsewhere. As in this way he may become a formidable enemy, our true policy is to put it out of his power, by taking the first favourable opportunity of destroying him."

Acting on these Machiavellian principles, the Madras council resolved to undertake the conquest of Tanjore for the behoof of the nabob. This transaction, which, in point of equity, may be regarded as a counterpart of the Rohilla war, was of course engaged in for large pecuniary considerations. The nabob was taken bound to make payment in advance, by cash or good bills, for the estimated expense of the expedition, to provide all neces-

saries except military stores, and to pay in future for 10,000 sepoy instead of 7,000, the number previously fixed. The troops assembled for this expedition, at Trichinopoly, set out on the 3rd of August, under command of General Joseph Smith, and three days after arrived within a short distance of Tanjore. On the 13th a letter was received from the raja, in which, after declaring that he "had quietly submitted to the hard terms" imposed by the nabob, and violated none of the stipulations to which he had agreed, he continued thus:—"Some offence should surely be proved upon me before an expedition be undertaken against me. Without any show of equity, to wage an unjust war against me is not consistent with reason. This charitable country is the support of multitudes of people; if you will preserve it from destruction you will be the most great, glorious, and honoured of mankind. I am full of confidence that you will neither do injustice yourself, nor listen to the tale of the oppressor. I only desire a continuance of that support which this country has formerly experienced from the English, and you will reap the fame so good an action deserves."

These remonstrances and supplications proved unavailing, and on the 20th of August the siege of Tanjore was commenced. The approaches were regularly made, and on the 16th of September so large a breach had been effected that preparations were made for the assault. The garrison, which mustered 20,000 fighting men, did not expect it to take place till daylight next morning, and were caught completely by surprise when at mid-day the besiegers, taking advantage of the hour usually allotted for refreshment and repose, rushed in and made themselves masters of the place. The raja, Tulaji, his family, and the commander-in-chief, Monakji, were taken prisoners. Previous to the expedition the Dutch had been suspected of assisting the raja. This suspicion was confirmed when they took possession of the seaport of Nagore and some other districts of Tanjore, alleging that they had become theirs by purchase. Both the nabob and the council declared their determination not to recognize this alleged purchase, the council in particular justifying their refusal by the following extraordinary argument:—"As the raja held his lands of the nabob in fee, he could not, agreeable to the feudal system, which prevails all over India,

alienate any part of this country to any other power without the consent of his liege lord, the ruler of the Carnatic Payin Ghat." The assertion that the feudal system "prevails all over India," and the argument founded upon it, are ludicrous in the extreme, and only prove into what incompetent hands the interests of the Company in the Madras presidency were at the time committed. Anything, however, would have sufficed them for a pretext. To show that they were in earnest, their troops were immediately put in motion, and the Dutch, aware of their inability to resist, were glad to compound the matter by resigning their purchase, and the jewels of the raja, which they held in pledge, on being reimbursed for their advances. The nabob, elated with his new conquest, insisted on garrisoning it with his own troops, and began to make extensive improvements on the fortifications. He was aware that the Marathas, who claimed Tanjore as one of their dependencies, would resent the dethronement of the raja, and he had some reason to suspect that the sanction which the Madras council had given it would not be ratified by the court of directors. In regard to this latter point, it is rather strange that the doubt was not cleared up till nearly two years had been permitted to elapse. The dethronement of the raja was effected, as has been seen, on the 16th of September, 1773. An account of it, together with the documents and details, was received in London on the 26th of March, 1774. The last ships of the season did not sail till three weeks after, and the directors allowed them to depart without carrying a single despatch from them on the subject. In August they began for the first time to deliberate upon it, but it was January, 1775, before the papers and their views upon them were submitted to the ministry, in terms of the regulating act. Other three months passed away before a final resolution was despatched. It condemned all that the Madras council had done, deprived the president of his office for the share he had taken in it, and sent out a successor to repair the injustice, by reinstating the raja on his throne. The details will afterwards be given. At present it is necessary only to advert to the extreme negligence of the directors in allowing an event of so much importance to remain so long unnoticed. They attempted a defence, which, however, amounted to little more than an admission that "the

situation of affairs in England lessened the attention of the directors to political affairs in India." This is a very poor apology for a sluggishness and indecision which, as will afterwards be seen, proved fruitful sources of mischief.

The presidency of Bombay, which, in the early history of the Company, was the most important of the three, had remained almost stationary while they were making rapid progress. Only a few isolated spots on the western coast of India and a few inland factories belonged to it, and it possessed nothing so extensive as to be entitled to the name of a territory. It was evident, however, from the course of political events in India, that a more prominent part was about to be taken by the Bombay presidency. As early as 1759, when a kind of anarchy prevailed at Surat, a vigorous effort had put them in possession of its castle, and they had ever since, under the nominal protection of the Mughul, been intrusted with the defence of the place, while the civil management was vested in a native official, with the title of nabob. The rights of the presidency in Surat had, as they conceived, been violated by the nabob of a neighbouring district, whose capital, Broach or Baroach, is situated on the estuary of the Narmada. After negotiation had failed recourse was had to arms, and the presidency despatched a body of troops against Baroach in 1771. Through some mismanagement the expedition did not succeed, and a new attempt was about to be made, when the nabob, despairing of being able to resist, made his appearance in Bombay. He professed to throw himself on the generosity of the Company, and signed a treaty on the 30th of November, agreeing to all the terms which they proposed. It soon appeared that his object had only been to gain time. He had been intriguing with the Maratha chief, who, under the name of the Gaikwar or Herdsman, had made himself master of nearly the whole of Gujarat. The treaty, therefore, was treated as a dead letter, and the chief of the factory which the Company had established at Baroach met with so much indignity, that he was ordered to retire to Surat. A new expedition was accordingly undertaken against Baroach, which was taken by assault on the 18th November, 1772, the same day on which the Peshwa Madhu Rao died.

For a long time the Company had been anxious to obtain possession of the islands of Salsette, Kenery, Hog Island,

Elephanta, and Caranja, and of the port of Bassein. These were all in possession of the Marathas, whose pageant raja lived at Satara, while all the powers of the government were exercised by the peshwa at Poona. With a view chiefly to open a negotiation for the cession of the above localities, Mr. Mostyn was appointed resident at the peshwa's court, and endeavoured to turn the capture of Baroach to account, by offering it as one of the equivalents to be given in exchange. His offers were rejected with little ceremony, and he had almost despaired of success, when a new and unexpected series of events seemed to bring it within his reach. While Madhu Rao was in minority, his uncle, properly called Raghunath Rao, but better known by the name of Raghoba, conducted the government in his name. The power thus intrusted to him he was reluctant to relinquish, and entered into a series of intrigues, which obliged his nephew, shortly after attaining majority, to place him in confinement. The state of Madhu Rao's health made it probable that the office of peshwa would soon become vacant. He was pining away under consumption, and, seeing little prospect of recovery, was anxious to secure a peaceable succession to his brother, Narain Rao. With this view he effected a reconciliation with Raghoba, and in several conversations with him, while Narain Rao was present, earnestly impressed upon both the necessity of concord for their mutual safety and the preservation of the government.

Early in December, 1772, Narain Rao repaired to Satara, and received investiture as peshwa from the raja. For a time the reconciliation which Madhu Rao had effected seemed to be successful, and nephew and uncle lived together on terms of apparent amity. Ere long, however, old jealousies, fanned by domestic female feuds, revived, and on the 11th of April, 1773, Raghoba was again placed under restraint. If there was any danger from his intrigues, the place of confinement was rather strangely chosen, for it was an apartment in the very palace in which Narain Rao, when at Poona, usually resided. While here, on the 30th of August, 1773, Narain Rao was barbarously murdered. A body of troops, after clamouring for arrears of pay, forced their way into the palace. Narain Rao was asleep, and, on hearing the noise, made at once for Raghoba's apartments, closely pursued by Somer Singh, one of the leaders of the

mutineers. He threw himself into his uncle's arms, begging him to save him, and it is said that Raghoba so far interfered as to ask that his life should be spared. "I have not gone so far to insure my own destruction," was Somer Singh's reply; "let him go, or you shall die with him." On this Raghoba got out upon the terrace, and the young peshwa was speedily despatched. Though the circumstances seemed at first to disconnect Raghoba with the conspirators, suspicion generally fell upon him; and he is said to have so far confirmed it by his own confession that he had given them a written order to seize Narain Rao, but not to kill him. This is the view generally taken by the Marathas themselves. If correct, it still charges Raghoba with being the leader in the conspiracy, though it declares him not guilty of the greater atrocity in which it terminated. One thing is certain—the deed was no sooner perpetrated than he endeavoured to profit by it by obtaining investiture as peshwa. It is true he stood next in succession, but the path was not so clear as he imagined it to be.

Raghoba, aware of the suspicion which attached to him, and the many enemies, open and secret, who were longing for his downfall, began his government with a great display of energy, apparently hoping to gain popularity by foreign conquest. Both Nizam Ali and Hyder had taken the field in order to profit by the Maratha dissensions. Raghoba first turned his arms against the former, and obliged him to seek shelter under the walls of Bidar. After several skirmishes, generally to the advantage of the Marathas, the Mughul army became straitened, and Nizam Ali submitted to a treaty which bound him to cede territory yielding twenty lacs of annual revenue. This territory, portioned out among the Maratha chiefs, might have brought over many of those who were most opposed to the new government; but Raghoba, instead of making this politic use of it, allowed himself to be talked by Nizam Ali into a fit of generosity, during which he made him a present of all that he had ceded. This act of folly was the first of a series which produced a rapid decline of his fortunes.

After making peace with Nizam Ali, Raghoba turned his attention to Hyder, and contemplated an expedition, which might not only regain the territories Hyder had recently seized,

but carry his arms into the Carnatic, and punish Muhammed Ali and the English for their proceedings in Tanjore. With this view he had proceeded beyond Bellary. Here the want of money was so severely felt, that on receiving from Hyder a sum of three lacs in hand, and a promise of twenty-two lacs more, Raghoba renounced all claim to three of the Maratha districts in dispute. Hyder, on his part, recognized Raghoba as lawful peshwa, and agreed to pay to him, and him only, six lacs as tribute. The next step of Raghoba, had he followed out his original plan, would have been to enter the Carnatic and attempt the recovery of Tanjore; but he was startled from all his dreams of aggressive warfare by the announcement that revolutionary movements, which had for some time been visible to all but himself, had broken out, and that the leading ministers of the Marathas had leagued against him. At the same time with these news it was announced to him that Ganga Bai, the widow of Narain Rao, was pregnant, and might consequently have a son, to whom alone the office of peshwa would rightfully belong.

Having publicly announced the pregnancy, Nana Farnavis and Hari Pant Phadke, two of the leading Maratha ministers, carried off the widow from Poona to the fort of Purandhar, situated about twenty miles to the south-east, on the summit of a rock which rises 1,700 feet above the plain below, and 4,470 above the level of the sea. The reason assigned was security, and was doubtless sufficient to justify the removal, but there were accompanying circumstances of a very suspicious nature. Several Brahmin women, in a state of pregnancy, were at the same time conveyed into the fort. The report put into circulation was that one of them was to be selected as a wet nurse, but it was generally believed that the real object was to make sure that Ganga Bai should have a son. Had her child been a girl, a boy of one of her Brahmin companions would have been substituted, and declared peshwa. Meanwhile the Maratha ministers formed a kind of regency under Ganga Bai, and began to govern in her name.

Raghoba, now fully alive to the extent of his danger, hastened back from the frontiers of the Carnatic. Strong symptoms of disaffection had appeared in his own army, and he found it

almost impossible to distinguish between friends and foes. Ultimately, however, the latter so far declared themselves that they formed a separate encampment, and hung upon his left flank, keeping a march distant from him, and taking every precaution against surprise. Their object was to form a junction with one of three armies which were advancing to dispute Raghoba's further progress. Two of these were headed by Maratha confederates; the third, strange to say, was headed by Nizam Ali, who, notwithstanding the recent treaty he had concluded with Raghoba, and the liberal treatment he had received from him, made no scruple of joining his enemies as soon as it seemed that he might thereby best promote his own interests. The rashness of Trimbak Rao Mama, one of the Maratha chiefs, who had hastened across the Bhima in the hope of finishing the campaign by one decisive blow, gave Raghoba an advantage of which he ably availed himself. Trimbak Rao Mama, in consequence, sustained a signal defeat, and was taken prisoner, after being mortally wounded.

This success revived the drooping spirits of Raghoba's adherents, and he was able to raise a large sum of money, partly by contribution, and partly by pawning some valuable jewels which Visaji Kishen had brought from Hindustan, and delivered up to him, as being then the only recognized peshwa. With this money he had little difficulty in alluring troops to his standard from all quarters. For some days he continued his advance towards Poona, at the head of an army of about 40,000 men. His enemies were in consternation, and had almost despaired of being able to oppose him, when, by a sudden change of tactics, he sacrificed all his advantages, and relieved them from their fears. Stopping short in his march on the capital, he suddenly changed his direction, and began to move off toward the north. Different explanations have been given. Some say that he found his army could not be trusted; others that he had promises of support from the great Maratha chiefs Sindhia and Holkar, and even from the English, with all of whom he was negotiating. Whatever may have been his motive, the result was disastrous. Scarcely had he turned aside from the path which was leading him to victory, when it was announced that on the 18th of April, 1774, Ganga Bai had given birth to a son.

Though the circumstances justified suspicion, it seems to be established that the child was not supposititious. He was named Madhu Rao Narain, and, when only forty days old, was formally installed as peshwa.

When Raghoba turned northward, and continued his march without interruption into Malwa, the almost desperate situation of his affairs might have been inferred; and yet it was at this very time that the Bombay presidency chose to enter into a negotiation with him, in which they unhesitatingly took it for granted that he was either the legitimate, or if not the legitimate, was at all events destined to be permanently established as the actual peshwa. The negotiation was opened by a communication made to Mr. Gambier, the Company's chief factor at Surat. In this communication the agent stated that his master was desirous of being furnished with a sufficient force "to carry him to Poona and establish him in the government; for which he would defray the charges of the expedition, make very considerable grants to the Company, and enter into any terms of friendship and alliance the president and council at Bombay might choose." This proposal was submitted to the presidency on the 6th of September, 1774, and was at once most favourably entertained, as it seemed to promise possession of Salsette and the other localities which the directors had repeatedly evinced the greatest anxiety to obtain. Their answer, therefore, was, that they would assist Raghoba with all the troops they could spare, amounting, artillery included, to about 2,500 men, on the following conditions—that he would advance from fifteen to twenty lacs of rupees; and on being established in the government at Poona, would cede to the Company in perpetuity Salsette, the small islands contiguous to Bombay, and Bassein with its dependencies. It was also suggested that the Maratha share of revenue in Surat and Baroach should be given over to the Company, and that protection should be given from Maratha inroads into the Bengal provinces and the territories of the Nabob of the Carnatic.

Contrary to expectation, Raghoba offered far less than had been asked. He positively refused to cede Bassein and Salsette, and declared his inability to advance so many lacs. He was willing, however, to cede districts and claims in Gujarat yielding

annually eleven lacs of revenue, to advance six lacs in cash, and pay one lac and a half monthly as the expense of 1,000 Europeans, 2,000 sepoy, and fifteen guns. The presidency, while hesitating about the acceptance of these terms, received startling intelligence from their agent at Goa. The Portuguese government had sent a formidable army from Europe, for the avowed purpose of recovering their lost possessions. Among these Salsette and Bassein were included. The Company had no right whatever to the places for which they were negotiating. The possession of them would give them important advantages, and it was natural that, with a view to these, they should be most anxious to secure it. The case of the Portuguese was very different. They had long been in undisputed possession of them, and though driven out by violence, had never recognized any legal right in the captors. There cannot a doubt, therefore, that when they resolved to reassert their original title, and prepared to vindicate it by force, the question lay entirely between them and the Marathas, and the Company had no right to interfere. Their only justifiable course was to stand aloof till the question of possession was decided, and then endeavour to obtain the cession by peaceable means from the successful party. The Bombay council judged differently; and, without any regard to the justice of the case, determined to be regulated entirely by what they conceived to be their interest. They had even, some months before the negotiation with Raghoba was commenced, while pretending friendship for the Marathas, taken a mean advantage of their dissensions, and endeavoured to obtain possession of the fort of Tanna, situated at the head of Bombay harbour, through the treachery of the Maratha killadar in command of it. That officer had opened a communication with Mr. Hornby, the Bombay president, to put the Company in possession of the place for two lacs and sixty thousand rupees; and Mr. Hornby, instead of rejecting the infamous offer with disdain, had, with the consent of his council, continued the treacherous correspondence, and offered one lac. After some higgling, the killadar agreed to accept of one lac and twenty thousand rupees; and this most dishonourable transaction would have been completed on these terms, had not the government at Poona, alarmed on hearing of the Portuguese preparations, reinforced

the garrison. These not being parties to the plot for surrendering the place, rendered it abortive, and thus saved the Bombay authorities from an act which would have covered them with disgrace.

When treachery had thus proved unavailing, the Bombay council met once more to deliberate on the subject, and on the 9th of December, 1774, resolved that they ought to anticipate the Portuguese. Why they ought to do so is not explained, and, it is needless to add, after what has been said above, could not have been explained satisfactorily. They were determined to gain possession at all events, totally unscrupulous as to the means; and accordingly an expedition, consisting of 620 Europeans, including artillery, 1,000 sepoys, and 200 gun lascars, was despatched against Tanna on the 12th of December, General Robert Gordon conducting the military, and Commodore Watson the naval part of the enterprise. Both while negotiating with Raghoba and deliberating on the seizure of Tanna, the Bombay council had some doubt as to the extent of their powers. They were aware that by the Regulating Act their presidency was made subordinate to that of Bengal, and prohibited from making war without express sanction. It was argued, on the other hand, that the act was not to have full effect till the new government in Bengal was actually proclaimed, and that, as they had not yet received intimation to this effect, their former powers remained entire. This argument satisfied the council; but, singularly enough, if it was sound at the time, it ceased to be sound at the very time when practical effect was given to it. In the interval between the meeting which resolved on the expedition and its actual departure, a letter arrived from Bengal from the new government, stating that it had been regularly constituted, and desiring to be informed of the whole of the proceedings regarding Salsette, and the general state of the Bombay presidency. This was indeed a serious dilemma; but the same eagerness of possession which had already blinded the council to the injustice of their procedure, made them regard its illegality as a comparatively venial offence, and the expedition was allowed to proceed. A new difficulty immediately arose. The very day after the expedition departed, the Portuguese fleet anchored in the mouth of Bombay harbour, and lodged a formal protest against it. The council, however,

were not now to be moved by remonstrances from any quarter. On the 20th of December the batteries were opened, and on the 27th the breach was declared practicable. The only thing necessary before the assault was to fill up the ditch. It attempting this operation a severe repulse was sustained, and 100 Europeans, of whom Commodore Watson¹ was one, lost their lives. On the following day, the 28th, a more successful attempt was made. Tanna was taken by storm, and the soldiers barbarously revenged their previous loss by putting most of the garrison to the sword. The conquest of Salsette, after the fort of Versova, situated at its northern extremity, had been captured by a detachment, necessarily followed; and the whole of the possessions which the Company had so long and so earnestly coveted were in their hands by the 1st of January, 1775.

From the survey which has now been made, it will be seen that the Regulating Act did not come into operation under very favourable circumstances. In each of the three presidencies a conquest had been made on grounds which it is impossible to justify. The council of Bengal had lent themselves to a dastardly tyrant, and sent their troops to execute his cruel and wicked behests, for no better reason than because they were in want of money and he had agreed to give it to them. The council of Madras had in like manner become the tools of Muhammed Ali, and put him in possession of the kingdom of Tanjore, not because the raja had done them any injury, but, on the contrary, because they had, by their own confession, injured him; and having thus reason to fear that he might become their enemy, deemed it necessary for their own security to aggravate the original injury tenfold, by robbing him of his personal liberty and depriving him of his kingdom. The council of Bombay had done iniquity on a less extensive scale, but, if possible, in a still more flagrant manner. In their conquest they could not even pretend the entanglements of allies whose importunities they found it impossible to resist; but unblushingly seized upon property possessed by one ally and claimed by another, simply because they had long coveted it, and had ceased to have any hope of obtaining it except by violence.

¹ Duff mentions (*History of the Mahrattas*, vol. ii, page 278) that the cause of the Commodore's death was singular; "a cannon-shot struck the sand close to him, and drove the particles into his body".

Messrs. Clavering, Monson, and Francis reached Kedgeree on the 14th of October, 1774, and immediately announced their arrival to the president, who deputed the senior member of council to wait upon them and pay the customary marks of civility. On the 19th they landed at Calcutta, under a salute of seventeen guns, and were received by Mr. Hastings at his own private residence. The following day the whole council, with the exception of Mr. Barwell, who had not arrived from the country, met, and ordered proclamation to be made on the following morning that the new government commenced on the 20th of October. After the proclamation Mr. Hastings, now governor-general, and the three members from England again met in council, and heard the general letter of the court read, together with a paper of instructions. It has been mentioned that parliament, in making their nominations under the act, seem not to have used any precautions to secure harmony in the new government. This important point, however, had not been overlooked by the directors, who dwelt upon it at some length and with some earnestness. Among the other instructions it was ordered that the council should meet twice a week, and that all correspondence with country powers, though carried on in the name of the governor-general only, should be under the immediate superintendence of the council—all letters proposed to be sent being previously approved by them, and all letters received submitted to them at their next meeting. As disputes concerning the powers of the governor and of the commander-in-chief, under their respective commissions, had frequently arisen, a commission was given to the governor-general constituting him governor and commander-in-chief of the fortress and garrison of Fort William and town of Calcutta, and another to General Clavering, appointing him commander-in-chief of all the Company's forces in India. At the same time it was provided that, should the governor-general and council think proper at any time to issue orders to any officer in the army, these orders suspending or superseding those issued by the governor-general or commander-in-chief, were to be obeyed. On the suggestion of the governor-general the council adjourned till the 25th, when it was expected that Mr. Barwell would be able to take his seat.

When the full council met on the 25th, the governor-general put in a minute, reviewing the revenue system and the political state of the provinces. In the discussion which ensued symptoms of disagreement were strongly manifested, and the instructions of the directors on the subject of harmony were speedily forgotten. The Rohilla war at once became the subject of dispute. When the new government commenced it was understood to be still in progress. Faizulla Khan, the Rohilla chief next in importance to Hafiz Rahmet, had, after the defeat of the latter, escaped to the mountains, and entrenched himself in a strong position, from which it was found impossible to dislodge him except by making regular approaches. The process would have been tedious; and as the Company's troops had begun to show symptoms of disaffection, the result might have been doubtful. The nabob, therefore, became desirous for negotiation, and an agreement was made, by which Faizulla Khan received a *jaghir* yielding a revenue of fourteen lacs and seventy-five thousand rupees in Rohilkhand, and surrendered one-half of his treasure. This transaction, which terminated the Rohilla war, was not known at Calcutta at the time when Mr. Hastings' minute was discussed; and on this account, as the war was supposed to be still subsisting, the members of council perhaps thought it the more necessary to lose no time in explaining their views.

In the course of the discussion General Clavering called for the original correspondence of Mr. Middleton, the resident in Oudh. It will be remembered that the former government had allowed Mr. Hastings to appoint the resident and carry on the correspondence with him without divulging it to his colleagues, any further than he might think necessary. On this ground, while he offered to lay before the Board all the correspondence relating to public affairs, he alleged that there were other parts of a strictly private nature, consisting of unreserved and confidential communications, totally unfit for public inspection. These he must withhold. The resident, he said, was his own recognized agent, appointed on his sole responsibility, with the sanction of his late colleagues, and in conformity with the practice which had prevailed from 1757 to the present time. If the engagements undertaken in accordance with that practice were legal, no power on earth could authorize him to violate them;

still less was he prepared to submit to an *ex post facto* law of so sudden a formation.

That the reasons for refusing the whole correspondence were not deemed satisfactory, and that even vague suspicions of corruption began to be entertained, is not surprising. Still, the maxim of doing nothing rashly ought to have prevailed; and the three new councillors, conscious how ignorant they were on all the matters on which they had been suddenly called to legislate, might have been content slowly and gradually to feel their way. It would seem, however, that their minds were not in the state best fitted for calm deliberation. Their feelings were ruffled by real or imaginary slights. They thought, and did not hesitate to make it a subject of complaint to the directors, that in the reception given to them on their arrival their dignity had not been sufficiently consulted. More guns ought to have been fired when they landed at Calcutta; the troops ought to have been drawn out; they ought to have been received at the council-chamber instead of Mr. Hastings' private residence; the proclamation of the new government ought to have been made with more parade, &c. Those who could stoop to enumerate such points of etiquette must have felt the omission of them to be real grievances; and therefore it is easy to understand how readily, when a real ground of quarrel was discovered, it was embraced. The governor-general had a steady adherent in Mr. Barwell; but the three new councillors clung together as if only one mind and one spirit had animated them, and seemed determined to lose no opportunity of asserting the supremacy which their majority gave them. Without waiting for further inquiry, they immediately voted the recall of Mr. Middleton, requiring him to bring down the whole of his correspondence, as essential to a right judgment on the course of policy observed towards the *vizir*, as well as of the Company's existing engagements with his excellency. The order to produce the correspondence may have been justifiable, but it was harsh in the extreme thus summarily to recall an official against whom no charge had been made. For anything that had yet appeared, Mr. Middleton might have been the person best qualified to sustain the interests of the Company at Lucknow; and, to say the least, it showed little regard for their interests to sport with them in this manner, in order to gratify a kind of personal pique against a third party!

When the majority thus recalled Mr. Middleton, of whom they knew nothing, they appointed Colonel Champion, the commander of the troops, of whom they knew as little, to supply his place; and at the same time proposed a series of instructions to be given him. He was to repeat the demand on the *vizir* for the forty lacs which he had promised for the expulsion of the Rohillas, to require payment of such sums as might be due, and the liquidation of all unsettled accounts. If the whole forty lacs could not be obtained, not less than twenty were to be accepted as an instalment, and the rest within twelve months. If the *vizir* refused these terms, Colonel Champion was to serve him with a protest. Nor was this all. Within fourteen days after receiving the instructions, he was to withdraw the brigade from Rohilkhand into Oudh, and then, unless the *vizir* declared it necessary for the defence of Kora and Allahabad, to march it back into the Company's territories to its station at Dinajpur.

In all these proposed measures there was much ignorance and rashness, and in the most prominent of them gross inconsistency. At the time when this meeting of council was held, the Rohilla war was understood not to be finished, and yet a peremptory demand was to be made upon the *vizir* for forty lacs, though he had only engaged to pay them after the Rohillas should be expelled. Moreover, the councillors from England denounced, and justly denounced, the Rohilla war as an abomination; and yet their great anxiety now was to pocket the wages of it! Again, what could be more rash than to withdraw the brigade within fourteen days? For aught they knew, it might have been at the time in face of the enemy, or in a position where retreat might have been ruin. It is scarcely necessary to add, that if it were not intended to break altogether with the *vizir*, and either convert him all at once into an enemy, or at least to furnish him with an excuse for not fulfilling his engagements, nothing could be more indelicate and inconsiderate than the kind of treatment to which he was to be subjected.

Considering the temper of the majority, it would not have been wonderful if they had carried their proposals off-hand, and insisted that the instructions should be immediately despatched. They were allowed, however, to lie on the table till the next

meeting of council, which was fixed for Monday, the 31st. On that day a letter was received from Colonel Champion, acquainting the council for the first time with the arrangement which had been made with Faizulla Khan, and the consequent termination of the war. When the instructions were again discussed, the governor-general and Mr. Barwell, anxious that they should be either delayed or greatly modified, pointed out the effect they were calculated to have on the *vizir*, who might regard the communication made to him as equivalent to a declaration that the engagements made with him were no longer binding. They also urged, with great appearance of reason, that as the Rohilla war was the act of a past administration, the new government might have been satisfied with recording their disapproval of it, and with refusing, after it was finished, to allow the Company's troops to be employed beyond the bounds which the policy of the court had prescribed. With regard to Mr. Middleton, they suggested that, instead of removing him, the better course would have been to confirm his appointment, and recognize him as the agent, not of the governor-general exclusively, but of the council at large. The majority were in no mood to listen to argument or expostulation, and the instructions were despatched very nearly in the form in which they were originally proposed.

The new government had rapidly degenerated into two hostile factions—the one consisting of the three new councillors from England, who formed a dominant and intolerant majority; and the other consisting of Mr Hastings and Mr. Barwell, who, being unable as a minority to carry any measures, were to all intents excluded from any proper share in the administration. The very first communication of this heterogeneous council to the directors furnished a strange commentary on the lecture which had been read to them on the subject of harmony. So complete was the discord that it was impossible to frame a common despatch, and each faction was left to make its own separate statement. Of course, both partook very much of the nature of special pleadings. They are now undeserving of attention; but it may be worth while to state the views of the directors on a few of the leading points submitted to them. They deemed the cession or sale of Kora and Allahabad to the

vizir "an act of great propriety," and entirely approved of withholding all further tribute from Bengal to the emperor. They agreed in the assertion that the Rohilla chiefs had drawn their calamities upon themselves, by "refusing to fulfil their solemn engagements with the *vizir*;" but they deprecated the aid given by the government with the Company's forces, as founded on wrong policy, and as contrary both to their frequently repeated instructions to keep the troops within the provinces, and to the general principles they desired to maintain. At the same time, the recall of the troops by the majority of the council was far too hasty, and might have been attended with inconvenience to the public service. On the subject of the correspondence they decided against Mr. Hastings, and gave it as their opinion that the whole ought to have been laid before the council. In conclusion, they expressed their regret at the differences which had arisen among the members of the government, but trusted that a sense of duty would animate them to an exertion of their utmost abilities in conducting the important affairs committed to them with the spirit of harmony and cordiality so essential to the welfare of the public interests, and to the prosperity of the Company. This advice, like that first given on the same subject, was absolutely thrown away. Length of time, instead of calming the strife, only increased its virulence; and the breach between the two continued to grow wider and wider, till proceedings took place which made it irreparable.

The dissensions in the Bengal council being matters of public notoriety, the natives became aware that the power of the government no longer centred in Mr. Hastings, but in the majority opposed to him, and that all who, from any cause, bore him a grudge, or conceived they had been in any way aggrieved by him, had now full opportunity of gratifying their resentment. The fact was not lost upon them; and plausible statements, charging him with acts of corruption, began to be circulated in various quarters. Had the majority of the council been better acquainted with the Bengali character, or less prejudiced against the governor-general, they would have turned a deaf ear to such statements or, at all events, been very slow of attaching any credit to them; but partly, it may in charity be presumed,

because they did not know how easily charges of corruption could be concocted, and partly because they had already rushed to the conclusion that corruption must have been practised, they acted as if they had wished it to be generally understood that the surest avenue to their favour and patronage was to furnish them with the means of convicting the head of the government of dishonourable conduct.

As early as December, 1774, the Rani of Burdwan, the widow of the late zamindar of that district, presented a petition to the council. Her son, a youth of only nine years of age, had, on his father's death, been confirmed by the Company in the zamindari, and she had for some time acted as his guardian. Ultimately, however, she had been displaced to make way for a native diwan appointed by the Company, and superintended by their resident. Her petition charged the diwan with maladministration, accused Mr. Graham, the resident, of accepting bribes to wink at his delinquencies, and requested permission to repair to Calcutta with her son, for the purpose of substantiating her allegations. The majority having at once resolved on inquiry, granted her the permission she requested, and suspended the diwan from his office on the ground that his conduct could not be properly investigated while the papers and subordinate officials remained under his control. These resolutions were ineffectually opposed by the minority, who described the rani as a troublesome, violent woman, whose presence at Calcutta would only give annoyance, and denounced the suspension of the diwan, without any proof of his guilt, as a violation of justice. On the 6th of January, 1775, a letter was received from Mr. Graham, who was now stationed at Hughli, containing an indignant denial of the charges, and a categorical answer to the petition. Two strong points in Mr. Graham's favour were, that he had little opportunity of interfering with the affairs of the zamindari, as he had finally quitted Burdwan six weeks after the succession opened to the young raja, and that the rani, for the purpose of concealing this important fact, had antedated the late raja's death three years. Mr. Graham offered himself for examination, but insisted that the rani should previously be taken bound in a heavy penalty, to be paid in the event of failing to make good her allegations.

A penal bond of this nature was not unusual, and, in a state of society where the distinction between truth and falsehood was so little regarded, was perhaps a necessary check on false and calumnious charges. The majority, however, refused to impose it, and commenced the investigation. In support of the petition the rani presented to the board a variety of accounts, from which it was made to appear that a sum exceeding nine lacs of rupees (£90,000) had been distributed among the servants of the Company. One of the items was an alleged payment to Mr. Hastings himself of 15,000 rupees (£1,500). It is not uncharitable to presume that it was this item which gave the petition its zest, as the majority not only entertained it, but indicated a belief—we had almost said a hope—that it would be substantiated. Apart from all other considerations, the smallness of the sum charged might have made reasonable and impartial men suspect its accuracy. If Mr. Hastings was, as his colleagues had been pleased to assume, a wholesale dealer in corruption, was it not preposterous to believe that when £90,000 was distributed he consented to receive a paltry £1,500 as his share? It is right to add that no proof was ever attempted of the charge thus frivolously made and indecently entertained.

Another charge more directly implicating the governor-general was brought before the council on the 30th of March, 1775. A native, apparently possessed of no station or influence, presented a paper, in which he alleged that the foudar of Hughli, to whom the Company paid a salary of 72,000 rupees, received only 32,000, and employed the remainder in bribes to secure him in office and to cover his malpractices—Mr. Hastings regularly drawing in this way 36,000 rupees, and his native secretary 4,000. The motive for making this representation was palpable on the face of the document, for it concluded with an offer to undertake the duties of the office for 32,000 rupees, which the present foudar actually received. A document presented under such suspicious circumstances was far too flimsy to support the very grave charge which it made against the head of the government; but the majority proceeded with the same recklessness as before, and, on the most insufficient evidence, both dismissed the foudar and found the charge proved.

On the 2nd of May, 1775, Mr. Grant, one of the members as well as the accountant of the provincial council of Murshidabad, sent to the council a set of accounts which he had received from a native who was now in his service, and had lately been a clerk in the nabob's treasury. According to these accounts, Munni Begum, the nabob's guardian, had received above nine lacs more than she had accounted for. On examination the clerk stated that the Begum's head eunuch had endeavoured to bribe him, before he parted with the accounts, to deliver them up and return to the nabob's service, and Mr. Grant declared that similar attempts had been made upon himself. These circumstances satisfied the majority of the council that the accounts were authentic, and they at once carried a resolution to suspend the Begum from her office, which was in the meantime united with that of nabob's diwan, then held by Raja Gourdas, Nanda Kumar's son, and to despatch Mr. Goring to Murshidabad to conduct an investigation on the spot. Mr. Goring, who owed his appointment to the majority, appears to have imbibed a portion of their spirit. The instruction given to him was to enforce delivery from the Begum of the whole of the public and private accounts for the preceding eight years, and hand them over to the provincial council, Messrs. Maxwell, Anderson, and Grant, who were to examine them minutely. He had been only a few days in Murshidabad, when he despatched to Calcutta memorandums of disbursements of a lac and a half of rupees (£15,000) to Mr. Hastings, and of the same amount to Mr. Middleton. When the memorandums were read, Mr. Hastings wished Goring to be asked "in what manner he came by the accounts he has now sent, and on what account this partial selection was made by him." This question, which the majority declined to put, would, it is said, have brought out the fact that he had extorted the account by intimidation, and selected the particular items with a view to the incuplation of the governor-general. But though Mr. Goring's bias might thus have been made manifest, it does not follow that his account was inaccurate, and the important question therefore is, Were these disbursements really made? Did Mr. Hastings, when he went to Murshidabad in 1772, and the Begum was formally installed as the nabob's guardian, receive £15,000 from her under the name of entertainment

money? It is admitted on all hands that he did. In his answer, so far from denying the receipt, he justifies it on various grounds. The act of parliament prohibiting presents was not then passed, the allowance made was in accordance with the custom of the country; it put nothing into his own pocket, and had he not received it, he must have charged an equal amount against the Company. One thing is wanting to make this defence complete. Why was the receipt of this money concealed? Why was it only brought to light at last by an investigation partaking of the nature of a criminal inquest? Mr. Hastings rendered what were understood to be full accounts of that journey, and among other heads inserted a very heavy item for the travelling charges of himself, his colleagues, and attendants. If, in addition to all this, he expended £15,000 more, the fact was surely important enough to be stated, and it is difficult to account for the omission of it on any ground but that of studied concealment. Mr. Hastings was well aware of the very unfavourable light in which presents were viewed by the directors, by parliament, and by the British public generally, and he had honourably distinguished himself by refraining from the acceptance of them at a time when Indian officials above him in rank were setting an opposite example. His conduct in the present instance is the more inexplicable. His own assertion is, that he added nothing to his own fortune by this allowance. This is probably correct. The money received was all spent, and the charge to which thereby he laid himself open, was not so much one of corruption, as of want of economy and efficient control over the disbursements of servants and dependants.

Another charge, though it preceded some of those already mentioned, has been reserved to the last, because it was attended with very remarkable circumstances, and is the only one which still possesses historical interest. On the 11th of March, 1775, Nanda Kumar put into the hands of Mr. Francis a letter addressed to the governor-general and council, and requested him to lay it before the board, "as a duty belonging to his office as a councillor of the state." Mr. Francis presented the letter to the council on the same day. He could not, he said, consistently with his duty, refuse to receive it; it was given him publicly, in presence of a considerable number of persons, and

the raja's request for its delivery had been interpreted by three different individuals. The letter entered into various details respecting the case of Muhammed Reza Khan, insinuating that he had obtained his release by bribery, and concluded with the specific charge against Mr. Hastings, of having received above three lacs and a half (3,54,105 rupees) for the appointments of Munni Begum and Gourdas Mr. Francis, in presenting the letter, professed to be unacquainted with its contents, but admitted, in answer to a question by Mr. Hastings, that he did apprehend it contained some charge against him. On the 13th of March, Nanda Kumar transmitted through the secretary a letter, which he requested to be delivered to the governor-general and council, and opened in their presence. It contained little more than a declaration of the purity of his own motives, and a request that he might be permitted to appear before the council in support of the charges in his former letter.

Mr. Hastings had from the first protested against the course of procedure adopted by the majority in regard to charges affecting his character. He denied their competency to sit in judgment upon him, but did not object to inquiry, provided they would conduct it in a becoming manner. Instead of arraigning him as a culprit, they might appoint a committee and investigate to the utmost everything that might be laid to his charge. Unmoved by this remonstrance, Colonel Monson moved that Nanda Kumar should be called before the council to substantiate his charge against the governor-general. Though an indecent and monstrous motion he found no difficulty in carrying it, but not till Mr. Hastings had made a final effort to save himself from the meditated insult. "Before the question is put," he said, "I declare that I will not suffer Nanda Kumar to appear before the board as my accuser. I know what belongs to the dignity and character of the first member of this administration. I will not sit at this board in the character of a criminal, nor do I acknowledge the members of this board to be my judges. I am reduced on this occasion to make the declaration that I regard General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis as my accusers." Adverting to what Mr. Francis had said about being compelled by duty to deliver Nanda Kumar's letter, he continued: "It was no part of his duty to

make himself the carrier of a letter, which would have been much more properly committed to the hands of a peon or hircarra, or delivered by the writer of it to the secretary himself. Mr. Francis, by his own acknowledgment, apprehended that the letter contained some charge against me. If the charge was false, it was a libel; it might have been false for anything Mr. Francis could know to the contrary, since he was unacquainted with the contents of it; in this instance, therefore, he incurred the hazard of presenting a libel to the board—this was not a duty belonging to his office as a councillor of state.” Mr. Hastings then finally remarked:—“The chief of this administration, your superior, gentlemen, appointed by the legislature itself, shall I sit at this board to be arraigned in the presence of a wretch whom you well know to be the basest of mankind? I believe I need not mention his name, but it is Nanda Kumar. Shall I sit to hear men, collected from the dregs of the people, give evidence, at his dictating, against my character and conduct? I will not. You may, if you please, form yourselves into a committee for the investigation of these matters in any way which you may think proper; but I will repeat, that I will not meet Nanda Kumar at this board, nor suffer Nanda Kumar to be examined at the board, nor have you a right to it, nor can it answer any other purpose than that of vilifying and insulting me to insist upon it.”

In the course of his speech, Mr. Hastings stated that he had expected such an attack as that now made, for he had seen a paper containing many accusations against him, and had been told that it was carried to Colonel Monson by Nanda Kumar, who was, moreover, employed for some hours in private, explaining to the colonel the nature of the charges. He produced a translation of the paper, and desired it to be recorded. Colonel Monson, thus unexpectedly put upon his own defence, denied that he had seen any paper in the Persian or any country language, containing any accusation against the governor-general, but he did not deny Nanda Kumar's visit; and it therefore stands as an uncontradicted fact, that one at least of the trio who had constituted themselves judges of the conduct of Mr. Hastings, was closeted for hours with his accuser, listening to such representations of the charge as the accuser

was pleased to lay before him. Could there be a grosser violation of judicial propriety? As soon as the motion for Nanda Kumar's admission was carried, Mr. Hastings declared the council dissolved and withdrew. Mr. Barwell followed his example. The remaining three, holding that the council could be dissolved only by the consent of the majority, kept their seats. General Clavering, as the senior member, took the chair. Nanda Kumar being called in and asked what he had to say in support of his charges, replied: "I am not a man officiously to make complaints, but when I perceived my character, which is as dear to me as life, hurt by the governor's receiving into his presence two natives of low repute, and denying me admittance, I thought it incumbent on me to write what I have. Everything is contained in the letter I have given in." This was very rambling, and so far as relevant, damaging only to himself, because it proved that he was actuated, not as he professed by public spirit, but by private resentment. Being called upon for other papers, he produced a letter purporting to be written to him by Munni Begum. It began by adverting to the favour conferred upon her by the appointment of guardian to the nabob, and stated that after considering what would be as proper acknowledgment, she proposed a present of one lac. The letter then proceeds thus:—"The governor answered that he had not done what he had from motives of private advantage, but for the satisfaction of his employers. I pressed the present exceedingly upon him, when he at last said, 'Very well, if you do think proper to make a present, give two lacs as Maharaja (meaning you) engaged; otherwise, do as you please, you are your own mistress'." The letter goes on to state that one of the lacs was paid by herself, and the other by a draft on him (Nanda Kumar), and concludes in the following terms: "For the future, let us take care, in the conduct of our affairs, to consult and plan beforehand, that when we are called upon, no difference may appear in our representations and answers, and that I may conform to whatever you may say; let nothing of the secret part of these transactions be known to the governor or the gentlemen of the council, or any others. The proverb is, 'A word to the wise'."

This letter is of very doubtful authenticity. The handwriting did not appear to be that of the Begum, as ascertained by a

letter which had been received from her only a few days before; and though the seal was apparently hers, little weight was due to the fact, because it was well known that such a desperate and unprincipled intriguer as Nanda Kumar could have had no difficulty in either obtaining temporary possession of the real seal, or in procuring a facsimile which could not be distinguished from it. There was in the letter itself strong internal evidence of spuriousness. Its object, except for the purpose of giving plausibility to Nanda Kumar's charge, is absolutely meaningless. Why should the Begum have written to him a long detail of a transaction of which, if it was a reality and not a mere fabrication, he was already perfectly cognizant? What, too, is to be thought of the conclusion in which the Begum and Nanda Kumar are represented as conspiring together to fabricate falsehoods and give them currency, without running any risk of detection? Where there was so much ground for suspicion, it might at least have been expected that before any effect was given to the letter, the doubts as to its genuineness would have been set at rest, by the very simple process of sending it to Murshidabad, where the Begum was residing, and calling upon her to say whether it was or was not a forgery. The "gentlemen of the majority" were, it seems, too impatient for a decision to brook any delay; and with nothing more before them than the above suspicious document—which, even if genuine, proved nothing against any one than the writer and receiver of it—and the unsupported assertions of an informer of infamous character, they did not hesitate to resolve that the sum of three lacs forty thousand rupees (£34,000) had been received by the governor-general, and that he ought to be required to pay the amount into the treasury of the Company, to whom it of right belonged. When this resolution was intimated to Mr. Hastings, he treated it with the scorn which it deserved, and the majority were unable to do more than complete their impotent malice, by ordering that "the whole of the papers should be placed in the hands of the Company's attorney, for the purpose of counsel's opinion being taken as to the best mode of proceeding to recover the amount."

Nanda Kumar was playing a very dangerous game without being conscious of it. Having gained the ear and been taken

under the special patronage of the three councillors, in whom the whole power and influence of government now centred, he saw nothing before him but honour and emolument, to an extent which he had never before ventured to anticipate. He was soon rudely awakened from this pleasing dream. The same act which had remodelled the council had established a supreme court, possessed within its own sphere of powers still more unlimited than those of the council, and not indisposed to stretch them to the utmost, were it only for the purpose of proving its independence. Sir Elijah Impey, the chief-justice of this court, had been the school-fellow, and was still the intimate friend, of Mr. Hastings, and there was therefore ground to presume that if Nanda Kumar could be made amenable to the supreme court, the friendship of the majority of the council would not avail him. This was a danger of which Nanda Kumar appears to have had no apprehension, till it actually overtook him. On the 11th of April, 1775, he was charged before the supreme court, along with two Englishmen, Joseph and Francis Fowke, with having conspired to compel a native named Kamal-ud-din to write a false petition, impugning the conduct of the governor-general, Mr. Barwell, Mr. Vansittart, and two others, and to sign a list of bribes alleged to have been received by them. Ultimately, the indictment stood only in the names of the governor-general and Mr. Vansittart, and after an examination, Nanda Kumar and Joseph Fowke were held to bail at their instance, to take their trial at the ensuing assizes. The examination, which took place on the 12th, lasted from eleven o'clock in the morning to eleven at night; and the governor-general, knowing that both he and Mr. Barwell required to be present at it, addressed a letter to General Clavering, requesting him to take the chair at the meeting of council which was fixed for that day, and proceed, along with the other members, to despatch the current business. This having been done, the three councillors addressed a letter to Mr. Hastings, in which, after mentioning what they had heard of a conspiracy, they said, that as an investigation which required the absence of the governor-general and Mr. Barwell from the council, must be of great moment, if not involving the welfare of the government, they had resolved to continue in council

till apprised of the issue. Very possibly they suspected that their own conduct might be implicated, and that the conspiracy might be made partly to turn on the zeal of Mr. Francis, in delivering Nanda Kumar's letter, and the secret interview which Colonel Monson had held with them. Mr. Hastings, in reply, explained the cause of his absence, and added, he was sorry the three members should have thought it necessary to remain in council, until informed of a subject and the issue of an inquiry which they would perceive had no relation to the safety of the state, nor to any circumstance that required their present attention. This ought to have satisfied them that further interference on their part was unnecessary, and would be unbecoming. The charge was about to be judicially investigated, and the duty of all, and more especially of those high in office, was to do nothing to prejudice it. What, then, must be thought of the conduct of the majority, who, the very day after Nanda Kumar was held to bail, publicly expressed their sympathy with him by proceeding to his house and paying him a formal visit!

What would have been the issue of the charge of conspiracy, it is now vain to conjecture. It is difficult to believe that the governor-general and Mr. Vansittart would have committed themselves to it, unless they had felt confident of obtaining a verdict; and yet it may have been only a tentative process, raised not so much with an intention of seriously carrying it out, as of trying the effect which it might have of deterring the crowd of informers and intriguers whom the proceedings in the council had called into activity. When the charge of conspiracy was brought, the majority complained of it as an obstacle to the investigations on which they had entered, and declaimed on the difficulty of finding men bold enough to risk the consequences of revealing the truth. To this Mr. Hastings indignantly replied: "To talk of persons having the courage to declare themselves against the late administration is an insult on my situation! The fact is, it requires courage in any man not to do it, it being universally believed that the surest means to obtain the friendship and support of a fixed majority of the council, who have the whole power of government in their hands, is to lodge accusations against the late administration, and to refuse is the surest means of incurring their resentment. Promises and

threats have been used by the instruments of the majority, particularly by Nanda Kumar, to obtain accusations against me." Dwelling on the same subject in a letter to the directors, he says, "My adversaries have placed me in a situation particularly difficult and delicate. They have made me the butt of increasing persecution for these seven months past, and have called down the whole host of informers from every quarter of Bengal against me. Yet, when I have endeavoured to bring to justice men charged with a conspiracy to ruin my fortune and blast my character with forged and libellous accusations, the same charge is retorted upon me by the gentlemen of the majority, although, in all their most violent attacks upon me, they have made professions of the deepest concern for the honour of the governor-general. This is the very wantonness of oppressions; it is like putting the man to the rack, and exclaiming against him for struggling with his tormentors; while rewards are held out publicly to those who will offer themselves as my accusers."

The majority having ventured to appeal to public opinion in support of the judgment they had formed of his conduct, Mr. Hastings accepted the challenge, and thus addressed the directors:—"It is in your power, honourable sirs, to obtain that opinion. There are many men in England, of unquestionable knowledge and integrity, who have been eye-witnesses of all the transactions of this government in the short interval in which I had the direction of it. There are many hundreds in England who have correspondents in Bengal, from whom they have received successive advices of those transactions and opinions of the authors of them. I solemnly make my appeal to these concurring testimonies; and if in justice to your honourable court—by whom I was chosen for the high station which I have lately filled, by whom my conduct has been applauded, and through whom I have obtained the distinguished honour assigned me by the legislature itself, in my nomination to fill the first place in the new administration of India—I may be allowed the liberty of making so uncommon a request, I do most earnestly entreat that you will be pleased to call upon those who, from their own knowledge or the communications of others, can contribute such information,

to declare severally the opinions which they have entertained of the measures of my administration, the tenor of my conduct in every department of this government, and the effects which it has produced, both in conciliating the minds of the natives to the British government, in confirming your authority over the country, and in advancing your interest in it. From these and from the testimonies of your own records, let me be judged—not from the malevolent declamations of those who, having no services of their own to plead, can only found their reputation on the destruction of mine.” This appeal, though somewhat overloaded with self-laudation, was in the main well founded; and there cannot be a doubt that, if at this time the British subjects who had been or were still resident in Bengal, and the great body of the natives, could have been polled, a vast majority would have declared in favour of Mr. Hastings and against the three councillors, who, after they had, by combining together, wrested all power from his hands, used it, not for the purpose of advancing the public interest, but for the purpose of detecting flaws and delinquencies, in the exposure of which they might gratify personal animosities. It is doubtful, however, if Mr. Hastings’ appeal to the public would have been so successful after the date of the transaction which we are now about to relate. Whether rightly or wrongly, an important share in it has been generally imputed to him, and the effect has been to cast a dark shade on his reputation.

On the 6th of May, 1775, Nanda Kumar was arrested, and committed to jail to stand his trial at the ensuing assizes for forgery. The charge was made by a native Calcutta merchant, of the name of Mohan Prasad; but many jumped at once to the conclusion, that whatever the technical form might be, Mr. Hastings was the real prosecutor. Only three weeks before he had come forward avowedly in this character, and it was believed that the change of the charge from conspiracy to forgery had only been made because it might be more easily proved and involved a heavier penalty. The majority of the council, with their usual forwardness and indiscretion, were the first to give open expression to this opinion; and only three days after his committal, having deposed Munni Begum from her office of guardian to the nabob, gave him the strongest

pledge of their determination not to abandon him by conferring the vacant office on his son. Looking to them as his patrons, Nanda Kumar complained to the council that he could not in the jail perform his ablutions and take food without loss of caste, and prayed to be removed. When the point was debated General Clavering said that the judges were probably ignorant how much a close confinement might endanger the life of the raja, which was of so much importance to the public for proving an act of venality against the governor-general, and the usual majority resolved that the sheriff or his deputy should wait on the chief-justice, on the part of the board, and desire that he would consider of granting the prisoner relief. Mr. Hastings dissented, on the ground that the representation might be made by the prisoner himself, and that it would be improper to convey it to the chief-justice through the authority of government. In principle he was correct, but most persons will be inclined to think that, considering the position in which he stood with regard to the parties, he would have shown better taste by remaining silent.

Before the message of the council was delivered, Sir Elijah Impey had heard of the ground of complaint, and besides giving orders to make his confinement as easy as possible, had employed pundits to inspect the part of the prison assigned to Nanda Kumar. Their opinion being that, by performing his ablutions and taking food, he would only be obliged to perform penance without losing caste, no change was made. On the subject of the message, Sir Elijah in his answer took rather lofty ground, and concluded by requesting that, should the maharaja have any other application to make for relief, he would address himself immediately to the judges, since, by continuing to address the council, that which could only be obtained from principles of justice might have the appearance of being obtained by the means of influence and authority, the peculiar turn of mind of the natives being to expect everything from power and nothing from justice. The majority deemed it necessary to explain and justify the course they had adopted with regard to the petition, by intimating that they considered the natives of India as the immediate objects of their care and protection. On this Sir Elijah observed that

the bounds between the authority of the supreme court and the council were of too delicate a nature to be discussed, unless there should be an absolute necessity to determine them. He did not question the authority of the board to receive petitions generally, or the raja's petition in particular, but thought that application by a prisoner for relief should be made directly to the judges. This opinion he supported by adding, "It is not sufficient that courts of justice act independently; it is necessary for the good government of a country that they should be believed, and known to be above all influence." The maxim is excellent, but sounds rather strangely in the mouth of Sir Elijah Impey, who is greatly belied if he did not, both on this occasion and during his whole career, act in total disregard of it.

The forgery with which Nanda Kumar was charged was alleged to have been committed in 1770, and had become the subject of judicial proceedings in the court of *diwani adalat*. The judge of this court, whether as a preliminary step or by way of sentence does not exactly appear, had put Nanda Kumar in prison. Singularly enough he was indebted for his release to Mr. Hastings, who probably at this time required his services in the investigation of the charges against Muhammed Reza Khan, and who, in setting him at liberty for such a purpose, appears to have arbitrarily and unwarrantably interfered with the regular course of justice. The process had thus been suspended, and the document said to be forged had been deposited in the mayor's court at Calcutta. By section 19 of the Regulating Act the mayor's court was declared to be abolished as soon as the supreme court should be established; and by section 20, "all the records, muniments, and proceedings whatsoever of, or belonging to, the said mayor's court," were ordered to be "delivered over, preserved, and deposited for safe custody in the said new court of judicature, to which all parties shall and may resort and have recourse, upon application to the said court." The supreme court sat for the first time in October, 1774, and could not well have taken any steps in the criminal process against Nanda Kumar till May, 1775, when proceedings again commenced. How a process which was originally raised in the *diwani adalat* came to be

transferred to the mayor's court is not distinctly explained. The former court tried civil actions only, and the transference to the latter court may have taken place when the forgery, which had previously been made the ground of a civil action only, was to be tried as a crime. But in whatever way the action may have been brought into the mayor's court, it must be admitted that little time had been lost, and that its removal into the supreme court followed in regular course as an act of ordinary routine. This view, apparently unimportant in itself, is zealously contended for by the friends of Mr. Hastings, because it seems to prove that the charge of forgery against Nanda Kumar and his charges against the governor-general had no connection with each other,—that they were brought at the same time was, though a remarkable, and in some respects an unfortunate, only an accidental coincidence, and therefore all the insinuations which were so lavishly thrown out for the purpose of connecting Mr. Hastings with the criminal charge against Nanda Kumar were groundless. That charge would, in the natural course of law, have been made at the very time when it was made, though Nanda Kumar had never become a willing tool in the hands of Messrs. Clavering, Monson, and Francis.

There is much plausibility in the above argument; and in the absence of direct proof to the contrary, we seem bound, at least in the judgment of charity, to hold that, however much Mr. Hastings may have benefited by the criminal charge brought against Nanda Kumar, he had no direct hand either in originating or reviving it. So far he is entitled to be relieved from the load of obloquy which the prevalence of a contrary belief has laid upon him. With regard to the ulterior proceedings, and the remorseless manner in which what is called "the law" was permitted to take its course, his exoneration will, we fear, be more difficult.

That Nanda Kumar was guilty of the crime laid to his charge cannot be doubted. The notorious villainies of his previous life afford presumptive evidence of his guilt, and the verdict which found it proven was given by a respectable jury of British subjects, whose sense of justice and regard for their oaths, would not allow them to be guided in their

decision by anything but the evidence which was laid before them. But even after the guilt is assumed, a number of important points remain to be considered. First of all, had the supreme court of Calcutta any right to put Nanda Kumar upon his trial? The court was established by charter from the crown; but the Regulating Act, in empowering his majesty to grant this charter, distinctly defines the extent of jurisdiction which it was to confer. By section 14 it is enacted that "the jurisdictional powers and authorities" of the supreme court "shall and may extend to all British subjects who shall reside in the kingdoms or provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, or any of them under the protection of the said united Company," and that it "shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all complaints against any of his majesty's subjects for any crimes, misdemeanours, or oppressions committed, or to be committed; and also, to entertain, hear, or determine any suits or actions whatsoever against any of his majesty's subjects in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, and any suit, action, or complaint against any person who shall, at the time when such debt, or cause of action or complaint, shall have arisen, have been employed by, or shall then have been, directly or indirectly, in the service of the said united Company, or of any of his majesty's subjects." By section 16 the supreme court is empowered to "determine any suits or actions whatsoever of any of his majesty's subjects against any inhabitant of India, residing in any of the said kingdoms or provinces of Bengal, Bihar, or Orissa, or any of them, upon any contract or agreement in writing entered into by any of the said inhabitants with any of his majesty's subjects, when the cause of action shall exceed the sum of five hundred current rupees;" but the power thus given is expressly restricted, by the words which immediately follow, to the particular instance in which "the said inhabitant shall have agreed in the said contract, that, in case of dispute, the matter shall be heard and determined in the said supreme court."

These are the only sections of the act which define the jurisdiction of the supreme court, and it is perfectly clear from them that the only "crimes, misdemeanours, or oppressions" which it was empowered to try were those committed by "any of his majesty's subjects," and that a native inhabitant was amen-

able to its jurisdiction only in two cases expressly specified—the one where he was directly or indirectly employed in the service of the Company or of any of his majesty's subjects at the time when the "debt, or cause of action or complaint," on which he was sued had arisen; and the other, where the cause of action exceeded 500 rupees, and where, in a written contract with any of his majesty's subjects, a native inhabitant had agreed that, in case of dispute, the supreme court should decide. The only other clauses of the act which have any bearing on the point occur in the 13th section, where it is enacted that the supreme court "shall be a court of oyer and terminer and jail-delivery, in and for the said town of Calcutta and factory of Fort William, in Bengal aforesaid, and the limits thereof, and the factories subordinate thereto;" and the 34th section, which enacted, "that all offences and misdemeanours which shall be laid, tried, and inquired of in the said supreme court, shall be tried by a jury of British subjects resident in the town of Calcutta, and not otherwise." These clauses, taken in connection with the above sections which define the jurisdiction of the court, furnish additional evidence that it had no right whatever to put natives upon their trial. A court of oyer and terminer and jail-delivery was undoubtedly competent to try crimes—but where? "In the said town of Calcutta and factory of Fort William, in Bengal aforesaid, and the factories subordinate thereto." The town of Calcutta is here mentioned in connection with the different factories of the Company, and the fair meaning obviously is, that all his majesty's subjects within these limits are amenable to the supreme court. The crimes and misdemeanours to be inquired into were exclusively those with which any of them might be charged; and hence, in order that they might not be placed in a worse position than at home, it is provided, as we have seen, in section 34, that they shall be tried by a jury of British subjects. Had the act, in using the words "town of Calcutta," meant to include not merely the British subjects, but all the men, women, and children, of every kind and degree, who might be resident within its limits, it must have meant to neutralize and contradict its express enactments in regard to jurisdiction, and must, moreover, have meant to commit a great injustice, totally abhorrent from the spirit of

English jurisprudence, by denying to the natives the privilege of being tried by a jury of their own countrymen. If it had really been intended to make them amenable to the supreme court, could anything have been more preposterous than the enactment that all crimes and misdemeanours should be tried by "a jury of British subjects resident in Calcutta, and not otherwise?"

Though nothing could be more preposterous than to interpret the words "town of Calcutta" in such a way as to include the native inhabitants, and thereby, instead of giving effect to the Regulating Act, to contradict and prevent it, it was only by such a stretch of interpretation that the judges of the supreme court found themselves competent to try Nanda Kumar. It is true, indeed, that they endeavoured to derive some countenance from the practice of the mayor's court, which, by a similar forced interpretation of a clause in their charter, granted by George II in 1753, had usurped criminal jurisdiction over the native inhabitants of Calcutta. It is of importance, however, to observe, that the mayor's court, as if conscious that its claim of criminal jurisdiction over the natives could not be legally sustained, had used it sparingly, never venturing to execute sentence without the consent of the government, and that in the only case in which it condemned a native for forgery, he received a pardon. Besides, it is very doubtful if the supreme court had any right to avail itself of any precedent furnished by the mayor's court. The Regulating Act did not transfer the powers of the mayor's court to the supreme court. On the contrary, it enacted that the part of the charter of George II relating to the establishment of the mayor's court, "or to the civil, criminal, or ecclesiastical jurisdiction thereof," should "cease, determine, and be absolutely void to all intents and purposes;" and merely directed that "all the records, muniments, and proceedings whatsoever" belonging to the mayor's court should be "delivered over, preserved, and deposited for safe custody in the said new court of judicature." It has been said that the crown charter, by which the supreme court was actually established, went further in this respect than the Regulating Act, and provided expressly that no "indictment, information, action, suit, cause, or proceeding depending" in the mayor's court "shall be abated or annihilated, but the

same shall be transferred, in their then present condition respectively to, and subsist and depend in the said supreme court of judicature at Fort William, to all intents and purposes as if they had been respectively commenced in the last-mentioned court." The answer to this is, that whatever the crown may have seemed to do, it could not legally give one particle of jurisdiction more than the legislature had empowered it to grant; and that, therefore, till a clause can be produced from the Regulating Act entitling the supreme court to take cognizance of causes to which natives only were parties, and try natives criminally by a law declared to be intended for British subjects only, we must hold that Nanda Kumar was not tried legally.

In sustaining their competency, all the judges of the court were equally in fault; but in the mode of conducting the trial, Sir Elijah Impey earned for himself a bad pre-eminence. It was evident, from the spirit which he displayed, that he had set his heart on a conviction, and that if he obtained it, the prisoner's doom was sealed. The crime of forgery was, as the chief-justice well knew, regarded with lenity by both Muhammedan and Hindu codes; and therefore, when, by a stretch of the English law, a native found guilty of this crime was sentenced to an ignominious death, there could not be a clearer case for the exercise of mercy. The crime had been committed years ago by a native, who, in common with his countrymen, regarded forgery as, at the worst, only an aggravated species of falsehood; and to convert it into a capital crime, because it was held capital by a law of which he knew nothing, and by which he was not bound, was a gross violation of the plainest dictates of reason and justice. Even if the conviction could be technically sustained, it was only by asserting law at the expense of humanity. These considerations weighed so little with Sir Elijah Impey that he even rebuked Nanda Kumar's counsel in open court, because he had urged the foreman of the jury who tried the cause to join in an application for a respite. By a special clause in the charter, the supreme court was empowered "to reprieve and suspend the execution of any capital sentence, wherever there shall appear, in their judgment, a proper occasion for mercy," till the pleasure of the crown should be known. Another clause provided that "in all indictments, informations, and criminal

suits and causes whatsoever," the supreme court should have "full and absolute power and authority to allow or deny the appeal of the party pretending to be aggrieved" to the privy council; and it was confidently expected that under these clauses the execution of the sentence of death which had been recorded would be deferred, and the sentence itself ultimately reversed. It is at this stage of the transaction that the conduct of Mr. Hastings appears in its most questionable light.

Sir Elijah Impey was universally believed to have conducted the trial more in the spirit of a partizan than of a judge. He thought his friend Mr. Hastings ill used, and gladly embraced the opportunity of coming to his relief. Informers and accusers were pouring in from all quarters, encouraged by the countenance which the majority of the council so lavishly bestowed upon them, and he was willing to teach them, by a lesson not likely to be soon forgotten, that the protection of the majority of the council might fail them when they stood most in want of it. Assuming that the chief-justice was actuated by the motives generally imputed to him, it is plain that nothing could have so effectually arrested him in the course he was bent on pursuing as a word of disapprobation from Mr. Hastings. He could not but be aware that in lending unscrupulous aid to his friend, he was placing himself in a position from which he might not be able afterwards to escape without some loss of character, or, it might be, incurring personal danger; and therefore, had that friend, who was probably in frequent communication with him during the whole course of the proceedings, only hinted that his zeal was outrunning his discretion, can there be a doubt that he would at once have found some plausible reason for stopping short? Mr. Hastings, strong in his integrity, might, for instance, have represented that as all the charges against him were groundless, the most effectual mode of proving their falsehood was to allow them to be thoroughly investigated; and that, on the contrary, the removal of Nanda Kumar, the leading witness against him, would make it impossible for him ever to establish his innocence—that the public, aware of their mutual friendship, would conclude they were acting in concert, and not be persuaded, however strong their protestations to the contrary might be, that Mr. Hastings had not murdered Nanda

Kumar by the hands of Sir Elijah Impey—and that, therefore, while the conviction which had been obtained would, doubtless, have a salutary effect by deterring those who were about to volunteer new charges, the wisest policy would be to defer the execution of the sentence, at least till its very questionable legality could be fully tested, and the pleasure of the crown could be known. Sir Elijah Impey never would have been so quixotic as to force his own plan of relief on Mr. Hastings in the face of such a representation. But if this, or a similar representation, would have saved Nanda Kumar's life, the question returns—Why was it not made? Mr. Hastings might have interfered with effect. He did not; and the conclusion is forced upon us that he did not, because he had satisfied himself that, all things considered, his interest would be best secured by allowing the law to take its course. In adopting this resolution, he may have been partly influenced by the wish to escape from the annoyance of false charges, but no degree of charity will enable us to believe, that he was not still more influenced by a desire to prevent disclosures which might be made, and which could not be made without serious damage to his reputation.

All efforts to stay the execution of the sentence having proved unavailing, Nanda Kumar prepared for his fate with a calmness worthy of a better man. The stoicism which existed only in theory among the Greeks, has been reduced to practice by the Hindus. So long as there seems an escape from danger, they have no courage to face it, and are not ashamed to display despicable cowardice; but when convinced that the inevitable hour is come, they often seem as if a new soul had been breathed into them, and view death in its most terrific forms with an apparent unconcern, which, if it be not apathy, is heroism. Such was the spirit which Nanda Kumar now displayed. On the eve of the execution, after taking final leave of his friends, he sat down to write notes and examine accounts, as if engaged in ordinary business. In the morning, when the hour for quitting the prison arrived, he walked with a firm step to the palanquin, took his seat in it, and in being carried along through the immense concourse, looked around with unruffled serenity. He had previously sent a message to Messrs. Clavering, Monson, and Francis, requesting their protection to his son Gourdas, and on arriving

at the scaffold, desired again to be remembered to them. He then mounted the scaffold, and seemed the only person unmoved amid the myriads who surrounded him. These consisted of two great classes, who viewed the spectacle with very different feelings. The Mussalmans hated Nanda Kumar for the active part he had taken in the proceedings against Muhammed Reza Khan, and thought he was only about to suffer a just retribution. The Hindus were filled with amazement, grief, and terror. A Brahmin, the very head of the caste in Bengal, about to suffer an ignominious death by legal sentence, for an offence which seemed to them too trivial to rank as a crime! A punishment so much at variance with their ideas of right and wrong would never be inflicted. They clung to this hope to the very last, and even when the apparatus of death was before their eyes, perhaps under some undefined impression that the gods themselves would interfere to save the life of a Brahmin, and vindicate the honour of his order. When at last the signal was given and the fatal bolt was drawn, they gave utterance to their horror in wild shrieks, and turning their backs on the spot as if it were pollution to look upon it, had in a few minutes left it almost deserted. From a comparison of dates it appears, that a few hours after this judicial murder was perpetrated, Mr. Hastings was seated at his desk penning a letter to Dr. Samuel Johnson, on such topics as the tour in the Hebrides and the arts and productions of India.

Believing that Mr. Hastings might have prevented this horrid tragedy by a word, and yet did not choose to utter it, we have already inferred that he had carefully weighed the matter and satisfied himself that he would gain more by Nanda Kumar's death than by interfering to save his life. If this was his calculation, the immediate result certainly seemed to prove his accuracy. The herd of native informers at once disappeared. This was doubtless an unspeakable relief, and yet it would not be difficult to show that he purchased it at too dear a rate. The majority of the council had, by the bitterness of their language, and the violence of their proceedings, put themselves decidedly in the wrong. Had they been allowed to continue their reckless course while he stood calmly on the defensive, their ignorance, rashness, and malignity must soon have betrayed them into

serious blunders, and produced, even at home, a strong reaction in his favour. But when it came to be known, or at least generally believed, that for the purpose of stifling inquiry he had allowed a judicial murder to be committed, it was no longer possible for him to attract any share of public sympathy. Everything he said or did was construed in the worst possible sense; and when at last the whole of his Indian administration was brought under review, even those on whose aid he had most confidently calculated, chose to desert him rather than risk the loss of popularity by making common cause with him. In calculating the gain and loss of Mr. Hastings through Nanda Kumar's execution, if we place on the former side the silence which it imposed on herds of native informers, we must place on the latter side the general suspicion which it brought on all his proceedings, and which ultimately subjected him to all the anxiety and ruinous expense of a public impeachment. When the two sides of the account are thus stated, there is no difficulty in ascertaining where the balance will be found. On the one side, we see only relief from an annoyance which, however galling at the time, could not have been permanent; on the other, we see a sullied reputation and years of agony endured in repelling charges far more serious than native informers, however unscrupulous, would have ventured to suggest.

Shortly after Nanda Kumar had brought his first charges against Mr. Hastings, the majority of the council thought it desirable to examine Kantu Babu, the banyan of the latter, and summoned him to appear for that purpose. Mr. Hastings, on grounds which are not explained, and could not have been sufficient, prevented him from attending; and on a subsequent day, a motion was made and carried that Kantu Babu was contumacious. On a new summons, after having been threatened with the stocks, he made his appearance, and a very questionable transaction was disclosed. Under the revenue system adopted in 1772, one of the regulations was as follows:—"That no peshkar, banyan, or other servant, of whatever denomination, of the collector, or relation, or dependant of any such servant, be allowed to farm lands, nor directly or indirectly to hold a concern in any farm, nor to be security for any farmer; and if it shall appear that the collector shall have countenanced, approved, or

connived at a breach of this regulation, he shall stand *ipso facto* dismissed from his collectorship." The government intimated their sense of the greatness of the abuse which the regulation was intended to prevent, not only by the severity of the penalty, but by adding a commentary in the following terms:—"If the collector, or any persons who partake of his authority, are permitted to be farmers of the country, no other persons will dare to be their competitors. Of course they will obtain the farms on their own terms. It is not fit that the servants of the Company should be dealers with their masters. The collectors are checks on the farmers. If they themselves turn farmers, what checks can be found for them? What security will the Company have for their property? or where are the ryots to look for protection?" This reasoning is unanswerable, and goes much deeper than the regulation, which applies the prohibition only to collectors and their servants or dependants; whereas the principle on which it proceeds made it applicable to all other officials, whose power and influence might in like manner have been abused. Looking to the spirit, and not merely to the letter of the regulation, every individual high in office in the Company ought not only to have abstained personally, but also prohibited his dependants from being concerned, directly or indirectly, with the farming of lands. Above all persons, the head of the government ought to have been strictly observant of this rule; and it is therefore not without some degree of surprise and indignation, we learn that, in the year 1773, this Kantu Babu had managed, during the wholesale auction of that year, to obtain leases for five years, of no less than nineteen parganas or districts, at an aggregate rent, commencing at 1,333,664 rupees, and gradually rising to 1,411,885 (£141, 188, 10s.). In defence of this monster monopolist, Mr. Hastings could only say that he was not expressly struck at by the regulation, and that little or no profit was made. For himself, though he could not disclaim a knowledge of the transaction, he solemnly declared that he had no personal interest in it. The directors, when appealed to on the subject, expressed their decided disapprobation of the conduct of the late Bengal administration, in allowing Kantu Babu to hold lands; the majority of the council went, as usual, farther than the facts warranted, and made the sweeping declaration, that "in the

late proceedings of the revenue board there is no species of speculation from which the honourable governor-general has thought it right to abstain."

It is now high time to turn from the personal squabbles of the Calcutta council chamber, to matters of more public interest. Suja-ud-daulah, the nabob *vizir*, returned from Rohilkhand in the middle of December, 1774, in a state which made him incapable of deriving any pleasure from his late unwarrantable conquest. His health, become so indifferent as to confine him wholly to his private apartment, continued rapidly to decline, and he died on 26th of January, 1775. He was succeeded by his eldest legitimate son, under the title of Asaf-ud-daulah. On these events the majority of the council started a very strange doctrine. They held that the treaty with the late nabob expired at his death, and that they were therefore entitled to negotiate with the new nabob on the principle that all former arrangements had ceased to be binding. Where they had learned this novel dogma of international law does not appear, but it may be presumed that they were strongly confirmed in the belief of it by a perception of the profitable uses to which it might be applied. In one sense, as a very heavy debt was owing to the Company, it might have appeared that in the application of the doctrine the new nabob would have the advantage. If he was not to have the benefit of the treaties made with his father, neither could he be obliged to bear the burdens imposed by them. All the lacs owing to the Company by the late *vizir* would thus be wiped off by an application of the sponge. This was doubtless a logical inference; but it soon appeared that the gentlemen of the majority, who had started the dogma, had also determined on the mode of applying it. They were the stronger party, and knowing their strength, had resolved on dictating their own terms. These were, that all the sums of money due to the Company by the late nabob were to be fully, faithfully, and expeditiously discharged; that the purchase of Kora and Allahabad, for which fifty lacs had been paid or promised, should be ratified, but only on condition that, over and above the purchase money, the Company should receive a free grant of the territory of Benares, held under Oudh by the Raja Chait Singh as zamindar, and yielding a revenue of 2,210,000 rupees (£221,000);

and that the monthly pay of the Company's brigade in Oudh should be raised from 210,000 to 260,000; in other words, that the pay should be increased half a lac monthly, or at the rate of £120,000 per annum. There is no wonder that Asaf-ud-daulah evinced what Auber is pleased to call "the most fluctuating disposition," and did not consent to sign the new treaty till he found that delay and resistance would be equally unavailing. The negotiator of this treaty was Mr. Bristow, whom the majority of the council had substituted for Mr. Middleton as resident of Oudh; but the whole merit of it was claimed by, and was unquestionably due to Messrs. Clavering, Monson, and Francis, who say in their letter to the directors, "The measure is strictly and exclusively ours; the original plan was opposed in every step by the governor-general and Mr. Barwell." This was strictly true, for Mr. Hastings had not only denounced the plan when it was proposed, but lodged a minute, in which he declared it alike dishonourable and impolitic to extort from a young prince "concessions inconsistent with our former treaties, to which the necessity of his situation alone obliged him, however unwilling, to submit." It is curious to observe the different lights in which this transaction is viewed by the same parties, according as they themselves are affected by it. The injustice displayed in the Rohilla war was an abomination on which the majority of the council were never tired of declaiming; and yet, no sooner is an act of injustice in their power, than they hasten to perpetrate it. Why? In the one case they were gratifying personal resentment; in the other they believed they were ingratiating themselves with their employers. The conclusion is, that in neither case were they actuated by any honourable motive.

Great importance had all along been attached to the alliance with Oudh, which was represented as forming an effectual barrier between the Marathas and the territories of the Company. This was one of the main grounds on which it was attempted to justify the Rohilla war. Only, it was said, give the nabob the Ganges for his frontier, and Bengal will be secure. While it was thus assumed that the nabob was able not only to protect himself, but to shield the Company from foreign aggression, his internal administration was so miserably conducted as to be verging on

anarchy. Matters were not improved on the accession of Asaf-ud-daulah. Suspecting the fidelity of Bashir Khan, who commanded in Rohilkhand, he took the remedy to which despotism not unfrequently resorts, and gave orders for his assassination. Bashir Khan made a narrow escape across the river to Agra, where Shah Alam's general, Najif Khan, took him into his service. Shortly after, two chiefs, to whom the late nabob had intrusted his conquests in the Doab, threw off their allegiance, and declared themselves independent. These events, and other disturbances, occasioned by the ambition of Murtaza Khan, the prime minister, to whom Asaf-ud-daulah had entirely resigned himself, induced the council to interfere through Mr. Bristow, who brought the subject before the nabob, and also insisted on the more regular payment of the subsidy, which had fallen heavily into arrear. As the only available source of supply, the nabob applied to his mother, Babu Begum, who at his father's death had come into possession of his whole treasure. By entreaty, which, as Mr. Bristow and many of the leading men at court joined in it, must have partaken of the nature of a demand, she gave him in money a sum of thirty lacs, and a release for a sum of twenty-six lacs previously received, on his engaging, by a regular agreement, which the Company's resident ratified, not to molest her again for money.

To provide an efficient force, available both for defence and for maintaining tranquillity, the nabob was induced, at the same time when the above arrangements were made, to place his troops under European officers. This new mode of disciplining the army was giving great promise, when a new commotion broke out. The nabob had disbanded a body of matchlock men while their pay was five months in arrear. When they demanded it they were told to wait fifteen days. This they considered a mere evasion, and 4,000 of them set out for the nabob's camp, then in the Doab, at Etawa, on the banks of the Jamuna. He went out to meet them in person, but having failed to pacify them, determined to put them down by force. For this purpose he ordered 15,000 of his sepoys to be drawn out. Mr. Bristow remonstrated against this proceeding, but in vain; and ultimately a regular engagement took place, and of 2,500 matchlock men who stood their ground, 600 were killed and many

wounded. This new way of paying arrears was rather costly, for 300 of the sepoys fell. After the mutiny had been thus quelled, Asaf-ud-daulah spent whole days in dissipation, not only drinking to excess, but amusing himself with making all about him beastly drunk. Such was the ally from whom the Company had been taught to expect so much!

While the nabob was at Etawa, his ambition was gratified by obtaining from Shah Alam the office of *vizir* of the empire, which had been held by his father. He had, of course, paid for it with a present, which the emperor's necessities would make most welcome, and which, in all probability, far exceeded its real value, as it had become a mere empty title. The new dignity, at all events, did not improve the position of the nabob or the manners of his court. Intrigues and dissensions everywhere prevailed. Murtaza Khan, the favourite minister, behaved with arrogance, and was cordially hated as an upstart by older servants. At the head of the malcontents was Khoja Basant, an eunuch, who had distinguished himself by military talents, and stood at the head of the army. So violent was the mutual animosity between the eunuch and the minister, that they had come to high words in the nabob's presence. An apparent reconciliation had, however, been effected, and in token of it the eunuch invited the minister to an entertainment. After they had both drunk to excess, Khoja Basant retired on pretence of sickness, and a number of assassins rushing in, assassinated Murtaza Khan. The eunuch, pretending not to be privy to the atrocity, immediately waited on the nabob to clear himself. The nabob at once taxed him with the murder, and avenged it by ordering him to be beheaded. Sadat Ali, the nabob's brother, probably because he was implicated, and because he had been denied admittance at court, suspected his own life to be in danger, and insured his safety by mounting his horse and fleeing with precipitation to Najif Khan. The nabob thus in one day lost his minister and his general, and was abandoned by his brother. These sudden changes did not tend to improve his affairs, and he started off from Etawa for Lucknow. The army, left in a manner without a head, and grumbling at the irregularity and shortness of their pay, were ready to avail themselves of any pretext to break out into

mutiny. Jealousy of the command given to British officers furnished the first example; and several of the battalions under their charge, though at a distance from each other, commenced, as if by preconcerted signal, to set them at defiance. With difficulty some of the officers made their escape, and others succeeded in recovering their authority; and at last, by coercive measures, to which two of the Company's battalions lent their aid, the mutinous troops were reduced or dispersed.

There was still one general of whom the nabob had strong suspicions. This was Mahboob Ali Khan, whom he had formerly intrusted with the command of the district of Kora. In consequence partly of the suspicion entertained, the nabob applied for two of the Company's battalions to occupy that district. They were accordingly sent, under the command of Colonel Parker, who seems to have possessed more zeal than judgment. Instead of waiting for proof which might have confirmed the suspicion, or, it may be, proved it groundless, he began with the rash step of disarming Mahboob's officers. His next proceeding was very eccentric. When he was approaching Mahboob's troops they received him with a salute of twenty-one guns. Ostensibly this was meant as an honour; but he interpreted it into an act of defiance, and demanded, in the nabob's name, the surrender of the guns. No sooner was this refused than he ordered his men to the attack, and, after an affair of ten minutes, routed Mahboob's troops and took possession of their whole park of artillery. These unfortunate proceedings looked like the commencement of a civil war and threw the nabob into great perplexity, which he is said to have evinced at one time by denouncing Mahboob as a traitor, and thanking Colonel Parker for his service, and at another time by allowing Mahboob to appear at court, and bestowing upon him some marks of favour. The Bengal council appear to have been also thrown into some degree of perplexity. It had now become apparent that Oudh was more likely to prove an incumbrance than a valuable ally; and even Mr. Hastings must have had some misgivings as to his treaty of Benares. He had removed the Rohillas, whose military prowess and love of freedom would have made them powerful auxiliaries in repelling the Marathas, who were aiming at their destruction; and he

had substituted for them a government so torn by intestine dissensions as to be utterly incapable of making head against a foreign aggressor. The conclusion, however painful and humiliating, must almost have been forced upon him, that he had mistaken the true interest of the Company, and, in agreeing to the treaty of Benares, not only done an act of injustice, but committed a political blunder.

Shortly after the proclamation of the new government in Bengal, the governor-general and council communicated with the other two presidencies, calling their attention to the subordinate position in which they had been placed by the Regulating Act, and requiring them to furnish information in regard to the various topics on which the Bengal council, as supreme, might require to offer advice or give judgment. The councils of both presidencies lost no time in framing reports and transmitting them to Calcutta. In that from Madras the proceedings which had terminated in the deposition of the Raja of Tanjore, and in that from Bombay the relations which had been formed with Raghoba, were the subjects brought most prominently forward. To these, therefore, it will now be proper to return.

The city of Tanjore, it will be remembered, was taken by assault on the 17th of September, 1773, and was immediately, with the whole of the raja's territories, put into possession of the Nabob of Arcot. This transaction was in direct violation of the treaty of 1762, by which the integrity of the raja's territories was guaranteed to him by the Company. The obligations of this treaty had been extinguished by a flimsy device concerted by the nabob, and connived at, if not directly sanctioned, by the Madras council; and hence the directors, so far from approving of the measures by which the raja had been made a prisoner and dethroned, expressed their displeasure in the strongest manner, by reprimanding the members of council, removing Mr. Wynch, the governor, and sending out Lord Pigot, not only to succeed him, but to replace the raja on the *masnad*. Lord Pigot was not new to the office conferred upon him. He was the same individual as the Mr. Pigot who was governor of Madras during the eventful period when the campaigns of Coote and Lally were deciding the question

of British or French ascendancy in India. He had returned to England in 1763, with a large fortune, said to have been mainly accumulated by lending money to native rulers; and he had managed to employ part of it in such a way as to procure for himself an Irish peerage. His re-appointment as governor was not obtained without a struggle. The directors decided by a small majority in favour of Mr. Rumbold, but the general court reversed their decision, and gave the preference to Lord Pigot; and as one great object in the appointment was to secure the restoration of the raja, there could not be a better choice. The treaty of 1762 had been concluded under his auspices; he plumed himself upon it, and must have been delighted with the opportunity of giving effect to it after it was to all appearance extinguished for ever.

Lord Pigot took his seat as governor of Madras on the 11th of December, 1775. On the subject of the restoration of the raja, the instructions of the directors were that he was to be reinstated in his territories as they existed in 1762. Some important conditions were, however, to be added to the treaty of that year. The raja was to be taken bound to allow Tanjore to be garrisoned by the Company's troops, and assign lands for their maintenance; to pay the nabob's tribute, and assist him with such troops as the Company should concur with him in requiring; and to form no treaty with foreign powers without the Company's sanction, nor give any assistance to their enemies. The raja, now a prisoner, was only too glad to submit to any stipulations that were to procure him his liberty and re-establish him in his territories; but the nabob, of course, felt very differently. Tanjore, which he had so long coveted, was now in his possession, and he could not consent to see it again wrested from him. Knowing how decided his opposition would be, the Madras council, on being made acquainted with the instructions of the directors, determined to use the utmost delicacy in communicating them to him, and Lord Pigot held several interviews with him, for the purpose of breaking the subject gradually. It was impossible, however, to reconcile him to a measure which undid what had been one of the main objects of his life; and except force, which he knew would be utterly unavailing, there was no kind of obstacle which he did not try to interpose.

Tanjore, he said, belonged to him of right, and had even been so recognized by the King of England himself, who, in a letter delivered by his plenipotentiary, congratulated him on the success of an expedition which he had made against it; the raja had at all events forfeited his right by presuming to alienate part of his territories without consent, and holding treasonable correspondence with the Company's enemies, whereas he had ever been a faithful ally. "I have been long a friend of the Company," he exclaimed; "I have placed my life and honour, and those of my children, in their hands, by fixing my residence at Madras; my father's life was sacrificed for them; my riches have been expended in their service; and I now beg from their friendship that they will have pity upon an old man's gray hairs." "This appeal," says Auber, "was calculated to interest the most indifferent person in wishing that the claims of the nabob should be acknowledged;" and it is therefore not out of place to mention, that not many months before the appeal was made, this faithful friend, who had grown gray in serving the Company, had been entertaining the ambassadors of Hyder with a glowing description of "the delight with which they should hereafter mutually view, from the terrace on which they were then seated, the expulsion of the last infidel Englishman over the surf which foamed at their feet."

When the appeal proved unavailing, the nabob used an argument which, as it affected the interest of some of the members of council, might perhaps have been more successful if the instructions had been less peremptory. How, he asked, could he be expected to pay the English creditors, to whom he was so largely indebted, if the revenues of Tanjore, forming a main branch of their security, were taken from him? His last plea was delay. There must be some mistake in the matter. The directors must have been imposed upon by false reports. His representation of the true state of the case would undeceive them; and therefore, in justice to all parties, no final step ought to be taken without giving the directors another opportunity of revising their decision. These prettexts, how much soever they may have influenced the other members of council, had no weight with Lord Pigot, who lost no time in preparing for the immediate restoration of the raja. The crop was at this

time on the ground, and it was of importance that it should be reaped for his benefit. The first step taken was to garrison Tanjore with a body of the Company's troops, under command of Colonel Harper. Sir Robert Fletcher, who had again become commander-in-chief at Madras, thought the restoration of the raja belonged of right to his office, and was much disappointed when Lord Pigot claimed this honour for himself, and was invested by the council with full powers for that purpose. Instead of urging his own claim, however, he appears to have contented himself with proposing that two other members of council should accompany his lordship, as a check upon his proceedings. The board, he argued, were not justified in delegating unlimited powers, and by doing so in the present case, while there was no extreme necessity to justify it, were furnishing a precedent by which individuals might serve their own corrupt interests at the expense of the public. His opposition was not effectual, but the spirit which dictated it remained, and was destined not to be long dormant.

On the 8th of April, 1776, Lord Pigot arrived at Tanjore, and on the 11th the restoration of the raja was proclaimed. The feelings of the prince when thus raised from a prison to re-occupy his throne, were vividly expressed in an address, in which he said, "Had I a thousand tongues I could not express my gratitude." As may be supposed, he readily agreed to every concession that was asked of him. Besides receiving a garrison into his capital, he placed the whole country under the protection of the Company's troops, and instead of an assignment of lands for the expense, undertook to defray it by the annual payment of a slump sum of four lacs of pagodas (about £160,000). On the 5th of May, when Lord Pigot returned to Madras and reported his proceedings, the council, though expressing their approbation generally, soon showed that in regard to particulars, a decided difference of opinion existed. Paul Benfield, a civil servant of the Company in a subordinate position, had addressed a letter to Lord Pigot at Tanjore, immediately after the restoration of the raja, intimating that he held assignments on the revenues of Tanjore to the amount of £160,000, for money lent to the nabob, and assignments on the growing crop to the amount of £72,000, for money lent to

individuals. How this enormous sum, amounting in the aggregate to not much less than a quarter of a million sterling, could have been lent by a junior civilian with a salary inadequate to his current expenses, was not explained, but the pretext at least must have been that he was not himself the principal creditor, but the agent of the creditors by whom the sums had been lent. Lord Pigot, on receiving the intimation, simply answered that he could do nothing more than lay it before the board. Benfield did not choose to submit to any delay, and wrote to the council requesting their "assistance to recover his property, while the right honourable president under their commission remained in authority over those countries."

When, a few days after Lord Pigot's return, the claim was brought under the consideration of the board, Benfield was called upon for his vouchers. He had none, and endeavoured to supply the want of them by referring to the records of the *Kachehri* or court where the obligations were registered, and to the nabob, who, he said, would acknowledge the debt. The claim for money lent to individuals, originally stated at £72,000, was no sooner submitted to examination than it dwindled down to £12,000. The only conclusion at which it was possible to arrive, was that the far greater part of the claim was fictitious, and was, in fact, a gigantic scheme of fraud, reared up probably by collusion with the nabob, for the purpose of cheating the raja. The council, without expressly adopting this view, acted upon it, by deciding that they could not "comply with Mr. Benfield's request in any respect, those claims on individuals which bear the appearance of having no connection with government not being sufficiently explained to enable the board to form an opinion thereon, and the assignment of the nabob not being admissible." This decision was given on the 29th of May. Four days after, on the 3rd of June, the council retraced their steps, and voted, by a majority, that their decision should be reconsidered. The pretext was, that when they decided against Mr. Benfield they supposed that he had *demand*ed, whereas it now appeared that he had only *request*ed their assistance. This was too flimsy to impose upon any one, and there is no want of charity in believing that on this occasion the majority gave golden opinions. Having

once committed themselves, they showed all the zeal of young converts in carrying out their new views; and after personally insulting their president, by taking the initiative of business out of his hands, decided, in opposition to him, that the nabob was entitled to make assignments on Tanjore, that the assignments so made formed public claims, and that the raja should be instructed to recognize the validity of the pledges in corn held by Mr. Benfield.

The dissensions in the Madras council, thus commenced, soon outrivalled those of the council of Bengal, and were followed with more extraordinary results. The garrison of Tanjore had been left in charge of Colonel Harper, but Colonel Stuart, the second in command of the Madras army, chose to consider Tanjore as now the most important station of the Company's troops, and claimed the command of it as his right. In this he was zealously supported by his superior officer, Sir Robert Fletcher, who, having found himself once more in his proper element, in the midst of strife, had leagued with the majority. The propriety of appointing a resident at Tanjore was unanimously admitted, but the nomination of the individual who should hold the office gave rise to a violent contention. Lord Pigot proposed Mr. Russell, because he believed he would carry out his views; the majority, for that very reason, opposed him, and proposed Colonel Stuart, who would thus combine the offices of resident and commandant. The latter was of course appointed; but on the 19th of August, when it was moved that a copy of instructions for Colonel Stuart, prepared by Sir Robert Fletcher, should be taken into consideration, the president refused to put the question. The council was in consequence adjourned till the following day. As soon as it met the old motion was renewed, and the president went even a step farther than before, by declaring that he would not allow the question to be agitated. This violent stretch of authority gave the majority a great advantage over him. Disregarding his menace, they approved of the instructions, and prepared a letter to Colonel Harper, desiring him to give up his command at Tanjore to Colonel Stuart. The president refused to sign either of the papers, and insisted that without his signature they were of no authority. The council adjourned for two days. When they again met on the 22nd, the majority produced a

minute, containing a series of propositions, to the effect that the vote of the majority constitutes an act of government, without the concurrence of the president by signature or otherwise, and that it was unconstitutional for the president to refuse either to put a question or to execute the decisions of the majority. Lord Pigot offered to refer these propositions to the directors, and to leave matters at rest in the meantime. This was refused, and the majority resolved that if the president still persisted in his refusal to sign the papers, a written order should be given to the secretary to sign them in name of the council. This resolution brought matters to a crisis, and the following singular proceedings took place.

After the order to the secretary was written out and approved, the majority began to sign it, and two of them had put down their names, when the president snatched up the paper, and, taking another out of his pocket, said that he had a charge to present. While the order to the secretary was in preparation, he had retired to his own apartment, and drawn up the document which he now read. The charge was, that Messrs. Brooke and Stratton, two of the majority, had, by signing the order to the secretary, been guilty of an act subversive of the authority of government. By the standing orders of the Company, no member of council when accused could vote on any question relating to the accusation, and hence the immediate effect of the charge was to reduce the two factions to an equality, and thus give the president a casting vote. He lost not a moment in availing himself of the privilege, and carried a motion suspending the two members whom he had accused. On the following day, the 23rd of August, the members constituting the former majority, instead of attending, sent a formal protest by a notary, in which, after denouncing the proceedings of yesterday, they declared themselves to be the governing body, and claimed the obedience of the presidency. This claim was not allowed to remain inoperative, for the protest was immediately served on the commanders of the troops, and all persons in authority. The president forthwith summoned the council, and as none but his own party attended, found no difficulty in passing a vote, by which he suspended the whole of the members who had signed the protest, and ordered Sir Robert Fletcher to

be put under arrest, preparatory to his being tried by court-martial.

The president had now taken the lead in violence, but this was a privilege which he did not long possess. Considering themselves vested with all the powers of government, the majority, on the evening of the same day (the 23rd), summoned a council, at which, besides appointing Colonel Stuart commander-in-chief for the time, in consequence of the illness of Sir Robert Fletcher, they took the far bolder step of resolving to arrest the president. This task was assigned to Colonel Stuart, whose mode of executing it evinced, to say the least, a singular want of delicacy and honourable feeling. His appointment as commander-in-chief had been acquiesced in by Lord Pigot, and he spent the greater part of the 24th in business with his lordship. He breakfasted with him, dined with him, and had accepted an invitation to sup with him. At this time all the arrangements for the arrest had been made; Lord Pigot, without the least suspicion of what was intended, was returning home in his carriage, when it was surrounded by troops, and his intended guest, who was sitting beside him, showed him his warrant, and told him that he must consider himself a prisoner. In this very unexpected character, accordingly, he was conveyed to his residence at St. Thomas' Mount, and detained in custody. To make their assumption of power complete, the majority suspended all the councillors of the opposite party.

Lord Pigot having claimed the protection of the king's flag, Sir Edward Hughes, the British admiral on the station, wrote to the board on the 25th of August, "I am to require, in his majesty's name, that you give orders for his lordship's safe conduct to my ship." No answer was made, and on the 4th of September, when the admiral waited on the council, various questions were put to him as to his becoming responsible for Lord Pigot in the event of his being given up. The admiral declined to be interrogated till a formal answer was given to his application of the 25th. This was given, but on finding that it contained stipulations, he replied in substance, that "the requisition for safe conduct to his ship being made in the king's name, could not admit of terms. He could only repeat, and again require that safe custody might be given his lordship to the admiral's ship." The council made bold to refuse in the following terms:—"As loyal

subjects to his majesty, and faithful servants to the Company, we shall always show the greatest veneration for the sacred name of his majesty, and the utmost respect for the British flag; but having no proof that his majesty empowers any of his officers to require the removal of any servant of the Company, in a similar situation with Lord Pigot, from under the authority of the Company's government, we beg to add that this is another reason why we cannot surrender his lordship." Sir Edward Hughes closed the correspondence by remarking truly, yet sarcastically—"I confess I should have been disappointed to have been told that you had any proof before you that his majesty had empowered any of his officers to require the removal of any servant of the Company in a similar situation with Lord Pigot. I believe the case to be unexampled, and I feel in my heart that I have done my duty to his majesty and to my country in making the requisition. I must leave the results and all ill consequences with you."

These very extraordinary proceedings were known in England in the beginning of 1777, and produced mingled feelings of surprise and indignation. It was apparent enough that neither party was free from blame, and that Lord Pigot, by the high hand with which he endeavoured to carry matters, had pushed them to extremity, when a little moderation might have kept them within bounds. Still, the outrageous proceeding of making him a prisoner, and the revolting manner in which it was effected, made him an object of general sympathy. The directors, indeed, who owed Lord Pigot a grudge because his appointment had been in a manner forced upon them, were almost equally divided as to the course which ought to be followed. Not so the proprietors. At a general court, held on the 26th of March, 1777, it was resolved, by a majority of 382 to 140, to recommend to the directors to take effectual measures for restoring Lord Pigot to the exercise of his authority, and for inquiring into the conduct of the principal actors in his imprisonment. So little, however, were the directors as a body disposed to follow this recommendation, that on the 11th of April they resolved, only by a casting vote, that Lord Pigot and his party should be restored to their situations, and that seven members of the council, Sir Robert Fletcher, the com-

mander-in-chief, included, should be suspended from the service. As a kind of set-off to this resolution, several parts of Lord Pigot's conduct were directly censured. The whole question, however, was not yet finally disposed of. Other resolutions were brought forward, for the purpose of apportioning the blame more impartially; and at last, on the 9th of May, a general court, by a majority of 414 to 317, adopted a kind of middle course, by strongly disapproving of Lord Pigot's removal, but at the same time recommending that his lordship, as well as the other members of council, should be recalled, in order that their conduct might undergo a full inquiry.

The final decision of the directors was not adopted till 10th June, 1777, when they issued a commission, restoring Lord Pigot to his office, but directing him within a week after the despatch of the first ship after his restoration, to deliver the government to Sir Thomas Rumbold, who had been appointed his successor, and either in that ship, or the next after it, to take his passage to England. The members of council who had removed Lord Pigot were recalled, and those military officers who had taken the chief part in arresting and confining him, were to be tried by court-martial on the spot. On the 11th of May, a month before the commission restoring him was issued, Lord Pigot was a corpse. The ignominious treatment to which he had been subjected, and a constitution enfeebled by old age and an Indian climate, had concurred in producing this melancholy result. It is impossible to believe that such a result had been anticipated by his enemies; and yet, as under the circumstances it was by no means improbable, they had made themselves in some degree responsible for it. In regard to the general questions raised, it must be admitted that great faults were committed on both sides; and faults, it is to be feared, produced not so much by mere error as by something of a less reputable character. In itself the great bone of contention—the appointment of a resident to Tanjore—was very trivial, but it was made the turning-point on which an important course of policy was to depend. The real struggle was between the nabob and the raja. They were, in fact, the heads of the parties into which the council was divided; and if mutual recrimination can afford any ground for judgment, they had gained

their adherents by the most corrupt means. The sudden change of opinion in the majority of the council in regard to Paul Benfield's claim, was the result not of conviction, but of something which to minds of a certain cast is far more powerful than conviction; on the other hand, if it be true, as Admiral Pigot asserted in the House of Commons, that bribes amounting to £600,000 were offered to his brother, only to delay the restoration of Tanjore, it is difficult to believe that during his personal visit to Tanjore the raja did not give him a substantial compensation for the sacrifice made in his behalf. Before Lord Pigot's death was known, the Madras proceedings were brought under the notice of parliament, and attracted little attention; but in a subsequent session, on the 16th of April, 1779, Admiral Pigot succeeded in carrying a series of resolutions, one of which directed an address to the crown, for the prosecution by the attorney-general of four members of the majority, who had returned to England. These members were accordingly tried for a misdemeanour, convicted, and fined £1,000 each.

The conduct pursued by the Bengal government during this unhappy contention is not unworthy of notice. It will be remembered that by the Regulating Act the governor-general and council were invested with a limited "power of superintending and controlling the government and management" of the other presidencies. The only cases in which this power could be directly exercised was in commencing hostilities, or negotiating treaties with any Indian princes or powers, the other presidencies being expressly prohibited from doing either, "without the consent and approbation of the said governor-general and council first had and obtained", except in cases of imminent necessity. But though these were the only cases in which direct interference is authorized, a certain degree of indirect interference is sanctioned by a subsequent clause, which strictly enjoins the other presidencies "constantly and diligently to transmit to the said governor-general and council advice and intelligence of all transactions and matters whatsoever that shall come to their knowledge relating to the government, revenues, or interests" of the Company. In accordance with this injunction, the governor-general and council appear to have been made acquainted with the schism in the Madras council.

From the many features which it had in common with the similar schism in Bengal, it might have been expected that each party in the latter council would have sympathized with the one in Madras, which was congenial to its own; and that thus, while Mr. Hastings' opponents would approve of the majority, he himself and Mr. Barwell would have taken the part of Lord Pigot. Strange to say, the Bengal council, who seldom agreed in anything, were in this instance unanimous. "On the affairs of Madras", writes Mr. Hastings in a letter to a friend, "we are all of one mind, thank God." And what was this one mind? Mr. Gleig tells us in his memoirs. Mr. Hastings "acquiesced himself, and persuaded his colleagues to acquiesce in the new arrangements." These so-called "new arrangements" included all the proceedings of the majority—their inconsistent and contradictory decision in the case of Paul Benfield, their removal, arrest, and imprisonment of Lord Pigot, and all the numerous irregularities which the directors, though at first willing to screen them, were compelled at last to condemn, and for which four of the members of council who took the lead in them were afterwards, by the express command of parliament, prosecuted to conviction. This makes the unqualified approbation of the Bengal council all the more wonderful, and almost justifies a suspicion that the conduct of Mr. Hastings, so different from what might have been expected from him on this occasion, proceeded from some secret motive not explained. Even if he believed that the majority were right in the main, common humanity might have suggested the propriety of insisting, or at least recommending, that the governor should be relieved from personal restraint. While thus committing themselves to an approval of the extreme measures adopted at Madras, the Bengal council took a very different course in regard to the proceedings at Bombay. To these we must now attend.

The capture of Salsette and the small islands in Bombay harbour, though effected ostensibly for the purpose of excluding the Portuguese, placed the Company in a very awkward position in regard to the Marathas. From some feeling of pride, or principle of policy, they had always piqued themselves on the possession of Salsette; and hence, though they were at this time

distracted by a civil war, in which the object of contest was the office of peshwa—in other words, the sovereign power—the attention of both the contending parties was at once drawn to the proceedings at Bombay. The council continued, as they had begun, to play a double game; and while offering friendly explanations of their conduct to the ministerial party at Poona, were actively negotiating a treaty with Raghoba. He had applied, as we have seen, for their assistance, but declined the terms on which they proposed to grant it, when he found that the cession of Salsette was one of them. This was about the end of September, 1774. At this time Raghoba's prospects had brightened by the professed adhesion to his cause of the two powerful Maratha chiefs, Holkar and Sindhia. With their aid he must ultimately have triumphed; and for this reason, perhaps, did not think it necessary or prudent to purchase the Company's assistance by agreeing to a cession which would have brought him into discredit with the great body of his countrymen. It was not long, however, before the ministerial party induced Holkar and Sindhia to secede, and thereby established such an ascendancy, that Raghoba, unable to keep the field, was compelled to make a hasty retreat into Gujarat. In taking this direction he had two objects in view. The one was to obtain the aid of the Gaikwar Govind Rao, on whom, as he had been the means of securing his succession to the Gaikwar territories, he could confidently calculate; the other was to renew his negotiation with the Bombay presidency. Immediately after reaching Baroda, on the 3rd of January, 1775, he again opened a communication with Mr. Gambier, the Company's factor at Surat. His misfortunes, which made him less fastidious than before as to the terms, ought to have made the Bombay council more circumspect, and ought to have induced them to pause before committing themselves to the support of one of the parties in a civil war which was still raging. If Raghoba should prevail all would be well; but if, as was now more probable, he should be worsted, the necessary effect of supporting him would be to bring the Company into direct and violent collision with the Maratha government. Undeterred by the alternative thus presented, the Bombay council never hesitated, and on the 6th of March concluded

a treaty, by which they recognized Raghoba as the true peshwa, and agreed to furnish him immediately with 500 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys, with a due proportion of artillery. This force was ultimately to be increased to 3,000 men in all, of whom 700 or 800 were to be Europeans. In return for this assistance Raghoba ceded in perpetuity Bassein with its dependencies, the island of Salsette and the other islands, and other districts, yielding in all nineteen lacs and twenty-five thousand rupees of revenue, and engaged to pay at the rate of one lac and a half of rupees monthly, as the expense of 2,500 men. He also undertook to procure the cession of the Gaikwar's share of the Baroach revenue, to defray all the expenses which the Company might incur in obtaining possession of the specified cessions, and to guarantee both the Company's possessions in Bengal and those of the Nabob of Arcot from Maratha incursions. As Raghoba had no money, he deposited with the Company, under promise of redemption, jewels valued at six lacs, in security of a stipulated advance.

The Bombay government must have been conscious that in concluding this treaty they had exceeded their powers, and made themselves liable to the penalty of suspension from office. The Regulating Act, in a clause already quoted, expressly prohibits the presidencies of Madras and Bombay from concluding any treaty with a native power or prince in India, without the previous sanction of the Bengal government, or specific instructions from the court of directors. They could not plead either of these, and were therefore guilty of a palpable breach of law. They seem, however, to have had no scruples on this head, and had, even before the treaty was concluded, begun to make the preparations which they knew that their engagements under it would render necessary. The treaty was not actually concluded till the 6th of March, 1775, but at least a month before this the auxiliary force to be given to Raghoba had been provided, and it was only the end of February when a detachment of 1,500 men, of whom 80 were European artillery, and 350 European infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Thomas Keating, sailed from Bombay for Surat. A reinforcement was to follow on the arrival of troops expected from Madras. The expedition anchored at Surat bar on the

27th of February, and received news of a disaster which rendered Raghoba's cause almost desperate. The army of the Poona government, mustering, with part of the troops of Holkar and Sindhia, about 30,000 men, under command of Hari Pant Phadke, had entered Gujarat in pursuit of Raghoba, and forced him to an engagement, during which he became so alarmed at symptoms of backwardness and treachery among his own troops, that he suddenly quitted the field of battle, and fled with about 1,000 horse to Cambay. The nabob of that place, though before friendly, was afraid to receive him as a fugitive, and Raghoba was only enabled, by the assistance of the Company's factor, to make his way to Surat. He had been here four days when Colonel Keating arrived.

The Bombay government must have felt themselves in a dilemma; and when, on the 7th of March, the course to be pursued was discussed, Mr. Daniel Draper, one of the members of council, argued that as no formal ratification of the treaty had taken place, the great change of circumstances, and the inadequacy of their means to the end proposed, made delay both justifiable and advisable, at least till it could be ascertained what number of Raghoba's party was likely to reassemble, and what resources of money and troops could be afforded from the other presidencies. This proposal seemed far too pusillanimous and desponding. Governor Hornby appears to have thought that his 1,500 men would be a match for the whole Maratha army, and Colonel Keating, who had been injudiciously selected for the command, gave a superabundant proof of ignorance and presumption, by congratulating the government on their good fortune at finding Raghoba so destitute that he would be entirely dependent on them for his future success. The remains of Raghoba's army had been collected in the neighbourhood of Cambay, and the resolution of the Company was, that for the purpose of forming a junction with them they should disembark at that port. Before quitting Cambay the expedition was reinforced by two companies of grenadiers and a battalion of sepoys, which raised the whole force under Colonel Keating to 2,500 men. On the 19th of April a junction was formed, about eleven miles north-east of Cambay, with Raghoba's fugitive army. It was in a most disorderly state, clamouring for pay, and little

better than an undisciplined rabble, all the more unmanageable from their numbers, which made up nearly 20,000. The enemy, under the command of Hari Pant, amounted to about 25,000 men, of whom only 5,000 were infantry.

On the 23rd of April, Raghoba's whole army, the British detachment included, began to move northwards, but made so little progress, that after ten days they were only thirty miles north of Cambay. This sluggishness was owing partly to imperfect commissariat arrangements, and still more to the indecision of Raghoba, who was inclined to proceed to Ahmedabad, and remain there during the monsoon, while the Bombay government were urging him to push on at once for Poona. This was the direction at last taken, and the army kept moving by slow marches towards the Mhye, where a decisive action was expected, as it was known that Hari Pant Phadke had orders from Poona to attack Raghoba if he should attempt to cross that river. On the morning of the 18th May, when the army had arrived near Arass, a smart cannonade from six guns suddenly opened from behind a grove in their rear, and a large body of the enemy were seen advancing. The cannonade was soon silenced, but it being observed that two of the guns had not been withdrawn, it was suggested, more chivalrously than wisely, "to have a dash at them." For this purpose, the two companies of grenadiers, with the rear-guard, advanced rapidly, and had just formed for the attack, when they were charged by a body of the enemy's horse. No sooner were these repulsed with slaughter, than a second charge, more desperate than the first, was made. It was likewise repulsed, but at a heavier cost, many of the grenadiers, including two captains, being cut down. Colonel Keating managed his artillery well, but neglected to support his exhausted men with fresh troops. The Marathas took advantage of this oversight, and by blocking up the narrow way with two elephants, charged the grenadiers in the rear, and cut them off from the main body. The men, undismayed, faced about, and routed whatever was opposed to them; but Raghoba's undisciplined hordes, careering about and interposing between the advanced body and the British line, caused infinite confusion. Suddenly, without any apparent cause, they turned right about and retreated at a quick pace. It was afterwards

ascertained that the command of their officer "to face to the right," had been mistaken for "right about face." The consequences were disastrous. The sepoy, fancying themselves defeated, also turned, and the rest of the Europeans followed. Ultimately their ranks were broken, and the whole grenadiers and rear-guard rushed towards the line, while the enemy, profiting by the confusion, mingled with them sword in hand, and made great slaughter. Notwithstanding this most unfortunate occurrence, the steadiness of the line and the admirably-served artillery redeemed the day, and the Marathas were finally routed. As a victory it was dearly purchased. The loss of the detachment was 222 men; of these, eighty-six, including eleven officers, were Europeans.

Colonel Keating deposited his wounded at Baroach, which he reached on the 29th of May. He did not march again till the 8th of June. His intention was to cross the Narmada, but the ford proving impracticable, he began on the 10th to move up the banks of the river. After a march of twenty miles, having learned that Hari Pant was still on the same side of the river, and only eight or ten miles in advance, he attempted to surprise him, and would have succeeded, had not some of Raghoba's troops, in their eagerness for plunder, spread an alarm in the enemy's camp, and enabled him to escape. The campaign, though unpromising at first, had been tolerably successful. Not only had the enemy been routed in the field, but a considerable sum of money, at a time when it was most urgently required, had been obtained by the submission of Fateh Singh in Gujarat. This chief, the brother of Govind Rao, had long contested the Gaikwar succession with him, but seeing the turn which events had taken, was anxious for an arrangement. Some difficulty was found in calming the animosities and reconciling the interests of the brothers. At last a treaty was framed, by which Fateh Singh became bound to furnish 3,000 horse, who were to be at Raghoba's service without pay, and to provide if required 2,000 more, for whom pay was to be allowed. The other more important articles were that Fateh Singh was to pay Raghoba twenty-six lacs of rupees in sixty-one days, and that the Company were to receive the Gaikwar's share of the Baroach revenue, and several villages estimated to yield two lacs and

thirteen thousand rupees. This was not the whole of the advantages secured to the Company; for Raghoba, to testify his gratitude, permanently ceded to them tracts of territory, of which the estimated annual revenue was two lacs and seventy-seven thousand rupees. Adding together all that the Company had acquired by the war, the accession of revenue was valued at about £240,000. Of all this possession had been obtained, with the exception of Bassein and its dependencies.

While Raghoba was thus elated by his success, the ministerial party were proportionably discouraged. Hari Pant after his surprise had hurried across the Narmada, and returned to the Deccan. An officer, Gunnah Pant Beeray, whom he had left in command of a detachment for the protection of Ahmedabad, had been equally unfortunate as his master, and had sustained a defeat from Amin Khan, one of Raghoba's officers, by whom the siege of Ahmedabad had been forthwith commenced. Sukaram Bapu and Nana Farnavis, the leading ministers at Poona, began to fear that worse disasters were still in store for them. Mudaji Bhonsla, the Maratha Raja of Berar, though he had strongly declared against Raghoba when he was a fugitive, was suspected of an inclination to join him in his better fortunes; Nizam Ali, too, who was always on the alert to turn events to his own advantage, had succeeded, under a threat of joining Raghoba, in extorting from the Poona ministers cessions to the value of nearly eighteen lacs of annual revenue; Sindhia and Holkar, in the same way, had stipulated for new advantages, and obtained at least abundance of promises. The most encouraging circumstance to the Poona ministers was the dislike generally entertained to Raghoba. He had habitually thwarted and even attempted to undermine the wise and virtuous Madhu Rao, whose memory was held in veneration; if not an instigator to the murder, he was certainly in league with the murderers of Narain Rao; he was now claiming the office of peshwa to the prejudice of the legitimate heir, Narain Rao's posthumous son; and he had made himself the special abomination of the Brahmins, by his present connection with usurping, impure Europeans. On all these grounds there was some reason to hope that he could not finally triumph. Still it was impossible to deny that Raghoba's success had sufficed to modify the

opinions of many, and that a new campaign, as successful as that which had been just concluded, would have enabled him either to dictate terms to his enemies, or made them glad to come to an accommodation with him. Fortune, however, was about to give another turn to her wheel.

The Bengal government having been invested for the first time with the power of controlling the other presidencies in matters of peace and war, were not disposed to think lightly of it, and therefore were not a little offended when they learned that the Bombay council had been acting of their own accord, as if they were still their own absolute masters, and under no obligation to consult them. In answer to the first intimation from Bengal, that the new government had been proclaimed, and that an account of the state of affairs at Bombay was expected, the council had, as we have seen, furnished a report. It was dated 31st December, 1774, but had not reached Bengal when, in February, 1775, the governor-general and council learned from a different source that the siege of Tanna had commenced. This seemed to them like open contempt of their authority, and they addressed a letter to the Bombay presidency, censuring them for having gone to war with the Marathas, and calling for an explanation. On the 31st of March the Bombay council reported their proceedings up to that date; and, of course, gave an account of the treaty which they had finally concluded with Raghoba on the 6th of this month, and the execution which it had so far received by the actual sailing of the expedition under Colonel Keating. If the governor and council were dissatisfied before, they now set no limits to their displeasure. For the moment their intestine strife was forgotten, and both majority and minority agreed in a common sentence of condemnation.

This condemnatory despatch, dated 31st May, reached Bombay on the 12th of August, and must there have been read with feelings of dismay. It pronounced the treaty with Raghoba "invalid," and the Maratha war "impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized, and unjust;" protested that the Bombay government should be held liable for all consequences; and peremptorily enjoined them "to withdraw their forces to their own garrisons, in whatsoever state their affairs might be, unless their safety should be endangered by an instant retreat." Not satisfied with this, they

intimated their intention to send an agent of their own to open a negotiation with the Poona government. Meanwhile the council were to retain possession of Salsette and Bassein, but on no account to form any treaty without previous sanction. The Bombay government endeavoured without success to defend their conclusion of the treaty, in direct defiance of the Regulating Act, which made it imperative on them before doing so to have the express sanction of the government of Bengal, and dwelt on the shame and degradation which would be the consequence of retracting the treaty. With a better show of reason, they remonstrated against the intention to supersede them in the management of the presidency, by sending a plenipotentiary to the court of Poona. It may be questioned, indeed, if such an appointment was not as gross a violation of the act as anything which the Bombay council had yet done. The superintending and controlling power conferred on the governor-general and council, even in regard to the making of war and the negotiating of treaties, amounted to nothing more than a veto. Their consent was to be obtained, and of course, when refused, no action could legally be taken. This negative, however, has no resemblance whatever to an initiative, though this was evidently the effect which it must have had if it authorized the appointment of a plenipotentiary for the purpose now contemplated. This extraordinary step, however, had already been taken. Sukaram Bapu, at the head of the Poona ministry, had been informed, by a letter from the governor-general, that the conduct of the Bombay government was contrary to the Company's order, "because they have directed all their officers not to make any war, nor enter on any dispute." He added, more grandiloquently than truly, "My employer, the King of England, has directed that all the Company's governors in India should obtain mine and my council's permission, as king's governor and council of Bengal, either to make war or peace." In conclusion, he intimated that he had issued orders to desist from hostilities, and requested the Maratha government to do the same, preparatory to the negotiation of a peace, for which purpose he was about to send an envoy. That no time might be lost, Lieutenant-colonel Upton immediately started for Poona in this capacity.

It will be remembered that when the above letter was written, the latest accounts from Bombay to Bengal had been carried down only to the 31st of March, and consequently that the governor-general and council were entirely ignorant of the results of the campaign. These were subsequently explained in letters from the Bombay government. In one, dated in July, the governor and council were informed that the Company's forces had in every engagement gained advantages over the enemy; in another, dated in August, they were informed of the advantageous treaty which Raghoba had made with Fateh Singh. Both letters concluded with an earnest request for men and money, in order that they might be able to gain new victories, and bring the war to a successful termination. The Bengal council, who had formerly been unanimous in condemning the Bombay proceedings, now split again into two parties. The old majority adhered to their original view; whereas Mr. Hastings, with some degree of inconsistency, maintained that, in consequence of the improved position of Raghoba, the required assistance should be given. The ultimate resolution was to forward twenty lacs in money, but not to allow any reinforcements to be sent either from Bengal or Madras.

Nothing could be more absurd and impolitic than the above letter to Sukaram Bapu. By a previous letter the Bombay government were ordered not to part with Salsette and Bassein, and immediately after, Sukaram Bapu is informed that they could not advance any honest claim to either. A competing claim to the office of peshwa had given rise to a civil war, and the result seemed so uncertain, that Colonel Upton was instructed "to negotiate a peace with either party, whom he might find the acknowledged authority in the empire," and yet the Bengal government, so far from maintaining the neutrality which these words imply, had, by deputing an envoy to the Poona ministry and not to Raghoba, taken the most public means possible of declaring against him. Then what was the object of Colonel Upton's mission? He was, it is said, to negotiate a peace. But when the hostilities which the Bombay government had commenced were disavowed, there was no war. All that remained was to make restitution of all that had been unwarrantably seized in their name—to give up Salsette, of

which they had taken violent possession; to relinquish all designs on Bassein, which, though the governor-general erroneously supposed that they had taken it, they were as yet only coveting; to retire from all the districts which Raghoba had so lavishly bestowed upon them; and to return to the exact state in which they stood before any aggressive measures were attempted. This was obviously the only honest course that could be taken after the declarations and confessions contained in the letter to Sukaram Bapu, but it was certainly not the course which Colonel Upton was instructed to adopt; and hence when negotiation was attempted, he found himself exposed to taunts, to which he found it impossible to make any effectual reply.

The place fixed upon for conference was the hill-fort of Purandar, situated twenty miles south-east of Poona, and ninety miles south-east of Bombay. Colonel Upton arrived here on the 28th of December, 1775. At the first interview the Maratha ministers were loud in praise of the just and honourable motives which "had determined the great governor of Calcutta to order peace to be concluded," but when Colonel Upton proposed the retention of Salsette, and the small islands in Bombay harbour, and the cession of Bassein and the Gaikwar's share of the Baroach revenues, they were or affected to be unable to conceal their surprise, and pertinently asked, "How the Bengal government, who had so justly condemned the war, could yet be so ready to avail themselves of its advantages?" To this question no satisfactory answer could be given; and the ministers, assuming that nothing but fear could have dictated the letter of the governor-general, began to speak more dictatorially. They wished "that they had not, on a supposed confidence of the power of the governor of Calcutta over the people of Bombay, suspended hostilities, and thereby, at an enormous expense, maintained a vast army inactive, with which they could otherwise long since have settled the business." Their terms now were the immediate surrender of Raghoba, and the restoration of all the territory occupied since the commencement of the war. In return, as a favour to the governor-general, they would pay the Company twelve lacs of rupees, to reimburse them for the expenses incurred by the Bombay govern-

ment. When these terms were declared inadmissible, they did not hesitate to employ threats. Colonel Upton was, in fact, no match for Maratha Brahmins. Had he met their arrogance with equal arrogance, they would at once have lowered their tone, but he contented himself with mild remonstrances, which they mistook for timidity, and thus tempted them to use a language from which they would otherwise have prudently abstained. The impression produced upon him was that the negotiation was at an end. On the 7th of February, 1776, he addressed a letter to this effect to the Bengal government. The Poona ministers probably ascertained the fact, for they immediately changed their tactics, and professed much more moderate views. In fact, their position made peace almost necessary, and while pretending the contrary, they had from the first been willing to make it, on terms not differing much from those proposed by the envoy. Little further difficulty, therefore, was experienced; and before his letter intimating that the negotiation was at an end had reached Bengal, he had concluded the treaty known by the name of the treaty of Purandhar. The leading articles were a general peace between the Company and the Marathas; the retention or restoration of Salsette, according as the governor-general should decide, the Poona government in the latter case giving, as an equivalent, territory worth three lacs of annual revenue; the cession of the Maratha share of the revenue of Baroach; and the payment of twelve lacs to the Company, as the expenses incurred by the Bombay government. On the other hand, the cessions made by Fateh Singh, now Gaikwar, were to be restored, on proof that he had no right to alienate without the peshwa's consent; the treaty with Raghoba was to be formally annulled, and both his army and the Company's troops were to be disbanded within a month, a general amnesty being proclaimed to all Raghoba's followers, except four, said to be particularly implicated in the murder of Narain Rao. Should Raghoba assent to the prescribed terms, he was to reside at Kopergaon on the Godavari, where the peshwa would allow him an establishment of 1,000 horse, 200 domestics of his own choice, and 25,000 rupees monthly for his other expenses; should he refuse to disband his army, the Company were not to assist him, nor were they in future to assist

him or any subject of the peshwa exciting disturbance in the Maratha dominions.

The letter of Colonel Upton to Bengal, announcing the failure of the negotiation and his subsequent conclusion of the treaty of Purandhar, led to a very extraordinary state of matters. Immediately on receiving the letter, the governor-general and council lost not a moment in determining to espouse the cause of Raghoba, and in commencing preparations on a scale adequate to the hostilities which they expected to ensue. Troops were got ready for embarkation at Calcutta, others were directed to sail from Madras, and a large supply of treasure was ordered to be transmitted to Bombay. At the same time letters were written to Raghoba himself, to Nizam Ali and Hyder, and communications were made to the great Maratha chiefs, Mudaji Bhonsla, Mahadaji Sindhia, and Tukaji Holkar, for the purpose of inducing them either to join as allies or to remain neutral. Meanwhile the treaty of Purandhar had thrown Raghoba and the Bombay council into consternation. The former, on hearing the terms, declared that he would rather maintain the war himself than submit to them; and the latter, though bound as the subordinate presidency to aid in the execution of the treaty, were ready to embrace every opportunity of obstructing it. Accordingly, when an impostor, a Brahmin from Hindustan, who pretended to be the Sewdasheo Chimnaji, who was believed to have fallen at the battle of Panipat, regained his liberty after a long confinement in a fort of the Koncan, and renewed his claim to the office of peshwa, they received his letters and welcomed his messengers, in the hope that the commotion which he excited might prove favourable to their views. Again, when Raghoba applied to them for an asylum at Surat, they gave orders to admit him with his baggage and 200 domestics. When Colonel Upton remonstrated with them on this breach of the Purandhar treaty, they justified themselves by referring to a letter formerly received from Bengal, which permitted them to give an asylum to Raghoba in case his personal safety should be endangered, and declared that nothing but absolute necessity should compel them to give him up to his enemies.

Intelligence of the treaty of Purandhar reached Calcutta in the midst of the warlike preparations which had been begun,

under the belief that a treaty was impossible. In fact, half of the detachment of troops, and above two lacs of treasure, had already been despatched for Bombay. The governor and council, though dissatisfied with the terms of the treaty, and also with the vague manner in which some of its articles were expressed, deemed it necessary to ratify the act of their envoy. This was a sad blow to the hopes of the Bombay government, but the effect of it was greatly lightened by a letter from the directors, dated 5th of April, 1776, and received on the 20th of August. In this letter the directors approved, "under every circumstance," of the treaty of Surat (the treaty made with Raghoba), and recommended the retention of the ceded districts. As the directors, when they thus wrote, were aware of Colonel Upton's mission, the council were at first disposed to interpret their language, that whatever the result of that mission might be, possession of the ceded districts was at all events to be retained. Ultimately, however, on reflecting that this view, if acted upon, would be equivalent to a renewal of the war, they modified it, and held the meaning to be, that possession was to be retained only while the negotiation was pending. The loose wording of the letter of the directors was not its greatest fault. By approving of the treaty of Surat—which, whatever may have been its merits in other respects, was concluded in direct defiance of the Regulating Act—they countenanced a subordinate presidency in an open act of rebellion against the authority which the legislature had made supreme. It surely ill became them to set such an example of illegality. For a time, in consequence of the opposing views entertained by different parties, little progress was made in giving effect to the stipulations of the treaty of Purandhar. To the Maratha ministers it had procured a season of respite, which they had turned to account, and this purpose having been served, they seemed little inclined to take any further steps in regard to it. The Bombay presidency, as we have seen, disapproving of its terms, and indignant at the manner in which they had been excluded from any share in the negotiation, would willingly have acted in defiance of its articles, or taken any steps that promised to neutralize them. These circumstances had the effect of producing an interval of inaction, of which we may take advantage to return to Bengal, and trace the progress of the struggle

6

Members of the Calcutta Council

FOR some time personalities had taken precedence of public business in the council-chamber of Calcutta; but when, in consequence of the execution of Nanda Kumar, informers were terror-struck, and the charges of corruption against Mr. Hastings were suddenly hushed, the members of council were able to give more attention to their proper duties. One of the most important subjects brought under consideration was the mode of realizing the revenue. In 1772, the lands, or more properly the revenue derived from the lands, had been farmed out on leases of five years. Preparatory to this, a committee of circuit had made the tour of the country, and formed estimates of the value of the lands, to be used as guides in letting them. The task assigned to the committee was too difficult and extensive, and the time allowed for the execution of it far too short to enable them to do more than form approximations to the truth. In following out this process they leaned too much to the views which they knew would be most acceptable to their employers, and fixed far higher values than could ever be realized. The consequences were very pernicious. Though a preference was given to the zamindars or hereditary collectors of the revenue, many of them, sooner than promise rents which they knew they could not pay, preferred the pension of ten per cent, allowed to them as a compensation when they were ousted, and thus made way for numbers of new tenants of a very indifferent description. It had been supposed that when the lands were put to auction, capitalists would be induced to come forward and lay out money in improvements. This

may have happened in some cases, but in general the terms were not sufficiently tempting, and instead of capitalists, mere adventurers gained possession, and kept it only so long as they could make it profitable, by cheating the revenue, or practising extortion on the ryots. As soon as the first payments under the leases became due, it was seen that the revenue obtained would fall short of what was legally exigible. From an "Abstract of Remissions to the Farmers, and Balances in Arrears for the Five Years' Settlement," drawn up by the accountant-general to the revenue department, and inserted in the work published by Mr. Francis, under the title of "Original Minutes of the Governor-general and Council of Fort William on the Settlement and Collection of the Revenues of Bengal," it appears that the remissions amounted, in 1772-3 to 1,294,758 rupees; in 1773-4, to 1,581,545; in 1774-5, to 2,567,419; in 1775-6, to 3,025,853; and in 1776-7 (estimated but unadjusted), to 3,410,000. The aggregate remissions for the whole five years were thus 11,879,575, or £1,187,957. The actual balance remaining unpaid at the end of the same period amounted to £1,292,691.

Mr. Hastings, who had originated, or at least identified himself with the plan which had produced these results, was naturally anxious to account for them in the way which would do least discredit to his judgment and foresight; and as early as the 10th of January, 1775, only three months after the new government had been established, lodged a minute, in which he said, "The plan for letting the lands has not miscarried, and is still, in our opinion, the best that could be adopted. What deficiencies have happened in it have proceeded from *eventual causes*, which have been fully explained, and which no general plan could prevent". In opposition to this minute, Messrs. Clavering, Monson, and Francis, on the 25th of February, lodged one, in which, while displaying a captious and quibbling spirit, they stated some important truths. Placing the above words, "The plan of letting the lands has not miscarried, and is still, in our opinion, the best that could be adopted," at the head of their minute as a kind of motto or text, on which they proposed to comment, they began with a remark which is, to say the least of it, paltry and undignified, and which if made, as is now generally supposed, by the author of the *Letters of*

Junius, is certainly not in his style. "We do not know," they say, "whose opinion Mr. Hastings means by the word *our* to unite with his own. We do not doubt, however, of proving in due time that it is a mistaken opinion, by facts which he cannot deny, and by authorities which we presume he will not dispute." After showing that the deficiency in the revenue was not owing to any *eventual cause*, such as the famine, "which was antecedent to the leasing of the lands, and should not be admitted as a plea for their falling short of their estimated value in 1773," they proceed as follows:—"This deficiency must be found in collateral causes, or in a defect in the system—a system which tends to alienate the affections of the people, and to destroy all confidence in government. The zamindar, or proprietor of the land, is deprived by it of his influence, and of the management of his zamindari, and becomes a pensioner. The amount of these pensions is an accumulated burden on government of more than twelve lacs of rupees per annum. The *izardars*, or farmers who occupy the place of zamindars, are in general persons taken from the dregs of the people—the banyans of Calcutta, or people protected by them, who take the farms at any rate, depending on the influence of their masters to screen them from the just demands of government, provided their farms should not prove an advantageous bargain. These people, to make good their engagements, extort the last anna from the ryot, and when they can get no more, and their masters' influence is on the wane, they flee, leaving a depopulated and impoverished country behind. To a system which produces these effects, the cause of the balance in arrear may be truly imputed."

Much of what is here asserted could not be gainsayed; and could Mr. Hastings have so far mastered his self-love as to confess an error, he would at once have admitted that the plan, at least in the way in which it had been carried out, was a failure. If, as he asserted, the plan was "the best that could be adopted," it necessarily followed that there could not be a better, and therefore the only proper course was to persist in it. Instead of this, little more than three months after the date of the former minute asserting the superlative excellence of the plan, he produced another of an entirely different nature. This new plan, concurred in by Mr. Barwell, was arranged in a series of

proposals, each of them accompanied with a commentary. The most important of them were as follows:—Proposal 1. “That all new taxes, which have been imposed upon the ryots in any part of the country, since the commencement of the Bengal year 1172 (or 1764-5), being the year in which the Company obtained the diwani, be entirely abolished.” In the commentary appended to this proposal, it is stated that “whenever any occasion or any pretence has been found to levy a new tax upon the ryots, it has been the custom of the zamindars and aumils to continue to collect it, whether the occasion has remained or not;” and that the amount of taxes thus permanently and oppressively imposed since the acquisition of the diwani, “could not be less than fifteen lacs of rupees” (£150,000).

Proposal 2. “That the twenty-four parganas be sold as zamindaries by public auction, in lots not exceeding a *jumma* or rent roll of 20,000 or 30,000 rupees a year.” These parganas, which were granted to the Company by Mir Jafar as a zamindari, and afterwards became better known under the name of “Clive’s Jaghir,” had hitherto been under the Company’s own management. In the commentary the proposed sale of them is justified on the ground that it “would raise a large sum of money, and there is no doubt that the lands would be greatly improved in the hands of zamindars on the permanent footing which we have recommended. It would then be their interest to attend to the cultivation of the most valuable articles of husbandry, which require time to bring them to perfection, and submit to present expenses for the sake of future profit.” Another recommendation raises a question which has been much debated, and in regard to which Mr. Hastings, both in earlier and in after life, held a different opinion from that here expressed in the following terms:—“We would recommend, too, that Europeans be allowed to be purchasers, provided they can be made amenable to the revenue courts, and subject to the same regulations as the natives, with respect to the payments of their rents and the treatment of their ryots; being of a more enterprising spirit than the natives, they would be more likely to introduce new manufactures, and even to import an accession of inhabitants from foreign countries; and they would in time become an addition of strength to the British empire in India.”

The most important proposals were the tenth and the eleventh. They were as follows:—10. "That all the other districts of Bengal be farmed out on leases for life, or for two joint lives, to such responsible people as shall offer the most advantageous terms, allowing a preference to the zamindars, provided they have attained the age of eighteen years, if their offers are equal or nearly equal to those of the others, or if they are equal to what the council shall judge to be the real value of the lands."

11. "That it be expressly stipulated that no attention shall be paid to any proposals for an annual increase, it being meant that the same revenue shall be paid for the first year as for the subsequent years; that no increase be levied or deduction allowed, on any account or pretence whatever." These leases, though said to be for life, were meant for perpetuity, as it was provided that possession should, on the death of the party holding it, devolve to his heirs, with the option on the part of the government to exact the same rent as before, or a rent equal to the average of the actual collections of the three preceding years, it being understood, however, that the new should in no case be less than the old rent, nor more than ten per cent in excess of it. Where the zamindar from any cause did not farm the lands, he was to receive an allowance fixed at ten per cent on the amount of the revenue settled by the government; and each zamindar or farmer in possession was "to exercise a faujdari jurisdiction, and be made answerable for murders and robberies committed in his district, agreeable to the old constitution of the empire."

The concluding proposal was in the following terms:—"That these regulations, or any others which the honourable court of directors shall think fit to add to them, be passed into fixed law by their express command; that it shall not be in the power of the governor and council to change or deviate from them on any occasion or for any pretence whatever; and that copies thereof, in the English, the Persian, and Bengal languages, be affixed to all the kacheris of the provinces, with the same authority declared for their establishment and duration." The commentary on this proposal contains a candid confession which speaks volumes as to the grievous oppression under which the ryots, forming the great mass of the population, had hitherto

been suffering. It deserves to be quoted verbatim:—"The continual variations on the mode of collecting the revenue, and the continual usurpation on the rights of the people, which have been produced by the remissness or the rapacity of the Mughul government, and in the English, by the desire of acquiring a reputation from a sudden increase of the collection, without sufficient attention to remote consequences, have fixed in the minds of the ryots so rooted a distrust of the ordinances of government, that no assurances, however strong, will persuade them that laws which have no apparent object but the case of the people and the security of property, can be of long duration, unless confirmed by a stronger pledge than the resolution of a fluctuating administration. Even with the honourable court of directors, time will be required to reconcile their belief to so extraordinary a revolution in the principles of this government."

This plan, which furnishes the outline of a permanent settlement of revenue, and gives the matured views of one so thoroughly versed in Indian affairs as Mr. Hastings is universally admitted to have been, deserves all the space which has here been given to it, though it was not destined to come into operation. The reception given to it by the majority of the council appears from a minute, of which Mr. Francis himself has published the following extract:—"Since our arrival in this country, and during all our debates with our colleagues, we have not met with a circumstance that has filled us with greater astonishment than the terms and purport of the plan proposed by the governor-general and Mr. Barwell, for the new settlement of the provinces at the expiration of the present leases. That gentlemen who have contributed to subvert the constitution of this country and the rights of the natives, should wish to revert to that government they have so lately overset, and should so far forget themselves as to recommend the abolition of the very system which they every day support—which the governor-general has declared, in one of his late minutes, to be still, in his opinion, *the best that could be adopted*, and our disapprobation of which is constantly the subject of their censure—is only to be explained by themselves. This conduct in other persons might appear inconsistent. In them it is uni-

form, and consonant to that instability which characterizes their government." There is far too much of this pointless vituperation. The plan, however defective it may have been, was certainly a great improvement on any that had previously been acted upon, and was therefore entitled to a full and calm discussion. Compared with this the consistency or inconsistency of the proposers of the plan was unworthy of a moment's consideration. If they were formerly in the wrong, it was surely so far to their credit that they were now willing to follow a better course. At this time, however, Mr. Hastings, though at the head of the government, had no power whatever in the administration of it, and the disapproval of his plan by the majority sealed its fate.

When Mr. Hastings proposed his plan for a new settlement of the revenue, he called upon the other members of council to do the same. None of them, with the exception of Mr. Barwell, who concurred with him, considered themselves "sufficiently qualified by local observation and experience to undertake so difficult a task," and therefore contented themselves for the time with criticisms and objections similar to those of which a specimen has been given in the above extract. At last, however, Mr. Francis set himself manfully to the work, and by the aid, it is said, of Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth, than whom no man was better qualified to instruct his ignorance, submitted his views at great length in a paper which he transmitted to the directors, on the 22nd of January, 1776, and afterwards published in the "Original Minutes" already mentioned. The plan of Mr. Francis is based on the opinion he had adopted, that the zamindar, instead of being merely a collector of the revenue of lands, holding his office and various powers and privileges accompanying it by inheritance, but liable to be displaced by the government, was proprietor of the lands themselves in a sense differing little from that which Europeans attach to the term. This view of the zamindar's position is the key to his whole plan, which in substance was as follows:—"The whole demand upon the country, to commence from April, 1777, should be founded on an estimate of the permanent services which government must indispensably provide for, under the great heads of civil and

military establishments and investment, with an allowance of a reasonable reserve for contingencies." The gross sum required being thus determined, "each zamindary should be assessed its proportion," as ascertained by "the actual receipts of the three previous years," and this sum should be "declared the quit-rent of those lands in perpetuity." Besides this general assessment applied to each zamindary as a whole, the proportions to be paid by its constituent parts, as parganas, villages, &c., should also be fixed in perpetuity, so as to leave no doubt as to "the quit-rent of government for every portion of land in all future sales or transfers of property." The quit-rents being fixed, "the zamindar must be informed that the due discharge of his rent is the tenure by which he holds his lands, with every possible assurance that no further demands will be made upon him." If he incurs a balance, "a part of his zamindary should be invariably sold to make it good." This regulation should be enforced without "delay or indulgence," as the only effectual means of rousing the zamindars "from their present supine and hopeless state, to exert every endeavour for the preservation and improvement of their estates, now rendered of real value to them." The plan, it is said, "will at first require nursing and indulgence," but as the new establishment gains strength, "the zamindars should be gradually replaced in the exercise of all their ancient duties," criminal and civil. In regard to the latter, it is stated as "one essential reason why government should endeavour to restore the zamindars to a state of competence at least, if not of affluence," that they are not merely the stewards or collectors of the public revenue, but "are or ought to be the instruments of government in almost every branch of the civil administration. If this medium be removed, government then acts directly upon its subjects by its own officers, without the assistance of those intermediate gradations of rank by which all great civil societies are held together."

The rights of the zamindar being secured, Mr. Francis says, "The next step is to make a similar provision for their tenants." Here, however, a serious difficulty occurs. "The land," according to his view "is the hereditary property of the zamindar. He holds it by the law of the country, on the tenure of paying a certain contribution to government. When this condition is

complied with, he is master of the land, to re-let it to whom he thinks proper." Where, then, is the security of the ryot? Mr. Francis answers. In his lease; for "the same security which government gives to the tenant in chief, should, for the same reasons, descend to the under-tenants in their several gradations; so that every rank of society, and every member of it, may have something to call his own." This looks plausible, but how is it to be reconciled with the dogma that the zamindar "is master of the land, to re-let it to whom he will? "When a ryot has no lease, or his lease expires, what becomes of the "something" which he is still "to call his own?" Here Mr. Francis suggests two remedies of a very opposite description. The one is to call in the aid of government, and not only compel the zamindar to grant a pottah, but dictate its terms so rigidly that no other shall be deemed "legal" or "valid." This is surely rather singular treatment to one who is just before declared "master of the land, to re-let it to whom he thinks proper." It is here that the flaw in Mr. Francis' theory of zamindari property becomes apparent, and he is obliged to admit that the right to possess in perpetuity belongs as much to the ryot as to the zamindar. If so, it is evident that when he speaks, as he invariably does, of the zamindar as landholder and owner, he must use the words in an unusual and restricted sense. The zamindar is to hold his property under the "indispensable condition" that in the course of a stated time he shall grant new pottahs (leases) to his tenants, either on the footing of his own quit-rents, that is, as long as the zamindar's rent remains the same, or for a term of years, as they may agree. The latter alternative is not likely to be adopted by the tenant while perpetuity of possession is in his option; and hence the result at which Mr. Francis at last arrives, is that the ryot shall receive a lease which is to last as long and ought to be as sacred as the zamindar's quit-rent. The other remedy is rather hinted at than explained. It would scarcely do to give full utterance to it, and therefore we are only left to infer that after all the best security for the ryot would be to throw himself on the zamindar's mercy. "I know not," says Mr. Francis, "whether in ancient times the ryots constantly took out pottahs or not. They derived a better security against ill-treatment from the

natural interest and relation by which they and the zamindars were mutually bound to each other. This security, so much superior to any formal engagements, the present system (*i.e.* his new plan) promises to restore. By establishing a quit-rent for each zamindary, we make it the interest of the zamindar to extend his cultivation to the utmost, which can only be done by encouraging the resort of the ryots, and by letting his lands on such favourable terms as may excite their industry. I have heard it asserted that, formerly, when a ryot quitted any zamindar's land, he followed him, and used every motive of persuasion to prevail on him to return; and that zamindars were accustomed to bribe away each other's tenants." Such being the case, why talk of providing security for the ryot? He is only too secure already. It is only in the west that landlords can exercise undue influence; in the east the influence is all the other way, and zamindars, so far from being able to oppress, are under the necessity of courting their ryots.

When these competing plans were submitted to the directors, the adoption of either would have been premature, as a full year of the existing leases was still to run. The council, therefore, returned to other business of a more pressing nature. For a time the members were divided as before—three against two; but a change in this respect was about to take place. Colonel Monson's health had given way, and obliged him frequently to absent himself from the council-chamber. Latterly he had been unable to attend at all, and Mr. Hastings was able, by his casting vote, to establish an ascendancy as complete as that which the majority in numbers had previously possessed. General Clavering seems not to have borne his altered position with much equanimity, for on the 23rd of September he addressed a letter to the directors, in which, after mentioning Mr. Monson's continued illness, and deploring that the administration was in consequence in the hands of men whose conduct and principles obliged him to declare that he did not hold himself "responsible for the safety of these provinces while the government continues conducted as it now is," he concluded by intimating his intention to resign his office of councillor and commander-in-chief in November or December, 1777. Colonel Monson's recovery must at this time have been hopeless, for

the above letter was written only two days before his death. Mr. Hastings' ascendancy, which had till then been only precarious, was now permanently established. He lost no time in turning it to account. Returning to the subject of revenue settlement, on the 1st of November, 1776, he lodged a minute, in which, after premising that whatever might be the plan adopted on the expiration of the present leases, "accurate states of the real value of the lands" must be previously furnished; and that the preparation of them requiring "uniformity in the design, authority in the execution, and an extraordinary share of responsibility to animate the zeal of those who are intrusted with the charge of it," could neither be conducted by the board, nor be left wholly to the provincial councils, he proposed "that a temporary office be constituted to execute this business, under the conduct of one or two covenanted servants of the Company, assisted by a diwan and other officers, either selected from the officers of the *khalsa* (revenue office), or occasionally chosen for special commissions; that, for the sake of despatch, all orders issued for the execution of such particular services as shall have received the general sanction of the board, be written in the name of the governor-general, and the control of it be committed to his immediate charge." Besides the immediate duties of this office, "many other points of inquiry," he said, "will be also useful to secure to the ryots the perpetual and undisturbed possession of their lands, and to secure them against arbitrary exactions. This is not to be done by proclamations and edicts, nor by indulgences to the zamindars and farmers. The former will not be obeyed unless enforced by regulations so framed as to produce their own effect, without requiring the hand of government to interpose its support; and the latter, though it (they?) may feed the luxury of the zamindars, or the rapacity of the farmers, will prove no relief to the cultivator, whose welfare ought to be the immediate and primary care of government." The attempt to establish new pottahs for the ryots, with the failure of which the late administration had been reproached, had failed still more egregiously in the hands of the present administration in the case of Burdwan, where, "notwithstanding the solemn engagement of the zamindar, and the peremptory injunctions of government, not a

pottah has yet been granted, nor will be granted, of a different tenure from those which have been customary for some years past, unless more regular means be taken to produce them." The reason was obvious. "It is the interest of the zamindar to exact the greatest rent he can from the ryots, and it is as much against his interest to fix the deeds by which they hold their lands and pay their rents." Mr. Hastings therefore proposed that, as "the foundation of such a work must be laid by government itself," it should be part of the duty of the new office "to collect the materials for it by obtaining copies of the present pottahs, and of the *nerricbundi*, or rates of land, by which they are regulated in each district, and every other information which may throw a light on this subject, and enable the board hereafter to establish a more permanent and regular mode of taxation."

The proposal, supported almost as a matter of course by Mr. Barwell, was strongly opposed by Messrs. Clavering and Francis, the former denouncing it with more fury than judgment, while the latter, whose tone appears to have become somewhat softened since he was placed in a minority, argued the question calmly, but very pedantically, quoting at large from Adam Smith, Sir James Stewart, and Montesquieu, and appending to his minute foot notes in French from Mirabeau. The chief points laboured by Mr. Francis were that the information sought to be obtained was superfluous, as it had been, or at least ought to have been, furnished by the committee of circuit; that it could not be obtained without applying to sources unworthy of credit, and having recourse to measures tyrannical and oppressive; and that even if attainable, it would be useless, "except for the single purpose of levying the greatest possible revenue," a purpose which he hoped and believed was not in contemplation. In regard to the procuring of information, in order "to secure to the ryots the perpetual and undisturbed possession of their lands," he objected to the language, both as a kind of clap-trap, and as conveying an erroneous idea. "Before we give *perpetual possession*, we ought," he said, "to determine the property;" but it is not true "that the ryot is proprietor of the land." On the contrary, "the property and inheritance of the land" is vested "in the zamindars," and if zamindars and ryots "are left to themselves, they will soon come to an agreement, in which each party

will find his advantage. The pottah is the evidence and security of this voluntary agreement. In the present state of the country the ryot has, in fact, the advantage over the zamindar." After repeating this extravagant assertion in various forms, he concludes that "to dictate the specific terms of every lease is an invasion of the rights of property," and that "government, after assessing the zamindar or landlord according to his portion of the public revenue," is not entitled "to prescribe to him the rates at which he shall be obliged to parcel it out to his tenants." It is not out of place to give Mr. Hastings' description of these zamindars, for whom Mr. Francis reserves all his favour. Commenting on the above assertion, that zamindars and ryots if left to themselves "will soon come to an agreement, in which each party will find his advantage," he says, "This would be a just conclusion, if the zamindars were all capable of distinguishing what was (is?) for their advantage. But it is a fact, which will with difficulty obtain credit in England, though the notoriety will justify me in asserting it here, that much the greatest part of the zamindars, both of Bengal and Bihar, are incapable of judging or acting for themselves, being either minors, or men of weak understandings, or absolute idiots." Mr. Francis himself appears to have been at one time of a similar opinion, for in his plan of a new settlement, setting at naught all his own declamation about the "rights of property," he proposes that, "as many of the zamindars will at first be incapable of managing their lands themselves, they should be obliged to retain a diwan (or steward) of sufficient ability and good character, who should be intrusted with the management of the lands, and be answerable for the rent due to government, without whose approbation he ought not to be dismissed during four or five years at least after the first settlement."

Whatever objections there may have been to the new office, the governor-general's casting vote outweighed them all, and he proceeded to take the uncontrolled management of it. This was, in fact, the most objectionable part of his scheme, because it gave him a power the legality of which was very questionable, and the assumption of which, after the reprimand he had received in the similar case of the Oudh residency, looked very much like an open defiance of the directors. In reviewing that

case they distinctly told him that he had culpably exceeded his powers; and as he had reason to believe that the party opposed to him in the court had gained an accession of strength, it is strange that he should of his own accord have taken a step which could not but subject him anew to severe animadversion. It would almost seem as if the sweets of restored power, after a painful exclusion from it, had intoxicated him, and disposed him to grasp at every kind of patronage which could be brought within his reach. This view derives some confirmation from the manner in which he proceeded to undo some of the acts of the majority, which were personally most offensive to him. One of the first acts of the majority, as soon as the intestine war in the council commenced, was, it will be remembered, abruptly to recall Mr. Middleton from his residency in Oudh, because Mr. Hastings regarded him as his private agent, and on that ground refused to communicate his whole correspondence. After a time Mr. Bristow was appointed to the vacant office. On the 2nd of December, the governor-general moved in the council that Mr. Bristow should be recalled, and Mr. Middleton restored. In supporting the motion he was at least ingenuous. Mr. Bristow, he admitted, had performed the duty so well as to command his esteem, but Mr. Middleton had more of his confidence, and he therefore preferred him. After an altercation with Messrs. Clavering and Francis, his casting vote enabled him to carry his point. On the same day the governor-general moved the recall of Mr. Francis Fowke, whom the majority had sent on a kind of embassy to the Raja of Benaras, whose zamindary they had recently succeeded in extorting from Asaf-ud-daulah, the Nabob of Oudh. Mr. Fowke had probably owed his appointment to the zeal his father, Mr. Joseph Fowke, had displayed, in common with Nanda Kumar and others, in discovering or inventing charges of corruption, for which he was held to bail on a charge of conspiracy. It was not deemed prudent or becoming to connect the recall of the son with this charge; and as his conduct appears to have been unexceptionable, the only ground alleged for annulling his commission was that "the purposes therefor had been accomplished." This motion was carried, like the other, by the casting vote. Only twenty days later Mr. Thomas Graham was appointed resident at Benaras, and Mr. Daniel Octavius Barwell his assistant.

While Mr. Hastings was thus revelling in his newly-acquired ascendancy, a curious scene, deeply affecting his interest, was being transacted in England. In a communication to the directors, after he felt, as he expressed it, "that a majority had been formed against him, not by an accidental occurrence, but by a decided and permanent combination," he declared that "he would not quit the ground on which he stood," and that "it was his determined resolution to retain the place which the court's favour originally assigned to him, and which the legislature had so honourably confirmed." In another letter to the same quarter, after affirming of the majority that, "from the moment of their landing, their aim was, by personal indignities, to provoke me to resign my station, and leave them uncontrolled masters of the government, or by accumulated attacks to blast my character, and to effect the same end by alienating your confidence from me," he concluded thus: "Prompted equally by duty and gratitude, I have hitherto resolved to bear my part in this distracted scene, and if I live I will see the end of it." This letter was written on the 8th of September, 1775. Up to this date he had been cordially supported by the directors; but shortly after their sentiments underwent a change, and resolutions condemnatory of the Rohilla war were passed both by the directors and the proprietors—the latter, however, qualifying the censure by a declaration that "the court had the highest opinion of the services and integrity of Warren Hastings, Esq., and could not admit a suspicion of corrupt motives operating on his conduct without proof." The general court of proprietors, at which the Rohilla war was condemned, was held on the 6th December, 1775. It is difficult to say what effect it might have had in changing the determination he had above expressed to maintain his seat, as it could not possibly have been known to him at the time when a Colonel Lachlan Maclean, who possessed his confidence, quitted India. This gentleman, whom Mr. Hastings had intrusted with a writing relative to his resignation, arrived in England in February, 1776, and therefore could not possibly have been the bearer of any decision which Mr. Hastings had formed in consequence of proceedings in England in the previous December. Hence all the attempts to connect the supposed resignation of Mr. Hastings with the unfavourable

view taken of his conduct by the directors and proprietors are mere anachronisms. It is certain, however, that he had become disgusted with the irksome struggle in which he was engaged, and had, both in writing and in private conversation, declared that unless some concessions were made, for the purpose of strengthening the hands of the governor-general, he would resign.

Colonel Maclean had business of his own to take him to Leadenhall Street. He had come home as the unauthorized agent of the Nabob of Arcot, and he was also a petitioner to the directors respecting some personal grievance, by which, according to his own declaration, "he is and must continue to be a great sufferer, unless the court should be pleased to take his case into consideration, and grant him relief." While acting in these double capacities, as an agent and a petitioner, he had ample opportunity of becoming well acquainted with the light in which the administration of Mr. Hastings was viewed at the India House, in parliament, and by the country generally. The unfavourable impression thus produced appears to have convinced him that he could not do Mr. Hastings a greater service than by obtaining the acceptance of his resignation. On the 8th of May, 1776, the directors, though unable to dismiss any of the councillors named by the Regulating Act, took advantage of the other alternative which it left them, and resolved to petition his majesty for the removal of the governor-general and Mr. Barwell. The proprietors immediately took up the question, and a general court was summoned for the 15th of May. The greatest interest was taken in the result. The ministry in particular exerted all their influence in support of the directors, and crowded the court with peers, privy councillors, and other adherents. The strength of parties was first tried, after a protracted debate, by a motion for adjournment to next day. The friends of Mr. Hastings, who made the motion, were defeated, but succeeded two days after, when, on an appeal to the ballot, a motion that the directors should reconsider their resolution to address his majesty was carried by 377 to 271. Accordingly, in the following July, after stormy discussions, the resolution was rescinded, and for the time the question of removal ceased to be entertained. Had the question of removal been carried, he could not have been

restored to the service by less than three-fourths of the directors; whereas, if he merely resigned, a majority would suffice. This consideration may have weighed with Colonel Maclean in inducing him to take the extraordinary step of addressing the following letter to the directors:—

“GENTLEMEN,—Mr. Hastings, seeing the necessity of unanimity in the supreme council in Bengal for conducting the affairs of the Company there, and for establishing any permanent system of government for the good and prosperity of that country, and finding from the unhappy divisions which have subsisted in the supreme council, that such union is not likely to subsist, and having anxiously, on every occasion, studied to promote the welfare of the Company—a conduct which he will ever continue—has, from these motives, authorized, employed, and directed me to signify to you his desire to resign his office of Governor-general of Bengal, and to request your nomination of a successor to the vacancy which will thereby be occasioned in the supreme council.

“London, 10th October, 1776.”

“L. MACLEAN.”

Colonel Maclean appears to have been fond of intrigue, and, before addressing the directors, had been for some time in communication with a Mr. Robinson, a confidential servant of the Treasury. His object was to make the descent of Mr. Hastings from his high office as easy and dignified as possible. He had proposed honours; but finding that these would not be conferred, had made a series of stipulations. One of them was “that all retrospect and prosecution previous to the late act of parliament cease and determine, and in case any informer infringe this article, the administration shall give their aid to defeat it;” another was “that Mr. Hastings shall be well received at his return, a vote of thanks promoted if moved for, and nobody to be displaced.” This is Mr. Maclean’s account; but as the negotiation was never recognized by the ministry, and the stipulations proved a dead letter, it is impossible to say how far he has confined himself to facts, or mingled his own fancies along with them.

On the 18th of October the court of directors took the letter into consideration, and having called in Colonel Maclean, asked him to produce his authority for writing it. His answer

was that the papers conferring it contained matters "of a nature extremely confidential," which precluded him from laying them bodily before the court; but that he was ready to give every satisfaction, by submitting them to the inspection of any three directors who might be appointed for that purpose. This answer might have justified a suspicion that there was some mistake. Was it conceivable that Mr. Hastings, if he had really resigned, would have left it to be inferred from papers which could not be submitted to full inspection without betraying confidence? In fact, Mr. Maclean, in his own letter, had not ventured to do more than speak of "a desire to resign," and of a "vacancy which will thereby be occasioned." It was obvious, therefore, that at the utmost nothing more could be made out than a *constructive resignation*; in other words, a resignation which, not being made in direct terms, but only inferred from facts and circumstances, could never amount to the resignation which the Regulating Act required before action could be taken on it. This consideration should have restrained the directors from taking the undignified and unbusiness-like step of deputing a committee to sit in judgment on Colonel Maclean's papers. Their conduct can only be accounted for by their wishes. They longed for the resignation, and were determined, if possible, to prove that they had obtained it.

The chairman, deputy-chairman, and Mr. Richard Becher, the committee appointed, reported, on the 23rd of October, that "having conferred with Mr. Maclean, they find that from the purport of Mr. Hastings' instructions, contained in a paper in his own handwriting, he declares he will not continue in the government of Bengal unless certain conditions therein specified can be obtained." Of this, they add, "there is no probability." Assuming that they were correct in this opinion, what follows? "That Mr. Hastings has resigned," say the chairman and deputy-chairman only, for Mr. Becher refused to concur with them; but in order to show that nothing can be more illogical than this conclusion, it is necessary only to put the argument into the form of a syllogism—Mr. Hastings will resign unless certain conditions can be obtained: of this there is no probability: *ergo*, Mr. Hastings has resigned! Instead of this syllogism, in which the conclusion has no visible connection

with the premises, it is clear that the true syllogism should stand thus—Mr. Hastings will resign unless certain conditions can be obtained: of this there is no probability: *ergo*, there is every probability that Mr. Hastings will resign. By no possible squeezing can anything more be extracted from this part of the committee's report. But it seems that the committee allowed their zeal to carry them farther than their instructions. Besides interrogating Mr. Maclean, and inspecting his papers, and volunteering their own opinion as to probabilities, they examined Mr. George Vansittart, who was present when Mr. Hastings gave Mr. Maclean his instructions and empowered him to declare his resignation, and Mr. Stewart, who had heard Mr. Hastings declare that he had given Mr. Maclean such instructions. On this it is obvious to remark that this evidence, in so far as it agrees with the instructions, is superfluous, because the instructions speak for themselves; and in so far as it goes beyond the instructions, is worthless, because a resignation not established by writing could not possibly be eked out by hearsay. These considerations, palpable as they are to common sense, were ignored by the directors, who at once resolved to accept of what they called the "proposed resignation" of Mr. Hastings, and named Mr. Wheler, one of their own number, to the seat in the council thus rendered vacant. The consent of the crown, necessary to give effect to this nomination, was easily obtained, as all the proceedings of the directors in this business had been countenanced and cordially supported by the ministry. It is not so easy to account for the harmony which prevailed among the directors themselves. Several of them were strenuous supporters of Mr. Hastings, and yet their resolution was unanimous. The explanation given is, that while his enemies voted in accordance with their inclinations, his friends refrained from opposition, because they were as yet ignorant of the ascendancy which he had acquired in the council by the death of Colonel Monson, and perhaps also believed that a resignation accepted as voluntary was more conducive to his interests than the forcible expulsion which had been attempted, and, though defeated, would in all probability be attempted again.

Intelligence of these proceedings was received in Bengal on the 19th of June, 1777, and took all parties by surprise. No time,

however, was lost in forming a decision. General Clavering, whose right to the office of governor-general, in the event of a vacancy, was expressly declared by the Regulating Act, at once asserted his new dignity. On the 20th of June, Mr. Barwell, while on his way to the council-chamber, received a note, signed "J. P. Auriol, secretary," requesting his presence at the council, "by order of General Clavering, governor-general;" and Mr. Hastings received another note, similarly signed, requiring him to deliver up the keys of Fort William and of the Company's treasury. His reply was that, not having resigned, he was governor-general by act of parliament, and would not allow any one to usurp his authority. He therefore summoned a council, and instructed the secretary to issue orders in his name only. Each of the competing governors-general had a partisan. Mr. Francis obeyed the summons of General Clavering, Mr. Barwell that of Mr. Hastings, and thus two rival councils were constituted. The proceedings were in themselves ludicrous, but must have been productive of fatal results, had not a third party been permitted to interpose and settle the dispute. Mr. Hastings offered to submit to the decision of the supreme court, and General Clavering could not in decency refuse. The result might easily have been foreseen. The judges, after perusing the instructions of the directors and the other relative papers, had no difficulty in giving their opinion, "unanimously, clearly, and decidedly, that Mr. Hastings had not resigned." After stating the grounds of their opinion at length, they concluded thus: "We have given the papers and the subject several hours' consideration, wishing to deliver such an opinion as from the reasoning of it, not from its authority, might claim sufficient weight to prevent the fatal consequences of a divided government; but we do assure you that none of the time has been taken in settling a difference of opinion. There is not one point of it, from the first to the last, in which we have not entirely concurred."

Hitherto, in this extraordinary dispute, Mr. Hastings had justice, reason, and common sense on his side, but nothing could be more paltry and vindictive than the use he attempted to make of his victory. On the 22nd of June, having met in council with Mr. Barwell, he gave a detail of the acts of

General Clavering, and concluded with moving a series of resolutions, to the effect that by these acts General Clavering "had relinquished, resigned, and vacated" his offices both of second member of council and of commander-in-chief. As Mr. Barwell was the only other member present, these resolutions passed of course, and it was determined, under the pretext of its being necessary for the preservation of the legality of their proceedings, that General Clavering "shall not in future be summoned or admitted as a member of council." On the 24th of June, Mr. Francis attended the council, and lodged a minute, in which, after remarking that "everything has been hazarded by some degree of passion and a great degree of precipitation," and taking credit to himself for having given a signal example of "prudence and moderation," not only by his "immediate and implicit acquiescence of the decision of the judges," but in his "present attendance here," he concluded thus: "Let me have the honour and happiness of assuming the character of mediator." Mr. Hastings must have been inwardly delighted at seeing his most relentless enemy in this supplicating posture, and ought to have embraced the opportunity it gave him of retiring gracefully from a false and untenable position. Unfortunately for himself, he persisted in maintaining it, till he was forced to yield by another appeal to the judges, who decided, again unanimously, that the council had no power to remove one of their members or declare his seat vacant. He had thus no alternative but to retrace his steps, by moving, on the 25th, "That, under the advice of the judges, the council do recede from putting into execution all their resolutions passed since the 20th instant, and that all parties shall be placed in the same situation in which they stood before the receipt of these orders."

The crisis, brought on mainly by the rash and undignified proceedings adopted at the India House, and sanctioned, if not prompted, by the ministry, was now past. Mr. Hastings, however, felt that explanation was still due, and on the 15th of August addressed a letter to the directors on the subject. This letter commenced as follows:—"No event of my life ever befell me for which I was so little prepared as the news of the notification made by Colonel Maclean. Your acceptance of that

notification, your nomination of Mr. Wheler, your application to the king for its approval, and his majesty's approval thereof—acts so solemn in their profession, so important in respect to their object, and concluded by an authority so sacred, that although I know them to be invalid, the grounds on which they were built being defective, yet my confidence forsook me, and I thought of nothing but to submit to the hard lot imposed upon me." After dwelling upon the difficulties of his position, his reluctance "to disavow the declaration made by Colonel Maclean," who, "even in this instance, in which he exceeded his powers, had been actuated, I knew, by a sincere and honest, though a mistaken and too precipitate, zeal to serve me," or "to arraign the justice of those whose approbation I have ever sought as the first reward of my fidelity and incessant toils in their service"—his aversion, on the one hand, to refuse effect "to an instrument having his majesty's royal signatures," however obtained, and his inability, on the other hand, to ratify it, "without making an ungrateful return to the Company" for their honourable support, and "without branding my own character with falsehood and deception, after the repeated protestations publicly and loudly made by me, that no consideration of private convenience nor impatience of injury should prevail upon me to make a voluntary surrender of the trust which had been committed to me"—he endeavours to come to an impartial decision, and ends by saying, "I am compelled to declare that I do not hold myself bound by the notification of Mr. Maclean, nor by any of the acts consequent upon it."

This letter is not satisfactory. There is too much rhetoric in it, and too little of plain ingenuous statement. Who that knows anything of Mr. Hastings' career will be imposed upon by these protestations of almost nervous delicacy? He cannot hurt the feelings of his friend Mr. Maclean, and therefore, in order to spare them, is half-inclined to allow himself to be humiliatingly deprived of what he calls "a trust of the first importance, perhaps, under the British empire." He shudders at the idea of withholding effect to a document rendered sacred in his eyes by the signature of his majesty. He is burdened with a load of gratitude to the Company; and, therefore, how can he be so ungrateful as to allow them to deprive themselves of the

benefit of his services? Lastly, what does he not owe to himself? and how can he, after protestations publicly and loudly made to the contrary, even entertain the idea of resignation, without branding his character with falsehood and deception? The hollowness of all this is too manifest to require exposure; but one is tempted to ask, when the very idea of resignation is thus disclaimed, What, then, was the purport of the paper of instructions given to Mr. Maclean? Did it say nothing of resignation? Did it not declare it to be the only alternative if certain conditions were not obtained? In the whole of Mr. Hastings' conduct in regard to the resignation there is so much appearance of duplicity that it looks as if he had contemplated the misunderstandings which afterwards arose, and made his arrangements so as to be able to pursue any course which might happen at the time to be most convenient. He seems, indeed, to have loved and practised mystification for its own sake. Writing Mr. Sullivan, on the 29th of June, 1777, he says, "I have now no channel to Lord North, nor encouragement to write to him; yet I wish it were possible to make him acquainted with the late proceedings." On this very day he had written, or was about to write, a long letter to Lord North on the subject with which he wishes it were possible to make him acquainted. In this letter he does not deny the sufficiency of Colonel Maclean's powers, and makes the following startling statement:—"I was not pleased with the engagement made for me by Mr. Maclean; I will candidly own it; but I held myself bound by it, and was resolved to ratify it. This was my resolution." Why, then, was it not executed? Because "General Clavering himself has defeated it, by the attempt to wrest from me by violence what he could claim only as a voluntary surrender." This account, though it shifts the ground previously taken, is plausible, and there may be some truth in it; but it serves very imperfectly to dispel the cloud of mystery in which Mr. Hastings has enveloped everything connected with his real or proposed resignation.

Mr. Hastings, in the above letter to the directors, speaks of "the hard lot which had been imposed" upon him. It appears, however, that he was compensating himself for it in another way. At this time intelligence arrived that the collusive divorce

so long pending in the Franconian court had been brought to a close, and that the Baron and Baroness Imhoff were no longer man and wife. The baron accordingly took his departure to purchase an estate in Germany, with the wages which, by a dishonourable and immoral compact, Mr. Hastings had become bound to pay him, and the baroness took her place at the head of the governor-general's table, as Mrs Hastings. Considering the circumstances, common decency might have suggested that this extraordinary transition should be made with the least possible publicity; but Mr. Hastings, as if he imagined that the purchase of a woman from her lawful husband was an achievement to boast of, was not to be satisfied with anything less than a round of splendid festivities. So completely had the joyous event opened his heart, that his animosities were for the time forgotten; and he succeeded, by a personal visit at General Clavering's house, in carrying him off in triumph to the marriage banquet. The poor general was loath to go, for he had a very solemn work before him. His health had given way, and he died, after an illness of fourteen days, on the 30th of August, 1777.

Mr. Wheler arrived at Calcutta shortly after General Clavering's death, and took his seat in the council. His original commission had appointed him to succeed to the place rendered vacant by Mr. Hastings' proposed resignation. As the case turned out, there would have been no such vacancy, and Mr. Wheler would have come out on an empty errand. It happened, however, that when he was on the point of sailing, intelligence of Colonel Monson's death arrived; and Mr. Wheler, wisely preferring certainty to the hope of a resignation which he probably regarded as problematical, landed from the vessel, hastened to London, and procured a new commission, which appointed him to Colonel Monson's place. In the interval between General Clavering's death and Mr. Wheler's arrival, Mr. Hastings, having no opponent but Mr. Francis, was able to carry all his measures without having recourse to his casting vote; but Mr. Wheler, though he began with professing neutrality, generally voted with Mr. Francis, and thus the casting vote became necessary as before. Mr. Hastings might now have seen the necessity of acting with the utmost circumspection.

He had received from the directors two very significant intimations, showing how little disposed they were to view his measures with favour, or even treat him with personal civility. One of these intimations was the eagerness with which they had hastened to take advantage of his supposed resignation; the other was a severe censure passed on some of his recent proceedings. In their general letter to Bengal, dated 4th July, 1777, commenting on the new office which had been created for the purpose of procuring information with regard to a final revenue settlement, they say—"Our surprise and concern were great on finding, by our governor-general's minute of the 1st November, 1776, that, after more than seven years' investigation, information is still so incomplete as to render another innovation, still more extraordinary than any of the former, absolutely necessary, in order to the formation of a new settlement." A little further on they add—"We by no means disapprove the attempt to obtain further information, if it be necessary; but are sorry that the conduct of the majority of the council on the occasion has been such as must have our utter disapprobation. We should have hoped that, when you knew our sentiments respecting the conduct of our late administration, in delegating separate powers to the president, it would have been sufficient to prevent us further trouble on such occasions; but, to our concern, we find that no sooner was our council reduced, by the death of Colonel Monson, to a number which rendered the president's casting vote of consequence to him, than he exercised it to invest himself with an improper degree of power in the business of the revenue, which he could never have expected from other authority." There is much more to the same purpose in the letter; but perhaps the most stinging paragraph of all is that in which the censure administered to himself is brought into contrast with the praise bestowed on his opponents. The paragraph runs thus:—"The minutes of General Clavering and Mr. Francis leave us little to add on this disagreeable subject. Their reasons against delegating a separate power of control to the governor are solid and judicious, and we are happy in declaring that their conduct on this occasion meets with our approbation."

In the above letter the directors did not confine their censure to the establishment of the new office, but referring to the

recall of Mr. Bristow from Oudh, and the re-appointment of Mr. Middleton, declared their "strongest disapprobation of the whole of that transaction," and peremptorily directed that "Mr. Bristow do forthwith return to his station of resident at Oudh, from which he has been so improperly removed." In a later letter, dated 30th January, 1778, they were equally decided in their disapprobation of the removal of Mr. Fowke from Benaras. "If it were possible," they say, "to suppose that a saving to the Company had been your motive for annulling Mr. Fowke's commission, we should have approved your proceedings; but when we find two persons appointed immediately afterwards, with two salaries, to execute an office which has been filled with reputation by Mr. Fowke alone, we must be of opinion that Mr. Fowke was removed without just cause, and therefore direct that Mr. Francis Fowke be immediately reinstated in his office of resident and post-master at Benaras." Mr. Hastings could not now doubt that he had entirely lost the favour of the directors; but the fact seems rather to have emboldened than discouraged him, and he began to act as if he had determined that if he could not obtain their consent to his measures, he would dispense with it or set them at defiance. Peremptory as were the orders for the restoration of Mr. Fowke, Mr. Hastings moved, on the 20th of July, 1778, that the execution of them should be suspended. "Their execution," he said, "would be adequate (equal) to his own resignation of the service, because it would inflict such a wound on his authority as it could not survive." General Clavering's death, too, he added, was unknown to the directors when the orders were issued; and as their nomination to the vacancy, and other resolutions which might seriously affect his position, were daily expected from England, he moved delay, and carried it, by the aid of Mr. Barwell and his own casting vote, against Messrs. Wheler and Francis. The offices of General Clavering, both as a member of council and as commander-in-chief, were supplied by Sir Eyre Coote. When this distinguished officer had taken his seat, Mr. Fowke brought the subject of his restoration again before the council by a petition, in which he prayed that effect should be given to the orders of the court. Mr. Francis made a motion to this effect, and took it

upon him to announce beforehand that it would be carried, as he was sure of the new member's support. Whether because he was offended that his vote should be thus forestalled, or because Mr. Hastings had succeeded in gaining him over, Sir Eyre Coote declared that had he been present when the court's orders arrived he should have voted for their immediate execution, but that now he would wait the result of the reference to the home authorities. Victory, accordingly, remained once more with Mr. Hastings.

In another matter in which the governor-general thought his honour interested in undoing the work of the majority, he was equally successful. After Muhammed Reza Khan was declared innocent of all the charges which Nanda Kumar had maliciously fabricated against him, the directors felt that some reparation was due, and gave orders that the situation held by Gourdas, Nanda Kumar's son, in the nabob's establishment, should be conferred on him. In mentioning this office they committed a misnomer, and this furnished an opportunity for much keen wrangling in the council, the minority asserting that a very subordinate office was meant, whereas the majority insisted that he was to unite in his person the joint authorities of both Gourdas and Munni Begum. This view accordingly prevailed. Even this, however, seemed to fall short of what was desirable, and they proceeded formally to reinvest Muhammed Reza Khan with the office of naib subah, which Mr. Hastings flattered himself had been abolished for ever, when the court of *nizamat adalat* was removed from Murshidabad to Calcutta. It was therefore not without a feeling of indignation he saw himself outvoted on this important subject, and an attempt made to restore the native government by changing the seat of the *nizamat adalat* to Murshidabad, and conferring on Muhammed Reza Khan the superintendence of all the native penal courts throughout the country. "All the acts of policy," he said, and said truly, "cannot conceal the power by which these provinces are ruled, nor can all the arts of sophistry avail to transfer the responsibility to the nabob, when it is as visible as the light of the sun that they originate from our own government, and that the nabob is a mere pageant, without the shadow of authority, and even his most con-

sequential agents receive their appointments from the recommendation of the Company and the express nomination of their servants." Originally Mr. Hastings bore no grudge to Muhammed Reza Khan. On the contrary, he was charged by Nanda Kumar with having acted from corrupt motives in declaring him innocent. His favour for him appears to have been extinguished when he was taken under the patronage of the majority. No appointment conferred upon him could have been so personally offensive to Mr. Hastings as his substitution for Munni Begum. She had lost her office on charges of corruption, which might never have been made had they not been expected to furnish ground of accusation against the governor-general himself; and he probably considered it as a point of honour not to allow her to be a sufferer on his account. An opportunity of gratifying his feelings in this respect was now afforded. On the 23rd of July, 1778, the governor-general moved in council that a letter from the Nabob Mubarak-ud-daulah should be read. It complained bitterly of the management of Muhammed Reza Khan, and prayed that as he had now attained his twentieth year, which by Muhammedan law was that of majority, he should be set free from a tutelage all the more oppressive and degrading that the individual who exercised it was not bound to him by any ties of nature and affection. Mr. Wheler moved that as the directors had both ordered and confirmed the appointment of Muhammed Reza Khan, it was incompetent to make any change without their sanction. Mr. Hastings, on the contrary, proposed that the nabob's request should be immediately complied with. In advocating this proposal he took very high ground, and forgetting his former assertion, that the nabob was "a mere pageant, without the shadow of authority," argued that his "demands are grounded on positive rights, which will not admit of discussion." Had he only insisted that "he has an incontestible right to the management of his own household," he could hardly have been gainsayed; but he contradicted himself and gave ground to suspect that he was swayed by something else than reason and justice, when he went the length of saying that the nabob "has an incontestible right to the *nizamat*" (the whole administration of justice within the

provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa)—it is his by inheritance; the dependants of the *nizamat adalat* and of the *faujdari* have been repeatedly declared, by the Company and by this government, to appertain to the *nizamat*." When the subject was first discussed Mr. Barwell was absent, and Mr. Wheler carried his motion for delay. Mr. Hastings did not allow himself to be thus baffled, and resumed the subject on a future day, when his casting vote was available. Muhammed Reza Khan was accordingly displaced, and his various offices shared among the nabob's relatives and dependants, the household management being given chiefly to Munni Begum, and his own mother, Babu Begum, while the judicial department was committed to an individual of the name of Sudder-al-Hak. How little prudence had been exercised in this appointment became so manifest in less than three months from its date, that Mr. Hastings was obliged to address a letter to the nabob, complaining that "the affairs of the *faujdari* and *adalat* were in the greatest confusion imaginable;" that "daily robberies and murders were perpetrated throughout the country;" and that "his dependants and people, actuated by selfish and avaricious views, had by their interference so impeded the business of justice, as to throw the whole country into a state of confusion."

The above proceedings, with reference both to Mr. Fowke and Muhammed Reza Khan, could not but be displeasing to the directors, who accordingly commented upon them with great severity. In regard to the latter they thus expressed themselves, in a letter dated 4th February, 1779:—"The nabob's letters leave us no doubt of the true design of this extraordinary business being to bring forward Munni Begum, and again to invest her with improper power and influence, notwithstanding our former declaration, that so great a part of the nabob's allowance had been embezzled or misapplied under her superintendence." In another passage they say they observe with equal surprise and concern, "the nabob's ostensible rights so solemnly asserted at *this period* by our governor-general; because, on a late occasion, to serve a very different purpose, he has not scrupled to declare it is visible as the light of the sun, that the nabob is a mere pageant, and without even the shadow of authority. No

circumstance has happened since that declaration was made to render the nabob more independent, nor to give him any additional degree of power and independence; you must therefore have been well apprised that your last concessions to Mubarak-ud-daulah were unnecessary, and as such unwarrantable." Their decision therefore is, that "as we have no reason to alter our opinion of Muhammed Reza Khan, we positively direct that you forthwith signify to the Nabob Mubarak-ud-daulah our pleasure, that Muhammed Reza Khan be immediately restored to the office of naib subahdar." On the subject of Mr. Fowke their language was, if possible, stronger, and even menacing. In a letter dated 27th May, 1779, they wrote, "We have read with astonishment your formal resolution to suspend the execution of our orders relative to Mr. Francis Fowke. Your proceedings at large are now before us. We shall take such measures as appear necessary for preserving the authority of the court of directors, and for preventing such instances of direct and wilful disobedience in our servants in time to come. At present we repeat the commands contained in the sixty-seventh paragraph of our letter of the 30th January, 1778, and direct that they be carried into immediate execution."

It is a singular fact, that while the directors were thus censuring and even menacing their governor-general, they failed to avail themselves of the expiry of the period fixed for his tenure of office by the Regulating Act, to insist on a new appointment, and that by act of parliament 19 George III, c. 61, Mr. Hastings was continued in his office of governor-general for another year. The ministry seemed to have proposed this act because they were not yet prepared to take any decisive steps for fixing the future relations between the government and the Company, and the directors to have acquiesced in it, both because the period of prolongation was so short, and because they were aware that their hostility to Mr. Hastings was not shared by a majority of the proprietors, and consequently that any extreme measure taken against him would in all probability recoil upon themselves. Soon after this renewal of the tenure of office, an attempt was made by mutual friends to effect a reconciliation between Mr. Hastings and Mr. Francis. It was less difficult than might have been supposed. Mr. Hastings, threatened with

the loss of the support of Mr. Barwell, who was bent on returning to Europe, was in danger of being again left in a minority; and Mr. Francis, who had so long been consigned to that unenviable position, was not unwilling to escape from it though it should cost him some sacrifice of consistency. A kind of arrangement was accordingly patched up. The terms cannot be exactly stated, for ere long they became the subject of acrimonious dispute, each giving his own version of them, and endeavouring to fix a charge of deceitful dealing on his adversary. Mr. Hastings had probably the better reason to complain, though he did not give the best proof of it, by losing his temper and using language which no provocation could justify. Not in a moment of excitement and ungovernable passion, but in a deliberately penned minute, he wrote as follows:—"I do not trust to Mr. Francis' promises of candour, convinced that he is incapable of it. I judge of his public conduct by his private, which I have found to be void of truth and honour." This language led to the result which Mr. Hastings evidently contemplated; and according to a practice which still exists, as if to remind us that, with all our boasted civilization, we have not yet entirely escaped from barbarism, a duel was fought, in which Mr. Francis was shot, and nearly lost his life. Mr. Hastings acted throughout in the way which is called honourable, and not only made repeated inquiries after his adversary's health, but offered him a visit. This was more than Mr. Francis could allow himself to accept, and he declared that henceforth they could only meet at the council table. They did meet there on several occasions, and were usually found, as before, on opposite sides; but Mr. Francis having profited so little by the strife, was the first to lose heart in it, and took his departure for England.

Though the council was freed by the departure of Francis from intestine strife, it had previously become involved in controversy of a more serious description. The Regulating Act had established in India two independent powers, forming a kind of *imperium in imperio*, and had not accurately defined their limits. The intent of the act certainly was, that all the powers of government should belong exclusively to the governor and council, but that in administering justice the supreme court should be entirely beyond their control. The judges were appointed by

the crown, for life, from barristers of a certain standing, and all that the Company had to do with them was to pay their salaries, in accordance with a compulsory enactment made for that purpose. The jurisdiction of the court was limited, as has been already shown, to the British subjects resident in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, and to any persons whatsoever who were directly or indirectly in the service of the Company or of British subjects at the time when the cause of action on which they were sued had arisen. Except over British subjects so resident, and natives so employed, the supreme court had no authority whatever. This was made still plainer in regard to natives by a special clause, which enacted that they should be amenable to the court at the instance of British subjects only when in a written contract for more than 500 rupees they had agreed that in case of dispute they should be so amenable. Even in regard to resident British subjects there were some important restrictions. The supreme court could not try the governor-general or a member of council for any offence not being treason or felony; nor could it arrest or imprison upon any action, suit, or proceeding before it, either the governor-general, or a member of council, or the chief-justice, or any of the judges.

It has been seen in the case of Nanda Kumar, how, by a forced interpretation, the criminal jurisdiction given within the town of Calcutta was extended, contrary to the plain intention of the act, so as to include all natives resident within its limits. The governor-general had himself not only acquiesced in this forced interpretation, but profited by it, and was therefore the less able to resist when the supreme court began to employ similar means for the purpose of supporting other encroachments. Shortly after the Nanda Kumar tragedy, Mr. Stuart, who had been dismissed from the office of secretary to the council, brought an action against Mr. Auriol, his successor, for a month's salary, which, he alleged, ought to have been paid to himself. In this case the jurisdiction of the court was undoubted, but the proceedings raised a difficult and important question. The plaintiff, in calling for the production of papers, included among them letters from the directors and portions of the consultations of government. The governor-general and council refused to give the papers. On this the assistant-secretary, to whom the requisi-

tion had been made, was served with a subpoena, and on appearing without the papers, was told that he had made himself liable for the whole sum in the suit. Having answered that the board prohibited him from bringing the papers, he was asked whether the board in refusing were unanimous, and if not, who were the members constituting the majority. An objection by the defendant's counsel, that these questions could not be answered without a breach of trust, was overruled, and it was distinctly laid down by the court, that the refusal of the papers was a denial of justice, and that as the board was no corporation, the individual members who had voted for the refusal were personally liable. This extravagance was only a first step. Others which soon followed made it almost be forgotten.

The clause of the act empowering the court to try and determine any suit, action, or complaint, against any person who shall, at the time when such debt or cause of action or complaint may have arisen, have been employed by, or shall then have been directly or indirectly in the service of the said united Company, or of any its subjects, is very loosely worded, and admitted of being interpreted so as to entangle almost every native of the least consequence in the meshes of the court. Direct service gave jurisdiction at once over all persons, civil and military, however subordinate the office they held—judges of every kind and degree, revenue officers, menial servants, and even common soldiers. Indirect service could be made still more sweeping, and not merely zamindars and farmers, from their connection with the revenue, but all persons under obligation to the Company by any kind of contract, might be included. The first fault undoubtedly was in the act itself, which, from not using language sufficiently specific, left room for such extravagant interpretations; but the next fault was in the judges, who must have been aware that a power so tremendous and so liable to abuse, if really given to them, must have been given by mere oversight, and who ought therefore to have done what in them lay to moderate the power, instead of stretching it to the utmost, mainly for the purpose of magnifying their own importance.

When the nature of the jurisdiction claimed by the supreme court was made palpable to the natives by some of the processes which it sanctioned, a real reign of terror commenced. No man,

however great his respectability, or undoubted his solvency, felt safe from the indignity of arrest, and the still greater indignity of imprisonment, when the enormous bail demanded as a security for claims, which often had not even the shadow of a foundation, could not be obtained or was refused. This was bad enough when the writs were directed only against males, but when they began to be directed against females also, and attempts were made to serve them, by violating sanctuaries held sacred even during the ravages of war, it was evident that a crisis had become inevitable. The judges, who ought to have maintained tranquillity, were throwing the country into confusion, and as argument seemed to be lost upon them, the only other alternative was to deny effect to their proceedings. To show how completely the government was justified in adopting this alternative, a specimen of the processes sanctioned by the court must be given.

Kashinath Babu, the Calcutta agent of the Raja of Kashijura, sued his employer in the supreme court in a question of accounting; and, in order to show that the court had jurisdiction, made oath that the raja was in the service of the Company as a collector of revenue. He was, in fact, merely zamindar of his district. On this affidavit a *capias* was issued, with a permission to take bail for 300,000 rupees (£30,000). The raja, made aware of the issue of the writ, kept out of the way, and the writ was returned unexecuted. On this a new writ was issued to sequester his land and effects. Meanwhile the governor-general and council had taken the alarm, and consulted their legal advisers. The opinion given by Sir John Day, the advocate-general, was to the effect that zamindars, merely as such, were not amenable to the supreme court; that the raja, therefore, should be advised not to plead, or in any way recognize their jurisdiction; and that in this and all similar cases government should refuse to aid the court in the execution of its processes. This opinion was adopted; and, in accordance with it, the officer at Midnapur was instructed, if applied to by the sheriff for military aid, to refuse it. The court was not to be thus baffled; and one of their officers set out for Kashijura with an armed force of sixty men, mostly furnished by Kashinath Babu, who, conformably to a common practice among opulent natives, had them

in his pay. On this government ordered Colonel Ahmuty, the officer in command at Midnapur, to preserve the peace of the country, by apprehending any armed force of the kind described. He sent out a small detachment for this purpose, but it did not arrive in time to prevent a gross outrage. The officers of the court had already effected an entrance into the raja's house, forced their way into the zanana or female apartments, defiled his temple, beaten and wounded some of his servants who resisted, and carried off his diwan or steward as prisoner. On the arrival of the troops from Midnapur, the sheriff's party were all taken into custody. After this decided step there was no longer room for hesitancy, and the governor-general and council, in the end of 1779, published a notification to all zamindars and other natives similarly connected with land, that they were not in that capacity amenable to the supreme court, and were not bound to acknowledge its jurisdiction, unless they had voluntarily agreed to do so by a written contract, or unless they were or had been British servants. All provincial authorities were ordered to circulate this notice, and give effect to its object, by not aiding in the execution of any process that contravened it.

On the 18th of January, 1780, the supreme court began to retaliate, by granting a rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue against Lieutenant Bamford, the officer who commanded the Company's troops, Mr. Swanston, collector's assistant at Midnapur, and Mr. Naylor, the Company's attorney, for the part they had taken in order to defeat the course of process. Ultimately the rule was made absolute against Mr. Naylor; and on his refusal to answer a string of interrogatories, he was committed to jail for contempt. When the imprisonment was proposed, Mr. Naylor's counsel remarked to the bench, "I hope your lordship does not mean that Mr. Naylor shall answer *in vinculis*?" "Why not?" replied Sir Elijah Impey, in the brutal style of the notorious Judge Jeffries; "why not? Mr. Naylor will have more time to think of his conduct, and prepare his answer." During these proceedings, the governor and council were served with a summons for trespass, at the instance of Kashinath Babu. As the nature of the trespass did not clearly appear on the face of the summons, they entered appearance,

but on learning that they were sued for things done by them in their public capacity, they refused to plead. This was immediately declared to be "a clear contempt of his majesty's law and of his court." It is difficult to say how far the extravagance of the bench would have carried them, and the public were waiting in suspense and anxiety for the next steps that were to be taken, when it was abruptly announced that Kashinath Babu's action, and all the proceedings taken upon it, were quashed.

Most desirable as this result was in itself, the pleasure which it gave was damped by a suspicion that the means which had been employed to produce it were not honourable. No proper explanation was ever volunteered or extorted, but a transaction which took place a few months afterwards throws much light on the subject. The refusal of the governor-general and council to plead, and the denunciation of this refusal by the judges as "a clear contempt," occurred about the middle of March, 1780. On the 11th of April, on the motion of the governor-general, a considerable change was made in the constitution of the native civil courts. By the regulations of 1773, the duties of these courts were performed by the provincial council sitting as the *diwani adalat*, in which cognizance was taken of all civil causes, whatever their nature might be. By the new arrangement, the provincial councils were to judge in revenue cases only, and the *diwani adalat* proper, withdrawn entirely from their jurisdiction, and made competent to determine all civil cases arising between individuals, was placed under the superintendence of a covenanted servant, who was not member of the provincial council, nor dependent upon it. This was probably intended as a preliminary step to another of greater importance. On the 22nd of September the governor-general lodged a minute, in which he stated that the above change had not proved satisfactory. Troublesome and alarming competition had already taken place between the new courts and the provincial councils, and much of the precious time of the board was in consequence wasted in discussing appeals brought into the *sadar diwani adalat*, in which the governor-general and council were the presiding judges. Their other avocations left them no time for the proper discharge of this duty. The remedy

he suggested was, that the *sadar diwani adalat* ought to be entirely changed. Instead of merely receiving appeals from the district civil courts, it ought to have a general superintendence of all their proceedings, and the power of remedying their defects, by forming "such new regulations and checks as experience shall prove to be necessary," and instead of being presided over by the governor and council, who neither had the leisure nor possessed the qualifications necessary for the discharge of these important duties, should be placed under a single judge, of whose fitness there could not possibly be any doubt, as the individual he meant to propose was the chief-justice of the supreme court, Sir Elijah Impey!

A key was now given to the mystery which hung over the abrupt termination of the jurisdiction controversy. Kashinath Babu had been bribed to withdraw his suit, and the chief-justice was now to be bribed to lower his claims to jurisdiction, or keep them in abeyance. "The chief-justice," said Mr. Hastings, "being invested with the superintendence of the native courts of *diwani adalat*, would regulate, and consequently have no occasion to question their jurisdiction; his closer connection with the government, while holding an important office under it, and drawing, in addition to his previous emoluments, a salary of about £8,000 a year, payable by the Company and revocable at their pleasure, would 'be the means of lessening the distance between the council and the court; in this way might be prevented those dangerous consequences to the peace and resources of the government which would inevitably result from a continuance of the contest in which they had been unfortunately engaged.'" Recollecting the many occasions on which Mr. Hastings had shown his readiness to sacrifice principle to expediency, one is not much surprised at his having made this offer to Sir Elijah Impey; the only wonder is how the chief-justice agreed to accept of it. In replying to an application in favour of Nanda Kumar from the majority of the council, he had taken occasion to give utterance to the maxim, that "it is not sufficient that courts of justice act independently; it is necessary for the good government of a country that they should be believed, and known to be above all influence," and here he is fleeing in the very face of this maxim

and placing himself as a judge "under influence," simply because he was to be handsomely paid for it. He had claimed jurisdiction because, as he alleged, a sense of duty compelled him, and he now enters into a compact by which he, virtually at least, engages to withdraw the claim, because, though the sense of duty may remain, the stronger sense of personal interest overpowers it. By an honourable-minded man the very arguments which Mr. Hastings employed in advocating the appointment would have been felt to be insulting, but Sir Elijah Impey saw nothing but the money, and blindly grasped at it. We say *blindly*, because, however little restrained by principle, he might have foreseen that he was throwing away a substance, and snatching a shadow. The grossness of the bargain would not allow it to pass without animadversion, and the probable consequence was that parliament would interfere and decide that, instead of being entitled to draw the salaries of two judges, he had dishonoured the bench, and proved himself unworthy of being a judge at all.

Mr. Hastings' proposed reconstruction of the *sadar diwani adalat*, and the appointment of Sir Elijah Impey as its sole judge, was strongly opposed in the council, but his casting vote once more availed him. There was, however, another ordeal to be passed. While the jurisdiction controversy was raging, and threatening to throw everything into confusion, petitions had been presented to parliament from the Company, from the governor and council and the British inhabitants in Bengal, praying for legislative interference, and representing that unless relief were given "the Company would have ports without trade, possessions without revenue, and provinces without inhabitants." These petitions were referred to a select committee on the 12th of January, 1781, and an act was passed to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court, and keep it within due bounds. By this act (21 Geo. III. c. 70) it was enacted that "the governor-general and council of Bengal shall not be subject, jointly or severally, to the jurisdiction of the supreme court of Fort William, in Calcutta, for or by reason of any act or order, or any other matter or thing whatsoever, counselled, ordered, or done by them in their public capacity only; that persons implicated in any action or process, civil or criminal, in the said supreme court, for any

act or acts done by the order of the said governor and council in writing," may give the order in evidence, and this order, with proof that the actor acts complained of were done in accordance with it, "shall amount to a sufficient justification;" that the supreme court "shall not have or exercise any jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue, or concerning any act or acts ordered or done in the collection thereof, according to the usage and practice of the country, or the regulations of the governor-general and council; and that "no person shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the supreme court for or by reason of his being a landowner, landholder, or farmer of land, or of land rent," or by reason "of his being employed by the Company, or the governor-general and council, or by any person deriving authority under them," or on account of "his being employed by a native, or a descendant of a native of Great Britain," except in actions for wrongs or trespasses, and also except in any civil suit, where the parties have agreed in writing that the supreme court shall decide.

The question of jurisdiction was thus settled, as it only could be, by the authority of the legislature; and therefore the greater was the dissatisfaction felt with the very different kind of settlement which had been attempted without legislative interference. The directors, before taking any step in the matter, determined to have the highest legal advice, and laid the case before the attorney-general, the solicitor-general, Mr. Dunning, and their standing counsel, Mr. Rous. The first three concurred in an opinion which would now find few supporters. It was as follows:—"The appointment of the chief-justice to the office of judge of *sadar diwani adalat*, and giving him a salary for the latter office, besides what he is entitled to as chief-justice, does not appear to us to be illegal, either as being contrary to 13 Geo. III. (the Regulating Act), or incompatible with his duty as chief-justice, nor do we see anything in the late act, 21 Geo. III, which affects the question." Mr. Rous differed, and Mr. Mansfield, one of the three who had signed the opinion, intimated that he now doubted whether the acceptance of a salary to be held at pleasure was not against the spirit of the act, or at least the reason of the case. The lawyers had viewed the question in the spirit of their profession, and had decided

nothing but the legality. The select committee of parliament took higher ground; and in their report, which was presented on the 18th of April, 1782, looked beyond the mere question of law, and judged Sir Elijah Impey's appointment on its own merits. They objected to the power which it conferred as exorbitant, and all the more dangerous that it was undefined. He was to decide on the fortunes of the whole natives of Bengal, with nothing to guide him but his own will, and subject to no appeal which might have corrected him when he went astray. To his judicial was superadded legislative power, for the regulations which he might be pleased to frame were to have all the force of law. On seeing all this power concentrated in a single individual, it was not out of place to ask whether he was the kind of person who might be expected to use it with moderation. Just before receiving the appointment, he had been stretching his jurisdiction beyond all reasonable bounds, and would to all appearance be stretching it still, had not his moderation been purchased by bestowing upon him a large salary. Such a compact reflected dishonour both on "the public justice" and on "the executive administration of Bengal." Sir Elijah Impey is seen "one day summoning the governor-general and council before his tribunal for acts done as council, and the next accepting emoluments nearly equal to his original appointment, to be held during the pleasure of the same council." To secure his independence the crown had made him chief-justice, and fixed his salary for life; and to deprive him of his independence the governor-general and council had made him judge of the *sadar diwani adalat*, and given him a still larger salary, to be held only during their pleasure. The two offices are incompatible. "By the dependence of one tribunal both are rendered dependent—both are vitiated, so far as a place of great power, influence, and patronage, with near £8,000 a year of emoluments, held at the pleasure of the giver, can be supposed to operate on gratitude, interest, and fear." On these and similar grounds parliament decided, in accordance with the recommendation of the committee, that the appointment should be declared null and void, and that the directors should order it to be rescinded. This they did without delay, and on the 9th of May the House of Commons moved an address to the crown, for the recall of

Sir Elijah Impey from India. The result, which might have been anticipated, was thus realized; and he found, when too late, that in attempting to double his emoluments by an unworthy compact, he had made a fearful sacrifice of both character and fortune. In order to bring these internal transactions to a close, it has been necessary to advance a few years beyond the period to which we had brought the narrative of public events. This must now be resumed.

Peace with the Marathas

THE treaty of Purandhar, concluded with the Poona ministry by Colonel Upton, not being much relished either by the Company or the Marathas, had received a very imperfect execution, each party endeavouring to evade his obligations under it, and lay the blame of non-fulfilment on the other. In this state of feeling very little was required to produce a rupture. The more immediate occasion of it was as follows. In the middle of March, 1777, a French ship, laden with military and marine stores, cloth, and other articles of European export, arrived at Choul or Chowal, a Maratha port about twenty-three miles south of Bombay, and landed several Frenchmen, who proceeded towards Poona. One of them announced himself as a French ambassador, and was received in that character by the Maratha ministers. This ambassador proved to be the Chevalier St. Lubin, who, it will be recollected, formed part of the train of the field-deputies whom the council of Madras during the war with Hyder had the folly to send to the army, as a kind of check on the movements of their own general. This chevalier pretended to have lived long among the Marathas, to be intimately acquainted with their leading chiefs as well as with Hyder, and to be thus able, by the accuracy of his knowledge and the extent of his influence, to be of essential service during the campaign. Credit was given to his statements, but subsequent inquiry proved that they were without foundation, and that he was a mere adventurer. He had now succeeded in palming his impostures on the French, who, mortified at the ascendancy which the British had established in India, and in daily expectation that a new war between the two nations was about to commence, were anxious to obtain

some locality which might facilitate their naval and military operations, and serve as a nucleus from which new conquest might be made. On the east coast the retention of what they already possessed was the utmost that they could venture to hope for; the west coast presented a more favourable prospect. It was much nearer to the Mauritius, which had become the chief place of rendezvous for their European armaments, and the hostile feelings of the Marathas towards the British would make negotiation with them comparatively easy. Entertaining these views, they gave a willing ear to St. Lubin, and sent him on a mission to Poona. As soon as his arrival and reception were known at Bombay, the greatest alarm was excited; and the council, who had been mortified above measure, both at the terms of the treaty of Purandhar, and the manner in which it had been concluded, would at once, had their power been as absolute as it formerly was, have begun to prepare for war. Under the restrictions which the Bengal government had imposed upon them, they were obliged to proceed more cautiously. Their freedom of action had, however, been in a great measure restored to them by a letter from the directors, disapproving of the manner in which they had been interfered with by the governor-general and council, giving it as their opinion "that an alliance originally with Raghoba would have been more for the honour and advantage of the Company, and more likely to be lasting than that at Poona," and summing up their views on the subject thus:—"His (Raghoba's) pretensions to the supreme authority appear to us better founded than those of his competitors; and therefore, if the conditions of the treaty of Poona have not been strictly fulfilled on the part of the Marathas, and if, from any circumstance, our governor-general and council shall deem it expedient, we have no objection to an alliance with Raghoba, on the terms agreed upon between him and you."

Shortly after they had obtained this sanction to their proceedings, the Bombay council received an application which at once decided their future course. The dissensions which had long prevailed in the court of Poona at last came to such a height that one of the parties, despairing of being able to establish their own ascendancy, resolved to espouse the cause of Raghoba.

At the head of this party was Moraba Fadnavis, the cousin and rival of Nana Fadnavis, the acting prime minister. The latter, not satisfied with showing favour to St. Lubin, had put many petty affronts on Mr. Mostyn, the Company's resident at Poona, and it was therefore concluded that he had finally committed himself to the French, and was even prepared to give them a permanent footing in the country. Hence when Moraba, the head of the rival party, opened a communication with the Bombay council, and formally proposed that they would take means to reinstate Raghoba at Poona, the request was so much in accordance with their own views and wishes, that they determined to comply with it without delay. Having formed this resolution, they lost no time in conveying intelligence of it to Bengal. Here, as usual, a serious difference of opinion arose. Messrs. Wheler and Francis opposed the Bombay resolution as illegal, because adopted without the previous sanction required by the Regulating Act; as dishonourable, because in violation of a still subsisting treaty; and as impolitic, because involving the Company, without necessity or any adequate cause, in a war of the most formidable description. On the other hand, Messrs. Hastings and Barwell argued that the resolution, which might otherwise have been illegal, was fully justified by the suddenness of the emergency, and its conformity to the views expressed by the directors; that it could not be considered as a breach of the Purandhar treaty, since one of the principal parties to that treaty was in favour of the application which had been made for assistance; and that it was in accordance with true policy, since it would not only frustrate the ambitious schemes of their great European rival, but secure their future ascendancy in Maratha councils, besides giving accessions of territory which would more than compensate for all the expense. This opinion, by means of the governor-general's casting vote, prevailed, and it was resolved to assist the Bombay presidency both with money and with troops.

The transmission of the money was a simple process, but the conveyance of troops presented obstacles of no ordinary nature. The Company's brigades were stationed far to the north and west, near the frontiers of Oudh, and not only would much time be required to bring a sufficient detachment down to

Calcutta, but a long and tedious voyage at an unfavourable season would intervene before it could reach the field of action. Mr. Hastings suggested the bold idea of an overland journey. It was adopted, and a force consisting of six battalions of sepoys, a proportionate artillery, and a corps of cavalry, was directed to assemble at Kalpi, on the right bank of the Jamuna. This place is nearly equidistant in a direct line from Calcutta and Bombay, being about 600 miles W.N.W. of the one, and 680 miles N.N.E. of the other. In the latter direction, the distance by any practicable route cannot be less than 1,000 miles, and thus was the march about to be undertaken through a country only half explored, and for the most part unfriendly, if not actually hostile, by a force mustering in all 103 European officers, and 6,234 native troops, with a cumbersome mass of followers estimated at not less than 30,000. The command was given to Colonel Leslie, whose orders were to proceed across India towards Bombay, and place himself at the disposal of that presidency.

During these preparations the aspect of affairs at Poona had undergone another change. Moraba, whose talents and honesty were far less than his ambition, no sooner believed that his own ascendancy was established, than he began to repent of the invitation to reinstate Raghoba, and showed an evident anxiety to evade the subject when it was pressed by his English friends. A majority of the Bombay council seeing this change, resolved, on 22nd April, 1778, to countermand Colonel Leslie's detachment. A letter, received immediately after, from the Bengal government, induced them to alter this resolution, and on the 3rd of May another order was despatched, directing Colonel Leslie to advance. Meanwhile another sudden revolution at Poona had issued in the overthrow of Moraba and his party. Moraba himself was imprisoned in the fortress of Ahmednagar; Sukaram Bapu, through whom chiefly the treaty of Purandhar was concluded, and who had throughout all changes steadily supported Raghoba, was carried off to end his days in a dungeon, loaded with chains so heavy, that though a powerful man he could scarcely lift them, and so scantily supplied with food and water, that they barely sufficed to maintain him in life for fourteen months, without satisfying

his hunger or quenching his thirst; and Nana Fadnavis, who had played his part with consummate art, was once more at the head of the ministry without a rival. On this change of administration, the Bombay council applied to know whether the new ministers held the Maratha state to be still bound by the treaty of Purandhar.

At an earlier period the Company's resident at Poona had made application to the ministers there, and to Sindhia and Holkar, for passports to the British troops during the overland march. The object of their expedition was stated to be to counteract the designs of the French. On this subject the Maratha chiefs were rather incredulous. "They probably considered," says Duff,¹ "that if it had been intended to send troops to Bombay, they would have been embarked from the coast of Malabar or Coromandel, and replaced from Bengal, an opinion," he adds, "in which many competent judges among our own countrymen coincided." Sindhia and Holkar, who were at Poona when the application was made, naturally desired that during their absence the British force should pass as friends rather than enemies, and therefore readily granted the passports. Nana Fadnavis was not so complying. When he saw that the favour shown to St. Lubin at Poona was made the ground of serious complaint, he dismissed him without difficulty, because he was too clear-sighted not to have discovered his true character, but he made this dismissal the ground of a very plausible argument. If the object of Colonel Leslie's expedition really was to counteract the designs of the French, this object was already gained by their dismissal, and the expedition being thus rendered unnecessary, there was no occasion for passports. To the important question, whether the new ministers held themselves bound by the treaty of Purandhar, the reply was, that "the English should keep that treaty faithfully, and then they would do the same."

About the time when this decisive reply was given, intelligence arrived that the expected war with France was actually declared. This seemed to the Bombay council an additional reason for taking decisive steps. They accordingly entered into a new agreement with the opposition party at Poona. It

¹ Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. ii, p. 354.

differed considerably from the former, inasmuch as under it Raghoba was only to assume the regency, and retain it till the majority of Ganga Bai's son, Madhu Rao Narain, who was thus acknowledged to be the legitimate peshwa. This agreement had scarcely been concluded, when the party with whom it had been made was completely overthrown. The Bombay council, however, had gone too far to recede, and they determined to carry out their plans.

Colonel Leslie had commenced his march in the end of May, 1778, and was expected by the Bengal government to advance with so much rapidity as to be able to cross the Narmada before the rains. Instead of this he allowed himself to be retarded by some petty Rajput chiefs, whom the Marathas had instigated to throw obstructions in the way, and in desultory warfare with them wasted the time which might have carried him far in advance. In the middle of August he had only reached Mhow, a town of Bundelkhand, a little west of Chhatarpur; and in the course of five months, while the estimated expense of his army amounted to more than twelve lacs, the whole distance accomplished did not exceed 120 miles. His incapacity, which had been previously suspected, was now considered proved, and an order was issued for his recall. Before it reached him he had died of fever, on the 3rd of October, 1778. The command of the detachment was assumed by the next senior officer, Colonel Goddard, who a few days after quitted Rajgarh, and proceeded towards the Narmada. The Maratha officer stationed at Sagur, after many professions of friendship, made a perfidious attempt on the baggage of the army; the Nabob of Bhopal, on the contrary, gave it every assistance in his power, and greatly facilitated its progress. On the 2nd of December, the Narmada was forded at Husangabad.

Colonel Goddard, after crossing the Narmada, remained for some time on its south bank, awaiting some communications on which his future operations depended. Mr. Hastings had conceived it possible to detach Mudaji Bhonsla, the Raja of Berar, from his connection with the ministers of Poona, and enlist him in the interests of the Company. His views of the means by which this desirable object was to be accomplished were at first somewhat indefinite. When questioned on the

subject by the party opposed to him in the council, he stated two methods by which the friendship of the raja might be secured. The one was to assist him in recovering certain territories which had been wrested from him by Nizam Ali; the other was to support his claim to the Maratha rajaship. The former pageant raja had recently died at Satara without issue, and Mudaji Bhonsla, without pretending to be the nearest heir, was disposed to put in a claim to the succession, on the ground of his being a descendant of Sivaji. Before determining in which of these two modes the raja's friendship was to be courted, it was resolved to send an embassy to him. Mr. Elliot, who was at the head of the embassy, died on the 12th of September, before reaching Nagpur, the capital of Berar, and further proceedings were in consequence deferred. The raja, whose vanity had been flattered by the court paid to him, professed great sorrow at the death of the ambassador, and wrote a letter to the governor-general, in which, after lamenting the event, he expressed a hope that the plan of friendship would not thereby be frustrated. On the same day the governor-general received a despatch from Colonel Goddard, dated 22nd October, detailing the progress he had made towards the Narmada. It was now necessary to come to some decision, and the governor-general had nothing better to propose than that the negotiation with the raja should be resumed, and conducted through Colonel Goddard. This motion, though strenuously opposed, was carried by the usual casting vote, and Colonel Goddard received the necessary powers to act in a double capacity. It was this which kept him halting on the banks of the Narmada.

The state into which affairs had thus been brought was very complicated. The Bombay government were under agreement to secure the regency at Poona for Raghoba, till such time as the young peshwa should be able to act for himself; and the Bengal government were negotiating another agreement, which was totally incompatible with it. Mudaji Bhonsla's object was to be a real, not a pageant raja; and if he succeeded there would obviously be no room for any peshwa, at least in the sense in which the term was now understood, and the Bombay council and Raghoba and his friends understood it, when they incurred their mutual obligations. Mr. Hastings, when twitted

with the inconsistency, did not attempt to deny it. He merely argued that the proposed agreement with the raja would, if adopted, be by far the more valuable of the two, and that at all events the detachment ought to continue its march, whether its service should ultimately be employed in restoring Raghoba, or in raising Mudaji Bhonsla to the rajaship, or in counteracting the schemes of the French. On the 7th of December, when the complete overthrow of Raghoba's party at Poona became known at Calcutta, the governor-general held that the object originally contemplated in sending the detachment to Bombay was defeated, and that it therefore ought not to remain any longer under the orders of that presidency. His object in advising the Bengal government to resume authority over it, was to prevent the employment of it in a manner which would defeat his favourite negotiation with the Raja of Berar. On this occasion he carried the whole council along with him, though their votes were given on very different grounds; the opposition hoping that the result would be to secure the object for which they had all along been contending—the recall of the detachment to Bengal. Meanwhile, the negotiation with the raja made little progress, as he was evidently anxious not to commit himself so long as there was room to doubt which of the two would prove the winning side.

Colonel Goddard, while still halting on the banks of the Narmada, received the order which withdrew him from the authority of the Bombay government, and a few days after received an order from this government to advance with all expedition to the aid of their army, which had taken the field in the cause of Raghoba. This was a dilemma from which an officer satisfied with performing the ordinary routine of duty could easily have extricated himself. He would simply have remained at Husangabad, and pleaded the authority of his superiors. Colonel Goddard was not an officer of this cast. Fearing, from the terms of the Bombay letter, that much more might be at stake than appeared on the face of it, he resolved without hesitation to hasten westwards. He accordingly started about the 26th of January, 1779, and on the 30th reached Burhanpur. In order to refresh his men, he remained here till the 6th of February, when he resumed his march. Surat,

towards which he was proceeding, was 300 miles distant. He reached it in twenty days. By this extraordinary expedition he avoided a body of horse which had been sent from Poona to intercept him.

Though Colonel Goddard had regularly transmitted full accounts of his progress to Bombay, he had received no information. Why he was thus kept in the dark has not been satisfactorily explained. It may have been merely culpable negligence, though another hypothesis is that the Bombay authorities, confident in their own resources, believed that they were a match for the Marathas without his aid, and were therefore unwilling to give him a share of the glory, which they hoped to appropriate entirely to themselves. If they acted from such selfish and vainglorious motives, they were now paying the penalty. They had brought disgrace on themselves, disaster on the Company, and dishonour on the British name. The course of events which terminated in this result must now be explained.

In the end of August, 1778, the Bombay government learned for the first time, from the governor-general and council, that there was some intention of forming an alliance with Mudaji Bhonsla, and were directed in consequence not to enter into any engagement hostile to the government at Poona. This information and direction were too vague to stay the majority of the Bombay council from following up the measures into which they had now entered with their whole soul, and they resolved that Mudaji was so totally unconnected with their design of securing the regency to Raghoba, that the intimation given them could not be intended to interfere with it. Their preparation, however, did not keep pace with their resolutions, and they remained inactive till the 12th of October, when Mr. John Carnac, one of the members of council, and the declared successor of Governor Hornby, lodged a minute, urging the necessity of adopting vigorous measures without further delay. Mr. Carnac, though ranked as a civilian, was the very same individual whom we formerly saw figuring in Bengal in the days of Clive as Brigadier-general Carnac. His opinion on a military question was therefore supposed to be entitled to some weight; and though Mr. Draper urged a delay of two months,

and gave good reasons for it, his caution only subjected him to a smile of contempt from the ancient brigadier, who carried the majority along with him, and obtained the first reward of his zeal by being appointed president of a committee to settle the preliminaries with Raghoba.

The council gave the command of their army to Colonel Charles Egerton. His health was so infirm as to unfit him for active service, and on this account the place properly belonging to him had been taken in the former expedition by Colonel Keating. Strange to say, this fact, which furnished the best ground for excluding him still, was urged as the main reason for now appointing him, and an individual confessedly unfit was placed at the head of the army on the eve of a formidable war, merely in order that he might be able to draw the emoluments attached to the office. In some measure to counteract the foreseen consequences of such an appointment, the absurdity of field-deputies, which proved so mischievous in the Carnatic during the war with Hyder, was repeated, and two members of council, Mr. Carnac, the ex-brigadier-general, and Mr. Mostyn, lately resident at Poona, accompanied the camp, to form, with the commander-in-chief, a committee empowered to regulate everything of importance, except the mere detail of duty and march. Colonel Egerton alleged that he had assented to the proposal of a committee under the impression that it was intended solely for the purpose of settling the preliminary arrangements with Raghoba, but afterwards, on finding how much more extensive its powers were, he not only made repeated objections, but protested against the whole measure "as contrary to the orders of the court of directors, and derogatory to his situation as commanding officer." This was an ominous commencement, and ought to have opened the eyes of the Bombay government to the blundering and fatal course they were pursuing.

Though it was well known that Nana Fadnavis was exerting himself to the utmost to meet the coming storm, a spirit of procrastination prevailed at Bombay, and it was late in November before the preparations were pronounced to be complete. On the evening of the 22nd, an advanced party, consisting of six companies of native grenadiers and some light artillery,

sailed from Bombay, and landing at Aпти, gained possession of the Bhor Ghat, a mountain pass on the road from Bombay to Poona, and nearly equidistant from both, being about forty miles south-east of the former and north-west of the latter. The main body sailed on the following day, and disembarked at Panwell on the 25th. Including the advanced party under Captain Stewart, the whole force mustered 3,900 men, of whom 591 were Europeans, 2,278 sepoys, and 500 gun lascars. At Panwell a proclamation, declaring the objects of the expedition, was issued in Raghoba's name. Some time was lost at Panwell, and before leaving it, Colonel Egerton and Mr. Carnac had quarrelled on a point of etiquette, the knotty point in dispute being the military honours claimed by the latter. A matter of more serious consequence was the illness of Mr. Mostyn, who, without once attending the committee, returned to Bombay, where he shortly after died. The great benefit which the expedition might have derived from his local knowledge, and the influence which he had acquired by personal acquaintance with the Maratha chiefs, were thus lost. On his illness Colonel Egerton declared that the powers of the committee were suspended; but in thus endeavouring to throw off a galling yoke, he only rivetted it more firmly. The Bombay council, when appealed to, overruled his objections, and as there were now only two members, and Mr. Carnac as president had the casting vote, the effect was to make him virtually sole master.

The army, which did not reach the top of the Ghats till the 23rd of December, was there divided into two brigades, the one commanded by Colonel Cay, and the other by Lieutenant Cockburn, while the advance under Captain Stewart was still kept up as a separate corps. There were thus three divisions moving in succession, the one always occupying the ground which the other had occupied, and the whole creeping on at such a sluggish pace that eleven days were spent in reaching Karli, a village only eight miles in advance of the Bhor Ghat. This extraordinary mode of warfare was attributed to the imperfection of the commissariat. The effect of it was to encourage the enemy, who kept harassing the march by infantry, rockets, and guns. In the skirmishes thus occasioned, both Colonel Cay, who was an excellent officer, and Captain Stewart, who had given great promise of future eminence, lost their lives. The

Marathas meanwhile had full leisure to assemble their army, in which the chief commands were held by Mahadaji Sindhia, Hari Pant Phadke, and Tukaji Holkar, the latter, however, who was known to have a leaning for Raghoba, being stationed so as to make it extremely hazardous to attempt to join him.

On the 9th of January, 1779, when the British army reached Tullygaon, the enemy appeared in force, and seemed prepared for resistance. This was merely a feint; for when battle was offered them, they suddenly retired. At this time Colonel Egerton, disabled by sickness, had resigned the command to Colonel Cockburn; but as he still remained in the camp—for the very good reason that he durst not venture to quit it, because a body of the enemy had cut off the communication with Bombay—his counsels and those of Mr. Carnac still prevailed. The distance from Tullygaon to Poona was only eighteen miles, and a determined effort might have accomplished it. Despondency, however, had now taken the place of overweening confidence, and two fatal resolutions were taken in one breath. The first was to open a negotiation with some of the chiefs, the second to retreat. Colonel Cockburn, on being asked his opinion, said he had no doubt of being able to carry the army to Poona, though not without the sacrifice of the baggage, provisions, and cattle. The last, in bullocks alone, were 19,000. Whether it was that the sacrifice was deemed too expensive, or that some other inexplicable motive weighed with Messrs. Egerton and Carnac, the resolution to retreat was persisted in, in the face of an earnest remonstrance from Raghoba, who saw but too clearly what the result would be. When unable to change the resolution, he prayed only that the execution might be deferred. This was refused, even for a single day, and “at eleven o’clock on the night of the 11th of January,” says Duff, “the heavy guns having been thrown into a large tank, and a quantity of stores burned, an army of 2,600 British troops began its retreat, secretly, as was supposed, before 50,000 Marathas.” They had not made a single march before receiving too good proof that they were discovered. At two o’clock in the morning, the advanced guard under Captain Gordon was fired upon by a party of horse. As soon as the firing was heard, Colonel Cockburn ordered two companies of Europeans to support the

advance, but before any respite was obtained the rear also was attacked, and part of the baggage plundered. At daylight the army discovered that they were completely surrounded. A halt immediately took place, the line was formed, and a desperate struggle commenced. In the rear, where the onset was fiercest, the six grenadier companies of sepoys, under command of Captain Hartley, fought with perfect enthusiasm, and set an example which, if followed, might have secured an unmolested retreat. As it was, Hartley's intrepidity so far succeeded in keeping the enemy at bay, that the advanced guard made some progress, and halted at the village of Wadgaon. The main body, however, was in great confusion. The followers crowded in between the troops so as greatly to impede their movements, and when the village was neared, rushed forward for shelter from the rockets which the enemy were showering upon them. The case, not yet hopeless, was soon made so by the pusillanimity of the commanding officer, who, instead of repressing despondency, encouraged it. Though a considerable loss had been sustained in entering the village, the troops had extricated themselves, the enemy's horse were driven off, and the guns were placed in commanding positions. In the afternoon of the 12th some respite was thus obtained, but on the following day, when the enemy's guns opened on the village, and a large body of infantry advanced to attack it, the resistance grew feebler and feebler, many desertions took place and the most alarming reports were circulated. The loss of the preceding day amounted to 56 killed, 151 wounded, and 155 missing—the last, the heaviest item of all, was supposed to be mostly owing to desertion. Among the killed and wounded were fifteen European officers.

A loss of 352 in a single day was a fearful deduction from so small a force, and a further retreat being deemed impracticable, Mr. Farmer, the secretary of the committee, was sent to negotiate. The first demand was that Raghoba should be given up. This would have been complied with, had he not previously made a better arrangement for himself by agreeing to surrender to Sindhia. The next demand was that the committee should enter into a new treaty, surrendering all that the Bombay government had acquired since the death of Madhu Rao, together with the revenues drawn by the Company from

Baroach and Surat. When this demand was made known by a note from Mr. Farmer, a consultation was held. Colonel Cockburn's opinion, given in writing, as he was called upon to do, was that retreat was impracticable, and that he could not undertake the responsibility of it. Captain Hartley manfully combated this opinion, and even showed a plan by which retreat might be insured. Colonel Cockburn refused to alter his opinion, and Mr. Carnac acquiesced in it, though according to his own account he rather agreed with Captain Hartley that a retreat might be accomplished, and ought to be attempted, sooner than submit to the humiliating terms proposed. Ultimately the answer of the committee was that they had no power to enter into any treaty without the sanction of the supreme government. No sooner was this answer returned than Mr. Carnac did the very thing which it was said he had no power to do, and sent Mr. Holmes to Sindhia to conclude a treaty. His apology for this double-dealing was, that if the Poona ministers, after he had told them he could not treat, chose to be duped, it was their own fault, and that so far from intending the good faith he pledged, he gave Mr. Holmes his powers under a *mental reservation* that they were to be of no validity.

Some dexterity was shown in sending Mr. Holmes to Sindhia. Between him and Nana Fadnavis great jealousy and rivalry had long subsisted, and he felt greatly flattered when a separate negotiation was opened with him. His vanity, however, did not blind him so far as to make him lower the original demands. The convention settled with Mr. Holmes, restored everything to the Marathas as held by them in 1773, gave Sindhia the Company's share of Baroach, besides a sum of 41,000 rupees in presents to his servants, and bound the committee to send on the spot an order countermanding the advance of the Bengal troops. Humiliating as these conditions were, the committee expressed their gratitude to Sindhia for having obtained them, and in security of fulfilment on their part, left Mr. William Gamul Farmer and Lieutenant Charles Stewart as hostages. On descending the Ghats, the first act of the committee was to commit a breach of faith by countermanding the order they had sent to Colonel Goddard, when under the

dictation of the Marathas they forbade him to advance. This explains the cause of the contradictory messages which puzzled that officer, and determined him to make his celebrated march to the west. When the army arrived at Bombay, the first thing which occupied the attention of government was the distribution of punishment and reward. Colonels Egerton and Cockburn they suspended from the service; of the conduct of Mr. Carnac, a worse culprit than either, they took no notice. The directors, when they reviewed these proceedings, distributed justice more impartially, by placing Mr. Carnac in the same category with the colonels, and dismissing the whole three. The only officer particularly entitled to reward was Captain Hartley, on whom the council immediately conferred the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Unfortunately this was a violation of the rule of rising by seniority, and excited so much clamour among those who considered themselves defrauded a step of promotion, that the directors virtually deprived Captain Hartley of his colonelcy by suspending his pay as lieutenant-colonel, and his further promotion, till all those formerly his seniors should in the usual routine be promoted over him.

Nothing could exceed the mortification and distress of the Bombay government. Eager to show the Bengal government what Bombay could do without their assistance, they had disdained to wait for the arrival of the detachment, and "desperately," as Duff well expresses it, "sent a handful of men against the strength of the Maratha empire." This enterprise, "practicable only by celerity, address, and resolution," they committed to men totally unfit for such a charge. The consequence was that "their army had returned defeated, their treasury was exhausted, their credit insignificant, and their reputation sullied." Under these disastrous circumstances, a most judicious course was pursued by Governor Hornby. He advised his colleagues to abstain from recrimination, leaving it to their superiors to decide on their motives and measures, and in the meanwhile giving their whole minds to the consideration of the means best fitted to prevent or surmount the evils which seemed to be impending. The disgraceful treaty or convention of Wadgaon they could never think of ratifying, but as this was a question which they could not of themselves decide,

nothing could be gained by repudiating it at once, and thus publishing a defiance to the Marathas. Their best policy was to begin anew with their preparations, and strain every nerve to recruit and improve their army.

Such was the position of affairs at Bombay, when the joyful tidings were received of Colonel Goddard's arrival at Surat. The government, besides expressing their liveliest gratitude for the honourable and generous motives which had induced him to hasten to their relief, testified their sense of his merits by offering him a seat in their council, and recommending that he should be appointed their commander-in-chief. During a visit which he paid to Bombay, the esteem which they previously felt for his character was greatly increased by personal acquaintance, but at the same time, some facts were communicated which awoke the jealousy of the council, and threatened to produce some degree of misunderstanding. The Bengal government, on learning that the Bombay army had taken the field, had decided on sending forward the detachment to their support, but declined to relinquish their own control over it. At a later period, they had taken the still more decided step of not only retaining Colonel Goddard under their orders, but of conferring upon him distinct powers to negotiate as their plenipotentiary with the court of Poona. On being made acquainted with the disasters which were crowned by the disgraceful convention of Wadgaon, they first provided for their own safety by ordering a brigade to the banks of the Jumuna, and sending Sir Eyre Coote, their commander-in-chief, to inspect and prepare their military resources on the north-west frontier, where an attack was most to be apprehended. This done, they gave their attention to the Bombay presidency, and manifested a spirit worthy of all praise. In this respect Mr. Hastings particularly distinguished himself. In a minute lodged on the 24th of May, 1779, he remarked, "Whatever our resolutions, I hope the board will see with me the propriety of conveying them in such a form and temper, as may give encouragement and confidence to the presidency of Bombay, instead of adding to their depression." Again: "To mark our want of confidence in them by any public act, would weaken theirs in us; to load them with harsh and unoperating

reproaches, would indispose them to our authority, at the same time that it would absolve them from its effects; and to bind their deliberations by absolute and unconditional orders, might eventually disable them from availing themselves of any fortuitous advantages which the confusion of the Maratha government is more likely to offer them, than any plan which we could prescribe to them, or which they could form on the letter of our instructions." His advice therefore was, "Let us rather excite them to exert themselves for the retrieval of their past misfortunes, and arm them with means adequate to that end; restricting their powers where the object is determinate, and permitting a more liberal extension of them in cases which are too variable and uncertain for positive injunctions."

Liberal and moderate as these views are, Mr. Hastings, when he came to the practical application of them, did not succeed in giving entire satisfaction. The Bombay government thought themselves slighted when the rank of brigadier-general was conferred on Colonel Goddard by the governor-general and council, and not as they thought it ought to have been only through them; they also complained of his being appointed to negotiate separately with the Poona ministers, and objected in particular to the stationing of a military force within their limits, and independent of their authority, as an invasion of their rights and highly unconstitutional. The governor-general and council refused to give way on any of these points, and the Bombay government had the good sense to promise that a difference of opinion would not prevent them from co-operating heartily in whatever measures might be adopted. On the 15th of April, 1779, General Goddard had been directed to endeavour to negotiate a peace on the terms of the treaty of Purandhar, with the addition of an article excluding the French from any establishment within the Maratha dominions. In the end of May he received more detailed instructions, directing him, if peace on the above terms could not be obtained, to adopt a plan suggested by Governor Hornby, and form an alliance with Fateh Singh as the acknowledged head of the Baroda or Gaikwar territories. After the disaster at Wadgaon, little hope was entertained of an effective alliance with Mudaji Bhonsla, and therefore General Goddard was instructed to tender speci-

fic conditions, the rejection of which would put it in his power to declare the negotiation at an end.

There was still another proposed alliance, from which at one time great things were expected. This was an alliance with Sindhia. The rivalry subsisting between him and Nana Fadnavis was well known. While apparently acting cordially together, they were constantly counterworking and endeavouring to outmanoeuvre each other. In playing this double game, Sindhia had repeatedly acted in a manner which seemed to imply that he would willingly come to a separate understanding with the Company. One marked instance had recently occurred. By the convention of Wadgaon, Raghoba had been committed to his custody. His real object in undertaking this office was to employ it as a means of working upon the fears of Nana Fadnavis. With this view he had caused a *jaghir* worth twelve lacs to be settled on Raghoba in Bundelkhand. Raghoba was thus induced to believe that Sindhia was his friend; and Nana was also satisfied, because Sindhia, on obtaining the *jaghir*, became security to him that Raghoba would no more molest his government. Shortly after this arrangement Raghoba was sent off to his *jaghir*. He was very imperfectly guarded, and in the latter end of May, just before he reached the Narmada, a hint was given him that it was intended to confine him in the fortress of Jhansi. He therefore watched his opportunity, and when about to ford the river made his escape, and fled with all speed to seek an asylum with his English friends at Baroach. The whole was believed to be a scheme of Sindhia, who thus at once widened the breach between Nana and the English, and led the latter to believe that he himself might be induced to co-operate with them in their scheme of establishing Raghoba at Poona.

All Sindhia's professions of friendship proved vain, and Nana Fadnavis, after the negotiation with him had been protracted for several months, virtually put an end to it, by declaring, when General Goddard demanded from him explicit answers, that the surrender of Salsette and the person of Raghoba were preliminaries to any treaty which the English might wish to conclude with the Maratha state. Previous to this, Raghoba with his two sons, Amrit Rao and Baji Rao, the latter a child of

four years old, had visited General Goddard in his camp, and received from him an allowance of 50,000 rupees a month. This was censured by the Bengal government as lavish expenditure, the more especially after it had been resolved to make no more use of him politically. The discovery, though late, had at last been made, that nothing could be more impolitic than an attempt to force into the Maratha government a person to whom the whole nation, instead of rising in his favour, as expected during the late expedition, had manifested indifference or aversion. Now, therefore, that the declaration of Nana Fadnavis had made war inevitable, it was to be carried on not in his name, but by the Company themselves as principals.

General Goddard, on receiving the above answer from Nana, set out for Bombay, where he arrived on the 1st of November. The object of his visit was twofold—to consult on the future plan of operations in connection with the proposed alliance with the Gaikwar Fateh Singh, and more especially to urge the immediate preparation and despatch of a reinforcement. The council would have preferred delay, but could not resist his urgency, and a detachment under Colonel Hartley, consisting of 100 European artillery, 200 European infantry, and two battalions of sepoy, was immediately embarked for Gujarat. From Madras a detachment, under Colonel Browne, of 100 artillery, 500 Europeans, and a battalion of sepoy, was expected. On the side of Bengal a detachment of 2,000 sepoy, which had been prepared to follow the overland route previously, was diverted to a different purpose, which will afterwards be explained. On returning to Surat, where the main body of his army was stationed, General Goddard dismissed the envoys of Nana, and opened a negotiation with Fateh Singh. On perceiving that this chief, afraid to commit himself, evaded a definite engagement, he put his army in motion, and crossed the Tapti on the 1st of January, 1780. He advanced slowly northward till joined by his battering train and stores from Baroach, and then hastened to attack the fort of Dubhoy, which was held by an officer for the peshwa, with a garrison of 2,000 men. This place, situated fifteen miles south-east of Baroda, and seventy-eight miles north-east of Surat, was believed by the natives to be of great strength, and had certainly a very impos-

ing appearance. It formed a quadrangle of two miles in circuit, inclosed by a rampart built of large hewn stones, and surmounted by fifty-six towers. General Goddard arrived before it on the 18th of January, and on the 20th, when ready to open upon it from a battery of three eighteen-pounders, within two hundred yards, found that the garrison had evacuated it during the night. Leaving it in charge of a company of sepoys and a few irregulars, under the charge of a civil officer, Mr. James Forbes, author of the *Oriental Memoirs*, he continued his march in the direction of Baroda. He was met by Fateh Singh, who showed how completely the sudden capture of Dubhoy had changed his views, by entering at once into an offensive and defensive alliance, by which, in addition to other advantages ceded to the Company, he agreed to furnish a body of 3,000 horse. One of the stipulations in his favour was that he should be put in possession of Ahmedabad. For this place, therefore, the army now directed his march.

Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat, situated on the left bank of the Sabarmati, about sixty miles above its mouth in the Gulf of Cambay, though greatly declined from its ancient splendour, was still a place of great importance, with a population estimated at upwards of 100,000. Its lofty turreted walls, about six miles in circuit, were remarkably strong, and it was at this time held for the peshwa by a Brahmin commandant, with a garrison of 6,000 Arab and Sindhi infantry, and 2,000 Maratha horse. General Goddard arrived before it on the 10th of February, and on the 12th opened a battery, by which a practicable breach was effected on the evening of the 13th. After the delay of a day in expectation of a surrender, the assault took place on the morning of the 15th, and was completely successful. Duff justly observes, that "the most honourable part of this gallant assault was the subsequent steadiness and good conduct of the troops. No excesses were committed, and two only of the inhabitants not composing the garrison lost their lives." The loss of the captors was only 106 killed and wounded. Among the latter were twelve European officers, two of whom, volunteers, died of their wounds.

Immediately after the capture of Ahmedabad, intelligence was received of the approach of Mahadaji Sindhia and

Tukaji Holkar, who forded the Narmada with upwards of 20,000 horse, and proceeded to the neighbourhood of Baroda. General Goddard crossed the Myhie on the 6th of March, to give them battle. They showed no inclination to accept of it, and retired as he approached. Sindhia even professed the greatest friendship, and as a proof of it, set at liberty the two Wadgaon hostages, Messrs. Farmer and Stewart, who arrived in the British camp. Their account of Sindhia's conduct, and the arrival of an envoy, with great professions of friendship for the English, and hatred for Nana Fadnavis, gave some ground for belief that he really desired an alliance. General Goddard, however, suspected that the real object was to keep him inactive during the fair weather; and therefore, while reciprocating the expressions of friendship, sent back the envoy, and left Sindhia only three days to make his proposals. On the 16th of March the envoy returned with terms, which were in substance that Raghoba should retire to Jhansi, and live on his *jaghir* of twelve lacs, that the government should continue, in the name of Madhu Rao Narain as peshwa, and that Baji Rao, Raghoba's son, should be appointed the peshwa's diwan. The most essential part of the proposed arrangement, though mentioned last, was that as Baji Rao, who was only a child of four years, could not act as diwan, Sindhia should take him with him to Poona, and manage for him. General Goddard answered that as these proposals amounted to nothing less than that the Company should assist Sindhia in acquiring the entire power of the state, it was necessary that he should on his part consent, in the name of the peshwa, to certain concessions in favour of British interests. Sindhia, seeing the negotiations which he probably meant to spin out for months brought to a point in a few days, made no further overtures, and entered into a communication with Govind Rao, the brother of Fateh Singh, and his rival claimant for the office of Gaikwar, with the view of putting him in possession of Gujarat. General Goddard, on being made acquainted with this new intrigue, had no other wish than to bring on an action with the least possible delay.

It proved no easy matter to force the Marathas to an encounter, which they continued anxious to avoid. Having placed

his baggage under the protection of the hill-fort of Pawangarh, Sindhia threw out a number of small parties of horse, to give alarm in case of danger, and prevent a surprise. Thus feeling secure, he allowed the British to encamp within six miles of him. The two armies had remained in sight of each other for a week, when, on the morning of the 3rd of April, General Goddard attempted a surprise. Taking the greater part of his troops, and heading them in person, he marched silently along, passed the out-parties of the Marathas and their grand guard of several thousand men, and was pushing on for the camp, which was still a mile in front, when the day dawned, and an alarm was given. The main body of the enemy hence stood ready mounted, and even advanced to charge, when a heavy fire from the advancing British obliged them to turn their backs. General Goddard was under the impression that he had gained a victory, and felt mortified when, after encamping, he perceived the enemy still keeping the same distance as before. On the 14th of April he was joined by the expected reinforcement from Madras, under Colonel Browne, and about a week after made another ineffectual attempt on Sindhia's camp, the Marathas merely waiting till he came within sufficient distance, and then retiring under a flight of rockets. The effects of this protracted desultory warfare was to make foraging extremely difficult, and General Goddard, shortly after one of his covering parties had been briskly attacked, moved to the Narmada, to place his troops in cantonments during the approaching rains.

The Bombay government made pressing application to General Goddard to seize Parneira, a hill fifteen miles north of Daman, which had been fortified in the time of Sivaji. Before it could be attempted, it was found that their wishes had been anticipated. A Maratha officer, of the name of Ganesh Pant, who had been stationed in the Konkan, set out on a marauding excursion, and after plundering the districts on the south of the Tapti known by the name of Uthawis Mahal, or Attawisi, carried his devastations to the vicinity of Surat. On application from the authorities, Lieutenant Welsh, of the Bengal cavalry, was sent forward with the Kandahar horse (the designation of a body of cavalry belonging to the Nabob of Oudh), and a body of infantry, and not only succeeded in surprising the camp of

Ganesh Pant, but afterwards proceeded southward, and greatly distinguished himself by the capture of three forts in the district of Daman, one of them this very Parneira, about which the government had been so urgent. At this time, also, the tranquillity of the districts in Gujarat, recently ceded to the Company by Fateh Singh, was insured during the approaching monsoon by the gallantry of a detachment of Bengal sepoys under Major Forbes, who came up with one of Sindhia's detachments near Sinnore, on the Narmada, and completely defeated it.

Mention has been made of a Bengal detachment which was preparing to follow Goddard's overland route to Surat, when it was countermanded, and employed in a different direction. The nature of this employment must now be explained. The Rana of Gohad, the designation of a Jat zamindar, made application to the Bengal government for assistance against the Marathas. His territories consisted of a hilly tract, of which Gwalior was the capital; but so little was known of him at the time, that he is merely described as "a chief south of Agra." Mr. Hastings thought that the application might be turned to account. In this view he was seconded both by Sir Eyre Coote and General Goddard, who strongly recommended a diversion, which might be effected by operating against the Marathas in Malwa, through the rana's territories. Accordingly, on the 2nd of December, 1779, a regular treaty with him was concluded, the Company engaging to furnish a force for the defence of his country, at a certain rate for each battalion of sepoys, and he engaging to furnish 10,000 horse, as soon as combined operations against the Marathas should be determined on. Of any new territories acquired he was to receive seven-sixteenths, and when peace should be made, he was not only to be included, but his actual possessions, as well as those seized by the Marathas, were to be guaranteed to him. Sir Eyre Coote, as has been said, was in favour of a diversion, but he wished it to be attempted on a large scale, and therefore condemned the measure as extremely injudicious, when it was resolved to employ only the detachment with which it had been intended to reinforce General Goddard.

This detachment, under Captain William Popham, consisted of 2,400 men, formed into three equal battalions, a small body

of cavalry, and a detail of European artillery, with a howitzer and a few field-pieces. Captain Popham crossed the Jumuna in the beginning of February, 1780, and immediately attacked and routed a body of Marathas, who were plundering in the neighbourhood of Gohad. He then marched, at the request of the rana, against Lahar, a fort situated fifty miles west of Kalpi. Though it proved much stronger than he had been led to expect, and a breach behoved to be made, he resolved to persevere, and having made some impression on the works, without seeing any prospect of effecting a practicable breach, in the ordinary sense of the term, gave orders for the assault, and, by the determined gallantry of the storming party, succeeded, though not without the heavy loss of 125 men. This success was so little expected by Sir Eyre Coote, who, knowing the want of battering cannon, anticipated nothing but disaster, that in consequence of his representations, another detachment of four regular battalions, with a battering train, was held in readiness to cross the Jumuna under Major Jacob Carnac.

The capture of Lahar was only the prelude to a much more brilliant achievement. After returning from Lahar, Captain Popham encamped during the rains within a few miles of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior. This place, situated sixty-five miles south of Agra, had been wrested about a year before from the rana, and was in the possession of Sindhia, who justly plumed himself upon his conquest, since it was regarded as all but impregnable. Its site is an isolated rock of ochreous sandstone, partially capped with basalt, about a mile and a half in length, by 300 yards in breadth, and at the north end, where loftiest, of the height of 340 feet. The lower part of the rock is sloping, but immediately above the slope the sandstone rises in a precipice, partly natural and partly scarped, so as to seem in some places to be not only perpendicular, but overhanging. Along the verge of the precipice rises a rampart, which, from being of the same height throughout, while the level of the base varies, has an irregular appearance. The entrance to the inclosure is near the north extremity of the east side, and consists of a steep road, succeeded by a huge staircase cut out of the rock, with a width so great, and an acclivity so gentle, that elephants easily ascend it. The outer side of the staircase is

protected by a strong and lofty wall, and within it are seven successive gates. Should an enemy surmount all these obstacles, and get within the rampart, his work would only be half finished, as a citadel with six lofty round towers or bastions, connected by curtains of great height and thickness, would still remain to be taken. The town of Gwalior lies along the eastern base of the rock. Hopeless as the capture of such a place by surprise might have appeared to ordinary minds, Captain Popham resolved to attempt it. He had a good coadjutor in the rana, who was himself thoroughly acquainted with the interior, and kept spies within it who would act as guides. After every preparation had been made with utmost secrecy, the night of the 3rd of August was fixed on for the attempt. The command of the advance was given to Captain Bruce, and consisted of two companies of chosen sepoys, headed by four British lieutenants. Immediately behind the sepoys were twenty Europeans; two battalions of sepoys followed. When the attempt was made, the scarped rock was only sixteen feet high, and was easily mounted by scaling ladders. Beyond this a steep ascent of about forty yards led to the bottom of the second wall. This was thirty feet high, and was surmounted by the aid of the spies, who, having managed to ascend, made fast ladders of ropes. Each man, as soon as by this means he reached the top of the wall and got inside, squatted down. Only twenty of the sepoys with Captain Bruce had thus entered, when three of them so far forgot themselves as to shoot some of the garrison as they lay asleep. The alarm was immediately given, but the sepoys stood firm till their comrades mounted to their support. The garrison, intimidated, made a feeble resistance, and Gwalior was taken without the loss of a man.

The Bombay government had every reason to be satisfied with the results of the campaign. Difficulties, however, of a most formidable nature had arisen. They were totally without funds, and knew not from what source they were to be obtained. A most ruinous war had begun to rage in the Carnatic, and the money which the Bengal government had been expected to send to Bombay was more than required to supply the still more urgent necessities of Madras. The expedi-

ents to which the Bombay government were obliged to resort evince the extent of their distress. A quantity of copper lying in the Company's warehouses, and valued at ten or twelve lacs, was sold to the highest bidder; loans on their own credit were proposed for negotiation in Bengal; and a plan was formed for seizing the enemy's resources, by anticipating them in the collection of the revenue.

It had been determined that General Goddard should open the ensuing campaign with the siege of Bassein. With this view the European part of the army was conveyed to Salsette by sea, the battering train was prepared at Bombay, and the sepoys were to march by land. Meanwhile the want of funds rendered it necessary to employ the whole disposable force at Bombay in work of a different description. Early in October, five battalions were placed under Colonel Hartley, with instructions to cover as much of the Konkan as possible, so as to enable agents from Bombay to collect part of the enemy's revenues, and secure the rice harvest, which is gathered at the close of the rains. Before he could accomplish this task, his services were required for the purpose of relieving Captain Abington. This officer, on the very night Gwalior was taken, had made a similar attempt on the strong fort of Mullangarh, or Bhow Mullan, situated eastward of the island of Bombay. He succeeded in gaining possession of the lower fort, but the garrison escaped to the upper fort, where they were able to set him at defiance. While he remained in the lower fort, a body of the enemy, to the number of more than 3,000, cut off his communication with Kalyan or Calliani. He was thus completely surrounded, till Colonel Hartley marched to his relief, and extricated him without loss. The enemy, however, having been reinforced, took up a position on the south-east side of the fort, and began to lay waste the country. Colonel Hartley, who had marched back to Kalyan, determined to return and attack them. The enemy, apprised of his advance, came forward to meet him, and for this purpose left their camp standing as if it were perfectly secure. As he approached they retired, apparently meaning to lead him into an ambuscade. Captain Jameson, who was marching with the 8th battalion to assist in the attack, seeing them thus retiring, did not hesitate,

unaided as he was, to encounter the whole body, and not only routed them, but gained possession of their camp. This exploit put the troops in high spirits, and Colonel Hartley, taking advantage of their alacrity, drove the enemy entirely from the Konkan, and by taking up a position near the Bhor Ghat, procured a short respite, during which the Bombay government were able to carry out the plan of replenishing their treasury at the expense of the enemy, by anticipating them in the collection of the revenue.

General Goddard arrived before Bassein on the 13th of November, 1780. This place, twenty-eight miles north of Bombay, stands on an island of the same name, separated by a narrow channel from the mainland of the Northern Konkan, and was so strong, that it was deemed necessary to attack it by regular approaches. These were practicable only on the north side, where several batteries, principally twenty-four pounders, were erected at the distances of 900, 800 and 500 yards. One of twenty mortars at the last distance did great execution. The division of Colonel Hartley endeavoured to prevent the Marathas from attempting to raise the siege. This they were evidently bent on doing, and large numbers of troops, as fast as they could be assembled, were hurried down into the Konkan. General Goddard's precautions having effectually frustrated all endeavours to succour Bassein, the Marathas turned their whole force against the covering army. It amounted to upwards of 20,000 horse and foot, led by an able officer of the name of Ramchander Ganesh; whereas the force under Colonel Hartley, diminished by casualties and sickness, mustered little more than 2,000 effective men. On the 10th of December, while he was occupying a position at Dugaur, nine miles east of Bassein, they attacked him both in front and rear, but notwithstanding the inequality were steadily repulsed. On the following day the attack was renewed with a similar result, though the Maratha guns did considerable execution. Colonel Hartley's flanks were secured by two eminences, and Ramchander Ganesh perceiving that he could not otherwise force the position, was determined at whatever cost to make himself master of one of them. Accordingly, on the morning of the 12th, while the other Maratha leaders were ordered to advance in front and rear,

Ramchander in person, at the head of a body of Arab foot, accompanied by 1,000 regular infantry under Signior Noronha, a Portuguese officer in the peshwa's service, approached by a circuitous route, for the purpose of storming the height. Colonel Hartley, having some apprehension of this attack, had prepared for it, by throwing up a small breastwork, and planting a gun on each of the eminences. A thick fog, which had greatly favoured the approach of the assailants, suddenly cleared away when they were just close upon the picket, and the parties stood in full view of each other, face to face. After a momentary pause the work of destruction began. Guns brought from the right of the British line made fearful havoc; but the Marathas persevered, and the issue was still doubtful, when their fire suddenly slackened, and a party were seen bearing off a dead body to the rear. It was Ramchander Ganesh. The loss of their leader produced the usual effect, and the Marathas retired precipitately with heavy loss. General Goddard had meanwhile been successfully prosecuting the siege, and on the 11th of December, the day immediately preceding that of the above victory, Bassein surrendered. It is not unworthy of notice, that at this time the services of Colonel Hartley were lost to the Company. In consequence of the order suspending his rank and pay as colonel, till all his seniors should have again stepped over, he sailed for England to lay his case before the directors. Their fiat was irrevocable; but they showed their sense of his services by recommending him to his majesty, who made him lieutenant-colonel of the 73rd regiment. At a later period he acquired new distinction in India, as Major-general Hartley.

The loss of Bassein, and the defeat of the army, though severely felt by Nana Fadnavis, were not destined to prove either so advantageous to the British, or so injurious to the Marathas, as might have been anticipated. Immediately after the fall of Bassein, General Goddard, knowing how Colonel Hartley was beset, hastened off to his assistance. On the very day when he joined him, letters dated the 9th of October were received from Bengal, intimating that the governor-general and council intended to make peace with the Marathas and ordering that hostilities should cease, as soon as the peshwa should intimate on his part the same order that had been given. Meanwhile,

till the intimation was actually received, the war should be vigorously prosecuted. This extraordinary change in the Bengal councils had been produced by a most formidable confederacy, which aimed at nothing less than the total destruction of British interests in India. In order to detach the Marathas from this confederacy, peace with them seemed desirable at almost any price; and in consequence of negotiations which had been entered into with this view, the above letters had been despatched from Bengal. The details will be given in the next chapter, and, in the meantime, not to break the thread of the narrative, the account of the operations in the west of India will be continued.

General Goddard, after spending some time in the capture of Arnaul, a fort on a small island ten miles north of Bassein, thought that his troops might be more usefully employed in making an advanced movement, which by threatening Poona, might facilitate the negotiations for peace. In pursuance of this "half measure of threatening, without being prepared to carry his threat into execution," which Duff calls "his first error," he proceeded towards the mountain passes, in the end of January, 1781. The Bhor Ghat though guarded by the enemy was easily forced, and the troops which forced it encamped at Kandalla, on the spot which Captain Stewart had occupied three years before, the headquarters still remaining at the village of Campoly at the bottom of the Ghats. The whole effective army mustered, exclusive of European officers, 6,152 men, of whom 640 were Europeans, and 5,512 natives. Nana Fadnavis, though under no alarm, thought it good policy to pretend it, and tried to amuse General Goddard with a show of negotiation, while he was straining every nerve to increase the army, and render the surrounding country a desert.

Nana having sent the peshwa, now in his seventh year, to Purandhar, advanced with the main body of the army, commanded by Hari Pant Phadke and Tukaji Holkar, towards the Ghats, while Parashuram Bhow Patwardhan descended into the Konkan to harass detachments and obstruct the communication with Bombay. The movement towards the Ghats having produced none of the political results anticipated, the negotiation was broken off, and it was resolved that the army should return

for cantonment during the rains to Bombay and Kalyan. This was resolved; but it was a resolution to which it had already become impossible to give effect, without sacrificing a great part of the stores and equipments. Parashuram Bhow had managed so dexterously, that no detachment or convoy could move without risk of being overpowered. In the beginning of April, General Goddard had sent down to Panwell three battalions of sepoys, ten guns, and the whole of the cavalry to escort a convoy of grain and stores. On the road to Panwell the escort was attacked by Parashuram Bhow, who succeeded in carrying off a considerable number of the cattle. The escort was strong enough to have brought on the convoy in spite of Parashuram Bhow, had he not been strengthened by the arrival of a large force under Holkar. Colonel Browne who commanded the escort, on being made aware of the large army in front of him, could not venture to proceed without a reinforcement. General Goddard was of the same opinion, but unfortunately the greater part of his cattle had gone down in order to assist in bringing up the supplies. The consequence was, that he could not march with his whole army without the sacrifice of a large amount of public property, or with a part without the certainty of being cut off. In this dilemma, all he could do was to forward a message to Bombay, entreating that every disposable man of the garrison should be sent to reinforce the escort. This was immediately done, and Colonel Browne, though exposed during a march of three days to the attack of upwards of 25,000 horse, besides bodies of rocket-men and infantry, succeeded in bringing in his convoy in safety.

On the junction of the detachment on the 15th of April, General Goddard prepared for his retreat. On the 19th, he sent down his guns and baggage to the bottom of the Ghats. The Marathas, while he thought himself unobserved, were watching all his movements. Tukaji Holkar with 15,000, and Parashuram Bhow with 12,000, were below the Ghats, while Hari Pant Phadke was above them with 25,000 horse, 4,000 foot, and several field-pieces. The moment General Goddard began his march on the 20th, Hari Pant's force poured down into the Konkan, and captured a considerable quantity of baggage and ammunition. The whole of the retreat was a succession of

attacks and repulses, and Panwell was reached on the 23rd, with a loss of 460 in killed and wounded. After despatching a reinforcement to Tellicherry, which was in imminent danger, and embarking the Madras troops for their own presidency, where they were imperatively required, the remainder of the army was marched to Kalyan, and there cantoned for the monsoon.

During this unfortunate campaign, the Bengal government had attempted a powerful diversion, by carrying the war into the heart of Sindhia's territories. A detachment had been prepared under Major Camac, to assist Captain Popham, when it was generally believed that he was on the eve of a reverse. His subsequent brilliant achievements having rendered this reinforcement unnecessary, Major, now Colonel Camac, employed it in invading Malwa. After reducing Sipri he advanced on Seronge, which he reached on the 16th of February. Here he allowed himself to be surrounded by Sindhia in person, and reduced to great distress for provisions and forage. In this extremity, he sent off pressing letters for a reinforcement to Colonel Morgan, commanding in Oudh, who detached for this purpose Colonel Muir with three battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a company of artillery. Meantime, Colonel Camac had no respite from Sindhia, and after he had been cannonaded in his camp for seven days, he resolved to attempt a retreat at all hazards. He commenced it at midnight on the 7th of March, and at daybreak, on the discovery of his departure, was pursued and harassed for two successive days till he arrived at Mahantpur. Here, having forced a supply of provisions, he faced about, and offered battle to his pursuers. Sindhia, though always on the alert, kept at the cautious distance of five or six miles. This disposition was continued several nights, till Sindhia, convinced that the British commander had no enterprise, became less careful. This was the very result at which Colonel Camac had been aiming, on the suggestion, it is said, of Major Bruce, who led the escalade at Gwalior. On the night of the 24th, when the wily Maratha suspected no danger, he entered his camp, routed his army, and captured his principal standard, thirteen guns, three elephants, twenty-one camels, and many horses. Nothing could have

happened more opportunely for raising the fame of the British, and disposing Sindhia to listen to overtures of peace. Colonel Muir joined Colonel Camac on the 4th of April, and as senior officer assumed the command. Though their united force kept the field for some time, and afterwards encamped during the rains within Sindhia's territory, nothing further was effected. Attempts to gain over some of the Rajput chiefs failed; and even the Rana of Gohad, after Gwalior was made over to him, showed an inclination to make separate terms for himself with Sindhia.

The government of Bengal had for some time been engaged in a series of intricate negotiations with Mudaji Bhonsla, who, it was thought, might act as a mediator, and be the means of establishing a general pacification with the Marathas. Little progress, however, had been made, when intelligence arrived that a separate agreement with Sindhia had been concluded by Colonel Muir. The overture had been made by Sindhia, who after his defeat by Colonel Camac, became convinced that he had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by a contest carried on in the heart of his dominions. It might result in his being driven a fugitive across the Narmada, while in the meantime, his rivals at Poona had the satisfaction of seeing him wasting his internal resources. Influenced by these considerations his demands were moderate. Colonel Muir was to recross the Jamuna, and Sindhia was to return to Ujjain. His territories west of Jamuna were to be restored, with the exception of Gwalior, in the possession of which the Rana of Gohad was not to be molested so long as he conducted himself properly. In return, he would either negotiate a treaty between the British and the Marathas generally, or at all events remain neutral. This opening of a new channel of pacification was particularly pleasing to Mr. Hastings, who lost no time in deputing Mr. David Anderson to the camp of Sindhia, with full powers to conclude a treaty with the Marathas. Nana Fadnavis and Hari Pant would rather have negotiated without the interference of Sindhia, but their feelings in this respect could not be openly manifested; and on the 17th of May 1782, a treaty was concluded at Salbai, thirty-two miles south-east of Gwalior, by Mr. Anderson on the part of the Company, and by Mahadaji Sindhia on the part of the peshwa, Nana Fadnavis, and all

the chiefs of the Maratha nation. By a singular arrangement, Sindhia, who acted as the plenipotentiary of the peshwa, and was, strictly speaking, one of his subjects, became the mutual guarantee of both parties for the performance of the conditions.

By the treaty of Salbai, which consisted of seventeen articles, the Company resigned everything for which they had engaged in a long, bloody, and expensive war, and returned to the same state of possession as at the date of the treaty of Purandhar. Salsette, and a few small islands in the vicinity of Bombay, were confirmed to them, but they lost Bassein, on which their hearts had been so long set, and all the districts and revenues which had been ceded to them in the Gaikwar territory, and other parts of Gujarat. Ahmedabad, too, which had been guaranteed to Fateh Singh, returned to the peshwa, and all the territory acquired west of the Jamuna was restored to Sindhia. In this last cession Gwalior was not excepted, because the Rana of Gohad, by attempting to make separate terms for himself, was held to have forfeited all title to the privileges of an ally. Raghoba, entirely abandoned by the Company, was to receive 25,000 rupees a month from the peshwa, and have the choice of his place of residence. The only articles which might be considered favourable to the Company, were a very vague agreement, that Hyder should restore all his recent conquests from them and the Nabob of Arcot, and an exclusion of all European establishments, except their own and those of the Portuguese, from the Maratha dominions. Though no part of the treaty, Baroach and its valuable district were made over to Sindhia, in testimony of the service rendered by him to the Bombay army at Wadgaon, and of his humane treatment and release of the two English gentlemen left as hostages on that occasion. These were the ostensible grounds of this extraordinary gift, though different grounds were taken by the governor-general and council in justifying it to the directors. It would have the important effect, they said, of attaching so distinguished a chief to the Company's interests, while the expediency of retaining what was given was doubtful, inasmuch as the expenses were nearly equal to the revenues, disputes about boundaries might arise, and the price of cotton, the staple of the district, had risen in Bombay after the Company obtained

possession of it. This last fact, of which more charitable explanations might have been given, was characterized by the governor-general and council as "the natural consequence of a commercial place (being) possessed by men who are dealers in the specific article of trade which it produces."

While the Bengal government endeavoured to show that the terms obtained were the best that could have been expected in the circumstances, the Bombay government did not hesitate to express a different opinion, and to insinuate that if the negotiation had been left to them, it would have terminated more advantageously. In a letter to the directors, the nature and probable results of the treaty are thus summed up:—"The whole of your possessions to the westward are now reduced to the castle and dependent revenues of Surat, as held since the first acquisition of them, in 1759. A powerful and dangerous neighbour is now placed close to this remaining possession, which it will be necessary to guard with a watchful eye; but it would be equally unavailing and mortifying to expatiate on this subject, or the value of the countries you have lost by this treaty. We shall rejoice should we have future occasion to enumerate the benefits resulting from it. This presidency must, from henceforward, require from the Bengal treasury a large and annual supply of money, for the indispensable occasions of the Company's concerns under our management."

Great as were the advantages which the Marathas gained by the treaty, it suited the crafty and tortuous policy of Nana Fadnavis to seem not perfectly satisfied with it. At Calcutta, it was ratified on the 6th of June, within three weeks of the day on which it was signed; at Poona it was not ratified till six months had elapsed, nor were the ratifications finally exchanged till the 24th of February, 1783. The delay was partly owing to jealousy of Sindhia, who, by acting as guarantee for both parties, had virtually declared himself independent, and partly to a belief that terms still more advantageous might be obtained, by working alternately on the fears of the Company and of Hyder. From the one, Nana Fadnavis wished to obtain Salsette, and from the other, his acquisitions of Maratha territory south of the Krishna. To the Company he represented himself as the steadfast ally of Hyder, while to Hyder he spoke only of his

intended ratification of the treaty with the Company, thus playing them off against each other, in the hope of receiving tempting offers from both. It is impossible to say how long he would have continued this game, had not Hyder's death obliged him to decide in favour of the treaty.

Tipu Sultan

ON the 18th of March, 1778, the war with France, which had become inevitable, in consequence of the part she had taken in the contest between the American colonies and the mother country, was formally declared. As soon as intelligence of the event was received in India, the minor French settlements were attacked and proved an easy conquest. Pondicherry threatened a more determined resistance, and General Sir Hector Monro, commander of the Madras army, set out at the head of a considerable force to reduce it. On the 8th of August he took post on a height called the Red Hills, a league from the town. About the same time Sir Edward Vernon arrived off the coast with a British squadron consisting of three ships, carrying respectively sixty, twenty-eight, and twenty guns, a sloop of war, and an Indiaman. A French squadron under M. Tronjolly was lying in the roads. It consisted of three ships, carrying respectively sixty-four, thirty-six, and thirty-two guns, and two Indiamen. Having thus no reason to decline an encounter, it immediately sailed out, prepared for action. The battle was fought on the 10th of August, and was gained by the British, who had, however, suffered so much in their rigging that they were unable to prevent their fleeing enemy from escaping back to Pondicherry. On the 21st, M. Tronjolly again sailed out as if once more to try the fortune of war, and Sir Edward Vernon, to give him full opportunity, cast anchor in the roads inside of him. This was just what the French admiral wanted. He had no intention of fighting, and when morning dawned was nowhere to be seen. He had finally disappeared from the coast.

Pondicherry made a gallant defence. M. Bellecombe the governor was a man of ability and courage, and the garrison had the advantages of fortifications, which, though hastily erected in violation of treaty, were too strong to be forced without regular approaches. The besiegers did not obtain possession of the bound hedge till the 21st of August, nor break ground till the 6th of September. Their batteries, mounting twenty-eight guns and twenty-seven mortars, opened on the 18th, and the approaches were vigorously carried forward in the face of numerous obstacles, partly interposed by the garrison and partly caused by the rain, which fell in torrents. About the middle of October a practicable breach had been effected, and everything was ready for the assault, when M. Bellecombe, convinced that further resistance was useless, offered to capitulate. Favourable terms were given him, and the garrison marched out with all the honours of war.

Though all the settlements of the French in India, with the exception of Mahe, were thus once more annihilated, their power of mischief was by no means destroyed. When unable to carry on hostilities in their own name as principals, they could still intrigue. The effect of their embassy to Poona, in exciting fears and jealousies which issued in the Maratha war, has already been seen; the manner in which they took advantage of the misunderstandings which arose in other quarters must now be traced.

The revenue obtained from the Northern Circars having fallen far short of what had been anticipated, the directors ascribed the deficiency to the mode of management pursued, and proposed to assimilate it to that which had been adopted in Bengal. With this view they directed the Madras presidency to appoint a committee of circuit, who were personally to visit the various districts, and report on their condition generally, and more especially on everything relating to finance. Considerable progress had been made by the committee, when Sir Thomas Rumbold, in February, 1778, succeeded to the president's chair, in consequence of the vacancy caused by the melancholy death of Lord Pigot. Pending the inquiry into the disgraceful proceedings connected with that event, a temporary government had been established, and as the number of the

members of council was thereby diminished, the absence of those forming the committee of circuit was inconvenient. On this ground Sir Thomas Rumbold suggested that the information which the committee were collecting might be obtained as effectually, and at much less expense, by bringing the zamindars to Madras, and there arranging with them as to the amounts of their rents. On this suggestion the committee of circuit was suspended, and the zamindars were ordered to repair to the seat of government. The difficulty of carrying this order into effect appears to have been disregarded or overlooked. The length of the journey and the expense of it made it impracticable to many of the zamindars, while almost all the others had a natural dread that the order was intended for a worse purpose than appears on the face of it. The council, however, determined to persist in their resolution, and issued their summons to thirty-one zamindars. Thirteen did not attend; the other eighteen, however much they might grudge the expense, had little reason otherwise to complain, as the arrangements made with them were moderate and judicious, though the governor did not escape suspicion of corruption from having made the arrangements without consulting or afterwards fully explaining them to his council.

Of the absentee zamindars, by far the most important was the Raja of Vizianagram, in the district of Vizagapatam. He was an indolent and voluptuous man, and had allowed the management of the zamindary to be in a great measure monopolized by his brother Sitaram and his diwan Jagannath, who was connected with him by marriage. Jagannath was his favourite, and had his full confidence: Sitaram, on the contrary, he regarded with distrust, and had even complained of as plotting his ruin. On Sitaram, notwithstanding, the Madras presidency chose to bestow all their favour. He had at once obeyed the summons to repair to Madras, and been appointed renter of one of the principal divisions of the zamindary. By a still greater stretch of power the president displaced Jagannath, and made Sitaram diwan. The raja earnestly remonstrated against this appointment, and gained nothing but a rebuke and a menace, the council telling him that if he continued obstinately to withstand their "pressing instances" made "conjunctively as well as separately," they

would be "under the necessity of taking such resolutions as will in all probability be extremely painful to you, but which being once passed can never be recalled." The raja replied, "I shall consider myself henceforward as divested of all power and consequence whatever, seeing that the board urge me to do that which is contrary to my fixed determination, and that the result of it is to be the losing of my country." The grounds of future disaffection were thus deeply laid, without any justifiable cause, in an important part of the Company's territory.

In another quarter the Madras presidency pursued the same reckless course to a far more dangerous extent. By agreement with Nizam Ali in 1768, when the other Northern Circars were finally confirmed to the Company, Guntur was specially reserved as the *jaghir* of his brother Basalat Jung, who was to possess for life or during good behaviour. At his death the Company were to obtain possession. Towards the end of 1774, the Madras council learned that Basalat Jung had taken a body of French troops into his service, and was supplying himself with reinforcements and stores by the port of Mutapilly. On communication with the Bengal government, the council were instructed to insist on the immediate dismissal of the troops. With this view, application was made for the co-operation of Nizam Ali, to compel his brother either to dismiss the French from his service, or to resign his life interest in the Circar of Guntur, for a rent to be fixed at a valuation and paid by the Company. Nizam Ali returned a friendly answer, but though repeated representations were made, no decisive steps were taken, and the French remained as before. In July, 1778, when an immediate rupture with France was anticipated, the council again took up the subject, but instead of again soliciting the interference of Nizam Ali, applied to Muhammed Ali, and through him entered into a direct negotiation with Basalat Jung. At this time his government of Adoni was threatened by Hyder, and as he considered it the more valuable of the two, he offered to cede Guntur for a fixed rent, and dismiss the French, on condition that the Company would supply troops for his defence. The Madras presidency closed at once with these proposals, and framed them into a treaty, which was concluded with Basalat Jung on the 27th of January, 1779. Shortly

after, on obtaining possession of Guntur, they took the extraordinary step of letting it on a lease of ten years to the Nabob of Arcot, and on the 19th of April, despatched a force under General Harpur for the protection of Basalat Jung in Adoni.

The dismissal of the French by Basalat Jung produced a contingency on which the Madras council had not calculated. Nizam Ali immediately received them into his own service. Here they were evidently capable of being more mischievous than before, and on this account, as well as to explain some of their recent proceedings, and perhaps gain some other advantages, it was deemed expedient to send a resident to the court of Hyderabad. Here Mr. Holland, who had been appointed, arrived on the 6th of April. No sooner had he begun to explain the transaction respecting Guntur than a change in Nizam Ali's features was visible. The English, he said, had no right to interfere in the concerns of his family; they had no right to negotiate with Basalat Jung, and they had no right to send troops to Adoni, a dependency on his subah. In all these respects they were violating the treaty; if they persisted, he would have no alternative but to oppose them. On the 6th of June, probably before they knew how deeply they had offended the Nizam, they instructed Mr. Holland to make a proposal by which he was still more exasperated. The Northern Circars had been granted to the Company by the Mughul absolutely, but as was mentioned in an earlier part of the work, they pusillanimously agreed to hold it of Nizam Ali, and pay him five lacs of *peshcush* or tribute. On the 5th of June, Sir Thomas Rumbold lodged a minute, in which, after adverting to this fact, and saying truly that this pusillanimous agreement "was a sacrifice of the Company's rights," he came to the extraordinary conclusion that the Company would be justified in treating it as so much waste paper. "The time," he said, "seems favourable to throw off so heavy a burden," and therefore a strenuous effort must be made either to get rid of the *peshcush* altogether, or to reduce it in amount. Much management would be necessary in opening the business to the Nizam, and therefore Mr. Holland "must by turns soothe and work upon his apprehensions as occasion may require." This unprincipled proposal of the president appears to have been at once acquiesced in by his

colleagues, and Mr. Holland obeyed his instructions. It was in vain. Nizam Ali knew too much of the dangers which were at this time thickening around the Company to be either soothed or frightened, and he distinctly declared that if the tribute were withheld, he would forthwith prepare for war. He even hinted that he might possibly march against Colonel Harpur, who was setting out for Adoni.

Mr. Holland had been instructed to communicate with the Bengal government, and as the best means of acquainting them with the nature of the transactions intrusted to him, forwarded copies of all the letters which had passed between him and the Madras presidency. Enough was at once seen to justify the severest condemnation, and the supreme council lost no time in interposing their authority. On the 1st of November, 1779, they addressed a letter to the Nizam, lamenting that "the negotiation had been imperceptibly carried beyond the limits originally prescribed to it;" that their intentions were entirely pacific; that there was no intention to depart from the treaty subsisting "between him and the Company;" and that to prevent further misunderstandings, Mr. Holland had been instructed in the meantime to suspend his commission. Nizam Ali expressed much satisfaction with the friendly assurances contained in this letter. The Madras council, on the contrary, were furious. Sir Thomas Rumbold in particular inveighed in bitter and sarcastic terms on the interference of the Bengal government, questioned their right to control a negotiation any further than by the exercise of a veto at its conclusion, and criticized their conduct in the Maratha war, which, if Nizam Ali was alienated, was, he alleged, the true cause of the alienation. A quarrel with the Bengal government was comparatively a small matter, and the president might have indulged his ill humour at their expense without incurring any severe penalty. All his measures, however, had been taken as if in defiance of the known wishes of the directors, and he had besides laid himself open to charges of personal corruption. The penalty inflicted, not only on him, but also on those of his colleagues who had been forward in countenancing him, will shortly appear.

Though Nizam Ali professed to be satisfied with the explanations given by the Bengal government, he was at this very time

engaged in a confederacy, which he is said to have originally suggested, and which aimed at nothing less than the total expulsion of the British from India. The parties were the Marathas, Nizam Ali, and Hyder. The Marathas of Poona were to continue operating on the side of Bombay, while those of Berar, Malwa, or Central India, and the more northern parts of Hindustan, were to make irruptions into Bengal and Bihar; Nizam Ali was to invade the Northern Circars, and Hyder was to direct his whole force against Madras. The detail of the negotiations connected with this confederacy was adjusted at Seringapatam, and Hyder immediately commenced preparations for the performance of his share of the compact. The zeal which he thus manifested was dictated partly by policy and partly by revenge—by policy, because, in return for the part which he had promised to take in the confederacy, the Marathas had agreed to confirm him in all the territories he had wrested from them, between the Tungabhadra and the Krishna, to discharge him of all past demands, and to accept of eleven lacs of rupees as the future annual tribute for all his possessions; and by revenge, for all the wrongs and insults which he conceived that the English, at the instigation of his inveterate enemy Muhammed Ali, had heaped upon him since the termination of the former war by the peace of 1769.

It is not to be denied that Hyder had just grounds of complaint. By one of the articles of the above treaty of peace, it was stipulated that in case of attack the contracting parties would assist each other with troops, and yet the very year after, when, in consequence of an invasion by the Marathas, he claimed the benefit of this article, the Madras presidency had recourse to a paltry evasion, and refused assistance on the ground that he had brought the attack on himself by resisting the demand of chouth, and ought therefore to be considered as the aggressor. Again, in 1771, when the Marathas proposed to Hyder to unite for the conquest of the lower countries to the eastward, he communicated the proposal to the Madras government, candidly telling them that he preferred their alliance to that of the Marathas, who, he knew, were aiming at his destruction, and that as the condition of prompt and effectual aid he would immediately pay them twenty lacs of

rupees, and cede to them the valuable districts of Baramahal, Salem, and Ahtur. As an additional inducement to accept of these terms, he warned them that if they were rejected he would be obliged to throw himself upon the French for support. Subsequently he more than once renewed his proposals, and Muhammed Ali, who had hitherto been the great obstacle to their acceptance, professing to see things in a new light, actually sent ambassadors to Seringapatam. Ere long, however, his tortuous policy was resumed, and Hyder, too clear-sighted to be imposed upon, dismissed the ambassadors in May, 1775, by a letter intimating in polite terms, that as the climate appeared to be unfavourable to their health, he could not subject them to further inconvenience. In his personal audience of leave he was more explicit, and thus addressed them:—"You are respectable men, and have acted in conformity to your orders; for seventeen months you have practised evasion, till you are ashamed of the part you have to perform; I will relieve you from the embarrassment, for I will no longer be trifled with; your master is desirous of shortening the thread of amity, but the time is not distant when he will be glad to renew the advances which I have condescended to press upon him in vain; I have sincerely wished for an alliance in that quarter, but I must do without it, and you must return and say so."

Immediately after dismissing Muhammed Ali's ambassadors, Hyder opened a communication with the French, and was received by M. Bellecombe, the governor of Pondicherry, with open arms. Military stores of every description were furnished to him through the French port of Mahe on the Malabar coast, and plans of future co-operation were concerted. Even after this new political connection was formed, Hyder found it convenient not to break finally with the Company, and continued to keep an ambassador or political agent at Madras. This, however, was mainly for the purpose of intelligence. All his sympathies were now with the French, and there cannot be a doubt that if he had not been fully occupied in making the conquest of the countries between the Tungabhadra and the Krishna, he would not have allowed Pondicherry to fall without an effort to save it. At the same time, as he had no personal interest in the place, there was no immediate call upon him to

interfere. It was different with Mahe. Through it, as already explained, his supplies of European troops were received; and therefore, when the Madras government intimated to him that they were about to attempt the reduction of Mahe, he replied that the various settlements, Dutch, French, and English, on the Malabar coast, being situated within his territory, were equally entitled to his protection, and could not be permitted to wage hostilities with each other. Not satisfied with this answer, he instructed his agent to acquaint the governor of Madras in explicit terms, that he would not only defend Mahe if attacked, but retaliate by an incursion into the province of Arcot. Previous to this threat, Colonel Braithwaite had sailed from Madras in command of an expedition against Mahe, and arrived on the Malabar coast. There was some talk of countermanding it, but it was allowed to proceed, and Mahe was captured in the month of March, 1779, though Hyder's colours were hoisted along with those of the French, to indicate his protection, and his troops assisted in its defence. Hyder meanwhile refrained from executing his threat, but lest it should be supposed that he had abandoned the thought of it, he took occasion, in a letter written in the following month, virtually to repeat it, by assuring the governor that, out of respect to the King of England and the gentlemen of the council of Madras, he had *as yet taken no steps to retaliate*. This hint was so significant, that the governor determined if possible to ascertain his actual designs. The means he employed for this purpose were singular.

The Rev. Mr. Swartz, a Dane, whom Heber justly calls "one of the most active and fearless, as he was one of the most successful missionaries who have appeared since the days of the apostles," was quietly pursuing his labours in Tanjore, when he received a letter from Sir Hector Monro; with whom he was well acquainted, to come up instantly to Madras, because the governor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, had something of importance to communicate to him. He immediately set out, and learned to his astonishment that he was desired to make a journey to Seringapatam. His own account of the interview is worth quoting:—"Sir Thomas addressed me nearly as follows—It seems that Hyder Ali Khan meditates upon war; he has in some letters

expressed his displeasure, and even speaks in a menacing tone. We wish to discover his sentiments in this weighty affair with certainty, and think you are the fittest person for the purpose. You'll oblige us if you will make a journey thither, sound Hyder Ali, and assure him that we harbour peaceable thoughts. The reason why we have pitched upon you is because you understand Hindustani, consequently need no translator in your conferences. We are convinced that you'll act *disinterestedly*, and won't allow any one to bribe you. In particular, you can travel privately through the country, without external pomp and parade, and thus the whole journey will remain a secret (which is of great importance to us) until you shall speak with Hyder Naik himself. You will have nothing else to do than to refer Hyder to his own letters, and to answer some dubious circumstances; and if you perceive him to be peaceably disposed, inform him that some principal members of council will come to him for to settle the business finally. As the intention of the journey is good and Christian, namely, to prevent the effusion of human blood, and to preserve this country in peace, this commission militates not against, but highly becomes your sacred office; and therefore we hope you will accept it."

Swartz after short deliberation undertook the commission, influenced, he says, by three reasons:—"1st, Because the mission to Hyder was not attended by any political intrigues; 2nd, Because this would enable me to announce the gospel of God my Saviour in many parts where it had never been known before; and 3rd, As the honourable Company and the government had shown me repeated kindness, I conceived that by this journey I might give them some marks of my gratitude." Having despatched a letter to Hyder, he started on his journey, and on the 6th of July, 1779, reached Karur, the frontier fort of Mysore, forty miles west of Trichinopoly. Here he was detained a month waiting for Hyder's answer. On the 6th of August he resumed his journey, and on the 25th he arrived at Seringapatam. His first interview with Hyder is thus described:—"When I came to Hyder he desired me to sit down alongside of him. The floor was covered with the most exquisite tapestry. He received me very politely, listened friendly and with seeming pleasure to all I had to say; he spoke very openly and without reserve, and

said that the Europeans had broken their solemn promises and engagements, but that nevertheless he was willing to live in peace with them, provided. . . . (*There is no means of filling up this unfortunate blank.*) At last he directed a letter to be wrote, had it read unto me, and said, What I have spoken with you I have shortly mentioned in the letter. You will explain the whole more at length." During his stay Swartz found ample scope for missionary labour, particularly among a body of European troops, partly French, partly German, and some Malabar Christians. "Every Sunday," he says, "I performed divine service in German and Malabar, without asking anybody's leave, but I did it, being bound in conscience to do my duty. We sang, preached, prayed, and nobody presumed to hinder us." Elsewhere he says:—"The most intimate friends dare not speak their sentiments freely; Hyder has his spies everywhere. But I knew that I might speak of religion, night and day, without giving him the least offence."

Swartz had many interviews, for he says, "I sat often with Hyder in a hall that is open on the garden side," but there is no account of any of them, except the last, when he had his audience of leave. On that occasion, Swartz thus explained to him the motives of his journey:—"You may perhaps wonder what could have induced me, a priest, who has nothing to do with political concerns, to come to you, and that on an errand which does not properly belong to my sacerdotal functions. But as I was plainly told that the sole object of my journey was the preservation and confirmation of peace; and having witnessed, more than once, the misery and horrors attending on war, I thought within my own mind, how happy I should deem myself, if I could be of service in cementing a durable friendship between the two governments, and thus securing the blessings of peace to this devoted country and its inhabitants. This I considered as a commission in no wise derogatory to the office of a minister of God, who is a God of peace." Hyder answered with great cordiality, "Very well! very well! I am of the same opinion with you; and wish that the English may be as studious of peace as you are. If they offer me the hand of peace and concord, I shall not withdraw mine." Swartz returned from his mission in October, and not till the 23rd of this month did the president make his colleagues even aware that it had been undertaken.

At the very time when Sir Thomas Rumbold was endeavouring to avert war, by means so little promising as the intervention of a Protestant missionary, he and his council were taking measures, the evident tendency of which was to make war inevitable. In the face of the remonstrance by Nizam Ali, and the known offence they were giving to Hyder, they persisted in sending Colonel Harpur with a detachment to the assistance of Basalat Jung at Adoni. This detachment was not ready to depart till August, 1779, and set out with instructions to pursue a route which led for 200 miles through the most difficult passes of the peninsula, and through the territories of Nizam Ali and Hyder, who had openly avowed their determination to stop its progress. This fact the Madras government not only thought proper to ignore, but they even omitted the ordinary courtesy of applying for permission to pass, because they had somehow been led to adopt the novel doctrine, that "friendly states were always at liberty to march troops through each other's territories." It was not long before they discovered their mistake. Colonel Harpur was allowed to proceed without molestation, till he was completely entangled in a rugged winding valley between two precipitous hills. Then he saw in front of him a breastwork of felled trees lined with musketry, while troops kept moving on the hills, and a large force was advancing to close up his rear. He had barely time, after perceiving the snare, to escape it by an immediate retreat. On being informed of this obstruction, the Madras government resolved to reinforce the detachment, and to remonstrate with Hyder for what they called his unfriendly behaviour. He answered by intimating his fixed determination, neither to allow an English corps to march to Adoni, nor his most inveterate enemy (Muhammed Ali) to obtain possession of Guntur by lease or otherwise. This intimation was quickly followed by a body of light troops, who began to lay waste the territory of Adoni up to its very gates. Basalat Jung was now in consternation. He had brought down upon himself the vengeance of Hyder, and was threatened with that of his brother. In this extremity he begged Colonel Harpur to desist from advancing, and implored the Madras government to save him from ruin, by restoring Guntur. They refused, and justified the refusal by declaring that they were ready to fulfil their part of

the agreement. In the midst of all these complications, and while pursuing this headstrong course, Sir Thomas Rumbold was still able to flatter himself that something might be effected by another private mission, and in February, 1780, despatched a Mr. Gray, formerly of the Bengal civil service, on this hopeless errand. Hyder, who seems to have exhausted all his civility on Mr. Swartz, gave a very different reception to Mr. Gray, who without ever being permitted to lay the subject of his visit before Hyder in person, was glad at last to escape from a country, in which, according to his own description, "he had been received and treated as a spy, rather than an ambassador; rather confined than lodged, and the trifling civilities of fruits and flowers were delivered by chobdars, who were uncivil, insolent, greedy, and clamorous."

Sir Thomas Rumbold quitted Madras in April, 1780, on the score of ill health. Though war, the consequence of his own rashness and incapacity or corruption, was now evidently impending, he was still buoyed with the hope of a lasting peace, and lodged a farewell minute, which, from the amount of delusion it displays, is a curiosity. It commences thus:—"It affords me a particular satisfaction that the whole of the Carnatic and the Company's northern possessions are at present undisturbed, and in perfect tranquillity, notwithstanding the unsettled state of affairs with respect to the Marathas, and the connections occasioned by the march of the Bengal troops across the country to Surat. However well inclined Hyder Ali may be to give disturbance, neither he nor the Nizam have as yet thought proper to put any of their threats into execution, and from the arrival of the fleet with the king's troops, I think there is the greatest prospect that this part of India will remain quiet, especially if the government here cautiously avoid taking any measures that may be likely to bring on troubles!" A few days before this minute was lodged, Mr. Gray had arrived at Madras, to announce the total failure of his mission, and the contumely to which he had been subjected. Sir Thomas Rumbold was succeeded by Mr. Whitehill, who was his colleague, and had shared with him in all his mismanagement. Of course, under the new administration no improvement took place, and the crisis was rather hastened than retarded. His power of doing

mischievous, it is true, was not long possessed, for the government of Bengal, indignant that their orders with respect to Guntur had not been obeyed, proceeded for the first time to exert a power which the Regulating Act had conferred upon them; and in October, 1780, suspended Mr. Whitehill from his office. This extreme measure was afterwards more than confirmed by the directors, who, by their letter of the 10th of January, 1781, after censuring the abolition of the committee of circuit, the proceeding with regard to the zamindars of the Northern Circars, the treaty with Basalat Jung, and the lease of Guntur to the nabob, dismissed Sir Thomas Rumbold, Mr. Whitehill, and Mr. Perring from their service, suspended other two members of council, and while admitting that the military conduct of Sir Hector Monro was meritorious, expressed their strongest disapprobation of his conduct in matters not pertaining to his profession.

The restoration of Guntur, and other conciliatory measures of the Bengal government, had the effect of withdrawing Nizam Ali from the confederacy; but Hyder's part was taken, and nothing could now divert him from the war which he had determined to wage. In the preparations for it a striking contrast was presented by his activity and the apathy of the imbecile government with which Madras was at this time cursed. On his part everything was arranged with the most scrupulous care, and no department escaped his personal inspection; on theirs everything was left to a kind of haphazard: the commissariat was entirely neglected, and no exertion was made either to garrison places of defence or form a field force. They insisted on closing both their ears and their eyes to all the indications of the coming struggle, and sat debating whether war was probable, when they might almost have heard the sound of the enemy's cannon and seen the smoke of his devastations. Hyder's account of them was true to the letter:—"I have tried them already, and I know them well; they have no conduct; and even now, when I have assembled my whole force to enter the country, they have not shown the least glimmering of ability." Hyder, while thus despising his enemies, must have swelled with pride when, in the month of June, 1780, he moved from his capital at the head of a force "which," says Colonel Wilks,

"had probably not been equalled, and certainly not surpassed, in strength and efficiency, by any native army that had ever been assembled in the south of India." Its effective strength was estimated at 90,000 men, of whom 28,000 were cavalry. After he began to move he knew that there was no necessity for haste, and advanced leisurely towards the frontier. Most of Muhammed Ali's officers in command of forts had been already gained, and the numerous spies, whom he had sent forward to seek employment as deceitful guides to the Company's troops, could not yet render him much service, simply as yet there were scarcely any troops to mislead. The sluggishness of his opponents thus made it impossible for him to be active. His appearance, while hovering on the mountains, and his subsequent terrific descent, have been described with matchless eloquence by the greatest of modern orators. After describing, in language more rhetorical than accurate, the treacherous dealings of which Hyder Ali had reason to complain, and saying that he had in consequence "resolved, in the gloomy recesses of a mind capacious of such things, to leave the whole Carnatic an everlasting monument of vengeance," Burke, in his celebrated speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, continues thus:—

"He became at length so confident of his force, so collected in his might, that he made no secret whatsoever of his dreadful resolution. Having terminated his disputes with every enemy and every rival, who buried their mutual animosities in their common detestation, he drew from every quarter whatever a savage ferocity could add to his new rudiments in the art of destruction; and comyounding all the materials of fury, havoc, and desolation, into one black cloud, he hung for a while on the declivities of the mountains. Whilst the authors of all these evils were idly and stupidly gazing on this menacing meteor, which blackened all their horizon, it suddenly burst, and poured down the whole of its contents upon the plains of the Carnatic. Then ensued a scene of woe, the like of which no eye had seen, no heart conceived, and which no tongue can adequately tell. All the horrors of war before known or heard of were mercy to that new havoc. A storm of universal fire blasted every field, consumed every house, destroyed every temple. The miserable inhabitants, fleeing from their flaming villages, in part were slaughtered;

others, without regard to sex, to age, to the respect of rank or sacredness of function—fathers from torn children, husbands from wives—enveloped in a whirlwind of cavalry, and amidst the goading spears of drivers and the trampling of pursuing horses, were swept into captivity in an unknown and hostile land. Those who were able to evade this tempest, fled to the walled cities; but escaping from fire, sword, and exile, they fell into the jaws of famine.” This vivid description, though accurate on the whole, might leave an erroneous impression, were it not explained that the desolation was not so universal as represented. Hyder aimed at nothing less than the permanent conquest of the Carnatic, and to convert the whole into a desert would have been to defeat his ultimate object. His merciless desolation, therefore, extended no farther than to interpose a desert between himself and his enemies. This was effected by a line of devastation extending southward from the lake of Pulicat to within a few miles of Pondicherry, and westward from thirty to fifty miles. A similar line, forming a circle thirteen miles in radius, was drawn round Vellore. With these exceptions, and other occasional devastations in carrying on sieges and impeding hostile military operations, “the whole of the country occupied by the invader was,” according to Colonel Wilks, “as well protected as his possessions above the Ghats.”

From St. Thomas' Mount, only nine miles from Madras, black columns of smoke were everywhere seen before a single order for the movement of troops was issued. The corps in Guntur, at first under Colonel Harpur and afterwards under Colonel Baillie, was directed to move southwards; Colonel Braithwaite, in command at Pondicherry, was ordered northwards to Chingleput, and subsequently to Madras. Colonel Cosby, with a detachment from Trichinopoly, was to have acted on the enemy's communications through the passes, but was ultimately instructed to join the main army. While these orders were being issued, almost every fort in which Muhammed Ali's officers commanded passed by treachery into the hands of the invader. After the Madras government had been in a manner forced into activity, one of the first arrangements which became necessary was the appointment of a commander. This office naturally devolved on Sir Hector Monro, as commander-in-chief;

but his vote in the council was necessary to give the president a majority, and for this purpose, though under a different pretext, it was seriously proposed that he should remain at Madras, while the command in the field should be given to Lord Macleod, who had recently arrived from England, in command of a king's regiment. A difference of opinion as to the proper place for concentrating the army broke up this arrangement. His lordship proposed the vicinity of Madras; Sir Hector Monro, with less judgment, insisted on Conjeveram, and undertook to carry out his own plan, the president having previously secured majority by the arbitrary appointment of an additional councillor, on whose vote he could calculate.

Hyder, after descending through the pass of Changama, on the 20th of July, 1780, detached his second son, Karim Sahib, with 5,000 horse, to plunder Porto Novo, situated on the coast, about forty miles south of Pondicherry, and a still larger body of cavalry to carry on the work of devastation. He himself advanced with the main army, but was so much retarded by the number of places to be occupied, that it was the 21st of August when he arrived before Arcot and invested it. On the 29th he departed abruptly, in consequence of learning that the British army had made its first march from St. Thomas' Mount on the 26th. The direction taken was Conjeveram, situated forty-two miles south-west. Here Sir Hector Monro arrived on the same day on which Hyder quitted Arcot. The movement to Conjeveram has been severely condemned. Colonel Baillie, still on his march from Guntur, had arrived without interruption on the 24th at an encampment not more than twenty-five miles from Madras, and by one forced march, or two easy marches, could have effected a junction with the main army. His detachment mustered 2,813, the main army 5,209; and, of course, the two when united would have formed a respectable force of 8,022 men. Instead of waiting for this junction, Sir Hector Monro moved off, as has been seen, in an opposite direction, and sent orders to Colonel Baillie to follow him, by taking an independent route of upwards of fifty miles. Hyder, ever on the alert to take advantage of a blunder, had, on quitting Arcot, detached his son, Tipu Sultan, or Tipu Sahib, as he is more usually called, with a select corps of 5,000 infantry, 6,000 horse, six heavy guns,

and a large body of irregulars, to intercept Baillie's detachment and endeavour to destroy it.

On the 25th of August, Colonel Baillie arrived at the Cortelaure, and committed the serious fault of encamping on its north or left bank. Though then nearly dry, it was liable to be suddenly swollen by mountain rains. It was, in fact, so swollen that very evening, and was found on the next morning to be impassable. After waiting six days, and seeing no indication of a fall in the stream, he sent a letter to the government, proposing to descend to its mouth at Ennore, and be there ferried over. This would have brought him within thirteen miles of Madras. From some cause no answer to this letter reached him, and on the 4th of September he succeeded in crossing, as had been originally intended. Tipu, who had been watching his movements, did not find an opportunity to attack him till the 6th. On seeing the preparations for this purpose, Colonel Baillie took post at Perembacum, only fourteen miles from Sir Hector Monro's encampment near Conjeveram. The action lasted three hours, without being decisive. The result was that Colonel Baillie wrote to Sir Hector Monro, stating his inability to join, and hoping that therefore he would be joined at Perembacum, and Tipu wrote to his father that he had no prospect of succeeding without a reinforcement.

On the 6th, the same day when the action was fought, Hyder, who had been encamped six miles to the westward of the British, made a movement which gave him command of the road by which the detachment was expected. At the same time, a heavy firing was heard in that direction. There could now be no doubt that Colonel Baillie was attacked, and that it would be impossible for him to join without fighting his way through the whole of Hyder's army. The destruction of the detachment was therefore absolutely certain unless it were relieved; and yet Sir Hector Monro, with this fact fully in his view, lay on his arms during the 6th, 7th, and 8th. The pagoda of Conjeveram was incapable, he said, of standing out a single day, and he could not leave it without sacrificing the provisions, the heavy guns, and most of the baggage of the army. In the course of the 8th, Colonel Baillie's letter, giving an account of the action, was received, and on the evening of that day

Sir Hector Monro, still determined not to risk the pagoda, fell on the expedient of detaching the flank companies of the army, and sending them off as a reinforcement. This expedient succeeded far better than it deserved. The natural result of it would have been to sacrifice the flank companies, by allowing the enemy to cut them off in detail before they could reach their destination; but by the dexterous management of Colonel Fletcher, the officer in command, who suddenly changed his route, and thereby deceived his own guides, who were in Hyder's pay, the junction with Colonel Baillie was effected without any loss. Thus augmented, the detachment mustered 3,720 men, and no doubt being felt of its being able to reach Conjeveram, it started for that purpose on the night of the 9th.

Hyder, full of indignation at the carelessness which had allowed the junction to take place, did not venture to move on the 9th, because he suspected that he himself was about to be exposed to a double attack, by the main army in front, and the detachment in the rear. He had accordingly made his arrangements to meet this emergency, but on ascertaining from his spies that Sir Hector Monro was not preparing to march, he sent off, as soon as it was dark, the great body of his infantry and guns against the detachment, and kept the camp with a few light guns and the whole of the cavalry. Even this precaution seemed unnecessary, when Sir Hector Monro showed no signs of shaking off his torpor, and he silently quitted the camp to follow his infantry. Colonel Baillie had not advanced half a mile from his position at Perembacum, when he was challenged by the enemy's videttes, and an attack, more harassing than formidable, was kept up for five or six miles by rocket-men and irregulars. As the detachment advanced, the resistance became more serious. The enemy had not only examined every part of the route which they knew must be taken, but had taken advantage of some artificial cuts made in the ground for purposes of irrigation, to throw up in various places a kind of breastwork, from which they might fire under cover. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, British discipline prevailed, every attack was repulsed, and everything was ready for the continuance of the march, when Colonel Baillie, against the decided opinion of Colonel Fletcher, adopted the fatal

resolution of halting for the night. The only opportunity of effecting the junction by taking advantage of the darkness was thus thrown away. In the morning it was too late. Shortly after the detachment began to move, at daylight of the 10th, the enemy commenced a distant cannonade, and Hyder's whole army was seen advancing. The odds were now fearful, and the British commander was unfortunately deficient in the coolness and presence of mind absolutely necessary to enable him to contend against them. Successive charges of cavalry, under which heavy masses of infantry were moved forward, were necessarily followed by some degree of confusion even in the best-disciplined ranks, while the cross fire of upwards of fifty guns committed fearful havoc. For a time the ten field-pieces of the detachment returned this fire with some effect, but the exhaustion of their ammunition, hastened by the blowing up of two tumbrils, deprived them of this aid, and the whole British corps, crowded together in a helpless posture, were mowed down by hundreds. Many of the men, seeing the destruction which awaited them where they stood, called out to be led on, but no orders had been given, when a combined charge by all the enemy's cavalry completed the confusion and made further resistance vain. Colonel Baillie, seeing that all was lost, went forward to ask for quarter by waving his handkerchief, and understanding that it had been granted, ordered the Europeans, who still stood in compact order, to lay down their arms. The enemy received Colonel Baillie as a prisoner, and seemed to pause, as if uncertain whether they should accept the surrender of the other troops. A straggling fire kept up by some sepoys, under the influence of panic and without any object, decided them, and they rushed forward to unresisted slaughter. In these atrocities and the others which followed, Hyder's young soldiers took the lead; they "amused themselves," says Colonel Wilks, "with fleshing their swords, and exhibiting their skill on men already most inhumanly mangled, on the sick and wounded in the doolies, and even on women and children." The few who escaped this treatment were indebted to the humane interposition of the French officers, particularly M. Pimorin, who had joined with a small detachment from Mahe shortly before its capture, and M. Lally, whose corps

had passed successively from Basalat Jung to Nizam Ali, and from Nizam Ali to Hyder.

The whole of Colonel Baillie's corps, with its equipments of every description, being totally lost, Sir Hector Monro, who at the time of the ultimate contest is proved to have been not more than two miles distant, moved off in the direction of Conjeveram, to which, he says, "the security of the army determined him to return." What kind of security he expected is not apparent. He arrived at six o'clock in the evening of the 10th, and by three o'clock on the morning of the 11th, after throwing his heavy guns and stores into the great tank, had commenced his retreat to Chingleput. His reason for this sudden movement was that he must have starved if he remained, as the grain, which had been his main inducement to cling so long and so fatally to Conjeveram, barely sufficed for one day's consumption. The incessant annoyance of the enemy cost him during the retreat the loss of a large portion of the stores and baggage. At Chingleput he found none of the provisions which were to have been stored there by Muhammed Ali, but the disappointment was more than compensated by the arrival of the important detachment under Colonel Cosby. After hesitating whether to proceed south-east to the Dutch settlement of Sadras-patam, evidently with a view to embarkation, or N.N.E. to St. Thomas' Mount, he prudently selected the latter route, and after arriving took up a position at Marmalong with a river covering his front. Hyder remained about forty miles distant in his fortified camp at Muserwauke, which was advantageously placed for any contingency. The campaign, which, though it had lasted only twenty-one days, was full of disgrace and disaster to the British, thus closed.

The consternation produced at Madras by the results of this campaign was nearly equalled at Calcutta, when the intelligence arrived by a swift ship which had been despatched for the purpose. There, however, better and more vigorous counsels prevailed, and it was at once resolved to make every effort to supply Madras both with money and with troops. Not less important was the consent of Sir Eyre Coote to proceed to the scene of war and take the chief command. He arrived at Madras on the 5th of November, 1780, bringing with him

fifteen lacs of treasure, and such a reinforcement as could be immediately spared. A considerable body of native infantry was ordered to proceed through the territories of Mudaji Bhonsla, whom Mr. Hastings had succeeded in withdrawing from the confederacy after he had actually sent 30,000 horse towards Cuttack for the purpose of invading Bengal. The same ship which carried Sir Eyre Coote conveyed the letter by which the Bengal government suspended Mr. Whitehill from the office of governor. Mr. Smith, as senior member of council, took the chair. He was one of only two members who had sounded the note of alarm and aroused their colleagues from their infatuated apathy when Hyder was on the eve of making his descent, and there was therefore good reason to hope that his administration would display more wisdom and vigour than that which preceded it.

On the 19th of September, Hyder quitted his fortified camp near Conjeveram to resume his ground before Arcot. Muhammed Ali, who regarded this place as his capital, had expended a large sum in surrounding it with a rampart, bastions, and ditch, regularly constructed by an European engineer, but destitute of revelins and lunettes. Hyder was guided in forming his approaches and batteries by French officers, and after six weeks' open trenches, having made two practicable breaches, ordered a simultaneous assault by two columns, the one headed by his son Tipu, and the other by Maha Mirza Khan. Tipu failed, but Maha Mirza succeeded, and Tipu, thus enabled to rally, made a second attempt and succeeded also. The European troops retired to the citadel, and might have made a good defence, had not Hyder found means of corrupting the native garrison and compelled a capitulation.

Sir Eyre Coote was not able to move before the 17th of January, 1781. His equipment was much crippled by the want of draught and carriage cattle, which could not be procured while the enemy's cavalry were in possession of the country. This want was partially remedied by employing small vessels, with provisions and stores, to accompany the movements of the army. Hyder was about this time engaged at once in the siege of five different places defended by English officers. One of these, Ambur, had fallen on the 13th; another,

Chingleput, was relieved by Sir Eyre Coote on the 19th. About thirteen miles south-west is the fort of Karangoly. Its works had been improved by Hyder, and it had a garrison of 700 men; but as information had been received that the garrison were evacuating it and carrying off the provisions, Sir Eyre Coote at midnight of the 20th sent a detachment of 1,000 men to obtain possession of it. The information proved false, and Captain Davis, who commanded the detachment, was surprised on his arrival to find the garrison ready to give him a warm reception. His orders having been peremptory, he determined to make the attempt notwithstanding, and after blowing open the gate, succeeded, though at considerable loss, in effecting a capture. The provisions obtained in the place afforded a very seasonable relief, but a still more important result was the confidence with which it inspired the troops, who regarded the fall of Karangoly as the first favourable turn in the tide of fortune.

The next place to be attended to was Wandiwash. When the other forts in the possession of Muhammed Ali's officers were falling by treachery into the hands of Hyder, Lieutenant Flint had preserved Wandiwash by an act of singular daring. As Hyder was known to be in the neighbourhood, and the fidelity of the killedar or native commandant was suspected, the lieutenant was despatched with 100 firelocks on the almost hopeless errand of attempting to gain admission into it. With the greatest difficulty, and by pursuing unfrequented paths, he reached its vicinity and announced his approach. The killedar returned for answer that he would fire upon him if he came within range of the guns. He moved on in spite of this threat, and on meeting a picket sent to stop him on the verge of the esplanade, had the address to persuade the officer that he must have misunderstood his orders, and that the meaning could only be to stop them if they proved not to be friends. He was thus allowed to move on till he was within musket-shot of the ramparts, and saw them lined with troops. On this he announced that he had a letter from the nabob, and was ordered to deliver it only into the killedar's own hands. For this purpose he demanded admission with a few attendants. The killedar refused, but at length agreed to receive the letter in the space between the gate and the barrier of the sortie. Lieutenant

Flint was admitted with four faithful sepoy attendants, and found the killedar sitting on a carpet, surrounded by several officers, with thirty swordsmen as his personal guard, and a hundred sepoys drawn up for his protection. After the first compliments the lieutenant confessed that he had no letter, but offered as an equivalent for it the order of his own government, issued in concert with the nabob. This order the killedar treated with contempt, and told the bearer of it to return as he came. Lieutenant Flint declared this to be impossible, as the country was in the enemy's possession, and was continuing to remonstrate when the killedar rose to depart. On this he suddenly seized him, threatened him with instant death if a hand was moved for rescue. The four sepoys were in an instant by their leader's side, and pointed their swords at the killedar's breast. In the confusion of the moment the remainder of the small detachment made good their entrance. That very day it was to have been surrendered to Hyder. Ultimately, the better part of the garrison were induced to place themselves under Lieutenant Flint's command, and the place was secured.

Wandiwash was now in command of Lieutenant Flint, and from the very remarkable manner in which he had obtained possession of it, great interest was felt in both camps as to its future fate. Early in December, 1780, when the first preparations were made for investing it, the wives and families of the sepoys departed, in the hope of being permitted to reside with their friends in the villages. Hyder caused them all to be collected, and on the morning of the 30th of December, when the approaches had been carried within fifty yards of the ditch, a motley crowd of old men, women, and children, were seen approaching the place surrounded by guards, and preceded by a flag of truce. Lieutenant Flint saw that there was not a moment to be lost. Besides himself there was only another European in the place, and there could be little doubt that the garrison, most of whom were resting from the fatigues of the night, would not be able to resist the screams and entreaties which implored a surrender as the only means of saving those who were dearest to them from barbarous treatment. Fortunately the bearer of the flag was considerably in front, and Lieutenant Flint, after pointing a gun and giving due notice, fired. The

shot appeared to take effect, for the flag fell, and the crowd, frightened by this and a few additional discharges over their heads, dispersed with the utmost precipitation.

The future details of the siege, though interesting, and displaying remarkable ability and fertility of resource on the part of the commander, cannot be given at length. On the 16th of January, when the enemy had entered the ditch by galleries in two places on the west face, and another gallery on the south was nearly completed, they attempted, by a well-managed feint, to lead the garrison into an ambuscade, but the only effect was to give Lieutenant Flint an opportunity of making a sortie, which succeeded in rendering many of the besiegers' operations useless. Five days had been employed by the enemy in repairing this damage, when, on the 22nd, the news of the capture of Karangoly so frightened them, that they evacuated the batteries and trenches, and sent off their tents and baggage to Arcot. The following day they raised the siege, and on the 24th Sir Eyre Coote made his appearance. He was just in time. In another day the ammunition of the garrison would have been exhausted. By a curious coincidence, the siege was raised on the same day of the same month on which Sir Eyre Coote raised it twenty-one years before, by the victory of Wandiwash.

After the relief of Wandiwash nearly six months elapsed before any operations of importance were undertaken. The British commissariat was so defective, that Sir Eyre Coote was under the necessity of selecting, not the positions which were strategically the best, but those which promised to furnish him with the means of saving his army from starvation. On the 25th of January a French fleet appeared off Madras, and Sir Eyre, who received the intelligence on the day when he was setting out from Wandiwash for the relief of Permacoil, immediately changed his direction, and began to march north-east for the protection of the capital from the danger with which it was threatened. On learning that, contrary to general belief, the fleet had no troops on board, he returned to his intention of relieving Permacoil, and then continued his southward march to Pondicherry, for the purpose of destroying the country by which alone the French fleet could communicate with the shore. He had scarcely completed these operations when Hyder's army appeared in

great force. Sir Eyre Coote had calculated on being able to outstrip Hyder, and reach the fertile countries south of the Colerun, where there would be no risk of want. This had now become impossible, and he was therefore forced to decide whether to move northward, so as to draw nearer to the main source of supply at Madras, or southward to Cuddalore, which it was important either to dismantle or protect, lest by falling into the hands of the enemy it might facilitate the future operations of the troops expected from France. The northward movement would have been preferred, but was impossible, as there was only one day's rice in the camp. Nothing therefore remained but to move southward. This was almost a desperate alternative, as it was known that even at Cuddalore the supplies would not suffice for more than three days' consumption. Sir Eyre Coote, moving parallel to Hyder's army, arrived, not without some loss of stores, at Cuddalore on the 8th of February, and as the French fleet, still at Pondicherry, made it impossible for him to obtain any supplies by sea, his situation became critical. "I cannot," he writes, "command rice enough to move either to the northward or the southward. I offered him (Hyder) battle yesterday, but I no sooner showed myself than he moved off, and has taken possession of, and strengthened all the roads leading to the southward. I have written to Nagore in the most pressing terms for supplies; I depend upon every effort in your power—everything must be risked to assist me; my difficulties are great indeed. I need say no more to induce you to take such steps as will speedily enable me to act as becomes a soldier." The gloomy forebodings of this despatch must soon, according to all human calculation, have been realized by the destruction or surrender of the British army, had not relief come from an unexpected quarter. M. d'Orves, the French admiral, from motives never satisfactorily explained, suddenly disappeared from the coast. The change thus produced in Sir Eyre Coote's prospect appears in a brief despatch—"The French fleet under sail, standing to the eastward; there is not a moment to be lost in sending me provisions; that supplied, I will answer for the rest."

Though the more immediate danger was removed, the supplies were still so deficient, and so many other obstacles were thrown in the way by Hyder's skilful and cautious tactics,

that the British army remained almost stationary from the 8th of February to the 16th of June. This period of inaction, while the expenses of the war were scarcely lessened by it, was so mortifying to the Madras government, that they ventured to submit to Sir Eyre Coote a kind of remonstrance, in the form of an elaborate exposition of his present military position, in which they discussed the propriety of adopting a northern or a southern movement. The veteran commander, whose temper had not improved with his years, did not relish this exposition, which he regarded as a covert attack on his military character, and made a very sarcastic reply. After pointing out the advantages secured by his present position, and telling the council that the powers which they had conferred upon him, additional to those which he already possessed as commander-in-chief of the British forces in India, had only loaded him with labour and anxiety, foreign to his duties and appertaining to themselves, he continues thus:—"Having stated the circumstances which proved the impossibility of marching this army at all, it does not seem immediately necessary that I should enter upon an inquiry whether a southern or a northern movement is to be preferred." After remarking, that from the non-arrival of supplies which ought to have been sent, a necessity of moving northward seemed to be approaching he adds, "I am happy in thinking I shall do (so), without apprehending any material danger, from even a more formidable enemy than a body of horse, which you have, with so much precision, pointed out as the only impediment I am likely to meet with in taking a northern route. In justice to both myself and the service, I promise you that the army I now command shall not remain unemployed, if you will only supply me with provisions, and the means of carrying them."

The British army, owing to its wretched equipment, was kept stationary near Cuddalore until the middle of June. Hyder's presence and devastations prevented it from moving inland, and its movement along the coast was only practicable by the substitution of ships for an ordinary commissariat. It thus depended on the co-operation of the fleet, which was kept cruising off the coast for this purpose, and to meet the possible contingency of a defeat, when it might be employed in embarking the wreck of the army. On the 16th of June, Sir Eyre

Coote moved southward, and on the 18th he crossed the Velaur. His object was to attempt the capture of the fortified pagoda of Chilambrum, situated three miles south of that river, and about twenty-five miles beyond Cuddalore. The pagoda was one of the posts which Hyder had selected and materially strengthened, both to arrest the southward progress of the British and serve as a depot for himself and his French allies. Sir Eyre Coote, finding no enemy in force near it, and having been informed that its garrison consisted only of a small body of irregulars, thought it possible to carry it by a sudden night assault. With this view, he proceeded at dusk with four battalions of sepoys and eight pieces of ordnance, gained possession of the petta or town without difficulty, forced the second line of defence, and pushed on with the greatest spirit to the body of the place. Here the progress of the assailants was suddenly arrested. The garrison, supposed to be only a few irregulars, consisted of nearly 3,000 effective men, under an officer of reputation, who, in addition to the ordinary means of defence, had provided bundles of oiled straw and other combustibles, by which the whole space through which the assailants had to pass was suddenly converted into a mass of flame. The sepoys, panic-struck, could not be rallied, and the attempt was necessarily abandoned.

After this repulse, Sir Eyre Coote recrossed the Velaur, and encamped near Porto Novo at its mouth. Here Admiral Sir Edward Hughes arrived on the 24th of June. He brought intelligence that Lord Macartney had assumed the government of Madras, and that he himself was under orders to commence immediate hostilities against the Dutch. An attack on Nagapatam was first suggested, but the preference was given to the reduction of Chilambrum by the united efforts of the army and the fleet. Before the necessary steps could be taken for this purpose, Hyder encamped with his whole army at the distance of a few miles. He had been in the south, collecting an enormous booty in money, merchandise, cattle, and human beings. The last consisted partly of weavers and their families, who were seized and sent off to people the island of Seringapatam, and partly of boys and females, indiscriminately captured, the former destined, after a forced conversion to Islamism, to be, and the latter

to become the mothers of, military slaves. On hearing of the attempt on Chilambrum, Hyder marched 100 miles in two days and a half, and having placed himself between the British army and Cuddalore, began to fortify himself in a position not more than three miles from their encampment. By this means, he both frustrated the intended siege of Chilambrum and covered his own designs against Cuddalore. The circumstances were so critical that Sir Eyre Coote summoned a council of war. The resolution adopted was, that the preparations for the siege should be abandoned, and that attempts should be made to turn or force the enemy's position, or to bring on a general action. To make this possible, four days' rice, to be carried on the soldier's backs, were landed from the fleet.

By seven o'clock on the morning of the 1st of July, the British had quitted their encampment. The road to Cuddalore lay N.N.W., and on its left was the termination of a lagoon. Considerable bodies of cavalry, with this lagoon behind their right and centre, covered the plain. Hyder's select cavalry, with some light artillery, was drawn up behind the lagoon. Sir Coote formed his army—necessarily diminished by a strong baggage guard, which moved between his right and the sea—into two lines, and advanced in order of battle over the plain. After thus marching about a mile and a half, the enemy's position was clearly distinguished. It was strengthened by front and flanking batteries, and extended from commanding grounds on the right across the Cuddalore road, to a point on the left, where the sand-hills of the shore gave a support to this flank. After an hour spent in reconnoitring, during which the enemy kept up an incessant but distant cannonade, while not a single shot was returned, Sir Eyre Coote, at nine o'clock, ordered both his lines to break into columns, and in this order moved rapidly to the eastward of the sand-hills. These, which run parallel to the coast and are about 1,100 yards from the sea, covered the greater part of this movement. On reaching an opening in the sand-hill range, where Hyder had made a practicable road, a height commanding it was occupied, the first line pushed through, and after clearing the pass of a strong body of the enemy, deployed again into order of battle, with its front to the west. Waiting with impatience under a heavy fire, till the height

should be effectually occupied by the artillery of the second line, Sir Eyre Coote moved on with the first, his right covered by a long thick hedge, and his left protected by corps and some guns in column. Hyder had in the meantime removed the artillery of his batteries to a line at right angles with the former, and commenced a tremendous cannonade. The British line still continuing to advance, an attempt was made to overwhelm it by a general charge of cavalry. This failed, and by four o'clock the enemy's line was forced, and compelled to a precipitate retreat. Meanwhile, a strong body of infantry, with their guns, and a large mass of cavalry, attempted to fall on the British rear. The second line met this attack, and after a close and severe contest, completely foiled it, driving it from the contiguous heights, and frustrating all its efforts to seize the commanding position first occupied. The failure of the cavalry attack on the first British line has been already mentioned. A similar charge, which ought to have been made at the same time on the second line, was at first retarded by the fall of its commander, and afterwards owed its repulse, in no small degree, to a schooner of the fleet, which, approaching the shore as near as soundings would permit, opened an effective flanking fire, from which the mass of cavalry sought shelter under a sand-hill.

All these operations had been viewed by Hyder from a gentle eminence in the rear, where he sat cross-legged on a *choukee*, a portable stool about nine inches high, covered by a carpet. The near approach of the British first line had induced him to order the retreat, first of his guns and afterwards of his infantry and cavalry; but when a hint was given of his own personal danger, he received it with a torrent of the obscene abuse which formed his only eloquence, and he continued to sit "obstinately stupid with vexation," till a groom, who had been long in his service, and was a kind of privileged person, ventured to lay hold of his legs, and put on his slippers, saying, "We will beat them tomorrow; in the meanwhile, mount your horse." Once mounted, he was quickly out of sight. The British first line rested on the ground abandoned by the enemy, and owing to the casualties of the day, was not joined by the second line till midnight. The victory now gained is known by the name of Porto Novo. Had not a heavy rain prevented it, the battle would

have been fought on the 30th of June. Had it been postponed to the 2nd of July, it could scarcely have been fought at all. The road in the sand-hills through which the attack was made had been prepared by Hyder, for the purpose of drawing his guns to a large work, which was to have received twenty guns, and would have commanded every part of the ground on which Sir Eyre Coote so ably manoeuvred. In another day this work would have been completed, and the consequence to all appearance would have been, that the British army could not possibly have been extricated. Its force in this battle was 8,476 men, of whom 830 were cavalry, 598 artillery, and 7,048 infantry. The loss in killed and wounded was only 306. Hyder's army, though deprived of a large detachment, absent under Tipu on other service, must have been about 65,000; his loss, at the lowest computation, could not have been less than 10,000. The physical resources of the British army were not improved by this victory, which could not be followed up, from the continued deficiency of provisions and equipment. The moral effect, however, was immense, and the troops, previously sinking into despondency, became full of confidence.

During his father's operations, Tipu had taken Thiagur, situated about forty miles west of Cuddalore, and had then moved rapidly to the north-east, with thirteen battering cannon, to resume the siege of Wandiwash. Meanwhile, the detachment sent from Bengal through the territories of the Raja of Berar had arrived at Nellore; and Sir Eyre, for the purpose both of facilitating its junction and succouring Wandiwash, began to move in a northerly direction, keeping near the coast, in order to draw supplies from the ships. Until he reached Pondicherry, he was in expectation of another general action; but Hyder, after tantalizing him with this hope, struck his tents, and moved off to the westward. On this, Sir Eyre Coote quitted the coast, and moved north-west to Karangoly. While here, on the 21st of July, he learned that Tipu, after his batteries were ready to be opened, had suddenly quitted Wandiwash. Before decamping he tried the effect of an escalade, to which Lieutenant (now Captain) Flint, was too much on the alert to give any chance of success. It was not difficult to divine Tipu's destination. He was in hopes of repeating the disaster inflicted

on Colonel Baillie, and was hastening to intercept the Bengal detachment. Sir Eyre Coote, having now nothing to detain him, set off for its protection, and with this view marched by Chingleput to St. Thomas' Mount.

The ordinary road from Madras to Nellore passes to the westward of the lagoon of Pulicat, an inlet of the sea, about thirty-five miles long from north to south, and nowhere above eleven miles in breadth. Tipu had prepared impediments and ambush on this road, but had overlooked the fact that there was another route between the lake and the sea, which, though interrupted by openings in the lagoon where it communicates with the sea, was still practicable. By this route the detachment had passed, and arrived at the fort of Pulicat, recently captured from the Dutch, without the necessity of firing a shot. Thirty miles of the journey to St. Thomas' Mount still remained, but Sir Eyre Coote was not the man to repeat the blunder which had been committed by Sir Hector Monro, and made two marches north, which enabled him on the following day to effect a junction with this detachment, which added nearly a third to his numerical strength.

The great objects of the campaign would have been the relief of Vellore and the siege of Arcot, but all the cattle which had been collected were unable, after other necessary purposes were provided for, to carry more than rice adequate to one and a half day's consumption of the army. These great objects being thus impracticable, Sir Eyre Coote turned his attention to Tripassore, a fort of some importance from its position, thirty-three miles west from Madras, on one of the roads leading to Arcot. The intermediate fort of Punomalli being already in British possession, he was able, by using it as a depot, to bring forward a sufficiency of grain to attempt Tripassore. He arrived before it on the 19th of August, and having made a good breach by the 22nd, was preparing for the assault, when a flag of truce appeared, with an offer to capitulate on terms. These were refused, and no alternative was given but an unconditional surrender in a quarter of an hour, or an assault. This answer had scarcely been given when Hyder was seen in full approach with his whole army. Not to lose a moment, the troops were ordered to storm instantly, and had just emerged from the

trenches when the surrender was announced, and the storming party were allowed to take possession without opposition. The moment the capture was perceived Hyder drew off.

Hyder, while Sir Eyre Coote was effecting a junction with the Bengal detachment, had returned to his camp at Muserwauke. This spot, from the success which he had obtained near it in the former campaign, he considered *fortunate*. The ground on which Colonel Baillie met with his disaster, he of course considered still more *fortunate*, and he had therefore determined to offer battle to Sir Eyre Coote on this ground, and if possible, on the same day of the same lunar month, the 11th of Ramzan. This day was not the same according to our mode of computation, for Baillie's defeat took place on the 10th of September, whereas that now fixed upon was the 31st of August. To Muhammedans, however, it was the very same; and Hyder, who had selected the ground after carefully ascertaining its strategical advantages, was confirmed in his selection by all the astrologers, whose prognostics promised success on any day of the month, but more especially on the 11th.

The first day's march of the British army from Tripassore was performed on the 26th of August, and brought it to the vicinity of Perembacum. On the 27th the advanced guard arrived about nine o'clock in the morning, at the very spot on which Colonel Baillie made his fatal halt, on the night of the 9th of September, 1780. Large bodies of cavalry had previously been seen to the south-west, and the enemy was now seen in full force in front, and toward both flanks. The action immediately commenced, and continued for upwards of eight hours with doubtful result. Hyder knew every inch of the ground, and had left nothing undone to secure all its advantages. Ultimately, however, by seizing the village of Pollilore, which has since given its name to the battle, Sir Eyre Coote turned the enemy's left by his first, and his right by his second line, and having thus compelled him to retreat, encamped before dusk on the ground which he abandoned. This fact, according to the usual criterion, entitles him to claim the victory, though the Mysoreans insisted on representing it as a drawn battle. The quantity of cover afforded by the nature of the ground, made the casualties fewer than might have been anticipated,

from the length and severity of the contest. The British army, 11,000 strong, lost only 421 in killed, wounded, and missing. The Mysoreans, who, from having brought their whole disposable force into the action, must have mustered 80,000 men, lost about 2,000.

This dubious victory did not improve the condition of the English army, which, in fact, possessed nothing but arms, and was left destitute of every other requisite. Sir Eyre was at length disgusted with this state of matters. He felt that he was wasting his time, and even endangering his military reputation, by remaining at the head of troops while denied the means of employing them with effect, and he therefore went down to Madras determined to resign. Some of the polygars, whose territories lie along the Eastern Ghats, and to the west of the lake of Pulicat, had professed a desire to give in their adhesion to the British, and as this seemed to open up a more favourable prospect, Lord Macartney succeeded in persuading the veteran commander-in-chief to make one further trial. He therefore made two days' march from Tripassore to Tritany, passing along the skirts of the polygars' territories. None of them furnished any aid, and he only received new promises to be followed by new disappointments. While thus situated, Colonel Lang, the commandant at Vellore, acquainted him, that unless relieved, the exhaustion of his provisions would compel him to an early surrender. At the same time Hyder was reported to be near the hill of Sholingur, not more than twelve miles distant, and to be strengthening his position for the purpose of frustrating any attempt to relieve Vellore. Sir Eyre Coote resolved to try the effect of another action, and leaving his heavy guns and every impediment in the little fort of Polur, which had fallen into his hands, made a short march of seven miles on the 26th of September. The night proved tempestuous, and Hyder, who was encamped considerably in advance of the position which he was fortifying, felt so confident of the inability of the British to move, in consequence of the drenching of their tents and the miserable state of their cattle, that he allowed his own cattle to be sent off for several miles to better pasture, and many of the troops, together with most of the drivers and followers, to disperse in search of grain, or for the supply of other wants.

In the morning Sir Eyre Coote, having gone out to reconnoitre, ascended an eminence from which he observed a long ridge of rocks occupied by troops belonging to the enemy. Desirous of further information he sent forward a brigade to dislodge these troops. In performing this duty the brigade mounted to the top of the ridge, and beheld to their astonishment Hyder's whole army not more than three miles off in a southern direction. Sir Eyre Coote ordered the whole army to hasten forward, and succeeded in coming front to front with the main body of the enemy, who stood drawn up at the distance of two miles in advance of their encampment, which was then in the very act of being struck. Hyder, though taken by surprise, made all his arrangements with great coolness and judgment. His object was to act on the defensive as long as possible, so as to enable his troops to recover from a certain degree of confusion into which they had been thrown, and the stragglers and cattle to return. Sir Eyre Coote's object on the contrary was to precipitate a general action, and he therefore, after a few masterly manoeuvres, ordered his whole line to advance. The enemy's cavalry in two principal masses endeavoured to repel or impede the advance by making repeated charges, during which great havoc was made among them by showers of grape and musketry. These charges, though they failed in their immediate object, served the purpose of the enemy so far, by enabling him during the delay caused by the struggle to carry off all his guns except one six-pounder. All the rest of his army soon followed. The victory was thus gained with a loss on the part of the victors of only 100 men killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy exceeded 5,000. The trophies taken were the above gun and three cavalry standards; but Sir Eyre Coote, in a despatch written on the field of battle, says that he would willingly have exchanged them and the whole credit of the victory for seven day's rice.

The extremity to which Vellore was reduced from want of provisions, induced Sir Eyre Coote to run the risk of sending a detachment twenty miles in advance, in the hope that it might be able to intercept some of the convoys of grain which the enemy were frequently sending down by the Damaracherla Pass. He was himself at this time in the polygar districts of

Venkatgiri and Calastray, into which he had moved for the usual purpose of obtaining the means of subsistence. The detachment consisted of five battalions with their guns, two flank companies of an European regiment, and a small portion of cavalry. The enemy soon made their appearance, and Sir Eyre Coote, having been made aware of it, was hastening forward, when he met a few of his own irregular horse in flight, and was told by them that the whole detachment had been cut to pieces. Unable to give entire credit to these dismal news, he advanced other two miles and was relieved by a note from Colonel Owen, the commander of the detachment, intimating its safety in a strong position. It had indeed been attacked by Hyder in person, at the head of nearly his whole regular infantry and select cavalry, when beyond the pass, and it had not succeeded in gaining it without the loss of all the camp equipage and baggage.

Vellore was now in the crisis of its fate. Not one day's grain was in store, and the garrison had for some time been subsisting on grain purchased in distant villages, and brought in by stealth on dark nights. The approaching moonlight would deprive them of this resource, and the commandant had made Sir Eyre Coote aware that the only alternative which remained was either to throw in an immediate supply, or make a movement to cover the escape of the garrison. While in the north among the polygars, a small surplus of rice had been obtained and reserved for the relief of Vellore. Sir Eyre determined to make a last effort, and advanced by three marches from his encampment among the hills. Hyder on this occasion betrayed his fear of another general encounter by retiring to the other side of the Paliar; and Vellore was saved for the present by a supply of rice adequate to six weeks' consumption. After this most seasonable relief, Sir Eyre Coote was obliged for his own subsistence to return to the Pollams, a district of which Chittur, situated twenty miles N.N.W. of Vellore, might be considered the capital. This place was reported to be the intermediate depot of the provisions sent to the enemy through the Damaracherla Pass, and as its strength was not great Sir Eyre Coote laid siege to it, and took it in four days. Great, however, was his disappointment on finding that it contained no grain. As it would be

impossible to subsist in this country during the monsoon, it was necessary to retire. The direction chosen was Tripassore, which it was necessary to relieve from a siege, and at which the army arrived on the 22nd of November, 1781, after a forced march over an incipient inundation. The whole march from Chittur was distressing. The food was so scanty that one-half of the army fasted alternately from day to day, and multitudes of camp followers died of starvation. Meanwhile the monsoon broke, the country became inundated, cattle and their stores were lost, an excellent corps of cavalry formed from the wreck of Muhammed Ali's horse were deprived of nearly half their numbers, and many of the followers not cut off by famine perished in the swollen streams. From Tripassore the army continued its march southwards, and finally entered into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Madras. The campaign, notwithstanding its dazzling triumphs, had yielded no solid advantages. The enemy was still in almost undisputed possession of the country, and the prospect of driving him from it was faint indeed.

While Hyder was personally conducting the campaign in the north of the Carnatic, his troops were not inactive in the south. Shortly after his invasion he had made an incursion into the provinces of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, and subjected the greater part of both to his dominion. In Tanjore, in particular, with the exception of the capital, around which he had for the distance of about twelve miles drawn his usual circle of devastation, he was in undisturbed possession of the whole country, and drew the revenues as regularly as those of Mysore. On the commencement of British hostilities with the Dutch, he immediately concluded a defensive treaty with them, by which reciprocal co-operation was stipulated, and in return for the cession of Nagore and other possessions of the Company to the Dutch, and the promise of providing for the security of Nagapatam, they undertook to assist him in maintaining his ground in Tanjore, and eventually in obtaining possession of its capital. Previous to this treaty the Company had made considerable exertions to collect a field-force in Tanjore, and given the command of it to Colonel Braithwaite, who as soon as he felt himself strong enough to leave the

capital in which he had been shut up, attempted the capture of some of the nearest posts. In two of these attempts he failed, and having been wounded, was obliged to resign the command to Colonel Nixon, who, by means of reinforcements, was enabled to take the field at the head of 3,500 men. By placing his officers and sergeants at the head of the forlorn hope he captured two forts, but sustained so heavy a loss that he hesitated to attempt a third. Meanwhile, Colonel Braithwaite had recovered, and having resumed the command, attacked a body of Hyder's troops double his own in number, and drove them in disorder and with great loss from a fortified position.

Sir Hector Monro, who had been acting as second in command to Sir Eyre Coote, and doing good service, had retired soon after the battle of Pollilore on the plea of ill health, and proceeded to Madras, with the view of sailing for England. It was believed that the ostensible cause of his retirement was not the real one, and that he had taken offence at a harsh answer given by Sir Eyre Coote to some advice which he tendered him. Being thus still fit for duty he had easily been persuaded by Lord Macartney to assume the direction of the siege of Nagapatam. The requisite equipments for this purpose were embarked in the fleet under Sir Edward Hughes, and arrived at Nagore, a few miles northward, on the 20th of October, 1781. To assist in the siege, Colonel Braithwaite, after returning to his command in the city of Tanjore, gave his disposable troops to Colonel Nixon, who arrived on the 21st, and made a successful attack on the enemy's troops when evacuating Nagore. The siege of Nagapatam was afterwards conducted with much skill and spirit. On the 3rd of November the trenches were opened, and the place capitulated. What added to the honour of the capture was the disproportion between besiegers and besieged. The former never exceeded 4,000; the latter, including a number of Hyder's troops who had joined according to treaty, were not less than 8,000. Immediately after the surrender, the monsoon set in, and placed the fleet in imminent danger; but towards the close of the year the weather permitted the embarkation of marines and sailors, who had been landed to assist in the siege, and the fleet having on board a detachment of volunteer sepoys and artillerymen, sailed for Ceylon, when it effected the capture of Trincomali.

The period to which Vellore had been provisioned having expired, Sir Eyre Coote, though he had previously intimated his intention to resign, and was still suffering from illness, determined to undertake its relief in person. On the 2nd of January, 1782, he joined the army, now encamped a little beyond Tripassore; on the morning of the 5th, when his servant entered, he found him senseless. He had been struck by apoplexy. The Madras government, anxious to save so valuable a life, urged his immediate conveyance to Madras, and were not a little astonished to learn that on the very next morning, the 6th, having so far recovered as to admit of his being carried by palanquin, he had started with the army for Vellore. On the 9th, Hyder made, his appearance, but found all the arrangements so skillfully made, that his meditated attack was abandoned, and on the 11th, the very day which the commandant had declared to be the last on which he could hold out, Vellore was victualled anew for other three months. The army commenced its return on the 13th, and Hyder, by the boldness of his movements, seemed determined to risk a general action. It proved only a feint, and Tripassore was reached without incident.

Malabar had also been the scene of military operations. In 1780, when the war was just commenced, Hyder detached a force for the reduction of Tellicherry, which was now the only possession of the Company on the coast. This place, though very imperfectly fortified and garrisoned, was enabled by timely aid from Bombay to make a protracted defence, and by the arrival of reinforcements under Major Abington, on the 18th of January, 1782, to raise the siege by a brilliant achievement—the capture of all the enemy's cannon, amounting to sixty pieces, all their baggage, equipments, and above 1,200 prisoners, including the Mysorean general, Sirdar Khan.

This success of the Company on the Malabar coast was counterbalanced by a disaster in Tanjore. Here Colonel Braithwaite had succeeded in re-establishing the raja's authority. Unfortunately, he gave credit to intelligence which had been given solely for the purpose of misleading, and remained encamped with 2,000 men on a plain, till, unconscious even of the enemy's approach, he allowed himself to be entirely surrounded. He attempted to retreat, and was ably seconded by his officers

and troops. All, however, proved unavailing, and he shared a fate very similar to that of Colonel Baillie. M. Lally, whose fortune it was to be present on both occasions, again exerted himself to arrest the carnage and give succour to the wounded.

While gains and losses were thus counter balancing each other on both sides, all the combatants were giving way to gloomy anticipations. The British were aware that a strong body of French troops might soon be expected, and reflecting on how little advantage they had yet gained in the struggle, knew not how they would be able to maintain it at all, when, in addition to Hyder's immense numerical superiority, they would be obliged to cope with some of the best disciplined troops of Europe. Hyder, on the other hand, imputing their long-delayed arrival to mere evasion, had almost ceased to hope for it. At the same time he knew that the confederacy had already been broken up. Nizam Ali had been bought off by the restoration of Guntur, and Mudaji Bhonsla by a large sum of money; while Mahadaji Sindhia had been induced to withdraw, partly by liberal promises, and partly by the dread of being obliged to carry on the war in the centre of his own territories, and at his own cost. The Marathas of Poona, too, were on the eve of concluding peace with the Company. Hyder, while pondering over these events and his future prospects, is said to have thus expressed himself to his minister Purnea:—"Between me and the English there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction, but no sufficient cause for war, and I might have made them my friends in spite of Muhammed Ali, the most treacherous of men. The defeat of many Baillies and Braithwaites will not destroy them. I can ruin their resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea; and I must be first weary of a war in which I can gain nothing." The result of his reflections was a determination to abandon his scheme of conquest in the east, concentrate his force, and to devote his attention, first, to the expulsion of the British from the western coast, and afterwards to the preservation of his own dominions. In accordance with these views, he began, in the early part of 1782, to demolish his minor posts in Coromandel, mined the fortifications of Arcot preparatory to blowing them up, sent off all his heavy guns and stores, and forced the inhabitants of the Carnatic who were in his power to emigrate with their flocks and herds to Mysore.

His determination to move to the west was probably precipitated by a general rebellion of the Nairs of Malabar, and of the Rajas of Bullum and Coorg, whose territories lie along the summits of the Western Ghats, overlooking that province. Before setting off in person, he despatched three strong detachments, one under Mukhdom Ali to Malabar, another under Waffadar to Coorg, and the third under Sheik Ayaz, generally named in English accounts Hyat Sahib, to Bullum. He was vigorously carrying out his scheme by a thorough spoliation of the Carnatic, and in a few days would have sprung the mines of Arcot and departed, leaving nothing but ruin behind him. Even then his absence would have been a great deliverance, but those who looked for it were not at this time to see it realized. On the 10th of March, 1782, a French force of 3,000 men, including a regiment of Africans, landed at Porto Novo, and produced a complete revolution in Hyder's plans. Having satisfied himself by a personal interview with Admiral Suffrein, and M. Cossigny, who commanded the troops, that a still larger division, under the command of the celebrated Marquis of Bussy, might be expected, he concerted with them the operations that were to be prosecuted in the interval. The most important of these was the reduction of Cuddalore, which was to be used as a French depot.

The French fleet, consisting of twelve ships of the line and eighteen other ships, chiefly transports, had made the coast considerably to the north of Pulicat, the same day that Sir Edward Hughes, on his return from the capture of Trincomali, anchored with six ships in the roads of Madras. M. Suffrein, believing that these constituted the whole British fleet, set sail in the hope of being able to surprise it in the open roads, and effect its destruction. Fortunately, three other ships of the line had arrived from England, and Sir Edward Hughes, though still numerically inferior, was not afraid to risk the encounter. M. Suffrein hesitated, and on standing away to the southward, was followed by the British fleet, which succeeded in capturing six transports, one of them the more valuable that it was laden with troops intended for M. Bussy. It was immediately subsequent to this action that the French admiral landed at Porto Novo the troops already mentioned. Afterwards he proceeded

to Point de Galle, which had been fixed as the rendezvous of the scattered convoy; while the English admiral sought the opposite extremity of Ceylon, and anchored in the harbour of Trincomali to repair the damages of his ships, most of them having suffered severely. This done, he returned to Madras early in March.

About the same time with the French armament, another, having the same destination, sailed from England. Both armaments met with misfortunes, but those of the French greatly preponderated. A convoy, carrying the first division of the troops intended for M. Bussy, was captured by Admiral Kempenfelt, in December, 1781, and a second shared the same fate in April, 1782. Both armaments had the Cape of Good Hope for their first destination, the object of the French being to continue that settlement in the hands of the Dutch, their new allies, and that of the British to wrest it from them. Admiral Suffrein arrived first, and anchored in Simon's Bay, situated in the bottom of False Bay, to the eastward of the Cape. The British squadron, having captured a Dutch ship when nearing the Cape, obtained intelligence which enabled them to capture a number of Dutch Indiamen in Saldanha Bay. As the previous arrival of the French had frustrated the intended attack on Cape Town, Commodore Johnstone returned with the prizes and three frigates to England, and left the remainder of the squadron thus crippled, by being deprived of its frigates, to proceed for Bombay. In making this voyage, a fifty-gun ship, accidentally separated, was taken by the French. The other three ships already mentioned as having joined Sir Edward Hughes in Madras Roads previous to his action, belonged to this squadron. These ships had on board, under General Medows, part of the troops intended to reinforce the Madras army. The other part of the troops intended for the same purpose were employed on the western coast, in consequence of an open rupture between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Macartney. To this unfortunate quarrel a brief reference must be made.

Sir Eyre Coote's powers were not well defined. He was commander-in-chief of all the king's and Company's troops in India. He was also a member of the supreme council of Bengal, and at the same time, when acting within its territories,

a member of the council of Madras. In the latter capacity he had only a single vote, and was bound by the decision of the majority, but in the other capacity, and more especially in that of commander-in-chief, he was not disposed to admit that a subordinate presidency had any right to interfere with him. For a time Lord Macartney left him entirely to his own judgment, and matters went on smoothly; but at last some degree of interference could not be avoided, and a collision took place. When the arrangements for the Dutch captures were made, Sir Eyre Coote was in the field, and was not consulted. He complained of this as an invasion of his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief of all the presidencies. This was rather unreasonable. Another complaint was better founded. Mr. Sullivan, political resident at Tanjore, had a general superintendence of all the southern provinces, and thus became the medium of communication between the two coasts. He was authorized by Lord Macartney to open all his despatches, and send in duplicate only such parts of their contents as might seem to be required. The intervening country was wholly in the hands of the enemy, and the advantage of communicating in this manner was, that while the despatches themselves could not have been transmitted, their substance was copied out on thin paper, inserted in a quill, and forwarded by means of spies, or other secret messengers. Mr. Sullivan in his zeal gave too large an interpretation to Lord Macartney's permission, and opened despatches addressed to the naval and military commanders at Madras. This practice, however useful it might be, was unjustifiable without express authority; and the admiral, Sir Edward Hughes, joined Sir Eyre Coote in a letter which they addressed to Lord Macartney, complaining of Mr. Sullivan's conduct, as an illegal assumption of authority which they could not delegate to any man, and much less to a man who must necessarily be uninformed of their intentions and plans. These misunderstandings were embittered by Sir Eyre Coote's incessant complaint that no proper attention was paid to the wants of the army, and by Lord Macartney's replies, in which, amidst a superfluity of complimentary language, he threw out insinuations that the army as it was should be capable of much more than was accomplished by it. It is unnecessary to dwell further on this unhappy quarrel.

The importance of preserving Trincomali, and of covering a convoy of troops and stores from England, induced Sir Edward Hughes to sail in the end of March, 1782, for the northward of Ceylon. M. Suffrein, who also knew of the expected convoy, was equally on the alert, and set sail in the same direction. The hostile fleets came in sight of each other on the 8th of April, fifteen leagues from Trincomali. The British force consisted of eleven ships, carrying 732 guns, and the French of twelve, carrying 770. After a variety of manoeuvres, a sanguinary battle was fought on the 12th, but without any decisive result. Both fleets, too much crippled to renew the action, anchored in sight of each other till the 19th, when the French made sail to repair their damages at Baticolo, in Ceylon, and the British pursued their original destination to Trincomali. While the hostile fleets were so equally matched, the armies, which depended on their co-operation, could not adopt decisive measures. Hyder was first in motion, and during the absence of the fleets took Cuddalore, which, having only a garrison of 400 sepoys and five artillerymen, yielded without resistance. Though a weak place, its position made it important, and the possession of it gave the French what they had hitherto much wanted, a convenient depot.

On the 11th of May, Hyder and the French having united their forces, appeared before Permacoil, and Sir Eyre Coote, while hastening to its relief, but retarded by violent and destructive storm, had the mortification to learn that it had capitulated on the 16th, and that the enemy were advancing on Wandiwash. He hastened forward and offered them battle. Notwithstanding their great numerical superiority, they declined it, and moved off towards Pondicherry. He followed, and found them encamped in a strong position, which had been previously prepared, in the vicinity of Kilianur. Acting on instructions from M. Bussy, to avoid a general action before his arrival, they refused to quit their ground, and as it was impossible to force it, Sir Eyre Coote set off in the direction of Wandiwash. His destination was Arni, situated twenty-three miles north-west of it, Hyder had made this place his principal depot for all that remained to him in the lower countries, and Sir Eyre Coote had determined to make a dash at it. It was too

strong to be taken by a sudden assault, but Captain Flint, at Wandiwash, had for some time been bargaining for its surrender by treachery. Even should this fail, an advance threatening it seemed the most promising method of drawing the enemy from his strong position at Kilianur. Such, indeed, was the result. The very evening on which the British army departed, Hyder detached Tipu to proceed by forced marches, for the purpose of throwing a strong reinforcement into Arni, and followed himself the following morning with his allies, whose instructions did not allow them to accompany him.

About eight o'clock on the 2nd of June, when Sir Eyre Coote was preparing to encamp, after a short march, near Arni, a cannonade, brisk but distant, was opened on both his front and rear. A series of skilful and admirably executed manoeuvres, for the purpose of at once protecting the baggage and closing with the enemy, produced a desultory struggle rather than a battle, which terminated a little before sunset, with the capture from the enemy of one gun and eleven tumbrils and ammunition carts. With cavalry, a long train of retreating artillery would have been secured. As usual, the want of depots or any means of commanding food made it impossible to follow up the victory. The surrender of Arni by treachery, the and capture of it by surprise or force, being now deemed hopeless, Sir Eyre Coote moved against the enemy on the 4th; but Hyder, having no wish for a new encounter, easily eluded it, and even succeeded by an ambuscade in cutting off 166 Europeans, and capturing fifty-four horses and two guns. This achievement so elated him after his recent defeats, that on his return to camp he ordered a salute, as a demonstration of victory. Climate and fatigue had produced so much sickness among the Europeans, that Sir Eyre Coote deemed it necessary again to retire. After halting four days at Wandiwash to refresh, he resumed his march, and on the 18th of June arrived in the vicinity of Madras.

Vellore was again in extremity, and the commandant had intimated his inability to hold out beyond the 1st of July. Sir Eyre Coote having declared that no relief could be obtained from the army, Lord Macartney taxed his own ingenuity, and devised a scheme which owed its success to its extreme improbability. While Hyder's attention was occupied with the move-

ments subsequent to the battle of Arni, his lordship prepared a convoy of 500 bullocks, 24 carts, and 2,000 coolies, loaded with provisions, and gave them an escort of 100 irregular sepoy, under the command of an ensign. They moved on the 6th of June to the skirts of the hills, and being there joined by a detachment of 1,500 polygars, succeeded by forced marches in depositing the convoy safe in Vellore. Hyder, who had not even suspected the movement, took the only revenge in his power, by intercepting the escort and compelling it to surrender at discretion.

M. Suffrein had set his heart on the possession of Nagapatam, as the best depot for the future operations of his countrymen, and took the first opportunity of bringing his squadron before it. Sir Edward Hughes immediately sailed from Madras to encounter him. The strength of the fleets was nearly equal, and the battle which took place proved indecisive. The French, however, so far acknowledged defeat that they abandoned their designs on Nagapatam. They were never able to resume them, as the Madras government, by a very doubtful policy, without consulting Sir Eyre Coote, caused the place to be destroyed. After the action of Nagapatam the British admiral made preparations for the revictualling of Trincomali. Before he could reach it M. Suffrein had anticipated him. At an appointed rendezvous on the coast of Ceylon he had obtained a reinforcement of two ships of the line, a frigate, and eight transports full of troops, and hastened off to Trincomali, where he landed 2,400 men, and pushed the siege with so much vigour as to induce a speedy surrender. The captors were scarcely in possession when Sir Edward Hughes made his appearance, and had the mortification to see the French colours flying as well on shore as in the roads. The French fleet now mustered fifteen sail of the line; the British, with only twelve, did not hesitate to meet them, and another battle was fought without capture. The British fleet returned to Madras before proceeding to Bombay to refit; the French fleet to Cuddalore, where it landed the troops and military stores which had been received in transports. M. Suffrein afterwards sailed back to Trincomali, but deemed its shelter so imperfect, that he took shelter during the monsoon at Acheen in Sumatra. On the 15th of October, the day on

which he left Cuddalore, a hurricane drove the British fleet from Madras Roads, and destroyed a great number of country ships laden with grain, intended to avert an impending famine.

The subsequent operations of the campaign were of a desultory character. Hyder's attention was chiefly directed to his detachments in Malabar. The French, too feeble to act separately, obeyed their instructions by acting on the defensive. Sir Eyre Coote, estimating their military prowess perhaps above its real worth, was more than usually cautious, and attempted nothing more important than the relief of Vellore, which he effected in August, by supplying it with provisions sufficient to last till the 1st of March, 1783. In the course of the campaign Hyder made some approaches to negotiation, through Colonel Braithwaite, who was a prisoner in his camp. He afterwards sent an envoy to the British camp, without giving him any definite proposals. Nothing can prove more strikingly the extent to which the quarrel between the civil and military authorities had been carried, than the fact that when Lord Macartney made official inquiries concerning the nature of Hyder's communications, Sir Eyre Coote declined to satisfy him. This was a state of matters which could not last; and accordingly, Sir Eyre Coote, on the plea of declining health—a plea for which, unfortunately, there was only too good foundation—resigned his command to Major-general Stuart, an officer who was next him in seniority, and had lost a leg at the battle of Pollilore.

On the Malabar coast, the relief of Tellicherry by Major Abington, and the destruction of the Mysorean army under Sirdar Khan, in January, 1782, had been followed by the reduction of Calicut, and the arrival of 1,000 men from Bombay under Colonel Humberstone, who, as senior officer, having assumed the command of the whole troops, including those under Major Abington, and been joined by a body of Nairs anxious to throw off Hyder's yoke, moved about twenty miles south of Calicut, and near Tricalore came in contact with the detachment under Mukhdom Ali. An action took place on a site which the Mysorean general had injudiciously chosen, and the result was that he lost his own life, and more than 1,500 of his troops were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. After an unavailing pursuit of the fleeing enemy, Colonel Humberstone

turned southward, intending to attempt the capture of Palghatcherri, situated on an affluent of the Ponani, about sixty miles from the town of that name, at its mouth, and sixty-eight miles south-east of Calicut. A violent storm, which dispersed his boats, spoiling the provisions carried in them, and damaged his ammunition, frustrated his design, and he marched his troops to the towns of Tannur and Ponani. The enemy rallied at Ramgerri, a place to the eastward, nearly equidistant from these two towns, and becoming troublesome, were attacked and defeated with the loss of two guns. The state of the weather induced Colonel Humberstone to seek better shelter, and he returned to pass the monsoon at Calicut. His force had been intended to reinforce the Madras army, but as circumstances had led to his landing at Calicut, Sir Eyre Coote, though disappointed, placed him under the orders of the Bombay government, and strongly recommended such a powerful diversion in the west, as might have the effect of obliging Hyder to move in that direction. Before this could be effected Colonel Humberstone was again in motion, to execute his favourite design on Palghatcherri. The Ponani allowed his stores to be carried thirty miles inland by boats. At Ramgerri, of which he had obtained possession, he left his battering train and heavy equipments in charge of a battalion of sepoys, and marched with eight light pieces and the remainder of his force to reconnoitre at Palghatcherri, before undertaking to attack it. He found it far stronger than he supposed; and while returning westward to the ground he had first occupied near the place, was attacked by a sortie of the garrison, which cost him nearly the whole of his provisions, and produced a panic among the Nairs. He fell back on a small place called Mangaricotta, but did not reach it before he had sustained a formidable attack, and suffered most severely from rains, which fell from the 21st to the 24th of October, with as much severity as during any period of the monsoon. He was still at Mangaricotta on the 10th of November, when he received orders from Bombay to return to the coast. He marched without delay, but must have been much retarded, as it was the 20th of November when he reached Ponani, closely followed by Tipu and Lally, who, with a superior force, had been endeavouring by forced marches to overtake him.

Colonel Macleod, sent by Sir Eyre Coote, having previously arrived, immediately assumed the command, and began to strengthen his position at Ponani by some field-works. Before these were finished, Tipu made a bold and determined attack upon them before day, but was repulsed at the point of the bayonet. This unsuccessful attack cost the Mysoreans 100 killed and about 1,000 wounded. The British loss is killed and wounded, was eighty-seven, of whom nearly a half were Europeans. On the 20th of November, the day succeeding this attack, Sir Edward Hughes, making the voyage to Bombay, came in sight of Ponani, and on learning the state of affairs offered either to embark the troops or leave a reinforcement of 450 Europeans. Colonel Macleod preferred the latter and was able thereafter to muster in all 800 Europeans, 1,000 sepoys, and 1,200 peons of Travancore. Tipu, after his repulse, retired to some distance, to await the arrival of his heavy equipments, and resume the attack on Ponani. Suddenly, on the 12th December, the light troops, which had continued to watch the British position, became invisible, and subsequent reports made it certain that the whole Mysorean troops were moving eastward by forced marches. Hyder was dead.

This event, which had been preceded by a marked decline of health, was immediately caused by a disease of a rather singular nature. The first indication of it is a swelling behind the neck, or the upper portion of the back, and it is hence named by the Muhammedans, *sertan* or *kercheng*, "the crab," from an imaginary resemblance of the swelling to the figure of that animal; while the Hindus call it *raj-pora*, "the royal sore or boil," from its being supposed to be peculiar to persons of rank. Hindu, Muhammedan, and French physicians tried in vain to arrest its progress, and Hyder expired in the camp on the 7th of December, 1782. His two leading ministers, the Brahmins Purnea and Kishen Rao, when his recovery became improbable, had agreed to conceal the death, as the only means by which they could keep the army together, until the arrival of Tipu. They accordingly placed the body in a large chest filled with *abeer*, a powder composed of various fragrant substances, and sent it off in the same way as valuable plunder was wont to be sent off to Seringapatam. The confidential servants

who accompanied it, were ordered to deposit it in the tomb of Hyder's father at Colar, where it remained till it was afterwards removed to a splendid mausoleum in the capital. Successive couriers having been despatched to intimate the event to Tipu, all the business of the state and of the camp went on as usual in the name of Hyder. The principal officers of the army and the foreign envoys made their daily inquiries, and were assured that although extremely weak he was slowly recovering. The real fact, however, began to be whispered, and two ambitious chiefs conspired to give the nominal sovereignty to Abdul-Karim, Hyder's second son, who was of weak intellect, while they should retain the real power in their own hands; but this conspiracy was so quickly and effectually put down, that the deception was still kept up. On the sixteenth day after Hyder's death, when the army began to march in the direction by which Tipu was expected, the royal palanquin with the accustomed retinue issued at the usual hour and due silence was maintained, not to disturb the illustrious patient supposed to be within. A few marches brought the army to Chucklamur on the Pennar, which had been selected as the place of rendezvous, because it was nearly equidistant from Cuddalore and the Changama Pass, and was thus conveniently situated for communicating both with the east and the west.

Tipu received his first despatches on the 11th, and was in full march the next morning. His arrival in the camp took place on the 2nd of January, 1783. In the evening he gave audience to all the principal officers, receiving them seated on a plain carpet, because he wished it to be understood that grief would not yet allow him to ascend the musnud. This affectation deceived no one, and was soon laid aside. The Mysorean army at the time of Hyder's death, exclusive of garrisons and provincial troops, mustered about 90,000 men; the amount in the treasury at Seringapatam was three crores of rupees (£3,000,000 sterling) in cash, besides accumulated plunder in jewels and valuables, to such an extent as almost defied computation.

Shortly after Tipu's arrival, he was joined by a French force, consisting of 900 Europeans, 250 Caffres and Topasses, 2,000 sepoys, and 22 pieces of artillery. The course of operations to be pursued was forthwith discussed. The French proposed that

the capture of Madras should first be attempted, but Tipu took advantage of the non-arrival of M. Bussy, in whose absence the French, as they had themselves repeatedly declared, were restricted to defensive operations. His plan, therefore, was to leave a respectable division of his army under Seyed Sahib, to co-operate with M. Bussy as soon as he should arrive, and be prepared to assume the offensive, and to set out with the remainder of his army to the west, where the diversion made by the British and their rapid successes demanded all his attention. Before following him on this expedition, and giving a narrative of the events which led to it, it will be necessary to return to the Coromandel coast, and attend to some extraordinary proceedings in which the civil and military authorities of the Madras presidency took opposite sides.

As soon as Hyder's death was rumoured, the Madras government urged General Stuart, their new commander-in-chief, to take advantage of the confusion which it might be expected to produce in the enemy's camp, more especially in the absence of the heir-apparent, and march immediately to the scene of action, even though his preparations should not be complete. The answer he returned was that "he did not believe that Hyder was dead, and, if he were, the army would be ready for every action in proper time." A few days after, when the rumour was converted into certainty, and there was reason to believe that the anticipated confusion in the enemy's camp was in some measure realized, the government repeated their urgency, and were answered by an expression of astonishment that "there could be so little reflection as to talk of undertakings against the enemy." These answers were neither courteous nor reasonable, as General Stuart had previously declared, that "upon any real emergency the army might and must move, and would be ready to do so." The truth is, that in being appointed commander-in-chief, he meant to imitate Sir Eyre Coote, and as unskilful imitators often do, stretched his claims to prerogative even farther than that distinguished general, with all the extraordinary powers conferred upon him, ventured to carry them. His idea was, that in the management of the army he was entitled to exercise his own judgment, and was not bound to listen to instructions from any quarter. He was a

king's officer, the Company was only a trading corporation; and he made no secret of his opinion, that though they were his paymasters he was not at all accountable to them, at least in regard to the troops belonging to the crown. In opposition to these extravagant views, Lord Macartney lodged a minute, in which he justly observed— "His majesty has been graciously pleased to send out troops to the assistance of the Company; he has expressly declared them to be for their service, and they are actually in their pay. The king has formed regulations for their interior discipline, and has reserved to himself to fill up the vacancies which may happen in them; but how they are to be employed, and when and where their services are to be performed, must depend on those whom they are sent to serve. The authority to conduct all military operations lodged in the Company's representatives, cannot be separated from the authority over the troops which are to execute them." In another part of the same minute, he says, "The commander-in-chief of your forces, in addition to the power and influence which that station confers, asserts and maintains, in a separate capacity, an independent authority over the king's troops, which now constitute the principal strength of your army, and avows obedience to another authority, superior and preferable to that which he owes to your representatives. We conceive that there is but a slight transition from refusal to employ the king's troops upon a requisition from the civil government, to the employing them without a requisition; and we submit to you to what uses such an authority might be applied and where the consequence might end." The soundness of this argument is unquestionable. The practical application of it, however, is not without difficulty, and it may be questioned whether Lord Macartney did not push it to an extreme, when, in the exercise of his "authority to direct all military operations," he proffered military advice to Sir Eyre Coote, and directed some other operations of which an account remains to be given.

General Stuart, who had rashly and thrasonically pledged himself, that "upon any real emergency the army might and must move, and would be ready to do so," was not able or did not choose to put it in motion till the 15th of January, 1783, exactly thirteen days after Tipu had arrived in the camp, and

been peaceably proclaimed. Even then he only moved with provisions to the intermediate depot of Tripassore, and did not fairly start on the campaign till three weeks later, when of course all the advantages which might have been taken of Hyder's death had been thrown away. This campaign Lord Macartney undertook to direct, and, as might have been anticipated from his professional ignorance, did not direct wisely. He had already, contrary to the advice of Sir Eyre Coote, demolished Nagapatam, and now proceeded, contrary to the same advice, but with the concurrence of his new commander-in-chief, to demolish the two forts of Carangoly and Wandiwash. This system of demolition was adopted on the ground that these places could not be successfully defended, and yet no sooner were they destroyed than the folly of the proceeding became apparent. On Tipu's departure to the west they were in no danger from the enemy, and would on the contrary have furnished important bases for future operations, defensive and aggressive. The greater part of February, devoted to these demolitions, was thus spent in doing mischief. The only instance in which a better spirit was manifested was in the vicinity of Wandiwash, where General Stuart offered battle to the united forces of the French and the Mysoreans, and they declined it. The only operation of any consequence in March, was the re-victualling of Vellore. This was effected without interruption, as Tipu had already ascended the western passes, after having destroyed the works of Arcot, and every other post of any consequence, except Arni, which was left as a depot for the division of troops left behind under Seyed Sahib.

During the absence of Sir Edward Hughes at Bombay, M. Suffrein had, on the 19th of January, 1783, made his appearance at the head of the Bay of Bengal, and captured a large number of vessels laden with rice for Madras, which was now suffering all the horrors of famine. Fortunately a still larger number of vessels had previously been despatched, but their supplies, though sufficient for the army, left little surplus for a crowded population, largely increased beyond its usual amount by fugitives driven in from the surrounding country by Hyder's devastations. It was therefore necessary to have recourse to

the extreme measure of expelling the great mass of the natives, and sending them northwards, chiefly to Nellore, where the ravages of war had not been felt. The misery thus inflicted must have been great, but appears to have been far less than was endured by those whom they left behind. Burke's description, in continuance of the passage already quoted from his celebrated speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, is believed not to be overdrawn:—"The alms of the settlement, in this dreadful exigency, were certainly liberal, and all was done by charity that private charity could do; but it was a people in beggary—it was a nation which stretched out its hands for food. For months together these creatures of sufferance, whose very excess and luxury in their most plenteous days had fallen short of the allowance of our austere fasts, silent, patient, resigned, without sedition or disturbance, almost without complaint, perished by a hundred a day in the streets of Madras; every day seventy at least laid their bodies in the streets, or on the glacis of Tanjore, and expired of famine in the granary of India."

Had M. Suffrein, in proceeding southwards, looked into Madras, matters would have been still worse, for he could not have failed to capture or destroy a great number of provision and other merchant ships; but partly from dread of Sir Edward Hughes, who might possibly be anchored there on his return from Bombay, and partly in the hope of finding M. Bussy at Trincomali, the place of rendezvous, he hastened on for that port. Here he was joined by M. Bussy with the last reinforcements from the Isle of France, in the beginning of March, and immediately set sail for Cuddalore. Having landed the troops and their long-expected commander, he returned to Trincomali to refit, and on the evening of the 10th of April, a few hours after entering its harbour, had the mortification to see Sir Edward Hughes with his fleet pursuing their course to Madras. M. Bussy must have been still more mortified when he found, that in consequence of the capture of convoys by the British, and the departure of one of his regiments, under M. Cossigny, for the west with Tipu, how miserably short his whole force fell of his original calculations. The Madras government were of course proportionably elated, and immediately on the

arrival of Sir Edward Hughes, determined to lose no time in carrying out their long-meditated attack on Cuddalore. All this time there was an immediate expectation of the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote. He had improved in health, obtained powers adequate to his wishes from the governor and council of Bengal, as the supreme government, and had announced his approaching return to resume the command. For this purpose he embarked with a large supply of money in the Company's armed ship *Resolution*, and towards the end of the voyage, was chased for two days by some French ships of the line. His agitation and anxiety, which kept him on deck night and day, were too much for a frame broken down both by age and disease, and he died on the 28th of April, two days after the vessel had safely reached Madras. Grief for the loss of so distinguished a soldier could not but be universal, and was fully manifested by all classes; but it has been said that the melancholy event was the means of preventing a collision which might have been attended with serious consequences. Lord Macartney, who, on Sir Eyre Coote's departure, had assumed the full exercise of what he conceived to be his legal powers, was not disposed to place them again in abeyance, and had resolved to contest the right of the supreme council to confer something like a military dictatorship on any individual, however eminent, within the limits of the Madras presidency. The death of Sir Eyre Coote rendered it unnecessary to decide this very important question, but the known determination of Lord Macartney to have raised it, probably increased the marked estrangement which had already taken place between his lordship and the governor-general, and of which some striking manifestations will yet be seen.

On the 21st of April, five days before Sir Eyre Coote's arrival, General Stuart, who had returned with his army to the vicinity of Madras, commenced his march towards Cuddalore. From the state of feeling between him and the governor, little harmony was to be expected, and accordingly we find his lordship complaining that the army had occupied forty days, at the average of less than three miles a day, in performing the distance of twelve ordinary marches, and the general sneering at theory, and declaring that he had advanced as fast as was practically compatible with his means of trans-

port. The fort of Cuddalore forms a quadrangle of unequal sides, inclosed by an indifferent rampart and ditch. Each angle has a bastion, but there are no outworks, except an advanced one at the north-east. Woody heights, called the Bandapollam Hills, embrace the western face and south-western angle at varying distances from two to four miles, the intervening space being occupied by rice fields. About a mile and a half to the north are the ruins of Fort St. David, situated on a peninsula formed by a small stream and the mouth of the Pennar. Along the eastern face runs an estuary, leaving a narrow strip of land between it and the sea. General Stuart, after arriving within a march of Cuddalore, made a circuit behind the Bandapollam Hills, and took up a position about two miles south, with his left resting on them, his centre fronting the north, and his right towards the estuary. M. Bussy took up an intermediate position between the British and Cuddalore, with his left on the estuary, and his right thrown a little back, so as to rest on a gentle eminence where the rice fields commenced.

The British, who had arrived on the 7th of June, were employed till the 13th in arranging the landing of stores and other preparations preliminary to more serious operations. M. Bussy was meanwhile active in strengthening his position by means of field-works. These becoming more and more formidable every day, it was determined in a council of war to attack them, and Colonel Kelly, at the head of a division, set out on the 13th, long before daylight, to turn the extreme right of some subsidiary works extending across the rice fields, now dry, to the Bandapollam Hills, and occupied by Mysoreans. These scarcely waited the attack, which was made between four and five o'clock, and fled leaving seven guns behind them. Subsequently, about half-past eight o'clock, a body of grenadiers under Colonel Cathcart, and the pickets under Colonel Stuart of the 78th, attempted, in combination with the troops under Colonel Kelly, to turn the right of the main position, but were received with such a fire of grape and musketry, that Colonel Stuart, who commanded the attack, found it necessary after heavy loss to desist and place his men under cover. The greatest resistance from the enemy had been experienced at a salient work on the right of his main position, and a third attack to

carry it and the trenches adjoining was made by two columns sent forward for that purpose under Colonel Bruce. The troops moved forward under a still heavier fire than that which the second attack had encountered, and one flank company of the 101st actually penetrated within the trenches. Unfortunately they were not supported as they ought to have been by the remainder of their regiment, and were driven back, with the whole column to which they belonged, amid frightful carnage, the French, besides plying them with grape and musketry, issuing forth from their trenches and charging them with fury. Colonel Stuart, who had been watching his opportunity, seized the moment when the enemy, in the eagerness of pursuit, had bared their works of defenders, and by a determined attack carried everything before him. He had driven the French right upon its centre, and gained possession of nearly a half of the line of works, when his progress was arrested by fresh troops and superior numbers. He was able, however, to retire slowly to a position now strengthened by the works which he had carried, and his success was evinced, not more by the capture of thirteen guns and of the key of the contested position, than by the retirement of the French during the night within the walls of Cuddalore. The whole affair had been most sanguinary. Though only a comparatively small portion of both armies was engaged, the British computed their loss at 1,016; that of the French was probably a third less.

On the same day when this affair took place, M. Suffrein made his appearance in the offing, and Sir Edward Hughes, who was anchored near Porto Novo, eleven miles to the southward, advanced to prevent the communication of the enemy's fleet with the besieged. The British fleet was suffering dreadfully from scurvy. From the 2nd of May to the 7th of June, 1,120 men, and in the course of another fortnight, about 1,700 more were rendered unfit for duty. In point of ships Sir Edward Hughes was superior, for he had seventeen ships carrying 1,202 guns, whereas M. Suffrein had only twelve ships carrying 1,018. Crippled as he was by the absence of so many effective men, Sir Edward Hughes was scarcely a match for his antagonist, but seems to have regarded it as a point of honour not to decline the challenge. On the 16th he weighed

for the purpose of bringing the enemy to close action, but somehow or other, owing either to better fortune, or superior manoeuvring, M. Suffrein was seen as soon as the morning of the 17th dawned, riding at anchor off Cuddalore, while the British fleet, which on the previous day occupied the same anchorage, had entirely disappeared. The blockade of Cuddalore, on which the British army had calculated, was thus raised; but this advantage, great as it was, did not satisfy M. Bussy, who, calculating on the interval that must elapse before the besiegers, who had begun to make regular approaches, could threaten an assault, stripped his garrison of 1,200 men and sent them on board the fleet, in the hope that M. Suffrein would thus have little difficulty in obtaining some advantage which would effectually cripple his antagonist. Deducting from the British fleet the men lost to it, at least temporarily, by scurvy, and adding to the French fleet Bussy's reinforcement, their relative strength, compared with what it was on the 2nd of May, gave a balance against the former, and in favour of the latter, of not less than 3,000 men. After a series of manoeuvres the fleets met on the 20th, and an action took place. The British admiral wished to come to close quarters; the French admiral avoided it, and kept up a distant cannonade which served his purpose better, and cost his antagonist in the course of three hours, 532 men. Night separated the combatants. On the following morning Sir Edward Hughes would still have renewed the fight, but on finding that only another distant cannonade was intended, and that his fleet had already suffered so severely as to be completely crippled and in a most inefficient state, he was obliged to adopt the mortifying resolution of sailing away for the roads of Madras, and least at leave the name of victory to his antagonist, who, on the 23rd, resumed his anchorage off Cuddalore and landed, not only the reinforcement lent him, but aid from the fleet to the amount of 2,400 men.

M. Bussy now feeling his strength, made a vigorous sortie with his best troops. It took place on the morning of the 25th, while it was still quite dark, but was repulsed with the loss to the French of about 450 men, and scarcely any loss at all to British. Among the wounded prisoners was a young French sergeant, whose interesting appearance attracted the attention

of Colonel Wangenheim, in command of the Hanoverian troops, who ordered him to be taken to his own tents, where he was kindly treated till his recovery and release. Many years after, when the French army under Bernadotte, the future King of Sweden, entered Hanover, Colonel (now General) Wangenheim attended his levee. On being presented, Bernadotte thus accosted him, "You have served, I understand, in India?" "Yes." "At Cuddalore?" "Yes." "Do you recollect of taking a wounded sergeant under your protection?" The circumstance had escaped General Wangenheim's memory, but after a little he recollected it, and said, "He was a very fine young man, and I should like to hear of his welfare." "I was myself that young man," rejoined Bernadotte, "and will omit no means within my power of testifying my gratitude."

The force under General Stuart had never been adequate to the siege of Cuddalore. After M. Bussy's reinforcement from the fleet, the besieged outnumbered the besiegers, who were gradually wasting away by casualties and sickness, while their labours were continually increasing. They had never been able to invest the place, and could not be said to possess an inch of ground beyond that on which they were encamped. General Stuart, shortly after setting out for Cuddalore, had sent orders to Colonel Fullarton, who was employed with a force south of the Coleroon, to cross that river for the purpose of joining him, should the course of the siege render it expedient. He had also repeatedly and urgently demanded succours from Madras, but obtaining no answer, and having learned that his order to Colonel Fullarton had been countermanded, he intimated his belief that the government had abandoned him to his fate, and his determination to abide the result. It could not have been long doubtful. Bussy was not the man to allow himself to be cooped up within walls by an inferior force, and had determined to attack the British in their camp. "The retreat of the English army, with the loss of its battering train and equipments, is" says Colonel Wilks, "the most favourable result that could possibly have been anticipated from a continuation of hostilities." Fortunately at this very crisis, hostilities ceased in consequence of the arrival of a frigate from Madras bearing a flag of truce, and having on board commissioners deputed by that

government to intimate to M. Bussy that peace was concluded between Great Britain and France.

On the Malabar coast and in several other districts of the west, various operations had taken place subsequent to Tipu's sudden departure, on receiving intimation of his father's death. The Bombay government, on hearing of Colonel Humberstone's retreat to Ponani, and Tipu's appearance before that place in full force, determined to despatch their commander in-chief, Brigadier-general Matthews, to its relief, with as many troops as could be immediately embarked, and to reinforce him as speedily as possible with other troops. At Goa, General Matthews, having learned that Ponani was no longer in danger, resolved to make a descent at Rajahmundrug, situated at the mouth of the Mirji, and about fifteen miles N.N.W. of Honawar or Onore, situated at the mouth of the Honawar. Could he succeed in capturing these two places, he would be able to command the whole of the fertile country between the two rivers; he would secure his rear and obtain supplies for his army during a meditated advance on Bednore, which, though originally Maratha territory, was now incorporated with Hyder's other conquests. Rajahmundrug was easily carried by assault, and the ships were despatched to Ponani for the force there, now commanded by Colonel Macleod. Shortly after his arrival, Honawar was also taken, and along with it five ships of war of fifty to sixty-four guns, and many others of smaller dimensions, forming part of the fleet which it had been one great object of Hyder's ambition to construct.

Intelligence of Hyder's death having meanwhile reached Bombay, that government sent positive orders to General Matthews, if the intelligence should prove true, to relinquish all other operations, and "make an immediate push to take possession of Bednore." At this very time he was pursuing a safe plan for making "a push" at Bednore. The fall of Honawar and Rajahmundrug had secured his rear, as well as a fertile district from which he could draw supplies; and he was preparing for the capture of Mirji or Mirjan, which would have opened a way to Bednore by the passes of Bilguy. On receiving the *positive orders*, he resolved to obey them to the very letter, though disclaiming all responsibility for consequences, and declaring that

the force at his disposal was totally inadequate to the task assigned it. Precipitately abandoning his own plans, he embarked his troops, and sailing southward, landed at Kundapur as the nearest point to Bednore. After capturing Kundapur with some difficulty, in consequence of the resistance of a small field-force forming part of the detachments sent by Hyder from Coromandel, he started for the mountains, but with such imperfect means of conveyance, that the twenty-five miles of low country intervening between them and the coast occupied three days. The ascent of the Ghats, forming a rugged acclivity of seven miles, presented more serious difficulties. But they yielded one after another; and General Matthews found himself, on the 27th of January, 1783, in the possession of the fort of Hydergarh on the top of the Ghats, though it mounted twenty-five pieces of cannon, was well constructed, and had outworks defended by 17,000 men. In taking this place, his loss in killed and wounded amounted only to about fifty. Bednore or Hydernagar was still fourteen miles distant, but it yielded still more easily than the hill-forts. Sheik Ayaz, or Hyat Sahib, as he was usually called, after retiring into the citadel with only 1,350 men, sent Captain Donald Campbell, who had been taken prisoner, to propose terms. These were, "to deliver the fort and country, and to remain under the English as he (Sheik Ayaz) was under the nabob (Hyder)." The terms were of course agreed to, and the conquest of Bednore was completed.

General Matthews, unable to account for his astonishing success, breaks out, in his official despatch, dated 28th January, 1783, into the following exclamation:—"To what can it be owing, but to the divine will, that my army, without provisions or musket ammunition, should have our wants supplied as we advanced; for without the enemy's rice, and powder and ball, we must have stopped until the army could be furnished!" Having thus very properly attributed his success to its primary cause, he deems it necessary, notwithstanding, to consider how far it may have been produced by the instrumentality of secondary causes, and finds none worthy of mention, except "panic." It never seems to have occurred to him, that he was at least as much indebted to treachery. Sheik Ayaz stood high in the favour of Hyder, and for this reason was hated by Tipu, who

had no sooner secured his succession, than he sent a secret order to the officer next in authority to Ayaz, to put him to death and assume the government. Ayaz intercepted the order, and immediately made arrangements for surrendering to the British. This was the real cause of the success which seemed to General Matthews so mysterious. The surrender of Bednore was followed by that of most of its dependencies. Among these was Anantpur, situated about twenty-five miles N.N.E. of the capital, and thirty miles north-west of Shimoga. Its garrison and inhabitants had sent in their submission, and a British detachment was marching to take possession of it, when Lutf Ali Beg, one of Tipu's officers at Shimoga, learning how matters stood, despatched 300 peons under a trusty officer to supersede the commandant, and keep possession of the place. The British troops, on approaching the place, sent forward a flag of truce. It was fired at, and in retaliation the British having immediately assaulted the place, and taken it, put the garrison to the sword. Still worse atrocities were laid to their charge; but Colonel Wilks, after a diligent use of "the ample means of inquiry within his reach," pronounces the tragical tale of 400 beautiful women "all bleeding with the wounds of the bayonet, and either already dead or expiring in each other's arms," to be in all its parts "destitute of every foundation in truth."

On the 9th of March, Mangalore, situated on the coast about fifty-five miles S.S.W. of Bednore, surrendered. General Matthews, who had descended to direct the operations of the siege, and paid a visit to Bombay, where, instead of the former *positive orders*, only general instructions for his guidance were given him, returned to Bednore to defend his new conquests, which were seriously threatened. Large bodies of the enemy were constantly arriving from Coromandel, while the largest force which he could bring into the field amounted only to 400 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys. Good reason, therefore, had he for urging the necessity of large reinforcements, and declaring that without them, "it would be a miracle if he could preserve his footing." Tipu was advancing with his whole army, and Sheik Ayaz, foreseeing the result, disappeared, to seek an asylum at Bombay. On approaching Bednore, Tipu divided his forces into two columns. The one, proceeding by the southern route of Couly

Drug, took possession of Hydergarh, and thus cut off all communication with the coast; the other, taking the north-eastern route, proceeded directly to Bednore, and completely invested it. A general assault followed, and the British, after attempting a defence to which their force was inadequate, retired, after serious loss, to the citadel. Having defended it till it was a heap of ruins, General Matthews, in accordance with the opinion of a council of war, offered to surrender on certain terms, to which Tipu agreed, induced, as he himself says, by the short interval which remained for the recovery of Mangalore before the rains. The terms included several articles, one of which guaranteed the safe conduct of the garrison to the coast, and another provided for the security of private and the surrender of public property. Unfortunately, a rapacity, of which too many examples had previously been given, prevailed over a sense of honour and even of self-preservation. In order to appropriate the sum in the treasury, which now belonged of right to Tipu, the officers of the garrison were told to draw for what sums they pleased, to be afterwards accounted for at Bombay. In this way the treasury was fraudulently emptied. The garrison marched out, in terms of the capitulation, on the 3rd of May, 1783. Tipu, who only wanted a pretext for violating the capitulation, found too good a one in the example thus set him by the prisoners. On being searched, the missing money was found upon them, and instead of being furnished with safe conduct to the coast, they were marched off in irons to various places of imprisonment. Bednore and its dependencies were thus lost as easily as they had been won; and Tipu, who had not before sat on the musnud, gave public audience upon it, and ordered a salute to be fired in honour of this his first victory.

Tipu, without loss of time, proceeded to Mangalore. A considerable force, which he had previously sent forward under Lutf Ali Beg, had been defeated with the loss of its guns, and he therefore now advanced at the head of his whole army. The defence of Mangalore devolved on Major (afterwards Colonel) Campbell of the 42nd. The enemy arrived before it on the 20th, and immediately invested it. The garrison endeavoured, notwithstanding, to keep possession of an outpost about a mile from the town, because it commanded the principal access to it.

The two battalions necessary to occupy it were in consequence attacked, after their retreat had been almost cut off, and with the utmost difficulty and considerable loss made their escape. This first success, and the overpowering force which he commanded, made Tipu confident of an early triumph. He soon found his mistake. His flag of truce, demanding an instant surrender, was dismissed without an answer, and he was obliged to have recourse to a regular siege. In this he was greatly assisted by the professional skill and experience of M. Cossigny, the commander of the French regiment which had been lent him. Three regular attacks embraced the faces of the fort accessible by land, and produced not so much breaches as continuous masses of ruin, while attempts at assault were repeated and repelled so often, as to become almost an affair of daily routine.

On the 19th of July, after fifty-six days of open trenches, Colonel Campbell received a letter, signed "Peveron de Morlay, envoy from France to the nabob Tipu Sultan," informing him that hostilities had ceased at Cuddalore, in consequence of the peace concluded between Britain and France, and that he was in possession of a letter which he was enjoined by Tipu to deliver to him in person. This letter from the British commissioners, Messrs. Sadlier and Staunton, had been delivered to M. Bussy for transmission on the 2nd of July, and must in all probability have arrived in the camp at Mangalore before the possession of it was thus acknowledged. During these ten days the besiegers had made the most vigorous efforts to make themselves masters of the place. That Peveron de Morlay was capable of this deceitful and dishonourable conduct was proved on subsequent occasions. Nothing could exceed Tipu's astonishment and rage, when M. Cossigny intimated that he could give him no further aid, and also compelled the French officers, Lally and Boudenot, to follow his example. By the treaty of peace which Tipu would now be under the necessity of concluding, a general restitution of conquests would take place, and consequently Mangalore would return to him without an effort. His dogged obstinacy, and his indignation at having been so long foiled, made him overlook this fact, or disregard it, and he determined to persist in the siege. Under cover of the arrangements for admitting M. Peveron to deliver his letter, a body of troops

landed, and gained possession of a detached work which commanded the entrance of the harbour, and though an armistice with Tipu was concluded on the 2nd of August, he continued every operation short of actual assault with renewed vigour. By the third article of the armistice a bazaar was to be established, where the garrison might buy provisions to the extent of eight days' stock at a time, and articles not furnished by the bazaar might freely enter from other places, to the extent of a month's supply. This article was shamefully evaded, and the garrison, instead of being fully supplied, were reduced to the point of starvation.

A fortnight after the armistice, Brigadier-general Macleod, holding the chief command of Malabar and Canara, and on the following day, a detachment of Hanoverians from Madras, destined to reinforce Mangalore, arrived in the offing. The general landed, and took up his residence in the town, but the detachment was ordered off to Tellicherry. Meanwhile, in consequence of the evasion of the articles of the armistice relating to provisions, the stock of the garrison had been so far diminished, that Tipu, who had been amusing both General Macleod and Colonel Campbell with the announcement of his immediate departure for Seringapatam, thought he had secured the object at which he had all along been aiming, and threw off the mask. In open defiance of the armistice, he declared that the garrison should no longer be supplied with provisions, and immediately commenced repairing his old works, and erecting new batteries. The garrison, from having previously converted into fuel all the materials which might have been available for military purposes, could not retaliate. General Macleod, when he remonstrated, was only told that he was at liberty to depart. He gladly availed himself of the permission, and sailed for Tellicherry to collect means for relieving the garrison.

On the 22nd of November, a fleet from the north and another from the south were descried standing for the roads. The garrison were overjoyed. Surely relief was now at hand. "The signal was made," says Colonel Campbell, "that the troops would land to the southward; they were discovered in the boats; every moment promised a speedy attack. Confidence and joy appeared in every countenance; even the poor, weak,

emaciated convalescent, tottering under the weight of his firelock, boldly stood forth to offer what feeble aid his melancholy state admitted of." All this expectation was most grievously disappointed. General Macleod, instead of carrying out what seemed to be his original intentions, became entangled in a negotiation with Tipu, and the result was, that after stipulating for a month's supply of provisions to the garrison, without taking care to see that it was properly furnished, he sailed away on the 2nd of December, with the signal flying, of "speedy succour arriving." Sea-scurvy now began to make great havoc among the garrison, who, on the 20th of December, were again put on short allowance. On the 27th, a vessel bearing General Macleod's flag, with a snow and five boats, appeared, and on the 31st, a supply of provisions was landed in Tipu's boats, but no intercourse was permitted between the vessels and the garrison. Only a small part of this supply proved fit for food. The scurvy of course continued to rage; two-thirds of the garrison were in hospital; a great number of the sepoys doing duty had become blind, the consequence, it was supposed, of being obliged to eat rice alone, without salt or any other condiment. Ultimately, on the 26th of January, 1784, Colonel Campbell, after calling a council of war, which deemed it hopeless or useless to resist any longer, capitulated on honourable terms. The only explanation which has ever been given of the shameful desertion of this brave garrison, is, that the preliminary articles of peace stipulated a term of four months to be allowed to the native belligerent powers of India to accede; and that the hostilities necessary to give succour to Mangalore might have been, or seemed to be, an infringement of these articles. There could not be a lamer excuse. The preliminary articles never could have meant, that during the four months indulged to one belligerent for the purpose of making up his mind, he was to be at liberty to make war, while his European antagonist was not to be at liberty to resist him, or, that after concluding an armistice, the native power might violate its obligations, while the European power should be bound to observe them.

The capture of Mangalore had cost Tipu dear. For nearly nine months it had locked up the services of his main army. It

had thus prevented him from realizing his revenues, and had moreover led to the invasion of one of his richest provinces. The events connected with this invasion must be briefly detailed. A Brahmin of the name of Tremalrao, who gave himself out as "the son of the minister of that Raja of Mysore who had been deposed by Hyder," having retired to Tanjore, ingratiated himself with the raja, and was by him through Mr. Swartz introduced to Mr. Sullivan, the resident there. He possessed considerable talents and acquirements, and showed himself to be well acquainted with the government and resources of Mysore. When it was resolved to make a diversion in the south and west, it seemed to Mr. Sullivan that important use might be made of Tremalrao, who professed to be in the confidence of the imprisoned Rani of Mysore, and that full employment might be given to Hyder, by setting up some member of the ancient family as a claimant of its throne. Colonel Lang, who commanded in the south, taking advantage of the departure of Tipu on his father's death, marched, accompanied by Tremalrao, and on the 2nd of April, 1783, obtained possession of the fort of Carur, situated on the eastern frontiers of Coimbatore. The Hindu colours of Mysore were immediately hoisted on the fort, and the management of the district was conferred on Tremalrao. Shortly after, Colonel Lang resigned the command to Colonel Fullarton, who was ordered to advance for the purpose of relieving the pressure on General Matthews at Bednore. His progress in this direction was stopped by General Stuart, who on the 31st of May sent positive orders to him to cross the Cauvery, and march with the utmost expedition towards Cuddalore. After some delay, he succeeded in crossing in basket-boats at Trichinopoly, but had no sooner reached the opposite bank than he received instructions so contradictory, as to place him in a dilemma. Those from General Stuart urged him to hasten on the Cuddalore; those from Lord Macartney ordered him to recross the river and proceed southward. Being a personal friend of Lord Macartney, and indebted to him for his command, his own feelings would have led him to comply with his lordship's wishes, but believing that his services were more required at Cuddalore, a sense of duty determined him to obey the general. He had accordingly arrived within three forced

marches of the British camp, when he received intelligence of the cessation of hostilities.

There was now nothing to prevent Colonel Fullarton from obeying Lord Macartney's orders, and he proceeded south, his numbers nearly doubled by a reinforcement from the army set free at Cuddalore. The armistice with Tipu reduced him for some time to inaction, but on the 16th of October, having received intelligence from Tellicherry of the violation of the armistice at Mangalore, he determined to assist in the relief of this place, by uniting his forces to those of General Macleod, who was understood to be making preparations for that purpose. As the best means of effecting this junction, Colonel Fullarton set out in the direction of Palghatcherri, and after a difficult and tedious route through the centre of a teak forest, arrived before that fortress, which owed its construction to Hyder, and was as strong as he could make it. The siege, vigorously conducted, terminated in the capture of the place, on the 15th of November. After communicating with Tellicherry, the proposed junction with General Macleod was deemed impracticable, or at least so difficult as to be inexpedient, and Colonel Fullarton determined to take the route to Seringapatam, by the pass of Gujelhutti. With this view he set out at the head of a force mustering 13,636 men, and arrived at Coimbatore on the 26th of November. On the 28th, two days before his intended advance, he received a letter from Messrs. Staunton and Sadlier, informing him that they were on their route as duly authorized plenipotentiaries to negotiate with Tipu, and directing him not only to suspend operations, but to abandon all his conquests and retire within the limits of the Company's possessions, as at the 26th of July preceding.

As early as February, 1783, before Tipu's departure for the west, Lord Macartney and his council had employed a Brahmin of the name of Sambaji, who was the Raja of Tanjore's agent at Madras, and was proceeding on his devotions to Conjeveram, to endeavour to sound Tipu on the subject of peace. Sambaji, proud of appearing as the British envoy, readily undertook the office, and Tipu, not unwilling to know on what terms he could command peace, directed a person named Srinowasnow to accompany Sambaji on his return to Madras. Some confer-

ences in consequence took place, but nothing was effected, and Tipu, on the return of his envoy for instructions, treated the whole matter with contemptuous silence. On the cessation of hostilities between the British and French at Cuddalore, on the 2nd of July, Lord Macartney, by agreement with M. Bussy, addressed a letter to Tipu, inviting him to accede to peace on certain provisional conditions, and announcing a cessation of hostilities till his answer should be received. Tipu returned a friendly answer, and sent it by a skilful diplomatist, Apaji Ram, whom he had appointed his envoy with the usual credentials. After much discussion, the principle of a mutual restitution of prisoners and conquests seemed to be established, but from time to time difficulties were started by Apaji Ram, and made by him a ground for suggesting, that the great delay occasioned by frequent references to Tipu, might be saved by sending to his court two gentlemen, so thoroughly acquainted with the views of the Madras government as to render reference unnecessary. The suggestion was at once adopted; and Mr. Sadlier, the second member of council, and Mr. Staunton, Lord Macartney's private secretary, were appointed commissioners. They set out on the 9th of November, fully anticipating the success of their mission, as Tipu had sent letters to the peshwa and Sindhia declaring his accession to the treaty of Salbai.

The commissioners arrived in the Mysorean camp near Arni, on the 19th of November, and the very next day despatched the above order to Colonel Fullarton. When it reached him, he was in possession of information that the armistice had been violated, and consequently knew that the commissioners must have issued their order under a very great misconception. He therefore adopted what seemed the only prudent course. He ceased from hostilities without giving up his conquests. Seyed Sahib, the commander of the Mysorean troops in the Carnatic, was found by the commissioners about twenty-five miles beyond Arni, and a discussion ensued as to the manner in which restoration should be made. They insisted that the places eastward of the Ghats should first be reciprocally restored, and all the English prisoners be set at liberty, and that then only a similar restitution of places west of the Ghats should take place. Seyed Sahib and Apaji Ram, on the other hand, insisted that the

evacuation of Mangalore should precede the release of the prisoners, and offered "to pledge their faith" that the evacuation should be immediately followed by the release. Here the commissioners differed. Mr. Sadlier was disposed to give up Mangalore and accept of "the pledge" as sufficient security, whereas Mr. Staunton was decidedly of opinion that, before giving up Mangalore and the other western conquests, they ought to be perfectly satisfied of the release of every prisoner. This difference made it necessary to refer to the government, who decided in favour of Mr. Staunton, and at the same time endeavoured to prevent future collision, by the appointment of Mr. Huddleston as a third plenipotentiary.

No sooner had the Madras government thus decided, that they began to deliberate anew, and on the 8th of December came to an opposite conclusion. Considering the distressed condition of their affairs—ruined finances, broken credit, and a supreme council not only withholding confidence, but supposed to be meditating suspension—they thought it not worth while to continue the war for the possession of Mangalore, and resolved that Colonel Fullarton should be required to make unqualified restitution, as previously ordered by the commissioners. Thus left without any alternative, he evacuated the whole of his conquests, at the very time that Tipu's troops remained in force in Coromandel. While making his first march from Coimbatore, Colonel Fullarton was met by Mr. Swartz, who was proceeding by way of Guejluhutti to join the commissioners at Seringapatam, and act as their interpreter. In accordance with Tipu's system of insult, the venerable missionary was stopped at the foot of the pass, and never allowed to proceed farther. His astonishment at finding Colonel Fullarton retiring is thus described by himself:—"Alas! said I, is the peace so certain that you quit all before the negotiation is ended. The possession of these two rich countries would have kept Tipu in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage that beast?" The truth of these remarks was soon proved, for on the 26th of January, 1784, before Colonel Fullarton had completed the cantonment of his troops, he received a new despatch from Madras, ordering him "not only to retain possession of Palghat, should that fort not have been delivered,

but likewise to hold fast every inch of ground of which he was in possession, till he should have received accounts of the result of the negotiation."

The impunity with which Tipu had hitherto bearded the Madras government naturally encouraged him to insult the commissioners. It had been distinctly agreed, that as the preliminaries of peace had been settled, and nothing remained but to adjust the details, they should, while proceeding through Mysore, have personal intercourse with the British prisoners, and an opportunity of giving them clothes and other requisites with which they had been provided for that purpose. So far from this, they had scarcely passed the frontiers when they found all communication cut off, and, partly for the purpose of contemptuous exhibition, were paraded on camels over routes impracticable to ordinary beasts of burden. On advancing farther, they were turned aside from Seringapatam by a letter from Tipu, informing them that the prisoners, with a view to their liberation, had been forwarded to the frontiers, and inviting them to meet him in his camp. Their progress thither was not allowed to be more rapid than that of the starvation of the garrison, and when only twenty miles distant they received another letter from Tipu informing them that, at the earnest request of Colonel Campbell, he had agreed to take charge of the fort of Mangalore. Their subsequent treatment was atrocious. Not only was every species of indignity heaped upon them, but three gibbets were erected, one opposite to the tent doors of each commissioner, and it seemed more than probable that the purpose insinuated by the erection would be actually executed. It was certain, at least, that Tipu was already stained with crimes of as deep a dye, for it had been ascertained that General Matthews and several other officers had by his orders been poisoned in prison, or cut off by some more cruel death.

Shortly after the arrival of the commissioners at Mangalore, General Macleod anchored in the roads with two Company's ships from Bombay. Finding communication with them all but absolutely interdicted, he declared that he would consider them as imprisoned men, whose orders were of no force; and for the purpose of bringing this point to an issue, sent a messenger on shore with two letters, one addressed to Tipu, and the other to

the commissioners. His messenger was detained, and he sailed away without an answer. A letter sent on the 1st of March, by the commissioners to the commander of one of the ships, required him to send two boats, one of which "must endeavour to come to the beach on seeing a gentleman near it on horseback, holding as a signal a white handkerchief in his hand." General Macleod, in commenting on this mysterious passage on the 9th of March, says, "The adventure of the white handkerchief was an intended escape of the commissioners from Tipu, leaving behind them their baggage, revenue," &c. This assertion, which charges the commissioners with a resolution to provide for their own safety, and leave the soldiers who acted as guard, and the other persons who accompanied them, to their fate, has been strenuously denied; but though the matter continues to be involved in mystery, the fair inference from the narrative given by Colonel Wilks, and "founded," he says, "on high and incontrovertible living authority," seems to be, that at least the two junior commissioners meditated something of the kind, and abandoned their design because the officer of their guard had come to the knowledge of it, and sent them the following intimation:—"If there be any embarkation, I hope to see the last private into the boats; but my sentinels have orders to give me precise information, and I have a party saddled in the lines ready to seize as a deserter any and every person who shall attempt a *clandestine* escape."

Negotiation, in which all was arrogance on the one hand and pusillanimous submission on the other, continued a little longer, and Tipu, having gratified his pride to the utmost by the employment of every form of derision, humiliation, and contempt, thought it necessary at last to provide for his own safety. His feigned assent to the treaty of Salbai and practical rejection of it were about to bring upon him a combined attack of the Company and the Marathas, and he had sense enough to avert the danger by consenting at last, on the 7th of March, 1784, to sign the treaty of peace. The only thing of consequence that now remained was the restoration of prisoners. Two of the commissioners having returned to Madras by sea, and the third by land, the arrangements for the reception of the prisoners released was intrusted to the officer commanding the escort. This

delicate and difficult task he performed with a spirit which strikingly contrasted with the dastardliness previously manifested by his superiors. Before leaving Mangalore he caused proclamation to be made, even within Tipu's camp, that he was ready to give protection to all inhabitants of Coromandel who chose to accompany him. In this way he secured the return of about 2,000, but it is said that at least 200,000 still remained in captivity. The number of prisoners released was 2,680. Of these 180 were officers, 900 British soldiers, and 2,600 sepoys. This number, too, ought to have been far larger, but many had sunk under harsh treatment, and not a few had been deliberately murdered. With the latter atrocity Hyder is not chargeable. He acted like a barbarian in keeping his prisoners in irons, chained in pairs, treating them, according to his own expression, as "unruly beasts," not to be kept quiet in any other way, but he never murdered them. This horrible barbarity was reserved for his fiendish son, who selected for his victims all those who were reputed to have distinguished themselves, and might hereafter prove dangerous opponents. Colonel Baillie died during Hyder's reign, but Captain Rumley, who charged Tipu's guns on the morning of Baillie's tragedy, and Lieutenant Fraser, one of his staff, were among the first sufferers by the diabolical policy of the new reign. Lieutenant Sampson, captured with Colonel Braithwaite, General Matthews, and most of the captains taken at Bednore, experienced the same fate; afterwards, at different periods, other prisoners were carried off to Kabal Drug to be poisoned, or taken out to the woods and hacked to pieces. It almost makes one's blood boil to think that these execrable deeds were done with impunity, and would have been prevented, had the monster who committed them previously made aware that signal vengeance would certainly follow.

Mention has been made of the disputes between the civil and military authorities at Madras. After the departure of Sir Eyre Coote they increased in virulence, and the deputies sent from Madras announce the peace between Britain and France, carried with them orders to General Stuart to repair to the presidency and give an account of his conduct. Having yielded a very reluctant and dilatory obedience, he no sooner made his appearance in the council than the old quarrels were renewed.

At last Lord Macartney moved and carried a resolution that General Stuart should be dismissed from the Company's service. He, on the other hand, challenged this resolution, as not only unjust, but incompetent, and declared his determination still to retain the command of the king's troops. There was thus a collision, which, if one of the parties did not give way, must ere long have produced something like a civil war. General Stuart had formerly acted a prominent part in a similar collision, and tried to terminate it by arresting Lord Pigot, the governor. The fatal result of that proceeding had not taught him moderation, and it was therefore not impossible that he might be disposed again to try the same remedy. If this was his intention, Lord Macartney anticipated him by employing a party of sepoys to make him prisoner, and, a few days after, shipping him off for England. The kind of retributive justice apparent in this proceeding produced many epigrams. One of these, made by the second son of Muhammed Ali, in broken English, was as follows:—"*General Stuart catch one lord; one lord catch General Stuart.*"

The dissensions at Madras must have been fomented by the state of feeling known to exist between Mr. Hastings and Lord Macartney. His lordship, not long after his arrival at Madras, intimated his opinion that the government of Bengal had, in some instances, carried their interference with the internal affairs of Madras farther than law or good policy could justify. Mr. Hastings replied in moderate, and even complimentary terms, admitting that he had stretched his powers, because he had no confidence in the previous government, and much farther than he would have done had he known of Lord Macartney's appointment to the chair. One of the interferences complained of related to the Nabob of Arcot. This ally of the Company had always been much more liberal in promise than performance, and when, in consequence of the invasion of Hyder, the treasury of Madras was completely emptied, it was deemed advisable, in order to replenish it, that some permanent arrangement should be made for the purpose of rendering the nabob's revenues more available than they had hitherto been. When strongly pressed on the subject the nabob made a number of excuses, and ended by declaring that his future contributions

were defined by a treaty which he had just concluded with the government of Bengal. The Madras council having never heard of this treaty were naturally surprised, and on asking explanation discovered that the nabob's assertion of a treaty was not altogether unfounded. Probably from anticipating the demands which would be made upon him, he had sent deputies to Bengal and entered into a regular negotiation with its government. Ultimately he obtained the consent of the governor-general and council to a number of articles, the most important of which were—that he should be acknowledged independent sovereign of the Carnatic; that he should be entitled to appoint his successor; that he should be exempt from all pecuniary demands, except the expense of ten battalions of troops, to be employed, if necessary, in settling his country; and that certain districts possessed by Hyder should, in the event of their being wrested from him, be added to his dominions. On these conditions the nabob, retaining only as much of his revenues as might be necessary for the maintenance of his family and government, was willing to make over all the rest to the Company during the war, it being understood, however, that in making the collections his agents should act in conjunction with those appointed by the Madras government.

There cannot be a doubt that, in entering into such an agreement, the Bengal government, or, as they were now generally termed, the supreme council, far exceeded their powers. The Madras government, however, without dwelling on the illegality, contented themselves with criticizing the terms of the so-called treaty, and pointing out some of the evils to which it would necessarily lead. This representation was so far successful, that the whole matter was finally left to their decision, and it was arranged by a deed, dated 2nd December, 1781, that all the territorial revenues of the nabob should be transferred to the Company for a period of at least five years, without any interference on his part with the collections, but that a sixth of the whole should be paid over to him for his own expenditure, and that any surplus which might arise should be carried to his credit.

Another point in regard to which the supreme council and that of Madras took very different views related to the Northern

Circars. Mr. Hastings, in his anxiety to obtain an adequate force to carry on the war with the Marathas, entered into a negotiation with Nizam Ali, for the purpose of obtaining from him a body of cavalry, and was willing in return for this aid, to make him a present of the Northern Circars. A treaty binding the Company to this costly sacrifice was arranged, but not having been ratified when Lord Macartney arrived, it was deemed becoming to submit it to his approbation. In common with his colleagues he returned a very decided opinion, condemning the proposed treaty in all its parts. The revenue which Mr. Hastings, in supporting his views, represented as trifling, was shown to amount, exclusive of Guntur, to about a quarter of a million sterling. The territory, from forming a long and comparative narrow tract along the coast, could be easily defended by a people holding the command of the sea; it moreover gave an almost continuous line of communication between Bengal and the Carnatic, an object to which great importance was justly attached; while the manufactures of the inhabitants furnished an important part of the Company's investments. In return for this valuable territory, nothing more was to be obtained than the friendship of Nizam Ali, on which no dependence could be placed, and a body of horse so ill-disciplined, that their expense would almost to a certainty exceed the value of their services. These arguments prevailed; but there is reason to suspect that Mr. Hastings, though he yielded, felt sore when he saw the soundness of his judgment questioned, and one of his favourite schemes frustrated.

In the misunderstandings with Sir Eyre Coote, the supreme council took a very decided part against the Madras government, and Mr. Hastings, at the very time when he was expressing an "anxious desire to co-operate with Lord Macartney firmly and liberally for the security of the Carnatic, for the support of his authority, and for the honour of his administration," did not hesitate to address a letter, in the name of his colleagues, to the Madras council, in which, while intimating that they might have issued a peremptory command, they contented themselves with most earnestly recommending that "Sir Eyre Coote's wishes in regard to power may be gratified to their fullest possible extent; and that he may be allowed an unparti-

cipated command over all the forces acting under British authority in the Carnatic." Whether considered as a command or as a recommendation, the obvious meaning of this letter was to convert the commanding-in-chief into a military dictator, and to deprive the council of all control over his proceedings, while it left them responsible for the results. Accordingly, while the council, though protesting against the unreasonableness of the injunction, endeavoured to act upon it, they found their hands so completely tied up, that on receiving a requisition to send a detachment to Bombay, they could only answer that it was impossible for them to comply, because they no longer possessed any authority over the troops. This occurrence so far opened the eyes of the supreme council, that they saw the necessity of modifying the dictatorial powers which their letter had conferred. This modification, in so far as it met the wishes of the council, was in contradiction to those of Sir Eyre Coote, who, partly in consequence of it, threw up his command and return to Bengal. He appears to have succeeded in inducing the supreme council to make him once more dictator, and had arrived at Madras to resume his absolute powers, when the collision with the council, which had to all appearance become inevitable, was prevented by his sudden death. From this time there was no cordiality, and scarcely even a semblance of civility, between Mr. Hastings and Lord Macartney. Accordingly, in answer to complaints of counteraction in the discharge of their functions, we find the supreme council addressing that of Madras in such terms as the following:—"Records of laborious altercation, invective, and mutual complaint, are no satisfaction to the public for a neglect that may cost millions." Again, "In reply to our desire of unambiguous explanation on a subject of such public concern (the imputed counteraction), you favour us with a collected mass of complaint and invective against this government, against the Nabob of Arcot and his ministers, against the commander-in-chief of all the forces in India, against the commander-in-chief of his majesty's fleet, against your own provincial commander-in-chief, and again, against this government. Had you been pleased in so general a charge of impeachment to take cognizance of the co-operative support which was till of late withheld from you by the presidency of

Bombay, your description of the universal misconduct of the managers of the public affairs in India (the president and select committee of Fort St. George excepted) would have been complete." On reading such passages as these, there is no difficulty in believing that at the time when they were written, Mr. Hastings was meditating Lord Macartney's suspension.

The only other instance of direct collision between the governor-general and the Madras president which it is necessary to notice, took place in regard to the treaty with Tipu. When the treaty arrived in Bengal, Mr. Hastings was at Lucknow, and the supreme council having full authority to act, did not deem it necessary either to transmit it to him, or wait for his return. They therefore ratified it in due form, and sent it back to Lord Macartney, by whom it was at once transmitted to Tipu. Some months after, a fresh copy of the treaty was sent from Bengal to Madras. Beside the former signatures, it had that of the governor-general. This of itself was nothing, but there was moreover a declaration appended, which was to all intents and purposes a new article. Its purport was that the nabob, Muhammed Ali, though his name did not appear in the treaty, was entitled to be a party to it. The omission of his name had not been owing to inadvertence. When the treaty was made with Hyder in 1769, the nabob declined to sign it, and had not afterwards fulfilled the promise he had given to ratify it. Acting on this as a precedent, and believing that some advantages might thereby be secured, the Madras government had purposely refrained from making him a party. Probably for this very reason, the nabob desired to be included, and made his complaint to Mr. Hastings, in whom he had on several other occasions found too willing a listener. The result was the second ratification of the treaty, which the Madras government were not only enjoined to transmit to Tipu, but told in terms harsher than the occasion justified, that if they refused it was "at their peril." Lord Macartney was now in no humour to comply with such peremptory messages, and on the ground that the treaty was already validly ratified, and that from the suspicious temper of Tipu a second ratification might be productive of mischievous consequences, persuaded his colleagues to refuse to transmit it. At the same time he took the whole responsibility upon himself,

and declared his readiness to brave the wrath of the supreme council, by incurring the penalty of suspension. This would doubtless have been his sentence, had not Mr. Hastings been at the time engaged in transactions which more immediately concerned himself, and required all his attention.

Affairs of Chait Singh

DURING the dismemberment of the Mughul empire, the province of Benaras passed as a dependency to the *Subahdar* of Oudh, and was held as a zamindary by Balwant Singh, who, in 1740, had succeeded his father, Mansa Ram, both in his possessions and in the title of raja, conferred upon him by Muhammed Shah of Delhi. During the war between the Company and the *Subahdar* of Oudh, or Nabob Vizir as he was usually called, Balwant Singh, throwing off his allegiance as zamindar, became a valuable ally of the Company; and accordingly, in 1765, when peace was made with the vizir, an article was inserted in the treaty, stipulating that Balwant Singh, in again becoming the dependant of Oudh, should hold his possessions unmolested, and be liable to no more tribute than before. On the death of Balwant Singh, in 1770, the vizir showed an inclination to dispossess his son, Chait Singh, but the Company, in fulfilment of the guarantee which they had given in the treaty, interfered and secured the succession for him, on the same terms as before, with the exception of a small addition in the annual payment. In 1773, when Mr. Hastings paid his first visit to the vizir, he was earnestly solicited by the latter to allow him to dispossess the raja of two forts, and exact from him ten lacs of rupees above the stipulated amount, but refused, obviously on the ground that he could not consent without violating the treaty. This, indeed, is not an inference, but a fact, confirmed by Mr. Hastings in his general report to his colleagues, where he thus expresses himself, "I am well convinced that the raja's inheritance, and perhaps his life, are no longer safe than while he enjoys the Company's protection; which is his due by the ties of justice, and the obligations of

public faith, and which policy enjoins us to afford him ever most effectually; his country is a strong barrier to ours without subjecting us to any expense, and we may depend upon him as a sure ally whenever we may stand in need of his services." In accordance with these views it was formally decided that "no increase of revenue should ever thereafter be demanded."

On the death of the nabob vizir, in 1775, the Bengal government, then represented by the majority, Messrs. Clavering, Monson, and Francis, took advantage of the minority of his son and successor, Asaf-ud-daulah, to impose upon him the treaty of Faizabad, by which, among other extortions, they obliged him to cede the province of Benaras to the Company. The effect of this cession was obviously to place the Company in the very same position as that in which the vizir had previously stood. It was certainly never meant by it to injure the Raja of Benaras. On the contrary, while he remained liable to no greater payment than before, he was to have the advantage of exchanging his allegiance to a capricious despot into allegiance to the Company, whose protection he had already experienced, and in whose honour and justice he could perfectly confide. The majority of the Bengal council plumed themselves greatly on the treaty, and thought it necessary, in order to prevent their colleagues from sharing any part of the credit, to inform the directors, "The measure is strictly and exclusively ours; the original plan was opposed in every step by the governor-general and Mr. Barwell." But though Mr. Hastings objected to the treaty because it dishonourably exacted from Asaf-ud-daulah "concessions inconsistent with former treaties, to which the necessity of his situation alone obliged him, however unwilling, to submit," it appears that after the treaty was concluded, he strongly advocated the policy of improving rather than deteriorating the raja's position, by rendering him as much as possible an independent though a tributary prince. On this subject, indeed, the council were unanimous, and it was therefore decreed that so long as he performed his engagements, "no more demands should be made upon him by the honourable Company of any kind; nor, on any pretence whatever, should any person be allowed to interfere with his authority." The more effectually to secure this, Mr. Hastings

proposed that the raja should pay his revenue at Patna, putting on record the following reason:—"If a resident was appointed to receive the money as it became due at Benaras, such a resident would unavoidably acquire an influence over the raja, and over his country, which would unavoidably make him master of both. The consequence might not, perhaps, be brought completely to pass without a struggle, and many appeals to the council, which, in a government constituted like this, cannot fail to terminate against the raja, and by the construction to which his opposition to the agent would be liable, might eventually draw on him severe restrictions, and end in reducing him to the mean and depraved state of a mere zamindar." Though this passage does not explain the nature of the higher state which Mr. Hastings believed the raja already to possess, it proves to demonstration that, both in his own opinion and that of his colleagues, the raja, by the transference of his allegiance to the Company, had lost none of his former rights, and was not to be subjected to additional demands of any kind, nor to any interference with his authority so long as he discharged his engagements. It has been necessary to set this matter in the clearest light, because it was afterwards argued that the *sanad* or charter granted to the raja in 1776, made all former sanads null and void, and that, as that sanad did not contain any clause exempting him for ever from all further demands, there was in fact no limit to the demands which the Company, as his acknowledged sovereign, might make upon him. This argument is at best a legal quibble. If the sanad did not exempt him from further demands, neither did it reserve any right to make and enforce such demands. The only obligations to which it bound the raja were, to pay a certain amount of revenue, and maintain order within his territories; and the clear understanding of all parties was that the fulfilment of these obligations was all that the Company could legally or equitably require of him. To give any other interpretation to the sanad is to place the raja in a worse position than before, a result not only not contemplated, but disavowed in the strongest terms by Mr. Hastings and his colleagues at the time when the sanad was granted.

In the year 1778, when the Maratha war was raging, Mr. Hastings proposed that during its continuance the raja should

be required to furnish three battalions of sepoys, the annual expense of which was estimated at five lacs (£50,000). Half of the council proposed to substitute *requested* for *required*, but Mr. Hastings carried his point on agreeing to reserve the question of right for the decision of the directors. The raja endeavoured to stipulate that the exaction should be continued only for a single year, and was punished, for what was called his contumacy, by an order to pay the amount of a whole year forthwith, instead of by instalments, as would otherwise have been permitted. He pleaded poverty, and asked indulgence for six or seven months, but this was treated as a new offence, and instructions were sent to the resident at Benaras to demand full payment within five days, with intimation that failure to comply would be construed and treated as an absolute refusal. Thus pressed, the raja did not venture to carry resistance further, and the money was forthcoming. The feeling toward the raja evinced by Mr. Hastings on this occasion, differs so much from that displayed in the passages above quoted, that one naturally inquires whether anything had occurred in the interval to produce the change. Mr. Hastings has himself made statements which his enemies believed to give the *real*, though more charitable judges consider them to amount only to an apparent explanation. Speaking of the period when he was supposed to have resigned he says, "It is a fact, that when the unhappy divisions of our government had proceeded to an extremity bordering on civil violence, by the attempt to wrest from me my authority, in the month of June, 1777, he had deputed a man, named Sambhunath, with an express commission to my opponent; and the man had proceeded as far as Murshidabad, when hearing of the change of affairs he stopped, and the raja recalled him." When the raja pleaded for six or seven months' indulgence, Mr. Hastings made this other statement, "I will not conceal from the board that I have expected this evasive conduct in the raja, having been for some time past well informed, that he had been advised in this manner to procrastinate the payment of the five lacs, to afford time for the arrival of despatches from England, which were to bring orders for a total change in this government; and this, he was given to expect, would produce a repeal of the demand made upon him

by the present government." Mr. Hastings, for his own sake, ought either to have withheld these statements, or, having made them, to have abstained carefully from acting toward the raja in a manner which might be much more readily ascribed to personal vindictiveness than to a sense of duty.

In 1779 the demand of the five lacs was repeated. The raja again pretended poverty, complained of hardship, and even ventured to plead that, by the tenure of his territories, he was only under obligation to pay a stipulated sum—an obligation which he had regularly performed. He was again pronounced contumacious, and under threat of military execution, was compelled to pay the five lacs, and an additional sum of £2,000, as the alleged expense of the troops employed to coerce him. In 1780, when the demand was made for the third time, the raja sent a confidential agent to Calcutta, to deprecate the displeasure of the governor-general, and offer every reparation in his power except payment. As a substitute for it, he secretly offered a present of two lacs. Mr. Hastings at first refused it, telling the agent that the whole contribution must be paid, but he afterwards changed his mind and received it. He must have understood that the money was offered as a bribe, and would not have been paid, except under the impression that it was to relieve the raja from the larger claim. The acceptance, therefore, while still determined to enforce that claim, looks very like a fraud. Mr. Hasting's own explanation is, that he was exerting himself at the time to send a detachment under Colonel Camac into Sindhia's dominions, and being otherwise destitute of the necessary funds, regarded the proffered gift as a kind of god-send. There cannot be a doubt that the money was expended in the Company's service's and the allegation subsequently made that Mr. Hastings meant to have appropriated it to his own use may be dismissed as groundless. At the same time, it must be confessed that he made too much a mystery of it, and subjected himself very unnecessarily to misconstruction, by first talking of the money as if it had formed part of his private resources, and not informing the directors till five months after, "that the money, by whatever means it came into his possession, was not his own; that he had himself no right to it, nor would or could have

received it, but for the occasion which prompted him to avail himself of the accidental means which were at that instant afforded him, of accepting and converting it to the property and use of the Company." Ultimately the raja found that he had only duped himself by his present. The five lacs were exacted as before, and a considerable fine is said to have been imposed for his previous attempts to evade payment.

About the date of the last payment, the Bengal government resolved that the raja, in addition to the tribute and the forced contribution, should be required to furnish them with as many of the cavalry in his service as could be spared. This was rather a vague demand, but it was made specific by Mr. Hastings, who instructed the resident at Benaras to fix the number at 2,000. The raja averred that all his cavalry amounted only to 1,300, and were absolutely necessary to keep the peace and collect the revenue. Mr. Hastings must have been satisfied that there was truth in this statement, as he reduced his demand successively to 1,500 and 1,000. Ultimately the raja collected 500 horse, and 500 matchlock-men as a substitute for the remainder, and sent word to the governor-general that they were ready to receive his commands. No answer was returned, for coercion had already been resolved on. "I was resolved," says Mr. Hastings, "to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distresses. In a word, I had determined to make him pay largely for his pardon, or to exact a severe vengeance for his past delinquency." There is here no disguise. A demand is made upon a Hindu raja, who, believing on grounds which appear well founded, and are admitted on all hands to be at least plausible, that he is not liable, complies with the utmost reluctance, after pleading poverty and petitioning for delay. This reluctance is magnified into a heinous crime, not so much because it is so in reality, but because the fine or ruin inflicted on the raja under the form of punishment will have the effect of relieving the Company from severe pecuniary distress. When such motives are distinctly avowed, it is useless to inquire whether the proceedings that followed were in accordance with justice. They could not be so except by accident, as no justice was meant, and nothing but money was wanted.

Mr. Hastings, being about to make a tour to the north, for the purpose of visiting the Nabob of Oudh, had an opportu-

ity of personally exacting his "severe vengeance" at Benaras. His intention in this respect had been confidentially communicated to Mr. Wheeler, at that time the only other member of council; to all others it was a profound secret. It would seem, however, that his designs had been to some extent penetrated. The nabob, whose guest he was about to become, had actually offered to purchase the raja's dominions at a very large price; and the raja himself, now thoroughly intimidated, proved how groundless all his pleas of poverty had been, by tendering twenty lacs of rupees as a contribution to the public service. Mr. Hastings having the nabob's offer in his pocket, knew he could make a better bargain, and therefore refused to accept of less than fifty lacs, or £500,000 sterling. Meanwhile, he set out on his northern tour. Anxious, if possible, to avert the impending storm, the raja met him at Buxar, on the frontiers of his province, and humbled himself in every way before the relentless governor-general. During a confidential interview, granted on his own solicitation, he assured me, says Mr. Hastings, "that his zamindary, and all that he possessed, were at my devotion; and he accompanied his words by an action either strongly expressive of the agitation of his mind, or his desire to impress on mine a conviction of his sincerity, by laying his turban on my lap." All would not do, and the raja was dismissed without a hint of the fate which awaited him.

Mr. Hastings arrived at Benaras on the 14th of August, 1781. The raja, who did not arrive till a few hours later, offered to wait upon him in the evening, but was told to forbear his visit. On the following morning, Mr. Markham, the resident, was sent to him with a paper of complaints and demands. He returned an answer in the course of the same day, partly explaining and partly excusing his conduct; but it was money, not explanation, that was wanted, and therefore, in the course of the same evening, he found himself a prisoner in his own palace, with two companies of sepoys placed over him. The disapprobation which it is impossible not to feel at the harshness of this arrest, is almost lost in amazement at its boldness. Benaras, situated on the left or north bank of the Ganges, 420 miles north-west of Calcutta in a direct line, and a half more by water, was the acknowledged capital of Hinduism, and con-

tained a population of 200,000, of which the Hindus formed two-thirds. A large part of this population was casual and migratory, rather than fixed, consisting of pilgrims and mendicants, all of them of course deeply imbued with fanaticism, and many of them ferocious desperadoes provided with arms, which they were ever ready to use in any affray. The raja was popular on account of the mildness and equity of his administration, and the moment it became known that he had been subjected to the indignity of an arrest, and that his life was perhaps in danger, the whole city was in commotion, and a general rush was made for the palace. By some unaccountable oversight, the two companies of sepoys had not been provided with ammunition. As soon as the insurrection commenced, and the oversight was discovered, another company of sepoys was despatched to the assistance of their comrades, but the work of slaughter had already commenced. The sepoys in the palace, unable to defend themselves, were speedily cut to pieces, and the company sent to succour them found their passage disputed by multitudes of armed men, who had surrounded the palace and blockaded all the avenues. In the confusion the raja escaped through a wicket, and descending the steep bank of the river, by means of turbans tied together, entered a boat, which conveyed him to the opposite side. Such were the first-fruits of Mr. Hastings' resolution to "exact severe vengeance."

At a later period, Mr. Hastings, when called to account for his treatment of the raja, endeavoured to improve his case by imputing to him treasonable designs. His own conduct refutes the charge. He moved into the heart of the raja's capital, and arrested him in his own palace, under the very eyes of an attached and most excitable population, without providing himself with any stronger protection than a small escort. This, however much he might have been blinded by the desire of vengeance, he never would have done, if he had suspected treasonable designs. Still, though there seems not to have been any premeditated treason, the position into which he had now brought himself was full of alarm. His account of it is as follows:—"If Chait Singh's people, after they had effected his rescue, had proceeded to my quarters, instead of crowding after him in a tumultuous manner, as they did, in his passage over the river,

it is probable that my blood, and that of about thirty English gentlemen of my party, would have been added to the recent carnage; for they were about 2,000, furious and daring from the easy success of their last attempt; nor could I assemble more than fifty regular and armed sepoys for my defence." To these he was able almost immediately to add six companies of Major Popham's regiment, and a few recruits recently enlisted as a guard to the resident, the whole mustering about 450 men. This force, small as it was, might have sufficed to overawe the insurrectionists, had not new spirit and audacity been infused into them from another quarter.

The officer in command of the other four companies of Major Popham's regiment, lying at Mirzapur, together with a company of artillery and a company of the French rangers, was ordered to bring them down the river to Ramnagar, situated on the south bank, about four miles above Benaras. It was a place of some strength, in the raja's possession, and it was intended that no attempt should be made upon it till a larger force should be collected and placed under Major Popham's command. Unfortunately, the officer from Mirzapur, anxious to signalize himself, ventured on the attack with very inadequate means, and sustained a repulse, by which his force was nearly annihilated. The effect was to raise the whole country in the raja's interest. Even beyond his territories, in parts of Oudh and Bihar, the excitement was felt, and multitudes flocked to arms. The raja himself, meanwhile, professed an earnest desire for peace, protesting his innocence of all the blood that had been shed; but to his letters no answer was returned. Mr. Hastings must now have questioned, if not the propriety of his measures, the manner in which he had attempted to execute them, since instead of replenishing the treasury of the Company, they now threatened only to make a new drain upon it, by provoking an additional war. His quarters at Benaras were regarded as no longer tenable, and he removed, with all the troops which had been collected, to the Company's strong fort of Chunar, or Chunargarh, situated sixteen miles to the south-west. The danger was thus removed, and little difficulty was afterwards felt in collecting a force which rendered further resistance hopeless. The raja, who had mustered his forces after he found that no terms would be

granted him, proved totally unable to cope with his antagonists, and fled to the fort of Bidjeyghar, situated about fifty miles south of his capital. Here he had deposited most of his treasures. Major Popham followed in pursuit, but the raja, taking with him as much property as he could manage to carry, continued his flight. The rani, his mother, still remaining within the fort, maintained the defence till an assault was threatened, and then surrendered on the condition of personal safety, and the assurance that neither she nor the females of her family and household should be subjected to the indignity of search. This article was shamefully violated, and, it appears, with the sanction of the officers; for the report of the proceedings of a committee of officers, put on record at the time, contains, *inter alia*, the following resolution:—"That ten gold mohurs¹ be given to each of the four female searchers." Mr. Hastings also admits the fact when he writes, "It gives me great concern that the licentiousness of any persons under your command should have given cause to complain of the infringement of the smallest article of the capitulation in favour of the mother of Chait Singh and her dependants." It is not unworthy of notice that what he here censures is only the infringement. To the thing itself, provided it could be done without infringement, he appears not to have had any serious objections, since he thus addressed Major Popham when consulted as to the terms of capitulation:—"I apprehend that she (the rani) will contrive to defraud the captors of a considerable part of the booty, by being suffered to retire without examination. But this is your consideration and not mine. I should be very sorry that your officers and soldiers lost any part of the reward to which they are so well entitled; but I cannot make any objection, as you must be the best judge of the expediency of the promised indulgence to the rani."

This passage has been quoted, not so much for what it says about *examination*, as for its distinct admission that what should be found within the fort was to belong to the captors. Had it been taken by assault this would have been the rule, but as possession by capitulation only was now contemplated, the property found within the fort belonged of right to the Company. Accordingly, in the very face of the above passage, Mr.

¹ The Mohur was a gold coin worth about sixteen rupees.

Hastings did lay claim to all the treasure of Bidjeyghar, but it was only to meet with a grievous disappointment. The troops seized upon everything found within the fort, or obtained by the dishonourable search of the females, as lawful booty. Mr. Hastings, after claiming it as a right, was so distressed for money that he petitioned for part of the money as a loan, and had the mortification of being refused. What his original expectations had been may be inferred from his belief of the report made to him that Chait Singh took away "as much treasure as his elephants and camels together could carry, which is reported to me to have consisted of one lac of mohurs and fifteen or sixteen of silver (in all about £320,000), besides jewels of an unknown amount." When disappointed in the expectation of treasure, the governor may have found some compensation in the exaction of "severe vengeance," which he accomplished by depriving Chait Singh of his territories, and bestowing them on his sister's son, a youth of only eighteen years of age. A better source of consolation was given him by the intelligence which he received while at Chunar that Mahadaji Sindhia had agreed to terms of peace.

Mr. Hastings should now have continued his journey to Lucknow, but the eagerness of the nabob had rendered this unnecessary. On hearing of the insurrection at Benaras, and the subsequent retirement to Chunar, he determined to lose no time in setting out for this fort. Shortly after his arrival, a new treaty, known by the name of the treaty of Chunar, was concluded between the nabob and the Company. The main object of it was to free him from burdens which he had declared his inability to bear, and permit him to resume a number of *jaghirs* which the Company had guaranteed to their actual possessors. His payments to the Company for the troops maintained within his territories had fallen greatly into arrear; and as he declared that many of the troops might be dispensed with, and were even forced upon him contrary to his wish, there was little difficulty in arranging that as many as were deemed superfluous should be withdrawn. What, indeed, could the Company gain by sending troops into Oudh, and receiving for their maintenance nothing better than promises from the nabob, while the real burden was thrown upon themselves? The articles provid-

ing for the resumption of *jaghirs* raised questions of greater difficulty. The basis of agreement in regard to them was, that where the possessors were guaranteed by the Company, each should, on being ousted, receive a pension equivalent to the estimated annual value of the lands possessed. It must be perfectly obvious that such an exchange, when not left optional, but rendered compulsory, placed the holders of the *jaghirs* in a far worse position than before, and therefore amounted to a gross breach of faith. So long as they continued in the possession of the lands, they were always sure of drawing a revenue from them; but what were they to expect when they were degraded to the condition of pensioners, and had no better security for their pensions than the promise of a despot, notoriously unable to pay, and notoriously still more unwilling than unable?

The most extensive of all the *jaghirs* was that of Faizulla Khan, the last of the Rohilla chiefs who had battled for the independence of his country. Up to the last, he remained so strongly entrenched at the head of a numerous and valiant army, that the late nabob, the father of the present, was glad to come to terms. Faizulla Khan knew too well with whom he was dealing, to put any trust in his promises, and only agreed to enter into a treaty, on the Company undertaking to guarantee it. By this treaty he received a large and valuable *jaghir*, and engaged in return to retain in his service 5,000 troops, with 2,000 or 3,000 of which he was to assist the nabob in time of war according to his ability. In 1778, when hostilities between Great Britain and France were declared, Mr. Hastings applied to him for aid, and receiving less than he expected, urged the nabob to make a demand upon him for 5,000 horse. He replied that he had only 2,000 horse in all, which were ready at the Company's service, and that the 3,000 foot, the remainder of his troops, were necessary to keep the peace of the country and collect the revenues. When this answer was received, the governor-general and council, consisting at this time of only Mr. Hastings and Mr. Wheeler, minuted the following resolution:—"That the nabob Faizulla Khan had evaded the performance of his part of the treaty between the late nabob Suja-ud-daulah and him, to which the honourable Company were guarantees, and upon which he was lately summoned to furnish the stipulated number of

troops, which he is obliged to furnish on the condition by which he holds the *jaghir* granted to him." This resolution looks as if it had been inserted to pave the way for a transaction which was already in contemplation, and was completed by the third article of the treaty of Chunar. This article is as follows:—"That as Faizulla Khan has, by his breach of treaty, forfeited the protection of the English government, and causes, by his continuance in his present independent state, great alarm and detriment to the nabob vizir, he be permitted, when time shall suit, to resume his lands and pay him in money, through the resident—after deducting the amount and charges of the troops he stands engaged to furnish by treaty—the amount stipulated by treaty, which amount shall be passed to the account of the Company during the continuance of the present war." When the question is asked, Wherein does the breach of treaty by Faizulla Khan, previously in the minute of the council, and now more solemnly reasserted in this third article, consist? Mr. Hastings himself answers that there was really no such breach. "In the hurry of business," he says, "he and the other members of the board were deceived by this letter (a letter from a British officer in Rohilkhand) into the belief that 5,000 was the quota defined, and horse, though not expressed in the treaty, was undoubtedly understood." Again, after repeating the misstatement in the most solemn manner by inserting it in the treaty of Chunar, and employing it to excuse the Company for violating their guarantee, and leaving Faizulla Khan at the nabob's mercy, he distinctly admits, that "the conduct of Faizulla Khan in refusing the aid demanded," though "evasive and uncandid," was "not an absolute breach of treaty;" he was only guilty of a scrupulous "attention to literal expression, when a more liberal interpretation would have been highly useful and acceptable to us." This, he adds, "strongly marks his unfriendly disposition, though it may not impeach his fidelity, and leaves him little claim to any exertions from us for the continuance of his *jaghirs*." These words occur in a kind of commentary, with which Mr. Hastings accompanied the treaty of Chunar, on transmitting it to his colleagues. Why Mr. Hastings, while acknowledging that Faizulla had not broken the treaty, not only charged him with it, but made it a pretext for breaking faith with him, and depriving him

of the protection which the Company had solemnly guaranteed, can only be explained by admitting, that on this as on various other occasions, he was too ready to sacrifice honour and justice to the purposes of the moment. In the present instance, he could not even say that the course he took was in accordance with sound policy. On the contrary, in the commentary above referred to, he makes the following extraordinary confession:—"I am of opinion, that neither the vizir's nor the Company's interests would be promoted by depriving Faizulla Khan of his independency, and I have therefore reserved the execution of this agreement to an indefinite term; and our government may always interpose to prevent any ill effects from it." In other words, he had agreed, in consideration of a sum of money, to allow the nabob to rob Faizulla Khan, but had purposely made the terms so ambiguous, that the nabob, after paying the money, might still be prevented from committing the robbery.

The resumption of the *jaghirs* led to other transactions of a still more disgraceful character. A large extent of land was held in *jaghir* by two Begums or Princesses of Oudh, the one the grandmother and the other the mother of the nabob. In addition to the *jaghirs*, they were understood to possess an enormous amount of treasure, the hoard accumulated by the late nabob Suja-ud-daulah, and estimated at £3,000,000. The proceedings at Benaras, instead of yielding the money expected, had increased the financial difficulties of the Company, and Mr. Hastings, rendered almost desperate, determined as a last resource to replenish his treasury by the spoliation of the begums. With this view mainly, the second article of the treaty of Chunar, providing for the resumption of the *jaghirs*, had been framed. Decency and policy did not permit any express mention of the treasure, but the secret stipulation was, that the nabob should plunder his grandmother and mother, and pay over the proceeds to the governor-general for the behoof of the Company. There were difficulties in the way. Asaf-ud-daulah, though almost destitute of natural affection, stood somewhat in awe of the begums, and had no sooner consented to become their spoliator than he would fain have retracted. This difficulty, however, was easily surmounted. Another, involving the honour of the Company, was more serious. The nabob's mother had

made a formal complaint against him to the governor-general and council. He had extorted from her twenty-six lacs of rupees, and was demanding an additional thirty lacs. The pretext was, that he required the money in order to meet his obligations to the Company. Assuming this to be the fact, she was willing to make the new advance, which, added to the former, constituted an entire debt of £560,000, and renounce all claim for repayment, provided her son would become solemnly bound, and the Company would undertake to guarantee, that he would make no further demand upon her; and that she would have the full enjoyment of her *jaghirs* and effects wherever she might please to reside, whether within the limits of Oudh, or elsewhere. The terms were accepted. Asaf-ud-daulah signed the obligation, and the Company gave the guarantee.

In the beginning of 1778, the elder begum, who had not obtained any security for good treatment, resolved, in consequence of the extortion and insult to which she was daily subjected, to quit Oudh and make a pilgrimage to Mecca. This did not suit the views of the nabob, who feared that her treasure would thus be entirely lost to him, and he refused to allow her to depart. She made her complaint to the resident, Mr. Middleton, who, after hearing both parties, reported that "the deportment of the nabob toward her, his family, and relations in general, was, he could not but admit, very exceptionable." The complaint from the elder was soon followed by another from the younger begum, who charged her son with repeated violations of his agreement, and called upon the Company to make good their guarantee. The Bengal council, in which Mr. Hastings had regained the ascendant, took up the subject on the 23rd of March, and thus instructed the resident:—"We desire you will repeat your remonstrances to the vizir on these points, in the name of this government; representing to him the consequences of such an arbitrary proceeding; the reproach to which his honour and reputation, as well as ours from being connected with him, will be exposed by such acts of cruelty and injustice; and the right which we derive from the nature of our alliance with him, to expect that he will pay a deference to our remonstrances." With respect to the Bao Begum (the

nabob's mother), they add, "Her grievances come before us on a very different footing. She is entitled to our protection by an act, not sought by us, but solicited by the nabob himself. We therefore empower and direct you, to afford your support and protection to her in the due maintenance of all the rights she possesses, in virtue of the treaty executed between her and her son, under the guarantee of the treaty."

Such was the view taken by the governor-general and council in 1778, and we hear of nothing which had occurred to change it till 1781, when we are startled by an article in the treaty of Chunar, framed for the express purpose of sanctioning the spoliation of the begums. When asked, What had the begums done to deserve this cruel treatment, and place themselves beyond the pale of the Company's pledged protection? we can only answer, Mr. Hastings was in want of money and determined to have it. No doubt a proceeding carrying so much dishonour and iniquity on the very face of it, could not be carried out without some semblance of justification. Accordingly, it is said that the begums abetted Chait Singh, and countenanced, if they did not actually take part in his insurrection. Where is the proof of the fact? It was a rumour on which Mr. Hastings chose to act, before he had any means of ascertaining whether it was well founded, and he reiterated the charge, after he knew that if he could not make it good, his own conduct would be incapable of vindication. The means to which he resorted for proof only show the extremity to which he felt himself reduced. His old friend and schoolfellow, Sir Elijah Impey, in order, as he himself declares, that people in England might be satisfied that Mr. Hastings in his narrative had affirmed no more than the truth, volunteered to go to Lucknow, and take affidavits attesting the truth of the charges brought against the begums. Mr. Hastings accepted of this extraordinary offer, and Sir Elijah set out for the express purpose of taking these affidavits. Of course, he had no jurisdiction in Oudh. Why then employ him? The only answer that can be given is, that being chief-justice of the supreme court of Calcutta and the known friend of the governor-general, abundance of affidavits of the kind required could hardly fail to be forthcoming. Personally, Sir Elijah Impey was destitute of every

other qualification for the office. When afterwards interrogated on the subject, he admitted that he did not know what the affidavits contained, and he did not know whether the persons who swore them had ever read them, or whether they even understood them. They "brought their affidavits ready drawn," and he believed that the resident, Mr. Middleton, "in consequence of a letter Mr. Hastings wrote to him, had communicated the subject matter of what they were to depose to." It is needless to say, that affidavits so concocted and so sworn were worse than useless, and damaging only to those who had recourse to them.

The resumption of the *jaghirs* proved more tedious than had been anticipated, not from any difficulty in the thing itself, but from the nabob's reluctance to carry out the extreme measures to which he had been induced to give his consent. Mr. Hastings, in consequence, lost patience, and instructed Mr. Middleton to take the matter into his own hands. This threatened supersession of the nabob's authority compelled him to proceed, and Mr. Middleton wrote Mr. Hastings, on 9th December, 1781, that, "rather than suffer it to appear that the point had been carried in opposition to his will, he at length yielded a nominal acquiescence, and has this day issued his own perwannahs to that effect: declaring however at the same time, both to me and his ministers, that it is an act of compulsion."

The next part in the plan of spoliation was the seizure of the treasures. Mr. Hastings at one time alleged that this was not originally contemplated, and that it was inflicted as a punishment for the violent opposition which the servants and agents of the begums had made to the resumption of the *jaghirs*. It is clear, however, that in this instance, his memory had proved treacherous. In one of his own letters, dated 23rd January, 1782, but referring to the earlier date of the conferences at Chunar, he says, "that in addition to the resolution of resuming the begums' *jaghirs*, the nabob had declared his resolution of reclaiming all the treasures of his family which were in their possession, and to which, by the Muhammedan laws, he was entitled. This resolution I have strenuously encouraged and supported." Mr. Middleton also, in a letter dated the 6th of December, and consequently three days before the nabob had

issued any orders for the resumption of the *jaghirs*, wrote to Mr. Hastings, "Your pleasure respecting the begums I have learned from Sir Elijah; and the measure heretofore proposed will soon follow the resumption of the *jaghirs*. From both, or indeed from the former alone, I have no doubt of the complete liquidation of the Company's balance." The measure from which this magnificent result was anticipated, could be nothing else than the seizure of the treasures. Mr. Hastings himself afterwards became satisfied, and candidly acknowledged, that in ascribing the seizure of the treasures to the opposition offered to the resumption of the *jaghirs*, he had committed a blunder.

The begums were residing at Faizabad, the former capital of Oudh. Here the nabob, the resident, and a body of English troops arrived on the 8th of January, 1782. After three days spent in parleying, the troops took possession of the town, occupied the outer inclosure of the palace of the one begum, and blocked up the entrance to the other. Still negotiation proved unavailing. The begums remained within their secluded apartments, and no treasure was obtained. The next step was to operate on the feelings of the begums, through their favourite and confidential agents. These were two aged eunuchs, named Jiwar Ali Khan and Bihar Ali Khan, and the device fallen upon was to seize these persons, put them in irons, and by subjecting them to other severities, compel them to disclose any treasure of which they might have the custody, or to use their influence with the princesses, who, it was thought, might from mere compassion, on learning how their favourite servants were maltreated, be induced to give way. This diabolical expedient proved so far successful, that the elder begum paid to the English resident the amount of the bond granted by the nabob to the Company for the balance of 1779-80.

It does not appear what promise was made to induce her to make this payment, but the fact is that the eunuchs were not released. There was another balance due for 1780-81, but when it was demanded of her "she declared," says the resident, "with apparent truth, that she had delivered up the whole of the property in her hands." This might be so, argued the spoliators, and yet if not in her hands, it might be elsewhere. The torturing process must therefore be continued. What its

nature was, may be inferred from the following letter, dated 20th January, 1782, addressed by the resident to the British officer who guarded the eunuchs:—"Sir—When this note is delivered to you, I have to desire, that you order the two prisoners to be put in irons, keeping them from all food, &c., agreeable to my instructions of yesterday. (Signed) Nath. Middleton." Thus ironed, and starved, and subjected to all the privations and indignities which may be imagined to be included under the above "&c.," the eunuchs offered to pay the sum demanded in a month, from their own effects and credit. A bond for the amount was accordingly taken, but the imprisonment was continued, and the two begums remained under a guard. Before the 23rd of February, 1782, upwards of £500,000 had been received by the resident. This consisted partly of payments made by the eunuchs on the bond which had been extorted from them. To raise the balance, they requested to be allowed to go abroad, and solicit the assistance of their friends. This was positively refused.

On the 18th of May, after the eunuchs had suffered a two months' imprisonment, the officer in charge of them wrote thus to the resident—"The prisoners Bihar Ali Khan and Jiwar Ali Khan, who seem to be very sickly, have requested their irons might be taken off for a few days, that they might take medicine, and walk about the garden of the place where they are confined. Now, as I am sure that they will be equally secure without their irons as with them, I think it my duty to inform you of this request. I desire to know your pleasure concerning it." The resident, acting under higher orders, had no alternative but to refuse. Indeed, new terrors and rigours were prepared for them. In Faizabad, their ordinary residence, the fact of their being near the begums, and within reach of their possible intervention in their behalf, might afford some solace, but they were now sent off to Lucknow, perhaps to perish unheeded among strangers. What they here suffered must be conjectured from the following letter, addressed by the assistant-resident to the British officer on guard:—"Sir—The nabob having determined to inflict corporal punishment upon the prisoners under your guard, this is to desire, that his officers, when they shall come, may have free access to the prisoners, and be permitted

to do with them as they shall see proper." All measures of severity proving unavailing, it began to be suspected that the work of spoliation was complete, or, that if anything remained to be given up, lenient measures were more likely to obtain it. The begums and their attendants, who had often been reduced to the point of starvation, were set free from restraint, and the eunuchs regained their freedom. The kind of treatment to which they had been subjected may be learned from the delight expressed at their deliverance. This is described rather hyperbolically by the officer who had the charge of them, in a letter to the resident:—"I wish you had been present at the enlargement of the prisoners. The quivering lips, with the tears of joy stealing down the poor men's cheeks, was a scene truly affecting. If the prayers of these poor men will avail, you will at the last trump be translated to the happiest regions in heaven."

During his visit at Chunar, the nabob offered Mr. Hastings a present of ten lacs (£100,000), of course not in specie, for of this he had none, but in bills on some of the great soucars or bankers of the country. By the Regulating Act, all servants of the Company, civil and military, are expressly prohibited from accepting "from any of the Indian princes or powers, or their ministers or agents (or any of the natives of Asia), any present, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwise, on any account, or on any pretence whatsoever;" and by another regulation, all the ordinary nuzzurs or presents which it would be deemed an affront to the donor not to receive, are to be handed over to the Company. The only alternative remaining to Mr. Hastings, therefore, was to decline the present, or having accepted it, to pay over the amount into the Company's treasury. Once there, it must have appeared in the accounts, and could at any future time be traced. Mr. Hastings adopted a different course. He accepted the £100,000, as if for himself, expended it in the service of the Company, and then asked the directors to make his fortune by sanctioning his appropriation of it as a present. This request, contained in a letter dated 20th January, 1782, about four months after his acceptance of the gift, in September, 1781, was in the following terms:—"I accepted it without hesitation, and gladly, being entirely destitute both of means and credit, whether for your service or the relief

of my own necessities. It was made not in specie, but in bills. What I have received has been laid out in the public service; the rest shall be applied to the same account. The nominal sum is ten lacs Oudh currency. As soon as the whole is completed, I shall send you a faithful account of it, resigning the disposal of it to the pleasure of your honourable court. If you shall adjudge the disposal to me, I shall consider it as the most honourable appointment and reward of my labours, and I wish to owe my fortune to your bounty. I am now in my fiftieth year; I have passed thirty-one years in your service. My conscience allows me boldly to claim the merit of zeal and integrity, nor has fortune been unpropitious to their exertions. To these qualities I bound my pretensions. I shall not repine, if you shall deem otherwise of my services; nor ought your decision, however it may disappoint my hope of a retreat adequate to the consequence and elevation of the office which I now possess, to lessen my gratitude for having been so long permitted to hold it, since it has at least permitted me to lay up a provision with which I can be contented in a more humble station."

In making the above request, Mr. Hastings committed two important mistakes. He asked the directors for a gift which they could not bestow without flying in the face of an act of parliament; and he asked it under the impression that he stood high in favour with the directors, whereas his letter must have reached them about the very time when they were meditating his removal from office, in compliance with the following resolution adopted by the House of Commons, on the 30th of May, 1782:—"Resolved that Warren Hastings, Esq., governor-general, and William Hornby, Esq., president of the council at Bombay, having in sundry instances acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on India, and enormous expenses on the Company, it is the duty of the directors to pursue all legal and effectual means for the removal of the said governor-general and president from their respective offices, and to recall them to Great Britain." The parliamentary proceedings which issued in the adoption of the above resolution, and the course subsequently taken by the directors and the court of proprietors, must be briefly explained.

The exclusive privileges of the Company were to expire on three years' notice, given at any time after the 25th of March, 1780, and many communications passed between the ministry and the directors, with a view to a future arrangement. The points chiefly debated were the claim of the crown to all the territories which the Company had acquired, and the amount of payment which the Company ought to make to the public in return for their exclusive privileges. The precarious position of Lord North's ministry at the time, gave the directors advantages of which they did not fail to avail themselves, and the act which was passed left the more important of these questions still open. This act (21 Geo. III c. 65) left the Company in possession of all their former privileges till three years' notice after the 1st of March, 1791; accepted of a sum of £400,000 as full payment of the arrears due to the public under former arrangement; and provided that in future, after payment of a dividend of eight per cent out of the clear profits, the public should receive three-fourths of any surplus that might arise. The only part of the act seriously affecting the constitution of the Company was a section providing that, as the Company were already bound to communicate to government all despatches received from India, so they should in future be bound to communicate and submit for approval all despatches which they proposed to transmit to India. While the attention of parliament was thus directed to Indian affairs, two important committees were appointed—the one a select committee, restricted at first to the examination of the proceedings relative to the jurisdiction of the supreme court at Calcutta, but afterwards empowered to extend their inquiries generally to the administration of justice and government in Bengal; the other a secret committee, to inquire into the causes of the Carnatic war and the state of the Company's possessions on the coast. Mr. Burke took the lead in the one committee, Mr. Henry Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, was chairman of the other. From the two, eighteen reports (twelve from the select and six from the secret committee) were received, containing a vast mass of important matter, and still affording the best materials for the history of India during the period to which they refer.

On the 9th of April, 1782, Mr. Dundas, in moving that the reports of the secret committee should be referred to, a com-

mittee of the whole house entered very fully into the merits of the transactions to which they referred, and concluded with a long series of resolutions, relating partly to the general system of government, and partly to the affairs of the Carnatic. A bill of pains and penalties, founded on those relating to the latter head, was immediately brought in against Sir Thomas Rumbold, the late governor, and Messrs. Whitehill and Perring, late members of the council of Madras, for breaches of public trust and high crimes and misdemeanours. In March, 1782, Lord North's ministry had been succeeded by that of the Marquis of Rockingham, and this again, owing to his sudden death in the following July, by that of the Earl of Shelburne. The attention of parliament was so much engrossed by domestic politics, that Mr. Dundas's bill of pains and penalties had only passed a second reading when the session closed. In the spring of 1783 another ministerial change took place by the famous coalition between Lord North and Mr. Fox, and when parliament again met, the bill of pains and penalties continued to languish. In December the coalition ministry was dismissed, and Mr. Pitt became first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer. A few days afterwards the bill was finally dropped.

The resolution for the dismissal of Mr. Hastings, quoted above, was moved by Mr. Dundas during the Rockingham ministry, and would in all probability have been carried into effect, had not this ministry been suddenly dissolved, since Mr. Burke, though only paymaster of the forces, was one of its most influential members, and had already expressed his decided condemnation of the governor-general's conduct. The directors accordingly seemed disposed to give immediate effect to the resolution, when they found their hands tied up by the proprietors, who, at a special general court, held on the 19th of June, 1782, adopted the following spirited resolution:—"That the removing of Warren Hastings, Esq., the governor-general of Bengal, or any servants of the Company, merely in compliance with a vote of the House of Commons, without being satisfied that the grounds of delinquency against the said Warren Hastings, or such other servants, are sufficient of themselves to vindicate the directors in coming to such resolution, would weaken the confidence which the

servants of the Company ought to entertain of the justice of their employers, and will tend to destroy that independency which the proprietors of East India stock ought to enjoy in the management of their own affairs." Appended to this resolution was a recommendation to the directors not to give effect to any decision on the subject till it had received the approbation of a general court. The directors were so puzzled how to act, that they discussed the question at eleven meetings, held between the 20th of June and the 2nd of October. Ultimately they adopted a series of resolutions, which, after declaring that their policy had always been "to abstain from schemes of conquest," and "to confine their views to a system of defence," but "that a contrary system of policy has been adopted and pursued by the Company's servants in India," in disobedience to the well-advised orders of their superiors, concluded that "a steady perseverance in the system of conduct, so frequently enjoined by the court of directors, cannot be expected from those whose ideas of extension of dominion, either by negotiation or conquest, have led them to depart from orders so often enforced, and therefore, that it is expedient to remove Warren Hastings, Esq., from the office of governor-general of Bengal." These resolutions were met by counter-resolutions on the part of the proprietors, who, at a special general court, held on the 21st of October, adopted a motion declaring "that the war in which we are now engaged with the Marathas was evidently founded on the sentiments of the court of directors, conveying demands on the Maratha administration greatly exceeding the conditions of the treaty of Purandhar"—that "consequently it would be the height of injustice to lay the blame of that war, or the evils which have flowed from it, upon Mr. Hastings"—that "the government-general of Bengal were using every means in their power to effect a general pacification"—that this conduct "merits the warmest approbation of the court"—and "that therefore it would be evidently injurious to the interest of the Company and the nation to remove any of those principal servants of the Company, now discharging their duty with such uncommon exertions, ability, and unanimity."

In accordance with these opinions, the general court "recommended to the court of directors to rescind their late

resolution respecting the removal of Warren Hastings, Esq., governor-general of Bengal." This motion, when tested by a ballot, taken on the 31st of October, was carried by a large majority. The directors, in consequence, rescinded their resolution, and prepared a general letter to India announcing the result. Here, however, a serious difficulty occurred. By the recent act of 1781, it was necessary to submit the letter before transmitting it for the approval of government. This approval was distinctly refused. Mr. Secretary Townsend intimated that the resolution not to remove Mr. Hastings was so repugnant to the sense of the House of Commons, that he had received his majesty's commands to withhold all approbation and to prohibit the transmission of it; and Mr. Dundas, when moving that all proceedings relating to it should be laid before parliament, denounced it in still stronger terms.

While the question of removing Mr. Hastings was thus discussed, he was himself preparing to supersede it by a voluntary resignation. He had received a letter from the directors, condemning his conduct at Benaras, and declaring his treatment of the raja unwarrantable and highly impolitic. The unqualified terms in which the condemnation was pronounced, seemed to him to justify the use of equally unqualified terms in answer, and he replied, in a letter to the court, dated 20th March, 1783:—"I understand that these resolutions regarding Chait Singh were either published or intended for publication; the authority from whence they proceed leads to the belief of the fact. Who are the readers? Not the proprietors alone, whose interest is immediately concerned in them, and whose approbation I am impelled by every motive of pride and gratitude to solicit, but the whole body of the people of England, whose passions have been excited on the general subject of the conduct of their servants in India; and before them I am arraigned and prejudged of a violation of the national faith in acts of such complicated aggravation, that if they were true, no punishment short of death could atone for the injury which the interest and credit of the public has sustained from them." After arguing the question, and remarking that "it is now eleven years since I first received the nominal charge of your affairs," and that "in the course of that time I have had invariably to contend not only with ordinary difficulties, but with such

as most naturally arose from the opposition of those very powers from whom I primarily derived my authority, and which were required for the support of it," he concludes thus:—"It therefore remains for me to perform the duty which I had assigned myself as the final purpose of this letter, to declare, as I now most formally do, that it is my desire that you will be pleased to obtain the early nomination of a person to succeed me in the government of Fort William; to declare that it is my intention to resign your service, as soon as I can do it without prejudice to your affairs, after the allowance of a competent time for your choice of a person to succeed me; and to declare that if, in the intermediate time, you shall proceed to order the restoration of Raja Chait Singh to the zamindary from which he was dispossessed for crimes of the greatest enormity, and your council shall resolve to execute the order, I will instantly give up my station and the service." Even at this time, when expressing himself thus strongly, he was not without an expectation of still retaining his office, for he immediately says: "To these declarations suffer me to add this reservation, that if in the meantime the acts of which I complain shall, on a mature revision of them, be revoked, and I shall find myself possessed of such a degree of your confidence as shall enable me to discharge the duties of my station, I will continue it until the peace of all your possessions shall be restored, or it shall be your pleasure to allow me to resign it." In a subsequent letter, referring to the same subject, he says: "At whatever period your decision may arrive, may the government fall into the hands of a person invested with the powers of his office, not disgraced as I have been with an unsubstantial title without authority, and with a responsibility without the means of discharging it."

In this state of suspense it is rather singular that he undertook a journey to Lucknow, though he must have foreseen that it would occupy the greater part of a year, and that not improbably during his absence his successor might arrive. His own explanation, as given in a pamphlet which he published,¹ is that his resolution to resign was not absolute but conditional, and that he considered himself pledged to execute it, only provided "no circumstance intervened which might lessen the

¹ *Memoirs relative to the State of India*, p. 21.

weight of it as an engagement, or which, as a superior claim, might require it to be suspended. In effect," he continues, "such a contingency did actually come to pass within a very few months after the date of my letter. This originated in an appeal which was made by the nabob vizir and his ministers against the acts of Mr. Bristow, the Company's resident at his court, and impelled me by every tie of justice, honour, and public duty, to sacrifice every consideration that regarded myself alone, if necessary for his redress." Thus impelled, Mr. Hastings set out for Lucknow, on the 17th of February, 1784, and reached it on the 27th of March. During the journey he passed through Benaras, and had ample opportunity of contemplating the results of the revolution effected in that province. Under Chait Singh, as well as under his father Balwant Singh, it had enjoyed a high degree of prosperity. The striking contrast which it now presented he has himself candidly recorded. "From the confines of Buxar to Benaras, I was followed and fatigued by the clamours of discontented inhabitants. The distresses which were produced by the long-continued drought unavoidably tended to heighten the general discontent; yet I have reason to fear that the cause existed principally in a defective, if not a corrupt and oppressive administration." He afterwards says, "I have seen nothing but traces of devastation in every village," and "I cannot help remarking that except the city of Benaras, the province is in effect without a government. The administration of the province is misconducted and the people oppressed, trade discouraged, and the revenue in danger of a rapid decline, from the violent appropriation of its means." At Lucknow, Mr. Hastings made free use of the ample powers which his colleagues had conceded to him. He withdrew a detachment of the Company's troops stationed on the frontiers of Oudh, because the nabob complained of it as eating up his revenues without yielding him any equivalent service in return; and removed the resident, not with the intention of appointing a successor, but avowedly for the purpose of enabling the nabob to exercise an uncontrolled sovereignty. To this course he had previously been opposed, because he maintained that the nabob was a mere cipher in the hands of his minister Hyder Beg Khan, "as he ever must be in the hands of some

person." Now, however, from some sudden revolution in his views, he insisted that this cipher should have all the authority which his minister thought proper to ask for him, because, as he was now pleased to argue, "justice and good faith" cut off "every pretext for exercising any authority in the country, while the sovereign of it fulfils the engagement which he has contracted with the Company." While at Lucknow, Mr. Hastings was not indisposed to enter into some kind of treaty with the Mughul, then at Delhi, but the idea not receiving any countenance from his colleagues was dropped.

Mr. Hastings left Lucknow on the 27th of August, and arrived in Calcutta on the 4th of November, after an absence of nine months. His letter to the directors on the subject of his resignation still remained unanswered. To what was this long delay to be ascribed? Had the directors been prevented by circumstances from arriving at any decision? or, having accepted of the resignation as if it had been a matter of course, had they deemed it unnecessary to take any further notice of it? The latter appears to have been the view taken by Mr. Hastings, and therefore within three weeks of his return he wrote them as follows: "If the next regular advices should contain, either the express acceptance of my resignation of the service, or your tacit acquiescence, I shall relinquish my office to the gentleman who stands next to me in the prescribed order of succession, and return to England as soon as the ship *Berrington* can be made ready to sail." As a reason for thus taking the decision into his own hands he adds, "I do not believe this government will ever be invested with its proper powers till I am removed from it, nor can it much longer subsist without them. I am therefore a hurtful encumbrance on it, and my removal, whenever or however effected, will be a relief to it." After two months more had elapsed without an answer, he received accounts from England which satisfied him that all idea of continuing in office must be abandoned. His last communication to the directors on the subject, written on the 10th of January, 1785, contained the following passage:—"I conceive it now to be impossible for your commands to require my stay, on the terms in which I might have had the presumption to suppose within the line of possibility; were such to be your

pleasure, it is scarcely possible for your commands, on any subject which could concern my stay, to arrive before the season required for my departure. I rather feel the wish to avoid the receipt of them than to await their coming, and I consider myself in this act as the fortunate instrument of dissolving the frame of an inefficient government pernicious to your interests, and disgraceful to the national character." Accordingly, on the 1st of February, he formally delivered the keys of Fort William and of the treasury to Mr. Macpherson, the senior councillor, and on the 8th finally quitted the shores of India.

The accounts from England, which seemed to Mr. Hastings to leave him no alternative, and to compel his immediate departure, are understood to have related to the various ministerial changes which had taken place, and the various parliamentary proceedings of which India was the subject. In the course of nine months three distinguished statesmen had aspired to the honour of being its legislators, and with that view brought forward bills which still possess historical importance. The first in order was the bill introduced by Mr. Dundas on the 14th of April, 1783. It proposed, as its leading provisions, to give the crown a power of recalling the principal servants of the Company, to define more accurately the extent of control which the governor-general and council of Bengal were entitled to exercise over the other presidencies, and to authorize the governor-general to act, whenever he should deem it expedient, on his own responsibility, should he happen to differ in opinion with the majority of his colleagues. This bill had been framed while the Shelburne ministry was in office, but as that ministry had fallen nine days before it was introduced, Mr. Dundas, seeing no prospect of carrying it, allowed it to drop.

The second bill was introduced on the 18th of November, only a week after the meeting of a new parliament, by Mr. Fox, who had become a secretary of state, and ministerial leader of the House of Commons, in consequence of the coalition of his party with that of Lord North. It was entitled "A bill for vesting the affairs of the East India Company in the hands of certain commissioners for the benefit of proprietors and the public." In accordance with this title, it proposed not so much to reform, as to revolutionize the existing constitution of

the Company, and proceeded on the following preamble:—
“Whereas disorders of an alarming nature and magnitude have long prevailed and do still continue and increase, in the management of the territorial possessions, the revenues, and the commerce of this kingdom in the East Indies; by means whereof the prosperity of the natives hath been greatly diminished, and the valuable interests of this nation in the said territorial possessions, revenues, and commerce, have been materially impaired, and would probably fall into utter ruin if an immediate and fitting remedy were not provided.” Assuming this preamble to be proved, there was no use in attempting half measures. The whole body was totally and incurably corrupt, and was only to be saved from destruction by being deprived of all means of hurting itself. The proposal therefore was to place it under trust for a period of four years. With this view, the court of directors and the general court of proprietors were both to be abolished, and all their powers, so far as not altered by the new act, were to be conferred on seven directors, and nine assistant-directors, the latter, however, being restricted to the management of the commerce only, and being even in this “under and subject to the orders and directions” of the former, who alone were to have “full power and authority” to govern, order, and manage the whole affairs of the Company, and in particular “to remove, displace, suspend, appoint, confirm, or restore all and every person whatsoever, from or to any office, station, or capacity whatever, civil or military.” Both the directors, of whom no special qualification was required, and the assistant-directors, who behaved to be proprietors possessing at least £2,000 of stock, were named in the bill, but in the occurrence of vacancies they were to be supplied, in the case of directors, by the crown, and in the case of assistant-directors, by the proprietors, who, it was specially provided, were not to “vote by ballot, or in any other covert or concealed manner, but in an open court” specially summoned for the purpose. The assistant-directors might be removed for misconduct by a vote of five directors; and both directors and assistant-directors were removable by the crown on the address of either House of Parliament. Neither directors nor assistant-directors were to hold any office whatsoever in the service of the Company, nor any place of profit under the crown during

pleasure. No mention was made of any payment to the directors, but each assistant-director was to have a salary of £500 a year. Other sections of the bill contained various provisions for enabling the directors to settle the differences which might arise between the supreme council and the subordinate presidencies, or between governors and their councils, to redress the grievances of native and protected princes, and prevent or punish other ascertained abuses. It is unnecessary, however, to enter further into detail, as the bill, instead of becoming law, proved the ruin of the ministry which had ventured to propose it. This was owing, not so much to its own demerits, though these were neither few nor small, as to adventitious causes, the most powerful of which was the avowed hostility of the king, who went so far as to intrust Earl Temple with a written note, in which his majesty declared that "he should deem those who should vote for it (the bill) not only not his friends, but his enemies, and that if Lord Temple could put it in stronger words, he had full authority to do so." Before this note was written the bill had passed the commons by a majority of 208 to 102, and been read a first time in the lords. On the second reading the effect of the king's note was strikingly manifested. Several peers who had intrusted the minister with their proxies withdrew them only a few hours before the house met, others accustomed to be his supporters voted in opposition, and the bill was thrown out by a majority of eighty-seven to seventy-nine. The dismissal of the coalition ministry immediately followed, and Mr. Pitt became first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer.

The state of political parties was now singular. Mr. Fox's bill, rejected by the lords, had been carried in the commons by a majority of more than two to one, and this majority, though gradually dwindling down, still continued so great that the new ministry sustained a succession of defeats. One of these took place on the introduction of a third East India bill, which, having been brought in by Mr. Pitt on the 16th of January, 1784, after leave obtained, and been read a second time on the 23rd, was thrown out, on the motion for its being committed, by a majority of 222 to 214. Immediately on its rejection, as if India were now by mutual consent the battle-field on which

the struggle between the two great political parties in the state was to be decided, Mr. Fox gave notice of his intention to bring in another bill "for the better regulation and management of the affairs of the East India Company." This intention he was not permitted to carry out. His majority in the commons had almost disappeared, that against him in the lords had rapidly increased; and the general dissatisfaction felt at the coalition, in which everything like principle seemed to have been sacrificed for the attainment of place, left no room to doubt that ministers might, by dissolving parliament, gain a large accession of strength. So conscious, indeed, were Mr. Fox and his party of this fact, that they had endeavoured to prevent the realization of it, by moving and carrying an address to his majesty against a dissolution. This extreme measure, by increasing the unpopularity of its supporters, only precipitated the appeal to the constituencies. The result was to give ministers a powerful majority.

Shortly after the new parliament met, Mr. Pitt again brought in an East India bill. Though differing little from the former, which the commons had rejected, it now passed with comparative ease through both houses, and having received the royal assent on the 13th of August, 1784, ranks in the statute book as 24 Geo. III. c. 25. It is entitled "An act for the better regulation and management of the affairs of the East India Company, and of the British possessions in India; and for establishing a court of judicature, for the more speedy and effectual trial of persons accused of offences committed in the East Indies." Its distinguishing feature is the establishment of a board of commissioners, since usually designated, though not in the act itself, the Board of Control, because designed to "superintend, direct, and control all acts, operations, and concerns which in any wise relate to the civil or military government, or revenues of the British possessions in the East Indies." The board, nominated by the crown, and at all times revocable by it, was to consist of not more than six individuals, privy councillors, of whom one was to be a principal secretary of state, and another the chancellor of the exchequer. The secretary of state, or, in his absence, the chancellor of the exchequer, or, in the absence of both, the senior member was to preside. As the

former two could seldom if ever attend, the effect of this arrangement was to make the senior member the only actual president, and thus procure for him the usual designation of president of the board of control. The board was to have free access to all the papers of the Company, and the directors were not only to deliver to it all papers and despatches relating to civil and military government or revenue, but to obey whatever orders and instructions the board might be pleased to give respecting them. The only matters not submitted to the control of the board were the commercial; and as it was possible that the board and the directors might differ in opinion as to the subject-matter of a despatch, the one holding it to belong to one of the classes of subjects placed under control, and the other holding it to be strictly commercial, it was provided that in all such cases of difference, his majesty in council should decide without appeal.

Nominally the court of directors and the general court of proprietors were to be constituted as before, and exercise all the rights of patronage, and other privileges which they previously possessed; in reality, however, they were essentially changed, not merely by the very establishment of the board, but by other special provisions in the act. Thus, by section 29, the proprietors were prohibited from interfering to alter any order once approved by the board; and by sections 15 and 16, the directors as a body were excluded not only from the management, but even from the knowledge of all transactions "concerning the levying of war or making of peace, or treating or negotiating with any of the native princes or states in India." This great constitutional change was effected by the establishment of a secret committee. This committee, consisting of not more than three of their number, the directors were enjoined to appoint, and through these three the board might transmit and give effect to all their orders relating to the above important transactions. Again, while by section 19 it was expressly declared that the board were not to have the "power of nominating or appointing any of the servants the said United Company," it was enacted by section 22, that the power of removing or recalling any servant, high or low, civil or military, might be exercised not merely by the directors, but by the crown. The obvious

tendency, and, as will afterwards be seen, the practical result of this absolute power of recall, was to enable the crown to monopolize as much India patronage as it might choose to claim, since every nomination not made in accordance with its wishes it could at once nullify by recalling the nominee.

With regard to the management in India, few constitutional changes were made. The superiority of the governor-general to his colleagues was to remain restricted as before to a casting vote; but both in Bengal and the other presidencies, the number of councillors was to be reduced to three, of whom the commander-in-chief was always to be one, and to rank immediately after the governor. He was not, however, unless specially appointed, to succeed to the chair during a temporary vacancy, as the next senior councillor might. In order to define more accurately the relations of the supreme council and the other presidencies, it was enacted by section 31 that "the governor-general and council of Fort William aforesaid shall have power and authority to superintend, control, and direct the several presidencies and governments now or hereafter to be erected or established in the East Indies by the said united Company, in all such points as relate to any transactions with the country powers, or to war or peace, or to the application of the revenues or forces of such presidencies and settlements in time of war, or any other points as shall from time to time be specially referred by the court of directors of the said Company to their superintendence and control. Where doubts might arise as to whether the supreme council were not exceeding the above jurisdiction, the subordinate presidencies were still in the meantime to obey. In regard to foreign policy, the 34th section declares and enacts as follows:—"Whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of this nation," therefore "it shall not be lawful for the governor-general and council of Fort William aforesaid, without the express command and authority of the said court of directors, or the secret committee of the said court of directors, in any case (except where hostilities have actually been commenced, or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities, against the British nation in India, or against some of the

princes or states dependent thereon, or whose territories the said united Company shall be at such time engaged by any subsisting treaty to defend or guarantee), either to declare war or commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war against any of the country princes or states in India, or any treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any country, provinces, or states; and that in such case, it shall not be lawful for the said governor-general and council to declare war or commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war against any other prince or state, than such as shall be actually commencing hostilities, or making preparations as aforesaid; or to make such treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any prince or state, but upon the consideration of such prince or state actually engaging to assist the Company against such hostile commencement, or preparations made as aforesaid."

Among the various other provisions of the act, it may be sufficient simply to mention one series designed to prevent corrupt accumulation in India, by compelling the servants of the Company on their return to furnish inventories of their property on oath and under heavy penalties; another series erecting a new court in this country for the trial of offences committed in India by British subjects; and separate sections prohibiting presents, fixing the rule of appointment by seniority, enforcing economy, redressing the complaints of zamindars, and others arranging the Nabob of Arcot's debts, and settling disputes between him and the Raja of Tanjore. The provisions for the disclosures of property proved so inquisitorial, that they were formally repealed after the lapse of only two years by 26 Geo. III. c. 16, which also supplied an important defect in the above act, by authorizing the governor-general, as proposed by Mr. Dundas's bill, to act in certain cases on his own responsibility, even in opposition to the majority of his council, and allowed the offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief to be united in one person. The new court, though not abolished, was so clumsily contrived, that no proceedings ever took place under it.

BOOK VI

W. J. L. L.

Lord Cornwallis

WHEN Mr. Hastings quitted Bengal without waiting for the arrival of a regularly appointed successor, temporary possession of the chair was taken by Mr. John Macpherson, to whom it of right belonged as the senior member of council. This was the gentleman who was formerly seen intriguing for the Nabob of Arcot with the British ministry, and was rewarded for his zealous exertions to injure the Company, by the appointment of a writership in the presidency of Madras. His possession of talent, and more especially of that kind of talent which gains patronage, and thereby secures advancement, was fully evinced by his subsequent career. Governor Dupre, shortly after his return from England, admitted him to his confidence, and employed him in writing his despatches. Thus patronized, he in 1774 obtained the lucrative appointment of paymaster to the army. In 1776, he sustained what seemed to be a serious reverse of fortune, though it ultimately paved the way for his higher promotion. A memorial, detailing the manner in which he had intrigued for the nabob, had somehow fallen into the hands of Lord Pigot. It is probable that in the disputes which then prevailed at Madras, Mr. Macpherson had strenuously espoused the cause of his ancient patron; and that his lordship, who had been specially sent out to oppose the claims of the nabob, and reinstate the Raja of Tanjore in his territories, was not unwilling to use the memorial for the purpose of ridding himself of formidable opponent. He therefore caused Mr. Macpherson to be summoned before the council, and interrogated whether he acknowledged the memorial as his production. Having given what was held to be an evasive answer, he was forthwith, without being called upon for his

defence, dismissed from the Company's service. On his return to England, he appealed to the directors, a majority of whom seem to have been easily satisfied that he ought to be restored, but were puzzled how to proceed. By the Regulating Act, a servant dismissed could not be restored without the concurrence of three-fourths of the directors and three-fourths of the proprietors. Was this requisite in the present instance, or would a mere majority suffice? The Company's standing counsel, while admitting that the dismissal was informal, held rather inconsistently that the concurrence of three-fourths was required, and volunteered advice on a subject on which it was not asked, by adding to his opinion the following postscript:—"It is worth considering, if Mr. Macpherson should be restored, whether he is a proper person to be continued in the Company's service. He had in my opinion too much connection with the Nabob of Arcot; and when the Company's interest and the nabob's are affected, as they will often happen, they will greatly disturb a man of honour and integrity." The directors, not yet satisfied, consulted the solicitor-general, Mr. Wedderburn, afterwards Lord-chancellor Loughborough, who solved the difficulty in a more lawyer-like manner, by holding that an irregular dismissal was in fact no dismissal at all, and consequently that the only thing now necessary was to declare that Mr. Macpherson was still in the service.

The directors, in acting upon this opinion, thought it necessary to soften the proceeding to the Madras council by adding, when they announced to them Mr. Macpherson's restoration, that, "as his behaviour was disrespectful to the board, and in other particulars very reprehensible, we direct that you give him a severe reprimand, and acquaint him that a like conduct will meet with a severer punishment." The directors could hardly have been serious in this part of the sentence, since they allowed him to remain in England till January, 1781, and then sent him out, not to Madras, but to Bengal, to supply the place rendered vacant in the supreme council by the resignation of Mr. Barwell. This brought him so near the chair that Mr. Hastings' departure placed him in it, and thus, by a train of circumstances, an individual, over whose head a sentence of censure for conduct "very reprehensible" hung suspended, became Governor-general of India.

It is doubtful if any amount of administrative skill would have enabled Mr. Macpherson to surmount the obstacles arising from his early antecedents, and prove himself worthy of the honour which had been unexpectedly thrust upon him, and it was fortunate, both for him and the Company, that the short period during which he held the chair was one of comparative quiescence. He is far, however, from admitting that he had an easy task to perform. On the contrary, on the 4th of March, 1785, only a month after he had obtained his elevation, he declared in a letter to the directors—"The public distress was never so pressing as at this moment. The season of the heavy collections is over: the demands of Madras and Bombay are most pressing; and our arrears to the army are upwards of fifty lacs." At a later period, when made aware of the appointment of a successor, and naturally desirous to set his own conduct in the most favourable light, he reminded the directors that he had become their governor-general "at a season of peculiar difficulty, when the close of a ruinous war, and the relaxed habits of their service, had left all their armies in arrear and their presidencies in disorder." Some credit was given to Mr. Macpherson for financial ability, and for the exertions which he made to meet the pressure on the treasury, by enforcing economy and effecting reduction wherever it was practicable. Partly as a reward for this conduct, and partly also, it is presumed, for political services rendered at various times, he was created a baronet on the 10th of June, 1786. The directors also, when they appointed his successor, gave him an unanimous vote of thanks for his whole conduct as governor-general. It would seem, however, that in this vote they were somewhat premature, and that more careful inquiry would have thrown considerable doubts, both on the success and the purity of his administration. Promises of assistance, which he had unwarrantably made to the Marathas, placed his successor in a dilemma from which he found extreme difficulty in escaping, without serious offence either to them or to Tipu, who, if such assistance had been given, would justly have complained of it as a gross violation of treaty; and Lord Cornwallis, writing confidentially to Mr. Dundas, does not hesitate to say, "I depend on your secrecy, and will not conceal from you that the

late government (Sir John Macpherson's) had no authority, and the grossest frauds were daily committed before their faces; their whole conduct, and all their pretensions to economy, except in the reduction of salaries, was a scene of delusion."¹ At a later period, when Sir John Macpherson was proposing to return to India, not seriously, but in the hope that the proposal might induce government to grant him a pension, Lord Cornwallis again wrote Mr. Dundas as follows (vol. i. p. 371): "That the former (Sir J. Macpherson) does not return to India, is indeed a fortunate event: but his being officially permitted to return, and his having been within a few days of embarking, has had an effect not easily to be removed. What must the people of this country, either Europeans or natives, imagine? They have seen that our measures have been as widely different as, I trust, they believe our dispositions and characters to be." Again, he asks, "Why does Mr. Dundas let him return? Why does he not tell him, when he talks of grievances and pensions, that he may think himself well off that he is not impeached?—that he was guilty of a breach of an act of parliament in the offer which he made of aid to the Poona government; and that he was guilty of basely degrading the national character by the quibbles and lies which he made use of to evade the performance of it;—that his government was a system of the dirtiest jobbing?" As Lord Cornwallis, at the time when he used this strong language, was personally offended at a rumour which Sir John Macpherson had circulated respecting him, perhaps some deduction ought to be made from this bitter censure, but his lordship never would have written in such terms without having ample proof that his charges were well founded, and that Sir John Macpherson, whose large stature and soft plausible manner had given him the surname of "the gentle giant," was indeed what his antecedents lead us to expect—an unscrupulous intriguer and wholesale dealer in corruption.

During Sir John Macpherson's tenure of office, Lord Macartney paid a visit to Calcutta. He had been mainly instrumental in obtaining the assignment of the nabob's revenues,

¹ *Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis*; edited, with notes, by Charles Ross, Esq., vol. i, p. 213.

and was convinced that the only effectual method of making these revenues available, both for the current expenses of government, and the liquidation of the debt due by the nabob to the Company, was to make that assignment permanent. This proposal was of course most obnoxious to the nabob, who insisted, with some show of reason, that, as the assignment had been originally made on the understanding that it was to exist only during the war, it was a breach of good faith to insist on continuing it, now that the war had ceased. In this view the nabob was strenuously supported by Paul Benfield and the other so-called creditors of the nabob, who left no means untried to prejudice both the supreme council and the court of directors against Lord Macartney's plan. With the supreme council they were completely successful, and Mr. Hastings, now at open war with his lordship, had peremptorily enjoined him to make the re-assignment to the nabob without delay. The court of directors at first took an opposite view, but ultimately were induced, or rather perhaps compelled to change it, as the Board of Control was now in full operation, and had espoused the cause of Benfield and his coadjutors. Lord Macartney had braved the indignation of the supreme council, and in effect defied Mr. Hastings to do his worst by refusing to obey his orders. The same course could not be pursued with the directors, more especially as they were now understood only to express the sentiments of the government, and he therefore adopted the only alternative which could save his consistency by resigning. The resignation, however, was not a sudden thought. He had previously, on the ground of ill health, requested the appointment of a successor, and the same letter which ordered the restoration of the assignment, informed him that he was to be succeeded by Mr. Hollond, who, being already in the country, could enter on office at once. There was thus nothing to prevent Lord Macartney from carrying his resolution into immediate effect. Previous to the arrival of the final decision of the directors on the subject of the assignment, he had prepared for the worst. "Well apprised," he says, "of the nabob's extensive influence, and of the ability, industry, and vigilance of his agents, and observing a concurrence of many other circumstances, I was not without apprehensions,

that before the government of Madras could have timely notice of the train, the assignment might be blown up at home, the sudden shock of which I knew must almost instantly overthrow the Company in the Carnatic. I therefore employed myself most assiduously in making preparations to mitigate the mischief; and by degrees collected and stored up all the money that it was possible to reserve with safety from other services and demands; so that, when the explosion burst upon us, I had provided an unexpected mass of little less than thirteen lacs of rupees (£130,000) to resist its first violence." Whatever relief this might give, the future was still to be provided for, and therefore Lord Macartney, now relieved from the toils of office, agreed, at the request of his late colleagues, instead of sailing direct for England, to pay a visit to Calcutta, and endeavour, by a full and strong representation of the pernicious consequences of reinstating the nabob, to obtain the sanction of the supreme council to a postponement. Success could scarcely have been anticipated, since at the very head of the council sat a man whose sympathies must have been wholly enlisted in favour of the nabob, and who, after exposing himself to obloquy by acting as his agent and sitting in parliament as his nominee, was not now likely to turn his back upon him. There was still another resource. Hopes had been held out that the revenues of Bengal were about to yield a surplus by which the deficiencies of the other presidencies would be supplied, but the prognosticated funds were not forthcoming, and the supreme council, when solicited on the subject, could only point to their own necessities, and declare their inability to "give any extraordinary and continued aid to Fort St. George."

While detained in Calcutta by illness, Lord Macartney received a flattering testimony to the value of his previous services, in a despatch from the directors appointing him governor-general. His health and other considerations induced him to decline the appointment, and, leaving Sir John Macpherson still in possession of the chair, he set sail for England. He did not then think that he had closed his Indian career. From the account of his biographer he appears not so much to have refused the appointment, as deferred acceptance of it till he should have had an opportunity of personally "submitting to his majesty's ministers certain

regulations, which he considered indispensable for the salvation of this part of the empire, and of laying before them those conditions on which only he felt himself able to fulfil the purposes of his appointment, with advantage to the public and reputation to himself."¹ When he arrived in England on the 9th of January, 1786, the appointment was still open, and he had conferences both with the directors and with ministers, by whom, while ostensibly disclaiming Indian patronage, the vacancy was truly to be supplied. His suggestions for the improvement of the administration in India were favourably received, and everything preparatory to his acceptance of the office seemed about to be arranged, when he intimated his expectation, that, instead of continuing only an Irish, he would be made a British peer. Mr. Dundas, who, as president of the Board of Control, had urged Lord Macartney's appointment, and Mr. Pitt, who, on his suggestion, had concurred in it, in the face of considerable opposition from members of his administration and a strong party in the India House, felt hurt at this stipulation for honours, and without further communication with Lord Macartney, immediately conferred the office of governor-general on Lord Cornwallis.

The re-assignment of the revenues to the nabob was not the part of his affairs which had at this time occupied the attention of the directors and the Board of Control. The enormous claims of debt which Paul Benfield and others had reared against him were threatening to absorb all his revenues, and it therefore became necessary to make some final arrangement respecting them. Accordingly each of the three India bills brought into parliament by Mr. Dundas, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Pitt, contained a special clause on the subject. Mr. Dundas's bill proposed to "take into consideration the present state of the affairs of the Nabob of Arcot, and inquire into and ascertain the origin, nature, and amount of his just debts." Mr. Fox, in addition to a similar inquiry, proposed to strike at the root of the evil by enacting that in future it should be "unlawful for any servant, civil or military, of the Company to be engaged in the borrowing or lending of any money, or in any money transactions whatsoever, with any protected or other native

¹ Barrow's *Life of Lord Macartney*, vol. i, p. 305.

prince," and that the Nabob of Arcot, the Raja of Tanjore, or any other protected native prince, should "not assign, mortgage, or pledge any land whatsoever, or the produce or revenue thereof, to any British subject whatsoever." The clause in Mr. Pitt's bill, the only one which became law, was as follows: "Whereas very large sums of money are claimed to be due to British subjects by the Nabob of Arcot, . . . be it enacted that the court of directors shall, as soon as may be, take into consideration the origin and justice of the said demands; and that they shall give such orders to their presidencies and servants abroad for completing the investigation thereof, as the nature of the case shall require; and for establishing, in concert with the nabob, such fund for the discharge of those debts which shall appear to be justly due, as shall appear consistent with the rights of the Company, the security of the creditors, and the honour and dignity of the said nabob."

In accordance with this enactment, the directors proceeded to "take into consideration the origin and justice" of these claims on the nabob, and "for completing the investigation," prepared the draft of a despatch instructing the Madras government how to proceed. Having submitted this draft for approval to the Board of Control, they were astonished, on receiving it back, to find it so completely altered as to retain little of its original identity. In particular, the investigation contemplated by the legislature was entirely superseded, and it was declared in regard to two important classes of debts, described as "the loan of 1767 and the loan of 1777, commonly called the cavalry loan," that their "origin and justice" was "clear and indisputable, agreeable to the true sense and spirit of the late act of parliament." A third class of debts, described as the "consolidated debt of 1777," was admitted to stand "upon a less favourable footing." It had been contracted at a time when "an irreversible order of the directors" prohibiting their people "from having any dealings with the country governments in money matters" was "in full force and vigour;" it had been declared by the Madras council not to have been "in any respect whatever conducted under the auspices or protection of that government;" and in December, 1778, as soon as the consolidation of that debt became known to the directors, they had

written as follows: "Your account of the nabob's private debts is very alarming; but from whatever cause or causes those debts have been contracted or increased, we hereby repeat our orders, that the sanction of the Company be on no account given to any kind of security for the payment or liquidation thereof (except by the express authority of the court of directors), on any account or pretence whatever." The consolidated debt, accordingly, had received "no sanction or authority," and the creditors moreover, when they made their alleged loans, were not only aware "how greatly the affairs of the nabob were at that time deranged," but had taken "the most effectual means to postpone" the payment of his debt to the Company, "by procuring an assignment of such specific revenues for the discharge of their own debts as alone could have enabled" him to meet it. This debt, thus accumulated in direct violation of a subsisting order of the directors, and to the direct injury of the Company, had certainly no claim to their countenance, and ought, at all events, to have been subjected to a most rigid examination. The Board of Control arrived at a different conclusion, and using the directors as their mouth-piece, gave their decision in the following terms:—

"Under all these circumstances we should be warranted to refuse our aid or protection to the recovery of this loan; but when we consider the inexpediency of keeping the subject of the nabob's debts longer afloat than is absolutely necessary; when we consider how much the final conclusion of this business will tend to promote tranquillity, credit, and circulation of property in the Carnatic; and when we consider that the debtor concurs with the creditor in establishing the justice of those debts consolidated in 1777 into gross sums, for which bonds were given, liable to be transferred to persons different from the original creditors, and having no share or knowledge of the transactions in which the debts originated, and of course how little ground there is to expect any substantial good to result from an unlimited investigation into them, we have resolved so far to recognize the justice of those debts as to extend to them that protection which, upon more forcible grounds, we have seen cause to allow to the other two classes of debts." The only distinction made between the debts was, that while the two former classes were to be admitted without

question, complaints might be received against the third class "at the instance, either of the nabob himself, or of other creditors injured by their being so admitted, or by any other persons having a proper interest, or stating reasonable grounds of objection."

In carrying out the above views the Board of Control classified the debts in the following manner:— 1. The debt of 1767 to be made up to the end of 1784, with the current interest at ten per cent. 2. The cavalry loan to be made up to the same period, with the current interest at twelve per cent. 3. The debt consolidated in 1777 to be made up to the same period, with the current interest at twelve per cent to November, 1781, and from thence, with the current interest at six per cent. Twelve lacs of pagodas (about £480,000) were to be received annually from the nabob, and applied to the liquidation of his debt in the following order:—1. To the growing interest on the cavalry loan at twelve per cent. 2. To the growing interest on the debt of 1777 at six per cent. The remainder was to be equally divided—one half given to settling the Company's debt, and the other half to paying the growing interest at ten per cent and towards the discharge of the principal of the debt of 1767. After the extinction of this debt a similar process was to be continued, the twelve lacs being applied, first, in paying the growing interest on the debt of 1777, and the remainder thereafter equally divided—one half to pay the current interest and principal of the cavalry loan, and the other half to discharge the Company's debt. On the extinction of the cavalry loan, seven lacs were to be employed in extinguishing the Company's debt, and five lacs in paying the growing interest and capital of 1777. On the extinction of the Company's debt, the whole twelve lacs were to be applied to the debt of 1777 till the whole was discharged.

This complicated arrangement seemed to the Board "founded on justice and the relative circumstances of the different debts." The directors thought differently, and proceeded to state objections to such of the amendments on their original draft as appeared to them "either insufficient, inexpedient, or unwarranted." In thus objecting, they appear not to have felt sure of their ground, and hence, besides expressing "extreme concern"

at a difference of opinion with the Board in this early exercise of their controlling power, employ the following apologetic terms: "In so novel an institution, it can scarce be thought extraordinary if the exact boundaries of our respective functions and duties should not at once, on either side, be precisely and familiarly understood, and we therefore confide in your justice and candour for believing that we have no wish to evade or frustrate the salutary purposes of your institution, as we on our part are thoroughly satisfied that you have no wish to encroach on the legal powers of the East India Company." The directors were evidently under the impression that they still possessed some degree of independent power. The result of their remonstrance on this occasion must have gone far to open their eyes, and convince them that whenever the Board of Control chose to be peremptory they had no alternative but to obey.

In regard to the private debts of the nabob, and the application of the twelve lacs annually, the directors submitted "that at least the opportunity of questioning, within the limited time, the justice of any of the debts, ought to have been fully preserved," and doubted "how far the express direction of the act to examine the nature and origin of the debts has been by the amended paragraphs complied with." In respect to the mode of payment they use stronger language and say, "Our duty requires that we should state our strongest dissent. Our right to be paid the arrears of those expenses by which, almost to our ruin, we have preserved the country, and all the property connected with it, from falling a prey to a foreign conqueror, surely stands paramount to all claims for former debts upon the revenues of a country so preserved, even if the legislature had not expressly limited the assistance to be given to private creditors to be such as should be consistent with our own rights." They conclude with declaring, "until our debt shall be discharged we can by no means consent to give up any part of the seven lacs to the private creditors; and we humbly apprehend that in this declaration we do not exceed the limits of the authority and rights vested in us." The Board of Control condescended to return an answer, but in a style which evinced a full consciousness of the extent of their powers. After endeavouring to show that the debt of the nabob, if taken at three

millions sterling, will, by the plan proposed, be discharged "in the course of the eleventh year," they continued thus: "We cannot, therefore, be of opinion that there is the smallest ground for objecting to this arrangement as injurious to the interests of the Company, even if the measure were to be considered on the mere ground of expediency, and with a view only to the wisdom of re-establishing credit and circulation in a commercial establishment, without any consideration of those motives of attention to the feelings and honour of the nabob, of humanity to individuals, and of justice to persons in your service and living under your protection, which have actuated the legislature, and which afford not only justifiable but commendable grounds for your conduct."

The directors after this rebuff were unable to carry their interference any further, but there was still another ordeal through which the resolution of the Board of Control was destined to pass. On the 28th of February, 1785, Mr. Fox brought the subject before parliament, by a motion "for papers relative to the direction for charging the Nabob of Arcot's private debts to Europeans on the revenues of the Carnatic." This motion was resisted by ministers, in a manner which showed that there was something behind the curtain which they were anxious to conceal. Mr. Burke drew the curtain aside, and in the celebrated speech from which we have more than once quoted, made it palpable, almost to demonstration, that the recognition of the debt without even the form of examination, was a shameless concession made to Paul Benfield, for the purpose of securing his parliamentary influence. After a damaging exposure of ministerial corruption, Mr. Burke sums up in the following terms:—"I have thus laid before you, I think with sufficient clearness, the connection of the ministers with Mr. Atkinson at the general election; I have laid open to you the connection of Atkinson with Benfield; I have shown Benfield's employment of his wealth in creating a parliamentary interest to procure a ministerial protection; I have set before your eyes his large concern in the debt, his practices to hide that concern from the public eye, and the liberal protection which he has received from the minister. If this chain of circumstances do not lead you necessarily to conclude that the minister has paid to the

avarice of Benfield the services done by Benfield's connection to his ambition, I do not know anything, short of the confession of the party, that can persuade you of his guilt. Clandestine and collusive practice can only be traced by combination and comparison of circumstances. To reject such combination and comparison is to reject the only means of detecting fraud; it is indeed to give it a patent and free licence to cheat with impunity." It is rather singular that at the time of the debate, no reply to this speech was attempted. One reason assigned is, that from the little impression which it produced on the house, Mr. Pitt, after consulting with Mr. Grenville, considered a reply unnecessary. A more probable reason is, that a reply was deemed inexpedient. Ministers knew it was easier to find votes than arguments, and therefore hastened to close a discussion, which, the longer it was continued, only made the infamy of the transaction more apparent. How large the sums which fictitious creditors were enabled to extort under this corrupt arrangement with Benfield may be inferred from the fact that, under a commission which afterwards sat to adjudicate on other enormous debts alleged to have been contracted by the Nabob of Arcot, out of £30,400,000 claimed, only £2,687,000 was allowed.

Lord Cornwallis arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of September, 1786, and immediately assumed the two offices, conjoined for the first time in his person, of governor-general and commander-in-chief. Nearly four years before, when the Shelburne ministry was in power, the office of governor-general had been offered to him, and declined on grounds similar to those which afterwards induced Lord Macartney to defer his acceptance; and it was partly with a view to remove the objections of Lord Cornwallis, that Mr. Dundas introduced into his East India bill the clause empowering the governor-general to act in certain emergencies on his own responsibility, even in opposition to the majority of his council. In introducing this bill, Mr. Dundas had not only urged the recall of Mr. Hastings, but advocated the appointment of Lord Cornwallis, on whom, by way of contrast, he pronounced an eulogy more remarkable for plainness of speech than elegance. "Here," he exclaimed, "there was no broken fortune to be mended! Here was no avarice to be gratified! Here was no beggarly mushroom kindred

to be provided for—no crew of hungry followers gaping to be gorged!" An eulogy, in a much better spirit than this vulgar tirade, was pronounced by Mr. Fox, who, in bringing in his East India bill, referred to the above clause, and spoke of Lord Cornwallis in the following terms:—"A learned gentleman (Mr. Dundas) last year proposed to give the most extraordinary power to the governor-general of Bengal; he at the same time named the person who was to fill the office. The person was Earl Cornwallis, a person whom I name now only for the purpose of paying homage to his great character. The name of such a man might make parliament consent to the vesting of such powers in a governor-general; but certain I am that nothing but the great character of that noble lord, could ever induce the legislature to commit such powers to an individual at the distance of half the globe." Mr. Pitt's East India bill did not contain Mr. Dundas's clause, and this may have been one reason why Mr. Dundas, when again in power, proposed that the appointment of governor-general should be offered, not to Lord Cornwallis, but to Lord Macartney. When, for reasons already explained, this appointment did not take effect, Lord Cornwallis was again applied to, and accepted, on being assured that the additional powers which he claimed, and the legal union of the offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief would be secured by a new application to parliament. Clauses to this effect were accordingly introduced into the bill, which was passed into act 26 Geo. III. c. 16, but had not received the royal assent when Lord Cornwallis sailed.

The new government undoubtedly commenced under favourable circumstances. The character of Lord Cornwallis, notwithstanding the disaster which had befallen him in America, stood justly high with all parties; at the head of the Board of Control, in which all the leading powers of the directors now centered, was his able and zealous friend, Henry Dundas; the absolute right of recall vested in the crown would be exercised the moment he intimated a wish to be rid of any member of his council who might threaten to be troublesome, and in the meantime, before the actual recall was pronounced, he could set opposition at defiance by acting as he was empowered to do on his own responsibility. The government of Sir John

Macpherson had been so feeble and defective, that there was no risk of suffering by any comparison which might be instituted, and all the presidencies, though exhausted by an expensive and unsuccessful war, were beginning to reap the fruits of the general peace which had succeeded it. Lord Cornwallis, it is true, was entering on a field which was entirely new to him, and being in consequence obliged for a time at least to rely on the judgments of those whose long service had given them experience, was liable to be led through bad advice into serious error. On the other hand, he had nothing to unlearn, no old opinions to renounce, no entanglements to escape, and no interests to serve but those of the public. Thus disencumbered of everything that could divert him from the path of duty, or thwart him in the discharge of it, he could hardly fail, in the exercise of the talents and virtues he was known to possess, to prove at once a popular and an efficient governor-general.

The first subject which engaged the attention of Lord Cornwallis, after he assumed the government, was the treaty which Sir John Macpherson had made with the Marathas, and by which he had bound the Company to furnish them with a body of troops. This treaty had been concluded in the very teeth of the act of parliament, and was a palpable violation of the treaty made with Tipu, since he was at that time actually engaged in hostilities with the Marathas, and could not but consider a supply of troops to them as equivalent to a declaration of war against himself. Within a fortnight after his arrival at Calcutta, Lord Cornwallis thus expressed his opinion in a letter to Mr. Dundas:—"You will see that we are got into a very awkward, foolish scrape, by offering assistance to the Marathas; how we shall get out of it with honour, God knows, but out of it we must get somehow, and give no troops."¹ Accordingly, on the 27th September, he lodged a minute, in which, after exposing the illegality and injustice of the treaty, he adds, "It is unnecessary to examine the policy of a measure we are not at liberty to adopt; we cannot give the three battalions without going to war; we cannot go to war without offending the laws of our country. It is therefore high time to extricate ourselves from our present critical and dangerous situation, the continuance of which will

¹ *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*, vol. i, p. 219.

not only give the most just grounds of offence to Tipu, but will probably produce a quarrel with the Poona ministers." The course adopted was to take the opportunity of the change in the government, to intimate to the Marathas that "a strict adherence to subsisting treaties" would not allow the troops to be supplied, and soften the intimation by referring to this decision, as a proof that the government was determined in their future conduct to be guided by "a spirit of justice." Nana Fudnavis and the other ministers at Poona, on receiving the intimation, expressed much disappointment, and even made strong charges of duplicity, but the plain and honest course which had been taken proved also to be the most politic, and no open rupture was produced.

The pecuniary position of the Company next engaged attention. The view which Lord Cornwallis took of it was almost desponding. In a letter addressed to the Duke of York, who was then, it seems, engaged "in the pursuit of military knowledge under the great authorities of Potsdam and Brunswick," he says, "The state of our finances is alarming, the difficulties are infinite; I feel that the whole may go to ruin in my hands, but I do not despair. I will not fail in my duty; I shall probably commit many errors, but I trust to the candid judgment of my king and country." To the directors he wrote, "While our unavoidable expensive establishments, the interest due upon our debts, and the demands from the other presidencies, absorb the produce of the revenues, a considerable investment can only be made by fresh issues of paper. By this mode the evil, though protracted, is increased. It exhibits a delusive appearance of wealth which cannot be supported, and, by a temporary accommodation, entails permanent distresses." His language would probably have been still more desponding, had he been at this time aware of the arrangement respecting the Nabob of Arcot's debts. In ignorance of that arrangement, he had proposed to leave the creditors to recover their debts as they could, and written in a letter to Mr. Dundas, "I trust you will have approved of discouraging Campbell's plan of taking that load on the shoulders of the Company, which I think are not able to bear this load of iniquity." How much must he have been disappointed and disgusted on learning that not only had this load of

iniquity been laid on the shoulders of the Company, but that in the doing of it another load of disgrace had been laid on the shoulders of the British government.

Shortly after the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, several of the native princes and other leading personages anxiously desired leave to visit Calcutta. The Nabob of Oudh, whose difficulties had continued to increase, proposed to come in person, but was at last satisfied on being permitted to send his minister. Hyder Beg Khan. From the accounts which he had received, the governor-general seems to have had some fears of being overmatched by him. "This minister," he says in a letter to the directors, "is described to me as a man of uncommon abilities, and he no doubt exercises at present the whole power of the vizir's government." Alluding to the same subject, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, he says, "I expect Hyder Beg in the course of next month, when I shall have a difficult game to play; but I think fairness, honesty, and firmness, will be a match for cunning, corruption, and timidity." The interviews which took place in February, 1787, when the visit was made, appear to have justified this opinion. The account which Lord Cornwallis gives of these interviews, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, is worth quoting. "I have had several interviews with Hyder Beg Khan, the vizir's minister. The total mismanagement of Oudh, the confused manner of stating accounts between the vizir and the Company, and the constant practice on the one part of trumping-up charges, to extort every rupee that it was possible to get, and on the other, of making use of every art and evasion to defer payment, have rendered it very difficult to establish a fair open line between us." "One great difficulty was to persuade the nabob's minister that the promises made to him would be kept." "Hyder Beg," continues the letter, "constantly repeats a proverb of theirs—*Whoever has been stung by a snake is frightened when he sees a rope*. I have been greatly embarrassed to determine in my own mind what would be a fair bargain between the two governments, but it has been a much more arduous task to endeavour to make the minister believe what I said, or indeed understand the language I talked; I might almost as well have expected him to understand English." Lord Cornwallis proposed as the basis of agreement,

"that we should disclaim all manner of interference in the revenues, collections, commerce, and internal management of the country, and that, on the other hand, we should have the entire direction of political matters; and as no dependence can be placed on their own contemptible rabble, that it should be clearly admitted that they looked to us solely for defence, and were to enjoy the blessings of peace under the protection of the most formidable power in Hindustan." The ultimate arrangement was that the Company should keep two brigades in Oudh, and that, instead of the seventy-four lacs with which the nabob was previously charged, he should in future pay only fifty lacs in full of all demands. The revenue of Oudh at this time exceeded two millions sterling, and therefore fifty lacs, or a fourth of the whole, for complete protection was not a very unreasonable demand. The state of the country, however, must have made it doubtful if it would be paid, for at the very time when the arrangement was made, Lord Cornwallis drew the following picture of its government:—"From the best information I have been able to get concerning Oudh, I hear that the vizir extorts every rupee he can from his ministers, to squander in debaucheries, cock-fighting, elephants, and horses; he is said to have a thousand of the latter in his stables, although he never uses them. The ministers, on their part, are fully as rapacious as their master; their object is to cheat him and plunder the country. They charge him seventy lacs for the maintenance of troops to enforce the collections, the greater part of which do not exist, and the money supposed to pay them goes into the pocket of Almas Ali Khan (a favourite eunuch) and Hyder Beg."

Another visit was offered to the governor-general at Calcutta, by a guest of far higher pretensions than either Hyder Beg, or the nabob vizir his master. This was Jivan Bhakt Bahadur Shah, the heir-apparent of Shah Alam, and consequently designated as the Shahzada, or son of the king. His father, Shah Alam, had never been his own master since he left the protection of the Company, but had passed from hand to hand as a mere tool, according as each succeeding revolution gave some new chief the ascendancy at Delhi. During one of these vicissitudes he fell into the power of Golam Kadir Khan (son of the Rohilla

chief Zabita Khan, Nabob of Saharanpur), who, having gained possession of Delhi in June, 1788, made Shah Alam prisoner, and barbarously with his own hand put out his eyes with the point of a dagger. With this exception, his person had been almost constantly in the possession of the Marathas, who endeavoured, by means of titles and grants which they compelled him to give, to extend their authority and dominion. Shortly after the death of Nujif Khan, the Shahzada quitted Delhi, and arrived at Lucknow in 1784, while Mr. Hastings was on his last visit there. He was favourably received by the nabob, who allowed him four lacs of rupees for his maintenance; and he appears to have succeeded in ingratiating himself with Mr. Hastings, who thus writes of him—"I saw him almost daily for six months, in which we were either participators of the same dues of hospitality, or he of mine. I found him gentle, lively, possessed of a high sense of honour, of a sound judgment, an uncommon quick penetration, and a well-cultivated understanding, with a spirit of resignation, and an equanimity of temper almost exceeding any within the reach of knowledge or recollection." Such was the individual who was now engaged in a hopeless endeavour to revive the fortunes of his family, and in furtherance of this object was desirous of an interview with the new governor-general.

What encouragement the schemes of the Shahzada received from Mr. Hastings has not been satisfactorily explained; but the intimate terms on which he had lived with him seems to have encouraged him to try whether he might be able to ingratiate himself equally with Lord Cornwallis. In the letter announcing his intended visit, he says—"As the particulars of the allegiance, and sincerity, and fidelity of the noble English gentlemen used to come to my hearing, I turned the reins of my desire toward Lucknow, in reliance upon the attachment and service of the English gentlemen; and my heart's object was this, that, with the conjunction and advice of the noble English gentlemen, having provided for the settlement of the kingdom, and having planned the establishment of the throne of his majesty, I should obtain happiness from the title of heir-apparent which his majesty has bestowed upon me, and should, in return for this favour, perform some service which might be acceptable to his

majesty, and might remain recorded in the annals of the world. Accordingly, after my arrival at Lucknow, discourses of designs and actions took place with Governor Hastings, but as his departure towards Europe was near, the event of this business did not come to light. As all matters depend on their season, the event of these happy objects was kept until your arrival. God be praised that the object of all my prayers to God is come to pass ! Truly, from hearing the happy news of the arrival of you, worthy of favour, fresh delights and innumerable joys came to me, and it became fixed in my penetrating mind, that, by the assistance of God, the settlement of the affairs of his majesty's throne will take place in the manner which I wish, through the wise plans of you, a peer gifted with sincerity." He had therefore determined to make himself happy by an interview, and would very speedily arrive at Calcutta by the river. It was impossible for the governor-general to give any countenance to the objects which the Shahzada was contemplating. He had formerly told him so, and could therefore now only request that his highness would remain at Benaras, where, in consequence of orders which had been given to the officials, the attention and respect due to his exalted dignity would be paid with all assiduity.

Notwithstanding this refusal to receive the visit, it seemed probable that the Shahzada would insist on paying it, and Lord Cornwallis had therefore made up his mind as to the manner in which he was to act. "I shall certainly," he says, in a letter to the directors, "receive and treat him with much respect and the greatest kindness, but I have already prepared his mind not to expect many of the outward ceremonials usually paid in this country to the princes of the house of Timur, as they would not only be extremely irksome to me personally, but also in my opinion improper to be submitted to by the governor-general at the seat of your government. The whole political use that may be derived from this event is at present uncertain, but there may arise some future advantage if we can gain his affection and attachment; in the meantime you need not be afraid of my contracting any inconvenient engagements with him." The course thus chalked out was evidently dictated both by good feeling and sound policy, and preferable to that pursued by Mr.

Hastings when, on parting with the prince at Benaras, he left him his guard of honour, for the purpose of keeping up a show of state after the reality had vanished. The Shahzada, however, appears to have thought differently, for after learning that he would not only receive no countenance to his schemes, but be denied the gratification of exhibiting himself in full pomp as the heir-apparent of the Mughul, he gave up the idea of visiting Calcutta, and fixed his residence at Benaras, where he was suddenly cut off by fever, in May, 1788. A year before his death, the interview which he had sought was obtained, as Lord Cornwallis was passing through Benaras on a tour to the north. The answer to his urgent applications for troops, or money to assist in the re-establishment of his father's throne, was a firm refusal, and at last all he asked was an asylum to himself and his family within the Company's territories, in the event of his being obliged to flee from his enemies. This request was granted, and to make it more formal and secure, it was reduced to writing, and signed by the governor-general and council.

Among the instructions which Lord Cornwallis received from the directors before quitting England, one was to institute a strict inquiry into the mode in which the Company's investment was provided, and into the gross abuses and frauds which were supposed to be practised, through a corrupt understanding between members of the board of trade and the contractors. The chief localities where these corrupt practices prevailed were Benaras and Lucknow, the great marts for silk, and the extent to which they were carried may be inferred from the fact, that as soon as the contractors were dismissed and open competition was invited, the prices fell thirty per cent. So satisfied were the directors of the existence of collusion, that they ordered the prosecution of seven of their servants, who appeared to be most deeply implicated. Lord Cornwallis having, as he himself expressed it, undertaken the government with a full determination to suffer no private considerations to interfere with the discharge of what he conceived to be his public duty, did not hesitate to take all the steps that seemed necessary, both for suppressing malpractices and punishing those who were guilty of them. At the same time he was not blind to the fact, that much of the corruption was fostered by the

injudicious custom of allowing inadequately paid officials to eke out sufficient salaries by underhand practices. On this subject he makes the following very startling statement : "I am sorry to say that I have every reason to believe, that at present almost all the collectors are, under the name of some relation or friend, deeply engaged in commerce, and by their influence as collectors and judges of *adalat*, become the most dangerous enemies to the Company's interest, and the greatest oppressors of the manufactures." His remedy was to improve the position of the collectors, and thus raise them above the temptation of committing fraud, or leave them, if they committed it, without excuse. With the former salaries he held it "impossible that an honest man could acquire the most moderate competency." He therefore made the necessary increase, and then announced his determination to make an example of every offender against the revenue regulations, and the prohibition to engage in trade. "I am clearly of opinion," he remarks. "that in such a country as this, where the servants who hold the principal offices are surrounded with temptations, it will ever be found, that the only mode that can be successful to prevent speculation and other abuses, will be by annexing liberal allowances to those offices, and give gentlemen a prospect of acquiring a moderate fortune from the savings of their salaries." This maxim, though sound, was not palatable to the directors, who disapproved of the additional salaries. Their conduct, in this respect, seemed to him as the result at once of false economy, and of a want of proper confidence in himself. Hence, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, dated August 26th, 1787, he animadverts upon it with some degree of indignation: "If the essence of the spirit of economy of the whole court of directors could be collected, I am sure it would fall very short of my earnest anxiety on that subject. But I never can or shall think that it is good economy to put men into places of the greatest confidence, where they have it in their power to make their fortune in a few months, without giving them adequate salaries." And again, "I have saved, since I came, upon the salt, upon the various contracts, upon remittances, balances, and jobs of different kinds, ten times, I may say fifty times, the amount of the salaries that are retrenched. I am doing every-

thing I can to reform the Company's servants, to teach them to be more economical in their mode of living, and to look forward to a moderate competency, and I flatter myself I have not hitherto laboured in vain. But if all chance of saving any money, and returning to England without acting dishonestly, is removed, there will be an end of my reformation."

The civil was not the only branch of the public in which reform was required. The army was also in a most defective state. In a letter to the Duke of York, Lord Cornwallis wrote, on the 10th November, 1786 :—"The East India Company's artillery are very fine, but their European infantry, on whom the defence of their valuable possessions may one day depend, are in a most wretched state. The sepoys or native black troops are fine men, and would not in size disgrace the Prussian ranks; I have heard undeniable proofs of their courage and patience in bearing hunger and fatigue, but from the little I have hitherto seen of them, I have no favourable idea of their discipline." One great cause of the inferiority of the Company's European troops to those of the king's army was the very nature and condition of the service. In the case of the officers "the mainspring," continues his lordship, "has always been wanting; they have had no head to look up to; the promotion of rank has always gone by seniority; and the lucrative commands have been given to those who have had interest. Consequently there has been no spur to merit. The Company's officers have no regiments or governments to look forward to; few constitutions can stand this climate many years. If they cannot save some money, they must go home without rank or pay, condemned to disease and beggary. Under these circumstances, the most rigid general must relax a little, and suffer practices that are in some degree repugnant to the nice feelings of a soldier." Another main cause of inferiority in the Company's army was the kind of materials from which recruits were obtained. Writing on this subject to the directors, he says, "The abuses or neglects in recruiting your Europeans appear to be scandalous, and if not corrected, may endanger the safety of your possessions in this quarter of the globe; the best men being picked from the whole of the recruits for the artillery, that corps both here and at Madras is in a good and serviceable state, but the other

European regiments are in very bad condition, incomplete in numbers, and many of those numbers consisting of foreigners, sailors, invalids, or men under the proper size for military services." Another singular class of recruits he refers to as "particularly embarrassing." They were, as he describes them, "gentlemen (among whom there are even some half-pay king's officers) who never meant to serve, and indeed are unfit for the duties of private soldiers, but who procured themselves to be enrolled as recruits, merely to get a passage on board the chartered ships to India." On their arrival they escaped from service by providing a substitute, usually a sailor who took the first opportunity of deserting, or some man who would probably have enlisted of his own accord, and then remaining for the most part without employment, were in a short time in great want and distress. To get rid of future importations of such fictitious recruits, Lord Cornwallis begged the directors to notify as publicly as possible, that "if any such young men do come out, either by passing themselves for persons of the proper class for recruits, or by the collusion of others," he would insist on their serving their time, or, in the event of discharge, on not only providing a substitute, but on giving security to return to Europe at their own expense by the first ships that sailed.

A serious obstacle to the efficiency of the Indian army had arisen in an early period of the Company's history, from jealousies and disputes about precedence among the officers. Those of the king's service assumed a superiority which was not only galling to the feelings of the Company's officers, but detrimental to their interests, by interfering with and impeding the regular course of promotion. The remedy had been much discussed before Lord Cornwallis took his departure, and it had been all but determined to abolish all distinction between the two branches of the military service, and declare the whole European army in India to be *king's troops*. Shortly after his arrival in India, Lord Cornwallis, who had previously concurred in this project, began to entertain serious doubts of its practicability or expediency, and did not venture further than to propose that the Company should be furnished with better powers of recruiting, and that the Company's officers should rank with those of the king's troops, according to seniority of commission.

Both points, though conceded at a later period, were disapproved at home, especially by Mr. Dundas, who had suggested the plan of declaring all king's troops, and continued strenuously to advocate it. In answer to Lord Cornwallis' proposals he wrote, "I confess the plan I have suggested is a favourite child, and do not be surprised if I am loath to give it up." "As to the first of these conditions" (better powers of recruiting), "I do not believe we could ever get the better of the grumbling of the army upon that idea, if it was proposed; and as to the second, I do not believe his majesty would ever be brought to yield up the notion of his commission having a pre-eminence over one flowing from a commercial body of his own subjects. I think my plan obviates all the difficulties." Mr Dundas was on this occasion too sanguine. His plan, instead of obviating all difficulties, raised several which could not be surmounted, and was destined, even after the king had formally approved of it and directed the consideration of it in the cabinet, to be thrown aside. The discussion of it, it may here be observed, has, in consequence of recent changes, been revived and still continues, as the highest authorities both civil and military have ranged themselves on opposite sides.

Before the design of declaring the whole India-European army king's troops was abandoned, it had been resolved, preparatory to its completion, to send out four new regiments to India. When the resolution was first intimated to the directors they seemed rather pleased with it, because at the time a war with France was apprehended, and they did not see how they could otherwise provide effectually for the defence of their territories. The rumour of war having blown past, the directors changed their view, and not satisfied with objecting to the sending out of the regiments, declared their determination neither to receive them on board their ships nor allow their revenue to be employed in paying them. There was thus a direct collision between the directors and the Board of Control, and ministers, taking part of course with the Board, with which they are in fact indentified, saw no better mode of explicating the matter than to bring in what they called a declaratory bill, for the purpose of explaining the powers vested in the Board by the act of 1784. This bill, which now ranks as 28 Geo. III. c. 8, was not passed

without encountering an opposition which more than once threatened the existence of the ministry. It proceeds on the preamble that doubts has arisen whether the Board of Commissioners, under act 24 Geo. III. c. 25, were empowered to direct that the expense of troops deemed necessary for the security of the British territories in India shall be defrayed out of the revenues of these territories, "unless such troops are sent out at the express requisition of the East India Company," and removes the doubts by enacting and declaring that the Board "was, and is by the said act, fully authorized and empowered to order and direct that all the expenses incurred, or to be hereafter incurred, for raising, transporting, and maintaining such forces as shall be sent to India for the security of the said territories and possessions, shall be paid, defrayed, and borne out of the revenues arising from the said territories and possessions; and that nothing in the said act contained extended, or extends, or shall be construed to extend, to restrain, or to have restrained the said commissioners from giving such orders or directions as aforesaid with respect to the expense of raising, transporting, and maintaining any forces which may be sent to India for the security of the said possessions, in addition to the forces now there." So far the victory remained with the Board, but the directors could also boast of a victory, since the above power, instead of remaining absolute, is restricted by subsequent sections, which limit the number of king's troops that might be paid by the commissioners as above to 8,045, and of Company's European troops to 12,200 men, and prohibits them from increasing salaries or bestowing gratuities beyond amounts proposed and specified in despatches from the directors. The account which Mr. Dundas gave Lord Cornwallis of the discussion on the above bill is amusing: "Although this contest at first began among the directors and proprietors of India stock, yet it was too tempting a bait not to be snatched at by higher powers. It became a complete opposition question, and brought forth all the secret foes and lukewarm friends of government. The Lord Marquis of Lansdowne rode one of the first houses, and it would have amused you in the House of Lords, to have seen him sitting between Lord Stormont and Lord Loughborough, and they all hugging and complimenting each other. It

proved, however, all in vain; the bill was carried with a high hand in both Houses of Parliament, and the court of proprietors of India stock have had several meetings called by factious proprietors, but in place of gaining their end or being able to keep up any flame, the proprietors have, three to one, negatived all their motions, and proved to the world in the most unequivocal manner that their confidence is firm and unshaken in the present system of Indian government."¹

While thus engaged in correcting abuses, and suggesting reforms in both the civil and military services, the attention of the governor-general was particularly directed to Guntur, one of the Northern Circars. It was included in the original grant obtained by Clive from Shah Alam in 1765, but by the subsequent treaty made with Nizam Ali in 1768, it was agreed that the Company should defer taking actual possession during the lifetime of his brother Basalat Jung, to whom it had been granted in *jaghir*. Basalat Jung died in 1782, and the Company immediately claimed the reversion, but Nizam Ali, under various pretexts, eluded compliance. It was inconvenient at the time to use force, and the Company in the meantime so far compensated themselves by withholding payment of tribute for the other Circars. The value of Guntur to Nizam Ali was greatly enhanced, because through it alone he could obtain access to the sea-coast. He had thus been enabled, when meditating war against the Company, to obtain supplies of military stores and a considerable body of French troops. To the Company the possession of Guntur was desirable, both for the very reason which made Nizam Ali anxious to retain it, and because the want of it interrupted the communication between Madras and the other Circars. The directors had at length determined to gain possession of it at all hazards, and given Lord Cornwallis such specific instructions on the subject as scarcely left him an option. Shortly after his arrival, however, he became satisfied that the time was unseasonable. Nizam Ali was engaged in an unsuccessful war with Tipu, and it would be thought ungenerous, under such circumstances, to subject him to any additional pressure. France, too, seemed to be preparing for war, and it could not be good policy to take a step

¹ *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*, vol. i, p. 355.

which might throw him into their arms, and convert an ally into an inveterate and formidable foe. Lord Cornwallis therefore allowed the subject to remain in abeyance till June, 1788, when an European war being no longer apprehended, nor the interference of other native powers suspected, there was good ground to hope that the Nizam, however much he might be offended, would make a merit of necessity, by quietly yielding up a possession which he saw it would be impossible for him to retain. The result was as had been anticipated, and Captain (afterward Sir) John Kennaway, sent on a special mission to Hyderabad, found little difficulty in obtaining the peaceful and final cession of Guntur.

Nizam Ali, in yielding Guntur, was not without the hope of compensating himself in some other way. The claim to which he had been compelled to submit was founded on the treaty of 1768. That treaty must therefore, at least in the view of the Company, be still in force. If so, Was not he in like manner entitled to take shelter under it and insist that its stipulations in his favour should also be fulfilled? No sooner had Nizam Ali started this idea, than he began to work it out in the manner which accorded best with his tortuous policy. He despatched two embassies, the one to Tipu and the other to Lord Cornwallis. To Tipu he pointed out that they two were now the only Muhammedan princes of note in the Deccan, and that it therefore was at once their duty and their interest to combine against the infidels as common enemies. To give at once a religious character to the negotiation, and a sacred pledge of his earnest desire for permanent friendship and alliance, he sent the Sultan a splendid copy of the Koran. At the same time he endeavoured to arouse his suspicion and alarm his fears, by informing him of the apparent intention of the Company to enforce the stipulations of the treaty of 1768. He himself had already, under that treaty, been compelled to give up Guntur, and Tipu, a large portion of whose territories were to be given away under that treaty, might easily judge what he had to expect. These arguments, which accorded so well with the views Tipu had long entertained, were not without effect, and he declared his readiness to return the sacred pledge, and enter into an offensive and defensive treaty, provided it were

previously sanctioned by intermarriage between the families. To this condition Nizam Ali's envoy could only answer that he had no orders; and therefore Kutub-ud-din and Ali Reza were sent back with the envoy to Hyderabad to make a formal proposal of affinity. Ali Reza, on being admitted to an interview, made known the object of his embassy by saying, "We are desirous of partaking of the *sheker-bhat*," the dish of rice and sugar sent as the first preliminary ceremonial of marriage. Affinity with the family of Hyder Naick was more than the Nizam's pride could brook. He disdained to give an answer, and the negotiation ceased.

The embassy to Lord Cornwallis was more successful. When the envoy Mir-Abdul-Kasim, better known as Mir Alam, referring to the recent cession of Guntur, demanded the fulfilment of the other stipulations of the treaty of 1768, his lordship appears to have felt himself in a dilemma. He could not deny that the treaty was still in force, for he had just been acting upon it, and yet, how could he give effect to stipulations which stigmatized Hyder Ali as an usurper, and bound the Company to attempt the conquest of a large portion of the territories now belonging to Mysore. In 1769 a treaty had been made with Hyder, formally recognizing his right to the territories of which the treaty of 1768 would have deprived him, and in 1784 a treaty to the very same effect had been made with Tipu. How, then, could it be maintained with any semblance of truth, that a treaty, on which the Company could not act without violating two treaties made subsequently to it, and declaring war against a state with which they were at peace, was still binding? It must be confessed, that in disentangling this difficulty Lord Cornwallis failed to display his usual sagacity and straightforwardness, and was betrayed into a series of gross inconsistencies and wretched subterfuges. Having good ground to suspect that Tipu was meditating war, he was, anxious to secure the Nizam as an ally. But a stringent clause in Mr. Pitt's act of 1784, made it illegal to enter into any new treaty for this purpose, and therefore the singular device was fallen upon, of effecting the object by reviving an old treaty, and at the same time accompanying it with explanations and stipulations which entirely altered its character.

This device of reviving an old treaty so as to give it the effect of a new one, was carried out by means of a letter which Lord Cornwallis addressed to the Nizam, and which, while it purported to be explanatory of the treaty of 1768, was declared to be *equally binding as a treaty*. This letter, dated 1st July, 1789, after some preliminary explanations, declares it to be the intention of the governor-general, that the treaty of 1768 "be carried into full effect." By the sixth article of the treaty, the Company was to furnish the Nizam with two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of cannon, managed by European artillerymen, "whenever the Company's affairs would permit." The letter declares the meaning of these words just quoted to be, that "the force engaged for by this article shall be granted whenever the Nizam shall apply for it; making only one exception, that it is not to be employed against any powers in alliance with the Company." These powers are distinctly enumerated as the different "Maratha chiefs, the Nabob of Arcot, the nabob vizir, the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore." As there is no mention made of Tipu, the only inference that can be drawn is, either that he was not considered to be one of the "powers in alliance with the Company," or that, notwithstanding, the Nizam was at full liberty to employ the Company's troops in attacking him. This is absurd enough, but still not so absurd as what follows. The treaty of 1768 contemplated the conquest of the Carnatic Balaghat, which was then possessed by Hyder, and which, by subsequent treaties, was solemnly recognized as belonging to Mysore. The diwani of this territory was to be granted to the Company, who engaged, in return, to pay the Nizam seven lacs annually, as the reserved revenue, and moreover volunteered, without being asked, to pay the Marathas their chaut. In regard to this projected conquest, the letter goes on to state that "circumstances have totally prevented the execution of those articles of the treaty of 1768 which relate to the diwani of the Carnatic Balaghat; but should it hereafter happen that the Company, with his highness' assistance, should obtain possession of the countries mentioned in those articles, they will strictly perform the stipulations in favour of his highness and the Marathas." Thus, in order to conform to the letter of an act of parliament, enjoining a system of neutrality, Lord Cornwallis

violated its spirit, by not only entering into what was, to all intents and purposes, a new treaty, but undertaking engagements which contemplated the dismemberment of the territories of an ally, and thereby broke faith with him. A proceeding so unjustifiable in itself, and so inconsistent with the course of policy which Lord Cornwallis was anxious to pursue, can only be palliated by referring to the circumstances. Tipu, though nominally an ally, was acting in a manner which made it almost impossible to doubt that he would seize the first favourable opportunity of commencing hostilities. It was therefore absolutely necessary to prepare for the worst, and this could not well be done without forming alliances with other native powers. Unfortunately, the legislature, in their zeal for neutrality, had, by a stringent clause in the act of 1784, made this illegal, and Lord Cornwallis, finding his hands injudiciously tied up, had allowed himself to be betrayed into the above circuitous and not very honourable course of procedure. While apparently unconscious of the evasion he had practised, he furnished the true key to the explanation of it, when he wrote as follows:—"Some considerable advantages have no doubt been experienced by the system of neutrality which the legislature required of the governments in this country, but it has at the same time been attended with the unavoidable inconvenience of our being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war, without having previously secured the assistance of efficient allies." When this observation was made, Tipu's conduct had already furnished what his lordship justly called "a case in point."

Treaty of Seringapatam

ON the conclusion of the war which he had been carrying on with the Nizam and the Marathas, Tipu returned to his capital, where he spent some months in making innovations, dictated for the most part by no regular system of policy, but by mere bigotry, caprice, and tyranny. Cham Raj, in whose name the government had been nominally conducted, having died by small-pox, no successor to him had been appointed. Though there was consequently no longer any pageant raja, the ancient capital where the former dynasty resided, and which had given its name to the whole country, still remained. In this Tipu saw a memorial which was continually reminding him of the usurpation of his family, and he therefore determined on its destruction. With this view he removed all the family of the late raja, after stripping them even of their personal ornaments, to a miserable hovel, rifled the palace of its contents, laid the fort and town in ruins, and forcibly removed the inhabitants. After this work of destruction, he set out in the beginning of January, 1788, at the head of his army, for Malabar. Having arrived at Calicut, he gave orders for its destruction, as the most effectual means of annihilating the memory of the Zamorin, and continued making converts by thousands to Islamism, by the simple but barbarous infliction of its initiatory rite, till he perceived that in his absurd and excessive fanaticism he had forgotten the approaching monsoon. As soon as it began to break, he determined to hasten back to Coimbatore, and when warned of the difficulty, answered, that he would *order the clouds to cease discharging their waters until he should have passed*. He paid the penalty of this impious boast, by being compelled to make a tedious and most

destructive march through swamps and floods, amid incessant torrents of rain.

About this time he renewed his negotiations with the French, who had again, in expectation of a new war, turned their attention to India, and even attempted to gain possession of Trincomali, by means of the Dutch faction opposed to the house of Orange. The possession of this harbour by the French seemed to the Madras presidency so dangerous, that Sir Archibald Campbell, who was then governor, on learning the design to capture it, determined on his own responsibility to retaliate by immediate preparations for the siege of Pondicherry. The French, finding Trincomali well prepared for defence, desisted, and Sir Archibald Campbell having in consequence abandoned his preparations, peace was not disturbed. Tipu's intercourse with the French under such circumstances, gave plain indication of his intentions to break with the Company. Another still stronger indication was shortly after given, by his ordering a minute inspection of the only two routes by which he could march an army into Travancore. This, he knew, could not be done without coming to an open rupture with the Company, since the Raja of Travancore was specially mentioned as one of their allies in the treaty of Mangalore. Every indication of a design to attack him could only be construed into a design to violate that treaty. Tipu returned to his capital in August, and was busily engaged in re-organizing his army, when intelligence arrived that all Coorg and Malabar had risen in rebellion. He lost no time in marching with his whole army, and descended, after traversing Coorg, into Malabar. The Nairs were completely overpowered, and submitted in great numbers to the rite of Islamism, as no choice was left them but conversion or death. Many, however, made their escape to Tellicherry, from which they embarked for Travancore. Tipu had long had designs on this province, and had even attempted the conquest of it indirectly in 1788, by engaging the Zamorin of Calicut to invade it in his own name. This scheme having failed, he endeavoured to turn the flight of the Nairs to advantage. Some countenance had been given to them by the Raja of Cochin, his acknowledged tributary, and he resolved, in punishing him, to make it conducive if possible to the furtherance of his designs.

Travancore is a long and comparatively narrow tract, forming the south-west corner of the Indian peninsula, and terminating a little to the east of Cape Comorin. On the east it is bounded by the lofty precipices of the Western Ghats, and on the west and south is washed by the ocean. It is thus secure against a land attack on all sides except the north, where, though partially protected by the Ghats, it lies open toward Cochin. To supply this want of a natural barrier, a series of artificial works, known by the name of the lines of Travancore, had been constructed. Though more formidable in appearance than in reality, a high opinion was entertained of their strength. Tipu maintained that part of these lines was built on the territory of Cochin, and that the effect of them was to divide this territory into two parts, and debar him from access to one of them. This allegation seemed plausible, but careful inquiry on the part of the Company proved it to be unfounded, and it was therefore intimated to him, that any attempt to force the lines, as he had threatened to do, would be deemed equivalent to a declaration of war. Meanwhile, to meet Tipu's complaint of the reception given to the Nairs in Travancore, Mr. Hollond, who had succeeded Sir Archibald Campbell as governor of Madras, desired the raja to withdraw his protection from the unhappy fugitives, and then spent several months in fruitless negotiation, instead of obeying the orders which he had received from Bengal, to lose no time in preparing for the worst. Lord Cornwallis, while most reluctant to believe that Tipu would break the peace, could not shut his eyes to the necessity of using every precaution against so faithless a despot, and had he not been restrained by the legislature, would probably have taken the initiative and compelled him to declare himself. As matters stood, he could do little more than wait in anxious suspense till Tipu should complete his operations, and by some overt act of hostility free him from injudicious legislative trammels. It was not necessary to wait long.

Tipu had established his camp about six miles northward of the principal gate of the Travancore lines. On the night of the 28th of December, 1789, he threw off all disguise by issuing orders for an attack on them. While the main body of the army manoeuvred in front of the gate, with the view of occupying the

attention of the defenders, he himself moved round, with a body of 14,000 infantry and 500 pioneers, by a route which a native had discovered to him. Nothing could be more propitious than this commencement. By daybreak of the 30th, he had with little opposition forced his way within the lines, and gained possession of a considerable stretch of rampart on the right flank. His expectation was, that in the course of the day his whole army would be able to follow. With this view, he ordered the pioneers to throw part of the rampart into the ditch, which was about 16 feet wide and 20 feet deep, and thus fill it up so as to give free entrance. At the same time, the troops advanced along the rampart to force the principal gate, and admit the infantry and cavalry who had been manoeuvring in front of it. The pioneers, worn out with previous exertion, did their work very sluggishly, and had made but little progress, when all the troops were seen rushing pell-mell towards the gap. In advancing towards the gate, a sudden onset by a mere handful of defenders, had caused a panic which speedily communicated itself to the whole detachment. As they crowded towards the gap they did the work of destruction more effectually than the enemy, by crushing and trampling one another to death. No less than 2,000 men are said to have been killed. Tipu himself, after attempting in vain to arrest the fugitives, was obliged to flee along with them; and in clearing the rampart, which he was only enabled to do by being raised on the shoulders of some faithful attendants, received contusions which gave him a certain degree of lameness for life. On arriving in the camp he swore, in a paroxysm of shame and rage, that he would not quit it till he had forced the lines; and there he was in fact destined to remain three months and a half, throwing away the only chance he had of striking a decisive blow, before effectual preparations could be made to oppose him in the field.

The moment Lord Cornwallis heard of the attempt to force the lines of Travancore, he acted on his previously declared determination, to hold it equivalent to a declaration of war. The case, therefore, was completely altered, and the neutrality system of the legislature being no longer applicable, he was left untrammelled to follow his own course. Without loss of time he communicated both with the Nizam and the Marathas, and

succeeded in forming a triple league against Tipu. By the treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, concluded on this occasion with the peshwa on the 1st of June, and Nizan Ali on the 4th of July, 1790, it was agreed that immediate measures should be taken to punish Tipu, and unfit him for again disturbing the public tranquillity—that the Marathas and the Nizam should each furnish a contingent of 10,000 horse to act with the British army, and be paid by the Company, and that a British detachment should in like manner act with each of their armies—and that at the conclusion of the war, the conquests should be equally divided. In regard to this last article, however, it was provided that the British should have exclusive possession of whatever forts and territories they might reduce before the other confederates took actual part in the war, and that, in like manner, the Marathas should obtain exclusive possession of the territories of certain specified zamindars and polygars formerly dependent upon them, by whichever of the allies these might be reduced. In these exceptions to the equal division of conquest, the advantage was so greatly in favour of the Marathas, that it has been thought that Lord Cornwallis could not be aware of the vast extent of valuable country which he was thus surrendering without any equivalent. It would seem, however, that even if he had known the value, he would still have made the surrender, since, in a letter written on the 28th of February, 1790, to Mr. (afterwards Sir) Charles Malet, resident at Poona, he says expressly, "I should think it incumbent upon me to agree to almost any conditions of that nature, which they (the Marathas) might appear determined to annex to their decision for making an immediate declaration in our favour." From the dates given above, it appears that Nizam Ali was more than a month later than the Marathas in executing the treaty. The cause of this delay is curious, and shows how feeble the tie was which bound the confederates. He was afraid that when he had set out with his army, the Marathas would take advantage of his absence and invade his dominions. At first he insisted that a specific guarantee of his dominions should be inserted in the treaty, but ultimately, on its being represented to him that the Marathas would justly take offence at such an article as implying an unworthy suspi-

cion of them, he consented to accept of a declaration which was deemed equivalent to it.

While Lord Cornwallis was thus exerting himself, he was not at all seconded at Madras. Governor Hollond, instead of obeying the orders which he had received from Bengal, acted as if he thought himself possessed of a discretionary power to obey or refuse, just as suited his own particular views. The supreme council had directed him, that on receiving certain information of Tipu having invaded any part of the dominions of the Nabob of Arcot or the Raja of Travancore, he was to consider him as from that moment at war with the Company, and was in consequence to cease from providing any investment for Europe, in order that all the funds which would have been so employed, as well as the other pecuniary resources of the Carnatic, might be reserved for the exigencies of the war. He had been further instructed of the determination to defend the raja, should it be ascertained on inquiry, as it eventually was, that he had a good title to the portion of territory which Tipu claimed as belonging to Cochin. This determination he had never communicated either to Tipu or to the raja, or to the resident at his court, while on the contrary, he sent letters both to the raja and the resident, "couched," as the supreme council express it, "in terms calculated to discourage a faithful ally in the defence of his own country against an enemy who was within a few miles of his frontiers, and with the insolence and violence of whose character" Governor Hollond had long been fully acquainted. His conduct with regard to the investment was equally contumacious; and he had continued to advertise for articles which were to form part of it, after he was perfectly aware of Tipu's attempt upon the lines. In the same spirit, though he had issued orders for a large body of troops to be in readiness to take the field on the shortest notice, he had to a great extent neutralized the order, by delaying to order a sufficient number of draught and carriage bullocks. On all these points Governor Hollond and his council were put upon their defence. They had none; and could only answer, in regard to military preparations, that they had delayed them in order to save expense. The answer of Lord Cornwallis to this wretched subterfuge deserves quotation:—"So far am I from giving

credit to the late government for economy in not making the necessary preparations for war according to the positive orders of the supreme government, after having received the most gross insults that could be offered to any nation, I think it very possible that every *cash* (the eighth part of a farthing) of that ill-judged saving may cost the Company a crore of rupees" (£1,000,000).

It would never have done to leave the management of the war in the hands of such a council, and therefore Lord Cornwallis had determined, with the full concurrence of his colleagues, and "upon the ground of state necessity," to proceed to Madras, invested by the supreme council "with full powers to take a temporary charge of the civil and military affairs at the presidency of Fort St. George, by exercising the functions of governor as well as those of commander-in-chief." Before he could act on this resolution, he received intelligence which induced him to abandon it. General Medows, previously governor of Bombay, had been regularly invested by the directors with the offices of governor and commander-in-chief at Madras. As he was "a man of acknowledged ability and character," there was no occasion to interfere, and the governor-general therefore wisely resolved to remain at his post in Bengal. Here his first business was to make its resources available for carrying on the war, and he quickly despatched a large amount of specie, stores, and ammunition, and a battalion of artillery, chiefly gun-lascars, by sea. The prejudices of the high-caste Brahmins made them object to the same mode of conveyance, and therefore a large force, consisting of six battalions of sepoys, completed to ten companies each, marched by land under Colonel Cockerell. To make the resources of the Carnatic also available, application was made to the nabob for a large sum of arrears, and he was told that, during the continuance of the war, he must either appropriate the greater part of his revenue to defray its expenses, or allow the Company to collect it, allowing him a liberal sum for private and family expenses. The latter course was adopted, both in his case and that of the Raja of Tanjore.

Tipu remained before the lines as he had sworn to do, waiting the tardy arrival of cannon and other equipments, as if,

instead of attacking a miserable wall, he had been about to engage in a regular siege. While thus awaiting, he drew up a letter which he antedated fifteen days, and sent off to Madras. It purported to be an account of the encounter at the lines. His troops, he said, while searching for fugitives, had been fired upon by the raja's people; they retaliated and forced the lines, but he on hearing of the affair recalled them. False and hypocritical as this account was known to be, it was so satisfactory to Governor Hollond, that he actually proposed the appointment of commissioners to adjust the points in dispute. Tipu haughtily replied, "that he had himself ascertained the points in dispute; after this, what was the use of commissioners? Nevertheless, if Mr. Hollond wished it, he might send commissioners to the presence." And doubtless, had Mr. Hollond been permitted to take his own way, he would have availed himself of this permission, and repeated the ignominious farce of sending commissioners to Tipu's camp, to be paraded as before over the country, and perhaps put in bodily terror, as at Mangalore, by the erection of gibbets in front of their tents.

While making hypocritical professions of peace, Tipu had begun to make regular approaches towards the rampart, and meeting with little resistance, filled up the ditch, and made a practicable breach of nearly three-quarters of a mile in extent. All Travancore was now in his grasp, and the usual merciless devastation followed. The open country was converted into a desert, and the inhabitants, hunted down, were carried off in immense numbers to captivity and death. It was a disgrace to the Company to have left an old and faithful ally exposed to such barbarity. When the raja first intimated his fears, two battalions of sepoys were sent to his aid, and when Tipu, after forcing the lines, was engaged in the siege of Cranganore, a small seaport which the raja had purchased from the Dutch, Colonel Hartley arrived from Bombay with one European and two sepoy regiments. These were the whole troops furnished, and being totally unequal to offensive operations, remained cooped up in Ayacotta, situated on the north extremity of the island of Vipin opposite to Cranganore. General Medows did not arrive at Madras till late in February. After forming a small encampment at Conjeveram, he set out on the 24th of May to take command

of the main army, which had been assembled near Trichinopoly, and mustered about 15,000 men. Before leaving Madras, he had on the 5th of April announced to Tipu his appointment and arrival in a letter, written in the form usual on such occasions. Tipu in his answer made the most pacific professions, and complained of "the representations, contrary to fact, of certain short-sighted persons, which had caused armies to be assembled on both sides, an event improper among those who are mutually at friendship." Formerly, he had with difficulty condescended to allow Mr. Hollond to send a commissioner "to the presence". His tone was now altered, and he begged General Medows to receive an envoy from him, in order "that the dust which had obscured his upright mind might be removed." The general's answer convinced him that it was now too late to continue the game of hypocrisy, and he hastened off with his army for Coimbatore. Before leaving Travancore, he gratified his pride and vainglory by converting the demolition of the lines into a kind of public ceremony. The whole army paraded without arms, marched in divisions to the appointed stations; Tipu, seated on an eminence, struck the first blow with a pick-axe, the chiefs and courtiers followed, and then the entire camp, not merely soldiers, but money-changers, shopkeepers, and followers of every description, put their hands to the work in earnest. In the course of six days the whole was razed to the ground.

The plan of campaign adopted by General Medows was as follows:—The main army, after reducing Palghat and the forts in Coimbatore, was to ascend into Mysore by the pass of Gujelhutti, while a force under Colonel Kelly, to be composed chiefly of the troops expected from Bengal, was to penetrate from the centre of Coromandel into the Baramahal. So much time had been lost in making commissariat arrangements, that it was the 15th of June before General Medows reached the frontier posts of Carur, only fifty miles beyond Trichinopoly, and the season of the year was so unfavourable, that upwards of 1,200 men were sent back to the hospital of Carur before a single shot was fired. It had been expected to overtake Tipu at Coimbatore, but he was already above the Ghats. On the 23rd of July, Colonel Stuart was detached to reduce Palghat. In this movement the

nature of the climate had not been considered. Though Coimbatore, from its position, was receiving only a sprinkling of the south-west monsoon, Colonel Stuart, when only twenty miles to the west of it, encountered it in all its force, and became so entangled between two mountain torrents, that he was glad, after escaping with the utmost difficulty, to make the best of his way back to headquarters. His destination was therefore changed, and he was sent in an opposite direction, above 100 miles south-west to Dindigul, while a detachment under Colonel Oldham was appointed for the capture of Erode, situated on the Cauvery, north-west of Carur, and on the best route from it to the Guejhutti Pass. Meanwhile, Colonel Floyd, who had advanced with the cavalry of the army and a light brigade of infantry, had come in contact with a large body of Mysore cavalry, whom Tipu, on quitting Coimbatore, had left under the command of Sayyid Sahib, with instruction to hang on the British army and disturb its communications. By a series of dexterous manoeuvres, Sayyid Sahib was driven northward across the Bhowani, a tributary of the Cauvery, flowing eastward from the Nilgiri Hills, and ultimately so close pressed that he ascended the Ghats for safety. By this injudicious retreat, he left the whole country to the south-east open, and Colonel Stuart was in consequence able to reach Dindigul without seeing an enemy. This place consisted of a town built on a gentle declivity, and a fort crowning a smooth granite rock, nearly perpendicular on three sides, and accessible only on the east by a flight of steps. The fort had within the last six years been strongly rebuilt on an improved plan, and now mounted fourteen good guns and one mortar. These improvements were not known to the British, and hence Colonel Stuart had not been provided with an adequate battering train, or a sufficient supply of ammunition. After silencing the enemy's fire and making a very indifferent breach, he found that he had shot for only two hours' firing. As a week would elapse before a new supply could arrive, he determined on risking an assault. The issue was very doubtful, but he was happily spared the trial, as the garrison on seeing the preparations for it, and not knowing the true cause, were frightened into a premature surrender. After returning to Coimbatore, Colonel Stuart was

again despatched against Palghat. On the 21st of September he opened upon it from two batteries. In less than two hours he had silenced its fire, and before night made a practicable breach. Happily, as at Dindigul, the assault was spared by a capitulation. By his kind treatment of the natives, Colonel Stuart so won upon them, that his bazaar assumed the appearance of a provincial granary, and he was able not only to leave the garrison provisioned for six months, but to carry back a month's grain for the whole army.

During these operations by Colonel Stuart, Colonel Oldham had captured Erode, and Colonel Floyd Satimangalam. A line of posts had thus been established, leading directly from Carur to the Guejhutti Pass, which General Medows still hoped to be able to ascend in October. Still farther up the Bhowani than Satimangalam stood the fort of Dannayakkankottei, still in Tipu's possession. Between these two places there was a ford at Pungur, and below Satimangalam another and a better ford, at Gopalchittypolliam. Early in September, Tipu, leaving his stores and baggage on the summit of the Ghat, began to descend by the Guejhutti Pass. Colonel Floyd, having received early intelligence of this important movement, immediately communicated it to headquarters, with a suggestion that, as the army was now dispersed, about a third of it being under the commander-in-chief at Coimbatore, another third with Colonel Stuart about thirty miles in the rear, and the remainder with Colonel Floyd himself, about sixty miles in advance, it might be prudent for him to fall back. The intelligence of Tipu's descent was not, however, believed, and he was ordered to maintain his advanced position. The force under his command consisted of six troops of his majesty's 19th dragoons, sixteen troops of native cavalry, his majesty's 36th foot, four battalions of sepoys, and eleven guns, and was encamped exactly opposite to Satimangalam. On the morning of the 12th September Tipu commenced the passage of the Bhowani, and encamped with a large portion of his army some miles south of the ford of Pungur, while the remainder was ordered to proceed along the north bank, seize upon Satimangalam, and then cross either at the ford above or below it. Colonel Floyd's intelligence only led him to believe that Tipu had nearly accomplished his des-

cent, when he was in fact in his immediate neighbourhood, ready to pounce upon him. The nature of the country, intersected by impenetrable inclosures of prickly shrubs, in some measure explains without excusing such defective intelligence. On the morning of the 13th, three troops of the 19th were sent out to reconnoitre the ford of Pungur, and at daylight, about an hour and a half after, a regiment of native cavalry was ordered to follow and support them. There are two roads to the ford, one winding along the river, and the other more direct at some distance from it. The three troops after meeting and driving off some cavalry, returned by the former road; the native cavalry took the latter, and had only advanced a few miles upon it, when they were suddenly attacked by a strong force, and perceived large bodies of cavalry in every direction. The officer in command seized a favourable post to maintain himself, till he should send intelligence to Colonel Floyd and obtain relief. When it arrived about an hour after, he was surrounded and hard pressed in every direction. Ultimately, however, the enemy were completely repulsed, and the whole troops reached the camp in safety. Their struggle proved only the prelude to one of a more serious nature. A large body of the enemy began to descend the northern bank, and at the same time Tipu's columns were seen approaching rapidly from the west. Colonel Floyd had only time to change front, and drew up the infantry in a position difficult to be outflanked, when Tipu opened a distant but efficient cannonade from nineteen guns, and continued it throughout the day. The British casualties were serious, and it was determined in a council of war to retreat. For the first twelve miles, an open country enabled the infantry, cavalry, and baggage to move in separate lines, but afterwards, owing to inclosures, it was necessary for the whole to move in a single column, the cavalry leading. The retreat was commenced at eight in the morning, and Tipu, who had drawn off for about six miles, was not made aware of it till an hour after. He immediately commenced pursuit, but was not able before two o'clock to bring any of his infantry into action, nor before five to bring his whole army so close as to make a combined attack. It was done with great spirit, but repulsed with great loss, many of the horsemen coming so near as to fall by the bayonet. Most

of the British cannon and of the baggage had by this time been lost, but the cavalry had reached a village two miles in front, where it was hoped that a good encampment might be obtained. Suddenly a cry was raised that General Medows was at hand. A troop sent out to reconnoitre was mistaken for his personal guard. The effect upon both armies was almost as great as if he had actually arrived. The British giving three cheers rushed to the charge; and Tipu, thinking that General Medows with his whole force was about to attack him, hastily drew off. The junction of the two divisions was effected without further opposition. Shortly afterwards, by the arrival of Colonel Stuart from Palghat, the whole army was, in the end of September, reunited under its commander-in-chief at Coimbatore.

The troops sent overland from Calcutta arrived at Conjevaram on the 1st of August, 1790, after a march of 1,200 miles. By the addition of three regiments of European infantry, one of native cavalry, and a formidable artillery, it mustered 9,500 men. The command, in consequence of the death of Colonel Kelly, on the 24th of September, devolved on Colonel Maxwell, who, in pursuance of the original plan of the campaign, entered Baramahal on the 24th of September. Tipu, on hearing of this invasion, set off to encounter it with about three-fourths of his army, leaving the remainder under Kumma-ud-din, to watch the movements of General Medows. Colonel Maxwell first approached the rocky fortress of Kistnagherri, of which he made a minute examination, as if with a view to a future siege, and then established his headquarters near the central position of Kaveripatam. On the 12th of November, Tipu made his appearance in full force, and attempted, by a series of manoeuvres, to attack with advantage, but being completely foiled in all his efforts, had resolved to depart on the 15th. Meanwhile, General Medows was advancing from the south, and on the very day fixed by Tipu for his departure, encamped on the northern face of a range of hills overlooking Baramahal, and about twenty-five miles distant from the position of Colonel Maxwell at Kaveripatam. When the advanced guard arrived on the ground, they observed at the distance of six miles another camp gradually rising in the plain, and bodies of troops arriving to take up their ground. As no direct intelligence from Colonel Maxwell

had been received for nearly three weeks, it was at once concluded that this must be his division, and three signal guns were fired to announce the happy meeting. In five minutes every tent was struck, and heavy columns were seen in full march westward. The mistake was now manifest; it was not Colonel Maxwell, but Tipu. On the 17th of November, the junction with Colonel Maxwell was effected, and the united army encamped near Kaveripatam, about twenty miles from the head, and twenty-six from the southern extremity of the pass of Tapur. Tipu, unwilling to be forced to ascend the Ghat, had determined to double back through this very pass. On the 18th both armies were in motion, and, unconscious of each other's movements, were tending towards the same point. By proper management Tipu might have been caught while completely entangled in the pass, but from some cause not explained, when the means were suggested to General Medows, he declined to act upon them, and allowed the enemy to escape with scarcely any loss. Tipu, astonished at his good fortune, proceeded southward along the left bank of the Cauvery, and never halted till he made his appearance opposite to Trichinopoly. His demonstrations against it proved unavailing, but he was able, before the arrival of General Medows, who had been following on his track, to pillage and lay waste the island of Seringham.

The unsatisfactory results of the campaign of 1790 pointed out the necessity of some change in the mode of conducting it, and there is hence little difficulty in understanding why Lord Cornwallis should have resumed his intention of assuming the command. In a minute dated November 6th, 1790, he enters into a full explanation of his reasons, and says, "Under these circumstances it has appeared to me that, exclusive of every measure that may be adopted for promoting our own offensive operations against the Mysore country, it may be of great consequence to the public interest that some immediate steps should be taken, which may tend to animate and encourage our allies to persevere with firmness in the favourable disposition which they have lately shown to perform their engagements; and although I am not vain enough to suppose that the military operations would be conducted more ably or with more success by myself than by General Medows, yet from the station which

I hold in this country, and from the friendly intercourse which I have hitherto had the good fortune to maintain both with the Nizam and the peshwa, I conceive it to be possible that my presence in the scene of action would be considered by our allies as a pledge of our sincerity, and of our confident hopes of success against the common enemy, and by that means operate as an encouragement to them to continue their exertions, and abide by their stipulations." While thus placing his assumption of the command chiefly on political grounds, he speaks out more plainly in a letter written on the 16th to his brother, the Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry. "Our war on the coast," he says, "has not succeeded hitherto so well as we had a right to expect. Our army, the finest and best appointed that ever took the field in India, is worn down with unprofitable fatigue, and much discontented with their leaders, and the conduct of both Medows and Musgrave (the previous commander) highly reprobated. In these circumstances I have no other part to take, but to go myself and take the command, and try whether I can do better; I shall therefore embark in little more than a fortnight for Madras, in the *Vestal* frigate, with the melancholy reflection that I had hoped about that time to have been bound for a happier port. I have in this war everything to lose, and nothing to gain. I shall derive no credit for beating Tipu, and shall be for ever disgraced if he beats me."¹ Lord Cornwallis arrived at Madras on the 12th of December, 1790, with a considerable reinforcement. General Medows, with the greater part of the army, was still pursuing his march towards the encampment at Vellout, about eighteen miles west of Madras. The moment his arrival was announced, Lord Cornwallis set out, accompanied by his reinforcement, including a considerable number of horses and draught bullocks which he had caused to be transported from Bengal, and by a heavy military chest, and assumed the command on the 29th of January, 1791.

Tipu, on finding that nothing was to be effected at Trichinopoly, hastened northward into Coromandel, marking his progress as usual by plunder and conflagration, till he found that he could more effectually replenish his military chest by levying contributions. At Thiagur, where, from the number of inhabitants from

¹ *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*, vol. ii, p. 52.

the surrounding country who had crowded into it with their most valuable effects, he expected to find a rich booty, he met with a serious disappointment, two successive attempts to carry the town, which was almost open, having been repulsed by the commandant Captain Flint, the gallant defender of Wandiwash. At Trinomali, about thirty-five miles farther north, he was more successful, and treated the inhabitants, for having presumed to attempt defence, with horrible barbarity. From Trinomali he turned south-east, and after taking Permacoil arrived in the vicinity of Pondicherry. Here he opened a communication with the governor, and by arrangement with him, despatched an envoy to the court of France to solicit the aid of 6,000 French troops. Bertrand de Moleville, then minister of marine, would have granted it, but the king, the unfortunate Louis XVI, on whose head the storms of revolution were about to burst, peremptorily refused, exclaiming, "This resembles the affair of America, which I never think of without regret. My youth was taken advantage of at that time, and we suffer for it now; the lesson is too severe to be forgotten." The embassy thus proved a failure. In another quarter Tipu's prospects were equally discouraging. He had left Hussain Ali in Malabar with a body of troops estimated at about 9,000 men. The general disaffection of the natives made it dangerous to separate them, and though all the force which Colonel Hartley, the Company's officer, could muster to oppose him, consisted only of a regiment of Europeans, and two battalions of sepoy, Hussain Ali deemed it expedient to assume the defensive by taking up a strong position near Calicut. Notwithstanding his inferiority of numbers, Colonel Hartley did not hesitate to attack him on the 10th December, 1790, and gained a complete victory, losing only fifty-two men, while 1,000 of the enemy were killed or wounded, and 900, including Hussain Ali himself, were taken prisoners. In the pursuit afterwards, 1,500 more surrendered. Still greater successes followed. General (afterwards Sir Robert) Abercromby, then governor of Bombay, arrived at Tellicherry with a considerable force a few days after Colonel Hartley's victory, and followed up the recent success with so much spirit, as to capture every place in the possession of Tipu and his dependants, and effect the entire conquest of the province of Malabar.

Lord Cornwallis commenced his march on the 5th of February, and on the 11th concentrated the army near Vellore. On hearing of this movement, Tipu broke off the negotiations which he had protracted very uselessly and imprudently at Pondicherry, and hastened rapidly westward to defend the passes leading into Mysore. He expected that the ascent would be attempted by Ambur; and Lord Cornwallis, confirming him in this belief by sending a battalion, apparently his advanced guard, in that direction, suddenly made a dexterous movement with his army in two divisions to the north, and then turning west entered the easy pass of Mugli, leading west from Chittur to Mulwagle. By the 17th, before Tipu could offer any effectual opposition, he had reached the summit and encamped on the table-land with a brigade. In four days more his battering-train and all his equipments, including sixty-seven elephants from Bengal and provisions for forty-five days, were within the encampment. Bangalore, the second town in Mysore, and the first object at which he was aiming, was only ninety miles distant. Though not a shot had been fired nor an enemy seen, the poor villagers had suffered all the horrors of war. Partly, perhaps, in retaliation of the devastations of the Mysorean army, not merely the camp-followers but the soldiers appear to have broken loose from all restraint, and pillaged and burned in every direction. The barbarity thus manifested at the very outset of the campaign required an immediate check, and Lord Cornwallis, besides executing nine of the ring-leaders, issued the following *general order*:—"Lord Cornwallis has too high an opinion of the zeal, honour, and public spirit of the officers of the army, to doubt for a moment, that every individual among them felt the same concern and indignation that he did himself, at the shocking and disgraceful outrages that were committed on the last march. His lordship now calls, in the most serious manner, for the active assistance of every officer in the army, and particularly those commanding flanking parties, advance and rear guards, to put a stop to these scenes of horror, which, if they should be suffered to continue, must defeat all our hopes of success, and blast the British name with infamy."

After the delay of a few days the army again moved, and took possession of Kolar and Uscotah, the garrisons of which,

after threatening resistance, tamely surrendered. Bangalore was now only ten miles distant and no enemy had appeared. Where was Tipu? The answer says little for his military tactics. He was looking after his harem, which had been lodged in Bangalore, and could not be left exposed to the impending danger. The removal might have been effected by an escort of 500 men, but Tipu chose to superintend it personally at the head of his whole army, which was thus employed in empty ceremony when its utmost exertions in the field were demanded. On the 4th of March the cavalry appeared in some force, and ineffectually attempted to break through the columns in order to reach the baggage, increased beyond the ordinary amount by the immense mass of stores and grain provided for the siege. The following day the British army took up its ground before Bangalore with only five casualties, though not without a very daring attempt on the life of Lord Cornwallis himself. While, accompanied by General Medows and their respective staff, he was viewing Tipu's movements from a gentleman's point of view, three Mysorean horsemen were seen approaching, but attracted little notice till they suddenly put their horses at full speed and made a dash at his person. Two of them were killed, and the third when seized seemed stupefied. The account afterwards given was, that the evening before, one of the horsemen having upbraided the other two with cowardice, they retorted that they would go next day where he durst not follow. They prepared themselves for the trial of courage by a dose of *bhang*, and the above was the result. On the 6th a skirmish in which Colonel Floyd injudiciously engaged very nearly cost him his life, and occasioned a serious loss. While rashly following a body of horse, in the hope of intercepting large masses of baggage on elephants and camels, he fell as if shot by a cannon-ball, a musket-shot having entered his cheek and passed through both his jaws. Though at first left on the ground as dead, his orderly dragoons remounted him and carried him back to the camp. He ultimately recovered, but the rash attempt cost the lives of seventy-one men and the loss of 271 horses.

The fort of Bangalore, entirely rebuilt with strong masonry by Hyder and Tipu, was nearly of an oval form, with round towers at intervals, and five powerful cavaliers. It was inclosed

by a good ditch, and had a good covered way, but the glacis was imperfect. It was entered by two gates, the one called the Mysore and the other the Delhi gate. Opposite to the latter, which faced the north, lay the petta or town, covering a large space, and surrounded by a rampart and ditch. The besiegers early gained possession of the town, but Tipu, who had encamped at the distance of about six miles, was determined that they should not keep it, and made many determined efforts for its recovery. Ultimately he was driven out with a loss of upwards of 2,000 men. The British loss was only 131, but among the killed was Colonel Moorhouse, an artillery officer of distinguished merit and the most amiable manners. Notwithstanding two wounds, he continued animating his men till struck dead by two musket-balls in the breast. Colonel Wilks thus describes him: "He had risen from the ranks, but nature herself had made him a gentleman; uneducated, he had made himself a man of science; a career of uninterrupted distinction had commanded general respect, and his amiable character universal attachment; the regret of his general and the respect of his government were testified by a monument erected at the public expense in the church at Madras."

As the place was never invested, and the garrison consisting of 8,000 men was regularly relieved by fresh troops, the siege was carried on under difficult and discouraging circumstances. Its commencement, too, was rather ominous, the engineers having stupidly erected their first battery without ascertaining the exact distance, and not discovered their mistake till they found the fire inefficient. Good progress, however, continued to be made. By the 20th of March an early assault was anticipated. Tipu, on perceiving indications of this, on the morning of the 21st drew up his army on the heights to the south-west, to protect an advanced body with heavy guns, which they were about to place in an old embankment where they would have enfiladed, and might have destroyed the whole of the trenches and open sap, now advanced near to the crest of the glacis. These preparations seemed so alarming, that Lord Cornwallis resolved on assaulting that very night. According to ordinary practice, much still required to be accomplished, and success could scarcely be expected, unless the garrison could be taken in some measure

by surprise. With this view Lord Cornwallis only communicated his intention confidentially to the senior artillery officer, for the purpose of enabling him to take the necessary steps to perfect the breach, and concealed it from the rest of the army until the last moment. The assault was to be made at eleven o'clock at night in bright moonlight, at a breach to the left of the projecting works of the Delhi gate. The storming party on the appointed signal moved on in silence, and had nearly planted the ladders before the garrison took the alarm. Resistance, which had been protracted by the gallantry of the commandant, slackened the moment he fell, and at the end of an hour all opposition ceased. The secret of the assault had not been so well kept as to conceal it from Tipu, who had not only warned the garrison, but appointed two heavy corps to fall upon both flanks of the assailants. This contingency had been foreseen and provided against, and they were repulsed with great slaughter by a reserve stationed for that special purpose. The capture was, in fact, effected in the presence of Tipu's whole army, and the storming party barely amounted to one-fourth of the ordinary garrison. The advantages from success may be estimated from the disasters which must have attended a failure. Short as the duration of the siege had been, the forage and grain found in the petta were all consumed; no supply could be obtained from the neighbouring villages, which had been completely destroyed, and the miserable resource of digging up the roots of grass had been used till not a fibre remained within the limits of the pickets. The draught and carriage cattle were daily dying by hundreds, and those intended for the shambles were so wasted and diseased as to be almost unfit for food. Every necessary, including ammunition, was at the lowest ebb, and a retreat after raising the siege must have been full of disaster. The knowledge of these circumstances was undoubtedly one main inducement to risk the assault, when the success of it was, to say the least, very problematical.

After repairing the breaches and making the place secure against a sudden onset, Lord Cornwallis set out on the 28th of March in a northern direction, taking the route to Deonhulli. Tipu had on the same day moved in the direction of Great Balipur, and the two hostile armies were consequently pursuing routes

which crossed diagonally. They were thus brought within sight of each other at the distance of only three miles, but Tipu had no idea of risking an encounter, and was able by his superior equipments to escape with little loss, except of reputation, by allowing himself to be ignominiously chased. The main object of moving northward was to effect a junction with the corps of cavalry which Nizam Ali had agreed to furnish. This being accomplished on the 13th of April, the united force moved south-east to meet a convoy which was advancing by the passes near Ambur, under an escort of nearly 4,000 men. On its arrival, the whole army returned to Bangalore. During this march, which occupied fifteen days, full means of estimating the value of the Nizam's cavalry was given. Nominally 15,000, they were actually 10,000 well mounted, and tolerably, though very dissimilarly armed, but totally without order or discipline, scampering about in wild confusion, and utterly unfit to be employed in any combined movement. It was hoped, however, that they might relieve the regular cavalry by performing the duties of light troops. This hope soon proved fallacious. They were even unequal to the protection of their own foragers, and consumed far more forage and grain than they supplied. The only dexterity they displayed was in pillaging the villagers. At best the Nizam's troops were little better than a rabble, and the present sample was even worse than the average, owing to the total want of military talent in their commander Tejwant Singh, a Hindu, and to the venality, rapacity, and treachery of Assad Ali his second in command.

Lord Cornwallis was now anxious, for many reasons, to terminate the war with as little delay as possible. The French revolution had burst forth with unexampled fury, and all Europe was heaving with commotion. The drain of the war upon the Company's resources was enormous, and instead of an anticipated surplus from economical reforms, their debt was rapidly accumulating. Then what dependence could be placed on confederates who eyed each other with jealousy and suspicion, and were ready at any moment to change sides, on being convinced that their separate interests would thereby be promoted? Taking all these things into consideration, the only expedient course was to break off all delays, and at once push boldly on for

Seringapatam. The great difficulty was, as in all former wars of the Company, to provide the means of transport, but extraordinary obstacles were overcome by equally extraordinary exertions, and the army, amply provided with everything except a sufficiency of draught and carriage cattle, commenced its march from Bangalore on the 3rd of May. Tipu on his part was not idle, but the measures which he adopted indicated only the terror and despair of a savage and brutal nature. Apparently under the impression that his capital was destined to fall, he began to remove every vestige of the evidence which would have revealed to the captors the full extent of his falsehood and cruelty. He had repeatedly affirmed on oath that all British prisoners had been released, and therefore, to avoid detection, all who still remained must be put out of the way. Among the victims were twenty English boys, the survivors of a much larger number, whom he had mutilated and brought up as singers and dancers. They were all handed over to Abyssinian slaves, and barbarously murdered, by the well understood practice of giving the head a sudden and violent twist so as to dislocate the vertebrae of the neck. Many of the prisoners of the preceding war were despatched by other modes of barbarity. In these horrible proceedings cruelty and fear went hand in hand, but other steps were taken, in which the latter passion alone was slavishly and even ludicrously manifested. The walls of the houses in the main streets had by his orders been covered with caricatures of the English. These are thus described by Colonel Wilks:—"In one it was a tiger seizing a trembling Englishman; in another it was a horseman cutting off two English heads at a blow; in another it was the nabob Muhammed Ali, brought in with a rope round his waist, prostrating himself before an Englishman, seated on a chair, who placed one foot upon his neck; but the more favourite caricatures are necessarily excluded from decorous narrative." All these caricatures he caused to be obliterated by careful whitewashing. Another step, which evinced as much fear but displayed more judgment, was the demolition of the bridge over the northern branch of the Cauvery.

While the British army was advancing on Seringapatam at a very slow pace, and suffering most severely from the nature of

the ground, from storms of thunder and torrents of rain, and the increasing difficulty of transport at each successive march, Tipu took up a strong position on the main road leading north-east through Kenapatam to Bangalore. Lord Cornwallis, aware how difficult it would be to force this position, or obtain any supplies in proceeding towards it, took the more circuitous road which passes through Kancauhulli, and nearer to the Cauvery. During the first day's march after this route was chosen much benefit was experienced, but the very day after the work of desolation began, and almost every trace of human habitation disappeared, the whole of the inhabitants were carried off, and detachments, sent out on different occasions in search of information, failed to descry a single human being. It was the 13th of May before the army arrived at Arikera, situated on the Cauvery about nine miles east of the capital. The quantity of water in the river did not admit of crossing, and after an ineffectual attempt to break down a dam in the hope of lowering the water, the march was continued westward along the northern bank as far as Kaniambadi, which is as far above Seringapatam as Arikera is below it. The hope of finding a better ford was not the only reason for this movement. General Abercromby, after the subjugation of Malabar, had ascended through the friendly territory of the Raja of Coorg, and was in possession of Periapatam, situated little more than thirty miles to the west.

This movement westward could not be made without passing immediately to the north of the island of Seringapatam, and Tipu, though he had hitherto carefully avoided a general action, was determined not to allow so near an approach to his capital without disputing it. Accordingly, on proceeding to take up his encampment near Arikera, Lord Cornwallis perceived the enemy strongly posted about six miles in front, with their right on the river, and the left along a rugged and apparently inaccessible height. This position was strengthened by batteries above, and a swampy ravine below, while the British army in approaching was so hemmed in between the river and a ridge of hills, that the only space left them gradually diminished from a mile and a half to a mile. Lord Cornwallis having ascertained that it was possible by crossing the ridge to turn the

enemy's left flank, and even get into his rear, determined on a night march for that purpose, and with the utmost secrecy ordered six regiments of European and twelve of native infantry to march at eleven o'clock. Nizam Ali's horse were to follow at daylight. The rest of the army remained to protect the camp. Unfortunately, before the appointed hour a dreadful storm of rain and thunder arose, and almost every corps became bewildered. Lord Cornwallis himself, having the best guides, had advanced four or five miles, accompanied by only one company and one gun, and the staff-officer who had been the first to make this discovery, on going back in search of the column narrowly escaped riding into the enemy's camp. As nothing could now be effected before dawn, the night attack had become impracticable, but Lord Cornwallis determined to force an action. Tipu did not decline it, and displayed much skill in his arrangements, after being deprived of many of the advantages of his former position. In his rear was the hill of Karigat, abutting abruptly on the Cauvery, and crowned by a redoubt. This hill sent off two branches, one of them occupied by Tipu's main force, and the other stretching two or three miles to his left in a strong rocky ridge. Opposite to the ridge, and separated from it by a ravine, was the hill on which the British army was posted.

The battle commenced with a struggle for the possession of the rocky ridge. A considerable body of British cavalry and infantry, with eight guns, were marching rapidly to seize it, when a detachment sent by Tipu anticipated it, and opened its first guns from the ridge, just as the British cleared the ravine. Fortunately the ground between the ravine and the ridge was so broken as to afford good cover and a support to subsequent formations. While Tipu's detachment was occupied in seizing the ridge, his main body, which had changed front, was preparing to advance in line. To meet these movements, the British army was formed into two unequal fronts, united at right angles. While the front on the left was being formed, the enemy's select cavalry, which had been concealed by the ground, rushed out and made a spirited charge, many horsemen falling on the bayonets. When the formation was completed, the smaller of the two fronts, consisting of five battalions under

Colonel Maxwell, attacked the position on the rocky ridge, and not only carried it, but overtook some guns on the opposite descent, and captured three of them. On this success, the remainder of the army advanced against the enemy's main body in two lines, and the action became general. The result seems never to have been doubtful. After the first onset, Tipu, fearing the loss of his guns, began to draw them off, and leave the battle to be contested by the infantry. At this stage the Nizam's cavalry began to act, but only managed to throw themselves in an unwieldy mass in front of the left wing, where they could neither advance nor recede. The effect of this obstruction was to impede the advance of the British line, and thus prevent the inevitable capture or destruction of a large portion of the enemy's guns and infantry. There is reason to suspect, from proofs of treachery afterwards discovered, that this obstruction was intentional, and not owing to mere awkwardness. After it was removed, the pursuit was continued till the works on the island of Seringapatam gave protection to the fugitives. The British loss was 500, that of the enemy above 2,000.

Though this victory was most honourable to those who earned it, and but for the treachery or stupidity of the Nizam's cavalry, would have been decisive, Lord Cornwallis might have exclaimed, like Sir Eyre Coote on a similar occasion, "I would gladly exchange all these trophies, and the reputation of victory, for a few days' rice." The whole country was so effectually desolated that no supplies could be obtained, and so many of the draught cattle had perished, or become so enfeebled by want of food, that during the two subsequent marches, which brought the army to Kaniambadi, and were made almost under the eye of the enemy, the battering-train and nearly all the public carts of the army were dragged by the troops. The future thus presented a most gloomy prospect. Some dependence had been placed on General Abercromby; but, short as the distance was, it was so completely scoured by Tipu's light troops, that communication with him was impossible. The decision could no longer be delayed, and Lord Cornwallis, now convinced that the original plan of the campaign must be abandoned, saw no alternative but to sacrifice his heavy guns and stores. On the 21st of May, he sent off a messenger with orders to General

Abercromby to return to Malabar, and on the 22nd the whole of the battering-train and the heavy equipments were destroyed. "The ground at Kaniambadi," says Major Dirom,¹ "where the army had encamped but six days, was covered, in a circuit of several miles, with the carcasses of cattle and horses; and the last of the gun-carriages, carts, and stores of the battering-train, left in flames, was a melancholy spectacle, which the troops passed as they quitted this deadly camp." General Abercromby duly received the orders sent him to return. They were entirely unexpected, and he immediately proceeded to execute them, though with extreme mortification. He had, with great difficulty, brought an army of about 8,000 men, with a battering-train and a large supply of provisions and stores, over the rugged precipices and through the dense forests of the Ghats. All this had proved labour in vain, and the soldiers, still suffering from disease and fatigue, were now to retrace their steps amid the storms and deluging rains of the monsoon. After leaving four eighteen-pounders imperfectly destroyed at Periapatam, and burying the rest of the battering-train at the summit of the pass, the Bombay army succeeded in reaching the coast, in a sickly state, with the loss of almost all the cattle.

On the 26th of May, the army, reduced to half rations, and pining away with disease, commenced its return to Bangalore, and had not completed its first short and tedious march of six miles, when a body of about 2,000 horse made their appearance on the baggage flank. It was at once concluded to be the enemy, and the necessary preparations were made to ward off an anticipated attack on the baggage and stores. One of the staff, while thus employed, was hailed by a horseman who announced himself as a Maratha, and part of the advance of two Maratha armies. It was really so. While Lord Cornwallis suspected that the Marathas had left him in the lurch, and had no idea that they were within 150 miles of him, the Poona army, under Hari Pant as commander-in-chief, and another more efficient army, under Parasuram Bhow, were on the eve of joining him. They had used all the customary means of sending him intelligence of every successive step in their approach, but so completely had Tipu cut off all means of communica-

¹ *Narrative of the Campaign in India*, pp. 3-4.

tion, that not a single messenger had arrived. The junction, even now, was a most fortunate event, but would have been far more fortunate had it happened a few days sooner. In that case the destruction of the battering-train and the other disastrous measures recently adopted would have been unnecessary, and the plan of campaign originally contemplated might have been carried out. All the wants of the British army could now be supplied, though at exorbitant prices, at the bazar of the Maratha camp. The description of this bazar by Colonel Wilks is so curious as to deserve quotation:—

“The bazar of a Maratha camp presented an exhibition of no ordinary character; and to these famished visitors exhibited a picture of the spoils of the East and the industry of the West. From a web of English broadcloth to a Birmingham penknife—from the shawls of Kashmir to the second-hand garment of a Hindu—from diamonds of the first water to the silver earring of a poor plundered village maiden—from oxen, sheep, and poultry, to the dried salt fish of Concan—almost everything was seen that could be presented by the best bazars of the richest towns; but above all, the tables of the money-changers, overspread with the coins of every country of the East, in the open air and public street of the camp, gave evidence of an extent of mercantile activity, utterly inconceivable in any camp, except that of systematic plunderers by wholesale and retail. Every variety of trade appeared to be exercised with a large competition and considerable diligence, and among them, one apparently the least adapted to a wandering life—the *trade of tanner*—was practised with eminent success. A circular hole dug in the earth, a raw hide adapted to it at the bottom and sides, and secured above with a series of skewers run through its edges into the earth, formed the tan-pit; on marching days, the tan-pit with its contents, in the shape of a bag, formed one side of a load for a horse or bullock, and the liquid preparation was either emptied or preserved, according to the length or expected repetition of the march: the best tanning material (catechu) is equally accessible and portable, and the English officers obtained from these ambulatory tan-pits what their own Indian capitals could not then produce, except as European imports—excellent sword-belts.”¹

¹ Wilks' *Historical Sketches* vol. iii. pp. 152-50

After the junction of the Marathas, the united armies proceeded slowly towards Bangalore. During the march, the intermediate plan of operation was arranged. The first preliminary was a loan of £144,000. This Lord Cornwallis was enabled to make on the part of the Company, by stopping, in its transit, the money intended for the China investment. Parasuram Bhow, with his own army and a detachment of Bombay troops, was to proceed by Sera, for the purpose of operating in the north-west. The Nizam's cavalry, long regarded only as an encumbrance, were to join the other forces of their own state, and operate with them in the north-east. Hari Pant, Tejwant, and Mir Alam were to remain with Lord Cornwallis, the first as representative of the Marathas, and the two last as respectively military and political representatives of the Nizam. Each of the representatives was attended by a select body of cavalry, designed to assist in the general operations of the British army.

Various causes had produced the delay which had left Lord Cornwallis to contend with Tipu single-handed, notwithstanding the promised aid of his allies. The army of Nizam Ali began to assemble in the vicinity of Hyderabad, as early as May, 1790, and was joined by the Company's stipulated detachment of two battalions of sepoys under Major Montgomery, and a company of sepoys. The cavalry were little if at all better than those which, under Asad Ali, had encumbered Lord Cornwallis, but the infantry, commanded by M. Raymond, a Frenchman, were as good as he could be expected to make troops imperfectly armed and not under strict discipline. The whole army moved southward, and after long delays reached Rachore. Here they remained till they heard of Tipu's descent to Coimbatore, in September, and then, having no fear of interruption, continued their march, and sat down on the 28th of October before Capul, situated about 100 miles to the south-west. The British artillery and M. Raymond's infantry did their part, but the obstinate ignorance of Nizam Ali's general protracted the siege, which was only terminated by capitulation on the 18th of April, 1791. Other minor places fell, and at last the only one of importance remaining in the enemy's possession was Gurumkonda, about eighty miles north-east of Bangalore. The Marathas ostensibly took the field about the

same time as the Nizam, and the army under Parasuram Bhow was joined at Cumppta by Captain Little, who, embarking at Bombay with two battalions of sepoys, one company of European and two of native artillery, landed at the mouth of the Jygurh, and ascended the Ghats by the pass of Amba. Parasuram Bhow's army, estimated at 20,000 horse and 10,000 infantry, did not march from Cumppta till the 3rd of August. The first object was to recover the provinces which Hyder had wrested from the Marathas during the civil war caused by Raghoba. Dharwar, considered as the capital, had been made as strong as native art could make it, and was garrisoned by a force of about 10,000 men. Parasuram Bhow arrived before it on the 18th of September. The siege made little progress, partly because the Marathas were not provided with the necessary battering-train, and when Captain Little reported this deficiency to the Bombay government, a considerable reinforcement was sent, but unfortunately not accompanied with what was most wanted—cannon and stores. The place was defended till the 4th of April, 1791, and then only surrendered on honourable terms, after the British had lost 500 and the Marathas about 3,000 men. After this capture, every place north of the Tungabhadra easily yielded, and Parasuram Bhow, crossing the river at Harihar, proceeded southward through Myconda, while Hari Pant followed the parallel but more eastern route by Harponelly and Sera. In this way the junction with Lord Cornwallis had been effected.

During the previous operations, Tipu had repeatedly professed a desire to negotiate. As early as the 13th of February, 1791, he sent a letter, which, as it was not received at Mugli on the 18th, was probably antedated two days. It proposed either to receive or send an ambassador for the adjustment of differences. Lord Cornwallis replied, that if Tipu, who had violated the treaty, was willing to make reparation, a statement to that effect in writing must precede the appointment of ambassadors. Another similar overture made on the 27th of March received a similar answer. On the 17th of May, two days after Tipu's defeat, he took advantage of an offer to release the wounded prisoners, to renew his proposal of negotiation. Lord Cornwallis being now attended by plenipotentiaries from the Marathas

and the Nizam, and having also a foresight of the difficulties about to beset him, was rather more conciliatory than before, and not only answered that, if Tipu would submit his propositions in writing, commissioners might be appointed, but even intimated his consent, should Tipu desire it, to a cessation of hostilities. In proportion as the allies seemed disposed to yield, Tipu became more exacting, and ultimately, after Lord Cornwallis had even conceded the point of written propositions, and proposed a conference of deputies at Bangalore, declined the terms, unless his lordship would first remove his army to the frontier. Tipu had meanwhile been trying the effect of similar overtures with the other confederates, and there can be little doubt that his real object was to stir up the jealousy of each, and thereby break up the confederacy.

In the beginning of July, 1791, Lord Cornwallis moved from Bangalore in a south-east direction by Ussur, which he found to be evacuated, and thence to the passes of Palicote and Rayacota. His object was to reduce the hill-forts commanding these passes above and below, and thus at once keep open his communications with the Carnatic, and protect it from the inroads of the enemy's cavalry. By the end of the month, most of the forts had yielded; and he was making arrangements for the blockade of Kistnagherri, when he was suddenly recalled to the assistance of Parasuram Bhow, who, by dispersing his forces too widely, had sustained a serious check. It was September before his lordship could resume his own objects. A number of places to the north-east of Bangalore still remained in possession of the enemy, and not only disturbed the communication with the Carnatic, but prevented the advance of the Nizam's army, still detained before Gurumkonda. Major Gowdie, detached with a brigade and some battering cannon, found little difficulty in reducing all of them except Nandidrug, which, crowning a granite rock of tremendous height, had been so much strengthened with artificial works by Tipu that he deemed it impregnable. The command of it had been intrusted to Lutf Ali Beg, an officer of tried merit and fidelity. Major Gowdie, after forcing the petta, sat down before the fort on the 27th of September. There was no choice of attack, as it was accessible only on the west. Notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of working up the face of a

steep and rugged height, erecting batteries at breaching distance, and dragging up cannon to mount them, two breaches were effected in twenty-one days. When the assault was about to be made, Lord Cornwallis moved the army to the immediate vicinity, and sent in some additional companies to lead the assault. It was made on the 19th of October, with so much spirit and success, that though nothing more than a lodgment for further operations against the interior works was anticipated, the assailants followed the retiring defenders to the inner gate, and by forcing it before it could be completely barricaded, made a complete capture. An attempt made on Kistnagherri on the 7th of November, by a detachment under Colonel Maxwell, was less fortunate. After carrying the lower fort by escalade, the assailants attempted to gain the upper fort by entering it along with the fugitives. They were so near succeeding that they captured a standard on the gateway, but enormous masses of granite, thrown down by a garrison which far outnumbered them, obliged them to retire with considerable loss.

After the return of Colonel Maxwell, Lord Cornwallis having secured access for supplies from Coromandel, turned his attention to several places of strength which the enemy still possessed, between Bangalore and Seringapatam, and without the reduction of which the siege of the latter could not be safely commenced. By far the most formidable of these places was Savandrug, situated about twenty-two miles W.S.W. of Bangalore, and fifty miles north-east of the capital. An enormous mass of granite covering a base of eight miles in circuit, rises in rugged precipices to the height of about 2,500 feet. In its lower part, wherever deemed accessible, it was inclosed by walls and traversed by cross walls and barriers; towards its summit a deep chasm divided it into two peaks, each of which was crowned with strong works, and capable of separate defence. The reduction of this place seemed to the natives an utter impossibility. Besides the strength of its position and its works, it had another powerful defence in its deadly climate, and hence Tipu, on hearing of the resolution to besiege it, is said "to have congratulated his army on the infatuation of the English, in having engaged in an enterprise that must terminate in their disgrace, as half the Europeans would die of sickness, and the other half

be killed in the attack.”¹

This important enterprise was intrusted to Colonel Stuart, who commanded the right wing of the army. The force employed consisted of the 52nd and 72nd regiments under Colonel Nesbitt, three battalions of sepoys, and a park of artillery, consisting of four eighteen-pounders, four twelve-pounders, and two howitzers, under Major Montague. On the 10th of December, Colonel Stuart pitched his camp within three miles of the north side of the rock, and Lord Cornwallis took up a position with the main body of the army, about five miles in his rear. The first operation of the siege was to cut a gun road from the camp, through a forest of bamboos, and transport the artillery by dragging it over rugged ground to the foot of the mountain. This was a work of incredible labour, as the guns, in order to be brought to the places marked out for batteries, required to be drawn or rather lifted over rocks of considerable height and almost perpendicular. Fortunately the garrison, over-confident in the strength of the place, scarcely interfered with these preliminary operations. On the 17th two batteries opened, one at 1,000 and another at 700 yards. Owing to the distance and the thickness of the walls, the effect was less than expected, and on the 19th a third battery was opened, at only 250 yards. By it in the course of two days a practicable breach was effected, and the morning of the 21st was fixed for the assault. The storming party, commanded by Colonel Nesbitt, attacked at four different points—one party gaining the eastern hill on the left, another scouring the works of the western hill on the right, a third attacking the works or parties that might be discovered in the chasm between the hills, and the fourth making a feint by proceeding round the mountain, for the purpose of drawing off the attention of the garrison, and at the same time preventing their escape. A strenuous resistance was anticipated, as a large body of the enemy had been seen descending the hill to defend the breach, but the moment the storming party advanced, they were seized with an unaccountable panic and fled. The eastern hill above the breach was in consequence carried without an effort. In fleeing from the breach the main body of the garrison endeavoured to gain the western hill, but from the narrowness of the paths so impeded and confined each other

¹ Dirom's *Narrative of the Campaign*, p. 69.

that the assailants overtook them, entered the different barriers along with them, and completed the capture. Thus, as much by the pusillanimity of the garrison as by the skill and gallantry of the besiegers, a place deemed so impregnable that the very idea of attacking it was derided, fell in a single hour without costing the captors a single man. Utradrug and Holiurdrug, the only intermediate forts of any consequence still remaining, were taken with almost equal facility, and nothing now delayed the commencement of the siege of Seringapatam, but the detention of Nizam Ali's army before Gurumkonda. The siege of this place had commenced early in September, but little progress had been made till the breaching artillery which was at Nandidrug arrived. Even then the detention of the army threatened to be indefinitely protracted, had not Captain Andrew Read, who commanded the British detachment, undertaken, on being allowed to manage in his own way, to capture the lower fort, by which alone access to the upper fort could be obtained. He succeeded, and by thus hemming in the garrison enabled the besiegers to convert the siege into a blockade. A strong detachment sufficing for this purpose, the main body of the Nizam's army was left free to join Lord Cornwallis. It accordingly set out for this purpose, but had not advanced far when intelligence arrived that the lower fort had been retaken by the enemy, in consequence of the rashness of Hafiz Ji, the officer left in command, who had sallied out and been suddenly overwhelmed by an army of 12,000 horse and foot, led by Hyder Sahib, Tipu's eldest son. On this disastrous news, the Nizam's army retraced their steps and were again detained till, by a second capture of the lower fort, the blockade was re-established.

The rains having ceased, and the men and horses recovered rapidly under the full supplies of grain and corn, which the Brinjarris were induced by liberal treatment to bring into the camp, the three armies of the confederates united on the 25th of January, 1792, near Savandrug, and commenced their advance on the capital. Meanwhile, a fourth army was preparing to join from an opposite quarter. General Abercromby, whose duties as governor had required his presence at Bombay, returned to Tellicherry in the beginning of November, and having on the 23rd assembled his army, consisting of 8,400 men, at

Cananore, proceeded five miles northward to Iliacore. The stream on which this place stands being swollen with rain, was crossed in boats, and a march of twenty-six miles was continued through a very rugged country, to the western head of the pass of Pudicherrim, on the frontiers of the Raja of Coorg, on whose friendly aid the utmost dependence could be placed. The ground of this confidence must now be explained.

In the time of Hyder, Coorg, which forms a mountainous tract, stretching along the very summit of the Western Ghats, from the Tambercherry Pass, opposite to Calicut, in the south, to the confines of Bednore on the north, had been subjugated by treachery, and then treated with the utmost barbarity. The inhabitants were hunted down as if they had been wild beasts, and every effort which they made to throw off the yoke had only rivetted it more firmly. The reigning raja with his family was carried off to the fort of Cuddur, and died there in close confinement. His eldest son, the present raja, had been subjected to the grossest indignity, and forced by the initiatory rite into an outward profession of Islamism. As he grew up he burned to avenge the wrongs of his countrymen. In 1783, when he was only fifteen years of age, he was removed by Tipu with the other members of the family to Periapatam. This place, before Mercara supplanted it, was considered as the capital of Coorg, and containing many persons who were still strongly attached to the native dynasty, was the very last which Tipu ought to have selected, if the security of the prisoners was his object. Fortunately this fact had escaped his notice, and the raja was able to effect his escape in 1788. For some time he could only carry on a kind of guerilla warfare. In this he displayed remarkable ability, and while heard of everywhere was seen nowhere. Success rapidly increased the number of his adherents, and he began to show himself openly at the head of nearly 4,000 faithful warriors. Post after post fell into his hands, and ultimately Mercara was the only place within the territory which Tipu could call his own.

The raja had for some time maintained the struggle single-handed, when a confidential servant, sent to make some purchases at Tellicherry, entered into communication with the Company's chief factor there. As the war with Tipu had then

commenced, the value of an ally whose frontier lay within forty miles of his capital was easily perceived, and the Bombay government gladly entered into a treaty for mutual co-operation and the invasion of Mysore. Contrary to the usual practice of native princes, the Raja of Coorg not only faithfully performed his engagements, but even went beyond them. The only case in which his conduct excited some degree of suspicion is deserving of notice. When General Abercromby, availing himself of the treaty, was preparing for the first time to pass through Coorg on his march to Periapatam, the raja was engaged in the blockade of Mercara, which had been so long continued that the garrison was starving, and an early surrender seemed inevitable. It was known indeed that a large convoy for its relief was approaching, but the escort which accompanied it had been surrounded and could not possibly escape. How great, then, was the surprise of General Abercromby when the raja himself arrived in his camp, and announced to him that he had allowed the convoy to enter and the escort to escape! His explanation was, that Kadir Khan, who commanded the escort, had laid him under obligations which made it impossible to treat him as an enemy. While the raja was imprisoned at Periapatam, he had shown him great kindness, and not only so, but when two of the raja's sisters were carried off to Tipu's harem, he had been the means of saving the honour of a third sister, and of returning him to her unharmed. In return for these services, the raja, after the convoy and escort were entirely in his power, caused information to be conveyed to Kadir Khan that he was desirous to save him. A conference thereupon took place, and on Kadir Khan representing that his acceptance of individual safety would be the ruin of his family, and his return with the service unexecuted would be fatal to himself, the raja, with a generosity and gratitude to which it would be difficult to find a parallel, spared both the convoy and the escort. He was not ultimately a loser, as the garrison ere long consumed the provisions brought by the convoy, and being again reduced to extremity were glad to capitulate. With the aid of such an ally, General Abercromby had little difficulty in again reaching Periapatam.

The confederates, in advancing upon Seringapatam, passed through a country where every human dwelling was consumed

or in flames, and on the 5th of February, 1792, after passing over a high ground which gave a full view of the city, and of Tipu's army under its walls, encamped six miles to the northward. A bound hedge, formed by a wide belt of thorny plants, commenced on the north bank of the Cauvery, about a thousand yards above the island of Seringapatam, and after continuing due north for nearly two miles, swept round and pursued a south-easterly direction till it again met the river toward the eastern extremity of the island, and nearly opposite to the Carigat Hill. Within this inclosure, at its north-west extremity, was an eminence with a well-constructed redoubt, and at different parts also within the inclosure were seven other formidable redoubts, constructed so as to lend support to each other. A work commenced on the Carigat Hill was unfinished. The bound hedge thus formed the outer limit of a fortified camp, in which Tipu's whole army now lay. Lord Cornwallis, who had feared that Tipu would keep the field and operate on the communications of the besiegers, hoped to be able to strike a decisive blow, and with that view determined on an immediate attack. Orders were accordingly issued at sunset, and the army prepared to move in three columns at eight o'clock with a clear moonlight. The right column, under General Medows, composed of 3,300 men, was to leave the redoubt on the eminence at the north-west extremity untouched, and to enter the inclosure about 1,500 yards to east of it, then turn to the left and attack everything in its way till it met the centre column. This column, consisting of 3,700 men, under the immediate direction of Lord Cornwallis himself, was subdivided into three parts. One of these, under Colonel Knox, was to lead, and endeavour, by mixing with the fugitives, to pass over into the island; the second, under Colonel Stuart, after penetrating deep into the camp, was to turn to the left, attack the enemy's right wing, and thereafter endeavour to force a passage into the island; the third, left as a reserve under Lord Cornwallis, was to wait for the junction of the column under General Medows. The third or left column, consisting of 1,700 men under Colonel Maxwell, was first to attack the unfinished work on Carigat Hill, then descend, penetrate the inclosure, and unite with Colonel Stuart in forcing an entrance into the island.

Owing to some ambiguity in the order, the officer guiding the right column led it directly against the north-west redoubt, instead of avoiding it as had been intended. It was not carried till after a long and desperate struggle, in which the British lost ninety-one men, eleven of them officers, and the enemy 400. After this achievement, the right column, having secured its capture by a strong garrison, wheeled to the left, but on coming to another redoubt of great strength and magnitude, hesitated whether to attack it or to join the centre column, which it was conjectured might require to be strongly reinforced. The latter was the course adopted, and the consequence was, that the column, instead of advancing, countermarched, recrossed the bound hedge, and did not find the centre column till the business of the night was over. The head of the centre column, under Colonel Knox, penetrated by the bayonet alone, but a battalion belonging to his corps was just entering the camp, when a galling fire on its flanks produced some degree of agitation, which ended in confusion. Colonel Stuart, who was immediately behind with the centre division of this column, rode up, but finding that much time would be lost in attempting to rally the men, ordered the 71st, which was the next corps of his own division, to advance. Meanwhile, Colonel Knox, in order to mix more effectually with the fugitives, had pushed on through a crowded mass of them by the main ford, close under the guns of the fort, and by the aid of a guide, penetrated with three companies to the petta of Shaher Ganjam, situated near the middle of the eastern part of the island. The other seven companies of the regiment, and three companies of sepoys following in compact order, missed the ford, but crossing a little below, gained possession of the palace of Deria Daulat Bag. Captain Hunter, the officer in command, thinking his the first party that had crossed, took post to wait for further orders or intelligence, but as none arrived, and he perceived, as the day dawned, that his position immediately under the fire of the fort was not tenable, he recrossed the river and joined the reserve under Lord Cornwallis. Colonel Stuart, with the centre division of the centre column, had penetrated far into the camp, when he came upon a strong work called the Sultan's Redoubt. He immediately stormed it with far more

ease than had been anticipated, and then leaving a party to defend it, turned to attack the enemy's right wing. After driving a large body of infantry before him, and thinking that they had crossed into the island, he was surprised to observe a line of troops drawn up with perfect regularity, as if to oppose him. He had just ordered a volley and a charge with the bayonet, when the opposing troops were discovered to be Colonel Maxwell's column. The mistake had been mutual, and might have been attended with serious consequences. Colonel Maxwell, after storming the work on Carigat Hill, had suffered severely in descending from it, from a body of the enemy who had availed themselves of the cover of a water-course at its foot. Ultimately, however, it had surmounted this and every other obstacle, and broken the enemy's right wing.

Shortly after the junction of the two columns, a heavy fire was opened upon them from works on the island. After an ineffectual attempt to force them where the river was not fordable, Colonel Baird discovered a practicable ford, and effected a lodgment with a small party on the opposite bank. The head of the column following up this success was scarcely half-way across the stream, when the enemy's fire suddenly ceased. Colonel Knox, with his three companies, penetrating the cause of the heavy fire, had descended from Ganjam, and taken the batteries in reverse. Lord Cornwallis, who had passed the bound hedge with the centre column, took post with the reserve within it, with the Sultan's redoubt on his left. He had not as yet taken any active part in the battle, but he was destined to have his full share before it terminated. The unaccountable absence of General Medows had left him without the support on which he had calculated. The enemy, still unbroken on the left, and reinforced by the troops which had been obliged to retire from the centre, having become aware of his comparatively defenceless state, rushed upon him with overwhelming numbers. A charge with bayonet led by himself with the utmost coolness, and executed with the greatest gallantry, drove back the assailants, but they repeatedly rallied, and did not finally desist till near daylight. During this struggle, his lordship was wounded in the hand, and the number of casualties was considerable. General Medows and his division were at last found at

Carigat Hill, to which his lordship had repaired, in order to take up a position where his small corps could not be surrounded.

The attack took Tipu by surprise. His tent was pitched as usual in the rear of the centre of the position, close to the road by which the head of the central column penetrated, and he had just left, after making his evening meal in the Sultan's redoubt. On the first alarm he mounted, and was first made aware by a mass of fugitives that his centre was penetrated, and that a column advancing to the main ford was about to cut off his retreat. He waited not a moment longer, and was barely in time to pass the ford before the head of the column reached it. Having entered the fort, he repaired to a detached lozenge work at its north-east angle, and there sat until daylight issuing his orders. On counting his loss in the morning, it was ascertained that the killed, wounded, and missing amounted to 23,000. The missing, however, was by far the largest of these items, for no fewer than 10,000 Chelas (native Hindus carried off and forced to become soldier slaves), taking advantage of the confusion, marched off with their arms to the forests of Coorg. As yet the only positions gained by the British were the unfinished work on Carigat Hill, the redoubt in the north-west corner of the bound hedge, the Sultan's redoubt, and the post held by Colonel Stuart near the east extremity of the island. Tipu made several determined efforts to recover the two last positions, but was so signally repulsed that, as if in despair, he abandoned all the other redoubts within the inclosure, and thus allowed the preparatory operations for the siege to be immediately commenced.

On the 12th of January, 1792, Tipu had again attempted to negotiate, but had only received for answer, that negotiation was useless with one who disregarded treaties and violated articles of capitulation. "Send hither the garrison of Coimbatore," said Lord Cornwallis, "and then we will listen to what you have to say." His lordship alluded to the capture of Coimbatore by Kummer-ud-Din. After a protracted defence, conducted by Lieutenant Chalmers with a mere handful of men under the most unfavourable circumstances, a capitulation was agreed to. One of the express conditions was, that the garrison should

march to Palghat. This condition, after the performance of it had been delayed under the pretext that the Sultan's ratification was necessary, was grossly violated, and the whole garrison were marched off as prisoners to Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis by his answer had convinced Tipu that his own faithlessness had made future negotiation impossible, and now therefore, when he could not but tremble for the fate of his capital, and see that without negotiation his doom was sealed, he took a step which at least showed the extent of his despair. Sending for Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash on the 8th of February, the day after all his efforts to drive the British from their positions had proved unavailing, he announced their release. He had supposed that the former, from having had the command at Coimbatore, was either a relative of Lord Cornwallis, or an officer of high rank. On being told the contrary, he asked him if he should not see his lordship on his return to the camp. To this question, Lieutenant Chalmers was able to answer in the affirmative, and Tipu put into his hand a letter, telling him that it was on the subject of peace, and even begging him to assist in obtaining it. The letter attempted to justify the treatment of the garrison, by asserting, contrary to fact, that Kummer-ud-Din had not engaged to liberate them, but only promised to recommend their liberation. Lord Cornwallis, while he denied the truth of this statement, and upbraided Tipu with the notorious fact that the garrison were kept in irons, agreed, with the concurrence of the representatives of the Nizam and the Marathas, to receive the envoy. One cannot help wishing that, before this concession was made, the liberation not only of the garrison but of all the other prisoners unlawfully detained, had been insisted on as an essential preliminary. By the treaty of Mangalore, every European prisoner then in Mysore ought to have been delivered up, and yet it was perfectly well known that numbers of prisoners whose release was thus stipulated for were pining in its dungeons. Some indeed had been freed from misery by the atrocious assassinations already described, but others, including several whom Suffrein, the French admiral, had infamously consigned to the tender mercies of Hyder, were still alive. The fact was indisputable, for not only had some who had recently escaped

from Chitteldrug revealed the horrors of the prison-house in which their companions were still detained, but in Shaher Ganjam, on its capture only two days before, besides a considerable proportion of the garrison of Coimbatore, twenty-seven European captives, some of them Suffrein's victims, had been discovered and set at liberty. Antecedent therefore to the least concession to such a faithless barbarian as Tipu, he ought to have been made to understand that nothing but the instant release of every prisoner unlawfully detained could avert or delay the ruin evidently impending over him.

Only a few hours before releasing Lieutenant Chalmers, Tipu had entered upon a scheme which seemed to promise a termination of the war by a speedier process than negotiation. The headquarters of Lord Cornwallis, known by its distinguishing flag, was placed a little to the left in the rear of Carigat Hill. The situation being somewhat exposed, it seemed possible to make a dash at it and slay his lordship. This project, which, from the circumstances in which it was undertaken, can only be considered as a meditated assassination, was to be carried out by the corps known as the stable horse or guards. On the morning of the 8th of February, the very day, it will be observed, on which Lieutenant Chalmers, doubtless to lull suspicion, was sent with his letter, Tipu called the principal officers of the corps into his presence, and harangued them on the importance of the enterprise, and the glory they would acquire by terminating the war at a single stroke. All they had to do was to rid him of one individual. The officers pledged themselves not to return till they had done the deed, and retired after receiving the betel from Tipu's own hand. Setting out with their detachment, they proceeded down the river and crossed at Arikera; on the 9th they waited to receive further reports from their spies; at dawn of the 10th, their selected advanced guard penetrated between the camp of the Nizam and the British, but attracted no notice, as they were supposed to be Nizam's troops. After lounging on, they approached the park of artillery, and inquired with seeming indifference at some gun-lascars for the tent of the *burra saheb*, or commander. Supposing Colonel Duff the commandant of artillery to be meant, the lascars pointed to his tent, and in an instant the horsemen

with drawn swords were rushing at it in full gallop. The atrocity was so stupidly managed, that even before they reached the tent supposed to be that of the commander-in-chief, they were fired upon by a small body of sepoys, and obliged to save themselves by flight. Taking this attempt in connection with the one made during the previous campaign at Bangalore, Lord Cornwallis, who had hitherto used only two sentries, native troopers from his body guard, was prevailed on to allow a captain's guard to mount every night over his tent.

While consenting to the proposed negotiation, it was determined to prosecute the siege, and with this view, General Abercromby, again at Periapatam with an effective force of 6,000 men, was ordered to advance. He accordingly, on the 11th of February, crossed the Cauvery at Eratora, about thirty miles above Seringapatam, was met by Colonel Floyd with the cavalry on the 14th, at Kaniambadi, and joined the camp on the 16th. Meanwhile, materials for the siege, obtained chiefly by the destruction of the large and beautiful garden of Lal Bag at the eastern extremity of the island, were industriously provided. The point selected for the principal attack was the northern face near the western angle, a little above which General Abercromby crossed on the 19th, for the purpose of establishing the requisite enfilade. A vigorous attempt to impede his further progress failed, and the siege continued to advance. It is needless, however, to enter into details, as Tipu's speedy acceptance of the terms offered him put an end to hostilities. His vakils or deputies, Gholam Ali and Ali Reza, arrived in the British camp on the 14th of February, and were met by Sir John Kennaway on the part of the British, Mir Alam on the part of the Nizam, and an individual well acquainted with matters of revenue deputed by Hari Pant on the part of the Marathas. There cannot be a doubt that Seringapatam was now at the mercy of the confederates, and that therefore the ultimatum which they offered on the 22nd was not so rigorous as the circumstances would have justified. It consisted of the following five articles:—"I. One half of the dominions of which Tipu Sultan was in possession before the war to be ceded to the allies from the countries adjacent according to their situation. II. Three crores and thirty lacs of rupees (£3,300,000) to be

paid by Tipu Sultan, either in gold mohurs, pagodas, or bullion—
 1st. One crore and sixty-five lacs to be paid immediately. 2nd. One crore and sixty-five lacs to be paid in three payments, not exceeding four months each. III. All prisoners of the four powers from the time of Hyder Ali to be unequivocally restored. IV. Two of Tipu Sultan's three eldest sons to be given as hostages for a due performance of the treaty. V. When they shall arrive in camp with the articles of this treaty under the seal of the Sultan, a counterpart shall be sent from the three powers. Hostilities shall cease, and terms of a treaty of alliance and perpetual friendship shall be adjusted."

On the 23rd, Tipu assembled the principal officers of his army in the great mosque, and after swearing them on the *Koran* to give him their undisguised advice, read to them the above ultimatum, and then asked, "Shall it be peace or war?" The answer was in substance, that the troops had become disheartened and unworthy of confidence. The preliminary articles sealed by Tipu were sent in the course of the day to Lord Cornwallis, who did not insist on their delivery by the hostages, and while granting them a delay of two days, ordered hostilities to cease on the following morning. This order was received in the British camp with feelings bordering on indignation, and the soldiers in the trenches could scarcely be restrained from continuing their work. Lord Cornwallis endeavoured to soothe their feelings by his general orders, in which he spoke of the conditions as "highly honourable and advantageous," and "in consideration of the uncommon valour and firmness that has been manifested by the officers and soldiers of the king's and Company's troops during the whole course of the war," announced his "intention to take upon himself to order a handsome gratuity to be distributed to them in the same proportions as prize-money from the sum that Tipu has bound himself by one of the articles to pay to the Company."

There is said to have been a sad scene in the harem at parting with the boys who were to be sent out as hostages. Hyder Sahib, Tipu's eldest son, was, or at least was alleged to be, absent with the troops, and the two fixed upon were Abdul Khaliq, about ten, and Muza-ud-din, about eight years of age. Lord Cornwallis had instructed the vakils to say that he would wait

upon the princes as soon as they came to their tents, but Tipu, in a very polite answer, after assuring his lordship that he had "the most perfect confidence in his honour," begged that he would "allow them to be brought to his tent, and delivered into his own hands." On the 26th they left the fort under a salute, which was repeated by twenty-one guns from the British artillery. They were each seated in a silver howdah on a richly caparisoned elephant, and attended by the vakils and several other persons of rank, also on elephants. The procession was led by several camel hircarras and seven standard-bearers, followed by 100 pikemen with spears inlaid with silver. A guard of 200 sepoys and a party of horse brought up the rear. Lord Cornwallis, attended by his staff and some of the principal officers of the army, met the princes at the door of his large tent, and after embracing them, led them in by the hand. When they were seated, one on each side of him, Gholam Ali thus addressed him: "These children were this morning the sons of the Sultan, my master; their situation is now changed, and they must now look up to your lordship as their father." When his lordship declared that the greatest care would be taken of their persons, and every possible attention shown them, their faces brightened up, and told that their fears, if they had any, were already removed. They were dressed in long white muslin gowns and red turbans. Round their necks hung several rows of large pearls, and an ornament consisting of a large ruby and emerald surrounded by brilliants; in their turbans they wore a sprig of rich pearls. The elder boy had a dark complexion, thick lips, a small flattish nose, and a long countenance; the younger was remarkably fair, and had regular features, a small round face, large full eyes, and a countenance less thoughtful, but more animated than his brother's. His lordship presented each of them with a handsome gold watch, with which they seemed much pleased. The next day, the 27th, Lord Cornwallis visited them at their tents, attended by Sir John Kennaway and the vakils of the Nizam and the Marathas.

The adjustment of the definite articles now occupied the attention of Sir John Kennaway and the other vakils. The extent of the cessions depended on the whole amount of the Mysore revenue, and the value of the particular portions to

be ceded. In settling these, some delay was caused by the discussion of conflicting statements, but no decided misunderstanding arose till Tipu perceived that Coorg was inserted in the schedules as part of the Company's share. Becoming almost frantic with rage, he asked, "To which of the English possessions is Coorg adjacent? Why do they not ask for the key of Seringapatam? They knew that I would have died in the breach sooner than consent to such a cession, and durst not bring it forward until they had treacherously obtained possession of my children and my treasure (a crore of rupees, £1,000,000 sterling, had already been paid)." Nothing certainly could be more groundless than this charge of overreaching, but there is some reason to regret that the very possibility of making such a charge was not prevented by a distinct stipulation in favour of the Raja of Coorg. The faithful and valuable services he had rendered entitled him to this honour, and his protection ought not to have been left to depend on the interpretation of a dubious article. At the same time, it is plain that Tipu, however much he may have thirsted for vengeance on the raja, never could have imagined that he would be left to his mercy. Strictly speaking, when the ultimatum was signed, Coorg was not adjacent to any of the Company's territories, but the moment Malabar, in accordance with Tipu's own wish, was made part of the British share, Coorg did become adjacent, and therefore, in including it, neither the spirit nor the letter of the ultimatum was violated.

Whether Tipu's surprise, when he learned that Coorg was to be taken from him, was real or affected, it is certain that he began immediately after to act as if he had determined to resume hostilities. Immense bodies of men were seen at work on a retrenchment on the face of the fort which had been attacked. When remonstrated with on this violation of the armistice, he had the hardihood to deny a fact which was perfectly visible to both armies. His vakils also began to procrastinate, and managed to spin out the negotiation to the middle of March. By this time the position of Lord Cornwallis was greatly changed for the worse. The materials prepared for the siege, having been brought from the Lal Bag, were chiefly of the cypress tree, and from having been long made up, had become

so dry, brittle, and inflammable as to be unfit for use. A new stock could only be obtained by a long and difficult transport. The camp, too, was sickly, and the season soon arriving at the worst would probably so fill the hospitals as scarcely to leave a sufficient number of effective men for the siege. These facts seem to have burst on Lord Cornwallis all at once, and he despatched fair copies of a treaty to Tipu, leaving him only a few hours to decide on the alternative of signing or recommencing hostilities. On an attempted evasion, the hostages were moved preparatory to their departure for Coromandel, and their military guard were made prisoners. The vakils at first blustered, then entreated, and at last, on the 18th of March, returned with the treaty duly signed and sealed. On the following day, the forms of delivery and interchange were publicly concluded.

In arranging the division of the ceded territory among the confederates, the stipulations in the treaties of 1790, which gave exclusive right to the British of all they captured before the others took the field, and to the Marathas of all that Hyder had wrested from them, were disregarded, and the shares were allotted on the principle of perfect equality. The revenue of the whole territory ceded was estimated at 3,950,098 pagodas, or 11,850,294 rupees, equal to £1,185,029. Each share thus amounted to £395,009. The Maratha acquisitions were situated to the north and west of the Tungabhadra, and adjoined their previous territories immediately south of the Krishna, making their frontier nearly the same as it had been in 1779. The Nizam's acquisitions bounded with those of the Marathas on the west, where a considerable tract on both sides of the Tungabhadra was received; another still larger tract lay farther to the east, extending along both banks of the Penna, and north as far as the Krishna. The British acquisitions consisted of three distinct tracts, two of them on the east, and the third on the west. The most northerly of the eastern tracts commenced near Ambur, and stretched south to the vicinity of Carur; on the west it was bounded partly by the Eastern Ghats, which brought it to the table-land of Mysore, and partly by the Cauvery. Within this tract lay the Baramahal and some important fortresses, together with the chief passes through

which the incursions into the Carnatic had hitherto been made. The lesser and more southerly of the eastern tracts included the fort of Dindigul, and the districts connected with it. The acquisitions of the west comprehended a large extent of the Malabar coast, including the ports of Cananore and Calicut, and the whole territory of the Raja of Coorg, thus giving access to the table-land of Mysore on the west, in the same way as the other acquisitions gave access to it on the east.

The terms of the treaty made with Tipu have been much criticized on different and even opposite grounds, some maintaining that far too much, and others that far too little was exacted. The former, assuming the possibility of forcing European ideas into India politics, dream of a kind of a balance of power, by means of which Tipu, the Nizam, and the Marathas were to check and counter-check each other, and prevent any one from becoming so great as to endanger the territories of the Company. In accordance with this view Tipu's territories are represented as a kind of barrier, which the Company instead of weakening ought rather to have strengthened. Unquestionably, had Tipu been a faithful and attached ally, and not the inveterate enemy of the Company, it might have been good policy to keep him strong. But in this instance the theory, so far from being based on facts, only contradicts them. Under Hyder the Company had more than once been brought to the brink of ruin, and there cannot be a doubt that Tipu, though fortunately not possessed of his father's talents, was bent on following, and did in fact take the first opportunity of following in his father's steps. So far, therefore, from being available as a barrier against the Marathas, he was far more to be feared than they, and nothing but the curtailment of his power could prevent him from employing it for the injury, and if possible for the ruin of the Company. Those, on the other hand, who think that the terms given to Tipu were too favourable, allow themselves to be hurried away by a just detestation of his personal character, and overlook the fact that the dictation of more humiliating terms, if not inexpedient, might have proved impracticable. Seringapatam, though apparently destined to fall, was not yet taken, and besides the visible obstacles which remained to be surmounted, many still unseen might have

arisen and completely changed the aspect of affairs. Sickness was spreading in the camp, and the season was not yet at its worst. The allies, too, while determined to have a full share of the profits of victory, had as yet done scarcely anything to contribute to it. They were not only lukewarm, but suspected of being ready to change sides if a sufficient temptation were offered. In fact, it was afterwards ascertained that the representative of one of them was actually in treacherous correspondence with the enemy. Many other reasons made an early but honourable termination of the war extremely desirable. The directors were urging it in every letter from home; the legislature, not satisfied with a resolution denouncing conquest in India, had embodied the denunciation in an act of parliament, and in this had carried public opinion decidedly along with them; and the French revolution had brought Europe into such a state, that it was impossible to say how soon every soldier lent by the king to the Company might be absolutely required for other battle-fields. Lord Cornwallis had from the first declared, that he "would suffer no prospects, however brilliant, to postpone for an hour that most desirable event—a general peace," and that he would be satisfied with such concessions as "would put it out of the enemy's power to disturb the peace of India in future." The extent of the concessions necessary to curb such a ferocious and ambitious tyrant as Tipu could not easily be estimated, and future events seem to show that his lordship had rather underrated them; but on a review of all the circumstances, impartial judges will readily concede that he fairly and modestly characterized the treaty, when, announcing it in a letter to Mr. Dundas, he said, "We have at length concluded our Indian war handsomely, and I think as advantageously as any reasonable person could expect. We have effectually crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable".

In the beginning of April, Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by the two hostage princes, who were not to be delivered up till Tipu's obligations under the treaty were performed, commenced his march homewards. Before he finally parted with Hari Pant and Azim-ul-Omrah or Mir Alam, the respective representatives of the Marathas and the Nizam, they both endeavour-

ed to sound him as to the kind and extent of interference which the Company would be disposed to exercise in the event of any misunderstanding between their governments. The Marathas, who had long wished to make the Nizam their prey, were anxious to know how far they might proceed in their ambitious projects, and were moreover desirous of possessing, like the Nizam, a subsidiary force of Company troops at their disposal. Hari Pant, acting nominally for the peshwa, but really for Nana Fadnavis, showed, without actually avowing it, that the object contemplated by such a force was to curb and overawe several of their own chiefs, and particularly Sindhia, who had already acquired a kind of independence, and was suspected of a design to seat himself at Poona. The Nizam, on the other hand, was trembling for his dominions, because he knew that if left to struggle unaided with the Marathas he would be completely overmatched. Lord Cornwallis thus consulted could only answer vaguely, that the Company would always be ready to interpose their good offices, and mediate between the parties with the view of obtaining an amicable settlement. Farther than this he could not go without entering into a new treaty, a proceeding from which, as peace had been re-established, he was precluded by act of parliament. There was, however, another case to which the legislative prohibition did not apply. By the 13th article of the confederacy of 1790, it was provided that, "if after the conclusion of the peace with Tipu, he should molest or attack either of the contracting parties, the other shall join to punish him; the mode and conditions of effecting which shall be hereafter settled by the three contracting parties." This article was still in force, and Lord Cornwallis declared his readiness to convert the conditional stipulation contained in it into an explicit treaty of guarantee. This did not suit the policy of the Marathas, who preferred to leave everything open, so as that they might have full scope for taking advantage of contingencies, and hence, after some time wasted in negotiation, they positively refused to concur in the kind of guarantee which Lord Cornwallis had proposed. But the aversion of the Marathas to the guarantee was the very ground on which the Nizam desired to obtain it, and he argued with great appearance of justice, that the

failure of one of three contracting parties to fulfil a common obligation could not render the obligation null, or justify the violation of it by the other two parties. Not only had he an express right under the treaty to a guarantee against Tipu, but the letter which he had received from Lord Cornwallis before he consented, to sign the treaty was equivalent to a guarantee against the Marathas also. It is difficult to answer this argument, and it must therefore be confessed, that when the Nizam obtained nothing more than a vague assurance that the English government would always be ready to act according to existing treaties, Lord Cornwallis rather evaded than fulfilled a subsisting obligation.

Lord Cornwallis arrived at Madras in the end of May, 1792, and was not much satisfied with what he saw. In a confidential letter to Mr. Dundas he writes: "I must confess that I do not observe any material improvement that has been made, and that I see no flattering prospect. Sir Charles Oakley, though not a very capable man, is, I believe, the best of all the civil servants of this establishment that could have been selected to fill the station of governor, and yet you may rest assured that he will never possess sufficient authority, or make any radical reform." The great defect was, in his opinion, not so much in the men as in the system. Governors had hitherto been usually selected from the Company's service, and to this he objected in the most decided terms: "It is very difficult," he says, "for a man to divest himself of the prejudices which the habits of twenty years have confirmed, and to govern people who have lived with him so long on a footing of equality. But the Company's servants have still greater obstacles to encounter when they become governors; for the wretched policy of the Company has, till the late alterations took place in Bengal, invariably driven all their servants to the alternative of starving, or of taking what was not their own; and although some have been infinitely less guilty in this respect than others, the world will not tamely submit to be reformed by those who have practised it in the smallest degree." In the course of the letter he returns to this subject and adds, "What I have said about governors is equally applicable to Bombay, and still more to the supreme government, which I hope never again to see in the hands of a Company's servant."

It is not unworthy of notice, that at this very time, though he did not know it, the directors had appointed a Company's servant to succeed him as governor-general. The soundness of his opinion, however, in so far as relates to the supreme government, has since been practically recognized, though he overlooked a very important distinction when he applied it indiscriminately to all the presidencies. Admitting that long residence, and the local connections thereby formed, make it inexpedient to appoint a Company's servant governor of the presidency in which he has served, why should it disqualify him for holding that office in other presidencies? Surely, other things being equal, the experience of twenty years' faithful service in Bengal might be the best of all qualifications for the office of governor at Madras or Bombay.

Before quitting Madras, Lord Cornwallis availed himself of the opportunity of personal intercourse with Muhammed Ali, to make a new arrangement with him. The directors had called his attention specially to the subject, and the nabob himself was complaining that, in the arrangement made with Sir Archibald Campbell in 1787, he had promised more than he was able to perform. By this latter arrangement, four-fifths of the nabob's revenues were to be paid to the Company as his proportion in time of war; nine lacs as the expense of the civil and military establishments, together with twelve lacs to his creditors, were to be his payments in time of peace. It looked as if the nabob had entered into this arrangement merely to break it. Some securities for payment had been taken, but these proved unavailing, and the war with Tipu had no sooner commenced than arrears began to accumulate so rapidly as to leave the Company no alternative but to take the management entirely into their own hands. The nabob as usual strenuously opposed, and even threw obstacles in the way of the Company's collectors. Of course, the moment the war ceased he claimed the right of resuming his own management, or rather of handing over the management to the numerous harpies who were constantly preying upon him. Such was the state of matters when Lord Cornwallis endeavoured to place them on a better footing. He was perfectly satisfied that the true plan would have been for the nabob to invest the entire management permanently, during

peace as well as war, in the Company, reserving a liberal portion of the revenues for the maintenance of his family and dignity, and allotting the rest to the general defence and the liquidation of debt. This plan, however, the nabob at once rejected, and as the time had not yet arrived for forcing his assent, it only remained to provide the best possible substitute for it that could be obtained by persuasion. Accordingly an agreement, styled rather grandiloquently a treaty, was concluded on the 12th of July, 1792. It annulled all former agreements, gave the Company the sole management of the revenues in time of war, with the power of employing four-fifths of them in defraying its expenses, and reserved the management to the nabob in time of peace, but bound him to pay nine lacs of pagodas annually to the Company for the military establishment, and six lacs twenty-one thousand one hundred and five pagodas annually to creditors. The polygars were in future to pay their tribute directly to the Company, who were on this account to credit the nabob annually with a sum of rather more than two and a half lacs of pagodas; and in the event of failure of payment on the nabob's part, the Company were to enter into the possession of certain specified districts, and continue in it till all arrears were discharged. This agreement being only a compromise, could not be regarded as a perfect remedy, and the utmost that Lord Cornwallis ventured to say in favour of its provisions, was to express a hope that they would prove "well adapted to protect the Company against pecuniary losses and disappointments from the nabob in future, and to promote in an essential degree the quiet and general prosperity of the country." Referring to the same subject in a letter to Mr. Dundas he says, "I have at length settled everything with the nabob, and I believe in the best manner that it could have been done, unless we had kept possession of the country; but that point could only have been carried by force, without the least shadow of reason or justice, and was therefore not to be attempted." On the 28th of July, 1792, Lord Cornwallis returned to Bengal. Before this time his successful termination of the war was known in England, and it was determined to bestow the first instalment of his reward by conferring upon him the title of Marquis. Immediately on his arrival he resumed a subject which had long occupied his

thoughts, and with which he was busily engaged when the Mysore war commenced. This was the important subject of financial and judicial reform.

During the first five years of Mr. Hastings' administration, the revenues were collected and paid by farmers, who had for the most part obtained their leases as the highest bidders at public auction. Many of these farmers being mere adventurers, not only displaced the old collectors who, holding the office by hereditary right, had with their families been long connected with the lands, and were thus connected with them by many other ties than those of pecuniary interest, but practised all sorts of extortion on the ryots or cultivators. Under such a system it was impossible that the country could prosper. It was at the time only beginning to recover from a dreadful famine, and when this new instrument of oppression was added, threatened in many districts to return to a state of nature. Before the leases for five years expired, Mr. Hastings, though not willing to acknowledge the failure of a system which he plumed himself on having originated, could not shut his eyes to the misery which it had spread, and the enormous defalcations which had arisen under it; and he therefore proposed a new plan, of which the leading feature was that the lands, or rather the revenue exigible by government from the lands, should be "farmed out on leases for life, or for two joint lives, to such responsible persons as shall offer the most advantageous terms, allowing a preference to the zamindars, provided they have attained the age of eighteen years, if their offers are equal or nearly equal to those of others, or if they are equal to what the council shall judge to be the real value of the lands." As these leases were renewable to heirs on the same terms as before, or on a new valuation which was never to be less than the former valuation, and never more than ten per cent above it, this was to all intents and purposes a permanent settlement. The zamindar in possession could not be ousted so long as he paid the fixed rent, and his heirs could immediately on his death enter into possession, either on the same terms or on payment of a fine of limited amount. Where the zamindar declined, or from legal incapacity was unable to accept the terms, he was to receive a pension equal to ten per cent of the valuation, and

when he failed in his payments, the zamindary, or such part of it as might be necessary to cover the deficiency, was to be publicly sold. The only part of the settlement which seems not to have been permanent was that which related to other farmers than zamindars. The minute is not very explicit on the subject, but several passages seem to intimate that, on the expiry of leases held by such farmers, the zamindar, or the heir of the zamindar, who had previously declined, might step in and claim to be preferred on the new arrangement. Mr. Hastings, alluding to this part of his plan, says, "It might be resolved that no proposal should be received from any persons but the zamindars themselves," and then makes the following observations: "Leases to farmers on fixed terms for life would interest them in the improvement of the country equally with the zamindars, and in one respect would be more effectual; we mean, by being granted to substantial men who have money of their own to lay out in improvements. The principal argument in favour of the zamindars is, the security arising from the power of selling their lands, when landed property is put on such a footing as to become desirable." The last sentence in this quotation certainly implies that mere farmers and zamindars were considered as standing on a different footing, and that to the former nothing more than a life interest was to be given.

At the time when the above plan was proposed Mr. Hastings was in a minority, and had the support of only Mr. Barwell, who expressed his approval of the plan by signing the above minute along with him. The other three members of council opposed it, and concurred in a very elaborate minute which Mr. Francis drew up, and at a later period published. As some account of this minute was formerly given, it is here necessary only to mention one or two of its leading features. Assuming zamindars to be proprietors in the European sense of the term, he proposed first to form "an estimate of the permanent services which government must indispensably provide for, under the great heads of civil and military establishments and investment, with an allowance of a reasonable reserve for contingencies," and then "proportion the whole demand upon the provinces, and fix it for ever." The quit-rent of each zamindary being fixed, "the zamindar must be informed that the due discharge

of his rent is the tenure by which he holds his lands, with every possible assurance that no further demands will be made upon him. If he incurs a balance, a part of his zamindari should be invariably sold to make it good, and when the quit-rent is fixed, there can be no doubt of purchasers." Somewhat inconsistently, while complaining severely of the excessive amount of revenue previously exacted, Mr. Francis is inclined to think that the average of the three last years might be fairly assumed as the basis of a perpetual quit-rent.

In 1776, Mr. Hastings having, by the death of Colonel Monson, obtained the casting vote in the council, resumed his financial plans, and alleging that, in whatever manner the new settlement might be made, "it will be equally necessary to be previously furnished with accurate states of the real value of the lands, as the grounds on which it is to be constructed," proposed for this purpose the establishment of a temporary office, "under the conduct of one or two covenanted servants of the Company, assisted by a diwan and other officers." The control of this office was to be under "the immediate charge" of the governor-general, and the officers, besides the principal business of preparing for "the formation of an equal settlement," were to direct their attention to points of inquiry that might be "useful to secure to the ryots the perpetual and undisturbed possession of their lands, and to guard them against arbitrary exactions." Mr. Francis objected to the proposed office, both because, if, according to his own plan, an average of the last three years were to be taken, knowledge of the actual value was superfluous, and might, by exciting suspicion, prove pernicious, and because, in his opinion, inquiry for the protection of the ryot was so far from being necessary that, "in the present state of the country, the ryot has, in fact, the advantage over the zamindar." Mr. Hastings was not moved by these objections, which, indeed, were more captious than forcible, and the new office, with a full staff of officials, was appointed. When the directors were consulted on the subject, they expressed great "surprise and concern," that, "after more than seven years' investigation, information is still so incomplete as to render another innovation (the establishment of the temporary office), still more extraordinary than any of the former, absolutely

necessary in order to the formation of a new settlement, and while by no means disapproving" the attempt to obtain further information, if it be necessary, declared "that the conduct of the majority of the council on this occasion (in placing the office under the immediate charge of the governor-general) has been such as must have our utter disapprobation." The office, though thus denounced, was not abolished, and much valuable information was collected, but no attempt was made to use it for the purpose of forming a new system, and after the expiry of the leases for five years, the land revenue was collected by the most objectionable method of annual settlements.

Such was the state of matters when Lord Cornwallis was appointed governor-general. Before he sailed, the state of the land tenures in India had been the subject of conferences, which he held both with the ministry and the directors, and it was expected that he would be able, shortly after his arrival in India, to establish a permanent settlement. The subject, besides being difficult in itself, was entirely new to him, but he had the advantage on the outward voyage of being introduced to the knowledge of it by one of the ablest of Indian financiers. Mr. John Shore, who, after long service in India, had been appointed to a seat in the Bengal council, sailed in the same vessel with him, and must have had ample opportunity of imparting his stores of knowledge and experience to so apt and diligent a pupil. Hence, when his lordship reached Calcutta, he was rather an adept than a novice, and with the able assistance of his teacher, would not have been guilty of much presumption had he immediately begun to legislate. With characteristic modesty and caution, however, he determined not to commit himself till he could clearly see his way, and therefore, in the meantime, allowed the mode of settlement to continue as he found it. One year subsequent to his lordship's arrival thus passed away, and when the period for making the revenue arrangements for another year arrived, the governor-general in council thus addressed the directors:—"The acknowledged advantages which must result from concluding a settlement for a long term of years, together with your injunctions for carrying this measure into execution, impressed us with the greatest anxiety for completing it at the commencement of the current

year, 1195 or 1788-89; but it was with real reluctance we found ourselves under the necessity of postponing the arrangement till the ensuing year, for the reasons which we have now the honour to submit to you." The reasons were the voluminous nature of the materials which had unavoidably retarded their completion, the short time which remained for inspection even had they been prepared, and "the serious obstacles to forming a settlement on a permanent plan," in consequence of "the storms and inundations which had so universally prevailed during the last season."

It will be observed that the above despatch, though it mentions a "permanent plan," does not appear to contemplate a settlement for perpetuity, but only one "for a long term of years." Indeed, in a subsequent part of the despatch, the plan deferred for the above reasons is distinctly spoken of as "the ten years' settlement in Bengal." This seems, accordingly to have been the period originally contemplated. On the 7th of August, 1789, Lord Cornwallis intimated to the directors that he was now prepared to proceed. "The settlement," he says, "in conformity to your orders, will only be made for ten years certain, with a notification of its being your intention to declare it a perpetual and unalterable assessment of these provinces, if the amount and the principles upon which it has been made shall meet with your approbation." No doubt appears to have been entertained in any quarter as to the persons with whom the settlement ought to be made. The zamindars proper, and an inferior grade of zamindars called independent talukdars, were held to be the only proprietors of the soil, and it was never suspected that there were individuals, and even whole communities, who disputed, and, if they had had the opportunity, could have successfully contested their right. The term *zamindar* is not of Hindu but of Persian origin, and must therefore, in all probability, have been unknown in India till the establishment of Muhammedan ascendancy. It means landholder, but it does not follow that when it came to be applied to a particular class of persons in India it retained its original and literal signification. The Hindu village system recognized two headmen—the one the headman of a single village, the other the headman of a dis-

trict composed of several villages. The latter appears to be the official to whom the name of zamindar was subsequently given. At first he was probably elected by the villagers themselves, and held not only some portion of village land in his own right as a villager, but also a portion allotted to him by his fellow-villagers, under the name of *nan-kar* or subsistence land, in return for the services he was expected to perform. Subsequently, he was nominated by the government, which, in employing him to collect its revenues within the district, paid him by a percentage on the amount of his collections. He was at once a landholder, in respect of the land which he held in his own name and by grant from his fellow-villagers, and a government official paid by a fee. In course of time, when the office had become hereditary, the distinction between the two kinds of land disappeared, and both the village and the subsistence land belonged to the zamindar as one common property. To this extent and no further he was a landholder, and the villagers, though their individual shares might be of less extent than his, were to all intents as much landholders as he. In his other character of government official, he was no landholder at all, and in paying over the revenue of the district he was merely the hand through which the money passed. The villagers who paid it were neither his tenants nor his vassals. What they paid was paid not to him, but to government through him. A very great blunder, as well as gross injustice, was committed when a settlement was made with zamindars alone, and rights of property, every whit as good as theirs, were completely ignored. The utmost that can be said in excuse is, that in Bengal the village system had been much broken down, and the number of those whose rights were thus wrested from them at one swoop was far less than it would have been if that system had still been in vigour.

While all were agreed that the settlement was to be made with the zamindars, a serious difference of opinion arose as to its duration. Lord Cornwallis, convinced that the benefits anticipated never could be realized unless it was fixed and unalterable, proposed, while concluding only a decennial settlement, to issue a notification that the settlement, though fixed for a limited period, was intended to be perpetual, and would be

made so if the directors, on being consulted, should give their sanction. Mr. Shore at first confined his objection to the notification, on the ground that the zamindars would regard it as a promise, and might therefore, should the directors refuse to sanction perpetuity, charge government with a breach of faith. Subsequently he carried his objections much further, and argued that, however desirable perpetuity might be in itself, the idea of it ought, at least for the present, to be abandoned. Notwithstanding the long period which had elapsed since the grant of the diwani, the information necessary to justify a perpetual settlement had not been obtained, many important points still remained to be elucidated, and the experience of ten years would be required to show how the settlement actually worked. In that time many defects and errors would doubtless be discovered, and nothing therefore could be more rash and impolitic than voluntarily to deprive themselves of the power of correcting them. Lord Cornwallis was not to be diverted from his purpose by these or any similar arguments. He was convinced, as he himself expressed it, in an elaborate minute lodged in answer to Mr. Shore, that "by granting perpetual leases of the lands at a fixed assessment, we shall render our subjects the happiest people in India." Every delay therefore seemed to him repugnant to the dictates of humanity, and the perpetual settlement, after being conditionally promised in a notification, was finally and irrevocably established throughout the provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, as soon as the sanction of the home authorities arrived. The manner in which this sanction was obtained is graphically described by Mr. Dundas, in a letter dated 17th September, 1792, and received by Lord Cornwallis 2nd March, 1793:—

"In your letter," writes Mr. Dundas, "you allude to the important question of the perpetuity of the decennial settlement, and I have the very great satisfaction to inform you that the same conveyance which carries this, carries out an approbation and confirmation of your sentiments on this subject. It has been longer delayed than I expected, but the delay was unavoidable. Knowing that the directors would not be induced to take it up, so as to consider it with any degree of attention, and knowing that some of the most leading ones among them

held an opinion different both from your lordship and me on the subject of perpetuity, and feeling that there was much respect due to the opinion and authority of Mr. Shore, I thought it indispensably necessary both that the measure must originate with the Board of Control, and likewise that I should induce Mr. Pitt to become my partner in the final consideration of so important and controverted a measure. He accordingly agreed to shut himself up with me for ten days at Wimbledon, and attend to that business only. Charles Grant stayed with us a great part of the time. After a most minute and attentive consideration of the whole subject, I had the satisfaction to find Mr. Pitt entirely of the same opinion with us. We therefore settled a despatch upon the ideas we had formed, and sent it down to the court of directors. What I expected happened; the subject was too large for the consideration of the directors in general, and the few who knew anything concerning it, understanding from me that Mr. Pitt and I were decided in our opinions, thought it best to acquiesce, so that they came to a resolution to adopt entirely the despatch as transmitted by me."

Such is the secret history of this celebrated settlement for perpetuity. Lord Cornwallis urged it, Mr. Dundas cordially seconded him, and after ten days' closeting, gained the assent of Mr. Pitt. The directors as a body were unwilling as well as unfit to deal with it, and remitted to a committee, who, knowing that the decision was already formed, deemed it unnecessary to go through the farce of deliberating, and simply acquiesced. On the merits of the settlement opinions continued to be divided, but future inquiry has undoubtedly tended to increase the regret that the caution recommended by Mr. Shore was not exercised, and that Lord Cornwallis, led away by the idea that he was restoring the principal landholders "to such circumstances as to enable them to support their families with decency, and to give a liberal education to their children, according to the customs of their respective castes and religions," and thereby supporting "a regular gradation of ranks," which "is nowhere more necessary than in this country, for preserving order in civil society," should have conferred the whole property of the country on a body of men so little entitled to such a preference

that Mr. Hastings had put on record the following description of them:—"It is a fact, which will with difficulty obtain credit in England, though the notoriety will justify me in asserting it here, that much the greatest part of the zamindars, both of Bengal and Bihar, are incapable of judging or acting for themselves, being either minors, or men of weak understanding, or absolute idiots."

The judicial establishments next engaged the serious attention of Lord Cornwallis. Their numerous defects were well known, and the directors, in the instructions which they gave him on the subject, furnished a kind of plan, in the formation of which they stated that "they had been actuated by the necessity of accommodating their views and interests to the subsisting manners and usages of the people, rather than by any abstract theories drawn from other countries, or applicable to a different state of things." Before the passing of the Regulating Act, the councils of the different presidencies had not interfered much with the administration of justice among the natives. In Bengal, in particular, the collection of the revenue chiefly occupied their attention, and the administration of justice, when the revenue was not immediately concerned, was considered as lying beyond their province. The subject had, however, been gradually rising in importance, and when the Company had once determined to stand forth in their own names to manage the diwani, it was soon perceived that the collection of the revenue was so intimately connected with the other departments of government, that it would be impossible to keep them separate. Accordingly, the Regulating Act, by its 36th section, gave power to "the governor-general and council of the said united Company's settlement at Fort William in Bengal, from time to time to make and issue such rules, ordinances, and regulations for the good order and civil government of the said Company's settlement at Fort William aforesaid, and other factories and places subordinate, or to be subordinate thereto, as shall be deemed just and reasonable (such rules, ordinances, and regulations not being repugnant to the laws of the realm), and to set, impose, inflict, and levy reasonable fines and forfeitures for the breach or non-observance of such rules, ordinances, and regulations." Mr. Hastings devoted some attention to the sub-

ject, and, as has been already explained, established two courts in each collectorate—a civil, called the *diwani adalat*, and a criminal, called the *foujdari adalat*—and also two superior or *sadar* courts, which sat at Calcutta, chiefly for the purpose of hearing appeals. In 1780 the constitution of these courts was abruptly changed by the corrupt bargain which placed Sir Elijah Impey at the head of the *sadar diwani adalat*, in order to induce him to withdraw the extravagant claims to jurisdiction which had been made by the supreme court at Calcutta, and threatened to goad the natives into rebellion. Some other changes were made, and various regulations framed, but nothing like a general and uniform system existed till Lord Cornwallis tried to introduce it.

The first judicial changes which took place after the arrival of Lord Cornwallis did not originate with him. They were contained in the instructions which he received, and made changes of a kind which could scarcely have commanded his approval, as he afterwards saw occasion to recall them. The directors ordered that the provincial civil courts, which had been withdrawn from the superintendence of the collectors, should be again placed under it, and that criminal justice should continue to be administered by Muhammedan judges. As soon as his lordship's judicial reforms were matured, he entirely disconnected the collectors with judicial proceedings, and by abolishing the office of naib nazim, assumed for the Company the criminal, as they had previously assumed the civil jurisdiction over the whole country. In depriving the collectors of all judicial powers, and "confining their duties and functions to the mere collection of the public dues," the governor-general and his council state that they had proceeded on a maxim, the soundness of which cannot be disputed, that "when the power to redress oppressions, and functions that must always have a tendency to promote or screen the commission of them, are united in the same person, a strict adherence to the principles of justice cannot be expected, and still less can it be hoped that the people will feel a confidence of obtaining justice." In future, therefore, revenue was to be placed in the same category as other causes, and decided in the ordinary courts. Of these courts, as now constituted, a very brief account must be given.

Adopting the usual division of courts into civil and criminal, and commencing with the former, we find at the very base of the whole judicial system a species of small debt courts spread over the country, and fixed wherever the population seemed so numerous as to require them. These courts were limited to causes in which the pecuniary amount did not exceed fifty rupees, and were presided over by native commissioners, who received no salaries, but were paid by a fee of an anna per rupee, or a sixteenth of the sum claimed. Next in order were the *zila* or district, and the city courts, possessed of jurisdiction within the limits of the respective districts and cities in which they were established, and entitled to take cognizance of all civil causes, of whatever nature and of whatever amount. A single judge, a covenanted servant of the Company, with a Muhammedan and Hindu assessor, presided in these courts; the only other principal official was a registrar, also a covenanted servant, who, in order to relieve the business of the court, had a primary jurisdiction in all causes not exceeding 200 rupees. All the officers of government were made amenable to these courts for acts done in their official capacities, and even government itself, in cases in which it might be a party with its subjects in matters of property. No British subject, except covenanted servants and king's officers, was to be permitted to reside within the jurisdiction of these courts, "without entering into a bond" to be amenable to them in all civil causes brought against him by natives; but the legality of this proceeding was more than questionable, as the legislature had previously provided that British subjects were to be amenable only to the supreme court at Calcutta. Above the *zila* and city courts were four provincial courts, established in Patna, Dacca, Murshidabad, and Calcutta. These courts had a primary jurisdiction within certain limits, but their chief business was to decide on appeal from the *zila* and city courts. This decision, in all cases of real or personal property not exceeding a certain amount, was final, but in cases above that amount might be reviewed, as the minute of Lord Cornwallis expresses it, by "the supreme board as a court of appeal in the last resort, in their capacity of a court of *sadar diwani adalat*." Each provincial court consisted of three judges, all covenanted servants, a registrar, with one or more

assistants, also covenanted, and three assessors—a kazi, a mufti, and a pandit. The decision of the *sadar diwani adalat* was final in all causes under 50,000 rupees, but in those exceeding this sum the Act 21 Geo. III. c. 70 gave an appeal to the king in council.

The criminal courts were practically composed of the same judges as those of the civil courts. Thus, the zila and city judges were appointed to act as magistrates within their respective jurisdictions. In like manner, the judges of the provincial courts were to hold courts of circuits within their respective divisions, the senior judge going the circuit of one half of the stations, and the other two judges the circuit of the other half. By this means there were two annual jail-deliveries in the country; by another arrangement, a jail-delivery every month was secured in towns. In the land settlement, the zamindars were taken bound to keep the peace, and made responsible for robberies and thefts within their limits. This revival of ancient usage soon proved unavailing, and the police establishments of the zamindars were abolished, in order to make way for a system of police conducted under the direct authority of government. For this purpose, the zila magistrates were instructed to divide their districts into police jurisdictions. Each of these, averaging about twenty miles square, was committed to a *daroga* or native superintendent, with a suitable staff of officers under him. In cities, the extent of the jurisdiction and the number of officers was determined of course by the population.

While establishing courts for the administration of justice, Lord Cornwallis did not overlook the law according to which it was to be administered, but though aware how much both the Hindu and Muhammedan codes stood in need of reform, he saw the necessity of touching them with a sparing hand. The utmost which he ventured to do, was to order the admission of evidence in certain cases where the religion of the witness was the only ground for rejecting it; to prevent the escape of a murderer, merely because the heirs of the murdered person chose rather to compound with the criminal than to prosecute him; and to abolish the barbarous punishment of mutilation. There is still, however, another branch of judicial reform, in respect of which the administration of Lord Cornwallis is entitled to special and honourable notice. We allude to the complete

code of regulations, which not only explained every part of the new judicial system introduced, but was made patent to all who were interested in it, by being printed and published both in the original English, and in translations for the use of the natives. The code so printed and published, was declared to be the standard by which the courts of judicature should be guided, and an important check was thus provided against arbitrary and irresponsible proceedings. The best proof of the intrinsic merit of the code is, that it was used almost without change by several subsequent administrations, but it cannot be out of place to give the testimony of so competent a witness as Sir William Jones. He was then a judge in the supreme court at Calcutta, and Lord Cornwallis had sent the regulations to him with a letter, in which he said:—"I take the liberty of sending the foudari propositions, according to your obliging permission, and earnestly request that you will use no ceremony with them, but scratch out and alter every part that you do not approve." Sir William returned the papers with this answer: "The adjournment of the court having given me a whole day of leisure, I have spent the morning in reading with great attention your lordship's minute on the administration of criminal justice in the provinces, and in perusing the papers which accompany it. I read them all with my pen in my hand, intending to write without reserve all objections that might occur to me; but I found nothing to which I could object, and did not meet with a single paragraph to which, if I were a member of the council, I would not heartily express my assent." After two short verbal criticisms, he adds: "These are trifling remarks, but I cannot start one serious objection, and think the whole minute unexceptionably just, wise, and benevolent." It is but fair to mention that, though Lord Cornwallis had the merit of adopting this minute, and probably also of suggesting much that it contains, it is understood to have been drawn up by Mr. (afterwards Sir) George Barlow.

As the Company's charter was about to expire in 1794, Lord Cornwallis was consulted by the ministry as to the future arrangements. Their original intention was, to make a complete separation between the commercial and the other departments, leaving the former entirely to the Company, and appropriating

the latter entirely to the government. His lordship was decidedly opposed to this plan, because he was "perfectly convinced, that if the fostering aid and protection, and what is full as important, the check and control of the governments abroad were withdrawn from the commercial department, the Company would not long enjoy their new charter, but must very soon be reduced to a state of actual bankruptcy." He was not surprised that "the vexatious and interested contradictions" experienced from the court of directors, had made ministers "desirous of taking as much of the business as possible out of their hands;" but still he thought it would be wiser "to tie their hands from doing material mischief, without meddling with their imperial dignity or their power of naming writers, and not to encounter the furious clamour that will be raised against annexing the patronage of India to the influence of the crown, except in cases of the most absolute necessity." A court of directors "under certain restrictions, and when better constituted, might," he thought, "prove an useful check on the ambitious or corrupt designs of some future minister;" but in order to enable them "to do this negative good, or to prevent their doing much positive evil, they should have a circumscribed management of the whole, and not a permission to ruin uncontrolled the commercial advantages which Britain should derive from her Asiatic territories." It might be said, "If the Company cannot carry on the trade, throw it open to all adventurers." "To that mode," says his lordship, "I should have still greater objections, as it would render it very difficult for government to prevent this unfortunate country from being overrun by desperate speculators from all parts of the British dominions." Notwithstanding this bugbear which frightened most of the statesmen of his time, he saw no objection to the entire opening of the export trade from Britain to India. The directors, he thought, might be advantageously reduced to twelve or nine, and "if handsome salaries could be attached to those situations," he "should be clear for adopting means for their being prohibited from having an interest directly or indirectly in contracts, or in any commercial transactions whatever, in which the Company may have the smallest concern." His reason for making these suggestions is well expressed in the following passage:—

"The present court of directors is so numerous, and the responsibility for public conduct which falls to the share of each individual is so small, that it can have no great weight with any of them, and the participation in a profitable contract, or the means of serving friends or providing for relations, must always more than compensate to them for the loss that they may sustain by any fluctuation which may happen in the market price of the stock which constitutes their qualifications." In regard to the military arrangement, he was "clearly of opinion, that the European troops should all belong to the king, for experience has shown that the Company cannot keep up an efficient force in India; this," he adds, "is a fact so notorious, that no military man who has been in this country will venture to deny it, and I do not care how strongly I am quoted as an authority for it."

His lordship's views on the whole subject are thus summed up: "As the new system will only take place when the rights of the present Company cease, you cannot be charged with a violation of charters, and the attacks of the opposition in parliament will therefore be confined to an examination of its expediency and efficacy; I fancy I need hardly repeat to you that they would above all things avail themselves of any apparent attempt on your part to give an increase of patronage to the crown, which could not be justified on the soundest constitutional principles, or on the ground of evident necessity, and would make use of it to misrepresent your intentions and principles, and to endeavour to inflame the minds of the nation against you. An addition of patronage to the crown, to a certain degree, will however, in my opinion, be not only a justifiable measure, but absolutely necessary for the future good government of this country. But, according to my judgment, a renewal of the Company's charter for the management of the territorial revenues and the commerce of India for a limited time (for instance, ten or fifteen years), and under such stipulations as it may be thought proper to annex as conditions, would be the wisest foundation for your plan, both for your own sakes as ministers, and as being best calculated for securing the greatest possible advantages to Britain from her Indian possessions, and least likely to injure the essential principles of

our constitution." The above extracts are taken from a letter written to Mr. Dundas in 1790, and therefore it is right to mention that two years later, when offended at some obnoxious appointments and proceedings, he wrote to him as follows:—"If the court of directors cannot be controlled, I retract my opinion in favour of their continuance after the expiration of the charter. But I must confess that I cannot help believing that those orders, so degrading to our government, and some of them so slighting to myself, could not have found their way to India, if the Board of Control had not been too much occupied with other matters to have paid proper attention to them."

The above opinions concerning the renewal of the Company's charter are creditable to Lord Cornwallis as a statesman. In none of them was he behind, in some of them he was in advance of his age, and the length at which we have quoted them is justified by the fact, that they not only changed the views of ministers in regard to the mode of renewing the charter, but contained the germ of much future legislation. By an act passed 19th June, 1793, and now ranking as 33 Geo. III. c. 52, several previous statutes affecting the Company were consolidated, and the exclusive trade, as well as the management of the territorial revenues, was continued to them for twenty-four years, from the 1st of March, 1794, but "liable to be discontinued at or after the end of such period, upon three years' notice previously given by parliament for that purpose." Among the other new provisions, the most important were the power given to his majesty to pay the commissioners of the board such salaries as he should think fit, "provided always that the whole of the salaries to be paid to the members of the said board shall not exceed the sum of £5,000 in one year, and the whole of the salaries, charges, and expenses of the said board, exclusive of the members of the said board, shall not exceed the sum of £11,000 in one year;" in other words, that the whole annual expense of the board should not exceed £16,000, payable by the Company—and the power given to the directors, with the approbation of the Board of Control, "to suspend all, or any of the powers hereby given to the governor-general of Fort William to act upon his own sole authority, at and for such time or times as they may judge

expedient or necessary." "For establishing a just principle of promotion" among the covenanted civil servants, all of them under the rank of members of council were "to be entitled to precedence in the service of the said Company at their respective stations, according to their seniority of appointment." No office or offices yielding more than £500 per annum were to be conferred on any one who had not been "actually resident in India as a covenanted servant" for three years at least in the whole antecedent to the vacancy; and none yielding more than £1,500 till six years' similar residence, nor more than £3,000 till nine, nor more than £4,000 till twelve years' residence. The directors were not "to appoint or send out to India a greater number of persons in the capacity of cadets or writers, or in any other capacity, than will be necessary, in addition to those in India, to supply the proper complement of officers and servants," contained in a list of those establishments which they were required to furnish; and on the declaration that "it is expedient that the said Company shall be put under reasonable limitations in respect to the granting of pensions, or increasing the salaries of their officers and servants, or creating new establishments," it was enacted, that "no grant or resolution of the said Company, or their court of directors, to be made after the passing of this act, and during the continuance of their right in the said exclusive trade, whereby the said funds may become chargeable with any new salary or increase of salary, or any new or additional establishment of officers or servants, or any new pension or increase of pension, to any one person, exceeding £200 per annum, shall be available in law, unless such grant or resolution shall be approved and confirmed by the board of commissioners."

This act, containing no fewer than 163 sections, is stated by Mr. Dundas to have "received the sanction of the legislature with an unanimity almost unexampled." This statement was contained in a letter dated October 23rd, 1793, but before it reached its destination Marquis Cornwallis (such was now his title) had sailed for England. On the 11th of June, intelligence arrived that the French war, which was destined to envelope all the states of Europe in its flames, had broken out. Orders were immediately issued to take possession of Chandernagore, and several

factories in the presidency of Bengal. This was easily accomplished, but greater difficulty was anticipated in Madras, because it was understood that Pondicherry had again been put into a state of defence, and that an attempt would be made to strengthen its garrison. Marquis Cornwallis determined immediately to repair to the scene of action, but before his arrival the work was already accomplished. Colonel Floyd arrived before Pondicherry on the 11th of July to blockade it on the land side, while Admiral Cornwallis, brother to the marquis, blockaded it by sea. The command of the land troops ultimately devolved on Colonel Braithwaite, who had only opened fire from the first batteries for a few hours when the licentiousness and insubordination of the garrison forced the governor to surrender. On finding that his presence was no longer required, he deemed it unnecessary to return to Bengal, where Mr. (now Sir John) Shore had been installed as general, and sailed directly for England from Madras in the beginning of October, 1793.

3

The Trial of Warren Hastings

MARQUIS Cornwallis arrived in England early in 1794. His administration, though not so peaceful as had been anticipated, had been so successful as to unite in its favour the suffrages of all who did not think it necessary to make political capital out of his real or supposed deficiencies. As early as January, 1793, the court of proprietors unanimously resolved, that his statue should be placed in the court-room at the India House, in order "that his great services might be ever had in remembrance;" and in June following, another unanimous resolution bestowed upon him an annuity of £5,000, which was to commence from the date of his quitting India, and to be paid to his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns for the term of twenty years. The honours and rewards conferred on Marquis Cornwallis present a striking contrast to the return which Mr. Hastings received for his services. On the 28th of June, 1785, shortly after his return to England, he attended the court and received the formal thanks of the directors, but eight days before Mr. Burke had risen in his place in parliament, and pledged himself "that if no other gentleman would undertake the business, he would at a future day make a motion respecting the conduct of a gentleman just returned from India." Mr. Burke, in making this announcement, is said to have allowed himself to be carried by his zeal farther than his party were inclined to follow him. The administration of Mr. Hastings could scarcely be made a party question. Among both the great political parties he had many zealous supporters, and there was therefore a danger that the opposition in attacking him might not only sustain a defeat, but by alienating some of their most powerful friends permanently weaken their strength. Mr. Burke

was perhaps superior to such considerations. He had persuaded himself that Mr. Hastings was a great criminal, and he felt bound to leave no means untried to bring him to justice. His friends, however, either because they did not share his convictions, or because they deemed it quixotic to act upon them when no party advantage was likely to be gained, would have been satisfied with allowing the censure of Mr. Hastings, which stood upon the journals of the House of Commons, to remain unrescinded, or with raising a discussion which might enable them to repeat the censure in some sterner form. It may have been owing to the comparative indifference of his party that Mr. Burke allowed the session to pass away without taking any steps to carry his announced intention into effect.

The subject having thus apparently dropped, would not, it is thought, have been revived, had not Mr. Hastings and his friends made so sure of victory, that they determined to carry the war into the enemy's camp. To allow the censure to remain on the journals unrecalled seemed to them equivalent to a confession of guilt, whereas Mr. Hastings, so far from confessing guilt, was boldly claiming honours and rewards. A peerage was talked of, and his agent Major Scott had, after several conferences with Mr. Pitt, carried away the impression that the peerage would be granted if the censure were deleted. Entertaining this conviction, and having no doubt of the support of the ministry, which was at this time equivalent to the support of large majorities in both Houses of Parliament, it is easy to understand why Major Scott, at the very commencement of the new session in January, 1786, called upon Mr. Burke to produce his charges, and fix the earliest possible day for the discussion of them. This challenge could not with decency be refused, and Mr. Burke took his first step on the 18th of February, by moving for certain papers. He began his speech by asking that the 44th and 45th of a series of resolutions which Mr. Dundas had moved on 29th of May, 1782, should be read. These resolutions premising that it was contrary to the wish, honour, and policy of this nation to pursue schemes of conquest in India, and that parliament should give some mark of its displeasure against those who should appear to have wilfully adopted or countenanced such schemes, concluded

with declaring that Warren Hastings, Esq., governor-general of Bengal, and William Hornby, Esq., president of the council of Bombay, had in several instances so acted, and that it was therefore the duty of the directors to pursue all legal and effectual means for their removal. After remarking that the task he had undertaken would have been more appropriate in the hands of the mover of these resolutions, Mr. Burke proceeded to explain the course which he wished to pursue. Three courses were open—a prosecution by the attorney-general, a bill of pains and penalties, and impeachment. He preferred the last.

The debate which followed was remarkable only as indicating the feelings of the ministry. Mr. Dundas, while avowing the sentiments which induced him to move the resolutions, and still disapproving of many things in the conduct of Mr. Hastings, declared his inability to fasten any criminal intention upon him. Besides, Mr. Hastings, subsequently to the date of the resolutions, had rendered important services and merited the vote of thanks which had been given him. Mr. Pitt took similar ground. "It was absolutely necessary," he said, "in point of justice and right, to examine the whole of the public conduct of any servant of the people, to give him due credit for such parts as were meritorious, as well as to censure him for such as were culpable; and for his own part he should not hesitate one moment to declare that, however censurable some parts of Mr Hastings' conduct might be made to appear, he must, notwithstanding, consider such as were praiseworthy as entitled to the warmest approbation—nay, as a sufficient ground for reward and thanks, could they be proved to predominate over what was exceptionable." All the papers moved for were granted. Another important debate took place on the 3rd of April, when Mr. Burke moved that several persons who had been ordered to attend as witnesses should be called to the bar. There cannot be a doubt that such evidence, avowedly *ex parte*, would have given the accuser an undue advantage. Not having brought forward his charges, he was merely endeavouring to fish out matter of accusation. This was unfair, and at variance with ordinary legal procedure, and therefore the house unquestionably did right in insisting, as a preliminary, that the charges should be put on record. It would seem that Mr. Burke had

anticipated this decision; for he brought forward nine articles of charge the very next day, and twelve more in the course of a week; the last article was not brought forward till the 22nd of May.

The twenty-two articles of charge, drawn up more in the form of a pamphlet than an indictment, did not omit a single act of Mr. Hastings' administration in which any semblance of delinquency could be discovered, but it is unnecessary to notice more than the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 8th—the 1st because it was rejected by the House of Commons, and the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 8th, because to them alone the trial was confined. The substance of the 1st charge was, that Warren Hastings, in contradiction of the positive orders of the court of directors, furnished the Nabob of Oudh, for a stipulated sum of money to be paid to the East India Company, with a body of troops, for the declared purpose of thoroughly extirpating the nation of the Rohillas. There was good reason for placing this charge in the van. The facts on which it was founded could easily be proved, a complete justification of them seemed impossible, and Mr. Dundas had committed himself by moving a resolution in condemnation of the Rohilla war, and of the conduct of the president and select committee of Bengal in regard to it. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it must have appeared, both to the assailants and to the supporters of Mr. Hastings, that this was the charge from which he had most to fear; and hence, when by the aid of Mr. Pitt, who was at full liberty to give any vote that policy or conscience dictated, and Mr. Dundas, who chose rather to be inconsistent than not to follow his leader, the charge was rejected by a majority of 119 to 67, it was considered by all parties that the question of impeachment was virtually decided, for how was it possible to doubt that all the other charges would be disposed of in a similar way? Hastings now saw his way clear to the peerage. He was to be Lord Daylesford, thus taking his title from the ancestral property by the purchase of which he had realized the aspiration of his boyhood, and to have a seat at the India board. So much were these arrangements believed to be settled, that the opposition was only expected to make an almost hopeless trial of strength on one or two other charges, and then drop all further proceedings.

The rejection of the Rohilla charge occurred on the 1st of June; on the 13th, passing over the 2nd charge, which related

to the treatment of Shah Alam, Mr. Fox moved the 3rd or Benaras charge. It was in substance as follows: That Warren Hastings, in violation of agreements, by which Chait Singh, the Raja of Benaras, was liable only in a fixed annual contribution, and on the plea of a French war, extorted from the raja repeated additional contributions, and, on his refusal or inability to pay them, dispossessed him of his territories and drove him into exile. It was not to be expected that those who had failed to discover impeachable matter in the treatment of the Rohillas, would see anything to startle them in the treatment of Chait Singh. Mr. Fox was followed by Mr. (now Sir) Philip Francis, who had obtained a seat in parliament, and was bent on using it as a means of gratifying his old enmities. When Mr. Pitt rose, Mr. Hastings' friends were in high spirits. They knew that he held Francis in detestation, and were therefore rejoicing in the belief that his speech would not only vindicate Mr. Hastings, but inflict due punishment on his inveterate and vindictive antagonist. Mr. Pitt, in the first part of his speech, confirmed their belief. He maintained that the government of India were entitled to call upon the zamindars of Benaras for extraordinary contributions on public emergencies, and to punish the contumacious refusal of them. He lauded Mr. Hastings for the ability and presence of mind which he had displayed during the insurrection, and inveighed against Francis in the bitterest terms. The whole tendency of his speech being thus to prove the innocence of Hastings, it only remained to hear him declare his determination to vote an acquittal. How great was the surprise when he suddenly turned round and declared his determination to vote with Mr. Fox! Why? Because though a fine was exigible, the amount which Mr. Hastings exacted, or rather intimated his intention to exact, was oppressive and unjust. His reported language was as follows:—"Upon the whole, the conduct of Mr. Hastings, in the transactions now before the house, had been so cruel, unjust, and oppressive, that it was impossible he, as a man of honour or honesty, or having any regard to faith or conscience, could any longer resist; and therefore he had fully satisfied his conscience, that Warren Hastings, in the case in question, had been guilty of such enormities and misdemeanours as constituted a crime sufficient to call upon the justice of the house to impeach him."

Mr. Pitt pleaded conscience, but many did not hesitate to attribute his conduct to very unworthy motives. The friends of Mr. Hastings openly accused him of treachery; others spoke only of jealousy. Mr. Hastings had been received with great favour by the king, and what was justly deemed still more remarkable, Mrs. Hastings, the quondam Baroness Imhoff, had overcome the strict morals of Queen Charlotte, and been welcomed at St. James's. It was difficult to say to what all this favour might lead. Hastings made a peer, seated at the India board, and leagued with his staunch friend Lord Thurlow, who had repeatedly set an example of ministerial insubordination, might yet prove a formidable rival in the cabinet. Such was the kind of surmises employed to account for Mr. Pitt's sudden conversion. There is not much plausibility in them. Pitt would have disdained to stoop to the shabbiness thus imputed to him, and was too conscious of his own powers to fear the rivalry of Mr. Hastings, who only a few weeks before, when permitted to defend himself at the bar of the House of Commons against the proposed impeachment, had shown how destitute he was of the talent most essential to a ministerial leader, by reading a pamphlet instead of delivering a vigorous and effective speech. The true account of the matter we believe to be, that Mr. Pitt was equally persuaded of the guilt of Mr. Hastings when he voted for him and when he voted against him. In both cases he acted merely as a politician, supporting the accused while he thought he was thereby strengthening his party, and abandoning him when he feared that he might ruin it by forfeiting his popularity. Mr. Dundas, who wheeled round with his leader, referred to the subject in his correspondence with Lord Cornwallis, and says, in a letter dated 21st March, 1787:—"The session (of parliament) has proceeded with uninterrupted triumph. The only unpleasant circumstance is the impeachment of Mr. Hastings. Mr. Pitt and I have got great credit from the undeviating fairness and candour with which we have proceeded in it, but the proceeding is not pleasant to many of our friends, and of course, from that and many other circumstances, not pleasing to us; but the truth is, when we examined the various articles of charges against him, with his defences, they were so strong, and the defences so perfectly unsupported,

it was impossible not to concur; and some of the charges will unquestionably go to the House of Lords.”¹ Instead of giving Mr. Dundas credit for “the undeviating fairness and candour” which he here claims for himself and Mr. Pitt, the unbiassed opinion of most persons now is, that his own subsequent impeachment was a just retribution for his shuffling and hypocritical conduct. Be this as it may, whether the motives of the leaders were pure or paltry, the followers did their bidding as before, and the motion of Mr. Fox was carried by a majority of 119 to 79. As it was now certain that there would be an impeachment, the other articles of charge were carried without much opposition.

The session of parliament closed amid the discussion of these charges, and the ensuing session of 1787 having resumed the discussion, continued occupied with it till late in April. On the 2nd of this month, when the articles of charge were brought up, it was resolved, on the suggestion of Mr. Pitt, to appoint a committee to draw up articles of impeachment, before proceeding to vote whether the impeachment ought to be proceeded with. On the proposed committee stood the name of Sir Philip Francis, who, instead of recoiling at the idea of such an appointment, was quite prepared to gratify private malice, under the mask of performing a public duty. This was too much for the honourable feelings of the house, and he was ignominiously rejected, on the ground of private enmity to the accused, by a majority of ninety-six to forty-four. On this occasion, Mr. Dundas ventured to differ with Mr. Pitt, and give a new proof of his “undeviating fairness and candour” by voting in the minority. On the 9th of May, the impeachment was voted. Mr. Burke carried the impeachment to the House of Lords, and Mr. Hastings having been brought to its bar, in the custody of the serjeant-at-arms, was admitted to bail, and allowed till the second day of the ensuing session of parliament to prepare his defence. It is not unworthy of notice that in the same session of 1787, which impeached Mr. Hastings, Sir Gilbert Elliot announced his intention to bring Sir Elijah Impey in the same way to justice. The charges, among which the trial of Nandakumar stood in the foreground, were not brought for-

¹ *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*, vol. i, p. 281.

ward till the following session, but the house had no desire to burden itself with a second impeachment, and Mr. Pitt throwing his shield over Sir Elijah allowed him to escape. After he had been heard in his own defence, a motion for impeachment was negatived by seventy-three to fifty-five.

The trial commenced in Westminster Hall on the 13th day of February, 1788. The interest which it had excited among all classes was intense, and India and its government, which had hitherto been regarded as the most repulsive of all subjects, now fully engrossed the public mind. Much of the interest, doubtless, was factitious, being produced not so much by the importance of the questions at issue, as by the celebrity of the pleaders, the constitution of the court, and the dramatic effect of the scene about to be exhibited. The last has been repeatedly described, and still possesses sufficient historical importance to justify the following quotation from Lord Macaulay:—

“There have been spectacles more dazzling to the eye, more gorgeous with jewellery and cloth of gold, more attractive to grown-up children, than that which was then exhibited at Westminster; but perhaps there never was a spectacle so well calculated to strike a highly cultivated, a reflecting, an imaginative mind. All the various kinds of interest which belong to the near and the distant, to the present and to the past, were collected on one spot, and in one hour. All the talents and all the accomplishments which are developed by liberty and civilization were now displayed, with every advantage that could be derived both from co-operation and from contrast. Every step in the proceedings carried the mind backward, through many troubled centuries, to the days when the foundations of our constitution were laid; or far away over boundless seas and deserts to dusky nations living under strange stars, worshipping strange gods, and writing strange characters from right to left (?). The high court of parliament was to sit, according to forms handed down from the days of the Plantagenets, on an Englishman accused of tyranny over the lord of the holy city of Benaras, and over the ladies of the princely house of Oudh.

“The place was worthy of such a trial. It was the great hall of William Rufus—the hall which had resounded with acclamations at the inauguration of thirty kings; the hall which had

witnessed the just sentence of Bacon, and the just absolution of Somers; the hall where the eloquence of Strafford had for a moment awed and melted a victorious party inflamed with just resentment; the hall where Charles had confronted the high court of justice with the placid courage which has half redeemed his fame. Neither civil nor military pomp was wanting. The avenues were lined with grenadiers. The streets were kept clear by cavalry. The peers, robed in gold and ermine, were marshalled by the heralds under garter king-at-arms. The judges, in their vestments of state, attended to give advice on points of law. Nearly 170 lords, three-fourths of the upper house, as the upper house then was, walked in solemn order from their usual place of assembling to the tribunal. . . . The gray old walls were hung with scarlet. The long galleries were crowded by an audience such as has rarely excited the fears or the emulation of an orator. There were gathered together from all parts of a great, free, enlightened, and prosperous empire, grace and female loveliness, wit and learning, the representatives of every science and of every art."

That the interest taken in this celebrated trial was far more dramatic than real, became apparent in the course of the proceeding. At first the attendance was crowded, and many who could not claim seats by right were glad to purchase them at enormous prices; but after Burke, and Fox, and Sheridan had displayed their matchless eloquence in the opening charges, the excitement rapidly diminished, and the trial, ever and anon interrupted by dry and knotty points of law, was left without much notice to drag out its weary length. When it commenced, there was no event of importance to divide with it the public attention; but in the second year of its existence, the king's illness, followed by the regency question and a probable change of ministry, were felt to be more engrossing topics, and before the questions which they raised were settled, the affairs of France had come to a crisis, and all Europe was in alarm. The trial, thus regarded as only a secondary object, made little progress. Even in 1788, when it had all the interest of novelty, the lords devoted only thirty-five days to it, and in 1789 only seventeen days. In 1790 a dissolution of parliament took place, and it became a question whether the impeachment had not in

consequence fallen, and whether, if it were to be persisted in, it would not be necessary to commence it anew. When it was at length decided that the impeachment was still in force, so much time had been wasted, it was found absolutely necessary to prosecute only those charges on which it seemed most probable that a conviction could be obtained. Mr. Burke had made a general opening on all the charges. Mr. Fox had opened the Benaras charge, of which an abstract has already been given; and Mr. (afterwards Baron) Adam the Begum charge, which was in substance as follows: That Warren Hastings, contrary to justice, equity, and good faith, authorized the Nabob of Oudh, over whom he had an absolute control, to seize upon the landed estates of his mother and grandmother, his kindred, and principal nobility, as well as the personal property of the two princesses, who, together with their dependants, were, during the enforcing of these measures, treated with atrocious indignity and barbarity. It was now resolved to curtail the proceedings by opening only other two charges, the one relating to presents and the other to contracts.

After these were concluded, Mr. Hastings was still to be heard in reply on every separate charge, and to have an opportunity of rebutting the evidence of his accusers by counter-evidence. In this way seven years from the commencement of the trial were spun out, and the cause was not ripe for decision till the spring of 1795. On the 23rd of April in this year, the lords met for the last time in Westminster Hall. One hundred and seventy walked in procession when the trial commenced: only twenty-nine now voted. On all the charges Mr. Hastings was pronounced not guilty by large majorities, never more than six, usually only three, and sometimes none at all voting him guilty.

This decision had been expected and was generally approved. The managers, particularly Mr. Burke, had stretched their charges to the very utmost, and inserted in them many things which they were unable to substantiate. Every such failure was a victory to Mr. Hastings, because it not only proved his innocence of the particular charge, but attached a degree of doubt to all the others. The language of Mr. Burke was often intemperate, and not only recoiled upon himself and the cause he advocated, but turned the tide of sympathy, and produced a

strong reaction in Mr. Hastings' favour. There were other considerations which operated in the same way. The managers of the trial commanded the national purse, and might expend without limit, while not sustaining the loss of a single farthing; Mr. Hastings was incurring in necessary self-defence an expenditure, by which, even though innocent, he must inevitably be ruined. In some respects, too, the whole proceedings taken against him savoured of hypocrisy and injustice. What had become of the money which he was said to have extorted, and the territories which he was said to have usurped? Part of the money had passed into the British treasury, as the share which the legislature had exacted of an imaginary surplus of Indian revenue, and the remainder appropriated by the Company had helped to eke out their dividends. The territories were in like manner retained, and so far from thinking of restoring them, the Company and the government were quarrelling over them, the one claiming them as corporate, and the other as national property. They were thus at once hypocritically denouncing the alleged spoliation, and pocketing the proceeds of it. Such was the hypocrisy. The injustice was, if possible, still more glaring. Mr. Hastings was a public servant, and as such, bound to act according to the best of his judgment for the benefit of his employers. Mere blunders might prove him incapable, but they did not make him corrupt, and therefore could not form the ground of a penal accusation, except in so far as they implied criminal intention. From such intention the directors, even when they disapproved of his measures, entirely exculpated him, and hence, after they were perfectly aware of the worst things that could be laid to his charge, they more than once renewed his tenure of office. It is evident, therefore, that before the Company gave him a vote of thanks for his services on his return to England, they were barred by their previous approbation of his conduct from afterwards challenging it. It may be said that the acts of the Company could not foreclose the legislature. As a general rule this is true, but in the present instance the legislature was as much foreclosed as the Company. In the Regulating Act, in which parliament took upon itself the appointment of the Bengal council, Mr. Hastings was made the first governor-general. This office he held for five years as

the nominee and, by implication, with the approval of parliament, since the power of recall given by the act was not exercised. Nor was this all. When the five years of the Regulating Act expired, separate acts were passed, continuing him from year to year in his office. During this time all the measures charged as criminal in the impeachment were well known, and the fair conclusion therefore was, that the legislature did not condemn, or had condoned them. In either case, Mr. Hastings was entitled to a verdict of acquittal. From these and other considerations that might be urged, it is plain that the lords did right when they repelled all the charges, and found Mr. Hastings not guilty.

The moment the decision of the lords was given, Mr. Hastings was entitled to stand up and say he was an injured man. He had been ruined in his fortunes by a false accusation. The reparation ought, according to the ordinary rule, to have been made by the party which inflicted the injury, and the House of Commons, had its dignity allowed it to confess a fault, would have done no more than equity required, by replacing every farthing which Mr. Hastings had been compelled to spend in his defence. As this, however, was scarcely to be expected, the court of proprietors very properly took the initiative, and passed two resolutions—the one to indemnify him for the expenses incurred in his defence, and the other to grant him and his representatives, during the Company's exclusive trade, an annuity of £5,000 out of the territorial revenue, in consideration of his important services. These resolutions were unavailing without the consent of the Board of Control, and this there was some difficulty in obtaining. Mr. Dundas was at the head of it, and after the part which he had taken in the impeachment, was not generous enough to approve of a grant which virtually condemned it as unjust. After some higgling, it was arranged to grant Mr. Hastings an annuity of £4,000 for twenty-eight years and a half, commencing from June 24th, 1785, and to relieve him from present embarrassments by a loan of £50,000, without interest, for eighteen years.

Before parting finally with Mr. Hastings, it will not be out of place here to refer very briefly to his subsequent life. Though he was now only in his sixty-third year, and possessed a consti-

tution so vigorous that he reached his eighty-sixth year in the full possession of his faculties, his public career had already closed. In 1813, when the renewal of the Company's charter was under discussion, he was one of the witnesses examined at the bar of the House of Commons. Twenty-seven years before he had stood at the same bar to defend himself against an accusation which charged him with heinous crimes. How different his position now! A chair was ordered to be set for him, and when he rose to retire, the whole house, with the exception of the one or two surviving managers of the impeachment, rose and uncovered. He was shortly after made a privy councillor. Something more substantial than honour still awaited him. In 1814 his annuity of £4,000, and the period for which £50,000 had been lent him without interest, expired. The annuity was continued for life, and the loan under deduction of £16,000, which had been paid back, was remitted. In 1820, about eighteen months after his death, the court of proprietors resolved to place his statue in the general court-room of the India House, and about the same time his statue was placed in Calcutta by the inhabitants.

The resolution of the court of proprietors was thus expressed:—"That as the last testimony of approbation of the long, zealous, and successful services of the late Right Honourable Warren Hastings, in maintaining, without diminution, the British possessions in India against the combined efforts of European, Muhammedan, and Maratha enemies, the statue of that distinguished servant of the East India Company be placed among the statesmen and heroes who have contributed in their several stations to the recovery, preservation, and security of the British power and authority in India." This resolution is a tolerably fair specimen of the kind of style in which it has become customary to bepraise the administration of Mr. Hastings. The injustice to which he was subjected is doubtless a main cause of the encomiums which are now lavished upon him, and it may therefore seem ungracious to object to them as unmeaning and extravagant. Still, when a writer so well informed as Colonel Wilks talks of Mr. Hastings as the *Saviour* of India, and another writer tries to improve upon the idea, by speaking of him as having come "in the fulness of time," one

may be permitted to ask what the particular services are which fill them with such admiration that, in panting to give utterance to it, they are betrayed into profanity.

Though the House of Lords did right in finding that the criminal intention necessary to infer guilt was not proved, and that therefore Mr. Hastings was not guilty, it ought to be remembered that the facts on which the impeachment proceeded were either proved, or not proved, merely because they were confessed. It is true, then, that Mr. Hastings hired out British troops to the Nabob of Oudh, for the express purpose of extirpating the Rohillas, and thereby placed one of the noblest races of Hindustan at the mercy of a cruel despot, merely because that despot had promised to pay him liberally for his inhumanity and injustice. It is true that Mr. Hastings, when holding the provinces of Allahabad and Kora in trust, either for Shah Alam or the Company, sold them to the same despot for a large sum of money, and thus either cheated Shah Alam, or cheated the Company, by giving for money, provinces which, from their importance as a frontier, were to the Company above money's worth. It is true that Mr. Hastings might by a word have saved the life of Nandakumar, and that by refusing to speak that word he became virtually responsible for the judicial murder of a person who was giving evidence against him, and charging him with the grossest corruption. It is true that Mr. Hastings goaded Chait Singh into rebellion by extortionate demands, and thereby, so far from replenishing the Company's treasury, as he had boasted he would do, burdened it with a new load of debt. Finally, it is true that Mr. Hastings, on shuffling pretexts, deprived the Begums of Oudh of the protection which the Company were solemnly pledged to give them, and then employed the Nabob of Oudh, the son of the one and grandson of the other, to confiscate their estates, and rob them of their personal property, subjecting them and the females of their household during the process to shameful indignities, and extorting money from two of their aged dependants by cruel imprisonment and, it is more than suspected, by actual torture. All these things are true, and the administration under which they were done ought to possess very extraordinary merits indeed to entitle it to any kind of eulogy. What, then, were these

merits? The above resolution of the court of proprietors says, that they consisted in maintaining the British possessions in India "without diminution." This is at best but negative praise. After a vast expenditure of blood and treasure, he left matters no worse than he found them. But then, it is said, consider the formidable confederacy which he had to encounter. True; but what led to that confederacy? Mainly, we believe, the tortuous, vacillating, and short-sighted policy of Mr. Hastings. The Marathas were at peace with the Company, and had done nothing to provoke hostilities, when the Bombay council, merely because they coveted one of their possessions, attempted to seize it. War immediately ensued. Mr. Hastings, then in a minority in his council, very properly agreed with the majority in condemning the war; but no sooner had he obtained the majority, than he turned round and gave it his direct and hearty sanction. His only plea in justification was the change of circumstances. When he disapproved of the war, it threatened to be disastrous; it now promised to be successful, and therefore he approved of it. Thus, right and wrong had no weight in his political balance; nothing but success or the want of it was to be allowed to turn the beam. And what was the result? First the disgraceful convention of Wargaum, next the humiliating treaty of Purandhar, and lastly the equally humiliating treaty of Salbai, by which the Bombay presidency was not only deprived of the only remnant of conquest which the treaty of Purandhar had left, but stripped of almost all its older possessions, and nearly confined within its original island. The resolution of the proprietors asserts that Mr. Hastings maintained the territories "without diminution." Was there no diminution when Bombay was thus curtailed, and everything which it possessed in Gujarat handed over, along with a large sum of money, as a kind of peace-offering to Sindhia?

If the other principal events in the administration of Mr. Hastings were reviewed, the results would be found to be not one whit more satisfactory. The resolution enumerates "European, Muhammedan, and Maratha enemies." How the Company fared in their war with the last has just been seen. If by the Muhammedan enemy Hyder is to be understood, the allusion is unhappy, since the war with him was only terminat-

ed by imploring the intervention of the Marathas, to make him disgorge the territories which he had wrested from us, and which we had no hope of being able without this intervention to recover. It must be admitted that on this occasion, though there was no diminution of territory, it was only prevented by something like a stain on the national honour. By the European enemy must of course be meant the French. With them the early part of the struggle was chiefly naval, and so indecisive that neither of the combatants could boast much of their laurels. Latterly, when Sir Eyre Coote's great military talents were lost to the Company by his sudden death, the Madras army had been sent to Cuddalore, to an expedition which was so ill managed, that it owed its escape from destruction not to any measure of Mr. Hastings, but to the opportune cessation of hostilities on the announcement of an European peace.

It thus appears that all the wars of Mr. Hastings' administration were either blunders or misfortunes, and that, therefore, much praise cannot be due to the energy which was exerted merely in endeavours to redeem them. Some of the blunders were, as has been seen, committed by Mr. Hastings himself, and though it would be unfair to hold him responsible for the blunders of others, it cannot be forgotten that the measures by which he sought to repair them were as often wrong as right. It is often said that Mr. Hastings, having been refused the powers which were necessary to enable him to act efficiently, and been long thwarted by adverse majorities both in his own council and in the court of directors, is entitled to credit for the measures which he would have adopted, if he had been at liberty to follow his own judgment. Undoubtedly he is entitled both to the credit and to the discredit—credit where the measures would have been good, and discredit where they would have been pernicious. There are two sides to the account, and the only fair method of judging is to strike the balance. It is very doubtful if Mr. Hastings would gain by this process. Had he been left to take his own way, he would have involved the Company in a war with the Nizam, in order to conciliate the favour of the Maratha Raja of Berar; at a later period he would have conciliated the favour of the Nizam, by making him a present in perpetuity of the whole Northern Circars, in return for a

body of worthless cavalry; and the Dutch had inveigled him into a bargain, by which he would have accepted of a body of auxiliary troops, as an equivalent for ceding to them the whole province of Tinnevely. Such are the mischiefs he would have done, and the enormous sacrifices he would have made, had not others prevented him; and it may well be made a question, whether his reputation has not gained more than it has suffered by the obstacles thrown in his way. If from his foreign we turn to his internal policy, he will be found entitled to more praise. Except in the case of the Rohillas, when the want of money tempted him to commit a great iniquity, he showed an anxious desire to protect the natives from oppression, and in his financial arrangements never forgot the necessity of providing for the security and comforts of the ryots. He also brought the public offices for the first time into some kind of order, and in the face of much opposition, both from his colleagues and the court of directors, instituted a regular system of statistical inquiry, for the purpose of furnishing information without which several subsequent reforms could not have been attempted. His labours in this way are not, however, either so extensive or so valuable as to deserve further notice. One of his best claims to the gratitude of posterity, is the encouragement he gave to the cultivation of oriental literature, by the patronage both of learned societies and individual authors.

On the whole, though reprobating the harsh measure which was dealt out to Mr. Hastings by the impeachment, and admitting his claims in a few instances to the gratitude, and in many instances to the forbearance of his country, we are unable, in estimating his services, to concur in the high eulogy pronounced upon them, both by his admirers and by himself. In his published work, entitled *Memoirs relative to the State of India*, he speaks of "the invariable success with which all the measures which were known to be of my own formation were attended;" of "the apparent magnitude and temerity attributed to some of those which proved most fortunate in their termination;" of "the wonderful support and gradual elevation which my personal character had derived during a long and progressive series of contingencies," and then says, that "these and some other circumstances had altogether contributed to excite

a degree of superstitious belief in the minds of almost all men who were situated within the sphere of my authority or influence, that the same success would crown all my future endeavours." Had these words, the language, obviously, of inordinate vanity and not of truth and soberness, fallen from Mr. Hastings when so far advanced in years that a second childhood might have been suspected, it would have been unfair to quote them; but as he tells us himself that he penned them on the homeward voyage to England, they furnish a genuine specimen of the self-conceit which is known to have been one of his greatest failings. In this respect, and in several others, he suffers by contrast with Marquis Cornwallis. This nobleman was modest, candid, and straightforward; Mr. Hastings was vain, disingenuous, and equivocating. The one always meant what he said, and kept every promise he made; the other too often acted as if he had believed, like Talleyrand, that speech had been given to man to enable him to conceal his thoughts. Not only on ordinary occasions was he too much given to keep the promise to the ear and break it to the sense, but even in making solemn treaties with native powers, we find him at one time instructing a resident to throw in a *vague* article, and at another, telling his colleagues that he had purposely made a stipulation *indefinite*. In thus preferring the crooked to the straight path, he sometimes brought the Company into a position where they could not remain with safety, nor recede with honour. Indeed, on comparing the two administrations, we have no hesitation in giving the preference to that of Marquis Cornwallis. His war, unlike the Maratha war of Mr. Hastings, was engaged in, only because it could not be avoided, and, being just, terminated as it deserved, in curbing a faithless despot, and giving the Company, in addition to a large extent of territory, a much improved frontier. His reforms, though by no means free from faults, were carried on, not by fits and starts, like those of Mr. Hastings, but on a regular and comprehensive plan, embracing almost every department of the public service. Last, and best of all, Marquis Cornwallis was both in theory and practice the declared enemy of all corruption, and never made an appointment without preferring the candidate whom he believed best qualified to perform the duties; whereas, under Mr. Hastings, and still more perhaps under his immediate successor, Sir John

Macpherson, every kind of jobbery prevailed, and influential support from directors and proprietors was secured, first, by conferring profitable contracts on their relatives and friends, and then winking at the imperfect or fraudulent manner in which the stipulations contained in them were performed. The banishment of this shameless trafficking in bullock contracts, salt contracts, silk contracts, and opium contracts, introduced a new era in Indian administration, and made it tenfold purer than it had ever been before. Mr. Hastings, unfortunately, could not afford to bestow his patronage on the most deserving, because it was the great instrument on which he depended for confirming the wavering fidelity, and increasing the number of his supporters; Sir John Macpherson, partly for the same reason, and partly also, it may be, because corruption was congenial to his nature and his habits, seems to have dealt with his patronage as every trader does in the article in which he traffics, employing it wherever it promised to yield the quickest and best return; Marquis Cornwallis regarded it as a sacred trust, and when solicited, even by the heir-apparent to the British crown, returned the unvarying answer, that qualification was his only test, and that where it was wanting, it was impossible for him to make any appointment. All honour to him for his firmness, disinterestedness, and sterling honesty!

4

War between the Nizam and the Marathas

DIFFICULTY was felt in appointing a successor to Marquis Cornwallis. Mr. Dundas, owing to this difficulty, had some thoughts of taking the office upon himself, and in a letter dated September 17, 1792, referring to the appointment of a successor, wrote him as follows: "I can assure your lordship you have never imposed any task upon me that I have found more difficult to accomplish. The truth is, I had almost despaired of it, and it is not a month since I had determined to write to you, entreating you to remain a few months more, and promising that if we did not find a successor in the winter to our mind, I would come out to India myself, the moment the charter of the East India Company should be settled, sooner than which time it was impossible for me to leave this country." When the office of Governor of India had thus gone a begging, the name of Mr. Shore was mentioned. To his appointment there was only one serious objection. The appointment of Marquis Cornwallis was the first in which a previous connection with the Company had not been deemed necessary, and the success of his administration had gone far to confirm the opinion that all future appointments should be made on the same principle. Indeed, Marquis Cornwallis, when not aware that there was any intention of appointing Mr. Shore, had written to Mr. Dundas, that he hoped never again to see the supreme government in the hands of a Company's servant, and inclosed in confirmation of this opinion, a letter, in which the writer, declared to be "one of the most able and honourable men in Bengal," had thus expressed himself: "The Com-

pany's servants are certainly the most fit persons for members of council, but from what I have seen since his lordship's departure (for the war against Tipu), I am convinced that it could never answer to appoint any of them to the government. Such is the present temper of the British part of the community in India, that it appears to me that nobody but a person who has never been in the service, and who is entirely unconnected with the individuals who compose it, who is of a rank far surpassing his associates in the government, and has the full support of the ministry at home, can be competent to govern our possessions with that energy and vigour which is essential to our political safety and internal prosperity." The king himself appears to have been of the same opinion, for in a holograph letter to Mr. Dundas, dated "Weymouth, September 5, 1792, 4 p.m.," he says, "Unless a very proper man of distinction could have been (found) to be governor-general at Bengal, no one could have been so properly thought of as Mr. Shore, who will more certainly follow the civil plan Lord Cornwallis has laid down than any other person."

As the "very proper man of distinction" desired by his majesty was not forthcoming, Mr. Shore obtained the appointment, and along with it a baronetage. According to Mr. Dundas' account, he had not only the recommendation mentioned by the king of being certain to follow the civil plan of Lord Cornwallis, of which he was in fact the author, though he would have preferred a decennial to a perpetual settlement, but had moreover expressed his readiness to place himself entirely at the disposal of the ministry, being "willing either to remain for a few years at the head of the government, or to become second in the council, if we think it right, upon further inquiry, to send out any other person from this country or to come home again, if that suits our arrangements best." In other words, Mr. Dundas intimates that Sir John Shore was merely to keep the vacancy supplied till the king's "very proper man of distinction" could be found. In the above holograph letter, his majesty had added, after the passage already quoted, "I trust at the same time, a seat at the supreme council will be conferred on Major-general Abercrombie, and the commission of a commander-in-chief of the forces in the East Indies; and a

fit person intrusted with the command of the forces in the Carnatic." In accordance with these wishes, which of course were received by Mr. Dundas as commands, Major-general Abercrombie obtained his appointments. About the same time, Lord Hobart was appointed to succeed Sir Charles Oakley as governor of Madras, and in the event of the death, resignation, or departure of Sir John Shore, was to become governor-general.

Sir John Shore arrived in Calcutta some time before Marquis Cornwallis finally left it, but he did not enter formally on the duties of government till the 28th of October, 1793. An European war, sprung out of the French revolution, was then raging. As yet, however, its effects were little felt in the East, and the peace of India remained undisturbed. Tipu, having performed his obligations under the treaty, claimed the restoration of his sons. Some objections by the Nizam, on the ground that Tipu was making claims upon him inconsistent with the treaty, in respect to the district of Kurnool, were over-ruled, and the two princes, sent off from Madras under the charge of Captain Doveton, were formally restored to their father at Deonhully, on the 28th of March, 1794. Before their arrival, Tipu had submitted to his counsellors in writing the important question, whether or not he should admit the Englishman to his presence. Their answer was, that as the refusal to receive him might excite suspicion, "he might be amused with professions of friendship, while whatever is in the heart may nevertheless remain there." Tipu resolved to act on this advice, and left his capital for Deonhully. His tent was pitched on a plain in its vicinity. The two boys, on entering it with Captain Doveton, approached as if completely overawed, and when close to the musnud, placed their heads on their father's feet; he, apparently unmoved, and without saying a word, touched their necks with his hands; on this they arose, and he pointed to their seats. Captain Doveton, on making his obeisance, was pointed in like manner to a seat near theirs, and an animated conversation ensued, Tipu talking with great ease and fluency on the wonders of the French revolution in making head against all Europe, on Lord Macartney's embassy to China, and various other leading topics of the day. During subsequent interviews, he declared to

Captain Doveton that he deemed Lord Cornwallis his best friend, that he would be governed by his advice to forget the past, and would in future cultivate the friendship of the English nation as the primary object of his policy. The future showed that while he thus spoke, he was acting literally on the advice of his counsellors, expressing friendship, and at the same time concealing what was in the heart.

The first subject of importance which engaged the attention of the new governor-general was the state of the relations between the Marathas and the Nizam. The mutual guarantee proposed by Marquis Cornwallis had, as we have seen, been rejected, simply because it would have bound the Marathas to a course of policy which they were determined not to follow. Fear of Tipu, or a desire to share in the partition of his territories, had induced them to become parties to the confederacy against him, but this object accomplished, they were no longer willing to be the ally, because they were determined to be the absolute masters of the Nizam. Aware of this determination, the Nizam used every endeavour to obtain the guarantee, and was willing for that purpose to have made such concessions as would almost have brought him into a state of vassalage under the Company. Marquis Cornwallis, however, stretching the system of neutrality beyond its fair limits, refused to give more than a vague assurance that the British government would faithfully fulfil all its obligations under existing treaties. Sir John Shore, when applied to, nearly repeated the same answer, and left the Nizam no alternative but to seek security from some other quarter. Accordingly, he employed a Frenchman of the name of Raymond, who possessed good military talents, and had for some time been in his service, not only to organize native troops, but to form battalions of his own countrymen.

While the Nizam was endeavouring to enter into closer alliance with the British, the Marathas were pursuing an opposite course. In particular, Mahadaji Sindhia, who was deeply offended because the extravagant terms on which he had at one time offered to furnish a contingent to the war against Tipu were not accepted, had used all his influence to prevent the conclusion of any treaty of guarantee. The English, he said, were already too powerful, and instead of taking any step

which would tend to increase their influence, a much wiser policy would be to employ Tipu as a counterpoise to it. In accordance with these views, the Marathas actually entered into an alliance with Tipu, the object of which was understood to be the destruction of the Nizam, and thereafter a combined effort against the Company. These measures were only in contemplation when Mahadaji Sindhia was suddenly cut off by fever at Wunowli, in the vicinity of Poona, on the 12th of February, 1794. Though nominally the subject of the peshwa, he was evidently aspiring to be his master, and had risen to a degree of power which would doubtless have enabled him, if he had lived, to accomplish the object of his ambition. Some short account of him will therefore not be out of place.

The family of Sindhia are Sudras. Ranoji Sindhia, the first of its members who acquired much distinction, had become by hereditary right the *potail* or headman of a village, when he was taken into the service of the peshwa, Balaji Rao. His nominal office was to carry the peshwa's slippers. Though humble, it was deemed, like all court offices, honourable, and, what was of more consequence, gave Ranoji an opportunity of acquiring influence with his master. After the death of Balaji Rao, his son Baji Rao continued him in his office, and treated him with still more favour. He had one day, on coming out from a long audience, found Ranoji asleep on his back, with the slippers clasped in his hands on his breast, and was so pleased with this simple proof of fidelity, that he immediately gave him a place in the *pagah*, or body-guard. It is said that Ranoji ever after "carried with him, carefully packed in a box, a pair of the peshwa's old slippers, which he never ceased to regard with almost religious veneration as the source of his rise."¹ In his new station he distinguished himself as an active enterprising soldier, and at his death, though largely in debt to Malhar Rao Holkar, with whom he had formed an intimate connection, was in possession of a valuable *jaghir*. He left four sons, three legitimate, by Mina Bai, a native of the Deccan, and one illegitimate, by a Rajput woman, a native of Malwa. The illegitimate son was Mahadaji Sindhia. After his brothers as well as a nephew who had held the *jaghir* were dead, he succeeded in

¹ Sir John Malcolm's *Central India*, vol i, p. 117.

supplanting another nephew, and being put in possession of the *jaghir*, became the recognized head of the family. He was present at the fatal battle of Panipat, and during the flight was closely pursued by an Afghan. He rode a fine Deccani mare, which soon carried him far ahead, but whenever he halted a moment for rest, he saw the Afghan, who rode a strong ambling steed, following close upon his track. Ultimately, the mare completely exhausted fell into a ditch, and Mahadaji was taken. His enemy, after wounding him with a battle-axe, which deprived him for life of the use of his right leg, stripped him of some ornaments and left him to his fate. He was found by one of the fugitives, Rana Khan, a water-carrier, who placed him on his bullock, and took him towards the Deccan. Mahadaji Sindhia told General Palmer, the resident at his court, that for a long time he never slept without seeing the Afghan and his clumsy charger pacing after him and his swift Deccani mare. Rana Khan was liberally rewarded for his humanity. He ever after went by the name of the Bhai, or brother of Mahadaji, rose to high commands, and was loaded with favours.

The return of Ahmed Shah Abdali and his Afghans to Kabul enabled the Marathas to repair the disasters of Panipat, and regain their possessions in Malwa and Hindustan. Mahadaji Sindhia, when Visaji Kishan as commander-in-chief crossed the Narmada in 1769, accompanied him at the head of 15,000 horse, and became the chief director of his councils; and it was chiefly at his instigation that the Marathas, in concert with Shah Alam's general, made the incursion into the territories of the Rohilla chief, Zabita Khan, thereby forcing the Rohillas into that treaty with the Nabob of Oudh, the alleged violation of which was afterwards made a pretext for attempting to extirpate them. The Marathas during this campaign gained almost entire possession of the Doab, and established such a complete ascendancy at Delhi, that Shah Alam was truly their prisoner, and attempted in vain to throw off their yoke. In all these transactions Mahadaji took the lead, and extending his territories in every direction, made rapid strides towards independence. When Raghoba engaged in the struggle which ultimately involved the Company in the first Maratha war, Mahadaji Sindhia, as well as Tukaji Holkar, who usually followed in

Sindhia's wake, appear to have promised him their support. On this account, these two chiefs were believed not to be indisposed to a separate alliance with the Company. An attempt was accordingly made with that view, but it failed; and Mahadaji Sindhia, having made common cause with Nana Fadnavis, took an active part in the hostilities which led to the miserable convention of Wurgaon. With him specially was this convention concluded, and as the terms, though most humiliating, were not so rigorous as might have been exacted, his leniency was afterwards gratefully acknowledged and even liberally rewarded. His course had been dictated by sound policy. He was now the avowed rival without being the open enemy of Nana, and had secured the favour of the British, which might yet stand him in good stead. It was probably for this reason that at a later period, when he had obtained the custody of Raghoba's person, he allowed him to escape in the manner which has been related.

After these apparent approaches to friendship with the Company, another turn of politics induced Mahadaji Sindhia actually to take the field against General Goddard in Gujarat. Still, even at this time he professed the greatest friendship for the English, and, as a pledge of it, restored the two English gentlemen who had been left with him as hostages for the fulfilment of the Wurgaon convention. These professions of friendship, though they led to negotiation, ended in nothing, and hostilities having been renewed, Sindhia sustained a defeat not so disastrous as disgraceful, because he had allowed himself to be surprised in his camp. Not long afterwards, the capture of Gwalior by Captain Popham and the invasion of Malwa by Colonel Camac, drove him northwards to defend his own territories. When thus forced to carry on the war at his own expense, he soon tired of it, and, contrary to expectation, entered into the negotiation which, as we have seen, terminated in a general Maratha peace.

By the above treaty of Salbye, Mahadaji Sindhia, besides many other advantages, was left at full liberty to follow his own ambitious schemes. He wrested Gwalior from the hands of the Rana of Gohud, whom the British had left at his mercy, reduced several Rajput chiefs, who, after becoming Maratha tributaries, had thrown off their allegiance, and sent a body of troops to

attempt the conquest of Bundelkhand. Still higher prospects opened before him when the two leading Mughul factions applied for his interference. At the head of the one was Muhammed Beg, of the other, Afrasiab Khan. As the invitation from the latter was ostensibly from the emperor, Mahadaji Sindhia preferred it, and set out for Agra, towards which the imperial court was advancing. Immediately after a meeting had been held, Afrasiab Khan was assassinated. Sindhia, from the advantage which he derived from the event, and the asylum he gave to the assassin, did not escape the suspicion of having been privy to the murder. Be this as it may, the result was to vest him with complete authority at Delhi. The office of *amir-ul-umara*, or vizir, was offered to him, but declined; in its stead he obtained for the peshwa the office of *vakil-i-mutlac*, or supreme deputy, and for himself, that of substitute to the peshwa in this new capacity. In this way he was really vested with the whole imperial authority, put in command of the army, and intrusted with the management of the provinces of Delhi and Agra. The position to which he had now attained is thus summed up by Sir John Malcolm:—"He was the nominal slave, but the rigid master of the unfortunate Shah Alam, Emperor of Delhi; the pretended friend, but the designing rival of the house of Holkar; the professed inferior in all matters of form, but the real superior and oppressor of the Rajput princes of Central India; and the proclaimed soldier, but the actual plunderer of the family of the peshwa."

At this time, when Mahadaji Sindhia was actual sovereign of Hindustan from the Sutlej to Agra, possessed two-thirds of Malwa and some of the finest provinces of the Deccan, and had an army composed of sixteen battalions of regular infantry, disciplined by a Frenchman of the name of De Boigne, 100,000 horse, and 500 pieces of cannon, a curious scene of mock humility took place at Poona. Having arrived here to pay his respects to Madhu Rao the peshwa, Mahadaji Sindhia, too modest to enter the city in any kind of state, dismounted from his elephant at the gates, and took his place in the hall of audience below all the hereditary nobles. When the peshwa, on entering, requested them to take their seats, Sindhia remained standing. For him to sit would be too much honour. Producing from a

bundle which he carried under his arm a pair of slippers, he placed them before the peshwa. "This," he said, "is my occupation: it was my father's before me." There was policy in this grimace. The affected pride of his humble origin made him popular, and it became a common saying, "Mahadaji Sindhia made himself a sovereign by calling himself a *potail*."

The new honours and conquests of Sindhia greatly increased his expenditure, and he had soon to contend with the greatest of all dangers to an Indian potentate—an empty treasury. In his eagerness to replenish it, he did not employ the most judicious means. Under various pretexts, he confiscated the *jaghirs* of many of the Muhammedan chiefs, and thus not only provoked their enmity, but spread disaffection among all the others, who were afraid, not without cause, of similar treatment. Another step he took brought matters to a crisis. Using the name of the emperor, he claimed tribute from the Rajput chiefs, and by appearing with an army before the gates of Jaipur, frightened the raja into payment of a first instalment. More was promised, and had he appeared again with his army, more would have been paid. Instead of this, he sent an agent, and only received a contemptuous refusal. The Rajput chiefs had leagued with the disaffected Muhammedan nobles and were ripe for revolt. Sindhia was taken at a disadvantage. His funds were exhausted, his troops were in arrears, and when about to encounter a formidable insurrection at home, he was obliged to detach a considerable force to repel an incursion of the Sikhs. To complete his difficulties, Ismael Beg, one of his leading Muhammedan chiefs, deserted him, on the eve of a great battle with the Rajputs, and was shortly after followed by the whole of the emperor's regular infantry, with eighty pieces of cannon. Had the Rajputs pressed their advantage, they might have freed Hindustan from Maratha domination, but, satisfied with driving the invader from their own territories, they left Ismael Beg to contend single-handed for the liberation of those belonging to the emperor. Even then Sindhia was encompassed with difficulties. Ismael Beg, joined by Ghulam Kadir, the son of Zabita Khan, defeated him in a pitched battle. Afterwards, when the tide of fortune had turned against them, they managed to obtain possession of Delhi, in June, 1788. Shah Alam, in endeavouring to maintain the

citadel against them, became their prisoner, and was deprived of eyesight by the hands of the merciless Ghulam Kadir. This atrocity did not long remain unpunished. The perpetrator, after being driven from Delhi, was captured, and subjected to a dreadful mutilation which he did not survive, and the unhappy Shah Alam, now a blind old man, and once more in the hands of Sindhia, was re-seated on his throne.

At the time when Lord Cornwallis concluded the treaty of alliance with the Nizam and the Marathas, Sindhia offered to become a party to it, and march against Tipu, provided the British would furnish him with two battalions similar to those granted to Nizam Ali, and engage moreover to protect his possessions in Hindustan during his absence. The rejection of these proposals gave him deep offence, and he henceforward showed himself decidedly hostile to British interests. It was partly with the view of being able to damage them more effectually, that in 1792 he quitted Hindustan to pay a visit to Poona, but his ostensible object was different. Shah Alam had been made to grant new patents, not only confirming the offices of *vakil-i-mutlac* to the peshwa, and of deputy to Sindhia, but declaring both offices hereditary and perpetual, and Sindhia, in setting out for Poona, gave out that he was proceeding thither by the emperor's orders, with the sannads and insignia, for the purpose of seeing the peshwa regularly installed. Nana Fadnavis made many objections to the proposed ceremony, and endeavoured to convince the peshwa that he could not accept of the titles and insignia without violating the Maratha constitution. His arguments were unavailing, and a day was fixed for the formal investiture. The following description of it is given by Duff:¹—

“Sindhia spared no pains to make it as imposing as possible. A grand suite of tents was pitched at a distance from his own camp. They proceeded towards them with the most pompous form. At the further end of these splendid apartments, a throne, meant to represent that of the Mughuls, was erected, on which was displayed the imperial firman, the *khillat* or dresses of investiture, and all the principal insignia. The peshwa on approaching the throne made his obeisance thrice, placed 101

¹ Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, vol iii, pp. 78-80.

gold mohurs upon it, as a *nazar* or offering, and took his seat on its left. Sindhia's Persian secretary then read the imperial firmans, and amongst others the edict which prevented the slaughter of bullocks and cows. The peshwa then received the khillat, consisting of nine articles of dress, five superb ornaments of jewels and feathers, a sword and shield, a pence, a seal and inkstand, and two royal *morchuls* or fans of peacocks' tails, accompanied by a *nalki* (a sort of sedan-chair without a top), a *palki* (a sort of short bedstead), a horse, and an elephant; besides six elephants bearing the imperial standard, two crescents, two stars, and the orders of the Fish and the Sun. The peshwa retired to an adjoining tent and returned clothed in the imperial khillat, when he resumed his seat; and Sindhia, followed by Nana Fadnavis and such of the peshwa's officers as were present, offered nazars of congratulation. When the peshwa arose to return to his palace, he was followed by Sindhia and Hari Pant, carrying the *morchuls* and fanning him. He entered Poona seated on the *nalki*; the concourse of people assembled to witness the procession was exceedingly great; the pomp and grandeur displayed was beyond anything that the inhabitants of Poona had ever seen, whilst the clang of thousands of musical instruments, the shout of the populace, volleys of musketry, and salvos of cannon, seemed to give all the effect that the projector of this state ceremony could possibly desire."

The investiture of Sindhia as hereditary deputy took place on the arrival at the peshwa's palace. It was a very tame affair, both because his affected modesty would not allow it to be pompous, and because intimations were not wanting to show how much his ultimate designs were suspected and disrelished. He saw the necessity of acting with the utmost caution, and made it his first business to establish himself in the young peshwa's good graces. He had brought as presents to him many of the rare productions and curiosities of Hindustan, and he soon rendered himself so agreeable to him by his frank unreserved manners, that he became his constant companion. He talked to him of hunting and hawking, carried him out on frequent excursions to these sports, and made parties of pleasure for his amusement. Madhu Rao was delighted with a behaviour

so different from the grave decorum habitual to the Nana, and began gradually to give part of his confidence to Sindhia. Business thus occasionally became the subject of conversation, and plans of policy were unfolded. If Holkar and any other Maratha chiefs who interfered with his management were withdrawn, he would make all Hindustan a secure possession to the peshwa. The English were the only enemies to be feared, and the accession of strength which they had gained in the late war by the aid of the Marathas was much to be lamented. The weakening of Tipu was a political blunder, and it would therefore be advisable in future to form a closer connection with him. Such was the kind of policy which Sindhia was understood to be inculcating, when all his schemes were suddenly cut short by a sudden death.

Both from the suddenness of the event, and the state of parties at the time, it might have been expected that great changes would follow. Mahadaji Sindhia left no male issue. He had a full brother, Tukaji Sindhia, who fell at Panipat, and left three sons. The eldest of them had no sons; the other two had, and Sindhia, without paying any regard to the legal order of succession, had repeatedly declared his intention to adopt Daulat Rao, the son of his youngest nephew. Though the adoption had not actually taken place, effect was given to the intention. Daulat Rao, then only a youth of fifteen years of age, was accordingly, after some slight opposition on the part of Mahadaji's widow, recognized as his heir, and entered into peaceable possession of his immense territories. The policy which he began to pursue was exactly that which his grand-uncle had advocated, and thus the question of interference on behalf of the Nizam, which Marquis Cornwallis had left open, Sir John Shore was compelled to answer. The case contemplated by the treaty between the confederates, but left for future arrangement, was about to be realized. Tipu was believed to have collected an army for the express purpose of attacking the Nizam. Had this been all, there could not have been any room for discussion, as assistance could not have been refused without a violation both of the letter and the spirit of the treaty; but the peculiarity of the case was, that in the contemplated aggression, Tipu could scarcely be considered as a principal. He was to be the auxiliary of another party, and

that party was one of the confederates. Under these circumstances, Sir John Shore decided that no obligation would lie upon the British to interfere. In a long and able minute in support of this decision, he maintains, "That as the union of the three allies was the basis of the treaty, the continuance of that union or friendship is essential to the performance of the obligations imposed by it, and a war between two of the parties totally changes the relative situation of all." As a necessary conclusion from these premises, he held that the British were under no obligation to interfere in any of the three following cases:—a war between the Nizam and the Marathas alone; a war between the Nizam and the Marathas assisted by Tipu; and an unprovoked attack by Tipu on the Nizam, while the Nizam and the Marathas were at war. The last of these three cases is the most ticklish of all, and it is very questionable whether Sir John Shore, in attempting to justify his decision respecting it, has not evaded a real obligation, by having recourse to a species of jesuitical casuistry. He argues thus:—"To support the Nizam against Tipu, if he should seize the opportunity of actual hostility between his highness and the Marathas, to attack the territories of the former without provocation, must necessarily involve us in a war with the Marathas, a predicament which the obligations of the treaty never supposed. I state this as a necessary consequence, for the operations of the field would lead to it: even though the invasion were not originally concerted or intended between Tipu and the peshwa, we cannot conceive it possible for us to fight against Tipu alone, in defence of the Nizam, and with the co-operation of his forces, whilst he is engaged with the Marathas; and to prosecute the war with effect against Tipu, we must commence hostilities at the same time with the Marathas. But if a contrary supposition were admissible, the whole burden of repelling and punishing the aggression of Tipu would exclusively fall upon us, contrary to the spirit, meaning, and terms of the triple alliance." The argument is in substance simply this:—Both the British and the Marathas are bound to punish Tipu should he attack or molest the Nizam; but should the Marathas choose to violate this obligation, the British will hold themselves entitled to violate it also, because to do otherwise would be very inconvenient, inasmuch as it might lead to a new Maratha

war, and even if it did not, would throw upon the British the whole, instead of only a share, of the burden of punishing Tipu.

Having, very sophistically, we think, disencumbered himself of the *obligation* of giving assistance, Sir John Shore need scarcely have taken the trouble to discuss the *expediency*. If there was no obligation, then, however great the expediency might be, he was not at liberty to act upon it, since the legislature had tied up his hands, and made it illegal for him to enter into, what would have been to all intents in the case supposed, a new treaty. With the view to the future, however, the question of expediency was really important, and he therefore proceeds "seriously to weigh the probable consequences of neglecting the Nizam, or of supporting him against the joint invasion of the Marathas and Tipu Sultan." He sets out with admitting that "the destruction of the Nizam's power, and the aggrandisement of that of his enemies, must be the consequence of leaving him without support, and Tipu and the Marathas will, of course, become proportionately dangerous." He also admits, that "our political consequence might lose something of its importance in the estimate of the native powers, by leaving the Nizam to his fate," and that the very opposite "conduct of the British government in resenting the attack upon their ally the Raja of Travancore, during the war, and in the negotiations for the termination of it, not only gained us the confidence of our allies, but established the British reputation throughout India for good faith, firmness, and moderation." These, then, are the weights which the governor-general, after setting up his political balance, throws into the one scale. Into the other scale, he throws "the vices and imbecility of the Nizam's administration—the impossibility of directing his politics without usurping his government—and the dangers of perpetual war, the consequence of such interference—the difficulty of making any effectual impression in the Maratha state by our forces—the comparative facility with which they might injure us—the magnitude of the resources and exertions, as well as the number of troops, both native and European, which would be required to oppose the united efforts of the Marathas and Tipu—and the inevitable ruin of a long-protracted war;" together

with "the situation of the affairs in Europe, which precludes the expectation of receiving any considerable reinforcement of troops during the continuance of the war, and impresses the necessity of preserving, by every effort, peace with all the powers in India." The scales thus standing—the one containing only prospective evils which might not be realized, and the loss of a reputation acquired by "good faith, firmness, and moderation," and the other containing the real danger of a long-protracted war, with a very doubtful issue—Sir John Shore held that the latter scale preponderated. This pusillanimous decision, as if it had not been more than enough even once to announce, he reiterates in various forms. "The inducement to support the Nizam, at the hazard of such impending consequences, ought to be much stronger than the apprehension of future evils from the subversion of his power." Again, after admitting that our conduct in the war with Tipu had "not only gained us the confidence of our allies, but established the British reputation throughout India for good faith, firmness, and moderation," he adds, "but in weighing these motives, we must attend to self-preservation, including the permanency of the British possessions in India." In a previous part of the minute he had said, "Although I am fully sensible of the value of opinion in this country, it cannot be placed in competition with the greater evils attending a war with Tipu and the Marathas."

When Sir John Shore arrived at this pitiable conclusion, and told the Marathas and Tipu how very much he was afraid of them, and that they need be under no apprehension from him in working their will upon the Nizam, who was certainly as much our ally as the Raja of Travancore was when his lines were forced, he entertained the hope that he had merely been considering a question which he would "not be compelled to decide." The dissensions between the Marathas might yet, he thought, be terminated by negotiation, though he could not help seeing, that in whatever way terminated, whether by negotiation or by war, "there is too much reason to fear that the Nizam will fall under the subjection of the Marathas, and on this event his power, under their control and direction, will become an accumulation of their strength, already exorbitant." A confederacy between Tipu and the Marathas, he says, "I deem

improbable, unless the latter should be forced into it by our avowed support of the Nizam against them," and then adds significantly, "they are, I presume, satisfied on this head." But even should such a confederacy take place, and the power of the Nizam be in consequence annihilated, there was still this very encouraging consideration—"the probability is as great that they would attack each other as that they would unite to invade the territories of the Company." On the whole, then, his advice to the Company was to provide for their safety by taking part with the strongest. "The consolidation of our alliance with the latter is an object of the first importance to us." No doubt "the nature of the Maratha government is well known to be avaricious, grasping, and ambitious—it never neglects any opportunity of extending its power or aggrandizing its wealth, with little solicitude as to the rectitude of the means employed in obtaining these objects." What then? It is the strongest; and therefore consolidate your alliance with it. Should any one object that this unprincipled, "avaricious, grasping, and ambitious" Maratha government might perhaps take a liking to the territories of its humble, cowering, crouching British ally, Sir John Shore has this answer: "With respect to all the powers in India, our actual security is our strength; but with regard to the Marathas, the alarm of danger is lessened by a consideration that a wider and safer career is open to their ambition, in the absolute subjection of numerous petty states in Hindustan, some of which are independent while others are partially under their control, than by attacking our possessions or those of our allies." Still, even at the very worst, existence, even by sufferance, was something; for "we are never to forget that a dominion exercised by foreigners must ever be viewed in a hostile light—that an union merely political is always precarious—and that if the whole power of the Maratha state were directed against us, we should find ourselves very vulnerable in many parts, and in some, perhaps, at present unsuspected."

This celebrated minute has been dwelt on, because it unfolds the course of policy which the new governor-general had resolved to adopt, and into which he may have been betrayed by his wish "to adhere as literally as possible to the strictest possible interpretation of the restrictive clause

in the act of parliament against entering into hostilities." Peace at any price was its characteristic feature, and it was to be procured simply by practising "ignoble ease," and clinging to the strongest side merely because it was the strongest. In all parts of the world, but nowhere so much as in India, is timidity provocative of aggression; and Sir John Shore could not have taken a more effectual method of stimulating the Marathas, alone or in concert with Tipu, to attack the Nizam, than by proclaiming that the British government had determined, from no higher motive than fear, to stand aloof, and see an ally annihilated without venturing to assist him. Tipu's reappearance was as yet premature. Indeed, the Marathas, now assured that the British would not interfere, had no occasion for him, and knew their business too well to offer him a share of the spoils which they were able to appropriate without division. In less than three weeks from the date of the governor-general's minute, the Marathas were within the Nizam's territories. M. Raymond, ever since the policy of the British was suspected, had been diligently employed, in obedience to Nizam Ali's orders, in organizing corps of infantry, and been so successful that he did not hesitate to encounter the celebrated brigades of Sindhia, trained by De Boigne. On the 11th of March, 1795, an action was fought near the frontier, and had every appearance of terminating to the Nizam's advantage, when Raymond was stunned by an order from him to retreat. Conformably to his usual practice, he was accompanied to the field by his harem. The favourite of the day took fright, and threatened to disgrace him by exposing herself to public view, if he did not instantly retire to the small fort of Kardla. He complied, and was in consequence cooped up with his army, and reduced to such straits, that it only remained for the Marathas to dictate terms. Many of them were secret: those made public were, the cession of a territory yielding thirty-five lacs, and including Daulatabad, the key of the Deccan, and the delivery of Azim-ul-Umara (Mir Alam) as an hostage. This unenviable distinction he owed not more to his talents, than to the constancy with which he had clung to a British alliance till all hope of it was extinguished.

Nizam Ali was now at the mercy of the Marathas, and the annihilation of his power, which Sir John Shore had contem-

plated with so much complacency, seemed inevitable. Two events saved him—the one, the rebellion of his son, Ali Jah, in June, the other, the death of the peshwa, in October, 1795. Previous to the treaty of Kardla, Raymond's corps mustered twenty-three strong battalions. In the battle their value was fully tested, and it was therefore wisely resolved to increase and improve them. With this view the territorial revenues of the district of Karpa or Caddapa were assigned to him for the maintenance of his troops. This district, from its vicinity to the sea-coast, furnished him with facilities for recruiting his officers, and of uniting with an European corps which revolutionary France was understood to be preparing, with the view of regaining some of its former conquests. Sir John Shore, who had forced the Nizam to form French connections, by leaving him at the mercy of the Marathas, now complained, somewhat unreasonably, of the necessary result of his own policy, and threatened to send a body of troops in the direction of Karpa if Raymond was not withdrawn from it. The discussions respecting Raymond were terminated by the rebellion and flight of Ali Jah. That officer was immediately despatched against him, and had just made him a prisoner when a British detachment, despatched for the same purpose at the Nizam's earnest request, arrived. The ready compliance with this request made the relations between the Nizam and the British more friendly.

The dissensions at Poona, originating in the choice of a new peshwa, produced still more important results. The legitimate heir, Baji Rao, son of the late Raghoba, was supported by Daulat Rao Sindhia, while Nana Fadnavis desired to give the office to a younger brother, Chimnaji, whom he expected to use as a pageant. The other Maratha chiefs took different sides, and a period of distraction ensued. Nana endeavoured to strengthen his party by courting the Nizam, and with that view released Mir Alam. This officer, while detained as a hostage, managed to form a strong party among the Maratha chiefs, and thus assist his old master. So much was the Nana pressed by his opponents that, in his anxiety to strengthen himself, he resigned all the cessions which had been wrested from the Nizam by the treaty of Kardla. Mir Alam, in return for this obligation, procured the secret assembling of a large body of

troops, which was intended to be placed at the Nana's disposal; but Sindhia, penetrating this design, rendered it abortive, and Baji Rao was regularly installed as peshwa. On this event a new negotiation became necessary, and Mir Alam, who had still been detained at Poona, was not allowed to quit it till an arrangement was made, by which the Nizam became bound to pay one-fourth of the amount stipulated at Kardla. The influence of Mir Alam, when again in office at Hyderabad, was employed in strengthening the British connection.

The attention of the governor-general had about this time been called to the north-west. Fyzulla Khan, the celebrated Rohilla chief, who held the *jaghir* of Rampura, under the Nabob of Oudh, in virtue of an agreement which the Company had guaranteed, died in 1794. Muhammed Ali Khan, his eldest son, was of course entitled to the succession; but he had scarcely entered into the possession of it when his brother, Ghulam Muhammed Khan, basely murdered him, and usurped his rights. The murderer immediately applied to the Nabob of Oudh, and by means of a large bribe, would probably have succeeded in obtaining his sanction to the usurpation, had not the British interfered. Sir Robert Abercromby, the commander-in-chief, marched against the usurper, and completely defeated him in a battle in which the Rohillas fought so well that they made a partial impression on the British line. Immediately after the victory, Sir Robert, on his own responsibility, obtained the consent of the vizir to the restoration of the *jaghir* to Ahmed Ali Khan, the infant son of the murdered Muhammed. It was fortunate that he had taken this step, as shortly afterwards instructions arrived from the governor-general and council suggesting, contrary to all equity, that the rights of the infant heir should be set aside, and that the *jaghir* should be resumed by the nabob. In consequence of the arrangement previously made, these instructions could not be carried into effect, and government was saved from committing great injustice.

The proposal of the governor-general and council to confiscate Fyzulla Khan's *jaghir* is the more extraordinary from the fact that, at the very time when they would have placed it at the disposal of the nabob, they were loudly complaining that, ever since the death of Hyder Beg Khan, his administration

had gone to wreck, and the whole power of the state had passed into the hands of a few favourites, who were of the most abandoned character, and known to be generally hostile to British interests. Sir John Shore, in particular, had given it as his decided opinion, that whilst the nabob's administration remained on its present footing, the British should derive no effective assistance from his troops, and must rather expect to find enemies than friends in his dominions. So much was he satisfied of the accuracy of this opinion, and alive to the evils which such a state of matters might engender, that, in March, 1797, he paid a visit to Lucknow, and, in addition to some other improvements, succeeded in obtaining the office of minister for Tafazzul Hussain Khan, who was believed to be a man of talent and probity. Only a few months after this visit, the nabob, Asaf-ud-Daulah, died. Vizir Ali, whom he had acknowledged as his son, and who was in consequence recognized as his presumptive heir, was immediately placed on the musnud, with the concurrence of the British government. His right, however, was disputed by Sadat Ali, the late nabob's brother, who offered to prove that Vizir Ali was spurious, and produced so strong evidence of the fact that the governor-general, while he refused to displace Vizir Ali, found it impossible to divest himself of the belief of his spuriousness. This decision was neither just nor politic. The new nabob, though only seventeen years of age, was already familiar with every species of profligacy, and in the hands of favourites as worthless as himself. Sir John Shore had never been satisfied with the decision he had given in his favour, and therefore during a second journey which he made to Lucknow, on seeing how miserably the government was conducted, was persuaded, though not without reluctance, again to open up the question. The conclusion at which he now arrived was—"1st, That Vizir Ali is undoubtedly the son of a *furraush* (the Persian name for a household menial servant), has no title to the musnud, and, from his character, is unworthy of it. This decision is supported by evidence as to his real birth, by the sanction of public opinion, by facts, and information. 2nd, That to support him on the musnud would not only be an indelible disgrace to the reputation of the Company, but in all probability would prove the ruin of the country and the des-

truction of the British interests in Oudh. 3rd, That the justice and reputation of the Company, as well as their political interests, require the establishment of the rightful successor. 4th, That, as all the reputed sons of Asaf-ud-Daulah are undoubtedly spurious, the line of succession should be transferred to that of Suja-ud-Daulah. 5th, That Vizir Ali ought to be deposed, and Sadat Ali be placed on the musnud." The above conclusions were immediately acted upon, and Vizir Ali was deposed.

Sadat Ali, when the resolution in his favour was taken, was residing at Benaras, and received the first notification of his intended elevation in the form of a regular treaty of twenty-three articles, in which he was required immediately to declare his acquiescence, without qualification or reserve. He was not in a condition to object to any terms that might be dictated, and therefore readily expressed his determination to fulfil all the stipulations in the most faithful manner. On this he proceeded without delay to Kanpur, where a large body of European troops waited his arrival. With them as his escort, he continued his journey to Lucknow, and was there without opposition proclaimed nabob vizir, on the 21st of January, 1798. The treaty ultimately concluded with him after his elevation to the musnud was, with a few modifications, the same as that to which he had assented at Benaras. It vested the Company with the entire defence of Oudh, and increased the annual subsidy payable by the nabob to seventy-six lacs. The number of Company's troops was rated at 10,000 men; but, in the event of their exceeding 13,000 or falling below 8,000, the amount of the subsidy was to be proportionally increased or diminished. The native force maintained in Oudh for internal police was not to exceed 35,000 men, and the nabob was not to hold communication with any foreign state, nor admit any Europeans to serve in his army or settle in his country without the Company's consent. The other payments stipulated in addition to the subsidy were, a sum of twelve lacs, payable to the Company as the expense of the nabob's elevation, a pension of a lac and a half to Vizir Ali, who was to be removed to Benaras, and suitable provisions for the other reputed children of Asaf-ud-Daulah. The only cession made to the Company was the important fortress of Allahabad, which, after the nabob had

parted with it for ever, was to be put in a state of repair at his expense. In order to meet the increased subsidy, and the other permanent charges on the revenue, all unnecessary expenditure was to cease, and a system of economy and reduction was to be carried out in concert with the Company.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that by the above treaty, imposed, not in consequence of military successes, but merely by taking advantage of a disputed succession, Oudh was deprived of its independence, and reduced to all intents to a state of vassalage. One main cause of the rigorous demands made by the governor-general on this occasion is stated to have been the apprehension of an invasion of Hindustan from Kabul by Zeman Shah, the grandson of the celebrated Ahmed Shah Abdali. In 1796, he had actually advanced, with little opposition, to Lahore, and seemed about to advance on Delhi, when the rebellion of one of his brothers compelled him to return with all haste to his own dominions. His approach excited great hopes among the Muhammedans of a restoration of the house of Timur, and equally great consternation among the Marathas, who, torn by their own intestine feuds, were totally unprepared for war, and solicited an alliance with the British against Zeman Shah as a common enemy. The governor-general having been obliged, while the alarm prevailed, to take some precautions, had obtained fresh proof "of the imbecility of the vizir's government, and the insufficiency of his military establishment," the troops of which "would rather have proved an encumbrance than an assistance to the British forces." As a repetition of Zeman Shah's invasion was expected, Sir John Shore had probably deemed it necessary to bring Oudh into a state which would make its resources more fully and more readily available.

Sir John Shore, whose services had been rewarded with an Irish peerage, under the title of Lord Teignmouth, resigned the government, and sailed for England in the beginning of March, 1798. The most important events of his administration have already been detailed, but some changes which took place at Madras still require a short notice. On the 13th of October, 1795, Muhammed Ali, Nabob of Arcot, ended a long and inglorious career. Contrary to his wish, which was to give the

nabobship to his second son, he was succeeded by the eldest, Omdut-ul-Umara. In 1792, Lord Cornwallis had attempted in vain to induce the late nabob to give up the management of his revenues in peace as well as in war, and, because unwilling to use compulsion, had concluded an agreement which, while diminishing some of the evils previously existing, left the root of them untouched. Muhammed Ali, though understood to be in the possession of considerable treasures, had early become the prey of usurers and sharpers. As the payments to the Company fell due, instead of emptying his own coffers, he met them by raising usurious loans, chiefly from the European residents, on the security of the territorial revenues. In these loans the lenders usually stipulated for the appointment of their own managers, and thus the unhappy ryots were handed over to the tender mercies of men whose only interest in the soil was to wring from it the largest sum of money in the shortest possible time. The effects were, most grievous oppression of the people, general impoverishment, and consequent decay of revenue. A new succession seemed to Lord Hobart, the governor, to offer a fair opportunity of insisting on the change which had long been felt to be most desirable, and he proposed the entire cession to the Company of all the territories which were pledged in security of the *kists*, or regular pecuniary instalments. The new nabob refused to comply. The real cause of his refusal is thus described by Lord Hobart:—"The great houses of business, who are the principal money-lenders at the durbar, borrow from individuals who, though not absolutely engaged in the loan itself, are partakers of the speculation in a remote degree, and feel with no less sensibility than their principals the approach of danger. Similarity of interest makes a common cause; and the great body of interest which is condensed upon this principle is uniformly exerted to support his highness in an inflexible resistance against a melioration of system." Thus tutored, the nabob declared his determination to adhere to the treaty with Lord Cornwallis, alleging as his reason "the dying injunctions of his father," though he afterwards candidly confessed the real reason to be that "his native ministers and European advisers so perplexed, plagued, and intimidated him that he could not venture on this measure (the proposed change), notwithstanding his con-

viction that he ought to do so." The nabob was successful in his resistance, and the Madras presidency, though backed by the supreme council, were obliged to leave matters on their old footing.

During this abortive negotiation with the nabob, Lord Hobart was engaged in transactions of a different nature. The successes of the French in the revolutionary contest had been so great as to compel the Dutch to take part with them against Great Britain. The Dutch settlements in Ceylon, Malacca, Banda, and Amboyna were consequently attacked and reduced by armaments fitted from Madras. Another armament, intended for the reduction of Manila, had sailed under the command of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, when the extraordinary victories of the French in Italy induced Lord Hobart to countermand it, under the belief that all the troops which could possibly be spared would be required to aid in defensive measures at home.

Lord Teignmouth's administration may be considered as having tested the system of neutrality laid down by the legislature, and proved it to be, at least in the sense in which it was then generally understood, to be wanting. In its laudable desire to prevent wars of conquest, the legislature had laid down restrictions which, literally interpreted by the Indian government, precluded it from taking measures of prevention against dangers which it saw in progress, and thus deprived it of one of the most effectual means of maintaining general peace. This display of moderation being ascribed by the native powers to weakness or selfish policy, only shook the confidence of our allies and increased the presumption of hostile states. The consequence was, that at the end of six years' peace, while the British power remained nearly stationary, its enemies were increasing in strength and preparing for a struggle which it was foreseen could not be distant. The lesson taught by the neutral system, as Lord Teignmouth had exemplified it, is well stated by Sir John Malcolm.¹ "It was proved from the events of this administration, that no ground of political advantage could be abandoned without being instantly occupied by an enemy; and that to resign influence was not merely to resign power, but to

¹ *Political History of India*, vol. i, p. 192.

allow that power to pass into hands hostile to the British government. The consequence of political inaction was equally obvious. No one measure of importance was taken, except the elevation of Sadat Ali to the musnud of Oudh, which the governor-general states in express terms was forced upon his adoption. But this inactive system of policy, so far from attaining its object, which was to preserve affairs upon the footing on which it had found them, had only the effect of making the British government stationary while all around it advanced, and of exposing it to dangers arising from the revolutions of its neighbours, while it was even denied the power of adapting its policy to the change of circumstances."

Marquis Wellesley

WHEN Lord Hobart was appointed to the government of Madras, he was also nominated provisional successor to Sir John Shore. Some time, however, before the resignation of the latter, a new arrangement was contemplated. The new appointment occasioned some surprise; Marquis Cornwallis was to resume his office of governor-general. The main reason for this was the state of the Company's European army. A series of new regulations had been proposed, and received with so much dissatisfaction that a general mutiny of the officers was threatened. In consequence of their hostility to the plan of amalgamating all the European troops in India, they had appointed delegates and framed resolutions, which they urged with great intemperance. The delegates formed into an executive board, who were to treat with the government. They were bound to secrecy, and were guaranteed, in the name of the whole army, both from penal consequences and pecuniary loss. One of their determinations was, that if the new regulations expected from Europe did not speedily arrive, they would judge for themselves, and enforce their decision at any hazard. When the regulations did arrive they gave little satisfaction, and seem to have been as unpalatable to government as to the officers, since the governor-general (Sir John Shore), in a minute dated December 1, 1796, considered them not "founded on solid principles, or framed with any knowledge of the country." While matters were in this threatening position a brevet arrived from England. It would have promoted several king's officers over officers of the Company of longer standing, and as this was a grievance to which the executive board had declared their determination no longer to submit, the Bengal government,

afraid of the consequences, protested against the issue of the brevet, and induced Sir Robert Abercromby to suppress it. In a letter subsequently written to the secret committee of directors, the governor-general intimated that he would be obliged, partially at least, to give way. The authorities at home, alarmed at the violence of the officers and the apparent want of firmness in the Indian government, immediately urged the re-appointment of Marquis Cornwallis.

In the correspondence on this subject, Mr. Dundas in opening it addressed the marquis as follows:—"Allow me to say to your lordship, that if you could bring yourself to forego the comforts of home for one year more of your life, and to spend three months at Bengal, and as much at Madras, you would do the greatest service to your country that ever any man had it in his power to do." In conclusion he says, "Take out your successors with you, teach them the road they should pursue, and having done that duty and settled all India by your presence and authority, you may return after six months in the same ship of war that would carry you out. And you will have the satisfaction of reflecting (and of transmitting the sentiment to your posterity) that you have twice been the instrument, in the hands of Providence, to save to the British empire in India that stake, in which no rational man can doubt that its permanent prosperity and stability do above all others truly rest." Mr. Dundas had again proposed to go himself, and hence Marquis Cornwallis answered—"I think on every account that you would succeed better than myself, especially as great pains have been taken from the moment of my leaving India, to impress on the minds of the Bengal officers that my sentiments were not favourable towards them, and that I was partial to the king's troops. If, however, you cannot go yourself, which I shall think very unfortunate for our Indian possessions, and if you and Mr. Pitt should be of opinion that, by once more doubling the Cape of Good Hope, I can render essential service to my country, I shall not depart from the line of conduct which I have invariably pursued through life, of sacrificing all private considerations of comfort and happiness to the service of the public."

After giving this consent, Marquis Cornwallis began to make his preparations, but on learning that the mutiny of the sailors

at Portsmouth had broken out a second time, and that the landing of a French army in Ireland was every day expected, he felt that this was not "a time to be occupied about speculative arrangements of the Indian army," and told Mr. Dundas, who was about to bring a bill into parliament for the purpose of giving legislative authority to the proposed regulations, that "there could be no hurry about the bill, as it was impossible that, under the present calamitous circumstances of this country, he could embark for India." He had already been sworn into office as governor-general, and believed that these events had only postponed his departure. Meanwhile, the Board of Control and the court of directors were discussing the regulations with a committee of Bengal officers sitting in London. This proceeding, which, but for the critical state of the times, could scarcely have been resorted to, appears to have been regarded by Marquis Cornwallis as unbecoming, and accordingly, when he found that concessions were made contrary to his opinion, he considered it unnecessary to proceed on the voyage, and resigned his appointment on the 2nd of August, 1797. Ultimately, at the earnest request of Mr. Pitt, he accepted the united offices of Lord-lieutenant of Ireland and commander-in-chief. The office of governor-general was conferred in October, 1797, on the Earl of Mornington, afterwards Marquis Wellesley. His appointment may have been originally suggested by his intimacy with the family of Marquis Cornwallis, whose uncle, afterwards Archbishop Cornwallis, had been his tutor at Eton, and by his possession of the qualification to which, as we have seen, his majesty attached great importance—that of being "a very proper man of distinction." He had at the same time personal claims of a high order. His appearances in the House of Lords had given evidence of distinguished talents, and his office as a lord of the treasury had given him an opportunity of proving his aptitude for business. With this office, which he had held from 1786, was united in 1795 that of an unpaid commissioner of the Board of Control, and thus during the two years preceding his appointment as governor-general his attention must have been specially directed to Indian subjects.

The Earl of Mornington sailed from England on the 9th of November, 1797, and arrived at Madras in April, 1798. Here

his administration may be said to have commenced in the settlement of a disputed succession in Tanjore, but as the final decision was not at this time announced, nor the arrangements consequent upon it, the details must in the meantime be deferred. On the 18th of May the governor-general arrived at Calcutta, and lost no time in entering upon his duties. In order to understand their nature, and form a judgment on the manner in which he discharged them, it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the state of affairs, both within the British territories and the principal adjoining states. The nominal limits of the Bengal presidency did not differ much from what they were after the grant of the diwani obtained by Clive. The only extension of any consequence was in the north-west, where the zamindari of Benaras, including also that of Ghazipur, was acquired during the administration of Mr. Hastings, and the fortress of Allahabad during that of Lord Teignmouth. These acquisitions had previously belonged to Oudh, which was now so entirely dependent on the British government, that the presidency might now be held virtually to include it within its limits. In the Bombay presidency, where Mr. Duncan had for some time been governor, the boundaries had fluctuated greatly within a recent period. It promised at one time to extend far to the north, and had appropriated a considerable tract of territory, or at least a large amount of territorial revenue in Gujarat, but the unfortunate Maratha war had stripped it of all its conquests, and driven it back nearly to its ancient limits, leaving it little more than the two islands of Bombay and Salsette. The last war with Tipu had, however, more than compensated it for all its losses, by obtaining for it a large territory stretching southward along the Malabar coast, and eastward to the table-land of Mysore. The presidency of Madras, now governed by Lord Clive, obtained a large accession of territory when his lordship's father, the true founder of our Indian empire, induced the Mughul to make a full cession to the Company of the Northern Circars. About the same time a considerable tract of territory had been procured from the Nabob of Arcot under the name of a *jaghir*. Neither the Circars nor the *jaghir* could be said to be held in absolute property, since, by a humiliating arrangement, tribute was paid for the one

to the Nizam, and the very name of the other implied that it had been accepted as a grant from a superior. The case was different with the two important tracts of territory which had been added to the presidency by the curtailment of Mysore, and which had the double advantage of belonging to the Company absolutely and adding to the security of the Carnatic frontier. In addition to these territories the whole nabobship of Arcot and rajaship of Tanjore might be considered as included within the presidency, since, in time of war, the whole of their revenues were managed by the Company, and nothing remained in order to make their possession complete, but a similar power of management in time of peace.

The leading powers with which the Company were in immediate contact, without having established any decided ascendancy over them, were Tipu, the Marathas, and the Nizam. It soon appeared that Marquis Cornwallis was too sanguine when he expressed the belief that, by depriving Tipu of half his territories, and exacting a large sum as the expenses of the war, he had so effectually crippled his resources as to render him incapable of again disturbing the peace of India. Nothing but the anxious desire of recovering his sons, who were detained as hostages, had induced him to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, and he had repeatedly shown, even while fulfilling them, how determined he was again to measure swords with the British, and at once repair the loss and wipe off the disgrace which he had sustained at their hands. During the negotiations which preceded the treaty, he had tried to shake the fidelity of the two native confederates, and the moment it was concluded he endeavoured to conclude arrangements with the Marathas, with the view, first of destroying the Nizam, and then making a combined attack on the British settlements. So eagerly was he watching his opportunity, that in 1797, when Ali Jah, the Nizam's son, rebelled, he immediately assembled an army on the frontier for the purpose of assisting in the rebellion, and was only deterred when he learned that a British force was marching to counteract his designs. It afterwards appeared that on this occasion he had actually stipulated with Ali Jah for the cession of all the Nizam's dominions south of the Tungabhadra and Krishna. His schemes

for the expulsion of the British from India took a still more visible shape in 1796, when, after corresponding with the ministers of Zeman Shah, through his agents at Delhi, he sent a secret embassy to him at Kabul, with a plan which he had sketched out for expelling all infidels and re-establishing Muhammedan ascendancy in India. But the most decided evidence of Tipu's determination to renew hostilities was furnished by his intercourse with the French.

Tipu had heard of the successes of the French in the revolutionary war, and by direct communication with the Isle of France, had been assured of direct assistance in any struggle into which he might enter with the British. While elated by these promises, he learned that a French privateer which had arrived at Mangalore, apparently in a disabled state, as if to obtain repairs, was commanded by a person of the name of Ripaud, who, in conversation with Ghulam Ali, the *mir-e-zem*, or lord of admiralty, represented that he was high in office in the Mauritius, and had by special instruction touched at Mangalore, for the purpose of ascertaining Tipu's wishes regarding the co-operation of a force which was ready to sail and unite with him for the expulsion of the common enemy. Ripaud was accordingly sent forward to Seringapatam and admitted to several interviews. Tipu appears to have suspected that the pretended envoy was an impostor, but thought it possible, notwithstanding, to turn his services to account, and therefore proposed, while retaining him in his assumed character, but ostensibly as a servant, to purchase his ship, lade it with merchandise for the Isle of France, and send confidential agents for the purpose of making arrangements respecting the desired armament. After forming this resolution, Tipu as usual consulted his principal counsellors, who strongly endeavoured to dissuade him from it, "From first to last," they say, "the language of this man has been that of self-interest and falsehood; nothing has resulted from this business, and nothing can." They afterwards add, "The object of this state will be better effected than by relying on the agency of this compound of air and water." The advice was good, but Tipu contenting himself with his usual remark, "Whatever is the will of God, that will be accomplished," took his own way. The vessel was purchased for

17,000 rupees, which were handed over to a Frenchman, called by the natives Pernore (apparently a corruption of Pernaud), who was to pay the amount at the Mauritius, agreeably to Ripaud's instructions. Ripaud himself was to remain at Tipu's court as French ambassador. The other officers of the ship were to navigate her, and to be accompanied by four envoys in the assumed character of merchants. One of these was to return with the fleet and army expected; the other three, after seeing the conclusion of the negotiations at the Mauritius, were to proceed as ambassadors to the executive directory at Paris. The four envoys, and Pernore in possession of the money, set out in April, 1797, from Seringapatam, to embark for Mangalore. The night after they reached it Pernore and three others absconded in a boat with the 17,000 rupees and were never more heard of. The expedient now fallen upon was to restore the vessel to Ripaud, after making him give bond for the price which had been paid for her, and send him along with the envoys, who were reduced to two. The vessel, which, owing to the delay caused by these new arrangements, did not sail till October, had scarcely got to sea, when Ripaud, collecting his European part of the crew, came up to the envoys and insisted on seeing the letters addressed to the authorities at the Mauritius. On being refused, he took them by force. Their contents probably satisfied him that he had nothing to fear, as he continued the voyage and arrived at Port Louis on the 19th of January, 1798.

Though the mission was intended to be secret, and in a great measure depended on secrecy for its success, General Malartic, the governor of the Mauritius, immediately resolved to give the envoys a public reception. Accompanied by the admiral and all the constituted authorities, he received them under the customary salutes, and conducted them between a double line of troops to the government house. Here they formally delivered their despatches and then proceeded to the mansion appointed for their residence. The despatches contained the project of a treaty with the Mauritius government. Assuming that a large army, consisting of 5,000 to 10,000 European French and 20,000 to 30,000 Africans, was actually prepared, they proposed that at a rendezvous to be fixed, it should be

joined by 60,000 Mysoreans. Goa was first to be wrested from the Portuguese, and Bombay from the British, and given over to the French. From the west, the united armies were to be transported to the Coromandel coast, to raze Madras. This accomplished, they were to subdue the Marathas and the Nizam, and conclude with the conquest of Bengal. The day after their arrival, the envoys had the mortification to learn that all Ripaud's representations were false, that no armament for Indian service had arrived, or was expected. The only thing the governor proposed, was to despatch two frigates with Tipu's letter in duplicate for the directory, requesting the desired succour, and in the meanwhile raise a corps of volunteers in the Mauritius and Bourbon. The envoys remonstrated against this last proposal, declaring that they could not return with a small force, as they had only been deputed to bring a large one. Disregarding the remonstrances of the envoys, and all injunctions to secrecy, Malartic ordered an advertisement to be published, and on the 30th of January 1798, issued a formal proclamation to the effect that Tipu Sultan had sent ambassadors to his government and the directory, with proposals to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and only waited the arrival of French troops to declare war against the English. The envoys, after resisting this publicity, acquiesced in it, and not only allowed the published advertisement, which called upon the citizens to range under the banners of Tipu, to be publicly distributed at their residence, but encouraged volunteers to accompany them, under the promise that their pay would be regulated by the Sultan himself.

It is difficult to account for the absurd part which Governor Malartic played throughout these proceedings. Though aware that the mission from Tipu had proceeded on false information, and that for this reason secrecy, even if it had not been enjoined him, was absolutely necessary, he took the measures above detailed to render secrecy impossible, and then, as if he had supposed that the British government could still be kept in ignorance, he informs Tipu, in a letter, that he had laid an embargo on all the vessels in Port Louis until the departure of the ambassadors and recruits, "lest the English, our common enemy, should be apprised of the part which you seem deter-

mined to adopt with regard to them, and of the supply of men I have sent you." This supply of men, of which the British were to be kept in ignorance, amounted to exactly ninety-nine, civil and military officers included. They were embarked with the envoys in a French frigate, and landed at Mangalore on the 26th of April, 1798, about the very same time when Lord Mornington landed at Madras.

It was in Tipu's power to have disavowed the proceedings of Malartic and the envoys, and thus furnished himself with plausible ground for postponing an open rupture with the British, at least till he was better prepared for it. So far from this, he only hastened to commit himself more deeply. The moment he heard of the arrival of the vessel, he was all impatience till his motley group of recruits reached Seringapatam. One of their first employments was to organize a Jacobin club under the sanction of *Citizen Tipu*; the tree of liberty was planted; and at a grand ceremony, in which Citizen Tipu performed the principal part, the national colours of the sister republic were consecrated under a salute from all the guns of the fort. "Of any comprehension of the purport or tendency of all these proceedings," says Colonel Wilks, "the Sultan was so entirely innocent that he fancied himself to be consolidating one of those associations devoted to his own aggrandisement, by which his imagination had lately been captivated in the history of the Arabian Wahabis." He understood better what he was doing when, a few weeks afterwards, he associated a French sea captain of the name of Dubuc, claiming to have come as commander of the naval forces, with two of his own envoys, and sent them on a joint embassy to the executive directory.

Such being the relation in which Tipu stood to the British government, it is obvious that when Lord Mornington entered on office war was already declared. It was so understood by his lordship, who accordingly held that an immediate attack upon Tipu Sultan, for the purpose of frustrating the execution of his unprovoked and unwarrantable projects of ambition and revenge, was demanded by the soundest maxims of justice and policy. In a minute, lodged on the 12th of August, 1798, within three months from the commencement of his administration, after giving a full detail of all the above proceedings, he arrived at

the following conclusion:—"Having thus entered into offensive and defensive engagements with the enemy—having proceeded to collect, in conjunction with the enemy, a force openly destined to act against the possessions of the Company—having avowed through his public ambassadors, that he has completed his preparations of war for the express purpose of attempting the entire subversion of the British empire in India—and having declared that he only waits to prosecute offensive operations, Tipu Sultan has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between him and the Company, and has committed an act of direct hostility against the British government in India." In this conclusion he had been to some extent anticipated by the authorities at home, who, in a letter written in June, 1798, had thus acquainted him with their views:—"Our empire in the East has ever been an object of jealousy to the French; we have no doubt that the present government of France would even adopt measures of a most enterprising and uncommon nature for the chance of reducing the British power and consequence in India. We recommend energy, promptness, and decision. Do not wait for actual hostilities on the part of Tipu, should he have entered into a league with the French." He would not have waited for this sanction to the commencement of hostilities, but there were circumstances which obliged him most reluctantly to postpone them till the ensuing season.

Lord Mornington's determination was "to attack Tipu with every degree of practicable despatch," and the objects at which he proposed to aim are thus enumerated by himself in the above minute:—"1. To seize the whole maritime territory remaining in his possession below the Ghats, on the coast of Malabar, in order to preclude him from all future communications by sea with his French allies. 2. By marching the army from the coast directly upon his capital, to compel him to purchase peace by a formal cession of the territory seized on the coast of Malabar. 3. To compel him to defray our whole expense in the war, and thus to secure the double advantage of indemnifying us for the expense occasioned by his aggression, and of reducing his resources with a view to our future security. 4. To compel him to admit permanent residents at his court from us and from our allies: a measure which would enable us

at all times to check his operations and his treachery. 5. That the expulsion of all the natives of France now in his service, and the perpetual exclusion of all Frenchmen, both from his army and dominions, should be made conditions of any treaty of peace with him." In order to carry these views into effect, he directed that the army upon the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and at Bombay, should be immediately assembled, expecting that a single campaign would bring the war to a successful termination. On inquiry, however, the military authorities gave their decided opinion that though the ultimate success of the plan proposed could scarcely be doubted, it could not be effected, in all probability, without a tedious, expensive, and protracted war. Radical defects existed in the military establishments on the coast of Coromandel. In the opinion of Colonel Close, the adjutant-general, the Madras army was not capable of defending the Company's territories, much less of carrying on offensive operations in a country like Mysore; even for the purpose of defence it could not move before the spring of 1799. This opinion was concurred in by General Harris, the commander-in-chief. The Madras council gave a still more unfavourable opinion, and even deprecated the ordinary precautions of defence "lest they should draw down the resentment of the Sultan upon our unprotected possessions."

In consequence of these opinions, "the question," says Lord Mornington in the minute already quoted, "was now entirely changed; the plan which I originally had in contemplation was nothing more than a military expedition of short duration, of no heavy expense, and of certain success; with the additional advantage that success would certainly exonerate our finances, and throw the whole expense of the undertaking upon the enemy who had provoked it. But it now appeared that I could not hope to effect any of my proposed objects without encountering the expense and inconvenience of a long war." A short military expedition might have been undertaken by the British troops single-handed, but a long war could not be contemplated without securing the aid of the leading native states, whose troops, if not available as regulars, might greatly assist in facilitating supplies of provision. The first step therefore which now seemed necessary, was to attempt to revise the old, or to form

a new alliance with the Nizam and the Marathas. To this important task the governor-general forthwith devoted all his energies. As a preliminary measure, which promised to facilitate the negotiations on which he was about to enter, he instructed the Madras council to provide a force of 4,000 men, with the view of offering them as a subsidy to the Nizam. The fears of the council were again aroused, and instead of at once obeying the instructions thus given, they proceeded to argue against them, and even to obstruct the execution of them. In a letter, dated 10th July, 1798, they returned to their old allegation, that Tipu's "resources are more prompt than our own, and that a great part of his army is supposed to have long been in a state of field equipment." On this ground they counselled "ignoble ease," because, as they argued, Tipu, the moment he saw signs of preparations, would anticipate them and overrun the Carnatic. In other words, because Tipu possessed the ready means of attack, the British must not even venture to resort to means of defence. The disposal of their fate was in his hands, and they must be contented to exist by his sufferance. The pusillanimous spirit thus displayed, filled the governor-general with indignation, and when it manifested itself, in the shape of direct opposition to his instructions, he had no toleration for it. "This opposition," he says, "I am resolved to crush; I have sufficient powers to do so, and I will exert those powers to the extreme point of their extent, rather than suffer the smallest particle of my plans for the public service to be frustrated by such unworthy means." These words occur in a letter to General Harris, complimenting him on his "honourable firmness" in refusing to yield to this opposition. In a public letter to the Madras council, the supreme government, adverting to the same subject, wrote as follows:—"If we thought proper to enter with you into any discussion of the policy of our late orders, we might refer you to the records of your own government, which furnish more than one example of the fatal consequences of neglecting to keep pace with the forwardness of the enemy's equipments, and of resting the defence of the Carnatic, in such a crisis as the present, upon any other security than a state of early and active preparation for war." This firmness at once suppressed all idea of resistance, and the orders of the

governor-general, understood to be peremptory, were henceforth implicitly obeyed.

The position of the Nizam about this period has been already adverted to. By the refusal to give him the guarantee to which he considered himself entitled under the treaty of 1790, and leaving him to his fate when about to be overwhelmed by the Marathas, his relations with the British became so unfriendly that he requested the withdrawal of the detachment with which they had furnished him, and endeavoured to provide for his security by organizing a large body of infantry, under the command of M. Raymond and other French officers. The Bengal government, when too late, began to see the result of the pusillanimous policy which they had pursued, and endeavoured to retrace their steps by hastening to send back the detachment when earnestly requested by the Nizam, in consequence of the rebellion of his son, Ali Jah. The relations between the two courts thus began once more to wear a friendly aspect, but the Nizam, who had already been brought to the brink of destruction by the Marathas, and compelled to submit to the humiliating treaty of Kardla, naturally clung to the force which he had found most available in his time of need, and continued to strengthen himself by additional levies of French troops. There had thus grown up in the very heart of the Nizam's dominions a new power, known to be decidedly hostile to British interests, and prepared to assist in any enterprise by which revolutionary France might secure a footing in India. It was hence obvious that no dependence could be placed on any alliance with the Nizam until his French connections were dissolved. Considering this, therefore, as an essential preliminary, Lord Mornington proposed to increase the British subsidy to such an amount as would enable the Nizam entirely to dispense with Raymond's corps. Fortunately there were several circumstances which secured for this proposal a more favourable reception than could otherwise have been anticipated. Raymond had recently died, and been succeeded in his command by one Perron, who very imperfectly supplied his place. Some of his proceedings had given umbrage to the Nizam, and made him apprehensive that, instead of continuing to be his servants, they were aspiring to be his masters. These

feelings in the Nizam were kept alive by his minister, Azim-ul-Umara, who, on his release by the Marathas, to whom he had been delivered as an hostage, had regained all his former influence, and was employing it in favour of a British alliance which he had always zealously advocated.

Availing himself of these favourable circumstances, Lord Mornington succeeded, after some demur on the part of the Nizam, in obtaining his consent to a negotiation for the dismissal of the French corps, and an increase of the British subsidiary force, together with a guarantee against any future aggression on the part of the Marathas. A regular treaty to this effect was accordingly concluded on the 1st of September, 1798, increasing the British subsidiary force to six battalions, to be paid for at the rate of 201,425 rupees per month, or £241,710 per annum, pledging the Nizam to the disbanding of the French corps, and guaranteeing him against any unjust or unreasonable demands of the Marathas. As soon as this treaty was signed, no time was lost in acting upon it. Four British battalions which had been assembled on the Nizam's frontier immediately marched to Hyderabad, and uniting with the two battalions already there, completed the stipulated number. The disbanding of the French corps was immediately demanded by Major Kirkpatrick, the resident. The Nizam, and even Azim-ul-Umara, demurred and begged delay. Their only motive was fear. The French were 14,000 strong, and the issue of a contest with them, should they offer resistance, might be doubtful. The resident, acting under the peremptory orders of the governor-general, declared that at that advanced stage of matters he had no alternative but to insist on the complete execution of the stipulations of the treaty. The interests of the British government, he said, might be seriously compromised by any delay, however short, after the resolution to disband had been announced, and therefore, should the Nizam continue wavering, he would himself authorize an attack on the French camp, and hold him responsible for the consequences. Captain (afterwards Sir) John Malcolm, then assistant to the resident at Hyderabad, had an important share in the management of this business, in which firmness and tact were equally required, and gave proof of the ability which ultimately made him so distinguished an ornament of the Indian service.

On the 9th of October, 1798, the detachment of four battalions under Colonel Roberts, arrived in the vicinity of Hyderabad, and on the same day the French corps joined their cantonments. Both forces were on the right bank of the Musy, and Azim-ul-Umara, afraid of a collision, begged Colonel Roberts to cross over to the left bank, where the two battalions were already stationed. He refused, and the Nizam, listening only to his fears, hastened off to his fortress of Golkunda. Meanwhile the French put on a bold front, and the *paga*, or household horse, whose commander was in their interest was, ordered to the capital. On the 19th, the resident having learned, at an interview with the minister, that the disinclination to disband the French corps was stronger than ever, made instant arrangements for the attack. Colonel Hyndman, in command of the two battalions on the left bank, was moved to a position from which he could open a destructive fire on their rear, and set fire with hot shot to their storehouses and magazines, and Colonel Roberts was about to occupy some heights, favourably situated for attacking their centre. The Nizam had now no alternative but to fulfil the treaty, or make common cause with the French. The former was preferred, not so much from good faith as because it was seen to be the safer course. Orders were given to dismiss the French officers, and deliver them up to the British government as prisoners of war, and the troops under them were informed that if they ventured to support them, they would be considered and punished as traitors. Perron, as soon as he received the order for dismissal, intimated to the resident that he and his officers were desirous to throw themselves on his protection, and begged that an officer might be sent to the French lines to take charge of articles of public and private property. Captain Malcolm, who proceeded on this errand, made a narrow escape. Before he arrived, a mutiny had broken out, and he fell into the hands of the mutineers. Fortunately, some men, who, four years before, had belonged to his company in the 29th battalion of native infantry, but had since joined the French corps, which was composed in a great measure of deserters, interfered in his behalf, and, as he believed, saved his life "by their active and spirited exertions." During the whole of the 21st, the French lines were a scene of disorder and tumult.

The officers made their escape by night, and at daylight of the 22nd the men of their corps were surrounded. Before evening the whole were disarmed, without the loss of a single life.

Negotiations with the Marathas were carried on at the same time as with the Nizam. This formed, indeed, an essential part of Lord Mornington's plan, which was to revive the tripartite treaty of 1790, accompanying it with such provisions and guarantees as its previous premature dissolution had shown to be necessary. Owing to the distracted state of Maharashtra, the negotiation did not succeed. A number of chiefs, nominally subject to the peshwa, but really independent, or aspiring to independence, could not be brought to act with any degree of unity, and the proposal of a treaty, which would have authorized British interference in any disputes arising between the Marathas and the Nizam, was distinctly declined. It was well known that the peshwa himself, who was subjected to a species of thralldom from which he was anxious to be emancipated, would have given a different decision, but the influence of Daulat Rao Sindhia, who, following out the latest policy of his immediate predecessor, was inimical to British interests, had prevailed. It was not likely, however, that when so many jarring interests were to be reconciled, the Maratha chiefs would unite in support of Tipu, and it was therefore determined vigorously to prosecute the war against him.

While engaged in these negotiations, the governor-general had never intermitted his military operations. He was, however, by no means averse to an amicable arrangement, and could he have obtained such concessions as would disengage Tipu from his French connections, and guarantee the abandonment of all his aggressive schemes, he would very gladly have dispensed with the necessity of war. In accordance with this feeling, when Tipu wrote complaining of an infringement of his rights by the occupation of some villages by the Raja of Coorg, his lordship immediately ordered those to which Tipu's right seemed established to be restored. At a later period he informed him of the great naval victory gained by Lord Nelson, off the coast of Egypt; and in answer to a letter from Tipu, who thought the time for professing friendship was not yet past, he answered him in a similar spirit, telling him of the sincere satisfaction he

felt on learning that Tipu had appointed two persons of honour to confer with the deputies appointed by his orders to investigate the question concerning some disputed taluks, and assuring him that possession of them will not be withholden from him for an instant, if the justice of his claim should be established. This letter was written on the 8th of November, 1798, and shows that, even at this period, though he held that Tipu had taken steps equivalent to a declaration of war, he was still desirous that peace should be maintained. Accordingly, in the same letter, he thus addresses him:—"It is impossible that you should suppose me ignorant of the intercourse which subsists between you and the French, whom you know to be the inveterate enemies of the Company, and to be now engaged in an unjust war with the British nation. You cannot imagine me to be indifferent to the transactions which have passed between you and the enemies of my country; nor does it appear proper or necessary that I should any longer conceal from you the surprise and concern with which I have perceived you disposed to involve yourself in all the ruinous consequences of a connection which threatens not only to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the Company, but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion, to shake your own authority, to weaken the obedience of your subjects, and to destroy the religion which you revere." In this letter, after stating, perhaps from a desire to make it more impressive, but certainly not with strict accuracy, that the peshwa and the Nizam concurred in the observations contained in it, Lord Mornington professed to communicate "on behalf of the Company and their allies, a plan calculated to promote the mutual security and welfare of all parties," and to depute to him for this purpose Major Doveton, the officer, it will be remembered, from whose hands Tipu received his sons who had been detained as hostages. The letter concluded thus:—"You will, I doubt not, let me know at what time and place it will be convenient for you to receive Major Doveton, and as soon as your friendly letter shall reach me, I will direct him to proceed to your presence. I shall expect your answer to this letter, with an earnest hope that it may correspond with the pacific views and wishes of the allies,

and that you may be convinced that you cannot, in any manner, better consult your true interests than by meeting with cordiality the present friendly and moderate advance to a satisfactory and amicable settlement of all points on which any doubts or anxiety may have arisen in the minds either of yourself or of the allies."

No answer having been received from Tipu, Lord Mornington wrote him, referring to his letter of the 8th November, as containing a variety of important points to which his highness would no doubt perceive the propriety and necessity of giving his earliest and most serious consideration, and informing him that he was on the point of setting out from Calcutta for Madras, where he hoped to arrive about the same time that this letter reached him. His lordship concluded thus:—"Should any circumstances hitherto have prevented your answering my last letter of the 8th November, I assure myself that you will, immediately on receipt of this, despatch a satisfactory reply to it, addressed to me at Madras." On the 15th December, a letter dated 20th November was received from Tipu. Being apparently written before Lord Mornington's letter of the 8th November had reached him, it commenced abruptly, thus:—"It has lately come to my ears from report, that in consequence of the talk of interested persons, military preparations are on foot. Report is equally subject to the likelihood of being true or false. I have the fullest confidence that the present is without foundation." After more to the same purpose, he concludes with declaring that his "friendly heart is to the last degree bent on endeavours to confirm and strengthen the foundations of harmony and union." This brief letter was followed by a very long one, which was received only ten days later, and not only referred to Lord Mornington's letter of the 8th November, but made large quotations from it, and discussed some of the points which it raised. His explanation of the expedition to Mauritius is a good specimen of the enormous lying to which he had recourse whenever a purpose was to be served by it. "In this *sircar* (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe who employ themselves in trading by sea and land; their agents purchased a two-masted vessel, and having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It happened that she went to the

Mauritius, from whence forty persons, French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment; such as chose to take service were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of this sircar (the gift of God), and the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship to put about reports, with a view to ruffle the minds of both sircars." In another part of the letter, he says that as he is "resident at home, at times taking the air, and at others amusing myself with hunting, at a spot which is used as a pleasure-ground," his lordship's allusion to "war," and his declaration that "prudence required that both the Company and their allies should adopt certain measures of precaution and self-defence," had given him the greatest surprise. Since "it has been understood, by the blessing of the Almighty, at the conclusion of the peace, the treaties and engagements entered into among the four sircars were so firmly established and confirmed as ever to remain fixed and durable, and be an example to the rulers of the age," he cannot even imagine how there can be any occasion to send Major Doveton to him. He concludes thus:—"I have the strongest hope that the minds of the wise and intelligent, but particularly of the four states, will not be sullied by doubts and jealousies, but will consider me from my heart desirous of harmony and friendship."

The above letter from Tipu was answered by Lord Mornington on the 9th of January, 1799. It was dated from Madras, where his lordship had arrived on the 31st of December, and entered into a full detail of all the proceedings by which the Company and their allies were alarmed and aggrieved. From the facts detailed, seven distinct conclusions were drawn, of which the two last were as follows:—"7. That your highness was prepared to make an unprovoked attack upon the Company's possessions, if you had obtained from the French the effectual succour which you had solicited through your ambassadors. 8. That your highness, by these several acts, has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between your highness and the allies." Still, notwithstanding all these provocations, the Company and their allies were "ready to renew and confirm

the bonds of amity, on such conditions as shall preclude the continuance of those jealousies which must subsist, so long as a final and satisfactory adjustment of all causes of suspicion shall be delayed." The letter concluded thus:—"Had your highness received Major Doveton, that gentleman would have explained to your highness how this advantageous arrangement is to be obtained. The allies being always anxious to enter into this friendly explanation with your highness, I once more call upon your highness, in the most serious and solemn manner, to assent to the admission of Major Doveton, as a measure which I am confident would be productive of the most lasting advantages to all parties. I trust that your highness will favour me with a friendly letter in reply to this; and I most earnestly request that your reply may not be deferred for more than one day after this letter. Dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs." To this letter, Lord Mornington appended a Persian translation of the manifesto issued by the Ottoman Porte against the French for their invasion of Egypt.

On the 16th of January, Lord Mornington again wrote Tipu, and transmitted a letter addressed to him by the Turkish sultan, for the purpose of dissuading him from his French connections. His answer to the governor-general was as follows:—"I have been much gratified by the receipt of your lordship's two friendly letters, the first brought by a camel-man, and the latter by hircarrahs, and understood their contents. The letter of the prince in station like Jumshied with angels as his guards, with troops numerous as the stars, the sun illuminating the world, the heaven of empire and dominion, the luminary giving splendour to the universe, the firmament of glory and power, the sultan of the sea and the land, the King of Rome, (be his empire and his power perpetual!) addressed to me which reached you through the British envoy, and which you transmitted, has arrived. Being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding on a hunting excursion. You will be pleased to despatch Major Doveton (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written) slightly attended." This letter, received on the 13th of February, closed the correspondence on Tipu's part, and was briefly answered on the 22nd, the governor-general simply intimating regret that his friendly

warnings had not been attended to. The season for action had now arrived, the army had been ordered to advance, and Major Doveton's mission would now be useless; but General Harris, the commander of the British troops, had been authorized to receive any embassy that might be sent to him, and to form a new treaty of friendship "founded on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace." On the same day when this letter was written, a manifesto was issued, entitled, "Declaration of the Right Honourable the Governor-general in council for all the Forces and Affairs of the British nation in India, on behalf of the Honourable the East India Company, and the Allies of the said Company, the Nizam and the Peshwa." Composed in the grandiloquent style to which the governor-general was rather too much addicted, it enumerated all Tipu's delinquencies and evasions, boasted that "the providence of God and the victorious arms of the British nation frustrated his vain hopes, and checked the presumptuous career of the French in Egypt, at the moment when he anxiously expected their arrival on the coast of Malabar," spoke of "the happy intelligence of the glorious success of the British fleet at the mouth of the Nile," and declared that the allies, while "equally prepared to repel his violence and counteract his artifices and delays," still retained "an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with Tipu Sultan."

It is not out of place to mention that Tipu, though he failed to obtain direct assistance from the French, was not forgotten by them, and that at the very time when he was corresponding with the governor-general, the following singular letter was addressed to him:—

"FRENCH REPUBLIC.

"Liberty.

Equality.

"Bonaparte, Member of the National Convention, General-in-chief, to the most magnificent Sultan, our greatest Friend, Tipu Sahib.

"Headquarters at Cairo, 7th Pluvoire, 7th year of the Republic, One and Indivisible.

"You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible

army, full of the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England. I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the desire I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation. I would even wish you could send me some intelligent person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I may confer. May the Almighty increase your power, and destroy your enemies. (Signed) BONAPARTE."

The above letter having been intercepted did not reach its destination, but other letters written in a similar spirit were undoubtedly received, and furnish the most plausible explanation of the comparative indifference which Tipu continued to manifest to all the warnings which were given him by the governor-general. He seems to have expected that powerful foreign armaments were about to arrive, which would so completely overmatch his enemies as to leave him little more to do than to look on and witness their destruction. Very possibly, too, he was misled by the very style which the governor-general adopted in all his letters. He spoke of himself and his allies as if they were all acting in concert, and he had agreed not to take a single step without their concurrence. Were this the case, Tipu might well calculate that a long period must elapse before he was actually attacked, because he was at this very time in close communication with the Marathas, and knew that so far from joining the governor-general, they were more likely to take the field against him. The only other hypothesis which might be adopted to explain Tipu's apparent indifference, would be to assume that he was unconscious of having given any just cause of offence, and therefore could not believe that he was in any immediate danger. This hypothesis however, though it has found supporters, is totally at variance with fact. Tipu knew well how deeply he had offended, but as he had offended as deeply on other occasions without being called to account, he perhaps inferred that he would again escape with impunity. He did not know, or at least did not attach sufficient importance to the fact, that British India was no longer administered by a governor-general who endeavoured to avert danger by winking at it, but by one who disdained this timid policy, and ever followed the wiser

course of anticipating danger, instead of allowing it to overtake him.

All hopes of an amicable settlement being now extinguished, the campaign immediately commenced. The main army under General Harris had assembled in January, 1799, at Vellore, and made its first march towards Mysore, on the 11th of February. It consisted in all of 36,979 men. Of these 20,802 formed the Madras army, in which the cavalry amounted to 2,635, and the infantry to 15,076; the remainder were artillerymen and pioneers. Of the cavalry 884, of the infantry 4,381, and of the artillerymen 608 were Europeans. The Nizam's army, nominally commanded by Mir Alam, but really by the Honourable Colonel Wellesley (Duke of Wellington), who had joined it with his own regiment, consisted of the subsidiary detachment of 6,536 men under Colonel Dalrymple, 3,621 infantry, formerly French, under Captain Malcolm, and about 6,000 regular and irregular horse. The united army proceeded south-west to Carimangalam, which was reached on the 28th. About the same time, the Bombay army of 6,420 men, which had assembled under the command of General Stuart, began to ascend the Western Ghats. On the 25th of February it reached the head of the Pudukhram Pass, and on the 2nd of March took post at Sedasir, only forty-five miles west of Seringapatam. The main army proceeding up the pass of Palicode, arrived on the 4th of March at Ryacotta on Tipu's frontier, and crossing it without opposition, encamped on the 9th at Kelamangalam, about eighty miles east of his capital. In addition to the main and the Bombay armies, two adequate detachments were stationed for the purpose of collecting and forwarding supplies; the one in the district of Coimbatore, under Colonel Brown, and the other in Baramahal, under Colonel Read. A British squadron under Admiral Ramier scoured the western coast, for the purpose of intercepting any armament that might have been fitted out by the French.

As the nearest route to Seringapatam led through a pass which had not been examined, General Harris proceeded northwards past Anicul. Parties of the enemy's horse were now seen in all directions, burning the forage and destroying the villages. On the 14th, the main army encamped at the village of

Cullagerapetta, about ten miles south, and within sight of Bangalore. It was expected that, before this time, Tipu would have appeared in force, and opposed further progress. He was elsewhere employed. On the 6th of March, when only the right brigade of the Bombay army, composed of three native battalions under Colonel Montresor, had reached Sadasir, the remainder being stationed in two divisions in the rear, at the distances of eight and twelve miles, Tipu, having crossed into the territories of the Raja of Coorg, suddenly made his appearance, in the hope of surprising the brigade, and destroying it by overwhelming numbers. He very nearly succeeded. Penetrating with secrecy and expedition through the jungles, he commenced an attack on front and rear almost at the same instant. The brigade was in fact completely surrounded, and was only saved by its own distinguished gallantry in maintaining the unequal struggle until it could be reinforced. Ultimately Tipu was driven off, with an estimated loss of 1,500 men, while that of the British amounted only to twenty-nine killed, ninety-eight wounded, and sixteen missing. The disgrace must have been felt by him still more severely than the loss, for 11,800 of his best troops had been repulsed by little more than 2,000. Two native accounts of this battle are extant, the one by the celebrated Raja of Coorg, the other by Tipu himself. They are both sufficiently characteristic, though, as might be expected, they differ widely. The raja, writing to the governor-general, says, "A severe action then ensued, in which I was present. To describe the battle which General Stuart fought with these two regiments of Europeans, the discipline, valour, strength, and magnanimity of the troops, the courageous attack upon the army of Tipu surpasses all example in this world. In our Shastras and Puranas, the battles fought by Allered and Maharat have been much celebrated, but they are unequal to this battle. It exceeds my ability to describe this action at length to your lordship. In this manner Tipu's army was beaten. The action with the two regiments lasted about three hours and a half. A sirdar of high rank with Tipu, the Benky Nabob, fell in this action; the first and second bakshis of a body of 6,000 men, being wounded with musket-balls, were taken prisoners; I have also heard that five or six officers of rank with the enemy have

fallen; many of the enemy were slain, and many wounded; the remainder having thrown away their muskets and swords, and their turbans, and thinking it sufficient to save their lives, fled in the greatest confusion. Tipu, having collected the remains of his troops, returned to Periapatam." Tipu's account, contained in a memorandum in his own handwriting, is as follows:—"On Wednesday, the 30th, or last day of the month Razy, of the Shadeb, 1226 from the birth of Muhammed, corresponding with the 29th of Ramzan (when the moon is not visible), the victorious army having left their baggage at Periapatam, and formed themselves into three divisions or detachments, entered the woods of Coorg by three different roads, where the army of the Christians had taken post, and advancing, gave battle, fighting with firelocks and spears, and the whole army of the infidels was routed, some of the Christians taking to flight. In that battle, Muhammed Reza and Muhammed Miran devoted themselves, and drank the cup of martyrdom; Mirza Bakir Bakshi, and Muhammed Ichangir, Bakshi Asiff of Cucherri, became martyrs; and Moazim Khan Bakshi was wounded and taken prisoner by the Christians, and Golam Mohi-ud-din devoted himself a martyr."

Tipu, quitting Periapatam, arrived at Seringapatam on the 14th of March, and immediately moved to encounter General Harris, who, continuing to advance, encamped on the 26th, five miles east of Malavilly, and not more than thirty miles east of the capital. The spies reported that Tipu had announced his intention to attack the English "so soon as they ventured out of the jungles." This information seemed to be correct, for his advanced parties, among which were some elephants, appeared on a distant ridge, and fourteen or fifteen guns were distinctly seen in motion. On the 27th five regiments of cavalry, forming the advance under General Floyd, on approaching within a mile of the village of Malavilly, discovered a numerous body of the enemy's cavalry on the right flank, and their infantry on the heights beyond. It was evidently Tipu's army, but as it kept at too great a distance to be brought to action, General Harris ordered the quartermaster-general to mark out a new encampment. This was scarcely finished when twelve or fourteen guns opened from the enemy's line, at the

distance of about 2,000 yards. This cannonade was answered by such of the field-pieces as could be brought up, and the action soon became general along the whole front. The enemy displayed much courage. After several repulses, a column of about 2,000 men moved forward in excellent order towards his majesty's 33rd. The regiment reserving its fire, received that of the enemy at the distance of sixty yards, and then advancing threw the column into disorder. At this, General Floyd with his cavalry charged and completed the rout with great slaughter. The whole of the British line now moved forward and drove the enemy's first line back upon his second, but his movements were too rapid to give any hope of overtaking him, and the pursuit was abandoned. The enemy's loss amounted to 1,000 killed and wounded; ours was trifling.

The British army on the 28th moved south-west towards Sosilay, where there is an easy ford over the Cauvery. This route not having been suspected by the enemy had not been devastated, and hence all the villages and even open fields furnished large supplies of forage. Sosilay, in particular, where the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages had taken refuge, was found to contain large quantities of grain and twelve to fifteen thousand head of cattle, besides a great number of sheep and goats. The right wing of the army, the cavalry, and Colonel Wellesley's division still remained encamped on the north bank, but the rest of the army crossed at Sosilay into a country which had all its stores untouched, as Tipu had reserved them for the consumption of his own army. This able movement had other advantages. It facilitated the junction with the Bombay army, and rendered nugatory all the intermediate defensive operations which the enemy had employed, under the impression that the attack would be made, as in 1792, from the north side of the river. On the 30th, the portion of the army which had remained on the north side also crossed, and the march westward was continued without further interruption. At length, on the 5th of April, the army took up its ground opposite the west face of the fort of Seringapatam, at the distance of about two miles. The position was admirably chosen. The right was on a high commanding ground, sloping gradually toward the Cauvery: the left resting on this river

was doubly secured by it, and by an aqueduct fifteen yards wide and six feet deep, which, fed by a dam built across the river near Caniambaddy, at once served as a strong entrenchment, and furnished an unfailing supply of the finest water. In the rear were several deep ravines impracticable for the enemy's cavalry; in front a chain of advanced posts on high ground afforded equal security.

Tipu, when he saw all his preparatory measures foiled by the advance of the besieging army along the south bank, is said to have sunk into absolute despondency. Calling together the whole of his principal officers he exclaimed, "We have arrived at our last stage; what is your determination?" They answered: "To die along with you." After a gloomy consultation, it was resolved, in the belief that General Harris would cross into the island by the southern fords, to cross at the ford of Arikeri, take up a strong position in the line of his presumed route, and give battle with no alternative but death or victory. The necessary movements were accordingly made, and Tipu was posted with his whole army at Chendgal waiting the decisive moment for action, when to his surprise and mortification the British army, instead of deviating to the right to reach the fords, made a turn to the left in order to avoid the intermediate low grounds, and so passed on at the distance of three miles, while he was unable to take any steps to prevent them.

The aqueduct already mentioned, after winding in front of the left of the British camp, continues in an easterly direction till within a mile of the fort, and then bends round to the south towards a woody eminence, called the Sultan Petta Tope. Behind the aqueduct on the town side was a lofty bank, and in front were several ruined villages and rocky eminences, affording cover to the enemy's infantry and rocket-men, so near the camp that many of the rockets fell among the tents, and occasioned some apprehension for the safety of the park of artillery stores. It was therefore resolved to attack these posts after sunset on the 5th of April. The troops appointed for this purpose were the king's 12th regiment and two sepoy battalions under Colonel Shaw, and another division consisting of the king's 33rd and the 2nd Bengal regiment under Colonel

Wellesley. The former division was to attack the forts at the aqueduct; the latter to make a diversion by scouring the Sultan Petta Tope. Colonel Shaw partially succeeded, but Colonel Wellesley failed. Next day, however, the attack was renewed with success, and a connected line of strong posts was in consequence established, extending for nearly two miles from the village of Sultan Petta to the river.

This success appears to have produced a considerable impression on Tipu, and induced him for the first time to open a communication with General Harris, who on the 9th of April received from him the following letter:—"The governor-general Lord Mornington Bahadur sent me a letter, copy of which is inclosed; you will understand it. I have adhered firmly to treaties; what, then, is the meaning of the advance of the English armies and the occurrence of hostilities? Inform me. What need I say more?" The general's answer was 'equally laconic:—"Your letter, inclosing copies of the governor-general's letter has been received. For the advance of the English and allied armies, and for the occurrence of hostilities, I refer you to the several letters of the governor-general, which are sufficiently explanatory on the subject. What need I say more?"

On the 6th of April, General Floyd had set out for Periapatam with four regiments of cavalry and the greater part of the left wing of the army, for the purpose of strengthening General Stuart and enabling him to advance. The whole of the Mysorean cavalry and a large body of infantry commanded by Kummer-ud-din followed close on General Floyd's track, determined if possible to frustrate his intention. They continued accordingly to hover around him, both before the junction and after it, but no opportunity was given them of making the least impression, and on the 14th of April, both General Floyd and General Stuart arrived with their united forces in the camp before Seringapatam. On the following day General Stuart crossed to the north bank of the river, and took up a position so as to enfilade the face of the fort intended for attack, and the exterior trenches or field works by which the enemy endeavoured to impede the progress of the siege.

The alternative of two plans of attack had been submitted by the chief engineer. The one was to assault at the south-west,

and the other at the north-west angle. In the one case it would be made from the west, and in the other from the north bank of the river. The former was the direction in which it was anticipated by Tipu, and he had accordingly employed many thousand workmen in making a new entrenchment on the west bank, and in opening new embrasures on various parts of the south face of the fort. He was again wrong in his calculation, for the north-west angle had been adopted in preference, and he became himself convinced of it when he saw that the position taken by General Stuart, instead of being merely a feint as he at first supposed, was intended for permanent occupation. Opposite to this angle the bed of the river was a bare rock, and the water so shallow as to offer no obstacle to the passage of troops. After the siege had regularly commenced, a very unexpected discovery was made. It had been understood that the grain in store would suffice for thirty days, but on measuring the bags of rice it was ascertained that there was not more than eighteen days' consumption for the fighting men of the army. "The cause of this alarming and unexpected deficiency," says Colonel Beatson, "has not been satisfactorily explained, but such was the actual pressure of our situation at the moment we were about to commence the siege."¹ "Happily", he continues, "from this alarm the commander-in-chief was soon afterwards effectually relieved, by a tender for the public service of twelve hundred bullock loads of rice. This supply, and some other private stock in camp, being secured and added to the public department, made the total quantity sufficient for the subsistence of the fighting men until the 20th of May; long before which time the convoy from the Baramahal was expected to arrive, and the siege of Seringapatam to be brought to a final issue." One would like to know by whom the above tender was made, and from what quarter the load of the twelve hundred bullocks was obtained. It looks as if it had found its way from the public stores, and returned to them by being purchased a second time. Colonel Beatson gives no further information on the subject, and Colonel Wilks disposes of it by saying, that "after a lapse of eighteen years this trans-

¹ Colonel Beatson's *View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultan*, p. 100.

action still continues to be an unfit subject for historical disquisition."

The siege continuing to make steady progress, Tipu became more and more convinced of his inability to make a successful defence, and resolved once more to try the effect of negotiation. Accordingly, on the 20th of April he sent the following undated letter to General Harris. "In the letter of Lord Mornington it is written, that the clearing up of matters at issue is proper, and that therefore you, having been empowered for the purpose, will appoint such persons as you judge proper for conducting a conference, and renewing the business of a treaty. You are the well-wisher of both sircars. In this matter what is your pleasure? Inform me, that a conference may take place." General Harris returned an answer, inclosing the draft of a preliminary treaty, and stating that if its demands were not acquiesced in within twenty-four hours after receiving them, the allies reserved to themselves "the right of extending these demands for security, even to the possession of the fort of Seringapatam, till a definitive treaty can be arranged, and its stipulations carried into effect. The leading demands were, that Tipu should cede one-half of his dominions to the allies, from the countries adjacent to their respective boundaries and agreeable to their selection, pay two crores of rupees (two millions sterling), and deliver four of his sons, and four of his principal officers as hostages. Tipu raved at what he called the arrogance and tyranny of the demands, and disdained to return any reply. It was better, he said, to die like a soldier than to live a miserable dependant on the infidels in the list of their pensioned rajas and nabobs.

On the 22nd, a vigorous and well-conducted sortie from the garrison, against all the outposts and advanced works of the besiegers on the northern bank, was repulsed, after several hours' hard fighting, with a loss of about 700 men; on the 23rd, the enlarged batteries of both northern and southern attacks silenced every gun opposed to them, and had so perfect an enfilade as to make the defence of the curtains all but impossible; and on the 26th and 27th, the enemy were dislodged from their last exterior entrenchment, distant only 380 yards from the fort, and consequently defended by its whole fire, as well

as by exterior musketry and rockets. Tipu, after this additional humbling, was able to pocket his disdain, and make a last attempt at negotiation. On the 28th he wrote as follows:—"I have the pleasure of your friendly letter, and understand its contents. The points in question are weighty, and without the intervention of ambassadors cannot be brought to a conclusion. I am therefore about to send two gentlemen to you, and have no doubt but a conference will take place. They will personally explain themselves to you." General Harris immediately replied, that he had made his demands in conformity to instructions from the governor-general, and could not without violating these instructions receive any ambassadors. As the terms had not been accepted the allies would be justified in making them more rigorous, but his acceptance would still be received, if given and properly authenticated before three o'clock P.M. of the following day.

Before this attempt at renewed negotiation, Tipu had recourse to every means which fear had suggested as likely to avert the impending fate. His attendance at the mosque was more frequent, and his devotions more earnest. He even entreated a fervent *amen* to his prayers from his attendants, and bribed the priests, not only of his own faith, but of Hinduism, which he had so cruelly persecuted, to intercede for his deliverance. The aid of astrology also was called in, and the professed adepts of every sect were consulted in regard to planetary influence, and unfavourable omens. Even with these, though their trade was chicanery, the time for delusion seemed to be past, and they spoke only of approaching calamities. After their worst predictions were confirmed by the refusal of General Harris to receive his ambassadors, Tipu's rage subsided into a kind of stupor, and he could not be aroused to make exertions by which the evil day, if it could not be averted, might at least have been postponed. When the works of the besiegers clearly indicated that the salient angle at the north-west corner of the fort was the point where the breach for assault would be made, he declined, when urged by the most judicious of his officers, to cut off the whole angle by means of a retrenchment of easy execution. In personal inspection, now more than ever necessary, he became remiss, and chose rather not to see the extent of his danger than to contend against it.

The besiegers, who had concealed the true point of their attack till the latest moment possible, began on the 2nd of May to make a breach of about sixty yards, immediately to the south of the bastion in the north-west angle. On the following day the breach was reported practicable, and the assault was fixed for the 4th. Before daybreak, 4,376 men took their appointed stations in the trench under General (afterwards Sir David) Baird, who was to have the honour of leading them. He had volunteered for this service, and had earned a kind of right to be selected for it, by an imprisonment of nearly four years within this very fort, as one of the captives taken when Colonel Baillie's detachment was destroyed. The troops for the assault were arranged in two columns, the one under Colonel Sherbrooke and the other under Colonel Dunlop; and the plan was, that after issuing together from the trenches, they were, on surmounting the breach, to separate, wheeling respectively to the right and left, and proceed along the rampart, so as to be able, after carrying such works as might be expedient, to meet on its eastern face. The only object of placing the men so early in the trenches was to elude observation, for it had been determined not to assault till one o'clock, at which hour the garrison, taking their usual refreshment and repose, would be most off their guard. A powerful reserve was likewise stationed under the command of Colonel Wellesley, in order to support the assault.

At half-past one, the moment fixed for the assault, General Baird, who had shortly before sent round an intimation to the troops to be ready at an instant's warning, stepped out of the trench, and drawing his sword, called aloud, "Come, my brave fellows, follow me, and prove yourselves worthy the name of British soldiers." In an instant both columns rushed from the trenches, entered the bed of the river under cover of the batteries, and hastened toward the breach. In six minutes the forlorn hope, closely followed by the rest of the troops, had gained its summit and displayed the British colours; in a few minutes more the breach was crowded with men. As soon as a sufficient number were collected on the rampart, they wheeled off right and left, according to the original instructions. The assault operated upon the garrison like a surprise. So little was it expected that

Tipu, after replying, in answer to some warnings given him, that an assault by day was very improbable, was seated at his mid-day repast, when intelligence of its having actually commenced, first reached him. After a very feeble resistance, they abandoned their strongest positions, and thought only of saving themselves by flight. Not a few in their terror threw themselves from the rampart, and were dashed to pieces on the rocky bed of the river. The right column, which, from the number of formidable works known to lie across its path, had anticipated a desperate struggle, in less than an hour had cleared their way along the rampart to the place of rendezvous on the eastern face of the fort. The left column made slower progress. The north-west bastion was soon gained, but all along the north rampart, the enemy—headed it is said by Tipu in person, and posted behind traverses, which they occupied in succession—kept up a fire which killed or disabled most of the leading officers of the assailants, and repeatedly brought their front to a stand. Being reinforced by fresh troops, some of which cleared the traverses by opening a flanking fire upon them, they pushed on towards the north-east angle. Here the enemy, perceiving the approach of the right column, were thrown into the utmost confusion, and perished by thousands, either by the sword or in vain endeavours to escape.

As soon as the whole rampart was occupied, and the firing from it had ceased, General Baird deputed Major Allan to proceed with a flag of truce to the palace, and offer protection to Tipu Sultan and all its inmates on condition of immediate surrender, at the same time threatening instant assault and death to every man within it in the event of further resistance. Major Allan having gained admission to the palace, was, after some delay, received by two of Tipu's younger sons, who solemnly declared that their father was not within. General Baird, on receiving this information, was not disposed to credit it, and in the hopes of inducing them to tell where he was, threatened to search the inmost recesses of the palace. Meanwhile the princes were brought away under the strongest assurances of protection, and sent off to the camp to the commander-in-chief. General Baird, after placing a sufficient guard round the zenana to prevent Tipu's escape, proceeded to make search for him in

the other parts of the palace. The killedar in command, on being severely threatened, informed him that Tipu had been wounded during the assault, and was lying in a gateway on the north face of the fort. He offered to point out the very spot. The information proved correct. Tipu was indeed lying there, not merely wounded, but dead. His horse, which had been shot, and his palanquin, were first discovered. The gateway exhibited a horrid spectacle. Numbers had perished there from being trodden down or suffocated, and their dead bodies lay heaped in mass over each other. As the darkness had come on, it was necessary to examine them by torch-light. A personal attendant of the palanquin, who had escaped suffocation by creeping under it, on being informed of the object of the search, pointed out the body of his master. On being brought out, it was immediately recognized by the killedar and several others, and conveyed in a palanquin to the palace, where the identification was completed by the unanimous testimony of the domestics. The body showed several wounds, but the one which must have almost instantaneously proved fatal, was a musket-shot, the ball of which had entered a little above the right ear, and lodged in the left cheek, near the mouth. It was said to have been given by a soldier whom he had endeavoured to cut down when seeking to deprive him of his richly ornamented sword-belt! Tipu's second son, who commanded the southern face, escaped during the assault, but surrendered on the following morning, and was sent back to the palace along with his two younger brothers. His conduct on viewing his father's corpse presented a striking contrast to theirs; he looked on with brutal apathy, while they gave affecting utterance to their grief. In the evening, the remains of Tipu Sultan were deposited with those of his father in the superb mausoleum of the Lall Baug, situated at the eastern extremity of the island. The funeral was as splendid as Muhammedan rites and European military honours could make it, and took place amid peals of thunder. The district is notorious for storms, but one so terrific as that which broke over the island at this time has seldom been witnessed.

It is impossible to feel any sympathy with Tipu, or regret for the dynasty which closed with him. His father, who founded

it, was possessed of natural talents of the highest order, but his successful career was less attributable to them than to perfidy, rapine, and bloodshed. Owing to the want of education, his faculties had never been improved nor his manners refined, and he remained to the end of his life a clever but heartless barbarian. Tipu, less talented than his father, surpassed him only in his vices, and was even notorious for some with which his father cannot be charged. To a cruel and vindictive temper he added a fierce and relentless bigotry, which was repeatedly displayed in the devastation of whole provinces and the extermination of their inhabitants merely because they resented his forcible conversions. In the eyes of Europeans the deepest stain on his memory is the inhuman treatment of his prisoners, the horrid dungeons in which he confined them, the heavy chains with which he loaded them, and the lingering or excruciating deaths by which he cut them off when he felt them to be cumbersome, or feared the revelations which they might make after he had been compelled to set them free. In this horrid butchery he had been engaged only a short time before his capital was stormed, and the knowledge of the fact when first made known to the British soldiers had so exasperated them that they were with difficulty restrained from taking a fearful vengeance on all the members of his family and the inmates of his palace. This vengeance, which would only have punished one crime by committing another of equal atrocity, was happily prevented, but there is something like retributive justice in the fact that the assault which cost Tipu his life and extinguished his dynasty, was headed by one who had experienced the horrors of a Seringapatam dungeon.

In the assault above 8,000 of the enemy's troops were killed. The whole number engaged in the defence was 21,839, but of these above 8,000 were in the entrenchments on the island, and consequently little more than 13,000 within the fort. It thus appears that nearly two-thirds of the actual defenders must have fallen. The whole loss of the British force, during the siege and the assault, including exactly a whole month, from April 4th to May 4th, was only 1,164. Of these 825 were European and 639 native troops. In the fort were found 373 guns, 60 mortars, and 11 howitzers, all of brass, and 466 guns and 12 mortars of iron,

in all 929 pieces of ordnance, of which 287 were mounted on the fortifications, 424,000 round shot, 520,000 lbs. of gunpowder, and 99,000 muskets and carabines. The buildings of the fort included eleven large powder magazines, seventy-two expense magazines, eleven armouries for making and finishing small arms, two foundries for cannon, three buildings with machines for boring guns and muskets, four large arsenals, seventeen other storehouses containing accoutrements, swords, and other articles, and many granaries abundantly stored with provisions of every kind. The whole value in treasure and jewels amounted to £1,143,216. These details, copied from Colonel Beatson's work, give a better idea of the vast resources of the Mysore capital than could be obtained from any general description. General Baird resigned the charge of Seringapatam, on the morning after its capture, to Colonel Wellesley, who was immediately after appointed permanent commandant. It is unnecessary to say that no officer better qualified for the post could have been selected, but it may be suspected, without any great breach of charity, that when the appointment was made, his great merits did not weigh so much as his relationship to the governor-general. General Baird had certainly a prior claim, and was aggrieved when another was allowed to reap the fruits of a capture which had been effected under his immediate leadership. It has been maintained, however, that he did not desire, or at least professed not to desire, the appointment. On this fact, which has given rise to some discussion, the propriety or impropriety of Colonel Wellesley's appointment hinges. Once installed, the good effects of his management were soon apparent. By a vigorous exertion of authority, the disorder almost inevitable after a storm was speedily suppressed; the inhabitants, who had sought refuge in the neighbouring fields and villages, were induced by the restoration of confidence to return, the bazaars were well supplied, and business ere long began to flow in its usual channels. Only three days after the capture, the main street of Seringapatam, says Beatson, exhibited the appearance of a fair, rather than that of a town just taken by assault.

After the fall of the capital, the submission of the whole country was easily effected. On the 14th of May, Fateh Hyder,

Kummer-ud-din, and Purneah, who had previously intimated their readiness to surrender, waited on General Harris, and were received by him with all the honours due to their rank. The whole army being under their command immediately followed their example, and peace and order were re-established in every part of Mysore. The conquest having been achieved, the first business of importance was to settle its future government on principles of equity and sound policy. To this task the governor-general immediately addressed himself. With the concurrence of Nizam Ali, who had left the arrangements entirely to the governor-general, General Harris, Colonel Wellesley, his brother the Hon. Henry Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley), Colonel W. Kirkpatrick, and Colonel Barry Close, were appointed by the governor-general "commissioners for the affairs of Mysore," with full powers, as the commission bears, "to negotiate and conclude, in my name, all such treaties, and to make and issue all such temporary and provisional regulations for the ordering and management of the civil and military government, and of the revenues of the said territories, as may be necessary for the immediate administration and settlement thereof." Captain Malcolm and Captain Monro were appointed secretaries to the commission, and the commissioners, before proceeding to act, were to take an oath, binding them "not to disclose any of the orders or instructions" transmitted to them by the governor-general, nor to "accept, directly or indirectly," any sum of money or other valuable thing, "by way of gift, present, or otherwise." The commissioners, "immediately on entering on their duties," were "to issue a proclamation notifying the restoration of tranquillity, and promising to all the inhabitants of the territories of the late Tipu Sultan, security of person and of private property, encouraging them to resume their ordinary occupations under the protection of the allies," and containing "the strictest injunctions, under the most severe penalties to all persons within the said territories, to abstain from acts of violence, outrage, and plunder." In the secret instructions accompanying the commission, the governor-general announced an intention to restore "the representative of the ancient family of the Rajas of Mysore, accompanied by a partition of territory

between the allies, in which the interests of the Marathas should be conciliated," and desired the necessary measures for the removal of Tipu's family to Vellore, which was to be their future residence. "The details," it is said, "of this painful but indispensable measure cannot be intrusted to any person more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by the occasion, than Colonel Wellesley; and I therefore commit to his discretion, activity, and humanity, the whole arrangement." After the arrival of the family at Vellore, no "reasonable expense" was to be spared "to render their habitation suitable to their former rank and expectations", and "a liberal pecuniary allowance" was to be given, not exceeding at the utmost, in the aggregate, four lacs of pagodas (£160,000) a year.

The 7th instruction is in the following terms:—"I have learned, with the utmost degree of surprise and concern, that the zenana in the palace of the sultan, was searched for treasure some time after the capture of the place: I could have wished, for the honour of the British name, that the apartments of the women had not been disturbed. In the heat and confusion of an assault such excesses are frequently unavoidable; but I shall for ever lament that this scene should have been acted long after the contest had subsided, and when the whole place had submitted to the superiority of our victorious arms. If any personal ornaments, or other articles of value, were taken from the women in that unfortunate moment, I trust that the commander-in-chief will make it his business to vindicate the humanity of the British character, by using the most zealous exertions to obtain a full restitution of the property in question". The outrage so justly censured had been committed, though the circumstances were not so bad as the governor-general imagined. In an answer written immediately after the receipt of the instruction, the commissioners say—"We feel great satisfaction in being able to assure your lordship that before the zenana was searched for treasure separate apartments were prepared for the ladies, and no precaution omitted to secure them from the possibility of being exposed to any inconvenience. No treasure was found in the zenana, nor was any article whatever conveyed from thence."

The above instructions were immediately followed by the transmission of the draft of a treaty, usually called the "Partition Treaty of Mysore," and entitled, "Treaty for strengthening the alliance and friendship subsisting between the English East India Company Bahadur, his highness the Nabob Nizam-ud-Daulah Asaph Jah Bahadur, and the Peshwa Rao Pandit Pardhan Bahadur, and for effecting a settlement of the dominions of the late Tipu Sultan." This treaty, to which the Company and the Nizam were the only parties, was concluded on the 22nd of June, 1799, the Mysore commissioners acting as representatives of the governor-general, and Mir Alam as representative of the Nizam. It consisted of ten articles, and proceeds on the preamble that a war, rendered necessary by the unprovoked hostility of Tipu, and his attempt "to evade the just demands of satisfaction and security," having terminated in "the reduction of the capital of Mysore, the fall of Tipu Sultan, the utter extinction of his power, and the unconditional submission of his people," and the allies having "resolved to use the power which it hath pleased Almighty God to place in their hands, for the purpose of obtaining reasonable compensation for the expenses of the war, and of establishing permanent security and genuine tranquillity for themselves and their subjects, as well as for all the powers contiguous to their respective dominions," had concluded a treaty "according to the under-mentioned articles, which, by the blessing of God, shall be binding on the heirs and successors of the contracting parties, as long as the sun and moon shall endure."

The 1st article specified the territories which were to be ceded to the Company, and the 2nd article those which were to be ceded to the Nizam. The estimated annual revenue of each, as fixed by the valuation adopted in the treaty of 1792, amounted to 537,170 canteria pagodas, equivalent, at the rate of three rupees to a pagoda, to £161,151. In addition to this common aggregate, the Company received to the value of £72,000 as the provision they undertook to pay for the families of Hyder and Tipu; and the Nizam, in like manner, £21,000 for the personal *jaghir* granted within his share to Kummer-ud-din, who was to fix his future residence at Gurrumconda.

The Company's districts comprehended on the west the whole of Canara, extending along the coast from the vicinity of Goa southward to Cannanore, where it joined their territory of Malabar, and on the south-west, south, and east, the district of Wynaad, forming a southern continuation of the Raja of Coorg's territory, nearly the whole of the Mysore territory south of the 12th degree of latitude, and two considerable tracts on the east, "together with the heads of all the passes leading from the territory of the late Tipu Sultan to any part of the possessions of the English East India Company Bahadur, of its allies or tributaries situated below the Ghats on either coast, and all forts situated near to and commanding the said passes." The effect of these annexations was to give the Company continuous possession from sea to sea across the southern part of the peninsula, and completely to inclose the table-land of Mysore on all sides except the north. The Nizam's share lay on the north-east, and included the districts of Gooty, Gurrumconda, and part of the district, but not the fort, of Chitteldrug. But the 3rd article made an important addition to the acquisitions of the Company, by conveying to them, "in full right and sovereignty for ever," the fortress of Seringapatam, and the island on which it is situated.

Article 4th was in the following terms:—"A separate government shall be established in Mysore; and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed that Maharaja Mysore Krishna Raja Udraver Bahadur, a descendant of the ancient Rajas of Mysore, shall possess the territory hereinafter described, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned." Cham Raj, the last pageant Raja of Tanjore, having died of the small-pox, Tipu deemed it unnecessary to continue the farce of nominating a successor. His son, who was now to be placed upon the musnud, was a child, according to Sir John Malcolm, only three, and according to Colonel Beatson, five years of age. His mother died a fortnight after his birth; but both his paternal grandmother, said to be ninety-six years of age, and his maternal grandfather were alive, as well as various other members of his family. The Brahmin, Purneah, who had been the chief financial minister of Tipu, had so readily given in his adhesion to the new arrangements, and was known to be possessed of so much

ability, that he was appointed his diwan. When the Mysore commissioners had their first interview with the raja's family, they found them in what Beatson calls "a condition of poverty and humiliation which excited the strongest compassion." Thus suddenly called from a hovel to a throne, it is easy to understand that they gladly promised compliance with every condition under which they were to hold their new dignity, and were full of "gratitude and joy." Previous to the interview the old rani, the second wife of the raja, who reigned at the date of Hyder's usurpation, and another lady, who was at once the maternal aunt of the new raja and one of his father's widows, had addressed a joint letter to the commissioners in the following terms:—"Your having conferred on our child the government of Mysore, Naggur, and Chitteldrug, with their dependencies, and appointed Purneah to be diwan, has afforded us the greatest happiness. Forty years have elapsed since our government ceased. Now you have favoured our boy with the government of this country, and nominated Purneah to be his diwan, we shall, while the sun and moon continue, commit no offence against your government. We shall at all times consider ourselves as under your protection and orders. Your having established us must for ever be fresh in the memory of our posterity from one generation to another. Our offspring can never forget an attachment to your government, on whose support we shall depend." The sentiments and feelings thus expressed furnish the key to the policy which the governor-general had adopted. In a letter to the directors he says—"The heir of Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan, animated by the implacable spirit and bold example of his parents, and accustomed to the commanding prospect of independent sovereignty, and to the splendour of military glory, might deliberately hazard the remnant of his hereditary possessions in pursuit of so proud an object as the recovery of that vast and powerful empire which for many years had rendered his ancestors the scourge of the Carnatic, and the terror of this quarter of India." On the other hand, "the heir of the Raja of Mysore, if placed on the throne, must feel that his continuance in that station depends on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts; it must, therefore, be his interest to unite with cordiality and

zeal in every effort necessary to its harmony, efficiency, and vigour. The effect of such an arrangement of the affairs of Mysore would not be limited to the mere destruction of the hostile power which menaced our safety; in the place of that power would be substituted one whose interest and resources might be absolutely identified with our own; and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity or alarm to the Carnatic, might become a new barrier of our defence, and might supply fresh means of wealth and strength to the Company, their subjects, and allies."

After all the curtailments, the territories left to Mysore were larger than they had been under the raja's ancestors, and formed a compact continuous kingdom, yielding an estimated revenue of 1,374,076 canteria pagodas, equal to £412,222. The conditions under which the new raja was to hold his territories were specified in what is called the "Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam," to which only the Company and the raja were parties. It bound the raja "to receive a military force for the defence and security of his highness's dominions", and to pay for it to the Company "the annual sum of seven lacs of star pagodas" (£280,000). In the event of war, the raja was to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expense such a sum to the governor-general, "to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenues of his said highness." To provide against any failure in the funds for payment, it was stipulated that whenever the governor-general should "have reason to apprehend such failure," he should have "full power and right either to introduce such ordinances and regulations as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the government of Mysore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Bahadur, such part or parts of the territorial possessions" of the raja as shall appear to him "necessary to render the funds efficient and available either in peace or in war." In no case, however, was the raja's "actual receipt of annual income, arising out of his territorial revenue," to be "less than the sum of one lac of star pagodas (£40,000), together with one-fifth part of the net

revenues of the whole of the territories ceded to him." The raja was further taken bound "to abstain from any interference in the affairs of any state in alliance" with the Company, or "of any state whatever;" to hold no communication or correspondence with any foreign state without the previous knowledge and sanction of the Company; "not to suffer, even for a day, any European foreigners to remain within the territories now subjected to his authority, unless by consent of the Company;" and to leave the Company at liberty to garrison, in whatever manner they may judge proper, such fortresses within Mysore as might seem to them advisable. Finally, the raja gave his promise "to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the English government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with his highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states." A glance at the above stipulations is sufficient to show that the raja was made a sovereign only in name, and that the government of his territories was henceforth entirely vested in the Company. As Seringapatam had been appropriated by the Company, it was necessary to select a new residence for the raja. Mysore, the ancient capital, was fixed upon; and, on the 30th of June, the ceremony of placing the child on the musnud was performed by General Harris, in presence of the commissioners and a vast concourse of Hindus, who rent the air with their acclamations, a royal salute from the fort of Seringapatam, and volleys of musketry from his majesty's 12th regiment. It is rather amusing to hear Beatson talking of the deportment of the young prince, a child of three or at most five years of age, as having been, during the ceremony, "highly proper." The investiture of Purneah as diwan was afterwards performed. Colonel Barry Close had previously obtained from the governor-general the appointment of resident at Mysore, an office for which he was considered peculiarly qualified by "extraordinary talents, proficiency in the native languages, and experience in the native manners and customs".

In the partition treaty of Mysore there was an article to which attention has not yet been paid. In addition to the territories which were appropriated to the raja, and the shares obtained by the Company and the Nizam, a tract in the north-west, yielding an annual revenue of 263,957 canterias pagodas (£79,186), had been reserved. This tract, which was thus equal only to a half of each of the other shares, was contiguous to the Maratha territory. The object of reserving it is explained in the 7th article, by which it was agreed that although the peshwa "has neither participated in the expense or danger of the late war, and therefore is not entitled to share any of the acquisitions made by the contracting parties (the Company and the Nizam), yet, for the maintenance of friendship and alliance," certain specified districts "shall be reserved, for the purpose of being eventually ceded to the said peshwa." This cession, however, was to be made only provided the peshwa "shall accede to the present treaty in its full extent, within one month from the day on which it shall be formally communicated to him by the contracting parties;" and provided, also, "he shall give satisfaction" to the Company and the Nizam "with regard to certain points now depending" between them, and "also with regard to such points as shall be represented to the said peshwa," on the part of the Company, by the governor-general, or the English resident at the court of Poona. By article 8th it was stipulated that if the peshwa should refuse to accede to the treaty, or to give satisfaction on the points to which the 7th article referred, the districts reserved for eventual cession to him should rest jointly in the Company and the Nizam, who would either exchange them with the raja for other districts of equal value, more contiguous to their respective territories, or otherwise arrange respecting them. A separate article, appended to the partition treaty, provided that, in the event of non-acceptance by the peshwa, the Nizam should have two-thirds and the Company the remaining third of the reserved districts.

The proposed cession to the peshwa was an act of great moderation, and even generosity. When the treaty was concluded with the Nizam in 1798, the governor-general offered to conclude one of a similar nature with the peshwa, who, after

some negotiation, evaded the subject, and simply declared that he would faithfully execute subsisting engagements. One of these was to take up arms against Tipu in the event of his attacking any of the parties to the tripartite alliance of Lord Cornwallis; and accordingly, when Tipu's proceedings with the French were declared to be equivalent to a declaration of war on his part, the peshwa promised to furnish a contingent to act with the allies. It was agreed that Purseram Bhow should head this contingent, and a British detachment, similar to that furnished in the former war, was held in readiness to join him. Nana Fadnavis, who, after having been imprisoned and obliged to save himself by flight, had again become prime minister, was favourable to the British connection, and urged Baji Rao to fulfil his engagement; but the influence of Daulat Rao Sindhia, who was hostile to that connection, prevailed, and the Maratha contingent never took the field. At one time, indeed, it seemed more than probable that if it did take the field it would be not to oppose but to assist Tipu, who had sent thirteen lacs of rupees to Poona, and seemed on the eve of effecting a Maratha alliance. The rapidity and success with which the war was carried on disconcerted this scheme, and the peshwa, to save appearances, affected the utmost joy when he heard of the capture of Seringapatam. Such was the state of matters when a considerable portion of Mysore, contiguous to the Maratha territory, was conditionally offered to be annexed to it. After protracted discussion the conditions were declined, and the reserved territory was shared between the Company and the Nizam in the proportions which had been previously arranged.

Shortly after the capture of Seringapatam, the district of Bednore, in the north-west of the Mysore territory, was disturbed by an adventurer of the name of Dhundia Waugh. When in the service of the Pathan or Afghan Nabob of Savanore, he had made incursions into Tipu's dominions, till he was made prisoner and carried to Seringapatam. A forcible conversion made him a Muhammedan, and he became one of Tipu's soldiers. For some misconduct, or on some ground of suspicion, he had again been imprisoned, and was found in one of the dungeons when Seringapatam was stormed. The

soldiers, knowing nothing of his character, set him at liberty. He fled immediately, and made a very ungrateful return to his deliverers. Being joined by some of Tipu's disbanded cavalry, he took the direction of Bednore. There his numbers considerably increased, and several of the principal places of the district, owing to the treachery of the commandants, fell into his hands. He immediately laid the country under contribution, devastated the finest parts of it, and spread general consternation by numerous acts of rapine and murder. At length, on the 21st of July, Colonel Dalrymple, with a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, moved against him from Chitteldrug, and having overtaken a party of his banditti, nearly exterminated it, refusing quarter, for the purpose of making a severe example. Dhundia proceeding westward, crossed the Tungabhadra, and was followed by Colonel Dalrymple, who on the 30th of July took Harrihar, on the east bank of that river. Meanwhile Colonel Stevenson, advancing with a light corps from another direction, took Simoga by assault on the 8th of August. Both corps having now effected a junction, Colonel Stevenson, as senior officer, assumed the command. Dhundia, who had encamped in a strong position near the fort of Shikarpur, was driven with considerable loss across a small river in his rear, and after the fort had been taken by assault, was pursued so closely, that he sought refuge within the Maratha frontier. He might have been overtaken and destroyed, had not Colonel Stevenson's instructions expressly prohibited him from giving umbrage to the Marathas, by entering their territory. Tranquillity was thus restored to Bednore, and as Dhundia was shortly after attacked by Dhondu Pant Gokla, a Maratha chief, who deprived him of his elephants, camels, bullocks, and guns, it was hoped that he had been rendered incapable of future mischief. He was destined, however, as will afterwards be seen, to give new trouble.

6

Nabob of Arcot

ON arriving at Madras on his outward voyage, Lord Mornington, as has been mentioned, spent a short time in endeavouring to induce the Nabob of Arcot to remedy the defects of the arrangement made with his father by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, and in finally settling a disputed succession in Tanjore. He failed in the former object; the proceedings in regard to the latter will now be detailed.

Tuljaji, Raja of Tanjore, died in 1786, leaving a half-brother, Amir Singh, and an adopted son, Serfoji, or Sarboji, the latter under the guardianship of the celebrated missionary, Swartz. Both claimed the succession, and appealed to the Madras government. Amir Singh denied his brother's right to cut him out of the succession by adopting a son, and moreover maintained that the adoption itself was, from the want of some essential requisites, null and void. For Serfoji, who was only a boy of about ten years of age, it was pleaded both that the adoption was valid and that Amir Singh was illegitimate. To settle these points, several questions were submitted to learned pundits. Their answers were favourable to Amir Singh, who was accordingly preferred. He was a man of bad character, and behaved in a way which made it doubtful if he were of sound mind. Possibly all this might have been overlooked had he yielded to the demands of the Company instead of imitating the nabob, and refusing like him to enter into an agreement for the assignment of his revenues. Meanwhile, doubts arose as to the soundness of the opinion given by the pundits, and it was proposed as a kind of compromise, and a check on Amir Singh's proceedings, that Serfoji should be declared his presumptive heir. This was strongly objected to by Mr. Swartz, who, in consequence of

Amir Singh's outrageous treatment of Serfoji and the late raja's widows, had been permitted and assisted by the presidency to bring them to Madras. In a letter addressed to Sir Charles Oakley, the governor, on 27th January, 1793, he thus expressed his views:—"When I heard that the honourable board was resolved to proclaim Serfoji, the adopted son of the late Raja of Tanjore, presumptive heir of the present raja, and that he was to succeed him in case the present raja should die without having a son born of his lawfully married wife (for that seems to be the meaning of the word presumptive heir), the following thoughts occurred to my mind, which I beg leave to disclose to your honour. I thought if Serfoji is proclaimed presumptive successor or heir to the throne of Tanjore, then he stands a poor, or perhaps no chance at all, of inheriting the country, for

"His excellency the present raja is but forty-three years old, and is now marrying one, or as some say two wives—he may therefore have a son. But if he does not have a son, he may take an infant, declaring him to be his own son, born of his wife; his hatred and jealousy of Serfoji makes this conjecture very probable. The same has been done at Tanjore by Aperup, the lawful but barren wife of Serfoji Raja. Or the present raja may adopt another man's son. This is more than a conjecture; he has already declared it to be his intention, being resolved to adopt Nana Sahib's son. This Nana Sahib is the son of a concubine." In the subsequent part of the letter, Mr. Swartz argues that the present raja, having no legal right to the throne, was not entitled to dispose of it in any way. "Can he give away that which is not his own? and shall an error once committed to the prejudice of the lawful heir be continued, so as to supersede the true and lawful heir for ever, or annihilate his right? It may be said that it would reflect on the decision formerly made in favour of the present raja; but in my humble opinion that decision was conditional, supposing the justice of the opinions given by the pundits; but as their opinion is found to be ill grounded, the decision built upon it, one might think, would cease to be valid."

Lord Cornwallis acknowledged that Mr. Swartz's sentiments, in addition to other circumstances, had made him very doubt-

ful of Amir Singh's right, while he was entirely persuaded of his personal unworthiness. He considered it necessary, however, "to proceed with great circumspection and delicacy in impeaching a right that has been sanctioned by a solemn decision, passed in consequence of the answers that were made by fifteen pundits to the questions that were referred to them," and therefore only recommended that at present Serfoji should be proclaimed presumptive heir to the throne, and that in the meantime the question of right should again be opened up, by submitting the substance of the questions formerly considered by the Tanjore pundits to other pundits at Calcutta and Benaras. Their opinion was contrary to that formerly given, and Sir John Shore having informed the directors that he concurred in it, they formally decided in Serfoji's favour. Still the final steps were not taken when Lord Mornington arrived. After an investigation at Madras, the first act of his administration in Bengal was to lodge a minute declaring his belief that Serfoji was the lawful heir, and his determination forthwith to place him on the musnud. This was only an act of justice, though it is needless to deny that policy, fully as much as justice, prompted to it. Amir Singh had been twelve years in possession when he was deposed to make way for Serfoji, whose greatest recommendation to the governor-general and the Company undoubtedly was, that he was not in a condition to refuse any terms that might be dictated to him. Accordingly, by a treaty dated 25th October, 1799, he was taken bound to resign the whole administration, civil and military, into the hands of the Company, and rest satisfied with a nominal sovereignty, and a pension of a lac of star pagodas (£40,000), drawn from the revenues, together with one-fifth of the net sum drawn from the remainder.

An arrangement similar to the above was shortly afterwards made in regard to Surat. In 1759, when this important town, in which the Company had long possessed a factory, was suffering by a state of anarchy, they were induced to attack the castle, and succeeded in gaining possession of it. The nabob, finding it impossible to oust them, entered into a treaty by which a double government was established, the Company undertaking the defence, while the nabob retained the civil

administration. This arrangement was afterwards confirmed by the Mughul. Their rights thus derived from the same source were consequently equal, but British influence ultimately established a complete ascendancy, and it was perfectly understood that the nabob could neither be appointed nor be able to retain his office without the concurrence of the Company. The expense of maintaining the castle was not met by the revenue set apart for it, and various attempts were made to induce the nabob to increase it. The plan proposed by the Company, to diminish expense by improving the government, was to disband the nabob's undisciplined soldiery, and substitute three of their own battalions to be maintained at the nabob's expense. To this he manifested the greatest repugnance, objecting that his funds were not adequate, and that the proposal was a violation of the treaty of 1759. He had agreed, however, to make some important concessions, but the treaty was not concluded when he died in January, 1799. His only son, an infant, survived him only a few weeks, and the succession was claimed by his brother. The Company, before consenting to recognize him, insisted on new stipulations in their favour, but the utmost that the claimant would agree to give was a lac of rupees annually, because the revenue, he averred, would not afford more. This sum was deemed insufficient, and the governor-general cut the matter short by simply ordering that the nabob should be displaced, and the government and revenues be transferred to the Company. The security and good government of Surat "can only be attained," he said, "by the Company taking the entire civil and military government of the city into their own hands." This looks very like "necessity, the tyrant's plea," and we question if his lordship improved the plea much by arguing that "the operation of the treaty of 1759 ceased on the demise of Mayen-ud-din" (the nabob with whom it was made), and "the power of the Mughul, having also become extinct, it follows that the Company, not being restricted with respect to the disposal of the office of nabob by any specific treaty, are at liberty to dispose of it as they think proper." They certainly had the power, but just as certainly they had not the right to do it, and there need not, therefore, be any hesitation in saying that the whole proceeding was characterized by tyranny and

injustice. Governor Duncan of Bombay made his appearance at Surat with a treaty ready drawn, and the nabob had no choice but to sign it. By its terms he devolved the whole government on the Company, in return for a pension of a lac of rupees with a fifth of the net annual revenue secured to himself and his heirs.

The Nabob of Arcot's turn came next, but the arrangement forced upon him, though similar in kind, was rested on very different grounds. Among the papers found in the fort of Seringapatam, were documents which seemed to establish a secret correspondence between the nabobs Muhammed Ali and Omdut-ul-Umara and Tipu, for objects hostile to the interests of the Company. When Tipu's two sons were carried off as hostages to Madras, they were accompanied by his two vakils or ambassadors, Ghulam Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan, who, as may be supposed, made good use of their opportunities, and maintained a regular correspondence with their master. Their residence at Madras gave them opportunity of frequent intercourse with Muhammed Ali and his son, and the part of their correspondence detailing what passed during this intercourse constituted the main strength of the evidence on which a charge of treachery was brought against these nabobs. In addition to this correspondence only two other letters were produced, the one from a subsequent wakil of Tipu at Madras, and the other under a fictitious name, but supposed to be from Omdut-ul-Umara. The most suspicious circumstance connected with this correspondence was the discovery of a cipher and a key to it. The key was found among Tipu's secret records, and was written in the same hand as that in which the letters from the nabob to the government were written; at the foot of it was a note by Tipu's head munshi, stating it to be from Omdut-ul-Umara. The fictitious names of the cipher had been used in the correspondence, and the meaning of them as ascertained by the key gave evidence of the feelings which had dictated the correspondence. Thus the English were designated by the name of *teza wareeds* or *new comers*, the Nizam by that of *heeck* or *nothing*, and the Marathas by that of *pooch* or *contemptible*.

The correspondence in itself was by no means decisive. Much of it was complimentary, and probably meant nothing more

than figurative and high-flown oriental expressions are understood to do. Religion was talked of, and the duty of making common cause against the infidels, and hints were given to Tipu as to the necessity of using caution in his intercourse with the French and the Marathas, of doing nothing rashly and biding his time. Nothing stronger than this was found, and it must be remembered that even this was not brought home to the nabobs, since the statements were not made directly by them, but only reported at second hand. On this subject it was justly observed by the Persian translator employed by the government:—"The accuracy of reports from agents, natives of India, to their principals, cannot under any circumstances be implicitly relied on; and in one of the reports of the vakils, which contains the substance of a conference between themselves, the princes and the nabob, at which Colonel Doveton was present, a speech is ascribed to that gentleman which is evidently fabricated—a circumstance which tends to weaken the validity of all their reports; and if the evidence of the nabob's conduct rested solely upon them, the proofs might be considered as extremely defective and problematical." Additional evidence therefore was necessary, and no means of obtaining it were omitted. A list of witnesses was produced, and Mr. Webbe, secretary to the Madras government, and Colonel Barry Close, resident in Mysore, were appointed commissioners to examine them. The most important were the two vakils, who were still living, and being now pensioners of the Company could have no interest in concealing the truth, after they were assured that nothing which they said would criminate themselves, and had on the contrary an intelligible interest to assist in making out a case which they knew that their paymasters were anxious to establish. Ali Reza, who was residing at Vellore, was first examined, and in the opinion of the commissioners evinced "an earnest disposition to develop the truth." Ghulam Ali, resident at Seringapatam, impressed them less favourably, and seemed even to feign dotage as a means of concealment. Both the vakils testified that the complimentary expressions employed in their reports were, conformably to the custom of the country, much exaggerated, and gave other evidence which weakened rather than strengthened the proof

of criminal intention in the nabobs. Several other witnesses were examined, but those of them who from their position were most competent so completely failed to establish any fact, that the commissioners "thought it unnecessary to record their evidence."

A singular specimen of the lamentable extent to which our judgments are biassed by our wishes, may be found in the fact, that the leading authorities of the Indian government, both abroad and in this country, were ready on this imperfect evidence to hold the charge of treasonable correspondence completely proved, and in consequence to blacken the memory of the deceased nabob, and take signal vengeance on his successor, who could hardly be said to live, as he was pining away under a mortal disease. With nothing but the documents before him, and before a single witness was examined, Lord Mornington had evidently made up his mind, and wrote as follows:—"A deliberate consideration of the evidence resulting from the whole of these documents has not only confirmed in the most unquestionable manner my suspicions of the existence of a secret correspondence between the personages already named, but satisfied my judgment, that its objects on the part of the Nabob Wallaja (Muhammed Ali) and Omdut-ul-Umara, and especially of the latter, was of the most hostile tendency to the British interests. The proofs arising from the papers would certainly be sufficient to justify the British government in depriving that faithless and ungrateful prince of all means of rendering any part of the resources of the territories, which he holds under the protection of the Company, subservient to the further violation of his engagements and to the prosecution of his desperate purposes of treachery and ingratitude." Lord Clive, governor of Madras, after the witnesses had been examined, arrived at the same conclusion. "With this strong evidence of internal treachery, and of open opposition to our interests in the Carnatic, established by treaty, it is my deliberate opinion that a further adherence to the letter of the treaty of 1792, while the Nabob Omdut-ul-Umara has been and now is perfidiously betraying the spirit and substance of the alliance between him and the Company, would be as inconsistent with the true principles of public faith, as it would be obviously incom-

patible with the preservation of our just rights and interests. On these grounds I have no hesitation in recommending to your lordship the immediate assumption of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, under such provisions as your lordship may be pleased to authorize for his highness the nabob, his highness's family, and the principal officers of his government."

The above letter of Lord Clive was written on the 23rd of May, 1800, but a full year elapsed before the final steps were taken. The governor-general had intended to proceed to Madras as soon as the season would permit, and personally perform this great act of retributive justice. Circumstances, however, occurred which made this impossible, and he directed that Mr. Webbe should come to Calcutta, in order that he might obtain the fullest information from him before issuing his final arrangements. This delay gave Lord Mornington an opportunity of learning the views of the home authorities on the subject of the Mysore correspondence. The Board of Control agreed in his lordship's conclusions, and in the measures which he had declared his intention of adopting. The secret committee of directors not only held the treachery of the correspondence proved, but stated that many other circumstances might in their opinion be urged to strengthen the doubts of the nabob's fidelity to the fundamental engagements with the Company, and referred particularly to the mode in which he had evacuated a fort in 1796, than which, they remarked, "a more decided instance of disaffection can scarcely be imagined." It would rather seem, however, that the directors only approved "of demanding some more certain pledges of the fidelity of Omdut-ul-Umara than the Company then possessed." In fact, it is impossible not to see that the discovery of the Mysore correspondence was held to be most opportune, and that it was determined from the first to use it for the purpose of forcing an arrangement, which was felt to be extremely desirable, but to which it had been found impossible to obtain the nabob's assent. But for this the treachery said to have been discovered might easily have been overlooked. It was perfectly understood that Muhammed Ali and his sons had no real attachment to the Company, and submitted to the control

exercised over them from necessity, and not from choice. They had repeatedly complained of being defrauded of what they called their sovereign rights, and there could not be a doubt that they would gladly have availed themselves of an opportunity of shaking off a galling yoke. Professor Wilson states the case very fairly, when he says in a note to Mills' *History* (vol. vi, p. 324):—"It may be admitted that upon the face of the correspondence little appeared to convict the nawabs of the Carnatic of actual treachery against the British government, yet there can be little difficulty in crediting that they entertained hostile sentiments towards it, or that they expressed those sentiments to Tipu's vakils. Although, then, the correspondence with Tipu may not substantiate any conspiracy against the English power, it is impossible to question the inference that is reasonably drawn from it, an inference which scarcely required such testimony—that no reliance could be placed upon the fidelity or attachment of the nabobs of Arcot." Thus far Professor Wilson states the case with perfect accuracy, but we think he is egregiously in error when he adds—"Their political position, and their religious creed, rendered them irreconcilable foes, and with this conviction it would have been folly to have intrusted them longer with any degree of political power." Were this apology for the proceeding of the Company well founded, it would follow that they were entitled to overthrow and extinguish every native government in their vicinity, on the simple ground that political position, and difference of religion, made them irreconcilable foes. Then what is meant by saying that the Company had "intrusted" the nabobs with political power? When did the Company become the absolute sovereigns of the Carnatic, and when did the nabobs begin to hold it under them in trust? Is it not notorious that even in an European treaty the Nabob of the Carnatic had been formally recognized as a sovereign prince, and that the Company, besides entering into treaties with him on that footing, had proclaimed themselves his vassals, by soliciting and accepting a *jaghir* from him? There was indeed much "folly" in the intercourse of the Company with the nabob, but as they had never intrusted him "with any degree of political power," there is no sense in speaking of the "folly" of prolonging the trust.

The arrangement ultimately made with regard to the Carnatic virtually acquitted the nabobs of the heaviest charges which had been brought against them. Had they been, as Lord Mornington asserted, prosecuting "desperate purposes of treachery and ingratitude," or, as Lord Clive expressed it, "perfidiously betraying the spirit and substance of the alliance," absolute expulsion was the proper sentence, since the very idea of compounding with traitors was absurd. And yet what was the course which it was resolved to follow? To begin with negotiation, for the purpose of obtaining a complete resignation of the civil and military government of the Carnatic to the Company. Could the nabob's consent be obtained, no mention was to be made of his guilt, but on the contrary he was to be liberally pensioned, and treated as an old and faithful ally. It was only in the event of its being necessary to overcome opposition, that "the combination of fortunate circumstances" which had "revealed his correspondence" was to be turned to account, however painful it might be, "to expose the humiliating proofs of the ingratitude and treachery with which these infatuated princes had acted towards that power which had uniformly proved their guardian and protector." The ultimate result of the proceedings was to secure a valuable end by very unworthy means.

When the final instructions of Lord Mornington reached Madras, it was too late to negotiate with Omdut-ul-Umara. He was on his deathbed, and expired on the 15th July, 1801. When his recovery became hopeless, the tranquillity of his last moments was disturbed by intrigues for the succession among the different members of the family, and Lord Clive deemed it necessary to take military occupation of his palace, for the purpose both of preserving order and preventing the dilapidation of treasure. Among the claimants to the succession Lord Mornington had selected two—the one Ali Hussain, the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Umara, and the other Azim-ul-Daulah, the acknowledged son of his younger brother Amir-ul-Umara. To the former, and, in the event of refusal, to the latter, the succession was to be offered, on the previous condition of holding only a nominal sovereignty with a liberal pension. Omdut-ul-Umara by his will declared his son Ali Hussain, a youth of

eighteen years of age, his heir, and appointed Muhammed Najib Khan and Tuki Ali Khan his guardians. With these two, therefore, a few hours after the death, Mr. Webbe and Colonel Close were deputed as commissioners to hold a consultation. It was continued for several days without result, the guardians positively declining the terms. The commissioners refused to take a final answer from the guardians, and demanded an interview with Ali Hussain himself. After many objections it was granted, but when it took place he simply referred them to his guardians, plainly declaring that "his counsels and theirs could never be separated." He was not to be parted with in this summary way, and the commissioners therefore intimated that Lord Clive desired a personal interview, and would for that purpose receive him in the tent of the Company's officer commanding the troops, which had been stationed at the palace. When the guardians retired to provide the necessary equipage and accessories, Ali Hussain whispered that they had deceived him. During the interview with Lord Clive he made the same statement against the guardians without hesitation, and declared his disapprobation of the issue to which matters had been brought by them. The proposal was then repeated to him in the most distinct manner, and he declared his readiness to accept of it. It was supposed that the whole business was now on the eve of being satisfactorily arranged, and the greater, therefore, was the surprise of the commissioners when, during an interview on the following day while the guardians were present, Ali Hussain retracted everything he had said to Lord Clive. A second interview with his lordship in private failed to change his resolution. His whole family, he said, had been convened for the purpose of assisting his judgment; his resolution was final; he was prepared to meet every danger rather than subscribe to the conditions proposed. Further negotiation being useless, Lord Clive retired, after intimating to him that he had forfeited all claim to consideration, and must await the extreme measures which his conduct had rendered unavoidable.

It now only remained to bring forward the other candidate who had gained Lord Mornington's preference. The first difficulty was to obtain access to him, as he was kept in rigorous confinement, and the least hint of his intended elevation

would probably have cost him his life. This difficulty was unexpectedly removed by the guardians themselves. Becoming impatient of delay they had of their own accord placed Ali Hussain privately on the musnud, and were reported to be preparing to repeat the ceremony publicly on the following day. Lord Clive immediately took the necessary steps to prevent them, and by occupying the palace with the Company's troops, and removing all the late nabob's guards, obtained possession of Azim-ul-Daulah's person. The sudden elevation from a prison to the musnud was too tempting to leave him any inclination to demur to the terms, and on the 25th of July, 1801, Azim-ul-Daulah ascended the musnud with the title of nabob, and a pension of one-fifth of the annual revenues, while the Company gained the object for which they had long been striving, by becoming vested with the whole civil and military government of the Carnatic.

Mention has been made of the intention of Lord Mornington to visit Madras, and make the settlement of the Carnatic in person. The main cause of his being obliged to abandon this intention was the state of affairs in Oudh. By Lord Teignmouth's treaty, the Company were at liberty to increase the force serving in Oudh, whenever it might be deemed necessary for the security of the contracting parties. The threatened invasion by Zeman Shah, and the disordered state of the government under the nabob's mutinous and ineffective military establishment, determined the governor-general to make a large increase of the Company's, and at the same time effect a corresponding reduction of the native troops. When the proposal was first made to the nabob, he acquiesced in its propriety, but on second thoughts, after finding how much it would lessen his consequence with his adherents, he withdrew his assent and began to throw every obstacle in the way.

One of the methods which the nabob took to evade the reformation which he saw was about to be forced upon him, was to feign a desire to abdicate. Addressing Colonel Scott, the resident, at an interview, he said "that his mind was not disposed to the cares and fatigues of government; that as one of his sons would be raised to the musnud, his name would remain; and that he was possessed of money sufficient for his

support, and the gratification of all his desires in a private station." At a second interview, he returned to the subject of his abdication, and stated as his motives, "the refractory and perverse disposition of the people at large," the "want of zeal and fidelity in the men immediately about his person," the "arrogance of some of the aumils," and "the open disobedience of others." The resident was not blind to the advantages which the Company might derive from the abdication, but deemed it prudent to expostulate with the nabob on the subject, showing him that the remedy of the evils was within his own power. "A strong and just administration would," he said, "insure the obedience of the bulk of his subjects," and attach them "to his person and government," and the "reform of the military establishment was the specific measure that would curb the arrogance of the aumils." If he would only "reject the advice of interested favourites, and be guided by the impartial and friendly council" of the governor-general, "the affairs of his government would be conducted with ease to himself, to the acquisition of a high reputation, and to the prosperity and happiness of his subjects." As he was about to resign, the nabob observed that it was unnecessary to enter on the subject of military reform. In this observation the resident acquiesced, and in consequence abstained from delivering a letter in which the governor-general had explained his views. There was afterwards reason to suspect that the delay which he thus gained was one of the main objects which the nabob aimed at when he announced his intention to abdicate. He made a grievous mistake when he thus attempted to trifle with Lord Mornington.

As soon as the proposal of abdication was announced to the governor-general, it was so much in accordance with his own wishes that he caused his military secretary, after only a week's delay, to communicate with the resident respecting it. "The proposition of the vizir," writes the secretary, "is pregnant with such benefit not only to the Company but to the inhabitants of Oudh, that his lordship thinks it cannot be too much encouraged, and that there are no circumstances which shall be allowed to impede the accomplishment of the grand object which it leads to. This object his lordship considers to be the acquisition

by the Company of the exclusive authority, civil and military, over the dominions of Oudh." The formal abdication his lordship did not consider necessary to this end. On the contrary, he thought that it might cause embarrassment by raising a question of succession; and he therefore proposed a secret treaty, by which the nabob should vest the Company in the civil and military establishment of the country, and in which his sons should be "no further mentioned than may be necessary for the purpose of securing to them a suitable provision." In regard to the treasures and jewels left by the late nabob, the governor-general, on Sadat Ali's agreeing to the above arrangement, would have "little difficulty in allowing his excellency to appropriate" them, under deduction of arrears of subsidy and of any other debts due to the Company.

A treaty embodying the above stipulations was forwarded to the resident, and on being submitted to the nabob was perused by him with great apparent calmness. He put some questions as to the authority which was to remain with his successor, and on being told that the plan did not provide for a successor, asked "whether a family, which had been established for a number of years, was to abandon the sovereignty of its hereditary dominions." The resident could only refer to the ample provision made for the comfort and independence of that family. The impression left upon him is thus described:—"From this conversation I can hardly venture to draw any conclusion, and shall therefore only observe, that though his excellency is perfectly master of concealing his passions, yet if he had entertained an immovable repugnance to the basis of the treaty, he could scarcely have disguised it under smiles and an unaltered countenance". Whether the professed desire to abdicate had been mere pretence, or the intimation that, if he should abdicate he must not expect to take with him the whole of his accumulated wealth, had induced him to abandon an intention once really entertained, it is certain that he soon began to retract. A few days after the above interview the resident was waited upon by the nabob, whose views appeared to have undergone a considerable change. After some preliminary remarks, wrote the resident, "his excellency proceeded to declare, that the proposition offered by your lordship was so

repugnant to his feelings—departed so widely, in a most essential point, from the principle on which he wished to relinquish the government, and would, were he to accept it, bring upon him such indelible disgrace and odium, that he could never voluntarily subscribe to it. The sovereignty of these dominions had been in the family near a hundred years, and the transfer of it to the Company, under the stipulations proposed by your lordship, would in fact be a sale of it, for money and jewels; that every sentiment of respect for the name of his ancestors, and every consideration for his posterity, combined to preclude him from assenting to so great a sacrifice for the attainment of his personal ease and advantage.” His ultimate proposition was that he should appoint his successor; when this was objected to, he concluded with saying, that “he was ready to abandon his design of retirement, and to retain the charge of the government.” On being reminded that the military reform would still be necessary, the nabob observed “that the reform of his military establishment upon the principles proposed by your lordship would annihilate his authority in his own dominions.”

Lord Mornington, suspecting that “his excellency’s principal, if not sole view in the late transaction, has been to ward off the reform of his military establishment,” declared himself “extremely disgusted at the duplicity and insincerity of his conduct,” and determined to lose no time in enforcing his own plan of military reform. By the treaty concluded by Lord Teignmouth, the whole defence of Oudh was undertaken by the Company. The amount payable by the nabob as subsidy was, under ordinary circumstances, fixed at seventy-six lacs, but if it should at any time become necessary to increase the Company’s troops beyond 13,000 men, the subsidy was to be proportionably increased. The necessity of an increase was, apparently by the letter, and unquestionably by the spirit of the treaty, left to the decision of the Company, and on this ground the governor-general held that they were entitled, without consulting the nabob, to burden him with the permanent payment of troops to any extent which they might choose to consider necessary. In the present instance, the number which the governor-general resolved to send fixed an additional

burden of £500,000 sterling on the revenue of Oudh, and made the whole sum permanently payable as subsidy amount to one crore and twenty-six lacs, or rather more than a million and a quarter pounds sterling (£1,260,000). Orders were accordingly given to move the troops forthwith to such points within Oudh as might seem advisable, giving due notice to the nabob of the augmentation, and "calling upon his excellency to adopt the requisite measures for the regular payment of the additional force." On being informed by the resident that the troops were on their march, the nabob "entreated that no actual steps might be taken for their actual march into his dominions," till he had an opportunity of submitting to his consideration a paper which he was then engaged in drawing up, and some propositions which he had to offer. The resident told him that "it was totally impossible to delay the march of the troops, but that as it would require a day or two to arrange a place for their distribution; if his excellency would in that space come forward in an unreserved manner with any specific propositions," he (the resident) would judge what weight to allow them, and how far they would authorize him to suspend the progress of the corps. The nabob having observed that he had not consented to the augmentation, and been told that the governor-general considered himself the proper judge of its necessity, made the following reply:—"If the measure is to be carried into execution, whether with or without my approbation, there was no occasion for consulting me."

On the 14th of January, 1800, ten days after the above interview, the nabob put into the hands of the resident a paper in which he reminded him that the proposed plan had never received his approbation or acquiescence, and objected to it on various grounds, such as the thousands of people whom it would deprive of their subsistence, and the serious commotion which the disbanding of the native troops would in all probability produce in the capital. He concluded, however, with saying, that from dread of his lordship's displeasure, and with the sole view of pleasing him, he was compelled to assent to the introduction of the plan. On the 18th of January, the resident transmitted to the governor-general another paper or memorial which the nabob had delivered to him on the 11th,

and in which the whole question was argued with considerable ability. Referring to the 2nd article of the treaty, he remarks:—"On my accession to the musnud, the force designed for the defence of those dominions was increased beyond what it had been on any former period; whilst on my part I agreed to defray the expense of the said augmentation. But in no part of the said article is it written or hinted, that after the lapse of a number of years, a further permanent augmentation should take place." On the 7th article he remarks, that after the conclusion of the treaty "no further augmentation is to be made, excepting in cases of necessity; and that the increase is to be proportioned to the emergency, and endure but as long as the necessity exists. An augmentation of troops without existing necessity, and making me answerable for the expense attending the increase, is inconsistent with the treaty, and seems inexpedient". Quoting a part of the 17th article, which stipulated that "the nabob shall possess full authority over his household affairs, his hereditary dominions, his troops, and his subjects," he asks, "Where is my authority over my household affairs, over my hereditary dominions, over my troops, and over my subjects," should the management of the army be taken from under my direction?

Some of the above arguments were not easily answered, and the governor-general found means of dispensing with the necessity of it. His letter, to which the paper purported to be an answer, was attested by the governor-general's seal and signature. The reply ought, according to established usage, to have been executed with equal solemnity. The paper was therefore returned to the resident with instructions to replace it in the hands of the nabob, and at the same time inform him, that "the mode adopted in the present instance by his excellency, of replying to a public letter from the governor-general, attested by his lordship's seal and signature, and written on a subject of the most momentary (momentous?) concern to the mutual interests of the Company and of his excellency, besides indicating a levity totally unsuitable to the occasion, is highly deficient in the respect due from his excellency to the first British authority in India." It was added, that "if in formally answering his lordship's letter, his excellency should think

proper to impeach the honour and justice of the British government in similar terms to those employed in the paper delivered to you on the 11th, the governor-general will then consider how such unfounded calumnies and gross misrepresentations both of facts and arguments deserve to be noticed."

It cannot be necessary to continue the detail of this altercation. The nabob, after interposing some impediments to the execution of the governor-general's plan, was intimidated by a letter, in which he was charged with pursuing a course "nearly equivalent to positive hostility," and told that "perseverance in so dangerous a course" would leave "no other alternative than that of considering all amicable engagements" between him and the Company "to be dissolved." Thus menaced, he saw the necessity of giving way, and by the end of February, 1800, paid the money demanded on account of the additional troops. When the nabob subsequently complained of the difficulty he found in making these payments, the governor-general, in a letter dated 22nd January, 1801, and addressed to the resident, rejoined:—"If the alarming crisis be now approaching in which his excellency can no longer fulfil his engagements to the Company, this calamity must be imputed principally to his neglect of my repeated advice and earnest representations. The augmented charges might have been amply provided for, if his excellency had vigorously and cordially co-operated with me in the salutary and economical measure of disbanding his own undisciplined troops. It is now become the duty of the British government to interpose effectually for the protection of his interests, as well as those of the Company, which are menaced with common and speedy destruction, by the rapid decline of the general resources of his excellency's dominions." He concluded with declaring, that "no effectual security can be provided against the ruin of the province of Oudh, until the exclusive management of the civil and military government of that country shall be transferred to the Company, under suitable provisions for the maintenance of his excellency and his family. No other remedy can effect any considerable improvement in the resources of the state, or can ultimately secure its external safety and internal peace."

Entertaining these views, the governor-general could not consistently make any proposal which did not embody them,

and yet, as if conscious that an attempt to carry them out by violent methods would expose him to a charge of tyranny and injustice, he modified his measures so far as to give him the choice of two propositions. The one was to cede his whole dominions to the Company, reserving to himself and his successors only a nominal sovereignty; the other was to cede only as much of his dominions as would yield a revenue equal to the whole of the augmented subsidy of which he had been compelled to bear the burden. The whole revenue of Oudh at this time fell short of two millions and a half sterling, and as the subsidy considerably exceeded one million, the only alternative left to the nabob was to allow himself to be deposed, or to allow the Company to seize and appropriate one-half of his dominions, in consideration of their undertaking to defend the other half, and control him in the management of it. This was in substance the option submitted to the nabob. Can we wonder that he complained bitterly, or deny that he complained justly of harsh and iniquitous treatment?

The nabob had no hesitation in rejecting the first proposition. "As it is impossible for me with my own hands to exclude myself from my patrimonial dominions (for what advantage should I derive from so doing?)—this therefore is a measure which I will never adopt." To the second proposition he manifested the greatest repugnance, and urged an objection which was never answered. By Lord Teignmouth's treaty, the Company were entitled on failure of payment of the subsidy to take such steps as might seem necessary to obtain it. Of course when there was no failure they had no right to interfere. The nabob accordingly argued thus:—"Since I have not in any way delayed or neglected to discharge the kists for the expenses of the troops, but have paid them with punctuality, where is the occasion for requiring any territorial resource?—I expect to derive the most substantial profits from bringing into a flourishing condition this country, which has so long been in a state of waste and ruin. By a separation of territory, my hopes of these substantial profits would be entirely cut off, and a great loss would accrue. How then can I assent to any territorial cession?" Instead of contradicting the statement that the kists had been punctually paid, or attempting to answer

the argument founded upon it, the governor-general satisfied himself with such declamation as the following:—"I now declare to your excellency, in the most explicit terms, that I consider it to be my positive duty to resort to any extremity rather than suffer the further progress of that ruin, to which the interests of your excellency and the honourable Company are exposed, by the continued operation of the evils and abuses actually existing in the civil and military administration of the province of Oudh." To the resident he wrote:—"Any further reference to me from Oudh is unnecessary. I therefore empower you to act under the instructions contained in this letter, without waiting for additional orders. If, therefore, his excellency should persist in rejecting both propositions, you will inform him that any further remonstrance to me on this subject will be unavailing; that you are directed to insist upon the immediate cession of the territory proposed to be transferred to the Company; and that in the event of his excellency's refusal to issue the necessary orders for that purpose, you are authorized to direct the British troops to march for the purpose of establishing the authority of the British government within those districts." To this, the *ultima ratio* to which the governor-general was always too ready to resort when dealing with native powers, the nabob could make no reply, and after some stipulations which he proposed had been disdainfully rejected, he declared that no other alternative was allowed him than that of "passive obedience" to whatever measures might be resolved on; "the utmost which could be expected from him was passive submission to those measures;" his lordship's power could dispose of "the whole of his territorial possessions, and of his treasures;" "he neither had the inclination nor the strength to resist it; but he could not yield a voluntary consent to propositions injurious to his reputation." Such were the circumstances under which the Nabob of Oudh was compelled to conclude a treaty, which extorted from him one-half of his territories, and left him, in regard to the other half, nothing more than a nominal sovereignty.

Before the arrangements were concluded, Lord Mornington deemed it necessary to despatch his brother, the Honourable Henry Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley), on a mission to

Lucknow, in the hope that his diplomatic talents, combined with his near relationship to the governor-general, might enable him to smooth down any difficulties which still stood in the way. Mr. Wellesley arrived on the 3rd of September, 1801, and on the 5th placed in the hands of the nabob a memorial explanatory of the objects of his mission. The alternative of the two propositions was again tendered to him, and he was invited to a renewed discussion of the merits. He consented, but soon gave a peremptory rejection of the first proposition, on the ground that it would bring "an ever-lasting stigma on his name, by depriving a whole family of such a kingdom." Mr. Wellesley and the resident endeavoured to reason him out of this belief, by telling him "that his excellency reasoned upon the first proposition as if the execution of it deprived him of the possession of the musnud, whereas the true extent and meaning of it, and indeed the primary object, was to establish himself and posterity more firmly and securely on the musnud, with all the state, dignity, and influence." Can anything be more ludicrous and insulting? The proposition was that he should cede all his territories in perpetuity to the Company, and bind himself never to reside in them, and the effect of it, he is told, will be to establish him and his posterity more firmly and securely in the possession of all the state, dignity, and affluence of his exalted station. Had the nabob been simple enough to believe this representation and to act upon it, would it have been possible to deny that he had been swindled out of his dominions?

While the nabob positively rejected the one proposition and delayed his passive assent to the other, the governor-general lost patience, and caused intimation to be made to him that, in the event of further delay, he would not even have the privilege of choosing. The British government would choose for him by selecting the proposition to which he was known to be most repugnant. The nabob, now reduced to extremity, only begged to be allowed to depart on a pilgrimage, and appoint his son to act for him during his absence. He no longer withheld his consent, but he wished not to be present at the execution. He gives his reason:—"I should consider it a disgrace, and it would be highly unpleasant to me to show

my face to my people here." The indulgence thus asked was conceded, and the treaty was signed on the 10th of November, 1801. The possession of one-half of the territories of Oudh thus passed to the Company by a stroke of the pen, and the possession of the other half was so imperfectly guaranteed to the nabob that the Company could be at no loss at any future time for a plausible pretext for seizing it. It is not unworthy of notice that the cession made to the Company included nearly the whole of the territories which the nabob's father, Suja-ud-Daulah, had acquired, partly from the Company and partly by their aid, at the cost of about a million sterling. By a singular reverse of circumstances the Company were able, after having pocketed the price, to seize the territories, and thus obtain possession both of price and subject. Mr. Hastings sold the provinces of Cora and Allahabad, and hired out British troops to make an iniquitous conquest with the avowed object of improving the frontiers of Oudh, and interposing it as a barrier for the protection of the Company, and Lord Mornington had now taken possession of all the territories thus acquired with the avowed object of interposing the Company as a barrier for the protection of Oudh. There is too much ground to believe that in both cases the avowed was very different from the real object, and both honour and justice were sacrificed to policy. At the same time, how much soever the means employed must be reprobated, it is impossible to deny that a very great boon was conferred on the inhabitants of the ceded countries when they passed from the government of Sadat Ali to that of the Company. Immediately after ratifying the treaty the governor-general provided for the settlement of the new territory by establishing a board of commissioners, composed of three civil servants of the Company, presided over by Mr. Henry Wellesley as lieutenant-governor.

Before the conclusion of the treaty the governor-general had set out on a tour to the north, and was at Benaras when the treaty was sent to him for ratification. In a previous part of the journey a letter arrived from Mr. Wellesley, intimating that the nabob had some thoughts of imitating the example of his predecessor, and supplying the deficiencies of his revenue by plundering the begum his grandmother. As Mr. Hastings

had sanctioned a similar proceeding, and drawn large sums by means of it, the Nabob of Oudh, who had himself no scruples on the subject, imagined that the present governor-general would be equally unscrupulous, and proposed that, in the event of the territorial cession being carried out, he should be permitted in this way to compensate himself. The begum, who had a suspicion of the treatment which her grandson was preparing for her, endeavoured to avert it by not only soliciting the protection of the British government, but offering to constitute the Company her heir. The legality of such a proceeding was more than doubtful; but the governor-general, while admitting as a general rule "the justice and policy of preventing the transfer of individual property by gift or testament to a foreign state," held that there were peculiarities in the position of the begum which might justify the Company in accepting the legacy. Any doubt which he might have had on the subject was removed by the above proposal of the nabob, to which his lordship, instead of imitating the unworthy example which Mr. Hastings had set him, ordered his secretary to return the following indignant answer:—"The inclination manifested by his excellency the vizir in the form of a conditional assent to Lieutenant-colonel Scott's proposal for a territorial cession, to degrade and despoil the most distinguished characters of his family and his court—a design, though under some degree of disguise, particularly directed to the begum—and his insidious and disgraceful attempt to obtain the sanction of the British name to such unwarrantable acts of proscription, have given additional weight in his lordship's mind to the arguments above detailed, and have determined his lordship not only to acquiesce in the begum's proposal to its full extent, if it should be revived on her part, but to encourage her highness to renew her proposition at the earliest period of time, and by every justifiable means."

Mr. Wellesley, in the course of his duties as lieutenant-governor of the ceded districts, had his attention called to the position of the Nabob of Farrukhabad, who was a tributary of Oudh, and had now, in consequence of the territorial cession, become a tributary of the Company. His territory, forming part of the fertile tract of the Doab, extended for about 150 miles along

the right or western bank of the Ganges, and yielded a revenue of above ten lacs (£100,000). While subject to Oudh the nabob had been under the special protection of the Company, and he naturally expected that when his allegiance was entirely transferred to it his position would be improved. The succession had devolved upon him in consequence of the murder of his father by his eldest son. He was then too young to undertake the government, and a regent had been appointed; but the young nabob was now approaching majority, and, as he had always had a dislike to the regent, he was in hopes of being permitted to take the administration into his own hands. Mr. Wellesley, as lieutenant-governor, had fixed his residence at Bareilly. Hither the nabob and the regent repaired with a view to a new arrangement. The regent arrived first, and took the opportunity of an interview to give the nabob a very bad character. This would not have told much against him; but, unfortunately for him, the governor-general had adopted a policy which he was determined to follow whenever he found it not absolutely impracticable. This was to pension the native ruler, as he had done in Tanjore and attempted to do in Oudh, and assume the whole civil and military government in name of the Company. When this plan was submitted to the nabob, he requested that it should be put in writing, and after perusing it gave utterance to his feelings in the following terms:—"When I was in hopes that I should be put in possession of the country and property, this proposition is made to me. I am totally at a loss what to do. If I deliver over the country to the English government, all my relations and my neighbours, and all the nobility of Hindustan will say that I have been found so unfit by the English government that they did not think it proper to intrust me with the management of such a country, and I shall never escape for many generations from the sneers of the people. If, on the contrary, I say anything in disobedience to your orders, it will be against all rules of submission and propriety." In this dilemma he proposed that the English government should make one of its own servants superintendent of revenue, with power to send his agents into the villages and act along with the Farrukhabad collectors. By this means, he said, "your wishes may be accomplished, and my honour and name

preserved throughout Hindustan." Mr. Wellesley, acting under the instructions of the governor-general, turned a deaf ear to these remonstrances, and the nabob was compelled to submit to all the disgrace he had so earnestly deprecated, and cede his territories in perpetuity to the Company in return for a pension. Before the settlement of the territorial cessions in Oudh was completed, it was necessary to have recourse to arms in order to reduce a refractory zamindar of the name of Bhagwant Singh, who maintained an army of 20,000 men. He had two strongholds, Bidgegarh and Sasani, both of which stood sieges and made a good defence; Sasani, in particular, situated on the route from Agra to Aligarh, repulsed a premature assault, and was not evacuated by its garrison till the siege was undertaken by the commander-in-chief in person and the approaches had been regularly advanced to the distance of 200 yards. In March, 1802, the settlement having been completed, the board of commissioners for Oudh was dissolved, and Mr. Wellesley shortly after sailed for Europe.

The governor-general, amid the numerous subjects which occupied his attention in India, looked beyond its limits, and engaged in various measures which, while they were intended to give additional security to the Indian government, had a direct bearing on European politics. The earliest of these measures was the mission of Captain Malcolm to the court of Persia towards the end of 1799. The object was to enter into political and commercial treaties with the shah, by which the general interests of Great Britain might be promoted, and, at the same time, encourage him to make a diversion in Kabul, which would give Zeman Shah sufficient occupation at home, and oblige him to abandon his schemes of conquest in India. This mission, from the ability with which it was conducted, and the interesting account which Sir John Malcolm has given of it, acquired a considerable degree of celebrity; but, from various causes, the brilliant results at one time anticipated from it were not realized. The next foreign measure of importance projected by the governor-general was an expedition against the Mauritius. The French privateers which found an asylum there had, since the commencement of the war, been most destructive to British commerce, and nothing promised to be

more efficacious in suppressing their depredations than the capture of their place of rendezvous. With this view an armament was fitted out under the command of Colonel Wellesley in the end of 1800, and arrived in the harbour of Trincomali, in Ceylon, to wait for Admiral Rainier, commanding the British squadron in the Indian Ocean. An extraordinary crotchet on the part of the admiral frustrated the expedition. The governor-general, he thought, had no right to engage in it without the express command of his majesty, signified in the usual official form to the Indian government and to the commanders of his majesty's sea and land forces. On this ground he refused to co-operate, and before his scruples could be overcome the troops designed for the expedition were required for a different service. This was an expedition from Bombay to Egypt, to co-operate with the British forces which were engaged in frustrating the views of the French in that country. When the governor-general was obliged to abandon his designs on the Mauritius, he was meditating an attack on Batavia, when instructions from England turned attention to Egypt. The governor-general had in some measure anticipated these instructions by causing a body of 1,600 native infantry to be held in readiness at Bombay for foreign service. These, having been joined by the troops from Trincomali, sailed from Bombay under General Baird, and reached Jedda, on the east coast of the Red Sea, on the 18th of May, 1801. Here they were joined by a body of troops from the Cape. The united force, now amounting to 7,000 men, of whom 2,000 were sepoys, proceeded northwards to Cosseir, which was reached on the 8th June. Intelligence had previously been received of the victory gained over the French by Sir Ralph Abercromby, though at the expense of his own valuable life. Hostilities, however, were still raging, and General Baird commenced his march across the desert. It was accomplished with much difficulty, but without any serious loss; and the whole army, after having been carried down the Nile in boats, assembled in the Isle of Rhonda on the 27th of August. It expected still to be in time to assist in the capture of Alexandria; but, on arriving at Rosetta, received intelligence that Menon, who, on Bonaparte's departure, assumed the chief command, had capitulated. Hostilities in

Egypt consequently ceased, and shortly afterwards the peace of Amiens was proclaimed. The Indian army had thus no opportunity of gaining any laurels in the field; but the expedition itself, and the march across the desert, no mean achievements, are well entitled to an honourable place in Indian history.

On the 1st of January, 1802, the governor-general addressed a letter to the directors, intimating his intention to resign at the close of the year. His reasons were not given, but there could be no doubt that he was mainly influenced by a want of confidence, if not actual hostility, evinced towards him by the directors themselves in various proceedings. The earlier acts of his administration, and more especially the conquest of Mysore, had been universally applauded. The crown had hastened to do him honour by conferring on him the title of Marquis Wellesley, and the court of directors had passed a resolution, afterwards unanimously confirmed by the court of proprietors, bearing testimony to his eminent services, and rewarding them with an annuity of £5,000. In proportion, however, as the views of his lordship's administration seemed to enlarge, and the acquisition of new territories was followed by its necessary consequence, increased expenditure, dissatisfaction began to be felt, and even to be expressed by overt acts. Several of his appointments to office were animadverted upon and rescinded. The appointment of his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, to be one of the Mysore commissioners, was objected to as inconsistent with the act of parliament, which specially reserved all such offices to covenanted servants of the Company; the emoluments allowed to his other brother, Colonel Wellesley, as governor of Mysore, were cut down as extravagant, and a peremptory order to reduce the army of the Deccan, not only implied a censure upon him for having unduly increased it, but seemed to him so dangerous that he ventured, on his own responsibility, to suspend the execution of it. He was, moreover, thwarted in a magnificent project on which his heart was set. This was the erection of a college at Fort William for the improved education of the civil service. In a minute recorded 10th July, 1800, he gave a very full and able exposition of his views on this subject. "The civil servants of the East India Company," he said, "can no longer be considered as the

agents of a commercial concern. They are in fact the ministers and officers of a powerful sovereign; they must now be viewed in that capacity, with reference not to their nominal, but to their real occupations. They are required to discharge the functions of magistrates, judges, ambassadors, and governors of provinces, in all the complicated and extensive relations of those sacred trusts and exalted stations, and under peculiar circumstances which greatly enhance the solemnity of every public obligation and aggravate the difficulty of every public charge. Their duties are those of statesmen in every other part of the world, with no other characteristic differences than the obstacles opposed by an unfavourable climate, by a foreign language, and by the peculiar usages and laws of India, and by the manners of its inhabitants." From these acknowledged facts the governor-general inferred that "whatever course and system of study may be deemed requisite in England to secure an abundant and pure source for the sufficient supply of the public service, the peculiar nature of our establishments in the East, so far from admitting any relaxation of those wise and salutary rules and restraints, demands that they should be enforced with a degree of additional vigilance and care proportioned to the aggravated difficulties of civil service, and to the numerous hazards surrounding the entrance to public life in India." These were the important objects aimed at by the college, and so eager was the governor-general for a commencement, that he actually established it without waiting for the sanction of the home authorities. This was unfortunate, as it was an usurpation of authority which could not plead any immediate necessity, and furnished the directors with grounds of objection additional to those which were furnished by some parts of the constitution of the college itself. The consequence was, that the college had scarcely commenced operations when it was abolished, and a very humble substitute for it was provided by the establishment of an institution at each of the three presidencies, for instruction in the native languages.

It is doubtful if the directors would have come so directly into collision with the governor-general, had they not been goaded on by what was called the "shipping interest," which then formed the most powerful body connected with the East

India House, and had been mortally offended by some steps in advance which the governor-general had taken on the subject of free trade. On the renewal of the charter in 1793, the Company were taken bound to reserve at least 3,000 tons of their shipping annually for the use of private merchants engaged in the India trade. For exports from Great Britain the amount of tonnage was at the time sufficient, had it been allotted fairly, under proper regulations, and at a reasonable rate. In India the case was very different. The 3,000 tons were far from supplying what was wanted for export to Europe, and the consequence was, that a large export trade had sprung up, and was carried on almost entirely by foreign shipping belonging to the different maritime states of the European continent. This trade, affording the British residents in India a convenient means of transmitting their fortunes, was mainly supported by their capital, and thus, owing to injudicious restrictions, a trade by which Britain might have greatly profited, was thrown entirely into the hands of foreigners. The evil was so manifest that in May, 1798, the directors empowered the Bengal government to take up ships on account of the Company, and re-let them to the Calcutta merchants for shipments to London. The governor-general, finding that under this plan the merchants complained loudly both of expense and delay, innovated upon it so far as to allow them to make their own arrangements for the extent and rate of freight, and the despatch of the vessels. As these ships were India built, the ship-builders in London raised an outcry in which they were joined by the "shipping interest" at the India House. Ministers, strongly backed by the other mercantile interests of England, cordially supported the innovation, and a serious quarrel ensued between the directors and the Board of Control. The governor-general was made a kind of scape-goat in this quarrel, and subjected to numerous annoyances which at times resembled studied insults. Lord Clive, who had been throughout the steady supporter of his policy as governor of Madras, suffered in the same way, and therefore had also tendered his resignation.

Though Marquis Wellesley did not state his reasons for resigning to the directors, he freely communicated them to Mr. Addington, afterwards Lord Sidmouth, and then secretary of

state. In a letter addressed to him ten days after that addressed to the directors, he gives a list of grievances. It is unnecessary to enumerate them further than has been done already, but as the charge brought against the governor-general and his still more celebrated brother, Colonel Wellesley, in regard to the emoluments drawn by the latter, still possesses public interest, the indignant refutation of it deserves to be quoted. "Can the court of directors," he asks, "suppose that I am capable of permitting the government of Fort. St George to grant an extravagant allowance to my brother, and that my brother is capable of accepting such an allowance? If such be the opinion of the court, it ought to remove Colonel Wellesley from his command, and me from my government. The fact is, that the allowance is scarcely equal to the unavoidable expenses of Colonel Wellesley's situation, which is known to be of a very peculiar nature, involving the necessity of a great establishment and of other charges requisite for the maintenance of our interest in that recently conquered kingdom." After dwelling on the affront to his brother, he continues thus, "It cannot be denied that the court, by reducing the established allowances of Colonel Wellesley, has offered me the most direct, marked, and disgusting personal indignity which could be devised. The effect of this order must be to inculcate an opinion that I have suffered my brother to derive emoluments beyond the limits of justice and propriety, and that I have exhibited an example of profusion and extravagance in an allowance granted to my nearest connection. I have already stated that the ground of the order is as unjust and unwarranted in point of fact as its operation is calculated to be injurious and humiliating to my reputation and honour. If the court of directors really was of opinion that Colonel Wellesley's allowances were too high, the respectful and decorous course would have been to have referred the question to my consideration; nor can it be imagined that the court would have omitted so indispensable a precaution of delicacy and justice, unless the court acted under a strong sense of displeasure and discontent at the general tenor of my administration, and under the influence of an intolerable jealousy of my intentions." The court of directors, though differing with him on some material points, were aware

how difficult it might be to supply his place, and therefore, expressing their high sense of the zeal and ability which he had displayed, and of the advantages which the Company would derive from his continuance in office, begged him to prolong his stay for at least another year. With this request he immediately complied.

Before concluding the present chapter, it will not be out of place to record the fate of Dhundia Waugh. After he had taken refuge within the Maratha territory, and been pillaged by Dhondur Pant Gokla, as has been already described, he entered the service of the Raja of Kolhapur, who was then at war with the peshwa, but soon again became his own master, and commenced his depredations. Having appeared on the frontiers of Mysore at the head of 5,000 horse, and assumed the title of "King of the World," or "King of the Two Worlds," the Madras government instructed Colonel Wellesley "to pursue him wherever he could be found, and to hang him on the first tree." The service was not one in which many laurels could be gained, and yet it was not without importance. "Dhundia," as Colonel Wellesley remarked in a letter to Lord Clive, "is certainly a despicable enemy, but from circumstances he is one against whom we have been obliged to make a formidable preparation. If we do not get him, we must expect a general insurrection of all the discontented and disaffected in these countries." Before the British troops took the field against him, both the Nizam and the Marathas had commenced the pursuit. The latter, so far from succeeding, sustained a severe defeat. They were commanded by Dhondur Pant Gokla, against whom Dhundia had vowed vengeance, declaring that he would either sacrifice his own life, or dye his mustachios in the heart's blood of Dhondur Pant. This ferocious vow he is said to have literally fulfilled, by lying in ambush in a wood, and watching his opportunity. At last he came suddenly upon Dhondur Pant when he was separated from the main body of his followers, slew him along with several persons of note, and then following up his advantage, obliged the whole Maratha detachment to take refuge in the fort of Hullyhul, garrisoned by British troops.

As Dhundia was now held to be a common enemy, Colonel Wellesley, before starting, had received permission from the

peshwa to follow him if necessary into the very heart of the Maratha territory. Without this nothing could have been done, for Dhundia had already crossed the frontier, and moved north as far as the right bank of the Malpurba, when, on the 31st of July, 1800, Colonel Wellesley surprised his camp, and as he himself relates, "drove into the river or destroyed everybody that was in it." Dhundia, however, made his escape, and was ere long once more at the head of a large body of marauders. Six weeks more had been spent in a harassing pursuit, when he was overtaken on the 10th of September. The result cannot be better told than in Colonel Wellesley's own words. Writing on the 11th from his camp at Yepulpur, he says: "After a most anxious night, I marched in the morning and met the King of the World with his army, about 5,000 horse, at a village called Conahgull, about six miles from hence. He had not known of my being so near him in the night, and had thought that I was at Chinnur. He was marching to the westward, with the intention of passing between the Maratha and Mughul cavalry and me. He drew up, however, in a very strong position as soon as he perceived me; and the 'victorious army' stood for some time with apparent firmness. I charged them with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regiments of cavalry, and drove them before me till they dispersed and were scattered over the face of the country. I then returned and attacked the royal camp, and got possession of elephants, camels, baggage, &c., which were still upon the ground. The Mughul and Maratha cavalry came up about eleven o'clock; and they have been employed ever since in the pursuit and destruction of the scattered fragments of the rebellious army. Thus has ended this warfare, and I shall commence my march in a day or two towards my own country." He writes this confidently, because Dhundia himself was among the slain. The importance of the event was not overrated by Major (afterwards Sir) Thomas Monro, when he remarked half jocularly to Colonel Wellesley, "Had you and your regicide army been out of the way, Dhundia would undoubtedly have become an independent and powerful prince, and the founder of a new dynasty of cruel and treacherous sultans."

Peace with the Marathas

MARQUIS Wellesley, in agreeing to prolong his stay in India, had been influenced, not so much by the request of the directors as by the menacing aspect which affairs were rapidly assuming. It required little political sagacity to perceive that the peace of Amiens could not be lasting, and both the dissensions which prevailed among the Marathas, and the hostile spirit manifested by several of their leaders, made it impossible to say how soon a new Indian war of a very formidable description might become inevitable. Under these circumstances the governor-general, even before the flattering request of the directors reached him, had so far retracted his intention of resigning, as to intimate that he would remain until there was a greater prospect of permanent tranquillity. The causes of threatened disturbance must now be briefly traced. The Marathas, who had marked the Nizam for their prey, were greatly disappointed and offended at the treaty, by which he dissolved his connections with the French, and placed himself entirely under the protection of the Company. Of course, they were still more disappointed and offended when they found that treaty superseded by another, which established an absolute identity of interest between the contracting parties, and made the Nizam not so much the ally of the Company as their vassal. By this latter treaty, concluded 12th October, 1800, the Nizam was furnished with two battalions of sepoys and a regiment of native cavalry, as an addition to the former subsidiary force, and agreed to cede to the Company in perpetuity as much territory as would yield a revenue equal to the amount of subsidy which he would otherwise have been bound to pay. The possibility of arrears, and of the disputes

to which they might have given rise, was thus precluded, and at the same time the sacrifice made by the Nizam was felt to be comparatively slight, because the territories ceded consisted almost entirely of those which he had acquired from Mysore, in the wars of 1792 and 1799, and scarcely trenched at all on his hereditary dominions, the integrity of which was henceforth guaranteed. While the British government were pledged not to interfere in any way with his children, relations, or subjects, and declared that in regard to these they would always consider him absolute, they engaged not to permit any power or state whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked aggression on his territories. As a necessary counterpart of this obligation, he engaged neither to commit hostilities against other states, nor to enter into negotiation with them, without informing and consulting the Company, and in the event of differences arising between him and any other state, he was taken bound to submit them to the Company, and acquiesce in their final decision.

In the above treaty the Marathas were not entirely overlooked, for it was expressly stipulated, that in the event of either the peshwa, Raghuji Bhonsla, or Daulat Rao Sindhia, desiring to become a party to it, all or either of them should be admitted to all its advantages. Whatever these might be, the Marathas were little disposed, and even if disposed would scarcely have been able to avail themselves of them. Nana Fadnavis, who had long conducted the government at Poona in name of the peshwa, with so much ability and craftiness as to merit the surname of the Indian Machiavelli, died at a very advanced age, on the 13th of March, 1800. He was undoubtedly a great statesman, and during the latter part of his life compensated by wisdom, moderation, and a patriotic spirit, for the errors into which an inordinate ambition had led him. His death was the signal for new dissensions. The peshwa and Daulat Rao Sindhia, bent on seizing the immense treasures which he was believed to have accumulated, quarrelled over them. Other disputes followed, and disorders everywhere prevailed. After a kind of anarchy, Sindhia re-established his ascendancy, and while pretending the utmost deference for the peshwa Baji Rao, kept him virtually a prisoner in his palace

by placing a guard over him. This was a thralldom from which Baji Rao was of course anxious to be delivered, and he looked anxiously about for the means. These he could only obtain by two courses of policy, of which the one was to counter-balance the power of Sindhia by encouraging some rival confederate, and the other to accept of a subsidiary force with which the governor-general was willing on certain conditions to furnish him. He preferred the former course, and at one time hoped to be able to carry it out by means of Jaswant Rao Holkar, who, without possessing any legitimate claim, had succeeded in placing himself at the head of the Holkar family. As he will soon occupy a prominent place in our narrative, a brief account of that family, and of the means by which he became its head, may now be given.

The Holkar family are Sudras of the Dhungur or shepherd tribe, and take their name from their native village of Hull or Hohl, on the Nira, forty-five miles south-east of Poona. The first member who acquired distinction was Mulhar Rao Holkar. He was born about 1693, and owing to his father's death was removed at the age of five to Khandesh, where he was brought up by his maternal uncle. His first employment was to tend his uncle's sheep. One day as he lay asleep in the fields, a cobra-da-capello was seen to interpose its crest between his face and the rays of the sun. This was deemed so favourable an omen that he was sent to push his fortune as a horseman in the service of a Maratha chief of the name of Kuddum Bandi. He soon attracted notice, acquired some wealth by the marriage of Golama Bai, his uncle's daughter, and entered the service of the peshwa Baji Rao, who at once gave him the command of 500 horse. Shortly afterwards, he accompanied Chimnaji, the peshwa's brother, on an expedition to the Concan, and greatly assisted in wresting Bassein and various other places from the Portuguese. So rapid was his subsequent progress, that in 1728 he received a *jaghir* of twelve, and in 1731 another *jaghir* of no fewer than seventy districts, north of the Narmada. In 1750, after Malwa was conquered, nearly the whole of its territories were divided between Holkar and Sindhia, the former receiving 74½ lacs (£745,000), and the latter 65½ lacs (£655,000) of revenue. Mulhar Rao now fixed his residence at Indore,

which in consequence assumed the dignity and importance of a capital. As the Marathas were bent on extending their arms northwards, Mulhar Rao was chiefly employed in Hindustan, and took the lead in most of their operations in that quarter. He was one of the few Maratha chiefs who escaped unhurt from the disastrous battle of Panipat. It has been alleged that on this day he did not perform his part, and drew off, offended with Sadasheo Bhow, the Maratha commander-in-chief, who, when urged by him to delay the action for a day or two, disdainfully exclaimed—"Who wants advice from a goatherd?" Another and more probable account is that Mulhar Rao owed his escape to the superior manner in which he kept his troops together, and conducted their retreat. He subsequently acquired considerable tracts in Rajputana and in the Deccan. His merit as an administrator was not less than his skill and courage as a soldier, and he possessed many estimable qualities which have fixed his memory in the affections of his countrymen. He died at the age of seventy-six.

Mulhar Rao Holkar having had only one son, Kundi Rao, who predeceased him, was succeeded by Kundi Rao's only son, Malli Rao, who was considered of weak and unsettled intellect, and is said to have died in a paroxysm of madness brought on by remorse, for having on unjust suspicion put an innocent man to death. His mother Ahilya Bai, famed for her talents and virtues, immediately assumed the government, and conducted it for thirty years with singular ability and success. By the selection of Gangadhar Jaswant, the able Brahmin minister of Mulhar Rao, as her diwan, and of Tukaji Holkar, who though of the same tribe was not otherwise related to the family, as her commander-in-chief, she secured an administration which under her immediate superintendence secured the prosperity and happiness of her subjects. Tukaji, to whom she left the succession, being much older than herself, could not well be adopted as her son, and was therefore styled by her command Tukaji the son of Mulhar Rao Holkar. He remained always in close connection with Mahadaji Sindhia, and was usually found fighting along with him in the first Maratha war. Latterly, however, he began to pursue a more independent course, and on more than one occasion engaged in open hostil-

ities against him. He outlived Sindhia, but had reached so advanced an age that he wanted the vigour necessary to cope with Daulat Rao, Sindhia's successor, and died in the midst of the dissensions which followed the death of Madhu Rao.

Tukaji Holkar left two legitimate sons, Kasi Rao and Mulhar Rao, and two illegitimate, Jaswant Rao and Etogi. Kasi Rao was of course the legal heir, but incapable of ruling, because both weak in intellect and deformed in body, while his brother was a bold aspiring youth. An arrangement was attempted by which the elder brother was to hold the government, and the younger to command the army, but this arrangement, though it had the sanction both of Ahilya Bai and Tukaji, proved impracticable, and the two youths were soon found plotting against each other's lives. The elder courted the protection of Daulat Rao Sindhia, the younger that of Nana Fadnavis, and the dominions of Holkar were in consequence torn asunder by intestine faction. A reconciliation was sought for, and was not only concluded, but confirmed by a solemn oath between the brothers. There was no sincerity in it. In the course of the following night, Sindhia's disciplined battalions surrounded the camp of Mulhar Rao and slew him. Among those who escaped was the illegitimate son Jaswant Rao, who fled for protection to Nagpur, the capital of Raghuji Bhonsla, Raja of Berar. He had a few horsemen with him, and was reported to have carried off some of the family jewels. Whether with the hope of extorting these from him, or conciliating the favour of Sindhia, the raja was ungenerous enough to seize and imprison him. After nearly eighteen months he made his escape, and arrived in great destitution at Dhar, where he was hospitably received by Anand Rao, the head of the family of Powar. Sindhia no sooner heard of his asylum than he threatened Anand Rao with vengeance if he were not seized or expelled; and Jaswant Rao, to spare his benefactor, departed of his own accord with a few attendant horsemen and a small sum of money, which enabled him to raise about 120 half-armed foot. With these he surprised a small body of Kasi Rao's household troops, and completely defeated them. This first success was followed by others, but as he knew that his illegitimacy would prevent the great body of the adherents of the Holkar family from joining his standard

if he made war in his own name, he professed to have espoused the cause of Kundi Rao, the infant son of Mulhar Rao, who, since Kasi Rao's incapacity made him a mere tool in the hands of Sindhia, was, he maintained, the true heir. This profession did him good service, and he began to collect an army, composed indiscriminately of adventurers of all kinds—Marathas, Rajputs, Afghans, Bhils, and Pindaris.

Jaswant Row's force continuing to accumulate, some leaders of note began to join him; and he added greatly to his strength by entering into an arrangement with Amir Khan, a Muhammedan predatory chief, who was then encamped with 1,500 foot in the vicinity of Bhopal, a city of Malwa situated on the northern slope of the Vindhya Mountains. The terms of the agreement concluded in 1798 were, that the two chiefs should unite their fortunes, and share equally in all future conquest and plunder. The work of depredation was immediately commenced, and considerable sums were obtained by levying forced contributions. After a successful encounter with one of Kasi Rao's officers, Jaswant Rao moved directly against Mhysir, which was then considered the capital of the Holkar dominions, and obtained a large sum in money and jewels. While at Mhysir, the accidental bursting of a musket in his hand deprived him of the sight of one of his eyes, and three months elapsed before he was again able to take the field. The time, however, was not lost, as it enabled him to give a more perfect organization to his army, while Amir Khan successfully carried on the predatory warfare. At Saugar, in particular, where the work of unrestrained pillage was carried on for nearly a whole month, an enormous booty was obtained. Under such a mode of warfare discipline was impossible, and Amir Khan's force degenerated into a mere rabble. The fact was not unobserved, and an unexpected attack by an officer of the Raja of Berar gave him a severe check. A timely reinforcement by Jaswant Rao saved him, and by means of their united forces the half of Malwa was overrun before Sindhia could take any effectual steps for its protection.

As soon as Sindhia was in the field with his battalions the war assumed a different form, and several well-contested battles were fought. One of these, which took place in 1799, in the

vicinity of Ujjain, Sindhia's capital, was gained mainly by Jaswant Rao's courage and talent. The capture of Ujjain itself followed. On this occasion Jaswant Rao showed how superior his discipline was to that of Amir Khan. Instead of giving up the city to indiscriminate plunder, he took the more effectual plan of replenishing his treasury by a heavy contribution levied upon the inhabitants, in proportion to their real or supposed wealth. The victory of Ujjain was ere long followed by a reverse, which deprived Jaswant Rao of all its advantages, and brought him to the very brink of destruction. He had left his success, in another pitched battle fought near Indore, to depend on the success of a stratagem which failed, and was obliged to flee with a mere remnant of his army, leaving his guns, camp, and capital in the hands of the enemy. So disastrous was this defeat, that on his arrival at Mhysir he plainly informed his adherents that his means of giving them regular pay was at an end, that all he could now do was to lead them to plunder. The announcement is said to have been received with acclamations, as no doubt was entertained that under his leadership far more than regular pay would in this way be obtained.

Under this new system, Jaswant Rao's ranks were rapidly recruited, and he again assumed so formidable an appearance that Sindhia, who found himself unable to save his provinces from devastation, would willingly have made peace with him on favourable terms. The peshwa, who had at one time intended to use Jaswant Rao's influence as a counterpoise to that of Sindhia, had by an act of barbarism made this impossible. Etoji or Wittuji Holkar, the only full brother of Jaswant Rao, having, during the distractions which prevailed at Poona, joined a body of insurgent horse, was taken prisoner. Considering the services which his father Tukaji had rendered, some mercy might have been shown him, but Baji Rao was of an implacable temper, and forgetting all that Tukaji had done for him, remembered only that he had once been leagued with Nana Fadnavis against him. This was enough, and nothing but an atrocious execution would satisfy him. Having seated himself with his favourite at a window of his palace, he ordered Etoji to be brought out and tied to the foot of an elephant. The unhappy victim cried for mercy, but the peshwa, turning a deaf ear to his supplications, looked on with composure, while the elephant

dragged him forth from the palace-yard to crush him to death in the public street. Besides glutting his revenge, he meant by this barbarous proceeding to please Sindhia, who had him completely in his power. In this he may have succeeded, but he appears to have forgotten that he was at the same time provoking the just vengeance of a formidable enemy. Jaswant Rao loved his brother, and vowed not to rest till he had retaliated on those whom he held to be his murderers. The cowardly peshwa would have stooped to any means of propitiating his wrath. He offered to release the young son of Mulhar Rao who was detained at Poona, or to recognize himself as the heir of the Holkar family; but Jaswant Rao rose in his demands in proportion to the concessions offered, and finding himself strong enough determined to change the seat of war to the Deccan. When at last, after pillaging the territories of Sindhia and the peshwa without distinction, he was seen advancing on Poona, the consternation was extreme, and the peshwa, driven from all other resources, made overtures for a British subsidiary force. As yet, however, he was not so far humbled as to accept the only terms on which the governor-general was willing to grant it, and having once more made common cause with Sindhia, he determined to wait the result of an appeal to arms. An attempt was made to oppose Holkar at the Ali Bela Pass, but he avoided it by making a circuit to the east, passed Ahmednagar, and finally on the 23rd of October encamped near Lune, a few miles east of Poona. Two days afterwards the encounter took place. The field was well contested and the issue so doubtful, that Holkar, seeing part of his army seized with panic, exclaimed, "As for me, I have no intention of surviving this day; if I do not gain the victory, where can I flee?" His words were well seconded by his actions. Bringing forward his best infantry, and heading his cavalry in charge after charge, he at length carried all before him. Sindhia quitted the field in the utmost disorder, leaving all his guns, stores, and baggage behind. The road to Poona was now open, but Holkar would not allow his troops to enter, and when some of the Afghan marauders attempted to force their way he drove them back by turning his guns upon them.

The peshwa, who had made sure of victory, quitted his palace in the morning, with the intention of taking part in the

action. On hearing the noise of the firing his courage failed, and he turned off to the southward to await the result. The moment it was determined he hastened off to Singarh, and sent a message to Colonel Close, the British resident, binding himself to subsidize six battalions of sepoys, and cede territory of the annual value of twenty-five lacs (£250,000) for their support. After remaining three days at Singarh, he continued his fight, first to Raigarh and then to Mhar, from which he despatched a letter requesting the government of Bombay to send shipping to convey him thither. Before a reply was received he repaired to Severndrug, and finally embarked at Rewadanda in a British ship, which carried him to Bassein, where he arrived on the 6th of December, 1802.

The day after the action, Colonel Close at Holkar's request paid him a visit, and found him "in a small tent, ankle deep in mud, wounded by a spear, and with a sabre cut in the head". He expressed himself in the most friendly terms towards the British government, and solicited Colonel Close to mediate in settling his differences with Sindhia and the peshwa. His subsequent proceedings cast some doubt on his sincerity. Be this as it may, Colonel Close, after being detained by him nearly a month, quitted Poona. Passports for this purpose were granted with much seeming reluctance. Holkar's moderation after his victory was not of long continuance. He had hoped by means of it to induce Baji Rao to return. Having failed in this object he threw off disguise, and not only levied a contribution on Poona for the purpose of paying his troops, but placed Amrit Rao, the peshwa's brother by adoption, on the musnud, and began a course of indiscriminate extortion and plunder. Having discharged the arrears of pay and replenished his treasury with the booty thus obtained, he marched off towards Central India.

Colonel Close arrived at Bombay on the 3rd of December, and proceeded to Bassein. On the evening of the 6th, the very day on which the peshwa landed, he waited upon him, and entered on the subject of the proposed treaty. Its various articles were discussed for the first time on the 18th, and by the 31st everything was arranged. The treaty, consisting of nineteen articles, is of great length. Its leading provisions were, that a subsidiary force of six battalions of native infantry, with the

usual complement of field-pieces and European artillerymen, should be stationed by the Company within the peshwa's territories, and that to meet the annual expense the peshwa should cede to the Company in perpetuity territory yielding a revenue of twenty-six lacs—that the contracting parties would reciprocally protect the territories of each other, and of their allies, the Company engaging in the event of war to furnish as large a force as possible, and the peshwa to furnish, in addition to four of the subsidiary battalions, at least 6,000 foot and 10,000 horse, to be employed as circumstances might require—that the peshwa would not make any aggression on other states, nor negotiate with them, without informing and consulting the Company—and that both in regard to existing, and in the event of future differences, he would allow the Company to arbitrate, and submit to their award. By other articles the peshwa engaged not to allow any Europeans belonging to a nation at war with Great Britain, or engaged in intriguing against British interests, to reside within his territories, and agreed to commute or abandon certain Maratha claims on Surat and other districts. The subsidiary force was “to be at all times ready for such services as the due correction of his highness's subjects and dependants, and the overawing and chastising of rebels, or excitors of disturbance;” but the Company were “to have no manner of concern with any of his highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants; with respect to whom his highness is absolute.”

The peshwa had no sooner purchased security at the expense of independence, than he began to waver and question the propriety of the course which he had adopted. He was well aware how obnoxious the treaty would be to Sindhia, and Raghuji Bhonsla, Raja of Berar, had repeatedly warned him against any step which would increase British influence, and yet he had now rendered himself entirely subservient to it. Ostensibly for the purpose of explaining the treaty and urging them to become parties to it, but really for the purpose of excusing himself for having sought European protection, he despatched an envoy to each of them with a letter, in which he urged them to march with all speed to Poona, and punish the rebel Holkar. With his usual craft he said nothing of the

British, calculating that in the event of a collision, which he evidently anticipated, he would be able, by not having committed himself, to obtain the protection of the winning party. The governor-general, who had repeatedly urged Sindhia to conclude a treaty similar to that of Bassein, was in hopes that he would see the necessity of giving in his adherence to it, and sent him an invitation to that effect through Colonel Collins. At first Sindhia evaded discussion, but on being pressed declared that he would neither join the defensive alliance nor obstruct it, though he expected that, as the guarantee of the treaty of Salbye, he would have been consulted before new arrangements were made. His intentions, however, he declared, were in every respect friendly to the British government. So far was this from being true, that he had despatched an envoy to Raghuji Bhonsla, for the purpose of cementing a general Maratha confederacy against the British as the common enemy.

No time was lost in making the necessary preparations to re-establish the peshwa at Poona. On the 25th of March, 1803, Colonel Stevenson, at the head of the Nizam's subsidiary force and two regiments of native cavalry, mustering in all above 8,000 men, and accompanied by 15,000 of the Nizam's own troops, took up a position at Purinda on the peshwa's frontier, about 100 miles east of his capital, and at the same time Major-general Wellesley (such was now his rank) arrived on the northern frontier of Mysore, at the head of 8,000 infantry and 1,700 cavalry. On the banks of the Krishna, General Wellesley was joined by numerous Maratha jaghirdars in the peshwa's interest, and began his advance on Poona. Holkar's troops retired precipitately as he approached, and as it was learned that he had left only a small garrison in the capital, with instructions to burn it before leaving, General Wellesley hastened forward with his cavalry, and took possession of it without opposition, on the 20th of April. Colonel Stevenson, whose co-operation was no longer required, moved north towards the Godavari to protect the country against Holkar's marauders. On the 13th of May the peshwa arrived from Bassein, and resumed his seat on the musnud amid general rejoicings.

Sindhia, who proceeded to the north after his defeat, had in the meantime returned, crossed the Narmada, and encamped

at Burhanpur on the Nizam's frontiers. Though his professions were still friendly, he had through his ministers remonstrated against the British advance on Poona, and was busily engaged in concert with Raghuji Bhonsla in preparing for war. It was even understood that he had made overtures to Holkar, and was aiming at nothing less than a general Maratha confederacy, the object of which was obvious. From letters afterwards discovered, it appears that his designs were countenanced by the peshwa himself. Under these circumstances, the resident at his court was instructed that he should retire from the threatening position he occupied on the Nizam's frontier, or give some unequivocal proof that his intentions were not hostile. As the most effectual means of seconding the remonstrances of the resident, General Wellesley advanced a few marches to the northward of Poona, so as to have an opportunity of daily communication with him, and also of co-operating if necessary with Colonel Stevenson. On the 27th of May, the resident at an interview with Sindhia formally communicated to him the treaty of Bassein. He went over it article by article, and admitted that he saw nothing which trenched in the least on his legitimate authority. When pressed as to his intentions, he not only refused to explain them, but put an end to all further discussion by the following astounding announcement:—"After my interview with the Raja of Berar, you shall be informed whether it will be peace or war."

As war seemed now to be inevitable, the governor-general vested General Wellesley and Lord Lake, the respective commanders of the armies of the Deccan and of Hindustan, with the most complete military, civil, and political powers. General Wellesley was specially authorized to negotiate with Sindhia, Holkar, and Raghuji Bhonsla, with a view to their retirement within their own territories, or the granting of some sufficient pledge of pacific intentions within a certain number of days; should they by their refusal make war inevitable, he was to carry it on in the most active manner, and listen to no proposals of peace till the chiefs against whom the war was directed should be rendered incapable of further mischief. Lord Lake was informed that if war took place its objects were to be the complete reduction of the power which the French were estab-

lishing in Hindustan by means of Sindhia's brigades, the occupation of the whole of the Doab and of Bundelkhand, and the possession of Delhi, Agra, and a chain of posts on the right bank of the Jamuna.

On the 14th of July General Wellesley addressed a letter to Sindhia, in which, after pointing out the friendly purposes of the treaty of Bassein, and the apparently hostile intentions manifested by the confederate chiefs, he called upon him to separate his army from that of Raghuji Bhonsla and recross the Narmada. This being done, he would on his part withdraw the British troops to their ordinary stations. Four days after writing this letter he was made acquainted with the above powers conferred by the governor-general; he communicated them to Sindhia, and at the same time instructed the resident, in the event of his former demands not being complied with, to withdraw instantly from the Maratha camp. Sindhia at first seemed disposed to yield, but after a conference with Raghuji Bhonsla, and a delay of a few days, returned for answer on the 25th of July that they were within their own territories, and would promise not to pass the Ajanta Hills, nor march to Bona; as to the treaty of Bassein, they had already assured the governor-general that they would not interfere with it. After a number of promises and evasions, by which they managed to spin out the time till the 3rd of August, the resident quitted the Maratha camp, and General Wellesley prepared to commence hostilities by the attack of the fortress of Ahmednagar. The petta or town, which had a lofty wall flanked with towers, but no rampart, was defended by a number of Arabs, supported by a battalion of Sindhia's regular infantry, and a body of horse, who lay encamped in an open space between the town and fort. The resistance was vigorous, the enemy retiring to the houses after the wall was forced, and keeping up a destructive fire from them. The capture, however, was completed in a single day. On the following day, the 9th of August, the general, after reconnoitring the fort, seized a position within 400 yards of it. In the course of the night a battery of four guns was erected, and in the morning at daylight it opened with such effect that the killedar offered to treat for surrender. Immediate submission was demanded; and at last, on the 11th, he surrendered,

on being permitted to depart with his garrison and private property. The possession of this place was of great importance, from its position on the Nizam's frontier, and the facilities it afforded for future operations, by furnishing a large and secure depot for provisions and military stores.

After this capture, and the occupation of the adjoining districts, General Wellesley moved to the Godavari, and crossed it on the 24th of August, Colonel Stevenson in the meantime moving northwards in the direction of Aurangabad. Sindhia and the Raja of Berar were now also in motion. After penetrating the Ajanta Pass, they had marched eastward, and seized Jalnapur, or Jaulna, about forty miles east of Aurangabad, and then, on finding that General Wellesley had arrived at Aurangabad on the 29th, turned suddenly to the south-east, as if intending to cross the Godavari and make a dash at Hyderabad, where the death of Nizam Ali on the 6th, and the succession of his son Sikander Jah, were perhaps supposed to favour their attempt. To counteract this design, and either bring them to a general action, or compel them to a retreat, General Wellesley followed close on their track, and so completely checked their operations to the south, that they hastened back and took up a position to the north of Jalnapur. On the 2nd of September this fort was taken by Colonel Stevenson, who, being now in the immediate vicinity of the confederates, endeavoured to bring them to action. In this he failed; though he afterwards succeeded by a night attack in throwing their camp into the greatest consternation, and in inflicting upon them a considerable loss.

On the 21st of September the whole of the Maratha army, joined by their infantry, which consisted of sixteen battalions of regular infantry, was encamped in the neighbourhood of Jaffarabad, twenty-two miles north of Jalnapur, while General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson had formed a junction at Budnapur, about ten miles west of the latter place. The two camps were thus only about twenty-five miles distant from each other, and a decisive battle was consequently anticipated. The plan adopted by the British was to move their army in two divisions, and make an united attack on the enemy on the morning of the 24th. They accordingly separated on the 22nd, Colonel Stevenson taking the western, and General Wellesley

the eastern route. On the 23rd, when about to encamp at Naulnie, General Wellesley learned from his spies that the confederates were encamped within six miles of him, on the banks of the Kailna. His resolution was immediately taken. In another day the enemy would in all probability have sent off their infantry, and continued to carry on a desultory and protracted warfare with their horse, watching every opportunity to attack the baggage of the British, and hamper their movements. This was the very thing which General Wellesley was anxious to avoid, and he therefore determined, instead of waiting for Colonel Stevenson, to risk a general action with his own division, notwithstanding an immense disparity of numbers, still further increased by the necessity of leaving a detachment at Naulnie to protect the baggage.

General Wellesley having moved out at the head of the pickets to reconnoitre, ascended a rising ground from which the host of the confederates was seen extending along the north bank of the Kailna, within the fork formed by the junction of this river with the Jua. Their right, posted westward towards the village of Bokerdan, consisted wholly of cavalry, and was protected by the high and rocky banks of the stream, which, except at some particular spots, was wholly impassable for guns; their left, consisting of the infantry and artillery, was placed more immediately within the fork, and close to the fortified village of Assaye, from which the battle about to be fought afterwards took its name. The position was admirably adapted for defence; but in the event of its being forced, left no means of retreat, and hence General Wellesley's exclamation after surveying it, "They cannot escape me!" As the British had previously marched fourteen miles to Naulnie, and when there were still six miles distant from the enemy's camp, it was one o'clock in the afternoon before they reached their destined position.

When the British arrived on the field their position was on the south side of the Kailna, in front of the enemy's right; but as the attack in this direction would have been against cavalry only, while the great object was the capture or destruction of the infantry and guns, General Wellesley moved eastward till beyond the enemy's left, and then forded the Kailna near the

village of Pepulgaon. He thus arrived in the very angle of the fork, and drew up his infantry in two lines, with the British cavalry immediately behind them in a third line as a reserve. The peshwa's and the Mysore cavalry was left on the south side of the river to check the movements of the enemy's horse, of which a considerable number had crossed the Kailna, and followed the British in their movement eastward. This was the ostensible reason—but there is said to have been another. Intelligence had been received that the peshwa's cavalry intended to join Sindhia, instead of attacking him, and were therefore placed where they could do the least mischief. The first line of British infantry consisted of the advanced pickets to the right, two battalions of sepoys, and his majesty's 78th Highlanders; the second of his majesty's 74th regiment and two battalions of sepoys; and the third of his majesty's 19th dragoons and three regiments of native cavalry; in all 4,500 men. Opposed to them were Monsieur Pohlman's brigade of 6,000 men, Dupont's of 2,500, and four battalions, mustering 2,000 men, belonging to the Begum Sumru. These, forming 10,500 disciplined troops, commanded by European officers, were exclusive of the artillerymen, Sindhia's irregular infantry, and the infantry of the Raja of Berar. In addition to all these was a well-appointed train of artillery, exceeding 100 guns, and large bodies of horse, estimated at nearly 40,000.

The battle began with a cannonade on the British as they were moving to ford the Kailna. Previous to this movement the infantry and guns of the enemy were arranged along the north bank of the river; but as soon as it was discovered to be preparatory to an attack on the left, they changed their position, one line stretching from south to north, between the rivers, so as to face the British, and another at right angles to it, extending from Assaye westward along the south bank of the Jua. General Wellesley, as soon as his dispositions were completed, ordered his troops to advance under cover of his artillery, which opened on the enemy at the distance of 400 yards. In this way, however, little progress could be made. Owing to the tremendous cannonade of the enemy, the British loss in men and bullocks was so great that their guns could not be moved forward. They were therefore ordered to be left behind, and General Wellesley placing himself at the head of the line,

advanced to close combat. When the Marathas saw the comparatively insignificant band marching steadily and intrepidly towards them, they stood astonished and appalled, as if uncertain whether to risk the encounter or save themselves by flight. Shame rather than courage seemed to detain them, till the order to charge with the bayonet was given. Its effect was irresistible. The first line the moment bayonets were crossed gave way, and fell back closely pursued on the second line placed along the Jua. During the struggle the pickets of the infantry and the 74th regiment posted on the right of the British first and second lines had been so much thinned by the artillery stationed near Assaye, that a body of Maratha horse were emboldened to charge the regiment. They paid dearly for their presumption. Their charge was instantly met by a counter-charge of the British cavalry under Colonel Maxwell, who drove them with great slaughter into the river. Meanwhile the bayonet continued to do its work, and the enemy's second line gave way still easier than their first. The flight was now general, and the victory complete, though an incident occurred which, but for the cool intrepidity of the commander, might have converted it into a defeat.

The cavalry having crossed to the north of the Jua, were following the fugitives with great slaughter along the banks, and the infantry were also in eager pursuit, when they suddenly heard a cannonade in their rear. The cause was soon explained. A considerable number of Marathas had thrown themselves down among their guns, where they lay like heaps of dead. Believing them to be so, the British line passed them without notice, and were continuing the pursuit in disorder, when the fancied dead suddenly sprung up, and turned the cannon upon the pursuers. Before the mistake could be retrieved, some of the enemy's corps, who had been retreating in good order, faced about, while several bodies of their cavalry kept hovering at a short distance. The battle had in a manner to be fought over again, till General Wellesley put himself at the head of the 78th regiment and the 7th regiment of native cavalry, and charged the Marathas who had seized the guns. He succeeded, but only after a bloody contest, in which he had a horse shot under him, and was in the most imminent peril. Colonel

Maxwell, though equally successful in charging the infantry of the enemy, who had halted and formed anew, was not personally so fortunate, for the charge cost him his life.

The battle lasted upwards of three hours, and was not gained without a heavy loss. The number of killed and wounded in the British army was 1,566, rather more than a third of all the troops engaged; the enemy left 1,200 dead on the field of battle, and the country covered with their wounded, though the small number of the victors, and the incident above mentioned, prevented them from reaping the full fruits of their success. Their trophies were seven standards, the camp equipage, a number of bullocks and camels, a large quantity of military stores and ammunition, and ninety-eight pieces of ordnance. Colonel Stevenson having joined with his division on the evening of the 24th, was despatched in pursuit of the enemy, who had fled in the direction of the Ajanta Ghat. On the 8th of October a letter was received from Balaji Khunjar, now one of Sindhia's, though formerly one of the peshwa's ministers. It was addressed to General Wellesley, and purported to be written by Sindhia's authority. It requested that an envoy might be sent to his camp for the purpose of negotiating a peace. It was impossible to listen to such a proposal. The writer showed no proper authority, and his previous character makes it doubtful if he had received any. It seemed expedient, however, not to leave it unanswered, and therefore General Wellesley, while declining the overture in the form in which it had been made, declared his readiness to receive at the British camp, with every mark of distinction, any person duly authorized by the confederates to open a negotiation with a view to the termination of hostilities.

The confederates having collected the remains of their army, moved westward along the banks of the Tapti, apparently intending afterwards to turn south for Poona. General Wellesley therefore remained to regulate his movements by theirs, and directed Colonel Stevenson to proceed north to Burhanpur. It yielded to him without opposition on the 16th of October, and as the enemy on his approach retired towards the Narmada in complete disorganization, he determined to lay siege to the strong fortress of Asirgarh, situated about ten miles farther

north. On the 18th he gained possession of the petta, and effected a lodgment within 150 yards of the lower fort. A protracted defence might have been made, as the place, crowning an elevated summit of the Satpura range between the valleys of the Tapti and the Narmada, was strong both by nature and art. No sooner, however, had the batteries opened than the killedar agreed to the terms, or rather accepted the bribe which had been offered him, and delivered up the place, the garrison being not only permitted to depart with their private property, but receiving, moreover, 20,000 rupees as arrears of pay. Asirgarh was the last place which Sindhia possessed in the Deccan, and as his prospects were now gloomy in the extreme, he desired, or deemed it expedient to profess a desire for peace. He accordingly sent an ambassador to the British camp. General Wellesley, though aware that Sindhia's real object was to gain time for recruiting his strength, received his ambassador with every demonstration of satisfaction, and after various conferences agreed on the 23rd of November to a truce, of which the principal condition was, that Sindhia should occupy a position forty miles east of Elichpur, and that the British should not advance farther into his dominions. As the Raja of Berar was not included in this truce, Sindhia's agreement to it was equivalent to a dissolution of the confederacy. So important an event could scarcely have been produced by the campaign of the Deccan alone, and it is therefore necessary in accounting for it to attend to the military operations which had been simultaneously and successfully carried on against the confederates in other quarters.

When the Maratha war had become inevitable, Marquis Wellesley, with characteristic energy, made his preparations for it on a very extensive scale, and was ready to commence operations with a British force amounting in all to about 55,000 men. It was impossible, however, from the nature of the war, to concentrate this force so as to enable it to act as a single army, and it was therefore necessary to break it up, and station it in localities so widely distant from each other, that the subdivisions became in fact separate armies. The principal localities were the Deccan, Gujarat, Hindustan, and Orissa or Cuttack. The operations carried on in the Deccan, from the

commencement of the war to the truce with Sindhia, under General Wellesley, at the head of about 10,000, and of Colonel Stevenson at the head of about 8,500 men, have just been detailed. We now turn to the operations in Gujarat, which are properly an appendage to those of the Deccan, as the chief command of both forces belonged to General Wellesley.

The force employed in Gujarat amounted to rather more than 7,000 men, furnished by the presidency of Bombay, and commanded by Colonel Murray. After providing for the safety of Surat, Baroda, the Gaikwar's capital and other places, the number left to operate against Sindhia's possessions in the province amounted only to 4,281 men. These were formed into two detachments, the one of which, consisting of 2,187 men, was stationed in front of Baroda, while the other, consisting of 2,094 men, took up a position south of the Tapti, between Surat and Sonagarh. The former detachment, under Colonel Woodington, marched on the 21st of August against Baroach, situated on the right bank of the Narmada, thirty miles above its mouth in the Gulf of Cambay. The petta was gained on the 24th, a breaching battery of two eighteen pounders opened on the 26th, and a breach effected, which was pronounced practicable on the 29th. The assault, delayed till three o'clock in the afternoon for the co-operation of a gun-boat, which was, however, unable from the shallowness of the water to approach, was successful, after a vigorous resistance made chiefly by Arabs, who formed part of the garrison. The capture of the town was followed by the occupation of the whole district, the revenue of which was estimated at eleven lacs (£110,000). Colonel Woodington next reduced Champanir, and then summoned the adjacent fortress of Pawangarh. It consisted of a lower and an upper fort, occupying the sides and summit of an immense rock, so lofty and precipitous as to be accessible only on the north side. The killedar, after seeing a breach made in the lower fort, happily lost courage, and a place which might have held out for months was obtained by capitulation in the course of a few days. The whole operations in Gujarat had been skilfully planned, and were executed with so much celerity and success, that before the end of September Sindhia had not a foot of ground within the province.

In Orissa, on the opposite side of India, war was carried with equal success into the territories of the Raja of Berar. Though the whole of Orissa was included in the grant of the diwani obtained by Clive, the Company had been obliged to rest satisfied with only a portion of it. The district of Cuttack was held by the Marathas, who, fully aware of its importance, refused to part with it. Had the Company possessed it they would have had a continuous line of coast stretching from the mouths of the Ganges to Madras. The value of such a communication had been long recognized, and negotiations had been repeatedly entered into for the purpose of acquiring it, either by exchange or purchase. The war into which the Raja of Berar had rashly entered seemed to afford an opportunity of acquiring it by conquest, and it was accordingly determined to wrest it from him. With this view the governor-general, in fixing the localities which were to be made the seat of war, allotted an important detachment for Cuttack, which, when held by an enemy, not only enabled him to cut off the land communication with Madras, but brought him into dangerous proximity to Bengal. Indeed, during the first Maratha war, the part assigned to the Raja of Berar by his confederates was to ruin the Company's interest in their most valuable province, by leading an invading army direct to Calcutta.

The force designed to operate in Cuttack consisted of 573 Europeans, and 2,468 native infantry and cavalry, with some artillery, under Colonel Campbell. Besides these, 500 Bengal volunteers under Captain Dick, and the same number under Captain Morgan, were embarked at Calcutta, the former to land at Ganjam, to support the main body which had previously assembled at that place, and the latter to seize the port of Balasore, which then belonged to the raja. At Jellasore, situated on the north bank of the Subarnarekha, which bounded the Company's and the raja's territories on the north, as the small river at the mouth of which Ganjam stands bounded them on the south, was assembled under Colonel Ferguson another detachment of 750 sepoys, and 84 cavalry of the governor-general's body-guard; while at Midnapore, forty miles further north, a reserve of 800 sepoys and 500 native Bengal volunteers had been formed, for the double purpose of supporting the

advanced corps, and checking any inroads of the raja's predatory horse. On the 8th of September Colonel Campbell moved forward with the main body towards Cuttack, but a severe illness under which he was suffering obliged him to resign the command to Colonel Harcourt, the governor-general's military secretary. On arriving at Manickpatam, which was occupied without resistance, Colonel Harcourt despatched a letter to Brahmins Juggernaut, recommending them to place their temple under British protection. They at once complied. The city of Juggernaut was occupied by the British troops on the 18th, and the British connection with Hindu idolatry, afterwards so justly reprobated, began to be formed. The difficulties of the march were now greatly increased, both by the badness of the weather and considerable numbers of the enemy, who hovered on the British rear and flanks without venturing to come to close quarters. Still, Colonel Harcourt continued to make steady progress, and arrived in the beginning of October at the fort of Barabati, only a mile distant from the town of Cuttack. The fort, though possessed of considerable strength, was taken by storm on the 14th with little loss. Previous to this capture, important reinforcements had been made to the main body by the junction of the detachments under Colonel Ferguson and Captain Morgan. The latter had been completely successful at Balasore, which was gained with the loss of only one sepoy killed and three wounded. The capture of the fort of Barabati was immediately followed by the submission of the whole province of Cuttack, and Colonel Harcourt immediately prepared to proceed westward, through the defile of Bernath, into the other territories of the raja, for the purpose of co-operating with General Wellesley.

Hindustan, though the account of the military operations carried on within it has been reserved for the last, was in some respects the most important seat of the war. The main army, under the personal command of General Lake, commander-in-chief, assembled in the Doab—the fertile province so called from lying between two rivers, the Jamuna and the Ganges—and amounted to 10,500 men, exclusive of 3,500 collected at Allahabad for the purpose of invading Bundelkhand. The first object aimed at was the overthrow of the regularly disciplined

brigades, commanded by Monsieur Perron, and which, though belonging nominally to Sindhia, were to all intents independent, and entirely devoted to French interests. Instead of depending on periodical pay, they had obtained the assignment of a large tract of valuable territory in the very heart of the country for their maintenance, and as if they had been absolute sovereigns, not only ruled it with despotic sway, but were extending their influence on every side, by means of treaties offensive and defensive with the neighbouring chiefs. According to the statement of Mr. Stuart, a British officer, who quitted Sindhia's service shortly after the commencement of hostilities, Perron's brigades mustered in all 43,650 men and 464 guns. The portion of this force with Sindhia in the Deccan was estimated at 23,650 men, and consequently the remainder opposed to General Lake did not exceed 20,000. This, however, was exclusive of the troops employed in garrisons.

On the 7th of August, 1803, General Lake marched from Kanpur the infantry on that station, commanded by General St. John, and the cavalry by Colonel St. Leger. On the 12th the whole army, which had moved northward along the right bank of the Ganges, encamped on the plains of Aroul, not far from Kanauj. From this encampment the army quitting the river proceeded westward. Hostilities were not yet actually declared, but on the 26th, when at Sikandra, General Lake received despatches from the governor-general, authorizing him to commence active operations against Sindhia, Perron, and their allies, should intelligence of a pacific settlement not be in the meantime received from General Wellesley. On the 28th, the army, reinforced by the detachment from Fatehgarh under General Ware, encamped on the Maratha frontiers, within sight of the mosque of Koel, where Perron was seen strongly posted, not far from the fortress of Aligarh. At four in the morning of the 29th, the army entered the Maratha territory, and advanced to the attack of Perron, who immediately brought the whole of his horse, amounting to 20,000, of whom 4,000 were regular cavalry, into the plain. The position was strong. On the right was the fort of Aligarh, in front a deep morass, and on the left difficult ground, and some villages affording good cover. The last being evidently the weakest point, General

Lake selected it for his attack. In proportion, however, as the British advanced the enemy receded, and finally abandoned the field without hazarding a general action. M. Perron retired towards Agra, leaving the command of Aligarh to M. Pedron, with instructions to defend it to the last extremity.

General Lake having taken possession of Koel, and encamped on its north side, summoned M. Pedron to surrender the fort. The answer was, in terms of his instructions, that he was determined to defend it. As delay would only have rendered the capture more difficult, it was resolved to lose no time in making the assault. The morning of the 4th of September was fixed upon, and the attack was to be led by the Honourable Colonel Monson. On the previous night two covering batteries, each of four eighteen-pounders, were erected to protect the approach of the storming party, which left the camp at three in the morning, and by making a circuit, arrived within 4,000 yards of the gateway, without being discovered. Having halted here till the signal was given, they moved on under cover of a heavy fire from the batteries, till they were within 100 yards of the gate. A traverse recently erected in front of it was mounted with three guns, but the enemy were dislodged before they had time to fire them, and Colonel Monson pushed forward with the two flank companies of the 76th regiment, in the hope of being able to enter the fort with the defenders of the traverse. On arriving, he found the first gate shut, while the entrance was raked by guns, which kept up a destructive fire of grape. Two ladders were instantly applied, but a formidable row of pikemen made it impossible to mount. An attempt to force the gate, first by a six and then by a twelve-pounder, did not succeed, till after a delay of twenty minutes, during which the storming party stood exposed to a severe fire of grape and musketry. During this delay the enemy actually crowded the scaling ladders, and came down by them to engage their assailants hand to hand. It was at this time that Colonel Monson was wounded by a pike and the British sustained their heaviest loss. As soon as the first gate was forced the storming party advanced along a narrow circular road, defended by a round tower, loopholed for musketry, which plied incessantly, while showers of grape were poured down from a neighbouring bastion. Happily, the

second gate was easily forced, and a third was gained before the enemy, now becoming confused, had time to close it. A fourth gate threatened to be a fatal obstacle. The twelve-pounder, after some delay in bringing it forward, failed to force it. At length an entrance having been gained by the wicket, the whole party rushed forward, and having gained the ramparts soon rendered further resistance vain. In the course of an hour they had made themselves masters of a fortress long deemed impregnable. The total British loss in killed and wounded was 223; that of the garrison in killed alone, not so much by the sword of the assailants as by desperate attempts to escape, exceeded 2,000. M. Pedron, the commandant, was among the prisoners. The fortress was a most valuable acquisition, not merely on its own account, but from the quantity of military stores which it contained, the French having made it their chief depot in the Doab. This selection was certainly justified by the natural and artificial strength of the place. Its site on an elevated plain surrounded by swamps, made it perfectly inaccessible in the rainy season, and everything which the skill of French engineers could devise had been employed to add to its natural strength. One serious mistake they had made, in allowing the entrance by a causeway to remain. Had they joined the two sides of the ditch, by cutting it across, and substituting a drawbridge, it never could have been carried by an assault, without regular approaches. The number of guns found in the fort was 281.

After securing Aligarh, and by the substitution of a drawbridge making the improvement which the French so fatally for themselves had omitted, the army set out on the 7th of September for Delhi. On the same day General Lake received a letter from M. Perron, stating that he had quitted the service of Sindhia, and requesting permission to proceed with his family and property to Lucknow, under the escort either of a British or of his own body-guard. Both escorts were at once granted him, and he ultimately settled in the neighbourhood of Chander-nagore. Whatever the motive of his resignation may have been, it did good service to the British, from its being generally believed that he had despaired of Sindhia's success. The capture of Aligarh had made so strong an impression, that several

places which might have made a good defence were abandoned as the army approached them. Intelligence, however, was received which made it almost certain, that it would not be permitted to reach Delhi without a struggle. Sixteen battalions of regular infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and a large train of artillery, under M. Bourquieu, were said to have crossed the Jamuna for the purpose of giving battle. The intelligence proved correct. On reaching the place of encampment, near the Jehna Nullah, about six miles from Delhi, the tents were scarcely pitched when the enemy appeared in front in great force. On reconnoitring, General Lake found their whole force strongly posted on a rising ground in order of battle. Each flank was covered by a swamp, and while the cavalry were stationed beyond it, the front was defended by a line of entrenchments and numerous artillery.

General Lake, on reconnoitring, had taken with him the whole cavalry, consisting of three regiments. On making himself sufficiently acquainted with the numbers and position of the enemy, and perceiving that they could only be attacked in front, he sent instant orders for the infantry and artillery to join the cavalry. As the latter were two miles in advance of the camp, an hour was lost before this junction was effected, and in the meantime the enemy kept up a cannonade which caused a considerable loss in men and horses. The general himself had a horse shot under him, as had also his son, Major Lake, at a later period. After a time it seemed doubtful if success could be obtained while the enemy kept their position, and an attempt was therefore made to draw them from their entrenchments by means of a feint. The cavalry accordingly were ordered to retire, with the double object of alluring the enemy into the plain, and covering the advance of the infantry. The manoeuvre succeeded. The enemy, convinced that the withdrawal of the cavalry was the commencement of a retreat, rushed forward, shouting as if they had gained the victory. Meanwhile, the British infantry having come up, the cavalry opened in the centre and allowed them to advance to the front. Great was the surprise and consternation when the enemy, instead of finding the confusion of a retreat, saw themselves face to face with a firm and impenetrable line of infantry. The order to advance

was immediately given, General Lake himself leading in person, at the head of the 76th regiment, in the face of a tremendous fire of round grape and chain shot. On arriving within a hundred paces, the whole line fired a volley, and then rushed on with the bayonet. The result was not for a moment doubtful. The enemy, as if a general panic had seized them, fled with precipitancy in all directions. The cavalry and galloper-guns, taking up the pursuit, followed the fugitives to the banks of the Jamuna, in which prodigious numbers of them perished. The loss of the British in killed and wounded was 409; that of the enemy was roughly estimated at 3,000. The immediate trophies of the victory were sixty-eight pieces of cannon, two tumbrils laden with treasure and thirty-seven laden with ammunition, besides twenty-four which were blown up. The battle, which was fought within sight of the towers of Delhi and takes its name from it, was followed by the evacuation of this celebrated capital of the Mughuls by the enemy, and the undisputed occupation of it by the British forces.

Some time previous to the battle a secret communication had been opened with Shah Alam, assuring him, if he could place himself under the protection of the British government, "that every demonstration of respect and attention would be paid towards his majesty on the part of that government, and that an adequate provision would be made for the support of his majesty, and of his family and household." He returned an answer expressive of a wish to avail himself of this offer, and accordingly, when the army crossed the Jamuna on the 14th of September and proceeded to take possession of the city, they were hailed as deliverers. The interview of General Lake with Shah Alam took place on the 16th, and must have seemed to the governor-general very important, since he has condescended in one of his despatches to describe it circumstantially. The Prince Mirza Akbar Shah, the heir-apparent, was deputed to conduct the commander-in-chief to the royal presence. He was to have arrived at twelve o'clock, but oriental etiquette made him late, and he did not arrive till half-past three. The governor-general's description thus continues:—"By the time his royal highness had been received, remounted on his elephant, and the whole cavalcade formed, it was half-past four

o'clock. The distance being five miles, the commander-in-chief did not reach the palace of Delhi until sunset. The crowd in the city was extraordinary; and it was with some difficulty that the cavalcade could make its way to the palace. The courts of the palace were full of people, anxious to witness the deliverance of their sovereign from a state of degradation and bondage. At length the commander-in-chief was ushered into the royal presence, and found the unfortunate venerable emperor, oppressed by the accumulated calamities of old age, degraded authority, extreme poverty, and loss of sight, seated under a small tattered canopy, the remnant of his royal state, with every external appearance of the misery of his condition." From the sympathy here expressed, and his afterwards talking of the capture of Delhi as "delivering the unfortunate and aged emperor Shah Alam, and the royal house of Timur, from misery, degradation, and bondage", one is almost prepared to expect that the governor-general was to re-establish the Mughul empire, or at least to give back to Shah Alam all that the Company themselves had wrested from him since the grant of the diwani—the reserved revenue of £250,000 sterling, which they had ceased to pay him on some flimsy pretext, but in reality because they found payment inconvenient—and the two provinces of Allahabad and Cora, which, while holding them nominally as his trustees, they sold for their own behoof to the Nabob of Oudh. Nothing of the kind was intended; it would have been bad policy; it was totally inconsistent with the governor-general's schemes; and hence all his pompous language was only a prelude to his final instruction, that such "regard should be paid to the comfort and convenience of his majesty and the royal family as was consistent with the due security of their persons." Shah Alam appears to have repaid his benefactors in their own coin. "In addition to other marks of royal condescension and favour," says the governor-general, "the emperor was graciously pleased to confer on General Lake the second title in the empire, *Sumsam-ud-Daulah*, *Asghar-ul-Mulk*, *Khan Dowran Khan*, *General Gerald Lake Bahadur*, *Fateh Jung*—'the Sword of the State, the Hero of the Land, the Lord of the Age, and the Victorious in War'." Merely to show that the governor-general was not

permitted to monopolize the pompous verbiage used on this occasion, we quote the following observation on it by Major Thorn:¹—"In whatever light distinctions of this nature may appear to those who consider the blaze of power alone as the highest legitimate source of glory, without any regard to the means by which it is acquired or the consequences produced, the mind of nobler sentiments and more delicate feeling will estimate them according to the merits by which they have been earned, and the spirit from whence they flow. Though these lofty titles were conferred upon the British general by a sovereign destitute of wealth, and shorn of the beams of regal majesty, the importance of the service and the gratitude of an enfranchised people gave a splendour to the grant equal, if not superior, to the glittering rewards of renown." At the time when Shah Alam performed his part in this empty ceremony he was eighty-three years of age. He lived other three years, and at his death in 1806 was succeeded by the above prince, Mirza Akbar Shah, "who," says Thorn, "ascended the throne without molestation, a circumstance unparalleled in the history of Hindustan." He could not add, what will afterwards be seen, that he was destined to be the last who sat upon it, and to end his days on a savage island as a just punishment for atrocious crimes.

Leaving Colonel Ochterlony in charge of Delhi, General Lake, on the 24th of September, 1803, commenced his march southward along the right bank of the Jamuna. His object was Agra, which was in the hands of Sindhia's adherents. He arrived before it on the 4th of October, and by the 7th had cut off its communications with the surrounding country. On the 9th he concluded a treaty offensive and defensive with the Raja of Bharatpur, who immediately sent him a reinforcement of 5,000 cavalry. The garrison of Agra had previous to the war been commanded by British officers, who since its commencement were so much suspected by the troops that they had placed them in confinement. So great was the confusion which prevailed in consequence of this proceeding, that when General Lake summoned the place on his arrival no answer could be returned. It was determined, however, to make a vigorous defence. Seven battalions of Sindhia's regular infantry

¹ *Memoir of the War in India*, pp. 126-27.

were encamped on the glacis, and were in possession of the town and the ravines surrounding the south and south-west faces of the fort. Though Thorn makes no mention of the circumstance, Duff says that they were thus encamped without the fort because "the garrison were afraid to admit them, lest they should plunder a rich treasury which they wished to reserve to themselves." It was necessary to dislodge these troops before approaches could be made. They were accordingly attacked on the morning of the 10th, and, after a severe struggle, completely defeated, the town, twenty-six fine brass guns, and as many tumbrils laden with ammunition, remaining in possession of the victors. Two days afterwards the remainder of the battalions outside the fort, amounting to 2,500 men, surrendered. The siege was immediately commenced, and made rapid progress. A grand battery of eight eighteen-pounders opened on the 17th, and with such effect on the south-east bastion that a practicable breach would soon have been effected. The garrison, who had previously employed their British officers to make terms for them which they did not keep, were now in earnest in offering to capitulate on the morning of the 18th. The terms allowed them to depart with their clothes. Their number amounted to about 6,000. Within the fort were found tumbrils laden with treasure to the amount of twenty-two lacs (£222,000), together with 164 pieces of ordnance, 76 of them brass, and large quantities of ammunition and stores. "Among the ordnance," says Thorn, "was one enormous brass gun, which, for magnitude and beauty stands unrivalled. Its length was 14 feet 2 inches, its calibre 23 inches, the weight of its ball when of cast iron 1,500 lbs, and its whole weight 96,600 lbs, or a little above 38 tons." Though called brass, it was, according to common report, composed of a mixture of the precious metals. The *shreffs* seem to have been of this opinion, for they offered £12,000 for it, merely to melt it down. General Lake meant to transport it to Calcutta and thence to England, but it proved too heavy for the raft on which it was placed, and sunk in the river. The whole of the twenty-two lacs of treasure was modestly claimed by M. Perron, on the ground that it was his private property, and was guaranteed to him by the terms of his surrender, by which his private property was

reserved. The claim, though scarcely entitled to notice, was examined and found groundless, and the whole amount was shared by the captors.

At an early stage of the campaign Sindhia had detached seven regular battalions from the Deccan, under the command of a French officer of the name of Dudermaigue or Dudrenec. These had been joined by three of Bourquieu's battalions, who had not been engaged at Delhi, and by the other battalions formed of the fugitives from Delhi and Agra, the whole amounting to about 9,000 infantry, accompanied by a body of about 1,500 good cavalry and a superior equipment of artillery. Dudermaigue had given up the command and surrendered to the British, and the force was now commanded by a Maratha officer, under whom, during the siege of Agra, they had occupied a position about thirty miles distant. It was understood that they were intending to attempt the recapture of Delhi, and General Lake therefore moved against them from Agra on the 27th of September. He proceeded in a south-west direction to Fatehpur, where he left the heavy guns and baggage under the charge of two battalions of native infantry. Turning westward he arrived on the 31st of October at Cutumbo, which the enemy had only quitted on the preceding evening. As he was thus close upon their track he determined, in order to prevent their escape, to pursue them with his cavalry, now consisting of eight regiments, three of them European dragoons. He accordingly set out at eleven o'clock at night, directing the infantry to follow at three next morning. After a march of twenty-five miles in little more than six hours, on the 1st of November he came up with the enemy, now mustering about 9,000 infantry, 72 guns, and 5,000 cavalry. As they appeared to be in retreat and in some degree of confusion, General Lake determined to attack at once, without waiting for his infantry. By cutting a large tank the enemy so much impeded the progress of the cavalry as to gain time for taking up an advantageous position near the village of Laswari, about forty miles west of Bharatpur. Their right was in front of the village, and in their rear was a rivulet with very steep banks; their left was upon the village of Mohalpur; and their whole, concealed by high grass, was defended by a formidable line of

artillery, the pieces chained together, the more effectually to resist a cavalry charge. The change which they had made in taking up this position was only imperfectly ascertained, in consequence of the dense cloud of dust raised by the approach of the cavalry. Thus moving somewhat in the dark, General Lake ordered the first brigade of cavalry to move upon the point where the enemy had previously been seen in motion, while the rest of the cavalry were ordered to follow up the attack in succession as fast as they could form after crossing the rivulet. The point thus attacked had, in consequence of the enemy's change of position, become their left, and the resistance proved so obstinate and destructive that the commander found it necessary, after a heavy loss, to desist and wait the arrival of the infantry.

During this delay the enemy again changed their position, and drew up in two lines, the one in front and the other in rear of the village of Mohalpur. As soon as the British infantry arrived the Maratha commander was so much disconcerted that he endeavoured to escape with the loss only of his guns, and made an offer to surrender them on certain conditions. These were granted, provided they were fulfilled in an hour. Meanwhile the British infantry, composed of the 76th regiment and six battalions of sepoys, were formed into two columns on the left, close to the village of Laswari, the first composed of the right wing under General Ware, and the second forming the left wing under General St. John. After the hour expired without the fulfilment of the conditions, the infantry began to move along the banks of the rivulet nearly at right angles to the enemy's position. The object of this attack was to turn their right flank. For some time, owing to the high grass which intervened, they did not perceive it, but the moment it became known they frustrated it by throwing back their left wing, and covering the movement by a destructive cannonade, which greatly thinned the 76th regiment, while the nature of the ground impeded its advance. General Lake, perceiving this state of matters, determined to hasten the attack, and, placing himself at the head of the regiment and a battalion and five companies of sepoys which had closed in front, moved rapidly forward. On arriving within reach of canister shot, it was so

showered upon them that a regular advance was impossible, and the Maratha horse ventured to charge. After gallantly repulsing them, General Lake ordered the British cavalry to charge in turn. This service was performed by the 29th dragoons, who dashed through both lines of the enemy's infantry, wheeled round upon their cavalry, driving them from the field, and then attacked the rear of their second line. The enemy's first line had in the meantime been driven back by the British infantry upon the second. Both lines were thus mingled together, and attacked at once in front and rear. On this occasion Sindhia's veteran brigades proved themselves worthy of their high reputation. Disdaining to yield, they continued an unequal fight with desperate valour; and, with the exception of about 2,000 who were broken and made prisoners, perished where they stood with their arms in their hands. The British loss amounted to about 800; but the victory, though dearly purchased, was most complete. Except the 2,000 prisoners, the whole of the enemy's battalions, to the amount of at least 7,000 men, lay dead on the field. Most of their cavalry shared the same fate. The trophies of victory included the whole of the enemy's bazaars, with the camp equipage and baggage, a considerable number of elephants and camels, above 1,600 bullocks, 72 pieces of cannon, 5,000 stand of arms, 44 stand of colours, 3 tumbrils laden with treasure, 64 tumbrils laden with ammunition, and 57 carts containing stores of various descriptions. The effect of the victory was to give the British undisputed possession of all Sindhia's territories north of the Chambal.

On the 8th of November the army quitted Laswari, where the air had become tainted by the number of the dead, and began to retrace its steps by proceeding eastward in the direction of Agra. On the 14th the sick and wounded with the captured guns were sent off to that city, but the army halted at Paiashar. During a fortnight spent here the effect of the recent successes was manifested by the number of rajas who hastened to court the British alliance. Defensive treaties were formed with the Raja of Macherry, called the Ram Raja, the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur, and the Begum Sumru. The last was rather a singular connection, as she was the widow of the

villain by whose hands mainly the massacre of Patna was perpetrated. Vakils or ambassadors also arrived from different quarters, among others one from Delhi, bearing a *khelat* or dress of honour from Shah Alam to General Lake, and congratulations on his recent victory. "Desirous," says Thorn, "of receiving this high mark of distinction in a manner that should at the same time make a general impression in favour of the British arms and show respect for the emperor," General Lake made the ambassador's reception as pompous as possible, and returned public acknowledgments testifying his high sense of the honour which the emperor had conferred upon him. "This," adds Thorn, "highly pleased and gratified the ambassador and all the Mussalmans who beheld the ceremony." The army again moved on the 27th November, and finally turning southward took up a position at Biana.

One of the great objects originally contemplated by the war was the conquest of Bundelkhand, a province so called from its being in possession of the Bundela race. It consisted of a level and a mountainous country, the former lying on the north-east along the right bank of the Jamuna, and the latter stretching backward from it through rugged and elevated tracts connected with the Vindhya Mountains. This country belonging nominally to the peshwa, a new agreement was made with him in August 1803, by which he ceded the greater part of his claims in it to the Company, in lieu of Savanore and Benkapur in the southern Maratha country, and Ulpar in the neighbourhood of Surat. The districts which he thus received yielded little more than nineteen, while those which he ceded were estimated at upwards of thirty-six lacs; but still the exchange was not unequal, because he received districts of which the revenue was sure, whereas those which he gave up were in such a position that the first thing which the Company had to do was to fight for them. The arrangement included various other stipulations affecting the relative positions of the parties, and were therefore afterwards drawn up in regular articles, which were signed on the 16th of December, 1803, and termed supplemental articles to the treaty of Bassein.

After ceding Bundelkhand, or rather the rights which he either possessed or claimed in it, the peshwa sent orders to his

officers in the province enjoining them to surrender the territories under their charge to the British government. Shamsher Bahadur, who claimed by descent from Baji Rao, the first peshwa, and by grant made to his ancestor, questioned the validity of the cession, and prepared to resist it. The governor-general, on the contrary, was determined to enforce it, and thus war became inevitable. On the 6th of September, 1803, Colonel Powell, at the head of a detachment, which had been assembled at Allahabad, crossed the Jamuna, and entered Bundelkhand. Himmat Bahadur, another Bundela chief, who was at once a *gosain* or religious character, and a soldier of fortune, had previously given in his adhesion to the British government, and on the 14th of September joined Colonel Powell with 8,000 irregular infantry, 4,000 horse, three regular battalions, commanded by an European officer, and twenty-five guns. On the 23rd of September, when they reached the Cane, which flows past the fort of Callinger, and joins the Jamuna a little below Cora, they found Shamsher Bahadur strongly posted on the opposite bank. After reducing several places in the vicinity, the united forces crossed on the 10th of October, and after a fatiguing march of six hours, over a rugged country, saw Shamsher's army drawn up in order of battle. Though he presented a bold front he fled at the first onset, and by his superior speed escaped with very little loss. All his courage, however, appeared to be gone, and he professed a strong desire for peace. He could not have been sincere, as he managed to spin out the negotiation for two months, and at last broke it off at the very time he had fixed for his arrival in the British camp.

Hostilities were of course immediately renewed, and Colonel Powell resumed offensive operations by laying siege to Calpi, which capitulated on the 4th of December. The capture of this place, and the defection of his chief officers, at last convinced Shamsher that he had nothing to hope from continuing the war, and he threw himself on the mercy of the British, who treated him with a generosity which he could scarcely have anticipated. Several other chiefs, some of them adherents of Shamsher, and others independent of him, now gave in their adherence. Of the latter, the two most important were the

ruler of Jhansi, and the Maratha chief Ambaji Inglia, who had acted as Sindhia's minister, and held under him possession of extensive territories, including those of the Rana of Gohad. With the ruler of Jhansi, who really had pacific intentions, a treaty was immediately concluded; with Ambaji Inglia matters were not so easily settled.

Ambaji, in the month of October, 1803, offered to renounce his dependence on Sindhia and become tributary to the British on certain conditions. After some time spent in negotiation, a treaty was concluded with him on the 16th December, 1803, by which he resigned the fortress of Gwalior and all the lands in his possession to the north of it to the Company, and was recognized as independent sovereign of all the other territories in his possession, except those of the Rana of Gohad, to whom they had, by a previous treaty, been guaranteed. In accordance with this treaty, General Lake, on the 21st of December, despatched a corps under Colonel White to take possession of Gwalior. On arriving before it, Colonel White delivered the orders of Ambaji, but the commandant refused to give up possession. Circumstances afterwards transpired to prove that the commandant's apparent contumacy originated with, or was at least countenanced by Ambaji himself, and it was therefore resolved to enforce compliance without delay. A considerable reinforcement, with siege artillery, was immediately sent off to Colonel White, who was also empowered to call in additional aid from the troops serving in Bundelkhand. Batteries were accordingly erected, and having opened a fire which soon effected a breach, so intimidated the garrison that they capitulated. In order to complete the account of the operations in Hindustan, including the conquest of Bundelkhand and the capture of Gwalior, it has been necessary for a time to lose sight of the important transactions which were in the meantime taking place in the Deccan. To these we will now return.

The virtual dissolution of the confederacy between Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsla took place on the 23rd of November, 1803, when General Wellesley concluded a truce with the former, and excluded the latter from any participation in it. By the terms of the truce, Sindhia was bound to remove his troops to the eastward of Elichpur, but ocular evidence was given that

he had not fulfilled them, for on the 28th of November a large body of his cavalry was seen united with that of Raghuji Bhonsla, and accompanied by the greater part of the regular infantry, and a large portion of the artillery belonging to the latter. General Wellesley, holding this to be equivalent to a violation of the truce, resolved to attack them, notwithstanding the remonstrances and protestations of Sindhia's ambassador, who had not yet left the British camp. He accordingly set out at once, and after a long and fatiguing march, overtook them in the vicinity of Argaon, a village about thirty-five miles W.S.W. of Elichpur. They had drawn up as if prepared for battle, and were commanded by Sindhia in person, and by Munnu Bappu, the Raja of Berar's brother. In their rear stood the village with the gardens and inclosures of Argaon, and in front its plains much cut by watercourses. The main resistance was made by a body of Persian troops, who attacked the 74th and 78th regiments, and maintained a desperate struggle till they were almost totally destroyed. The rest of the enemy speedily gave way, and though evening had come on, were pursued in the moonlight with great slaughter by the cavalry, who captured all their elephants and baggage. The British loss in killed and wounded was 346.

It was determined to follow up this victory by the siege of Gawilgarh, a fortress belonging to the raja, and situated about fifteen miles north-west of Elichpur, on a lofty precipice of a mountain ridge stretching between the sources of the Tapti and the Purna. It consisted of an outer and an inner fort, both strongly built, inclosed by ramparts flanked with towers, and entered by three gates, one to the south leading to the inner fort, one to the north leading to the outer fort, and the third merely communicating with an interior wall. The ascent to the south gate is very steep and difficult; the road to the north gate was the one in common use, but was extremely narrow, and from passing round the west side of the fort was everywhere exposed to its fire. Notwithstanding these disadvantages the attack by this road seemed preferable to every other, and was adopted. Colonel Stevenson, who had equipped his corps at Asirgarh for the purpose, was to conduct the siege, while General Wellesley was to cover his operations, and if necessary

assist them by attacks on the south and west. On the 12th of December, after much laborious service in dragging the heavy ordnance and stores, by hand, over mountains and ravines for thirty miles, Colonel Stevenson erected two batteries fronting the north face of the fort, and General Wellesley erected a battery to breach the wall near the southern gate, or at least divert the attention of the garrison. These batteries opened their fire on the morning of the 13th, and by the evening of the following day the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable. On the morning of the 15th, the assault was given and the place carried. Though the garrison was numerous, and the resistance vigorous, the loss of the British was only 126. In the fort were found seventy-two pieces of ordnance, 2,000 stand of English arms, and 150 wall-pieces, carrying balls from half a pound to one pound each.

The operations of the British throughout the campaign had been so completely successful, that the war, if continued, must ere long have totally ruined the confederates. Nothing, therefore, remained for them but to sue for peace. The truce made with Sindhia on the 23rd of November was considered to be still subsisting, and hence Raghuji Bhonsla, as the confederate more immediately in danger, made the first overtures. His vakil accordingly arrived in the British camp immediately after the capture of Gawilgarh, and as he had no alternative but to accept the terms which General Wellesley dictated, the negotiation, commenced on the 16th December, occupied only one day, and the treaty was concluded on the next. Sindhia being forthwith informed that the truce with him must expire on the 27th of December, had no idea of exposing himself to new disasters. His ambassadors arrived in the British camp on the 23rd of December, when the terms were immediately dictated, and on the 30th the treaty was concluded. This war, one of the shortest, was also one of the most decisive on record. In the short period of four months, four general battles had been fought, eight fortresses besieged and captured, and whole provinces subdued. The disparity of forces added greatly to the lustre of these achievements. The whole British army never exceeded 55,000 men, that of the enemy averaged at least 250,000, exclusive of a corps of 40,000 formed into regular

brigades, disciplined by French officers, and obviously intended, if this war had not prematurely destroyed them, to form the nucleus of a larger army by which the French would have attempted once more to gain the ascendancy in India.

By the treaty concluded at Degaom on the 17th December, Raghuji Bhonsla, the Raja of Berar, ceded the whole of Cuttack, including the port of Balasore, and the whole of his territories and shares of revenue west of Warda, and south of the hills on which the forts of Narnalla and Gawilgarh are situated. By the treaty concluded at Surji Anjengaom on the 30th of December, Daulat Rao Sindhia ceded all his territories in the Doab, and all those northward of the Rajput principalities of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Gohad, the forts of Ahmednagar and Baroach, with these districts, and his possessions between the Ajanta Ghat and the Godavary. He also renounced all claims on the Mughul, and on the Company, or its allies the peshwa, the Nizam, and the Gaikwar. Both chiefs engaged not to entertain within their territories any European or American of a nation hostile to the British, or any British subject without the consent of the British government, and to send and receive accredited ministers to reside at the respective courts of the contracting parties. By a special article in Sindhia's treaty a defensive alliance was contemplated, and it was provided that in the event of a subsidiary force being furnished to him, the expense should be defrayed from the territories which he had ceded. Effect was given to this article by a treaty concluded on the 27th of February, 1804, by which a corps of six battalions of sepoys were to be furnished, and stationed at Sindhia's option, either within his territories or at a convenient frontier fort within those of the Company. By another article of the Surji Anjengaom treaty, pensions to the aggregate amount of fifteen lacs were granted by the Company to the principal officers of Sindhia's officers, who suffered loss by his cessions of territory in Hindustan.

The results anticipated from the conclusion of these treaties, and the glorious termination of the war, were thus glowingly described by the governor-general in answer to a congratulatory address from the inhabitants of Calcutta:—"The foundations of our empire in Asia are now laid in the tranquillity of sur-

rounding nations, and in the happiness and welfare of the people of India. In addition to the augmentation of our territories and resources, the peace manifested exemplary faith and equity towards our allies, moderation and lenity towards our enemies, and a sincere desire to promote the general prosperity of this quarter of the globe. The position in which we are now placed is such as suits the character of the British nation, the principles of our laws, the spirit of our constitution, and that liberal policy which becomes the dignity of a great and powerful empire. My public duty is discharged to the satisfaction of my conscience by the prosperous establishment of a system of policy which promises to improve the general condition of the people of India, and to unite the principal native states in the bond of peace, under the protection of the British power". These views were so far shared at home that the thanks of parliament were voted to the governor-general, and to the several armies which shared the glory of the contest. General Lake was raised to the peerage by the title of Baron Lake of Delhi and Laswari, and General Wellesley received the riband of the military order of the Bath. The courts of directors and of proprietors, though known to be not at all friendly to the policy of Marquis Wellesley, yielded to the general current, and gave him a vote of thanks, as well generally for the discharge of his public duty as specially for the success of the military operations.

The Siege of Bharatpur

GLOWING as were the governor-general's descriptions of the results of the peace, and his predictions of its permanency, there was at this very time one quarter from which disturbance must have been foreboded. Holkar had been violently expelled from Poona, and as yet no amicable arrangement had been made with him. Any steps he had subsequently taken were hostile. He had promised to join the confederates, and with this view had made a peace with Sindhia, which promised him large accessions of territory. After hostilities commenced, he waited with the usual Maratha cunning to ascertain the probable result before committing himself. At first he is believed not to have been dissatisfied with the reverses which the confederates sustained, because by their weakness he hoped to make himself more powerful; but when he saw them threatened with annihilation his views underwent a change, and he would probably have cast in his lot with them had he not been anticipated by the rapid course of events. Before the treaties of peace were concluded, he had advanced towards Hindustan, and kept hovering on the frontiers of the Raja of Jaipur, now a British ally, in a manner so suspicious that the governor-general instructed Lord Lake to enter into communication with him. His lordship accordingly, on the 29th of January, 1804, addressed a letter to him, stating the terms on which the British government were willing to leave him in the unmolested exercise of his authority, but requiring as a pledge of friendly intentions that he should withdraw into his own territory, and cease from exacting tribute from British allies.

After some delay Holkar sent vakils to Lord Lake with the following proposals—1. That he should be permitted to collect the *chaauth* agreeably to the customs of his ancestors. 2. That the ancient possessions formerly held by his family (twelve of the finest districts in the Doab, and a district in Bundelkhand) should be restored to him. 3. That the country of Hurrana, formerly in possession of the Holkar family, should be ceded to him. 4. That this country should be guaranteed to him, and a treaty concluded with him similar to that with Sindhia. These proposals were at once rejected as extravagant, and Holkar's real designs were manifested by attempts to shake the fidelity of the Company's tributaries and dependants. He had also, while communicating with Lord Lake, addressed a letter to Sir Arthur Wellesley, in which he demanded the cession of several districts in the Deccan, as originally belonging to the Holkar family, and concluded thus: "Countries of many hundred coss shall be overrun and plundered. Lord Lake shall not have leisure to breathe for a moment; and calamities will fall on lacs of human beings, in continual war, by the attacks of my army, which overwhelms like the waves of the sea." Not satisfied with these insulting menaces, Holkar openly solicited the aid of Sindhia in a meditated attack on the British territories, and commenced plundering those of the Raja of Jaipur. War was thus virtually declared, and Holkar was the aggressor.

Lord Lake having resolved, in consequence of Holkar's proceedings, to make a forward movement, sent the heavy part of artillery back to Agra, and marched from his encampment at Biana on the 9th February, 1804, proceeding southwest in the direction of Hindown, which was reached on the 20th. While here, occupying a position which covered the principal roads into the Company's territories, Lord Lake received a letter from Holkar, written in the most friendly spirit, and observing that "while the flame of contention can be extinguished by the water of reconciliation, it is unfit to bring matters to the extremity of war." So sincere was he in his friendship, that even before Lord Lake's letter reached him he had intended, he said, to march homewards. Though aware how hollow these professions were, his lordship answered him

in his own oriental style, telling him how glad he was that the purity of his mind was unsullied by the dust of enmity or revenge. At the same time he candidly told him that he was aware of his correspondence with some discontented chiefs, and would resent any aggression on the territories of an ally. Leaving Hindown on the 8th of March, Lord Lake turned north-west to Ramgarh, and was there waited upon by Holkar's vakils, who delivered a letter from their master, in which he expressed himself as follows: "Friendship requires that, keeping in your view the long existing unanimity between me and the English Company, you act according to what my vakils shall represent to you; and your doing so shall be fruitful of benefit and advantage; if not, my country and property are upon the saddle of my horse; and, please God, to whatever side the reins of the horses of my brave warriors can be turned, the whole of the country in that direction shall come into my possession." The proposals with which the vakils were intrusted were those mentioned above. The vakils accompanied them with a good deal of insolent bravado, to which Lord Lake briefly replied, "that it was not the custom of the English to boast of their power, but that in the event of a rupture, Holkar would probably find that he had considerably overrated his own."

There being now no doubt as to Holkar's hostile intentions, confirmed as they were by overt acts of aggression, a combined movement of the British troops took place, Colonel Murray, who commanded in Gujarat, being ordered to enter Malwa for the purpose of prosecuting hostilities in the direction of Indore, Holkar's capital, and the troops stationed above the Ghats preparing to operate against his possessions in the Deccan, while the commander-in-chief continued his march westward through the pass of Ballakira, towards the frontiers of Jaipur. On the 28th of April he arrived at Tonga, only fifteen miles east of the city of Jaipur, and after a halt of a few days, turned south in the direction of Narwahi, which was reached on the 8th of May. Offensive operations on the part of the British were now about to be commenced. On the 10th of May a detachment under Colonel Don was sent against Tonk Ram-pura, a Rajput fort situated sixty miles south of Jaipur, and the

only one which Holkar possessed north of the Chambal. It was a place of some strength; but proved an easy acquisition, having been captured by a sudden and unexpected onset on the 15th of May. Immediately on this capture Holkar recrossed the Chambal, and was closely followed, a detachment of three native battalions, whom Lord Lake had sent forward under Colonel Monson to Jaipur, with the troops of Jaipur and other auxiliaries, pressing him on the one side, while Colonel Murray from Gujarat was moving against him on the other. These two detachments being considered sufficient to keep Holkar in check, Lord Lake determined to march back to Agra, as the troops were suffering dreadfully from the hot winds, and the fields were so burned up that the cattle were perishing from want of forage. On arriving at the old encampment at Hindown on the 28th of May, the disagreeable intelligence was received that a party of British troops had been cut up in Bundelkhand. Colonel Fawcett, who had succeeded to the command there in consequence of the death of Colonel Powell, had detached seven companies of sepoys to take a small fort about five miles distant from his position at Kunch. The killedar, on being summoned, offered to surrender next morning if the firing ceased. These terms being agreed to, the killedar employed the interval in sending notice to Amir Khan, then in the neighbourhood with a large body of horse. About 7,000 of them were immediately despatched, and falling unexpectedly on two companies of sepoys and about fifty artillerymen in the trenches, slew every man of them, officers and privates, and then carried off all the artillery, consisting of three guns, two howitzers, and the tumbrils belonging to them. The other five companies succeeded with difficulty in making their escape.

Lord Lake continued his march under very distressing circumstances, multitudes perishing under the burning winds. "Young men," says Thorn, "who set out in the morning full of spirits, and in all the vigour of health, dropped dead immediately on reaching the encampment ground, and many were smitten on the road by the overpowering force of the sun, especially when at the meridian, the rays darting downwards like a torrent of fire." The misery produced by the heat was much increased by its necessary consequence, a scarcity of

water, and by hordes of Mewati robbers, who kept close on the track of the army, pillaging and murdering whenever they found an opportunity. Agra was at length reached on the 5th of June, and the troops moved to occupy their allotted cantonments during the rainy season. The first campaign thus closed with no very satisfactory results.

The force which Lord Lake when he set out on his return left with Colonel Monson to keep Holkar in check, amounted to five battalions of sepoys and about 3,000 irregular horse. With these, intending to co-operate with Colonel Murray from Gujarat, he entered Holkar's territory by the Mokandra Pass, and sent forward a detachment, which took the hill-fort of Hinglaisgarh by escalade. He had afterwards advanced fifty miles beyond the pass in the direction of the Chambal, when, on the 7th of July, information reached him that Holkar, who had retired beyond that river into Malwa, had recrossed it with his whole army. Colonel Monson hastened to meet him, but soon found it expedient to desist. His force had been greatly weakened by the absence of two detachments, the one which had taken Hinglaisgarh, and was not yet returned, and another which he had been obliged to send off for a supply of grain, of which he had barely enough for two days' consumption. He was moreover greatly staggered by a report that Colonel Murray, on whose co-operation he had calculated, intended to fall back on the Mhye. Influenced by these considerations, he resolved to retrace his steps in the direction of the Mokandra Pass. On the 8th of July, at four in the morning, he began his retreat by sending off his baggage and stores to Sonara. He remained on the ground of encampment with his troops drawn up in order of battle till nine, and then, as no enemy appeared, continued his march, leaving the irregular cavalry under Lieutenant Lucan to follow in half an hour, and bring him intelligence of Holkar's motions. He had made a march of twelve miles when he was startled by the intelligence that Holkar had come up with his whole army, completely defeated Lieutenant Lucan, and made him prisoner. Only waiting so long as to obtain full confirmation of the disaster, Colonel Monson continued his march, and reached the pass on the 9th without molestation.

On the 10th of July the Maratha cavalry appeared, and next morning, when their numbers had greatly increased, Holkar sent to demand the surrender of the guns and small arms. This was of course refused; and both parties prepared for the encounter. Holkar, dividing his horse into three bodies, charged the detachment vigorously on the front and flanks; but the advantageous position and valour of the defenders enabled them to repel all his attacks. On being thus foiled, he drew off about four miles, and was joined by his infantry and artillery. Colonel Monson, having no doubt of a renewed attack, and believing his post not to be tenable, resolved to retire upon Kota. After two marches, though harassed by the enemy, and suffering still more from the excessive rains, he succeeded in reaching it—but it was only to meet a great disappointment. He expected both shelter and provisions. The Raja of Kota refused to give either, and the retreat was continued towards the Gaumuch ford on the Chambal. The distance from Kota was only seven miles, and yet, from the incessant rain and the softness of the soil, a whole day was spent in accomplishing it. The ford was then impassable, but was crossed on the following day. A halt had become necessary in order to procure some grain, and on the 15th, when the march was resumed, the guns sunk so deep in the mud that they could not be extricated, and there was no alternative but to spike and abandon them. The Raja of Bundi, one of the chiefs with whom the British had recently entered into alliance, was requested to secure them. This he could not do; but it ought to be mentioned, to his honour, that he proved a faithful ally in the face of Holkar's whole army.

On the 17th of July the troops reached the Chambeli, usually a mere rivulet, but then so swollen that it was not fordable. The artillerymen, however, were sent across on elephants, and proceeded to the fort of Rampura. Nearly ten days were spent in conveying the rest of the troops across, partly on elephants and partly on rafts. Great privations were suffered during this delay; many men too were drowned in crossing; and what was even more distressing, many of the wives and children of the sepoys, who had, perhaps necessarily, but certainly not humanely, been left to the last on the oppo-

site side, were barbarously murdered by the Bhils under the very eyes of their husbands and fathers, who were unable to give them any protection. On the 29th of July the whole corps reached Rampura, where a reinforcement of two battalions of sepoys, with four six-pounders and two howitzers, a body of cavalry, and a supply of grain forwarded by Lord Lake from Agra, was waiting for them. Notwithstanding this relief, Colonel Monson judged it prudent to continue his retreat to Kushalgarh, where he expected to be joined by six of Sindhia's battalions and twenty-one guns, under Sadasheo Bhow Bhaskar, the officer whom Holkar defeated at Poona, and to obtain a stock of provisions that would enable him to keep the field. His force, now consisting of five battalions and six companies of sepoys, reached the Bunass on the 22nd of August. The river was so swollen that it could not be forded; but advantage was taken of those boats which were found to send the treasure across, and six companies of the 21st regiment, with orders to proceed to Kushalgarh.

Early on the morning of the 23rd of August, large bodies of Holkar's cavalry appeared, and encamped at the distance of about four miles. The river was next day fordable, and most of the baggage, and four battalions, with a howitzer, were sent across. The enemy's cavalry also crossed in great numbers to the right and left of the British position. At four in the afternoon their infantry and artillery arrived, and began to cannonade the battalion and pickets still left on the south bank to protect the remainder of the baggage and camp followers. By a spirited charge the enemy were driven back, and even some of their guns momentarily captured; but they soon rallied, and, led by Holkar in person, charged in such overpowering numbers, that the handful of troops opposed to them were nearly annihilated. In consequence of this disaster, Colonel Monson was obliged to abandon the baggage, in order to facilitate his retreat to Kushalgarh, which he reached on the night of the 25th. He had expected to find a powerful auxiliary in Sadasheo Bhow, and was surprised to find that he had already declared himself an enemy, but attempting to levy a contribution on the town, which belonged to the Raja of Jaipur, and demanding the surrender of the elephants, treasure, and baggage of

the British detachment, which had been deposited in the fort. When this demand was refused, he had actually cannonaded the place, but without effect.

On the morning of the 26th of August, the whole of the enemy's cavalry encamped in separate bodies around the detachment, whose difficulties were greatly increased by the detection of a treacherous correspondence of some of the native officers with Holkar. Though the most energetic measures were taken to check the meditated mischief, two companies of sepoy and a large proportion of the native cavalry deserted. At seven the same evening, Colonel Monson again moved with his troops formed into an oblong, which the enemy attempted in vain to penetrate, and on the night of the 27th reached the ruined fort of Hindown. After resting a few hours he resumed his retreat at one in the morning, but had no sooner cleared the ravines in the vicinity than the enemy's cavalry made a desperate charge in three divisions. It was repulsed with great bravery and coolness, the sepoy reserving their fire till their assailants were within reach of the bayonet. This was but a short-lived success. About sunset of the 28th, the troops, exhausted with fatigue and hunger, arrived at the Biana Pass, where it was Colonel Monson's intention to halt during the night. The enemy coming up with their guns did not permit it, and the retreat was continued to the town of Biana. The confusion which had been rapidly increasing now became inextricable, the troops fairly broke, and fled to make the best of their way to Agra, pursued by straggling parties of the enemy as far as Fatehpur.

In consequence of this disastrous retreat, it became absolutely necessary that Lord Lake should take the field without delay, though the rain was still pouring down in torrents, and large tracts of the country were under water. The troops were accordingly ordered out of cantonments, and the assembled army encamped on the right bank of the Jamuna, between Agra and Sikandra, on the 27th of September. Not a moment was to be lost. Holkar, at the head of an army which, according to Sir John Malcolm,¹ "amounted to 92,000 men, of whom 66,000 were cavalry, 7,000 artillery, and 19,000 infantry, and 192 pieces of

¹ Sir John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India*, vol. i, p. 238.

ordnance," had triumphantly advanced to Mathura, which was abandoned at his approach, and spread consternation over the country. On the 1st of October, 1804, the British army marched northward, and encamped on the 3rd within a mile of Mathura, which, having been abandoned by Holkar, was again in British possession. Flying parties of the enemy scouring the country, had in the meantime fallen in with a party of convalescent sepoys, coming with a convoy of a hundred camels laden with grain for the army, and captured the whole. Holkar's camp was at Aurang, to the west of Mathura, on the road to Dig, and General Lake proceeded in that direction on the 7th with the view of attacking it. A surprise was intended, but though the troops sent for the purpose arrived in the neighbourhood of the camp before daylight, the enemy were already mounted, and kept at such a distance that it was impossible to make an effectual charge. The attack was therefore abandoned, and the enemy returned to occupy their camp as before. Another attempt to bring them to action having failed, the army marched from Mathura on the 12th, no longer to the west, but northward in the direction of Delhi. While Lord Lake had been making fruitless attempts at Aurang, Holkar had moved with his brigades and artillery on the Mughul capital, and well nigh succeeded in gaining possession of Shah Alam's person. The plan was well conceived, and only frustrated by the precaution and gallantry of Colonel Ochterlony, the resident, who, on the first news of the enemy's approach, had assembled as many troops as possible from the neighbourhood.

The possibility of defending Delhi was very doubtful. The walls were in a shattered state, the ramparts in many places fallen, and the bastions so weak and narrow, that little use could be made of them. When Holkar's horse made their appearance on the morning of the 7th, the infantry were ordered within the walls. It was intended to employ the irregular cavalry outside, but when they came within sight of the enemy, and might, from the small number which had yet arrived, have charged with success, they positively refused, and finally dispersed. On the morning of the 8th the enemy's infantry and artillery appeared in sight, and a detachment being pushed forward, opened a heavy cannonade against the south-east angle

of the city wall. During the cannonade nearly forty feet of the parapet gave way, and by means of batteries erected during the night, the whole parapet was demolished, and partial breaches were even made in the wall. The defenders, urged to exert themselves to the utmost by the inspiring influence of Colonel Ochterlony, repaired the damage, and were even emboldened to make a sortie. It took place on the 10th, and was so successful as to spike the guns of a battery and inflict a considerable loss on the besiegers. Having now little hope of succeeding in this direction, the enemy employed their utmost efforts against the southern face. They were enabled to approach it under cover of gardens and ruins, and soon made a breach in the curtain between the Turkman and the Ajmeri gates. They were unable, however, to avail themselves of this success, as the defenders were able by the 12th effectually to cut off any communication through the breach with the town. During the whole of the 13th an unusual silence prevailed. As the defenders had conjectured, it proved the prelude to a serious attack which was made next morning at daybreak. Under cover of a cannonade which opened from the enemy's guns in every direction, a large body of infantry, preceded by ladders, made an assault on the Lahori gate. So warm was the reception given them, that they retired in confusion, leaving the ladders behind. Another attack was anticipated, but this was a final effort. News had arrived of the near approach of Lord Lake, and by the morning of the 15th, Holkar and his army were seen in the distance in full retreat.

On the same day when the siege of Delhi was raised, Lord Lake passed the town of Khusi, where, shortly before, Holkar was said to have had a grand nautch. During the festivity the head of an European soldier who had been caught straggling was brought him. He rewarded the bearer with twelve rupees, and placing the head upon a spear, made the nautch girls dance round it. This anecdote, whether authentic or not, accords well with the other atrocities committed by Holkar and his followers. Fugitives from Colonel Monson's unfortunate detachment were daily arriving horribly mutilated. Lord Lake, continuing his advance, arrived at Delhi on the 18th, and encamped in two lines between the city and the Jamuna.

Holkar had in the meantime moved secretly and rapidly to the northward, crossed the Jamuna opposite to Panipat, and began to waste the Doab with fire and sword. Lord Lake determined on an immediate pursuit with the cavalry, and with a reserve brigade of infantry under Colonel Don, Major Fraser being in the meantime left in command of the remainder of the army. On the 31st of October, his lordship crossed the Jamuna at a ford about three miles from Delhi, and advanced as lightly as possible, no wheel-carriages being allowed, and every fighting man and servant receiving a gratuitous supply of 6 lbs of flour, which was to last for six days, and be carried by the men themselves. The force, thus equipped, moved rapidly, and arrived on the 3rd of November at Shamli, where Colonel Burn, who had taken a distinguished part as commandant in the defence, had been shut up by a body of Sikhs in Holkar's service, as he was returning to his former station at Saharanpur. His detachment was in the greatest distress, many of the Hindus from refusing to eat beef having remained without food for many days. Much of this suffering having been caused by the inhumanity and violence of the inhabitants, Shamli was given up to plunder.

After relieving Colonel Burn, and issuing general orders passing a high encomium on him and the officers and men of his detachment for fortitude, patience, and perseverance, Lord Lake marched on the 5th of November in an easterly direction to Muhammadabad, and then south-east to Sherdana or Saldana, the residence of the Begum Sumru, whither Holkar was suspected to have moved, in the hope of inducing her to join him with her force, which consisted of five battalions of well-disciplined sepoys, and about forty pieces of artillery, commanded by European officers. The army now continued south in pursuit of Holkar, part of whose horse were shortly after seen, and continued hovering about the line of march, though he himself was far in advance carrying on his work of devastation. On the 15th of November he was at Farukhabad, thirty-six miles ahead, when Lord Lake, following close in pursuit without tent or baggage, received the agreeable news of a victory gained in the vicinity of Dig. Deferring the details for the present, we must accompany Lord Lake in his pursuit of

Holkar and his cavalry. At daylight of the 17th, the head of the British column reached the skirts of the enemy's camp, and gave the first intimation of their arrival by sending several rounds of grape into the very heart of it. Immediately thereafter, the cavalry dashed in as fast as they could gallop up, charging and cutting down in all directions. The surprise was most complete, and in a few minutes the whole plain was covered with dead. Holkar himself was one of the first to flee with what troops he had about him, and never stopped till he had crossed the Caline, eighteen miles distant, and taken the road to Mainpur. The rest of the troops, left to shift for themselves, were cut up or dispersed. The pursuit was continued upwards of ten miles, and as the march during the preceding day and night was fifty-eight miles, the whole ground passed over in the twenty-four hours before new encampment ground was taken up was about seventy miles—"an effort," says Thorn, "probably unparalleled in the annals of military history, especially when it is considered that it was made after a long and harassing march of 350 miles in the space of a fortnight." While performing this brilliant exploit, the British loss was only two killed and about twenty wounded. Holkar's loss was estimated at 3,000 killed on the field, and his whole cavalry, which, when he entered Hindustan, were 60,000, were now reduced to half that number. On this day the army fired three royal salutes, for as many victories—the one, this victory of Farukhabad; the second, the capture by Colonel Wallace of Chandore, the only stronghold of the Holkar family in the Deccan; and the third, the victory of Dig, of which an account must now be given.

A few days after Lord Lake left Delhi in pursuit of Holkar's horse, General Fraser set out in pursuit of his brigades and guns, which were known to be within the territories of the Raja of Bharatpur. On the 12th of November he arrived in the neighbourhood of Dig, and from the surrounding heights discovered the enemy encamped between a deep tank and an extensive morass, their left resting on the fort of Dig, and their right covered by a fortified village, while their whole position was defended by ranges of batteries which they deemed impregnable. It was determined to attack them on the following morning.

Two battalions of sepoys and the irregular cavalry having been left in charge of the baggage, the remaining British force consisted of his majesty's 76th regiment, the Company's European regiment, and four sepoy battalions. The right having been selected as the point of attack, the British column, after making a considerable detour southward in order to avoid the morass, arrived about daybreak at the fortified village, and immediately wheeled into line, the 76th regiment and two battalions forming the first, and the other troops the second line. The 76th carried the fortified village with their bayonets, and then running down the hill, charged the first range of guns under a tremendous shower of round, grape, and chain shot. The guns were instantly abandoned by their defenders, who retired to fresh batteries. The Company's European regiment on arriving at the village, and seeing the 76th so far ahead among the thickest of the enemy, rushed forward to their support, followed by the sepoys. When the second range of guns was about to be attacked, General Fraser fell mortally wounded by a cannon-shot, which carried off his leg, and the command devolved on Colonel Monson. The second range yielded to a charge of bayonets like the first, and battery after battery yielded, till the gallant assailants were carried under the guns of the fort, and suffered some loss. During these exploits a body of the enemy's horse gained possession of the first range of guns, and turned them on the British rear, till they were gallantly recaptured by only 28 men of the 76th under Captain Norford, though unfortunately at the expense of his own life. The enemy now seeking safety in flight, numbers of them precipitated themselves into the morass and perished, while the rest found protection under the guns of the fort. The British loss was 643 killed and wounded, of whom twenty-three were European officers; the loss of the enemy must have been very great, as no less than 2,000 are supposed to have been killed or drowned in attempting to escape. According to the most accurate accounts the enemy's force consisted of twenty-four battalions, a considerable body of cavalry, and 160 pieces of cannon. Of the last eighty-seven were taken, and among them, much to Colonel Monson's satisfaction, fourteen of those which he had been obliged to sacrifice during his retreat. Holkar after

his rout at Farukhabad had hastened off to Dig, where the remnants of his defeated infantry and cavalry were now assembled. Lord Lake lost no time in following upon his track, and having on the 28th of November crossed the Jamuna by the bridge of boats at Mathura, rejoined the infantry, which were then encamped about three miles to the west. During the month's separation the cavalry had marched upwards of 500 miles.

While Holkar's fortunes were thus at the lowest, he obtained an important auxiliary in Ranjit Singh, Raja of Bharatpur, who had already abandoned the alliance which the British formed with him at his own earnest request, and was now openly leagued with their declared enemy. At the battle of Dig his cavalry fought on the side of Holkar, and the guns of the fort of Dig, though it belonged to the raja, not only protected the fugitives of Holkar's army, but were turned with deadly effect on the British when they attempted to pursue them. From this time his interests and those of Holkar were completely identified, and the British could only regard them as common and inveterate enemies. As the raja is about to occupy a prominent place in our narrative, some account of him, and of the tribe of Jats to which he belonged, will be necessary.

The Jats—whom Tod, in his *History of Rajasthan*, has with more ingenuity than success endeavoured to identify with the ancient *Getoe*, and with the Jutes, through whom they might claim a place among our Danish ancestors—had, during the various revolutions in Hindustan which followed the reign of Aurangzeb, established themselves on the banks of the Jamuna. At first they were known chiefly as laborious agriculturists, but in course of time the necessity of self-defence and the temptations of ambition converted them into soldiers. A succession of warlike chieftains turned this change in their character to account. Churaman, their first leader of note, took a prominent part in the civil contests during the reign of the emperor Muhammed Shah, in the early part of the eighteenth century. His grandson Suraj Mal was still more distinguished, and claiming both the title of raja and the rights of an independent sovereign, built the forts of Dig and Kumbher, improved the fortifications of Bharatpur, which he made his capital, and

raised an army of 30,000 men, with which he joined the Maratha league against Ahmed Shah Durani. A fortunate quarrel with Sadasheo Bhow, the Maratha chief, made him withdraw from the league, and thus saved him from the carnage at Panipat. During the carnage which followed he managed to obtain possession of Agra, and brought his tribe to the highest pitch of prosperity which it ever attained. At his death, the Jats possessed a territory about 100 miles long by 50 broad, extending along both sides of the Jamuna, from the vicinity of Gwalior to that of Delhi. Under his son Nawal Singh this prosperity rapidly declined. In 1774 Agra was wrested from them by Nujif Khan, the emperor's commander-in-chief by name, but really independent, and they possessed little more than Bharatpur and the district around it, when Ranjit Singh, the grandson of Suraj Mal, succeeded. Under him the former prosperity was partially revived, and his revenue, though far short of that of his grandfather, was estimated at from twelve to fifteen lacs. He had a force of about 6,000 horse and foot in constant pay, and was reputed to be able on emergencies to raise the number to 50,000. As he was the first chief who applied for alliance with the British in Hindustan during the war with Sindhia, he was liberally treated, and received a free grant of territory adding nearly a third to his former revenue. How ungratefully he requited the favour has been partly seen by his conduct at the battle of Dig, and will now more fully appear.

On the 1st of December Lord Lake moved in the direction of Dig, and the following day encamped within sight of it. The reserve under Colonel Don, with the battering train from Agra, did not arrive till the 11th. An interval of nine days was thus spent, partly in reconnoitring and partly in skirmishing with Holkar's horse, who hovered round in large bodies without being allowed any opportunity of meditated mischief. On the arrival of Colonel Don, the whole army moved in an oblong square, protected on all sides so as to be secure from any attack. The necessity of moving thus cautiously arose from the immense area covered by the line of march. The followers, says Thorn, "were not less than 60,000; and our cattle might at a very moderate rate be estimated at 200 elephants, 2,000 camels, and

100,000 bullocks for carrying grain, equipage, and baggage, both public and private." On the 14th, the army which had encamped near the fortified village which formed the point of attack in the recent battle, moved round the hill on which it stands, and took up a final position a little to the south-west of the fort.

Dig, situated about forty-four miles W.N.W. from Agra, is so completely surrounded by marshes, and by jheels or small lakes, fed by a stream called the Manus Nye, as to be inaccessible to an enemy during most part of the year. The town, which is of considerable size, is inclosed by a strong mud wall with bastions, and a deep ditch, which is carried all round except at one point in the south-west, which terminates in a rocky eminence called the Shah Burj. This eminence, though it had an area of not more than fifty yards square on the inside, was surrounded by a wall with four commanding bastions, on one of which a large seventy-four pounder was mounted. The fort stood within the town wall, about a mile north-east from the Shah Burj. It was nearly in the form of a square, strongly built, inclosed by high and thick ramparts furnished with bastions, and a deep ditch faced with masonry. Its massive gateways were flanked with lofty towers, on one of which a sixty-pounder was placed. Immediately west of the fort stood the palace, a noble structure in which the raja resided when Dig was the capital.

The siege immediately commenced by breaking ground on the night of the 13th, in a tope to the south-west of the Shah Burj or King's Redoubt, which was selected as the point of attack. Before sunrise a trench 300 yards long, a mortar battery, and one for two six-pounders were completed. Towards evening of the same day, a breaching battery was commenced in the same locality, within 750 yards of the Shah Burj. During these operations considerable annoyance was given by the enemy's matchlock-men, who were stationed in the old mud fort of Gopal Garh, forming a kind of outwork. The breaching battery was, notwithstanding, completed on the night of the 16th, and opened on the following morning from six eighteen-pounders, four twelves, and four mortars. It continued firing for several days with very little effect. The distance was too

great, but the blunder being at length repaired by the erection of a new battery nearer the enemy's works, more rapid progress was made, the enemy's guns were mostly silenced, and the breach was pronounced practicable. Up to this time the enemy had never been shut up within the walls, but on the contrary had brought a number of guns into the plain, and placed them so judiciously under the cover of natural embankments, as to enfilade the batteries of the besiegers, at the same time that they were sheltered from them. It was hence necessary, when the assault was made on the 23rd of December, to form the storming party into three columns, one of which was to make the main attack on the Shah Burj, while the other two were to attack the batteries on the plain under the walls. All three succeeded, though only after an obstinate resistance, the enemy not only standing firmly to their guns, and, when no longer able to fire them, using their swords till most of them were bayoneted. After the Shah Burj was carried, the work seemed only half accomplished, as the fort was still entire, but the enemy were too much dispirited to risk a second assault, and on the night of the 24th evacuated the fort, to make the best of their way to Bharatpur. Hence, on Christmas Day, 1804, the British were in complete possession of Dig, both town and fort, together with all the guns within and without, amounting to 100, and including the greater part of Holkar's remaining artillery. A large quantity of grain was also captured, besides two lacs of rupees found in the public treasury.

The next object, and one of a much more formidable nature, was the siege of Bharatpur, situated about twenty miles S.S.E. of Dig, and thirty-four miles W.N.W. of Agra, on a plain amidst jungles and lakes. Its condition at the time when the siege commenced is thus described by Lord Lake himself, in a despatch to the governor-general. "A mud wall of great height and thickness, and a very wide and deep ditch everywhere surround it. The fort is situated at its eastern extremity, and is of a square figure. One side of that square overlooks the country; the remaining three sides are within the town. It occupies a situation that appears more elevated than the town, and its walls are said to be higher, and its ditch of greater width and deepness. The circumference of both town and fort

is upwards of eight miles, and their walls in all that extent are flanked with bastions at short distances, on which are mounted a very numerous artillery." Before this place Lord Lake arrived with his army on the 2nd of January, 1805, and immediately commenced the siege. The camp was on the south-west of the town, and operations began with seizing a grove considerably in advance of it, for the purpose of facilitating the approaches. This was done without difficulty on the evening of the 4th, and on the following evening a breaching battery for six eighteen-pounders was erected. This battery opened its fire on the morning of the seventh, and in the course of the same day another battery of four eight-inch and four of five and a half inch mortars, began throwing shells into the town. This cannonade, well responded to by the garrison, was continued with little interruption till the morning of the 9th, when a practicable breach in the western curtain, not far from the south-west angle, was reported. Previous breaches had been made, but the enemy had succeeded in stockading them. To prevent this from being done in the present instance, it was determined at once to assault.

The storming party moved off at seven o'clock in the evening, in three columns—one to attempt a gateway on the left of the breaching battery, and another to carry the enemy's advanced guns on the right, while the third or centre column, consisting of 500 Europeans and a battalion of sepoys, was to enter by the breach. At eight o'clock the three columns marched out of the trenches, and immediately encountered a tremendous fire of cannon and small arms. It had been hoped that the centre column might take the enemy by surprise, but in this it failed, owing partly to the irregularity of the ground broken up with pools and swamps, and partly to the darkness of the night. From these causes the advance of the column was greatly impeded, and many of the men belonging to it lost their way, some following the left column and some the right. The flanked companies of the 22nd, however, crossed the ditch breast-high in water, and mounted the breach, but being only twenty-three in number, could not attempt to storm the guns on the bastions to the right and left. In this predicament Lieutenant Manser made the men sit down in the breach, while he went in search

of the rest of the column. The object of the left column in attacking the gateway had been to endeavour to enter it along with the fugitives. To this a deep drain presented an insurmountable impediment, and it returned, as did also the right column which had driven the enemy from their guns, to support the centre column. They arrived too late. The few flankers of the 22nd, left in the breach exposed to an enfilading fire of grape from three guns of the right bastion, and seeing no prospect of support, were drawn off. The assault, in fact, had failed, and nothing remained for the assailants but to make the best of their way back to the trenches. In so doing they were exposed to the full fire of the enemy's guns and musketry, and suffered dreadfully. The British loss in this lamentable affair was 85 killed and 371 wounded.

Siege operations were immediately resumed, but as the previous breach had been repaired, it was resolved to effect another a little more to the right. For this purpose a breaching battery was erected adjoining the former, and mounting two twenty-four and four eighteen pounders, and also several twelve-pounder batteries, to take off the defences. The guns and mortars of the whole batteries again opened on the 16th with a very heavy fire, and with so much effect that a new breach was formed, and though on the following morning the garrison had stockaded it, still by continuing the fire the piles gave way, and left a hole quite through the work. The batteries continued playing incessantly for five days, when a large and practicable breach was effected. It seemed necessary, however, after the severe lesson taught by the former repulse, to use greater caution. Under an idea that the ditch was not fordable, three broad ladders covered with laths, and easily raised or depressed by means of levers, had been provided. That there might be no mistake, the exact dimensions of the ditch opposite to the breach behoved to be ascertained. This was no easy task; but three British troopers and three native horsemen, one of them a havildar or sergeant, tempted by the reward of £50 each and immediate promotion, undertook the task. Their mode of accomplishing it was singular. Having put on the dress of the country, they were seen about three in the afternoon, riding furiously toward the fort, and pursued as deserters

by a party of sepoys, who were firing at them. On arriving at the brink of the ditch, two of the troopers' horses fell, and while the men were extricating themselves the havildar called to the soldiers on the wall, to save them from the accursed Feringhis, and show them the nearest entrance to the city. Not suspecting any stratagem, the soldiers pointed to a gate in the very direction required, and the havildar as soon as the men were again mounted, rode with them along the ditch till he had passed the bridge and made the necessary observations. The difficulty now was to return. This they could only do by putting spurs to their horses, and galloping back at full speed amid showers of balls, which the garrison sent after them the moment the trick was discovered. They all escaped unhurt, and reported that the ditch was not very broad and apparently not deep, and that the breach itself might be easily mounted.

In consequence of this information, though evidently too loose to be acted upon in a matter of so much importance, the assault was fixed for the following day (the 21st). The storming party consisted of 150 men of the 76th, 120 of the 75th, 100 of the Company's 1st European regiment, and the 50 survivors of the 22nd flankers, the last headed by Captain Lindsay, who, still suffering from former wounds, threw away his crutch and moved with his arm in a sling. The portable bridges were carried by picked men, who had been previously exercised in the mode of throwing them over. The advance was to be supported by the remainder of the above regiments, and the second battalion of the 9th, 15th, and 22nd native infantry. The command of the attack was intrusted to Colonel Macrae. At three in the afternoon the storming party moved out, covered by the fire of the batteries, but no sooner reached the ditch than they encountered an unexpected and insurmountable obstacle. The garrison by damming up the ditch below the bridge, and sending in a large quantity of water from above, had added greatly and almost instantaneously both to its depth and width. The portable bridges were consequently too short, and only a few men, who were bold enough and able to swim across, succeeded in mounting the breach. As there were no means of supporting them it seemed madness to persevere. Colonel Macrae therefore recalled those who had

crossed, and the second storming party was obliged like the first to run the gauntlet of a most destructive fire before the trenches could be regained. The loss on this occasion was still more serious than before, amounting in killed and wounded to 591.

While making full allowance for contingencies which it was impossible to foresee, one cannot help suspecting that there was at least as much mismanagement as misfortune in these two repulses, and that Lord Lake, however able as a field officer, did not possess either the skill or the patience necessary to insure success in regular sieges. He had hitherto succeeded with minor places by sudden onsets, and he seems to have thought that regular approaches were fit for nothing but causing unnecessary delay. An able writer, adverting to Lord Lake's feelings in this respect, and to the blunders committed by the engineers, says:—"Even if an officer of the requisite ability and experience had been present, it is doubtful whether he would have been attended to, for so confident was the general in the resistless bravery of his troops, and so impatient withal, that he could hardly brook the delay that was necessary to enable his guns to make a breach in the ramparts." We have already seen him pay dear for this ignorant rashness, and before this unhappy siege terminates we shall be called to witness new disasters.

One of the original blunders of the siege was the excessive distance at which the batteries were placed. They were rather more than 700 yards from the wall, and made a proportionably feeble impression. Another equally serious blunder was the omission of regular approaches. While thus kept far off from the works, little knowledge could be obtained of their true character and of the obstacles necessary to be removed in order to insure success, and hence the necessity of precautions which ought to have been used was not discovered until it was too late to employ them. After the two signal failures new plans were adopted, and the character of the siege was changed. All that had previously been done was abandoned as useless; and the camp shifting round to the north and east of the town, the whole operations were commenced anew by carrying on regular approaches and erecting the batteries within the distance of 400 yards. On the 11th of February two batteries, one of them

consisting of six eighteen-pounders and another of eight mortars, opened their fire at this distance, and another still nearer, to take off the defences on the right bastion, was in course of erection. On the 20th the approaches had been carried to the brink of the ditch, and a mine was intended to be made for the purpose of blowing up the counterscarp and giving a sloping access.

All things were now in such a state of forwardness that the storming party was ordered to the trenches at an early hour, so as to be ready for the attack as soon as the repairs made by the garrison on the breach during the night should be destroyed. So bold, however, had the enemy become that, on the very night when the above orders were given to prepare for the assault, they made a sally, crept into the approach at daybreak unperceived, as the men at work there always left a little earlier, and remained for some time, demolishing the preparations that had been made for the mine and carrying off the implements. The storming party had just reached the trenches when another sally, composed partly of those who were concealed in the approach and partly of a reinforcement from the town, rushed out, and was not repulsed without considerable loss to the besiegers. The enemy still keeping possession of a trench in advance of the lines, it was proposed to dislodge them and follow them closely into the breach. The men, however, were not in a condition to give prompt obedience to these orders. The boldness shown by the enemy in their sally had dispirited, and the effort made in repulsing it had to some degree exhausted them, while an idea prevailed that the party who had for some time lain concealed in the approach might have filled the chamber, and made every necessary preparation for exploding it. Under the influence of this fear the soldiers of his majesty's 75th and 76th regiments, who were at the head of the column, refused to advance. The few men remaining of the 22nd flankers stepped boldly forward, but as they could effect nothing by themselves were recalled. Two native regiments, the 12th and 15th, when called to the front, took the place of honour, of which his majesty's troops had proved unworthy. Unfortunately the ditch near the breach again proved impassable; but a bastion to the right had so rugged an aspect that several men succeeded in climbing it, and actually planted

there the colours of the 12th native regiment. The climbing, however, being practicable only for one at a time, was too slow a process to secure the bastion, and the advantage gained was consequently lost. This third repulse was the most disastrous of all, the loss in killed and wounded amounting to 894.

Amid the general despondency caused by these repeated disasters, the general discovered a gleam of hope in the very partial success which had attended the climbing of the bastion. More battering would, it was supposed, make it easy of ascent, and it was therefore resolved to make it the point of a new assault on the following day. On the parade the commander-in-chief went up to the troops whose refusal to advance had been followed by such disastrous results, and "addressed them," says Thorn, "in terms of affectionate regret rather than stern severity," expressing "his sorrow that by not obeying their officers yesterday they had lost the laurels which they had gained on so many occasions." He was "yet willing to give them an opportunity of retrieving their reputation", and therefore called upon such as chose to volunteer in another effort to step out. They all volunteered to a man. The batteries in the meantime had opened their fire on the bastion and made such a gap in it that it was expected to tumble down by its own weight. This expectation was not realized; but if the assault was to be persevered in, further delay was impossible, as the ammunition was nearly exhausted and the army were suffering greatly from the want of supplies of every description. An assault under such circumstances was not so much a deliberate act as an effort of despair.

The storming party, placed under the command of Colonel Monson, was large, consisting of the whole European force, two battalions of the Bengal native infantry, the greater part of the 65th and 86th regiments, the grenadier battalion, and the flank companies of the first battalion of the third regiment of the Bombay army. It is difficult to say what the plan of the attack was, for the men appear to have been sent at haphazard to work their way as they best could up the face of a bastion still standing, though apparently tottering to its fall, and it says much for their dauntless courage that, in moving out to the attack at three in the afternoon, they cheered as they passed

the commander-in-chief, in token of their determination to carry the place and avenge their comrades or perish in the attempt. The result was only too soon ascertained. The monstrous task which had been assigned them is thus described by Thorn:—"The bastion to be attacked was extremely steep; and though the gap that had been made in it below sheltered those who could avail themselves of its protection, there was no possibility of getting from thence to the summit. Several soldiers drove their bayonets into the wall, one over another, and endeavoured by these steps to reach the top, but were knocked down by logs of wood, large shot, and various missiles from above. Others attempted to get up by the shot-holes which our guns had here and there made; but, as only two at the most could advance in this dangerous way, they who thus ventured were easily killed, and when one man fell he brought down with him those who were immediately beneath. All this time the enemy on the next bastion kept up a sweeping and most destructive fire." During this fearful struggle efforts were made on the curtain and other places which offered the least chance of success. It was all in vain. The assailants were met at every point by showers of grape and missiles of every kind, flaming packs of cotton previously dipped in oil, and pots filled with gunpowder and other combustibles, which, in exploding, spread death around them. Hopeless as it was throughout, the conflict was maintained for two hours before the men were drawn off. They had done their duty. Can it be said that the commander-in-chief did his when he sent them on such an errand? The loss in killed and wounded was 987. These, added to those sacrificed in the previous assaults, give an aggregate of 3,203 men. The numbers who had in the meantime died in the camp would furnish another heavy item. All idea of active operations was now abandoned, and the siege was converted into a blockade. There was in fact no alternative. Most of the guns employed had become unserviceable, and large detachments behaved to be sent off for supplies. The position of the army was indeed critical. The successes of the enemy had given them new courage, and when Lord Lake selected a new encampment to the north-east of Bharatpur he had some difficulty in reaching it in consequence of the interruptions given by the enemy's

horse. What, the reader naturally asks, had become of the British cavalry? This must now be explained.

When the siege commenced the Raja of Bharatpur endeavoured to strengthen himself by calling in the aid of Amir Khan, who was then carrying on his predatory warfare in Bundelkhand. That celebrated marauder, anticipating a more abundant harvest of plunder, soon made his appearance; and, when united with Holkar and the raja, formed so powerful a body of confederate horse that, at the very time when the second assault was made, the British cavalry stood drawn up in two lines for the purpose of opposing it. Amir Khan shortly after attempted to cut off a convoy of 12,000 bullocks, and had very nearly succeeded by attacking the escort, which amounted only to 1,400, with 8,000, when a reinforcement from the camp fortunately arrived, and assisted in driving him off the field with the loss of 600 men and forty stands of colours. So complete was the defeat that he only escaped by changing his dress and mingling with the rabble of fugitives. During the contest, however, a great many bullocks of the convoy laden with grain went astray and were never recovered. On the 27th of January an attempt was made on another convoy coming from Agra. The convoy consisted of 50,000 bullocks carrying grain, and about 800 hackeries laden with stores and ammunition, 8,000 rounds of eighteen-pound shot for battering guns, and six lacs of rupees. The escort consisted of the 29th light dragoons, two corps of native cavalry, and three battalions of sepoys. The raja, and his auxiliaries Holkar, Amir Khan, and Bapuji Sindhia, united their whole strength, in the hope of making a prize of this valuable convoy about half-way between Agra and the camp. They were again frustrated by a powerful reinforcement, and suffered still more severely than before, and the convoy arrived safely without the loss of a single bullock.

These defeats so disconcerted the confederates that they began to quarrel among themselves as to the share of the blame. The raja in particular, on whom the expense more immediately fell, began to regard his allies as an encumbrance, and Amir Khan, who saw that his golden hopes had vanished, began to look out for a new field of plunder. Rohilkhand, of which he was a native, obtained the preference, and he therefore set out

with his whole force, and a large body of Pindaris, a noted robber tribe, of which more will be heard hereafter. The position of the British army before Bharatpur convinced him that he could not be followed unless the siege were raised, and he therefore crossed the Jamuna on the 7th of February, expecting to have ample time to levy a rich booty. In this he had deceived himself. The very day after his departure the British cavalry, consisting of the 8th, 27th, and 29th light dragoons, and three regiments of native horse with horse artillery, the whole commanded by General Smith, were following close upon his track. Having crossed the Jamuna by the bridge of boats at Mathura, they encamped about three miles beyond. After marching and countermarching in pursuit of the fleeing enemy, whose movements were very imperfectly known, they arrived at Aligarh on the 11th, and were joined by a strong detachment under Colonel Grueber, who had abandoned the siege of the rebel fort of Komona on hearing of Amir Khan's arrival in the Doab. The pursuit was now continued northward as far as Commandanaghat on the Ganges, when it was learned that Amir Khan had only the day before crossed over into Rohilkhand. The British cavalry, having ascertained that the water was there only about breast-high, plunged in, and reached the other bank in safety. Continuing east on Amir Khan's track, they passed Moradabad, and on the 20th reached Rampur, the capital of the *jaghir* which the celebrated Rohilla chief Fyzulla Khan secured by his valour when his countrymen were barbarously warred upon by Mr. Hastings and the Nabob of Oudh. From Rampur the cavalry proceeded in a south-east direction, within view of the magnificent ranges of the Himalayas, till they arrived at Shirgur. Here learning that Amir Khan was still further north among the hills, where he could not easily be followed, further pursuit was for the present abandoned, and the cavalry retraced their steps first to Rampur and then Moradabad.

On the 1st of March, while proceeding north-west to Badalle, the smoking ruins of the surrounding villages gave evidence that Amir Khan could not be distant, and on the following morning, when passing north-east by Shirut, it became known that he and all his force were only about nine miles off. On

this welcome intelligence General Smith, leaving the baggage in charge of the rearguard and the 3rd regiment of native cavalry, hastened forward with the remaining troops, consisting of 1,400 regular cavalry, and Skinner's horse. At two in the afternoon, after a very long march, the enemy were found near Afzalgarh, close under the Kumaon Hills, drawn up as if prepared for an attack. Indeed, so courageous were they, that they assumed the offensive, and by rushing upon the dragoons before these had orders to charge, created some confusion. Two bodies of horse also, the one headed by Amir Khan and the other by his brother, attempted to penetrate the British flanks, but met a reception which compelled them to precipitate retreat with great slaughter. Amir Khan's infantry, consisting mainly of new levies of Pathans, fought boldly, and perished almost to a man; the cavalry generally escaped, the previous long march of the British cavalry making it impossible to follow them with any hopes of success.

General Smith in returning southward first learned, after reaching Moradabad on the 5th, that Amir Khan, taking a circuitous route after his defeat, had passed this place only the day before. As his object was supposed to be Bareilly and the southern parts of Rohilkhand, it was resolved, if possible, to anticipate his arrival. The effect of this movement was to make him double once more, and turn westward towards Sambal. Here an incident not unworthy of notice had about this time occurred. The younger Skinner, commanding a party of about 500 horse, had been detached to cross the Ganges at Anupshahr and return into the Doab. When near Sambal the detachment was attacked by a large body, headed by Amir Khan, and completely surrounded. It took shelter in a caravansary, which was gallantly defended for several days, though from the vast superiority of the enemy's numbers, and still more from a want of provisions, an early surrender seemed inevitable. Captain Skinner, made aware of his brother's position, and of the impossibility of relieving him, had recourse to the following stratagem:—Having written a letter to his brother desiring him to hold out, as the main body of the British cavalry would be with him in a few hours, he despatched it by a messenger with instructions to throw himself in Amir Khan's way, and give

up the letter to him. The moment it was read Amir Khan took flight and decamped, leaving young Skinner and his detachment overjoyed at a deliverance for which, till the matter was explained, they were wholly unable to account.

It would be vain to follow Amir Khan through all his subsequent windings. His incursion into Rohilkhand, though it had caused great misery to the inhabitants, had disappointed his expectations. Comparatively few had joined his standard, and even by these, after his defeat at Afzalgarh, he was abandoned. On the 13th of March, when he recrossed the Ganges into the Doab, his force had been reduced to less than half its original strength. Continuing his course westward he again crossed the Jamuna, and hastened back to his old quarters in the vicinity of Bharatpur, where the raja was not disposed to give him a hearty welcome. General Smith, taking the same direction, reached the British camp on the 23rd of March, after a month's absence and a tedious chase of more than 700 miles. The absence of the cavalry during this chase had added greatly to the difficulties of the besiegers, as well as the confidence of the besieged, and hence the annoyance which Lord Lake experienced in shifting the camp after his final repulse to the north and east side of the fort.

Though the siege had been converted into a blockade, preparations for resuming it were carried on with the greatest activity. Convoys with supplies of all kinds, battering guns, and ammunition daily arrived in the camp. The old guns also were again rendered fit for service, and everything indicated that ere long Bharatpur would be subjected to a more formidable attack than it had yet experienced. The raja could not behold these preparations without gloomy forebodings. The repulses sustained had not in the least diminished the resources of the besiegers, whose spirit and perseverance seemed to rise with the difficulties which they encountered; his resources on the contrary were nearly exhausted, and he knew of no way in which he could replenish them. The allies in whom he trusted were insufficient for their own protection, and he must prepare for being left ere long to maintain the unequal contest single-handed. Prudence, therefore, dictated that the best use which he could make of the advantages he had gained was to employ

them as means of terminating hostilities. Influenced by such considerations, he sent a letter to Lord Lake intimating a desire of peace. The overture was favourably received, and his vakils having arrived in the British camp, the negotiation was commenced. From various causes it did not proceed very rapidly, and during the time which elapsed some important operations took place.

As soon as the cavalry had rested from the fatigues of their pursuit of Amir Khan, Lord Lake determined to beat up the quarters of Holkar, who with the residue of his force was encamped about eight miles to the west. Accordingly, at one in the morning of the 29th March, they moved out silently, in hope to come upon him by surprise. They found him, however, on the alert, and were able to do nothing more than engage in an ineffectual pursuit, in which only two elephants, a hundred horses, and fifty camels were captured. Holkar, to avoid a similar risk, removed considerably to the south-west. Here he thought himself secure, till a bitter experience taught him the contrary. On the 2nd of April the cavalry, with the reserve and horse artillery, again moved off silently about midnight, and at daybreak came upon the enemy before they had time to mount their horses. They were at once charged in front and on both flanks, and were slain in great numbers, some on the spot, and still more during the pursuit, which was vigorously continued for nearly eight miles. The whole of the bazaars were captured, and whole bodies of troops, considering Holkar's case hopeless, left him to his fate. He was not now possessed of a single place of strength. Indore, his capital, was taken by Colonel Murray shortly after Colonel Monson, misled by false information, commenced his disastrous retreat; Chandore and Gaulna, his only strongholds in the Deccan, had also fallen; and now, in consequence of a new disaster, he was literally destitute of a place of refuge. In the attack on his camp, the British loss was only two killed and a few wounded. He, on the contrary, left more than 1,000 dead on the field, and was so much weakened by desertion, that when in his flight he crossed the Chambal, the whole force he could muster was about 8,000 horse, 5,000 infantry, and thirty guns.

On the 8th of April the army before Bharatpur moved round to the south-east. This indication of a design to commence

active operations induced the raja to break off all delays. On the 10th the preliminaries were signed, and next evening his third son arrived in the camp as an hostage for the arrangement of definitive terms. The treaty was shortly afterwards concluded. The raja agreed to pay twenty lacs of rupees, of which three lacs were to be immediately advanced, and became bound not to hold any connection with the enemies of Great Britain, nor entertain any European without the sanction of the British government. The territories formerly granted to him were resumed, and in security for the fulfilment of the treaty his son was to remain as an hostage, and the fortress of Dig was not to be given up. The conclusion of a treaty with the raja was a deviation from the course of policy which Marquis Wellesley had been accustomed to pursue. The repulses at Bharatpur had undoubtedly lowered the reputation of the British arms among the natives of India, and it might therefore have been expected, that until the stain was wiped off by the capture or voluntary surrender of the place, no overtures of any kind would have been listened to. Among the causes which may have led to the adoption of a more moderate course, was the threatening aspect which some disputes with Sindhia was beginning to assume, and the consequent danger that another formidable Maratha war might arise.

Sindhia's sympathies had all along been with Holkar, and nothing but doubt as to the final issue had made him hesitate as to throwing in his lot with him. Every new phase in the contest was accordingly followed by a corresponding change in his feelings, and he continued fluctuating between opposite tendencies, unable to come to any final decision. When Holkar prospered, Sindhia was warlike, and talked openly of a rupture with the British; when reverses befell him, Sindhia was pacific, and full of friendly professions for the British. It would seem that about the time when Holkar commenced his campaign so triumphantly by the destruction of Monson's detachment, and was threatening to make himself master both of Agra and Delhi, Sindhia in one of his warlike moods caused a letter to be written for the purpose of being delivered to the governor. It was somewhat in the form of a manifesto, and breathed throughout a spirit of defiance. This letter was dated 18th October,

1804, but the delivery of it seems to have been made dependent on the course of events, and the wakil to whom it was intrusted moved along by slow stages from Benaras to Calcutta, so that it might have been possible to recall him, or give him new instructions at any intervening period before he actually arrived. Shortly after the date of the letter Holkar's prospects darkened. He was chased from Delhi, surprised at Farukhabad, and signally defeated in a pitched battle at Dig. Had this state of matters continued, the letter would in all probability never have been heard of. The signal failures of the British before Bharatpur, however, gave new courage to their enemies, and Sindhia's letter was at last put into the hands of the governor-general on the 18th of February, 1805, exactly four months subsequent to its date. It revived a claim to the fort of Gwalior and the territory of Gohad, though his own minister had authorized the British resident to assure the governor-general that "the claim had been entirely relinquished by his master;" and included in a general list of complaints, two in particular—the one, that the British government had not given him the protection they had promised, and the other, that by not furnishing him with money, they had not only left him unable to co-operate in the subjugation of Holkar, but even compelled two of his generals to enter into a feigned league with Holkar, because they could not otherwise obtain subsistence for their troops. In both complaints Sindhia only showed that there is no limit to Maratha effrontery. In complaining of the want of protection he referred to Colonel Murray, who, when at Ujjain, then Sindhia's capital, had allowed Holkar and Amir Khan to devastate the surrounding country. The fact in this case was, that Colonel Murray's movements were paralysed by the failure of Sindhia to co-operate with him as he had engaged to do, and the opposition he encountered from Sindhia's own officers. The second complaint was, if possible, still more shameless. The officers who, according to Sindhia, were compelled from want of subsistence to feign a league with Holkar, were Bapuji Sindhia and Sadasheo Bhow. So far from merely feigning a league, both of them were guilty of unequivocal treachery, by deserting to Holkar at a most critical moment, and deserting as was notorious with their master's

consent. Sindhia's complaints were therefore mere pretexts, on which to found a quarrel which he had long been meditating.

At the date of Sindhia's letter, he had consented, on the urgent remonstrance of the resident, to leave Burhanpur, and proceed N.N.W. to Ujjain; but instead of this, proceeded north-east in the direction of Bundelkhand, where Amir Khan was waging war as the ally of Holkar. On his march he made aggressions in violation of his treaty with the British, first on the Nabob of Bhopal, and next on the peshwa himself. These were overt acts of hostility, but as they were not sufficient to disclose his designs, he entered into open communication with Amir Khan and other allies of Holkar, and did not hesitate both by himself and his ministers, to give decided proofs of sympathy with his cause. So unequivocal, indeed, was his conduct, that Mr. Jenkins, who had become acting resident in Sindhia's camp in consequence of the death of Mr. Webbe, determined to leave, and applied for his passports. As this would have been almost equivalent to a declaration of war, for which Sindhia had not yet finally decided, he interposed various delays, till Mr. Jenkins, seeing on every side indications of hostility, quitted the camp with his suite and baggage on the 23rd of January, 1805. At the end of his first march he was overtaken by a messenger from Sindhia, who induced him to return by promising entire compliance with his wishes. Mr. Jenkins in returning left his baggage behind in a grove in the vicinity of Sindhia's regular brigade, and while retained at the durbar till evening, received intelligence that his escort had been attacked by a large body of Pindaris, who had carried off the whole baggage, besides wounding the officer in command, the surgeon, and several of the sepoys. Sindhia professed great indignation at the outrage, but as he made no effort to punish it, the probability is that it was done with his knowledge, for the purpose of preventing Mr. Jenkins' departure.

Mr. Jenkins, now virtually a prisoner in Sindhia's camp, thus describes his position in a letter dated 10th February, 1805:—"Under the operation of the late events, the British residency is become a degraded spectacle to a camp by which it was formerly held in the utmost veneration and respect. Our equipage is reduced to a single tent which occupies a small

corner of Sindhia's encampment; and in this situation we are exposed to the derision of the plunderers, who triumph in the protection of a nefarious government, under the countenance of which they presume to insult us with the proffer for sale of our plundered effects." In these humiliating circumstances, Mr. Jenkins was paraded on the march as Sindhia proceeded northwards from Saugar, with designs which were almost transparent, though it did not yet suit him to avow them. Meanwhile Sindhia's letter, which took four months to travel to its destination, had been delivered. Its conclusion was as follows:—"Having maturely weighed and considered all these points, let your excellency be pleased to favour me with a speedy and favourable answer. If by the time of my arrival at Malwa a full and detailed answer to all that I have written arrives, it will be extremely proper and advisable." This style of address obviously savours of arrogance, and must have been felt by the governor-general to be offensive in the extreme; but, contrary to his usual practice, he restrained his indignation, and, as if for the purpose of allowing it to cool, delayed his answer till the 14th of April. It was long and elaborate, much more so, indeed, than could be necessary, as nothing could be gained by arguing with one who was evidently meditating an appeal to the sword. Sindhia's charges were retorted upon himself, and enumerated under thirteen distinct heads. As specimens we give only the first and the last. "1. After your highness's repeated and solemn assurances to the resident of your intention to return to your capital for the purpose of co-operating with the British government in the prosecution of the war, your highness, without affording an explanation to the resident, directed your march towards the territory of Bhopal, in positive violation of your personal promise, repeatedly made to the resident. . . . 13. The general conduct of your highness's government, and especially the augmentation of your highness's force and your march to Narwa, have encouraged the enemy to expect your highness's support, of which expectation the enemy has made a public boast; and a general opinion exists in Hindustan and the Deccan, that your highness has determined to unite your forces with the remnant of the enemy's power in a contest against

the British government, your friend and ally." The charges thus retorted might have justified the commencement of hostilities, but the governor-general had at this time many reasons for not proceeding to extreme measures, and he therefore concluded with expressing his desire to maintain peace so long as Sindhia would allow it to be possible.

Sindhia was actuated by a different spirit, and conformably to an usual Maratha interpretation, considered the desire of peace manifested by the governor-general as a sign of conscious weakness. Accordingly, on the 23rd of March he intimated by his minister to Mr. Jenkins, that he was about to march to Bharatpur, for the purpose of mediating a peace between the British government and its enemies. His object in making this intimation was to request the acting resident to write to the British officers in charge of the different detachments on his route to receive him as a friend. On this preposterous proceeding the governor-general justly remarks: "To proceed at the head of an army to the seat of hostilities for the purpose of interposing his unsolicited mediation, was an act not only inconsistent with the nature of his engagement, but insulting to the honour, and highly dangerous to the interests of the British government." A few days before the intimation to Mr. Jenkins, one of Sindhia's servants of high rank, but without credentials, waited on Colonel Close at Nagpur, and admitted to him that Sindhia was moving to the north because he was offended with the English. Combining the information derived from these different sources, the governor-general could no longer have any doubt as to Sindhia's designs, and proceeded with his usual decision and energy to adopt means to frustrate them. Colonel Close was vested with powers similar to those formerly held by Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was now about to quit India for ever, and prosecute the glorious career to which his Indian victories were only a prelude, and Lord Lake was instructed not to allow Sindhia to violate the treaty in a single iota. His attempt to march upon Bharatpur, should he make it, was to be treated as "not only a declaration of war, but a violent act of hostility." What the result might have been it is difficult to conjecture, as Lord Lake's army, weakened and dispirited, would have found it difficult to cope with a new

and powerful confederacy, which might have attacked it at once on opposite sides, and with overwhelming numbers. Fortunately Sindhia had miscalculated. Neither he nor Holkar was aware that the Raja of Bharatpur had concluded a peace, nor was the raja himself disposed suddenly to recede from it.

In consequence of the altered circumstances, Sindhia's tone once more became pacific, and an offer which he made to atone for the outrage committed on the resident's escort was accepted by the governor-general as sufficient. Meanwhile his intercourse with Holkar was still kept up, and at last both Holkar and Amir Khan arriving with their forces, the whole formed virtually one united camp. The closeness of the union was afterwards evinced by a characteristic proceeding. Ambaji Inglia, now in the service of Sindhia, was in possession of a large amount of treasure, while both his master and Holkar were very much in want of it. The two chiefs combined to enrich themselves by robbing the servant of one of them. Amir Khan, who was employed by Holkar to do the robbery, states that the suggestion proceeded from Sindhia, who observed, "Ambaji Inglia, who professes to be my servant, and has lacs of rupees in ready money, will give no aid. If you can contrive any way of extorting the money from him, you have my permission, but the half must be given to me." Such was the compact, and it was immediately executed by seizing Ambaji and torturing him till he purchased his deliverance by giving up thirty-eight, or, according to some, fifty lacs. This was in some respects a fortunate robbery for the Company, as it made Ambaji the irreconcilable enemy of Holkar, and thus disposed him to use all his influence in preventing the new Maratha confederacy, which was on the point of being formed, from acquiring any degree of stability.

On the 21st of April, Lord Lake quitted the vicinity of Bharatpur and proceeded south towards the Chambal, on the banks of which Sindhia and Holkar were now encamped. On the 27th, when the resident, who, by his lordship's directions, had requested an audience of Sindhia, went to have the appointed interview, he found the camp in confusion. A rumour of Lord Lake's approach was current, and neither Holkar nor Sindhia had any idea of risking the consequences of his arrival:

both were therefore preparing for a precipitate flight. They started on the 28th, and hastened up the right bank of the Chambal, taking the direction of Sheopur. The difficulty of the road, the excessive heat, and the precipitation, made the march very disastrous, and great numbers of men perished. Sheopur, when they reached it, did not seem distant enough, and after a halt of some days they started again southward for Kota, a distance of about fifty miles. Mr. Jenkins was obliged to accompany them. Lord Lake had not only expressly ordered him to quit the Maratha camp, but had distinctly intimated to Sindhia that the British government would hold him responsible in his own person, his ministers, and servants for the safe conveyance of the resident, with his attendants and property, to the nearest British camp. Notwithstanding this intimation, Mr. Jenkins was still detained under various pretexts, which had ceased to have even the semblance of plausibility. Week after week having thus passed away without any prospect of release, at last, on the 17th of June, a kind of ultimatum was sent by Lord Lake to Sindhia, declaring that if in ten days the resident were not allowed to quit the camp, it would be held equivalent to a dissolution of all friendly relations between the two governments. Evasions and professions of friendship, however, were once more received as substitutes for performance, and the resident was still virtually a prisoner in Sindhia's camp, when, on the 30th of July, 1805, Marquis Wellesley ceased to be Governor-general of India.

Great as had been the achievements of Marquis Wellesley's administration, it had lost favour both with the directors and the ministry. Conquests, however brilliant, failed to defray the expense which had been incurred in making them, and the debt of the Company had rapidly increased. This fact was to many, who still regarded the Company as merely a commercial body, sufficient to condemn any system of policy which failed to produce favourable financial results, and on his ground alone, without looking further, they were loud in their condemnation. Others, again, while admitting that in conducting the Indian government, mere pecuniary interests ought to be held subordinate to others of a higher order, were impressed with a belief that our Indian possessions were already larger than we could

profitably manage, and that any extension of them was only an additional source of weakness. So general had this belief become, that with the consent of all political parties, it had been embodied in an act of parliament, which declared, that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of this nation." This declaration standing unrepealed, furnished a rule from which no governor-general could legally deviate; and yet it was undeniable that Marquis Wellesley, from the day he landed in India to the day he quitted it, had been constantly engaged, if not in "schemes of conquest," properly so called, at least in "extension of dominion." On the west and the east coast, in the south and the north, he had either extended dominion indirectly by depriving independent princes of their sovereign rights, or forcibly wrested their territories from them, and annexed them to the already overgrown territories of the Company. Tested by the legislative declaration, Lord Wellesley's measures could not be justified, since they were to all intents the very measures which the act of parliament had stigmatized as "repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of this nation."

On the other hand, there is room to contend that Marquis Wellesley's policy was far wiser than that to which the legislature had restricted him. The system of neutrality had proved a broken reed. Marquis Cornwallis, when he tried to act upon it, found it impracticable, and without formally condemning it, admitted that it first tied up his hands, and then left him no alternative but to engage in war, without any previous preparation for it. Lord Teignmouth did act upon the system of neutrality, and what was the result? A cowardly, mean-spirited policy, which backed out of engagements when it became inconvenient to fulfil them, and made it a rule to lean always to the strongest side. Under this policy, the British reputation sank rapidly, and the Company were ere long left without an ally in whom any confidence could be placed. In striking contrast to this pusillanimous spirit, was that in which Marquis Wellesley commenced his administration and carried it on to the very end. He saw clearly that the British in India had advanced too far to recede, and that no alternative was

left them but either to gain the whole or lose the whole. The idea of becoming stationary was an absurdity. If they did not advance, they must lay their account with being driven back. If they repudiated the empire placed within their reach, some other power would certainly seize it. Marquis Wellesley saw this from the first, and having made his choice in favour of dominion, pursued it on system with consummate ability and brilliant success. The legality, the wisdom, and even the justice of some of his measures are very questionable, but the House of Commons undoubtedly did right when, refusing to entertain the charge against him which a wretched political adventurer had originated, it declared with reference to that charge, and by implication with reference to all others, that the Marquis Wellesley "had been actuated by an ardent zeal for the service of his country, and an ardent desire to promote the safety, interests, and prosperity of the British empire in India."

Cornwallis and Bentinck

DEVIATION from the restrictive policy enjoined by the legislature being regarded as the primary cause of the financial embarrassments of the Company, the directors naturally longed for a return to that policy, and the appointment of a new governor-general, who was at once inclined from conviction, and qualified by ability and experience, to carry it into full effect. The choice being thus limited, there was no difficulty in making it, and general satisfaction was felt at the announcement that Marquis Cornwallis had again consented to wield the destinies of India. His lordship, ever since his return, had been regarded as a high authority on Indian subjects. Lord Castlereagh, who had become president of the Board of Control, frequently consulted him: his views were known to be decidedly opposed to all schemes of conquest, and he was therefore regarded as the individual best qualified to remedy the serious errors into which his predecessor was presumed to have fallen. Of this his lordship himself seems to have been too easily persuaded. Referring to his second appointment, which, it will be remembered, he resigned hastily after every arrangement had been made for his departure, he had said,¹ "I am not sure that I acted wisely in declining to return in 1797." This declinature had led to the appointment of Marquis Wellesley, and was thus indirectly the cause of the evils which were supposed to have ensued. The moment, therefore, it was flatteringly suggested to him that it was in his power to remedy these evils, or, as it was expressed, to save the Indian empire, he never hesitated. What his views on the subject were may be learned from his correspondence. Mr.

¹ *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*, vol. iii, p. 509.

Pitt, who had given way to Mr. Addington (Lord Sidmouth), was again at the head of the ministry, but from some offence which he had taken, had not given the marquis any place in it. Hence his lordship wrote, "I know nothing of public affairs, and with the exception of Lord Melville, who has behaved to me with his accustomed kindness, I have not been in the most distant manner noticed by the present administration." This was galling to his feelings, as he still deemed himself capable of good service. Hence, though he considered it a "desperate act to embark for India at the age of sixty-six," on being assured by Lord Castlereagh that Lord Wellesley "could not be suffered to remain in the government," and that Mr. Pitt, Lord Melville (Mr. Dundas), and himself (Lord C.), "were of opinion that it would be of the utmost advantage to this country" that he should become governor-general, he answered as follows:—"They might easily suppose that it was no pleasant undertaking for a man of my age, but as I had still good health, and felt myself, in times like the present, rather awkwardly circumstanced by being totally laid aside, I would not refuse any situation in which I thought I might be useful."

Such were the circumstances under which Marquis Cornwallis again assumed the government of India. The nature of the services expected from him may be gathered from the above conversation with Lord Castlereagh, from which an extract has already been given. Mr. Pitt, according to Lord Castlereagh, "was decidedly of opinion that he (Marquis Wellesley) had acted most imprudently and illegally." So much was Marquis Cornwallis of the same opinion that he feared the mischief "had gone so far as to render it very difficult to apply a remedy." To this observation Lord Castlereagh replied, "that they were well aware that the subsidiary treaties could not at present be done away, but that it was highly necessary to bring back things to the state which the legislature had prescribed." The object gravely contemplated by the ministry, the court of directors, and the new governor-general, was to commence and carry out a retrograde process, with a view to the ultimate abandonment of the high position which had been gained by a lavish expenditure of blood and treasure, and the occupation of a subordinate, and by inevitable consequence, a precarious

place among the governments of India. It is melancholy to see such a man as Marquis Cornwallis thus sent out to India to end his days and sully his reputation.

The new governor-general arrived at Calcutta on the 29th of July, 1805, and though his predecessor was still present, lost no time in entering upon the government, for he was sworn in on the following day. Holding as before the united offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief, he had the destiny of India in his hands, and was determined to make all haste in carrying out his plans. To Lord Lake, who had descended to the subordinate position of provincial commander-in-chief, he wrote on the very day of his instalment: "It is my earnest desire, if it should be possible, to put an end to this most unprofitable and ruinous warfare." He might have written more confidently, because he was determined to make peace at all events, and purchase it at any cost however large. One is almost ashamed to add that he was willing for this purpose to make a sacrifice even of honour. In a letter to Lord Lake, acquainting him with the terms on which he was disposed to offer peace to Sindhia, he says: "I am aware of the disadvantage of immediately relinquishing, or even of compromising, which has been so repeatedly and so urgently made for the release of the British resident; but I deem it proper to apprise your lordship that, as a mere point of honour, I am disposed to compromise or even to abandon that demand if it should ultimately prove to be the only obstacle to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs with Daulat Rao Sindhia; and that I have hitherto been induced to support it by the apprehension that the motives of such a concession might be misinterpreted, and that it might lead to demands on the part of Sindhia with which we could not comply without a sacrifice of dignity and interest incompatible with our security, and thereby render still more difficult of attainment the desirable object of a general pacification."

According to this idea, so unlike that which Marquis Cornwallis was wont to entertain in better days, honour was to be abandoned or compromised, as an obstacle unworthy of standing in the way of "a satisfactory adjustment with Daulat Rao Sindhia." Could anything be more monstrous? A Maratha chief who had not only violated a solemn treaty, but trampled

on the laws recognized by all states having any pretensions to civilization, by detaining, maltreating, and plundering an ambassador, was to be not punished but propitiated—not hunted down as a barbarian whom no faith could bind, but studied and courted, and scarcely even reminded of his atrocious procedure lest his delicate feelings should be offended. Security was everything, and it was to be obtained by truckling to an insolent and faithless man, who on finding how much he had gained by rebellion, would take the first opportunity of rebelling again in the hope of gaining still more. To imagine that peace could be secured by stooping to such degradation was, to say the least, a very gross delusion. Sindhia would of course take all that misplaced indulgence could bestow upon him, but it would only be to employ it for the purpose of subsequent extortion, and to a certainty, the moment he felt strong enough, his former aggressions would be resumed. Fortunately the British government was spared the disgrace of making concessions to Sindhia, while he was openly insulting it by detaining the resident as a prisoner in his camp. Lord Lake, on being made aware of the extreme degradation to which the governor-general was prepared to submit in pursuit of a vain phantom of peace, managed to draw the first overtures from Sindhia, and to induce him to release the resident, by assuring him that until this was done, his overtures could not be favourably entertained. By this dexterous move on the part of Lord Lake, Mr. Jenkins was on his way to the British territories, and the humiliation which the governor-general was preparing for himself and his country was happily escaped.

It would be painful and it is not necessary to dwell on all the other concessions which Marquis Cornwallis had declared his readiness to make while bent on obtaining peace at any price, since he was not destined to carry his intentions into effect. He had arrived in India in very indifferent health, and did not allow himself to take the ease and relaxation which might have restored it. The very day after his arrival at Calcutta he was immersed in all the cares and toils of office. A week afterwards he was on his way to the upper provinces to engage in negotiations, of the success of which, notwithstanding the generous or rather lavish spirit in which he was

disposed to act, he was very doubtful. Though convinced of the propriety of the course he was taking, and not easily turned aside from his purpose when once it was formed, he could hardly be free from misgivings when he found his measures decidedly condemned by some of those who were best qualified to judge of them, and more especially by his old friend Lord Lake, who not only disapproved but threatened to resign. Thus perplexed and grieved his indisposition rapidly increased, and when he arrived at Buxar on the 25th of September, 1805, he was considered by his attendants as beyond hope of recovery. His voyage up the Ganges was however continued, and he lingered on in a state bordering on unconsciousness till he arrived at Ghazipur, where he breathed his last on the 5th of October. The merits of his first Indian administration have already been examined; in regard to his second administration, Sir John Malcolm justly observes: "However questionable the policy of some of the last acts of this nobleman may be to many, or whatever may be their speculations upon the causes which produced such an apparent deviation from the high and unyielding spirit of his former administration, no man can doubt the exalted purity of the motive which led him to revisit that country. Loaded with years as he was with honour, he desired that his life should terminate as it had commenced; and he died as he had lived, in the active service of his country." The universal esteem in which he was held both at home and abroad was testified by the honours paid to his memory. A mausoleum was erected over his remains at Ghazipur by public subscription; Bombay erected a statue, and Madras, which, as well as Calcutta, had already his statue, erected a cenotaph. At home the House of Commons voted a statue to him in St. Paul's; and the court of proprietors, who had in 1794 settled upon him a pension, of which at his death about ten years were still to run, bore further testimony to his merits by a vote of £40,000 to his family.

Sir George Barlow, an old and distinguished civil servant of the Company, succeeded by a provisional appointment to the office of governor-general. When the succession opened to him he had been four years a member of the supreme council. Previously he had been chief secretary to government during

the whole of Lord Teignmouth's and the commencement of Marquis Wellesley's administrations. He had also been actively employed by Lord Cornwallis during his first administration, and had the credit of having furnished the original draft of the code of regulations, in accordance with which the civil and judicial business of the Company had since been conducted. Judging from his previous antecedents, it was difficult to say what his policy would be. He had been connected with several administrations, and though the principles on which they acted were very different, he had the good fortune to give satisfaction to all. During the whole of Marquis Wellesley's administration, he had so uniformly and zealously supported it, that he was supposed to be finally pledged to the same system of policy, and hence, when Marquis Cornwallis, who had a high opinion of his merits, urged the propriety of giving him a provisional appointment as his successor, Lord Castlereagh, then at the head of the Board of Control, "did not," says the marquis, "give much encouragement on that head, intimating that the inveteracy of the court of directors against Lord W. (Wellesley) had produced a disinclination in that quarter towards Barlow." He was made acquainted with the objection thus taken to him, and it is not improbable that he had taken care to remove it by satisfying the court that he was very pliable on the subject of policy, and was just as ready to support the restrictive system of Marquis Cornwallis, as he had previously been to support the extensionist system of Marquis Wellesley. Be this as it may, it is certain that the objection was withdrawn, and he not only obtained the provisional appointment, but rose so high in the favour of the directors that they afterwards made the appointment absolute.

Brought into office under such auspices, Sir George Barlow immediately announced his determination to pursue the system of neutrality, and walk as much as possible in the footsteps of his predecessor. His plan was to terminate the war as speedily as possible by concluding treaties with Sindhia and Holkar, in which the defensive or subsidiary principle would be altogether ignored, and to throw off all connection with the petty states beyond the Jamuna, bounding the British territory by that river, or by a line nowhere exceeding ten

miles beyond it. Taking up the negotiation with Sindhia on the basis which Marquis Cornwallis had adopted, he concluded a treaty with him on the 23rd of November, 1805. Its principal articles were that the previous treaty of Surji Anjengaon should remain in force, except in so far as altered—that the Company, from mere considerations of friendship, would cede to Sindhia the fortress of Gwalior and certain parts of Gohad—that Sindhia would abandon all claim to the pensions payable by the Company to certain officers of his court, the Company, however, paying the arrears upon these pensions up to the 31st of December, 1805, and the balance due upon some territorial revenues, but only under deduction of certain claims, one of which was the plunder of the British residency—that the Chambal, between Kota on the west, and the eastern frontiers of Gohad, should form the boundary between the two states, Sindhia having no claims to any territory between these two points to the north of the river, and the Company in like manner, and within the same limits, having no claim to any territory to the south of the river—that the Company would pay to Sindhia annually the sum of four lacs, besides granting two *jaghirs* of their territories in Hindustan, the one of two lacs to Sindhia's wife, and the other of one lac to his daughter, and would moreover engage to enter into no treaties with the Rajas of Udaipur, Jodhpur, and Kota, or other chiefs, tributaries of Sindhia in Malwa, Mewar, or Marwar, nor interfere in any shape with Sindhia in settling with these chiefs. The Company further engaged that, in the event of their making peace with Holkar, they would not restore, nor desire to be restored to him any of the possessions of the Holkar family in Malwa taken by Sindhia, but leave Sindhia at liberty to arrange with Holkar or any branch of the Holkar family, in any way he pleased. This treaty, negotiated by Colonel Malcolm acting under the authority of Lord Lake, did not receive the entire approval of the governor-general. The new policy which he was to carry out assumed that the interest and security of the British possessions would be best provided for by limiting the relations with surrounding states to general amity without special engagements, and he therefore objected to those articles which, by fixing the Chambal as the

boundary, implied that the petty states immediately north of that river were to continue under British protection. So averse was he to any such implied guarantee, that he insisted on appending to the treaty two declaratory articles, for the express purpose of withdrawing it, and leaving the petty states to protect themselves as they best could. Lord Lake had already strongly protested against this policy, and again made a last effort to convince the governor-general that, while the breach of faith committed by such an abandonment of allies would lower the British reputation and produce general distrust, the distractions and wars which would necessarily ensue would sooner or later compel the Company to interfere, and involve them in new hostilities for the purpose of regaining the ascendancy, which they were now by a kind of suicidal act voluntarily relinquishing. Sir George Barlow could not answer Lord Lake's arguments, but he persisted in his own course, or rather, perhaps, the course which he knew that the home authorities expected from him.

Pending the negotiations with Sindhia, Lord Lake was in pursuit of Holkar, who had proceeded northward into the Punjab, in the hope of obtaining assistance from the Sikhs. When he failed in this object, Holkar saw that further resistance was hopeless, and sent envoys to Lord Lake to solicit peace. The terms were easily arranged, as Holkar was not in a condition to withhold assent from any proposals that might be made to him, and those who had him at their mercy were disposed to treat him with a liberality which he little deserved, and which must have gone far beyond his expectations. The conditions offered to his acceptance gave him back all his territories, with a few exceptions, of which the most important were, that he should renounce all claims to places situated north of the Chambal, to Kuch and Bundelkhand, and generally all claims whatever upon the British government and its allies. Chandore, Gaulna, and his other forts and districts in the Deccan, were not restored; but he was assured of their restoration in the course of eighteen months, provided his conduct in the interval were such as to give full proof of his amicable intentions. Both into Sindhia's and Holkar's treaty an article was introduced, binding them not to admit Sirji Rao Ghatka to their counsels

or service. The individual thus placed under the ban was the father-in-law of Sindhia, and was not only a man of a cruel and worthless character, but an inveterate enemy to the British, and the instigator to the plunder of the British residency. Notwithstanding the stipulation against him, he was understood to be preparing, a few months afterwards, to join Holkar; and Sir George Barlow, fearing the embarrassment which might hence arise, carried his peace policy so far as to cancel the article in the treaties which stipulated for Sirji Rao Ghatka's exclusion. He accordingly resumed his mischievous influence at Sindhia's court. His fate is not unworthy of being recorded. In 1809, while attending the durbar, he had pressed some of his proposals, and was answered evasively by Sindhia, who, to escape his importunity, ordered his equipage for the purpose of going to an elephant fight. Sirji Rao, enraged, so far forgot himself as to seize Sindhia's robe, and try to keep him forcibly in his seat. The attendants rushed to the rescue, and were ordered by Sindhia to secure the offender. A scuffle ensued, and Sirji Rao, drawing his sword, escaped to his own tent. The attendants enraged, and not unwilling to rid their master of an obnoxious minister, pursued, cut the ropes of the tent, and dragged him into the public street, where he fell dead, pierced with wounds.

The article in Holkar's treaty which bound him to renounce all claims to places north of the Chambal was at variance with the new policy, but was at first sanctioned by the governor-general, because he was in hopes that Tonk Rampura and its district to the north of that river would be accepted by Sindhia as an equivalent for the pension of four lacs which the Company had engaged to pay him. On finding that Sindhia would not accept Tonk Rampura, even as a gratuity, because it would bring him into necessary collision with Holkar, Sir George Barlow gave full effect to his policy by making a present to Holkar of Tonk Rampura, and leaving the British allies, as was already done in the treaty of Sindhia, to Holkar's mercy. This he did while forewarned and perfectly aware that these allies would be subjected to cruel persecution, and that mainly as a punishment for adhering steadfastly to British interests, when they might have gained much by betraying them. A

proceeding more unworthy of British honour and equity cannot easily be imagined. How humbling and yet how true the remark made by an agent of one of the abandoned rajas, that now, for the first time since the establishment of the English government in India, "it had been known to make its faith subservient to its convenience!"

The alliances with the Rajas of Jaipur and Bundi having been shamefully abandoned, the next step in the retrograde policy would have been to deal out the same measure to the Rajas of Macherry and Bharatpur. On the part of the governor-general there would have been no delay, but Lord Lake interposed once more, and pointed out so forcibly the confusion and anarchy into which countries recently settled at the expense of so much blood and treasure would inevitably be thrown, that even Sir George Barlow, with all his obstinacy, hesitated to proceed in the face of such a remonstrance. At first, while declaring that his resolution was unchanged, he simply intimated that he had no desire to precipitate the measure, but second thoughts proved better than his first, and he never again attempted to carry it into effect.

While engaged in making arrangements in Hindustan, the attention of the governor-general was arrested by a sudden and unsuspected outbreak in a very different quarter. At three in the morning of the 10th of July, 1806, a sudden discharge of firearms was heard in the fort of Vellore, which, it will be remembered, had been fixed upon as the residence of the family of Tipu on their removal from Seringapatam. The discharge was repeated in various quarters, and on inquiry being made, it was ascertained that the sepoys of the garrison, headed by their native officers, were in open revolt. They had assembled secretly, and on an appointed signal attacked the European posts. The few sentinels on duty had been shot down or bayoneted, and the magazine containing the only supply of ammunition was in the hands of the insurgents. The European part of the garrison, consisting of four companies of his majesty's 69th regiment, mustered about 370 men, that of the natives 1,500. The main body of the mutineers, having set watches on the apartments of the officers to prevent egress, beset the European barracks, and with a six-pounder, which they had planted

opposite to the doorway, and their muskets, commenced firing volley after volley through the doors and windows. The soldiers within, destitute of ammunition, were unable to return this murderous fire, and had no alternative but to shelter themselves as they best could behind the beds and furniture. At an early hour a few officers who had assembled in one of the dwellings and successfully defended themselves, made their way into the barracks. Here eighty-two privates had already fallen, and ninety-one were wounded. Nor was this the full amount of the loss. Colonel Fancourt, who commanded the fort, had been mortally wounded as he was descending from his house; Colonel M'Kerras shot dead as he was hastening to the parade; and, during an indiscriminate massacre by parties who searched the houses of Europeans, and with savage ferocity butchered every one they could discover, thirteen officers were killed. The officers who had reached the barracks, heading the survivors whom they found within them, sallied forth, and forcing a passage through the mutineers, ascended the ramparts and took post in a cavalier. From this they proceeded to the magazine, but being disappointed in their expectation of ammunition, were obliged to retrace their steps and seek cover above the main gateway, and in the bastion at the south-east angle. All these movements had been made under exposure to an incessant fire, and the consequence was, that every officer was disabled, and many of the men were killed.

At Arcot, about sixteen miles eastward, intelligence of the revolt was received at six in the morning, and Colonel Gillespie, who was there in command, hastened off with a squadron of the 19th dragoons and a troop of native cavalry, ordering the rest of the regiment and the galloper-guns to follow. By eight o'clock he arrived, and immediately passed through the two outer gates, which were open. The third gate was closed. It was, however, the one above in which part of the European soldiers had taken shelter; and a rope having been formed of soldiers' belts, Colonel Gillespie was enabled to mount and take his place beside them. As soon as the guns arrived, the gate was blown open and the dragoons rushed through. Colonel Gillespie at the same moment charged the insurgents at the head of his small party, and a signal vengeance was taken.

After a feeble and straggling fire, all resistance ceased. About 400 of the mutineers were slain, not a few threw down their arms imploring quarter, and many who had escaped through the sally-port, or by dropping from the walls, were afterwards captured. The recovery of the fort and suppression of the mutiny were the work of little more than ten minutes.

During the insurrection an active communication was kept up between the mutineers and the palace in which Tipu's family resided. A flag which once belonged to Tipu and bore his arms (a central sun with tiger stripes on a green field), was even brought out and hoisted on the flagstaff, amid the acclamations of the multitude. As there could thus be little doubt that at least some members of the family were deeply implicated, Colonel Gillespie lost no time in sending off the whole of them to Madras, from which they were ultimately removed to Calcutta. It was reported that but for these decisive measures, the insurgents would in a few days have been joined from different quarters by 50,000 men. Three native officers and fourteen non-commissioned officers and privates, condemned by a court-martial on the spot, suffered death. These were selected for extreme punishment from being regarded as ringleaders; but it was generally suspected, though legal proof was not obtained, that the whole of the native troops, with only a few exceptions, were privy to the plot. Under these circumstances it was difficult to draw a line of demarcation, and the utmost that could be done was to allow the officers and men who were absent at the time, or proved their fidelity, to remain in the service, and not only dismiss all the others, but erase the very names of the mutinous regiments from the army lists. About 600 sepoys retained as prisoners still remained to be disposed of. As the final decision was not given till a considerable period had elapsed, a lenient course was preferred, and, with the exception of those who, being proved guilty of plunder or murder, suffered according to their deserts, all the others were simply dismissed the service, and disabled from again entering it.

When a strict inquiry into the circumstances and causes of the mutiny was instituted, it appeared that had ordinary caution and judgment been used it might not have occurred

at all, or at all events could not have broken out so suddenly and unexpectedly. To make this manifest it will be necessary to enter a little into detail. When Sir John Cradock (afterwards Lord Howden) in the beginning of 1805 became commander-in-chief at Madras, he found that this presidency had no code of military regulations. With the permission of Lord William Bentinck, who had succeeded Lord Clive as governor, he instructed Major Pearce, the deputy adjutant-general, to draw up a code. According to Sir John's statement, the regulations previously in force and sanctioned by the government were to be simply inserted in the manuscript, while everything that was new was to be carefully distinguished, so as to make it easy for the governor to perceive at a glance what the changes were to which his sanction was requested. Lord William Bentinck, confiding in the strict accuracy of this statement, gave his whole attention to the marked regulations, as in these alone he conceived that he had any immediate interest, and discovering nothing objectionable, allowed all the regulations to be put in force. Unfortunately, from some strange oversight, a regulation which was entirely new—so new, indeed, that it had never before appeared in any military code—was inserted in the body of the old regulations without any distinguishing mark, and thus eluded the governor's notice. The object was to assimilate the appearance of the sepoys to that of the European troops. The most obnoxious of these changes were, that the sepoys should appear on parade with their chins clean shaved, and their mustachios cut to a particular model, and not only without earrings, but without the coloured marks which declared the particular sects to which they belonged. Their turban also was changed into a form which seemed to the sepoys to resemble a hat. This was to them an abomination, as they were wont to regard the hat as peculiarly an European, and therefore a Christian head-dress.

The feeling of discontent and insubordination thus engendered was first manifested early in May, by the second battalion of the 4th regiment of Madras infantry, quartered at Vellore. The grenadier company refused to make up the turban, and on being called before the colonel and questioned on the subject, declared firmly but respectfully that they could not wear

the new turban without disgracing themselves for ever in the eyes of their countrymen. This seems ludicrous, and yet when it is considered how much commotion the subject of man millinery has produced, and is producing, in one of the most enlightened churches of Christendom, it is impossible to deride the honest scruples of the childish and ignorant sepoy. Such, unfortunately, was not the spirit in which his superiors were disposed to deal with him, and his scruples were regarded and treated as contumacy. Nineteen grenadiers were sent off to Madras for trial. They were all convicted, and two of them actually received 900 lashes each. The remaining seventeen, who were each to have received 500 lashes, were pardoned on professing contrition. The governor, who could formerly have pleaded that he had unconsciously sanctioned the new dress, could not use this plea any longer, as he showed himself no less zealous for it than the commander-in-chief, and proclaimed his determination to enforce it.

In justification of the course thus pursued, it was shown that the new turban, or hat, as the sepoys insisted on calling it, was not objectionable either in itself or on the score of religion, and two respectable natives, a Muhammedan and Hindu, when gravely consulted, gave solemn testimony to this effect. But this was not the question. However absurd and unreasonable the scruple might be, was it felt in reality, instead of being used as a mere pretext for insubordination? The moment this question was answered in the affirmative, turbaned hats and shaved chins and clipped mustachios were condemned, and became fit only for the limbo of vanity. It is not impossible that the fear of corporal punishment or of expulsion from the service might ultimately have proved stronger than the scruple, and compelled the sepoy's submission, but in Vellore he was subjected to other influences, and there were parties on the alert to turn his scruples to account. Tipu's family had never forgotten that their father and grandfather had been sovereigns of Mysore, and it was proved that when insubordination had begun to take root, and secret meetings were held, Moiz-ud-din, one of his sons, attended, and both directly, and by means of real or pretended messages from the palace, encouraged the mutineers.

The Vellore mutiny was occasioned by the absurd attempt to force an obnoxious dress on the sepoys, and it was fostered by the adherents of Tipu's family, who snatched at the disaffection thus produced as a means of again becoming a reigning dynasty, but it had its primary cause in the deep-rooted hatred of Muhammedans and Hindus to the rule of a Christian nation. It is this hatred which, always lurking in the heart of the native, is ready to break forth on the slightest encouragement or provocation, that makes every outbreak of the natives against Europeans a war of extermination. What but this hatred actuated the wretches who, while the Vellore mutiny was raging, went about in bands to search the houses of Europeans, and massacre all their inmates? On ordinary occasions this hatred is not manifested, and the natives, balancing the advantages which they enjoy under British rule against the mischief which they would inevitably suffer under native dynasties, are not disposed to run the risk of violent changes. It is only when their fanaticism is aroused by some imaginary insult to their faith, or the fear of being forcibly compelled to abandon it, that all prudential restraints are thrown aside, and nothing but the utter extermination of the hated race will either allay their fears or satiate their vengeance. Assuming this representation to be correct, some have hastily inferred that in India Christianity ought to be altogether ignored, or at least, that no European ought ever to be allowed to make it the subject either of conversation or of argument in the presence of a native. It would, indeed, be a melancholy thing if the inference were well founded. But it is not. Persuasion enforced by pure Christian example is as potent in India as in any other part of the world, and many distinguished men, with nothing else to recommend them, have been and still are loved and venerated, even by those who have no sympathy with their doctrines. The thing to be guarded against is the reality or semblance of compulsion in any matter in which religion is supposed to be concerned, and more especially compulsion in which the government directly bears a part. "It is a great error," says Professor Wilson,¹ "to suppose that the people of India are so sensitive upon the subject of their religion, either Hindu or Muham-

¹ *The History of British India from 1805 to 1835* vol. i, pp. 140-42.

medan, as to suffer no approach of controversy, or to encounter adverse opinions with no other arguments than insurrection and murder. On the contrary, great latitude of belief and practice has always prevailed amongst them, and especially amongst the troops, in whose ranks will be found seceders of various denominations from the orthodox system. It was not, therefore, the dissemination of Christian doctrines that excited the angry apprehensions of the Sipahis on the melancholy occasion which has called for these observations, nor does it appear that any unusual activity in the propagation of those doctrines was exercised by Christian missionaries at the period of its occurrence. It was not conversion which the troops dreaded, it was compulsion; it was not the reasoning or persuasion of the missionary which they feared, but the arbitrary interposition of authority. They believed, of course erroneously, that the government was about to compel them to become Christians, and they resisted compulsory conversion by violence and bloodshed. The lesson is one of great seriousness, and should never be lost sight of as long as the relative position of the British government and its Indian subjects remains unaltered."

It has been mentioned that the mutiny took the European part of the garrison entirely by surprise. This ought not to have been. The previous insubordination had shown the necessity of increased vigilance. Though it had been forcibly suppressed; there was every reason to apprehend that the scruples in which it originated had not been removed. On the contrary, the presumption was that the usual result, whenever force and conviction are brought into collision, had been produced, and that feelings which could no longer find vent by external acts, had only become more deeply seated within. These considerations appear to have been altogether lost upon the officers in command. At the very time when rumours of disturbance were prevalent in the town and fort, and a Muhammedan fakir had repeatedly proclaimed in the bazaar the impending destruction of the Europeans, no means were used to trace these rumours to their source, and even the ordinary duties of the garrison were performed with culpable remissness. On the very night of the mutiny the European officer commanding the main-guard, when called to go the rounds at midnight, pleaded indisposition,

and ordered the subahdar (native captain) to take his place. The subahdar, likewise indisposed, sent the jamadar (native lieutenant), who being one of the ringleaders of the mutiny, of course reported that all was right, though the mutineers must at the time have been actually arming. A still more extraordinary degree of remissness had been previously displayed. Nearly a month before the mutiny broke out, a sepoy named Mustafa Beg waited at midnight on his colonel, and divulged the plot. That officer, partly from ignorance of the native language, which made it difficult for him to interpret accurately all that he was told, and partly also from Mustafa Beg's agitation, which made him give little credit to his testimony, left the investigation to a committee of native officers, in other words, to the conspirators themselves, who at once declared Mustafa Beg unworthy of belief, and demanded that his calumnies should be punished by imprisonment. He was, in consequence, expiating in a dungeon the supposed falsehood of his testimony, at the very time when its truth was only too fully established by the event.

It was for some time believed that the mutiny at Vellore had extensive ramifications, and was, in fact, only part of a general conspiracy to massacre all the Europeans in India, and thereby for ever extinguish British rule. The events of our own day give to this hypothesis a degree of plausibility which it did not previously possess, but still it does not seem to be borne out by facts. Insubordination was certainly manifested simultaneously in distant quarters. This, however, indicates rather a common ground of complaint than an extensively ramified conspiracy. At Hyderabad, for instance, the turban produced great dissatisfaction among the sepoys of the subsidiary force, and some designing men endeavoured to make it subservient to their own designs. Had the European officers in command been as careless and intemperate as those at Vellore, another dreadful mutiny would in all probability have been the result. A much more judicious course was taken, and all dissatisfaction vanished the moment the cause which had produced it was removed. As soon as the aversion to the new turbans was manifested, the order for making them up was suspended. The effect was instantaneous, and calm and confidence were at once restored.

This could not have been, had the objection to the turbans been taken, not on its own account, but with a view to the furtherance of a widely and deeply laid conspiracy.

The only important events which occurred during the administration of Sir George Barlow have now been mentioned. In his foreign policy, his main object seems to have been to establish himself in the good graces of the directors, by rigidly adhering to the course which he knew would be most pleasing to them. In so doing he proved himself at once an obedient servant, and a very indifferent statesman, throwing away great advantages, which it was necessary, at a later period under a better administration, to regain by a new expenditure of blood and treasure, and at the same time lowering the British reputation with foreign states, by quibbling away solemn obligations, and sacrificing honour and justice to fancied convenience. In his internal administration he appears to greater advantage. Under Marquis Wellesley's administration, expensive wars were not met by the ordinary revenue, and the debt which had been accumulated had caused severe financial pressure. So severely was this felt when Marquis Cornwallis entered upon his second administration, that in order to pay arrears which could no longer be delayed, and discharge other urgent demands, he was obliged to appropriate all the bullion which was sent out from England for the China investment. In a letter written to the directors, on the third day after his arrival at Calcutta, he says, "The pressure on your finances is so severe, that had the bullion sent out in the ships of the present season been withheld, I know not how our difficulties could have been overcome." Lord Lake's army, the monthly pay of which was about five lacs, was about five months in arrear. A large body of irregulars, composed chiefly of deserters from the enemy, had been engaged at a monthly expenditure of about six lacs, and were also in arrear. With the reduction of this force, as at once the most burdensome and least effective, Marquis Cornwallis immediately commenced, and during the few months of his administration made considerable progress in diminishing the monthly charge. Sir George Barlow continued the process, and was able to reduce still more largely and rapidly, by the steps which he took to force a general pacification. There is,

indeed, some reason for suspecting that his reductions were in some instances more rapid than judicious, and that by suddenly throwing loose upon the country numbers of men who lived only by their sword, he laid a foundation for future disturbance. While carrying on the work of retrenchment in Bengal, he called upon the other presidencies "to establish a system of the most rigid economy through every branch of their civil and military expenditure", and "to abrogate all such charges as were not indispensable to the good government and security of the provinces under their control". By means of a system of economy carefully matured and fully carried out, the excess of expenditure above revenue rapidly diminished, and ultimately—though he did not continue in office so long as to see this result—not only disappeared altogether, but left a surplus.

A governor-general who produced such favourable financial results, and showed himself ready at all times to give implicit obedience to orders received from home, was naturally a favourite at the India House. As soon as the death of Marquis Cornwallis was known in England, the directors made his provisional appointment absolute, and he was thus regarded as no longer a governor-general by sufferance, in consequence of an unexpected vacancy, but as formally installed in the usual way and for the usual period. The new ministry, which had been formed on the death of Mr. Pitt, was understood to have acquiesced in this permanent appointment. The commission to Sir George Barlow as Governor-general of India was signed on the 25th of February, 1806. How great, then, was the astonishment when, on the 7th of March, only ten days afterwards, the directors were informed by Lord Minto, president of the Board of Control, that ministers had determined to supersede Sir George Barlow, and confer the office of governor-general on the Earl of Lauderdale. A quarrel immediately ensued. The directors, charging the ministers with gross inconsistency in first sanctioning or rather expressly recommending Sir George Barlow's appointment, and then trying to cancel it, refused to recall him. The conduct of the ministers was, they said, insulting both to them and to Sir George Barlow, and they refused to be dragged through the mire for the purpose of enabling ministers to complete any job on which they might have set their fancy.

Lord Minto, through whom the correspondence with the directors was conducted, endeavoured to justify himself and his colleagues by replying that, in the letter in which he recommended Sir George Barlow, he distinctly intimated that the arrangement was to be regarded as merely temporary. This proved to be a very lame defence, as the letter as distinctly stated that there was no intention to make any immediate change. The truth is that the real point in dispute was not fairly put by either party. Ministers had rashly parted with a valuable piece of patronage, which they were now anxious to recover, and some of the leading members of the cabinet preferred the policy of Marquis Wellesley to that which Sir George Barlow was pursuing. The directors, on the other hand, not only preferred Sir George Barlow's policy, but had an invincible aversion to the Earl of Lauderdale. He was a free trader, in the limited sense given to these words at that period, and would do all he could to break up the Company's monopoly. It would therefore be suicidal to make him governor-general. Another objection, not quite so tangible, but probably regarded by some of the directors, was the Earl of Lauderdale's extreme liberalism, which led him, during the first fervour of the French revolution, to affect it even in his dress. When the quarrel between the directors and the ministers was at its height, Sir George Barlow was recalled by a warrant under the king's sign-manual. This stretch of authority, though it had been threatened before, was on this occasion exercised for the first time, and gave a practical solution to a question which had hitherto been rather evaded than answered. The question was, In which of the two—the court of directors and the government—was the power of appointing the Governor-general of India really vested?

By Mr. Pitt's India act of 1784 (24 Geo. III. c. 25), and by the act of 1793 (33 Geo. III. c. 52), renewing the Company's charter, it was expressly enacted that "all vacancies happening in the office of governor-general" were to be "supplied by the court of directors." Mr. Fox's East India bill had been severely censured for the amount of patronage which it would have placed at the disposal of ministers, and Mr. Pitt seemed to have introduced the above clause for the purpose of escaping a similar censure. Had the clause stood alone it would have

left the patronage entirely in the hands of the directors, and enabled them to exercise it without control. This was certainly not the intention of ministers, and they dexterously managed while disclaiming patronage to introduce clauses which virtually gave them a monopoly of it. The above clause enacted that the vacancies were to be supplied by the directors; but by two subsequent clauses his majesty, on the failure of the directors to supply a vacancy within two months after it was notified to them, might fill it up, and might, moreover, at any time by his sign-manual, countersigned by the president of the Board of Control, "remove or recall any person or persons holding any office, employment, or commission, civil or military, under the said United Company in India." By means of one clause the directors appointed; by another his majesty, or, which is the same thing, his ministers, might recall every appointment as soon as it was made; and by a third, should the directors, wearied out in making unavailing appointments, leave the vacancy unsupplied for two months, ministers were rewarded for obstructing them by obtaining the patronage to themselves.

There cannot be a doubt that an honest interpretation of the above clauses gave the directors the appointment, and the ministers nothing more than a veto—a veto, too, to be exercised not antecedent to the appointment, but subsequent to it, and not tyrannically or capriciously, but on grounds which could be stated and substantiated. Now in the present instance ministers could not possibly have any such grounds. Sir George Barlow owed his appointment to their recommendation, and therefore when they attempted to supersede him, only ten days after the appointment was made, they were precluded from saying that he was unworthy of it. What then? They were determined to usurp the patronage which their predecessors had disclaimed, and which the legislature had expressly denied them, and to this unworthy purpose they prostituted the sign-manual. In arriving at this conclusion we have looked merely at the statutes, and endeavoured to give fair effect to their meaning. The appointment by the directors was to be the rule, and the recall by ministers the exception. It is easy to imagine cases in which a governor-general might be supported by directors merely as a thorn in the sides of a ministry, or

from other motives equally unworthy, and in which such an extreme measure as the use of the sign-manual might be not only justifiable but imperative. The present, however, was no such case, and ministers, though they remained within the letter of the law, violated its spirit by perverting the powers conferred upon them to a purpose for which they never were intended. Had the directors met ministers in their own spirit, they were not without the means of maintaining a protracted struggle. They had the sole right of appointment, and might have baffled ministers with their own weapons by appointing as often as they recalled. They acted more wisely by submitting to a compromise. Sir George Barlow, descending from his elevation, was permitted to hope that he would be restored to it on the next vacancy, and condescended to console himself in the meantime by accepting the subordinate office of governor of Madras; the Earl of Lauderdale found employment which interfered less with his jacobinical predilections than the Indian appointment would have done; and Lord Minto exchanged the office of president of the Board of Control for that of Governor-general of India.

Lord Minto

ON the 3rd of July, 1807, Lord Minto reached Calcutta. He was not new to Indian affairs. For many years, when Sir Gilbert Elliot, he had taken a prominent part in parliament, and strenuously supported the policy of the Whigs in regard to eastern politics. He was one of the managers appointed by the House of Commons to conduct the impeachment of Warren Hastings, and made the abortive motion for the impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey. On the accession of his party to power his antecedents marked him out for the important office of president of the Board of Control, and when the repugnance of the directors to the Earl of Lauderdale could not be overcome, the known moderation of his views united the suffrages of both parties in his favour, and thus terminated what had always been an unseemly, and might ere long have become a most pernicious quarrel. His leaning was decidedly in favour of the restrictive system of policy; and his desire to keep on good terms with the directors and proprietors, who had formally and strongly declared their approval of this system, must have confirmed him in his determination to adhere to it; but he could not shut his eyes to some of its inconveniences, and he was not so wedded to it as to be unable to abandon it when it threatened to be mischievous.

One of the first subjects which engaged his attention was the condition of Bundelkhand. It had not, like some other territories, been gifted away as not worth the keeping, but on the principle of non-interference had been so much neglected that it was rapidly approaching to a state of anarchy. With the view of at once avoiding trouble and expense, and conciliating good-will, the petty rajas were left as much as possible to self-management,

and the consequence was, that they were soon involved in interminable quarrels with each other, and bands of armed marauders roamed the province in every direction. Lord Minto had no difficulty in determining to put an end to this state of misrule; and he therefore announced that, wherever mild measures had failed to secure tranquillity, force to any extent that might be necessary might be employed. In many cases this announcement proved of itself sufficient, and many disputes were settled at once by the voluntary consent of the parties to submit them to British arbitration. It could not be expected, however, that lawless banditti, who knew that they had no rights but those which the sword had given them, would yield to anything but compulsion; and it therefore became necessary, as the first step to their expulsion, to obtain possession of the strongholds of the leading chiefs by whom they were countenanced and protected. One of the most notorious of these was Lakshman Dawa. He was originally the captain of a band of plunderers, and had succeeded in possessing himself of the fort of Ajagarh. He had no kind of legal title to it, but when it became British territory an arrangement had been made by which he was permitted to retain it and the adjoining district. The district was to belong to him permanently as a *jaghir* on payment of a small tribute, but he was to give up the fort at the end of 1808. He never paid the tribute, and as it was also evident that he did not mean to resign the fort, a body of troops under Colonel Martindale was sent against him. He did not hesitate to defend himself, and it was necessary to lay regular siege to Ajagarh. After a practicable breach had been made he capitulated, and was allowed to go at large on parole, while his family was removed to the town of Nawanshehr. He was in hopes of being re-established in possession of the fort, but an application to that effect having been rejected by Mr. Richardson, the British agent, he suddenly disappeared. For a time no traces of him could be discovered, and when first heard of he was in Calcutta. In his petition to the agent he had prayed to be either restored or blown from a gun, as life without reputation was not worth the having, and on being refused, had adopted the singular resolution of applying in person to the governor-general. Having been again unsuccessful, he attempted to return to

Bundelkhand; but as his presence there might have led to new disturbances, he was intercepted and brought back to Calcutta, where he was detained till his death. In the meantime a tragical event had taken place. On his disappearance it was deemed advisable to detain his family as hostages, and orders were accordingly given to take all its inmates back to the fort. They were assured of kind and honourable treatment, and the charge of conducting them to their new quarters was committed to Baji Rao, Lakshman Dawa's father-in-law. He undertook it with apparent cheerfulness, and went to execute it. He remained so long within the house that some surprise was felt, and a native officer of the intended escort entered to ascertain the cause. The first thing he saw was Baji Rao seated before the door of an inner room with a drawn sword in his hand. As the officer approached the old man retired and closed the door. When it was forced a bloody spectacle was seen. The mother, the wife, the infant son of Lakshman Dawa, and four female attendants, lay dead on the floor, murdered by Baji Rao, and apparently with their own consent, as no cry had been heard. The moment the door gave way Baji Rao inflicted a fatal wound on himself, and thus completed his horrid tragedy. The deed was openly justified by several Bundela chiefs, who avowed that had the case been theirs they would have done the same thing. The disturbances in Bundelkhand were still far from being quelled, but the details must be deferred for the present to make way for matters of higher importance.

While breaking up the connections which Marquis Wellesley had formed, that with the Nizam naturally engaged Sir George Barlow's attention. According to the policy which he had avowed and was actually pursuing, there was no room for hesitation, and he ought, on the principle of non-interference, to have hastened to rid himself of the subsidiary alliance as at once cumbersome and dangerous. And he could not have been at any loss for an opportunity, for the new sovereign, Sikandar, Jah, though his succession without opposition was owing entirely to British support, had forgotten the obligation and become inimical to British interests. The interests involved, however, were too important to be disposed of by a kind of haphazard, and Sir George, after pausing, proved the soundness of his

judgment at the expense of his consistency, by deciding that the subsidiary alliance, and all the rights under it, were to be firmly maintained. Fortunately his decision was powerfully seconded by the prime minister, Mir Alam, and the ruin in which the Nizam would have involved himself by his folly in provoking hostilities was prevented. Still, however, a powerful party hostile to British interests existed at Hyderabad, and Mir Alam, threatened with assassination, was driven to seek shelter with the resident. Under these circumstances the resident was instructed to adopt the most energetic measures. The Nizam, made aware that his deposition might be deemed the only effectual guarantee for good behaviour, became thoroughly alarmed, and readily acquiesced in conditions which pledged him to dismiss every person hostile to the British alliance, to reinstate Mir Alam, and in the event of any difference with him to submit it to the resident. Such was the state to which Sikandar Jah's imbecile and dissolute character had reduced his government, that his chief favourite and adviser, Mahipat Ram, refused to be dismissed, and successfully resisted for a time by force of arms.

Mir Alam, who had nearly succeeded in replacing the relations with the Nizam on their former footing, died at an advanced age on the 8th of January, 1809. The appointment of a successor, after causing some difficulty, was settled by a compromise. Monir-ul-Mulk, as the Nizam's choice, was appointed, but to remedy his acknowledged incompetency, the real administration was intrusted to an able Hindu of the name of Chandu Lal, who had served under Mir Alam, and imbibed his spirit. This arrangement, though perhaps the best which circumstances permitted Lord Minto to make, did not work well. Monir-ul-Mulk thought himself entitled, as well as qualified, to possess the reality along with the name of power, and a series of intrigues were carried on, in consequence of which the interference of the resident was constantly required in support of Chandu Lal. The governor-general would probably have interfered still more effectually had he not been unwilling to run counter to the views of the directors. In a despatch dated September 14th, 1808, they had inculcated the necessity of carefully abstaining from all concern with the internal affairs of

Hyderabad, further than might be necessary in organizing the Nizam's army. To this object, accordingly, the governor-general's views were almost exclusively directed, and a regular army in consequence sprung up, disciplined by British officers, and subordinate to British interests. Chandu Lal, as diwan, implicitly acquiesced in everything which the resident proposed relative to the appointment of officers, and the pay and equipment of the troops, and was in turn protected in his office, and left uncontrolled in the internal government. This complete separation of civil and military authority was attended with many inconveniences. "The prosperity of the country," says Sir John Malcolm, "began early to decline under a system which had no object but revenue, and under which, neither regard for rank nor desire for popularity existing, the nobles were degraded and the people oppressed. The prince (of whose sanity doubts had often been entertained) lapsed into a state of gloomy discontent; and while the diwan, his relations, a few favourites and money-brokers flourished, the good name of the British nation suffered; for it was said, and with justice, that our support of the actual administration freed the minister and his executive officers from those salutary fears which act as a restraint on the most despotic rulers." Lord Minto is said to have felt and deplored these evils, but the principle of non-interference laid down by the directors left him without the means of applying any adequate remedy.

The relations with the peshwa, though they seemed friendly, were not on a very satisfactory footing. Baji Rao having by the treaty of Bassein bartered his independence for personal security, immediately repented, and would gladly have availed himself of any opportunity which the course of events might have afforded of again becoming the real head of a Maratha confederacy. He had been privy to many intrigues having this object in view, but the issue of the war disappointed all his expectations, and the British alliance having become absolutely necessary to him, he had dissimulation enough to disguise his aversion to it, and even impress a belief that it had his cordial approbation. He was accordingly ever ready to apply to it for aid when his purposes could not otherwise be gained, and at the same time often betrayed his real feelings when any of these

purposes were thwarted. During the war of 1803, in which Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsla were confederates, good service had been rendered to the British by a number of the peshwa's feudatories, known by the name of the Southern Jaghirdars. In consequence of this, they were considered under British protection, and therefore, when the peshwa endeavoured to stretch his powers over them to a much greater length than before, and was obviously aiming at their utter extinction, the aid of the subsidiary force when he applied for it was refused, and all that he received was an offer of the British government to arbitrate in the dispute. His title to be regarded as lord-paramount could not be disputed, and should it be necessary to compel a recognition of that title, the subsidiary force was at his disposal for that purpose. This, however, was far from satisfying him. What he wished was to resume the *jaghirs*, and compel the jaghirdars to submit by force of arms, and on this being denied him, he did not disguise his dissatisfaction. When Lord Minto's attention was called to the subject, he lodged a minute in which, while admitting that the treaty of Bassein entitled the peshwa to the aid which he asked, provided the justice of his claims could not be impugned, he approved of a compromise which the resident at Poona had suggested, and by which the jaghirdars, while acknowledging themselves to be the peshwa's feudatories, and relinquishing all acknowledged usurpations, were guaranteed in the possession of their lands. To these terms Baji Rao was obliged to submit, but he did it with visible reluctance, and showed that feelings were rankling in his breast which might be expected sooner or later to display themselves in overt acts of hostility.

During Lord Minto's administration, a few unsettled points in the treaty with Sindhia were amicably adjusted, and no part of his conduct was considered to give any just cause of complaint, except the countenance given by him to some bands of Pindaris, whose indiscriminate ravages were already becoming intolerable. Holkar's conduct was less pacific, but however hostile his designs may have been, he was not permitted to execute them. He had long been addicted to intoxication and unrestrained indulgence, which had seriously affected his health, and he had recently, in order to establish himself as

undisputed head of the Holkar family, poisoned his nephew, and been at least accessory to the murder of his brother. After these crimes, the stings of conscience and new excesses for the purpose of stifling remorse overthrew his reason. During a few months his madness alternated with lucid intervals, but at last he sank into a state of complete fatuity. For three years he was fed and treated like an infant, and died on the 20th of October, 1811. When he became insane, the management of affairs was usurped by his favourite mistress, Tulsi Bai, who employed Balaram Seth as her minister. In such feeble hands the whole country soon became a scene of confusion, and leaders, aiming at independence or bent on plunder, started up in various quarters. One of the most formidable combinations was headed by Mahipat Rao Holkar, first cousin of the Jaswant Rao, who was proclaimed his successor, and might have made his right good, had not the depredations of his followers, extended into the territories of the peshwa and the Nizam, brought him into collision with the subsidiary forces of both these states. The one force advancing from Poona under Colonel Wallace, and the other from Jalna under Colonel Doveton, gave him two successive defeats which completely ruined his cause.

Amir Khan, who had long shared Holkar's fortunes, might have been expected to take a prominent part in the changes occasioned by his insanity. At first a large bribe from Balaram Seth induced him to give his support to the Bai, but as he had a large number of troops in his own pay, and had no means of supporting them except by depredations, he soon took his departure and made an irruption into Berar. He had previously pillaged the Rajputs, and knowing that their resources were completely exhausted, he saw no territories so tempting as those of Raghuji Bhonsla. He was not without a pretext. Jaswant Rao Holkar, when, during the disasters of his early career, he sought an asylum at Nagpur, was said to have been ungenerously pillaged by the raja of valuable jewels. Amir Khan, acting in Holkar's name, demanded restoration of the jewels or their value in money. On receiving a refusal, he made his appearance in January, 1809, on the frontiers of Berar, at the head of a force amounting, according to his own statement, to 40,000 horse and 24,000 Pindaris or robber bands. Meeting with no

serious opposition, he crossed the Narmada and made himself master of Jabalpur and the surrounding country.

The Raja of Berar had no subsidiary alliance with the British, nor any treaty under which he was entitled to claim their protection, and therefore, on the principle of non-interference, he ought to have been left to his fate. There were also serious obstacles to be surmounted before any assistance could be given to him. Amir Khan professed to be acting in the name of Holkar, and in this character could plead that any assistance given by the British government to the raja would be a violation of the treaty by which they had engaged not to interfere in any manner whatever with Holkar's affairs, nor with his exaction of claims on any state with which they themselves were not actually in alliance. It was not easy to answer this objection. Amir Khan's pretext of being in the service of Holkar could be easily disposed of, but how was it possible, consistent with the policy on which the Indian government was now professedly conducted, to take part in the quarrels of native princes when not under any positive obligation to do so? Lord Minto, though aware of the inconsistency, refused to be trammelled by it, and placed the question on broader grounds than those of any routine of policy, when he said in a minute, lodged 10th October, 1809: "The question was not whether it was just and expedient to aid the raja in the defence and recovery of his dominions (although in point of policy the essential change in the political state of India which would be occasioned by the extinction of one of the substantive powers of the Deccan might warrant and require our interference), but whether an interfering and ambitious Mussalman chief, at the head of a numerous army, irresistible by any power but that of the Company, shall be permitted to establish his authority on the ruins of the raja's dominions, over territories contiguous to those of our ally the Nizam." Considering the encouragement which would thereby be given to projects probably entertained by the Nizam himself, and certainly entertained by a powerful party in his dominions, "for the subversion of the British alliance," his lordship held that there could be "but one solution" of the above question, and therefore decided that Amir Khan must at all hazards be repelled. Gratuitous assistance was therefore immediately tend-

ered to the raja, and provided by assembling a body of troops on the eastern frontier of Berar, under Colonel Close, and ordering another stationed in Bundelkhand under Colonel Martindale to be prepared to co-operate with it. The raja, though he had not formally applied for assistance, gladly accepted it, more especially when assured that no compensation either pecuniary or territorial was expected.

As soon as Colonel Close was ready to act, Lord Minto wrote both to Holkar and to Amir Khan; to the former asking whether the invasion of Berar was by his order, and to the latter, simply requiring him to withdraw. Holkar's minister disavowed Amir Khan's proceedings, but Amir Khan himself denied the right of the British to interfere with his proceedings, and threatened to retaliate by invading their own territories. The raja in the meantime had exerted himself to the utmost, and raised a force which had successfully encountered Amir Khan, and obliged him to take refuge in Bhopal. Here having been reinforced, he had again entered Berar, and sustained a second repulse, when the approach of Colonel Close left him no alternative but flight. He hastened off to Seronge, his own capital, and on being followed, abandoned his own troops and made the best of his way to Indore. As there was now no danger of an incursion into Berar, Lord Minto, who had at one time intended completely to destroy Amir Khan's power, took fright at the protracted hostilities which might ensue, and ordered the British troops to be recalled. To provide against the recurrence of a similar danger, the governor-general entered into a negotiation with the raja, with a view to furnish him with a permanent subsidiary force. The negotiation, protracted by the raja's repugnance to the force itself, and still more by his unwillingness to pay for it, did not lead to any satisfactory result.

Lord Minto's interference in the case of Berar was a practical proof of his disapprobation of the extent to which the neutral system of policy had been carried by his predecessor. He had previously given a still more decided proof by the part which he had taken in regard to some disturbances in the north-west. The reduction of the fort of Ajagarh, in Bundelkhand, and the fate of the family of Lakshman Dawa, its petty chief, have

already been described. Though the vigorous measures taken induced several of the other chiefs to make their submission, there were some against whom it was still necessary to employ force. One of these was Gopal Singh, who had usurped the district of Kotra. The legal heir was Raja Bakht Singh, whose title had been formally recognized by Sir George Barlow, but more in mockery than in good faith, since, on the principle of non-interference, he was denied the assistance necessary to make it effectual. Lord Minto, acting in a different spirit, sent a detachment to put him in possession, and Gopal Singh, apparently convinced that resistance was hopeless, did not even attempt it. He was too restless a spirit to be long tranquil, and abruptly quitting the British camp, to which he had come to make his submission, he retired with a few followers to the thickets of the neighbouring hills, and commenced a predatory warfare. Before he could be effectually checked, the removal of the force under Colonel Martindale from Bundelkhand to Berar towards the end of 1809, for the purpose of acting against Amir Khan, left Gopal Singh at liberty to pursue his depredations, and the whole country below the hills was remorselessly devastated. Various detachments were sent in pursuit of him, and at last, after he had eluded pursuit and carried off large quantities of plunder, he was surprised in an entrenched position among the hills. With the utmost difficulty he made his escape and recommenced his warfare. Again and again his capture was confidently predicted, but never realized; and he was ultimately able, instead of meeting the fate which he had deserved, to make terms with his pursuers. Besides a full pardon for four years of devastation, he received a *jaghir* of eighteen villages. It is difficult to understand the policy of an arrangement, the obvious tendency of which was not to repress, but to encourage depredation.

Another chief remained, and kept frowning from his fort, which, in common with his Bundela countrymen, he deemed impregnable. His name was Dariao Singh, and his fort was Kalinjer, situated 112 miles south-west from Allahabad. This place, which figures much in the early history of India, and still by its fabled sanctity attracts numerous pilgrims, crowns an isolated hill which rises from a marshy plain to the height of

900 feet, and terminates in a flat area about four miles in circuit. The lower sides of the hill were covered with almost impenetrable jungle; the upper part of it was a naked precipice. Where not absolutely inaccessible by nature, artificial means had been employed to make it so. The whole of the flat summit was inclosed by a strong wall with loop-holes and embrasures, and the only ascent to it was by a winding road, commencing at the south-eastern angle, where the petta was situated, and winding along the eastern face. This road was defended by seven fortified gates. Dariao Singh, confident that this stronghold could not be wrested from him, not only resisted the British authority, but was ever ready to give protection to all the predatory bands that applied for it, and it was therefore vain to hope that till he was dispossessed there could be any permanent tranquillity in Bundelkhand. This fact Lord Lake had brought distinctly under the notice of Sir George Barlow, but no heed was given to it, and a well-known nucleus of disturbance remained untouched till the beginning of 1812, when Colonel Martindale advanced against Kalinjer at the head of a considerable force which had assembled at Banda.

Against the north-east extremity of Kalinjer, at the distance of about 800 yards, rises another hill called Kalinjari, of much less extent but nearly as elevated. This was obviously the point from which the attack ought to be made, and accordingly on the 26th of January, after great difficulty in clearing a path through the jungle, four eighteen-pounders and two mortars were dragged up by main force and planted on its top. Lower down, other two batteries were mounted, one of them opposite to the great gateway. Fire was opened on the 28th, and the breach having been reported practicable on the 1st of February, the assault was given at sunrise on the following morning. The storming party with great difficulty arrived within fifty yards of the breach, and after a short halt, under cover of an old wall, rushed forward to the foot of the parapet. Here an unexpected obstacle arrested them. Before the breach could be entered, it was necessary to scale the almost precipitous rock on which the demolished wall had stood, and as fast as ladders could be applied for this purpose, the men who endeavoured to ascend by them were shot down by crowds of matchlock-

men or overwhelmed by heavy stones. Unequal as the conflict was, it was maintained by the assailants with the utmost gallantry for above half an hour before they were recalled. The loss, though severe, was not unavailing, for Dariao Singh, convinced by what he had seen that the fort was not so impregnable as he had imagined, chose rather than risk a second assault, to capitulate on the terms which he had previously rejected. The fort, after being used a short time as a military post, was dismantled and abandoned. After the reduction of Kalinjer, the tranquillity of Bundelkhand was completed by obliging the Raja of Rewa, a small principality adjoining it on the east, to enter into a treaty which, while it guaranteed his own territory, restrained him from disturbing or countenancing those who disturbed the territories of his neighbours.

Another district in which Lord Minto found it necessary to interfere by force in order to secure tranquillity was Haryana, lying immediately to the west of Delhi. Its Jat inhabitants, having thrown off their allegiance to the Mughul, became divided into a number of petty clans, which, though occasionally uniting to oppose a common enemy, were usually so much distracted by intestine feuds as to be incapable of a protracted struggle for independence. They were hence subject for the most part to military adventurers, of whom the most remarkable was George Thomas, an Irish sailor. Shortly after his arrival at Madras in 1781, he deserted and took service with some of the southern polygars. Leaving them, he proceeded through the heart of India and reached Delhi in 1787. The Begum Sumru gave him a commission in her brigade, and he stood high in her favour, till some other adventurer supplanted him. In 1792 he entered the service of one of Sindhia's discarded captains, who died in 1797, after establishing an independency to the west of Delhi. At his death, the newly-formed state fell to pieces, and George Thomas seized the opportunity to make himself a raja. He succeeded, and during four years reigned in his capital of Hansi, over a territory 100 miles long from north to south, and at its widest part 75 miles broad. Sindhia, pursuing his conquests in Hindustan, sent Perron to besiege him in his capital, and he surrendered on

condition of being conducted to the British frontier. He arrived at it in January, 1802, and was on his way to Calcutta to embark for his native land, when he was taken ill and died at Berhampur. Haryana passed to the British during the war with Sindhia, and during the rage which prevailed for throwing away provinces was given away to several successive chiefs. As they were unable to keep it, it again became a British possession, but remained in such an unsettled state as to endanger the tranquillity of Delhi itself. Lord Minto saw its value, and after a short struggle with its turbulent tribes, succeeded in withdrawing them from lawless pursuits, and inducing them to become peaceful agriculturists.

Proceeding still farther north, Lord Minto ventured on a bolder step than any he had yet taken. The Sikhs living on the left or east bank of the Sutlej had, at the termination of the Maratha war, professed submission to the British. It was nominally accepted without being defined. Neither was tribute paid nor protection promised; and the known determination of the government to retire from their conquests gave countenance to the belief that any native chief who could establish his ascendancy over this portion of the Sikh territory was welcome to do so. The celebrated Sikh chief, Ranjit Singh, had gained the ascendant over all competitors, and being thus brought to the right bank of the Sutlej, saw the tempting prospect which lay beyond it. Before committing himself, however, he proceeded to feel his way, and did not venture to cross till he could plead that he had received an invitation. It was not necessary to wait long for this purpose. During a quarrel between the Rajas of Patiala and Nabha, the latter applied to him for aid. He at once granted it, and crossing the Sutlej in October, 1806, with a strong body of horse, obliged the contending parties to submit to his dictation. His presence did not pass unnoticed at Delhi, but any apprehensions which were felt were removed by a letter professing profound respect for the British government, and he departed with the conviction that whenever it might suit him to return, he had nothing to fear from the only power capable of resisting him. His experiment had thus succeeded, and as might have been anticipated, he was not long of turning it to practical account.

In the course of 1807 a feud broke out in the family of the Raja of Patiala. His wife being refused an assignment of revenue to her son, carried her displeasure so far as to send for Ranjit Singh. He lost no time in again crossing the Sutlej. This repetition of the visit spread alarm among the Sikh chiefs, who considered themselves as British subjects, and they applied urgently to the resident at Delhi for protection against the designs of their countryman. The application was forwarded to Calcutta, but before an answer could be received, the Raja and Rani of Patiala had settled their quarrel, and purchased Ranjit Singh's departure by a valuable diamond necklace, and a celebrated brass gun. Before departing, however, he gave the petty rajas full proof of the treatment they might expect by levying contributions on them, or by seizing their forts, and confiscating their lands. Shortly after his return he addressed a letter to the governor-general, in which, while professing friendly dispositions, he asked why a British force was assembling on the Jamuna, and added, "The country on this side of the Jamuna, except the stations occupied by the English, is subject to my authority. Let it remain so." Lord Minto, instead of fully answering by letter, resolved on sending a mission to Lahore. Mr. Metcalfe, whose subsequent services made him successively a baronet and a peer, set out from Delhi in 1808 as envoy to Ranjit Singh, and after crossing the Sutlej, found him in his camp at Kasur or Kassur. His reception, at first friendly, changed its character as soon as Ranjit Singh learned that the British government refused to accept the Jamuna as the boundary between the two states. Openly testifying his dissatisfaction, he did not hesitate to give the strongest practical proof of it by suddenly crossing the Sutlej, with the envoy in his train, and proceeding to exercise sovereign rights within the disputed territory. Mr. Metcalfe refused to proceed any further in that direction, and Ranjit Singh was under the necessity of retracing his steps to Amritsar, where the other members of the mission had been left. The negotiation did not open favourably. On being informed that he must resign all the conquests which he had made on the left bank of the Sutlej since the period when the Sikhs there had been taken under British protection, he seemed so determined on an appeal

to arms that a detachment under Colonel Ochterlony proceeded across the Jamuna to Ludhiana, while a larger force under General St. Leger was prepared to follow. Ranjit Singh, now convinced that the governor-general was in earnest, abandoned his dreams of conquest, and on the 25th of April, 1809, a treaty was concluded, by which the Raja of Lahore agreed not to maintain more troops on the left bank of the Sutlej than necessary for the internal management of the territories there acknowledged to belong to him, nor to make any encroachment on the protected Sikh rajas, and the British agreed not to interfere in any way with his territories in the north of the river. In connection with this treaty it became necessary more exactly to define the relation between the British government and the protected chiefs, and it was formally announced that Sirhind and Malwa had been taken under British protection, and that the chiefs, though not subjected to tribute, nor interfered with in regard to internal management, would be expected, when called upon, to join the British army with their forces. At a later period it was explained that the declaration as to internal management did not preclude British interposition whenever it might be necessary to settle disputes among the rajas, or suppress domestic dissensions.

At the time when the above treaty was concluded with Ranjit Singh, a serious disturbance broke out at Delhi. Shah Alam, as already mentioned, died on the 18th of December, 1806, and was succeeded by his eldest son, who took the title of Shah Akbar II. The new monarch, not yet reconciled to the reduced fortunes of his family, made several attempts to break through the limits which the British, now his masters, had prescribed for him. On only one occasion, however, did Lord Minto find it necessary to interfere decidedly. Shah Akbar had several sons. The eldest had naturally the best title to the designation of heir-apparent; but the mother of the third son, Mirza Jehangir, being the favourite queen, intrigued in his behalf, and induced the king to take certain steps which indicated a design to give him the succession. When the British government interfered, Mirza Jehangir began to act for himself, and by means of a body of armed retainers kept the palace in a state of alarm. A body of the Company's sepoys

began in consequence, with the king's consent, to mount guard at the palace gates. The prince's retainers immediately took up a menacing position within, and when the resident, Mr. Seton, advanced to expostulate with them, he was fired at, and made a very narrow escape, a ball evidently intended for him having struck the cap of a sepoy at his side. On this the inner gates were forced, the retainers dispersed, and the prince himself sent off as prisoner to spend the remainder of his life in the fort of Allahabad. From this time Shah Akbar resigned himself to his fate, and his pension of 76,500 rupees a month, which had only been promised conditionally by Marquis Wellesley, was confirmed by Lord Minto, and subsequently increased till it reached its maximum of £150,000 per annum.

The propriety of concluding a treaty with Ranjit Singh had been partly suggested by the supposed designs of the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte against the British dominions in the East. To the same cause are to be ascribed the three important missions which Lord Minto despatched about this time to Persia, Kabul, and Sind. The embassy to Persia, intrusted for the second time to Sir John Malcolm, was mainly designed to counteract the influence which the French had succeeded in establishing at the Persian court. So important did this object seem to the British ministry, that they too had despatched Sir Harford Jones on a similar errand. This double embassy was unfortunate. Lord Minto protested against the embassy of the ministry as an interference with his prerogative, and several measures were adopted, as much with a view to maintain this prerogative as from any practical benefit anticipated from them. Sir John Malcolm, who had the start of his competitor, arrived at Bushire, but he returned to recommend the immediate preparation of a hostile armament for the Persian Gulf. Sir Harford Jones followed, and had succeeded in concluding a preliminary treaty, when a letter from Lord Minto to the court of Teheran arrived, disavowing his character as an ambassador. Ultimately, however, his preliminary treaty was ratified by the governor-general, and Sir John Malcolm returned, under his auspices, to perfect the negotiation. He arrived at Teheran in June, 1810, but quitted it without accomplishing anything, on being made acquainted with the

approach of Sir Gore Ouseley as the accredited ambassador of the British court.

The embassy to Kabul was intrusted to Mr. Elphinstone, and fitted out so as to impress the Afghans with a high idea of the British power and dignity. Little was known either of the country or the government, and the chief value derived from the mission consisted in the full and accurate information furnished with regard to both, in the excellent work which Mr. Elphinstone published after his return. Zeman Shah, who had excited the apprehension of successive governors-general, had ceased to reign, having been deposed and blinded by his brother Mahmud, who had usurped his throne. Mahmud was not permitted to profit long by his usurpation, and was obliged to give way to another brother, who took the title of Shah Shuja. He had held the nominal sovereignty for five years, and was still in possession of the sovereignty when Mr. Elphinstone, after a long and perilous journey across the deserts of Bikaner and Jaisalmer, arrived at Peshawar on the 5th of March, 1809. He met with a friendly reception, and would have had no difficulty in concluding an offensive and defensive alliance; but when he declined this, and showed that the only object aimed at was the protection of British interests, without any reciprocal advantage, Shah Shuja demurred, and became more difficult to deal with. Ultimately, however, he agreed to a treaty by which he was to oppose the French and Persians in any attempt to cross Afghanistan on their way to India, and was to be defrayed the expense which he might thus incur. This treaty was ratified at Calcutta on the 19th of June, 1809, but when returned to Peshawar was absolutely worthless. Civil war was raging—Mr. Elphinstone had left the capital to await the restoration of tranquillity, and Shah Shuja was fleeing before his enemies. A pecuniary grant which he urgently solicited, and Mr. Elphinstone strongly recommended, might have enabled him to regain the ascendancy, but Napoleon's reverses, and the restoration of the Bourbons, having removed all fear of French influence in the East, the grant was refused, and friendly intercourse with the Afghans was no longer courted.

The third embassy was to Sind. The Company had, with a view to commercial privileges, repeatedly attempted to estab-

lish friendly relations with Hyderabad, the name of the capital of Sind, as well as that of the Nizam's dominions, but their overtures had been coldly, and even insolently repelled. Political changes had, however, produced a change of inclination; and three brothers, Ghulam Ali, Karam Ali, and Murad Ali, who, as the principal chiefs or Amirs of Sind, jointly administered its affairs, became anxious for British protection, as a security against the threatened ascendancy of Persia. On their own proposal to renew the commercial intercourse, which at an early period had been carried on by means of a factory at Tatta, Captain Seton was sent as envoy to Hyderabad, and concluded an offensive and defensive alliance. The terms, however, pledged the Company further than was thought expedient; and hence, while the ratification was withheld, Mr. Nicholas Hankey Smith was deputed to explain the cause and restrict the stipulations. After many obstructions, to which the Amirs themselves were suspected of being privy, Mr. Smith reached Hyderabad on the 8th of August, 1809, and on the 23rd concluded a treaty stipulating eternal friendship, the mutual appointment of ambassadors, and the exclusion of the French. This last object, which had long been regarded as of primary moment, had in consequence of Napoleon's reverses become unimportant, and the treaty therefore remained almost inoperative.

While the governor-general was thus endeavouring to extend friendly relations with neighbouring states on the north and west, occurrences of an alarming character took place within the presidency of Madras. Sir George Barlow, when deprived unceremoniously of the office of governor-general, succeeded Lord William Bentinck, who had been as unceremoniously recalled from Madras. He entered upon the duties of his office in the end of December, 1807. His appointment was by no means popular. As he belonged to a different presidency he was considered an intruder; and as he had proved himself in Bengal to be a resolute financial reformer, a very powerful party, whom such reform would seriously affect, were disposed to view all his proceedings with suspicion, and use every means in their power to thwart them. Under such circumstances it would have been difficult for any governor, however conciliat-

ing, to have made himself popular, and Sir George Barlow, so far from being conciliating, was of a stiff, dogged temper, which provoked opposition by unnecessarily defying it. The mutiny which took place in the Madras army is by far the most important event in Sir George Barlow's government; but before proceeding to give the details, it will be proper to give some account of disturbances which occurred about the same time in Travancore. The close friendship which subsisted between the raja and the Company, and which was signally manifested when an encroachment on his rights by Tipu was regarded as a sufficient ground for declaring war against Mysore, had subsequently suffered considerable interruption. Two treaties had been afterwards concluded with the raja, one in 1795, which guaranteed his territories, and merely bound him to furnish what troops he was able, and another in 1805, which bound him to pay a certain amount for a subsidiary force. Towards the end of 1808 the subsidy was largely in arrear, and when payment was demanded, the raja protested that the treaty of 1805 had been forced upon him, and that the payment of four battalions with which it saddled him, was a far heavier burden than his revenues could bear. The resident, on the other hand, insisted that difficulty in paying the subsidy was owing to the expenditure lavished on a body of useless troops, maintained by the raja under the name of the Carnatic brigade. The real question in dispute thus was, whether the subsidiary force or the brigade should be reduced, the raja advocating the former and the resident the latter.

Vailu Tambi, the diwan or prime minister, was another cause of contention. The resident blamed him for allowing the subsidy to fall into arrear, and insisted on his removal. This was seemingly acquiesced in, but Vailu Tambi, while professedly holding office only till a successor should be appointed, secretly organized a conspiracy of the Nairs, induced the diwan of the Raja of Cochin to join him, and giving encouragement to some French adventurers who had landed on the coast, spread a rumour of the expected arrival of a French army to expel the English. He also entered into communication with the neighbouring rajas, and gained their support by pretending that their religion was in danger. Colonel Macaulay, the

resident, alarmed at the general excitement which began to prevail, applied for reinforcements. The diwan, aware of this precautionary measure, again professed a willingness to resign if his personal security were guaranteed, and arrangements were made for his removal to Calicut on the 28th of December, 1808. The very same night the house of the resident was surrounded by a body of armed men, and he had only time to conceal himself, before they broke in and commenced a search with the avowed purpose of murdering him. In the morning Colonel Macaulay escaped on board a vessel, which proved to be a transport with part of the expected reinforcements. Colonel Chalmers commanding the subsidiary force, which had its station at Quilon, immediately commenced operations, but the insurgents increased so rapidly that he was obliged to return to Quilon. Here he was joined early in January, 1809, by his majesty's 12th regiment under Colonel Picton from Malabar. The disparity of force was however still very great, for the diwan was advancing at the head of nearly 30,000 men, with eighteen guns. On the 15th of January the encounter took place. The attack was made by the diwan, and maintained for five hours, at the end of which he was driven from the field with considerable loss.

After this repulse Vailu Tambi, despairing of success at Quilon, hastened off to Cochin, which was held by Major Hewitt with only two companies of the 12th regiment, and six companies of native infantry. The insurgents advanced to the attack in three masses, each 1,000 strong, and were again repulsed. Meanwhile reinforcements were arriving. Colonel Cuppage, commanding in Malabar, entered the province of Cochin from the north with his majesty's 80th regiment, and two native battalions; Colonel St. Leger was marching from Trichinopoly with his majesty's 69th regiment, a regiment of native cavalry, three native battalions, and a detachment of royal artillery, and was, moreover, to be joined by a Kaffre regiment expected from Ceylon. Colonel St. Leger directed his march through the province of Tinnevely, determined to force his way into Travancore, across the mountain range by which the Western Ghats are continued to Cape Comorin. For this purpose it was necessary to diverge far to the south,

as in that direction the most practicable passes are situated. The one which he selected was the pass of Arambuli or Aramuni, which leads westward across the mountains by the highroad from Palamkota. This pass was defended by formidable lines, and as Colonel St. Leger had no battering train, the task which he had undertaken was one of no ordinary difficulty. It was accomplished however by a well-managed surprise, and the British troops began on the 17th of February to advance in the direction of Trivandrum, the Travancore capital. Colonel Chalmers was also advancing upon it from the opposite direction, while Colonel Cuppage, who had crossed the northern frontier, was continuing his march southward without opposition. All resistance now ceased, and it only remained to dictate to the raja such terms as seemed necessary to prevent the recurrence of similar insurrections. The diwan had in the meanwhile fled, and being abandoned by his master, who, as a proof of his zeal for the British interests, despatched various parties in search of him, was driven at last to take refuge in the pagoda of Bhagwadi. Though venerated as a sanctuary, his Hindu pursuers did not hesitate to force it. The diwan was found expiring of wounds, apparently self-inflicted; his brother who was with him was taken to Quilon and hanged. There cannot be a doubt that both brothers richly deserved their fate. Vailu Tambi in particular had atrociously murdered Mr. Hume, a British surgeon, to whose professional services he had at one time been indebted, and thirty-four soldiers of the 12th regiment whom he had entrapped into his custody, and was, moreover, accused of having put to death in cold blood 3,000 native Christians, charged with no crime but their religion. His dead body was carried to Trivandrum and exposed upon a gibbet. This proceeding, though said to have been the act of the raja, was strongly censured by the governor-general, who held that the resident had made himself responsible by neither preventing the exposure nor proclaiming his disapprobation. The ends of justice were served when the diwan ceased to exist, and the attempt to carry punishment further was, his lordship remarked, repugnant to humanity and to the principles of a civilized government.

Though the pacification of Travancore seemed to be complete, scarcely two years elapsed before the new diwan was

suspected of following in the footsteps of his predecessor. The subsidy again fell into arrear, and indications were not wanting of a new plot. It was therefore determined to give effect to an article in the treaty of 1805, which provided that on failure of the conditions the British government should be at liberty to assume the management of the country. The necessity for this had become so apparent that the raja himself is said to have requested it. Similar treatment was applied to the Raja of Cochin. His diwan was certainly implicated in the Travancore insurrection, and the same security against its recurrence was therefore taken. The expenses of the war were levied from the two rajas in the proportions of two-thirds from Travancore and one-third from Cochin. There is some reason for holding that the union of the two rajas, or rather of their ministers, in an insurrection which from the first must have been felt to be almost desperate, never could have taken place without strong provocation, and that the rigorous exaction of payment for troops which the rulers held to be unnecessary, and which are admitted to have been intolerably burdensome, was therefore a violation both of justice and of sound policy.

During these transactions at Travancore, dissatisfaction with the governor had been greatly increased by the introduction of a new element of discord. Sir John Cradock having, like Lord William Bentinck, been abruptly recalled, in consequence of the mutiny at Vellore, was succeeded as commander-in-chief by General Hay Macdowall. Sir John had held a seat in council. Both offices of course became vacant by his recall, but the directors thought proper in conferring the one upon his successor to deny him the other. General Macdowall was not a man to submit quietly to what he thought an insult and an injustice; and therefore, after he had failed in an appeal to the directors, he addressed a letter to Sir George Barlow, in which he declared that their refusal had placed him "in so extraordinary, so unexampled, and so humiliating a predicament, that the most painful emotions have been excited." Having thus a great grievance of his own, his sympathies were naturally given to those who had any list of grievances; and hence when the officers under his command became loud in their complaint of certain retrenchments to which they were subjected, so far from

repressing he rather encouraged them. Under such circumstances the rules of military subordination were not strictly enforced, and a mutinous spirit began to prevail.

All the military retrenchments enforced by the Madras government were naturally unpalatable to the army, and a strong inclination was therefore felt of seizing upon any pretext which would afford an opportunity of giving open and formal utterance to dissatisfaction. The desire thus entertained was ere long gratified. Among the retrenchments was the abolition of what was called the "Tent Contract," under which officers in command of native troops received a monthly allowance for providing the men with suitable camp equipage. This allowance did not vary with the nature of the service, but was fixed in its amount, and payable alike in cantonments and in the field, in peace and in war. Sir John Cradock, by whom this retrenchment was originally suggested, had instructed Colonel John Monro, the quartermaster-general, to report on its practicability, and the best mode of effecting it. The report entered fully into the subject, and placed the objections to the tent contract in so clear a light as to make it impossible to doubt the propriety of abolishing it. Sir John Cradock, Lord William Bentinck, and the Bengal government were perfectly at one on the subject, and held that the retrenchment ought forthwith to be made. The task, of course, devolved on Sir George Barlow as governor, and to this extent only was he responsible.

The officers whose emoluments were affected were not much disposed to grapple with the subject on its merits. The objections were obviously unanswerable, but it was discovered that the mode of stating them was not very guarded. There were passages in the report which, when brought into juxtaposition, might be construed not merely as hypothetical objections to the tent contract, but as specific charges against the officers who had profited by it. Colonel Monro set out with stating that "six years' experience of the practical effects of the existing system of the camp equipage of the army, and an attentive examination of its operation during that period of time, had suggested the objections." One of these objections was as follows:—"By granting the same allowances in peace and war for the equipment of native corps, while the expenses incidental

to that charge are unavoidably much greater in war than in peace, it places the interest and duty of officers commanding native corps in direct opposition to one another—it makes it their interest that their corps should not be in a state of efficiency fit for field service, and therefore furnishes strong inducement to neglect their most important duties.” Here, then, argued the officers, are two distinct statements. In the one Colonel Monro points out a dereliction of duty which the tent contract tends to produce, and in the other he gives it as the result of his own experience that this dereliction of duty has actually taken place. This charge he must either prove, or be punished as a calumniator. Colonel Monro now disclaimed all intention of insinuating anything against the honour and integrity of the officers of the army. This would not do. They had clearly been charged with gross and corrupt neglect of duty, and they called upon the commander-in-chief to bring Colonel Monro to a court-martial for aspersions on their characters as officers and gentlemen.

While admitting that the language of the report ought to have been more guarded, we are not at all disposed to admit that the inference which the officers drew from it was legitimate. Colonel Monro’s experience had convinced him that the practical working of the system was bad, but it did not follow that he had seen every one of the objections which he made to it actually exemplified. His experience suggested the objections, but how many of them had been realized, and how many of them existed merely as temptations to which his fellow-officers were unnecessarily exposed, he had nowhere stated. It was, therefore, as illogical as it was disingenuous to give his words a meaning which they did not necessarily bear, and then insist that this forced interpretation should be adopted as the only true one, and that in the face of his own disclaimer. Colonel Monro had not volunteered a report. He was ordered to make it, and he was bound in conscience to state every objection which he believed to be well founded. Even had he made specific charges, and said in plain terms that he had known cases where temptation had produced neglect, his statement might have been strictly true, and therefore justifiable, even though the evidence which he possessed might not have enabled him to establish it by legal proof.

If the officers had no good ground for the outcry which they raised against Colonel Monro, what must be thought of the commander-in-chief, who, after consulting the judge advocate-general, and receiving his opinion that the accusation of the officers could not be entertained, not only entertained it, but placed Colonel Monro under arrest in order to wait his trial upon it. Two circumstances connected with this proceeding made the conduct of the commander-in-chief absolutely inexcusable. First, he had resigned his office, and was on the point of sailing for England when he took this extraordinary step, though he must have been aware that delay could not have prejudiced the right of the accusers, while his premature decision would necessarily embarrass his successor. Secondly, at the very time when General Macdowall set the opinion of the judge advocate-general at nought, the officers themselves had acquiesced in it, and withdrawn their application for a court-martial, to substitute for it a memorial to the directors, praying for investigation. An examination of the motives by which the commander-in-chief appeared to have been influenced only placed his misconduct in a still stronger light.

When Colonel Monro was placed under arrest, he appealed for protection to the government. The commander-in-chief, through whom the appeal was in the first instance sent, refused to transmit it, and it was, in consequence of his refusal, sent directly to the governor in council. The government, in accordance with the opinion of their legal advisers in military matters, at once interfered, and after in vain requesting, peremptorily ordered the commander-in-chief to release Colonel Monro from arrest. Reluctant though he was, he did not venture to disobey, but besides protesting, took the only revenge still in his power, by issuing a general order, in which he severely reprimanded Colonel Monro for appealing to the civil government, and declared that nothing but his immediate departure prevented him from bringing him to trial for disobedience of orders, contempt of military authority, and disrespect to the commander-in-chief. Hitherto the conduct of the government had been firm, but temperate. The only part of their conduct which admitted of question was their refusal to transmit the memorial of the officers to the directors. Now, however, they were about to

take a step which placed them decidedly in the wrong, and in fact exhibited them as the imitators of General Macdowall's violence. Not satisfied with replying to his general order, by issuing a government order couched in language as unbecoming as his own, they proceeded to suspend from the Company's service Major Boles, the deputy adjutant-general, and Colonel Capper, the adjutant-general, the former because he had signed and circulated the general order, and the latter because, though absent at the time, he avowed himself responsible for the conduct of his deputy. Nothing could be more absurd and inconsistent than this procedure on the part of the government. Colonel Monro and Major Boles stood to all intents in the same position. They acted ministerially in obedience to the command of their superiors, and were therefore entitled equally to protection. Government, however, instead of dispensing justice with an even hand, protected the one and punished the other. They thus descended from the vantage ground on which they had previously stood, and became, instead of impartial judges, mere partizans. According to their new doctrine, an officer acting in obedience to orders was yet liable to punishment, if he did not refuse to obey when the orders given might happen to be illegal. If so, the subordinate, when called to act ministerially, is entitled for his own safety to sit in judgment on his superior, and to refuse obedience whenever he can satisfy himself that his superior has erred. This doctrine, if acted upon, would soon make sad havoc with military discipline. It were easy, indeed, to put extreme cases in which the subordinate might be bound to disobey. He might be ordered, for instance, to betray his trust, or commit some other manifest crime. As a general rule, however, his only duty is to obey without incurring the least responsibility. It is probably true that Major Boles, in signing and circulating the general order, displayed not only obedience but zeal. Still, in point of form, he was an irresponsible servant, and the government went far astray when they endeavoured to fasten upon him a different character.

The pernicious results of the course on which the government had now entered soon became apparent. Major Boles was regarded by his fellow-officers as a persecuted man, and

as the cause in which he had been made a martyr was theirs, they not only presented addresses to him approving of his conduct and denouncing his sentence, but commenced a subscription to compensate him for his pecuniary loss. The struggle between the government and the army had thus become inevitable, and could not be terminated unless one of the parties gave way. The government took a step which declared that they had no idea of yielding or even of remaining on the defensive. Three months after the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles, a new government order announced a sweeping list of suspensions and supersessions. At the head of those suspended from the service was the Honourable Colonel St. Leger, who had recently terminated the war in Travancore; and among those removed from the command of battalions were Colonels Chalmers and Cappage, who had distinguished themselves in the same campaign. The offences thus punished were stated to be, the signing and influencing others to sign the address to Major Boles, a memorial enumerating the grievances of the Madras army, and intended to be submitted to the governor-general, and a statement which had been drawn up in favour of General Macdowall and forwarded to him at Ceylon. The memorial, the most exceptionable of all the documents, had not been transmitted, and the intention of transmitting it was said to have been abandoned, when a copy of it fell into the hands of Sir George Barlow, and was made the ground of penal proceedings. In one respect these proceedings were wholly unjustifiable. The officers punished were made acquainted at the same moment with the charge and the sentence. They were not tried, and even those who declared their innocence were not allowed to prove it.

In the government order a serious blunder was committed. From strange ignorance of the nature of the disaffection, and the extent to which it had spread, the subsidiary force at Hyderabad was complimented at the expense of the other divisions of the army, for having refused to take any part in the proceedings, which the order characterized as improper and dangerous. The compliment was very unwelcome, and those to whom it was paid took the most effectual means of showing how little they deserved it, by publishing a letter in which they

condemned the proceedings of the government, expressed their willingness to contribute to a subscription fund for compensating the suspended officers, and declared their determination to co-operate cordially with the rest of the army in endeavouring to remove the causes of the present discontent. This letter was followed by an address to the governor in council, signed by 158 officers of the Jaulna and Hyderabad divisions, and calling for the restoration of those who had been suspended or removed, as the only means likely to prevent a collision between the civil and military authorities, the destruction of discipline and subordination among the native troops, and the ultimate loss of a large portion of the British dominions in India. Having advanced thus far their boldness increased, and Colonel Montresor, the officer in command of the Hyderabad force, received a paper from his officers which they styled their ultimatum. No longer mincing matters, it demanded the repeal of the government order, the restoration of the officers punished by it, the removal from the staff of the officers who had advised the government, and a general amnesty for all past proceedings. This paper was signed by all the officers, except those on the staff, and to give effect to it, a joint movement from Jaulna and Hyderabad on Madras was actually projected.

At Masulipatam, the natural result to which the prevailing disaffection inevitably tended was realized, and an act of open mutiny was committed by the European regiment quartered there. The officers had borne their full share in the general discontent, and at a convivial meeting had drunk toasts and uttered sentiments, on which their commanding officer had animadverted with some severity. The privates also had some grievances, one of which was their being occasionally drafted as marines to serve in the ships of war in the Bay of Bengal. Hence, when three companies were ordered for marine duty they refused, and the officers taking part in the mutiny arrested their colonel, instituted a committee of managing officers, and opened a correspondence with disaffected divisions at Hyderabad, and in other quarters. Colonel Malcolm, who was at Madras preparing for his Persian mission, was despatched to Masulipatam, and after various attempts to restore order and subordination, returned to report his conviction that nothing

but a revocation of the government order would suffice to prevent a general and fatal insurrection. This concession would have been as fatal as insurrection could have been, and Sir George Barlow did wisely in repudiating it. He had undoubtedly committed serious blunders, but none so serious as that which he would have committed had he yielded to the counsels of those who would have escaped from a present mutiny, by placing his neck beneath the foot of the mutineers, and thus destroying all future discipline. As the contest seemed now inevitable, he took his measures with the utmost promptitude and vigour, and struck terror into the mutineers, by showing them plainly what now awaited them. His majesty's troops were firm to a man; the native troops, when made aware of the fate which their officers were preparing for them, would pause before committing themselves to hostilities with the government, on whom their pay and pensions absolutely depended; and not a few of the officers, having been pushed farther than they ever meant to go, were desirous to recede.

In order to ascertain the relative proportions of well-affected and disaffected officers, and take the necessary steps for the removal of the latter, recourse was had to the very questionable device of employing a test. A paper in this form was accordingly drawn up, and copies of it were sent to the commanding officers of stations, with instructions to require the signatures of their officers to it. Those who refused to sign were to be removed from their regiments to stations on the coast, and remain there till better times might allow of their being again employed. At the same time, the native officers were made acquainted with the points in dispute, and instructed to acquaint the sepoys that the complaints of the European officers were entirely personal, and that their own position and emoluments, if they remained faithful, would not be in the least affected. The Company's troops were also so stationed as to be kept in check by his majesty's regiments. All of these measures were very successful except the test, which, on account of the suspicion which it was supposed to imply, was very obnoxious, and was refused by many of whose loyalty there could be no doubt. According to the returns, of 1,300 officers on the strength of the Madras army, only 150 signed.

The officers generally, perceiving the hopelessness of the struggle which they had provoked, and not only alarmed at the penal consequences, but also, it is to be charitably presumed, ashamed at the loss of character which they had sustained by their violent and unsoldierlike conduct, began so make their submission; but there were two localities in which the mutinous spirit could not be exorcised without coercive measures. At Seringapatam the European officers, on learning that they were to be separated from their native soldiers, broke out at once into open rebellion. After compelling a small body of his majesty's troops to quit the fort, they seized the public treasure, drew up the bridges, and placed themselves in an attitude of defiance. A detachment, consisting of the 25th dragoons and one of his majesty's regiments of infantry, together with a regiment of native cavalry and a native battalion, hastened under Colonel Gibbs to Seringapatam. Meanwhile two native battalions were on their way from Chitteldrug to join the garrison. Some Mysorean horse were sent out to intercept them, but no serious obstacle to their progress was opposed till they arrived within sight of the fort, when seeing the dragoons approaching to encounter them, they took fright, broke, and dispersed. Most of them, however, by means of a demonstration in their favour from the fort, managed to escape into it, though not without a loss of nearly 200 in killed and wounded. During the night the garrison cannonaded the British encampment, and compelled its removal to a greater distance, but this was the last act of hostility on which the mutineers ventured. Afterwards, on learning how gloomy their prospects were, they hastened to make their submission.

The only other locality in which an obstinate resistance was threatened was Hyderabad. When the demonstration there was at its height, it was deemed advisable to send for Colonel Close, the resident at Poona, whose popularity with the sepoys might, it was supposed, be turned to good account. He arrived on the 3rd of August, 1809, and after making his way with some difficulty into the cantonments, succeeded so little by expostulation, that, under some apprehension of personal restraint, he withdrew to the residency to await further instructions. As soon as he withdrew, the committee of officers sent for the

divisions at Jaulna and in the Northern Circars. The troops at the former place, at once obeying the summons, made two marches in advance, and those in the Circars were preparing to take the field, when the views of the officers of Hyderabad underwent a change, which they themselves, in a penitential letter to the governor-general, attributed to a kind of sudden conversion, though there is reason to suspect that they were influenced as much by fear as by genuine repentance. All their blustering and violence thus ended in abject humiliation. They signed the test, and began to preach submission by sending to the different stations of the army a circular in which they entreated their brother officers to lose no time in following their example.

On the 11th of September, 1809, Lord Minto arrived at Madras, and was gratified to find the mutiny already quelled. His decided reprobation of the conduct of the mutineers, and his general concurrence with the views of Sir George Barlow were well known, but still, from his known moderation and leniency, much was expected which it would have been vain to expect from the sternness and almost vindictive severity of the governor of Madras. General Macdowall, in some respects the greatest culprit of all, was already beyond the reach of human punishment, the vessel in which he sailed and all on board of her having perished at sea. Other culprits however remained, whose misdeeds could not be passed over. These were officers in command of stations or of separate corps, and officers who had made themselves conspicuous for activity and violence. Only three of the one class and eighteen of the other were selected, the former to be tried by court-martial, and the latter to be at their option either tried in like manner or dismissed. The proceedings of the home authorities with reference to the mutiny may be briefly stated. In the House of Commons papers were called for, but no motion was founded on them. In the court of directors the conduct of Sir George Barlow was generally approved, with two important exceptions—the one, the suspension of Major Boles for signing and circulating General Macdowall's general order, and the other the suspension of a number of officers, on private information, without notice and without trial. In appointing a new commander-in-

chief the impolicy of excluding him from the council was so strongly recognized, that one of the civil members was removed to make way for him. A motion for the recall of Sir George Barlow, though defeated in July, 1811, was renewed at the end of the following year and carried.

The nature of the Madras mutiny, the questions which it raised, and the proper mode of disposing of them, cannot be more clearly stated, nor more authoritatively stated, than in the following extract of a letter written by the Duke of Wellington from Badajoz on the 3rd of December, 1809, to Sir John Malcolm: "These transactions and their causes prove that it is not always the man who has the character of being the best-natured, and one of the easiest disposition, who will agree best with those placed in authority over him, or those with whom he is to co-operate. They owe their origin to the disputes of the persons in authority in India, that is to say, between the governor and the commander-in-chief. Both, but principally the latter, looked for partizans and supporters; and these have ended by throwing off all subordination, by relinquishing all habits of obedience, and almost by open resistance. Nothing can be more absurd than the pretext for this conduct. Colonel Monro's opinion might be erroneous, and might have been harsh towards his brother officers; but not only he ought not to have been brought to a court-martial for giving that opinion, but he ought to have been brought to a court-martial if he had refrained from giving it, when he was called upon by the commander-in-chief to make him a report on a subject referred to his special consideration. The officers of the army are equally wrong in the part they have taken in the subsequent part of the question, which is one between the governor and the commander-in-chief, whether the former had a right to protect Colonel Monro from the acts of the latter, upon which question no man can have a doubt who has any knowledge of the constitution of Great Britain, and particularly of that of the Indian governments. I who have arrived pretty nearly at the top of the tree should be the last man to give up any point of right or military etiquette. But I have no doubt whatever, not only that it was the right, but that it was the duty of the governor in council to interfere to save Colonel Monro; and that if he had not done so, and the public had sustained any loss or inconvenience from his trial, or if the

public attention had been drawn to the injustice of his trial, the governor would have been severely responsible for the omission to perform his duty. So far for my opinion upon the main points of the question. As for the others, the conduct of officers upon the addresses, the orders issued, the resolutions entered into, the resignations of their offices, &c., they are consequences of the first error; that is, of persons in authority making partizans of those placed under them, instead of making all obey the constituted authorities of the state. This conduct in the officers of the army would have been wrong, even if the cause had been just and the commander-in-chief had wished to screen Colonel Monro from the persecution of the government; and it is really not worth while to take up my time in describing, or yours in perusing a description of the folly, the inconsistency, or the breaches of discipline and subordination contained in all those documents."

Notwithstanding the local disturbances which have been described, the general peace of India was not interrupted during Lord Minto's administration. The period, however, was by no means destitute of stirring incidents and brilliant achievements, and his lordship repeatedly showed that he possessed abundance of activity and enterprise; but as the occasions on which they were displayed were more connected with European than with Indian politics, a very brief notice of them will suffice. On the occupation of Portugal by the French, the governor-general, in accordance with instructions from the British ministry, proceeded to take military occupation of the Portuguese settlements in the East. This was unnecessary with regard to Goa, where an arrangement, giving the military authority to the British, and reserving the civil administration to the Portuguese, had already been made. In order to effect a similar arrangement at Macao, an expedition fitted out at Calcutta and Madras sailed in the end of July, and arrived on the 11th of September, 1809. It was unexpected, and the governor of Macao having received no instructions from Europe, refused to receive the sanction of the viceroy of Goa as sufficient authority for resigning the place. Force was therefore employed, and he was compelled to yield a reluctant assent to British military occupation. It seems to have been altogether

forgotten that the Chinese had a right to be consulted, and the consequence was a complete stoppage of the British trade, and a narrow escape from a war with China. The expedition thus proved a complete failure.

The next expeditions were of a more important character and produced more fortunate results. The islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, in the possession of the French, had long been the rendezvous of their navy in the East, and of numerous privateers, who preyed upon the British trade and inflicted enormous losses upon it. In 1807 the port of Calcutta alone, in the course of six weeks, sustained losses by capture to the amount of £300,000. As the most effectual means of escaping from these losses, and paralysing the naval resources of the French in the Indian Ocean, it was determined to attempt the capture of the islands. With this view, after an important station had been obtained by seizing the small island of Rodriguez, situated about 100 leagues east of the Mauritius, and a descent had been made on the Isle of Bourbon, which seemed to prove that the capture of the whole island might be effected without difficulty, the governor-general fitted out a powerful armament, which arrived at Rodriguez on the 20th of June, 1810. Having joined the troops already there under Colonel Keating, it sailed again on the 3rd of July, under a strong squadron of the British navy in command of Commodore Rowley, effected a landing on the 7th in the vicinity of St. Denis, the capital, and completed the conquest of the whole island with the loss of only eighteen killed and fifty-nine wounded. This success was almost counterbalanced by some severe naval losses which the British shortly after sustained, not so much from the superiority of the enemy as from an imperfect acquaintance with the pilotage of the coast. These disasters having been repaired, the more important conquest of the Mauritius was now to be attempted.

The expedition, to which each of the three Indian presidencies contributed a quota, anchored on the 29th of November, 1810, in Grande Baye, near the north-east extremity of the island, and about fifteen miles from Port Louis, its capital. A landing was immediately effected without opposition, and the whole force, mustering about 11,000 men, began to advance. The French governor was unable to muster more than 2,000

Europeans, and a considerable number of undisciplined and half-armed inhabitants and slaves. With these, however, he ventured to make a stand in an advantageous position a few miles from the capital, and was not driven from it till he had inflicted some loss. Preparations being made to assault the town by land and cannonade it by sea, the governor offered to capitulate, and, owing to the advanced state of the season, obtained favourable terms. The strength of the place had been greatly overrated, and the conquest of the island, which immediately followed, though undoubtedly a valuable acquisition, was made by such an overpowering force that no great honour was gained by it.

After the reduction of the French islands, the settlements of the Dutch, who, in consequence of Napoleon's successes, had become, more by compulsion than choice, the allies of the French, became the next objects of attack. All that the British ministry originally contemplated was a vigorous blockade of Java and the Spice Islands. Lord Minto and Admiral Drury concurred in recommending a more decided course, and instead of resting satisfied with blockade, decided on capture. With this view, a small expedition was in the first instance fitted out against the Moluccas, and sailing from Madras, arrived off Amboyna, the largest of the group, in February, 1810. The town, situated at the bottom of a small bay, was defended by batteries placed along the beach and on the adjoining heights, and also by Fort Victoria mounting heavy ordnance. The resistance was feeble, and a summons to surrender, sent as soon as the commanding heights were gained, was at once obeyed. The defence had been disgraceful, for a body of more than 1,300 Europeans and Malays surrendered to a third of that number. The governor paid the penalty of his treachery or cowardice with his life. On arriving at Java, to which he was sent in terms of the capitulation, he was tried by a court-martial, found guilty, and shot. In the capture of Amboyna, the so-called massacre which was perpetrated upon it in the early annals of the Company, was for the first time avenged. The Bandas, Ternate, and the other islands of the group, were shortly afterwards taken, and the only important settlement which remained with the Dutch in the Eastern Archipelago was the island of Java. The expedition

against it, though previously contemplated, had been deferred till the return of the troops from the Mauritius. These, with the addition of his majesty's 78th regiment and a portion of the 22nd dragoons, were immediately re-embarked, while a large detachment, accompanied by the governor-general in person, sailed from Bengal. The expedition was commanded by Sir Samuel Auchmuty, commander-in-chief at Madras. At Malacca, the appointed rendezvous, the different detachments were assembled by the 1st June, and after an intricate navigation, not as usual through the Straits of Banda, but by an inner passage along the south-west coast of Borneo, the whole force anchored off the north coast of Java, on the 2nd of August, 1811. Napoleon's attention had been particularly called to the island by a feeble attempt made upon it by the British [in 1807. Reinforcements had in consequence been sent out, and General Daendels, an able and determined officer, had been appointed governor. Under his management the old forts had been repaired and new formidable works had been erected, but fortunately, perhaps, for the expedition, he had been superseded by General Jansens, just before the expedition arrived. Instead of entering into details, it must here suffice simply to mention that after Batavia had been easily occupied, and Fort Cornelis carried by a dreadful assault, in which British prowess was signally displayed, the whole island, with its dependencies, was formally surrendered by treaty to Great Britain. Mr. (afterwards Sir) Stamford Raffles, by whom the expedition had been first suggested and its practicability demonstrated, was appointed lieutenant-governor, and Colonel Gillespie, whose skill and gallantry had greatly contributed to the conquest, was left in command of the troops.

The governor-general, shortly after his return to Calcutta in the end of 1811, received information that Earl Moira had been appointed his successor. He had himself expressed a wish to resign in January, 1814, but a change of ministry had made patronage desirable, and the period he had mentioned seeming to the dispensers of it too distant, they had not been able to refrain from manifesting their impatience by recalling him. The short period of office remaining to him was employed in endeavouring to place the amicable relations of the British

government with allies and adjoining states on a satisfactory footing, and promoting the internal prosperity of the country. In the former class of arrangements he was not very successful. Oudh continued to be in as diseased a state as ever, and the very vague terms in which Marquis Wellesley's subsidiary treaty was couched, gave rise to interminable misunderstandings between the nabob and the resident; the nabob interpreting them in the sense which gave him the greatest freedom from restraint, and the resident stretching their meaning so as to give him an almost unlimited right of interference. Lord Minto took part with the resident, but ceased to rule before he had completed a final arrangement. In regard to the Nepalese and the Burmese, his policy was chargeable with dilatoriness, if not with timidity. Both of them had actually encroached on the British territory. Had they been instantly checked in a resolute spirit, they might easily have been intimidated, whereas, by first complaining of encroachment, and then temporizing, Lord Minto encouraged future insolence and aggression, and left the necessary punishment of them as a burdensome legacy to his successor. The same thing may be said of the half measures he adopted to check the incursions of the Pindaris.

In regard to financial arrangements Lord Minto's administration was eminently successful. The continuation of peace enabled him to give effect to the system of economy which his predecessor commenced, and in the very second year of his administration, the annual deficit disappeared, and a surplus of revenue over expenditure was obtained. This surplus, in his last year of office, amounted to about £1,500,000 sterling. This favourable state of matters, however, was produced, not so much by any increased aggregate of revenue, or by any diminished aggregate of expenditure, as by improved credit, which enabled the Company to contract new loans at a lower, and thus pay off those which they had contracted at a higher rate of interest. On loans opened in 1790, 1796, and 1798, the rate of interest was 12 per cent; in 1810, the rate on the whole of the Company's outstanding obligations was reduced to 6 per cent. Simultaneously with this improved power of borrowing, the debt itself had rapidly increased in amount. In 1792 it was little more than £7,000,000 sterling; and in 1799,

£10,000,000. In 1805, towards the end of Marquis Wellesley's administration, it had risen to nearly £21,000,000, and in 1807 to £26,000,000. In this last year the interest was £2,228,000. In the last year of Lord Minto's administration, though another £1,000,000 had been added to the debt, making it in all £27,000,000, the interest was only £1,636,000; in other words a reduction of interest to the amount of more than £500,000 sterling had been effected.

Among the personal merits of Lord Minto must not be forgotten the interest which he took in native literature, and the liberal patronage which he extended to those who cultivated it. So far as compatible with the restrictions imposed upon him by the home authorities, he endeavoured to carry out the view of Marquis Wellesley in founding the college of Fort William, and he also proposed a plan for the foundation of Hindu colleges at Nadia and Tirhut. These were to have been followed by Muhammedan colleges in other localities. The object contemplated by these institutions was to continue to native literature that encouragement which it received from native governments, but which had ceased in consequence of the political revolutions which the country had undergone. In regard to the Baptist missionaries at Serampore, the conduct of Lord Minto unfortunately is inconsistent with itself, and at variance with the good sense and enlightened spirit which he usually displayed. Besides defraying out of the public treasury the expense of several native grammars, dictionaries, and other rudimentary works printed at the Serampore press, he gave liberal aid to the Serampore translations of the Scriptures, and yet issued an edict which evidently tended, if not to crush them altogether, to diminish their usefulness, and bring them under bondage. Sir George Barlow, sharing in the prejudices then generally entertained by old European residents, and alarmed at the supposed connection between missionary labours and the Vellore mutiny, prohibited the missionaries from preaching in the public streets, or sending itinerant native preachers through the villages, or gratuitously distributing controversial and religious tracts, but imposed no restriction on their private instructions or Scripture translations, and left them at liberty to perform divine service in Bengali in their

mission-house at Calcutta. One of the first acts of Lord Minto's government was not merely to renew the restrictions, but to threaten the missionaries with others of a still more rigorous description. The pretext for this procedure was the circulation of a tract in Persian containing what was called a scurrilous account of Muhammed. By a strange perversion of the meaning of words it was held that government, by promising to protect the great body of the people in the undisturbed exercise of their religion, were thereby pledged not to allow any one to obtrude upon them printed works containing arguments or exhortations at variance with their religious tenets. The inference drawn was, that the Company were under an obligation to suppress, within the limits of their territory, treatises and public preaching offensive to the religious persuasions of the people—an obligation which considerations of necessary caution, of general safety, and national faith and honour, made it imperative on them to fulfil. In conformity to this very curious pledge and obligation, the governor-general in council not only prohibited the issue of religious tracts, but ordered that public preaching in the vernacular tongue in the mission-house at Calcutta should be discontinued. Even this was not deemed sufficient, and for the avowed purpose of bringing the missionary press more immediately under the control of the officers of the government, the missionaries were commanded to remove it from Serampore to Calcutta.

In order to see all the enormity of this edict it is necessary to remember that at this time Serampore was Danish, not British territory, and that the governor-general in council had no more right to expel the missionaries from it than to expel them from Copenhagen. Thus, under the pretext of maintaining what was called "national faith and honour," he was grossly violating both, by tyrannically interfering with the rights of an European sovereign. The removal of the missionaries from Serampore was equivalent to a confiscation of the their property there, since it rendered the whole establishment on which their capital had been expended worthless. If, by some absurd misnomer, this could be called toleration to Hindus and Muhammedans, what was it to Christian missionaries but rank persecution? They were to be put to an expense which they

declared to be ruinous, and their mouths were to be gagged in order that they might not be able to preach the gospel within their own mission-house to the natives who would have come of their own accord to listen to it. The whole proceeding was so monstrous, that when the missionaries remonstrated, government hesitated in carrying out coercive measures which could only have been characterized as an anti-Christian crusade. The interdict on preaching in the chapel at Calcutta was withdrawn, and the missionaries saved their Serampore press by submitting to a censorship. Henceforth, not one of the tracts penned by such men as Carey, Marshman, and Ward, nor indeed any work whatever, could issue from their press until it had undergone a degrading inspection, and received the imprimatur of the government secretary at Calcutta.

The tyrannical edict directed against the Baptist missionaries is the great blot on Lord Minto's administration, and is the more to be regretted, because he had in many respects well earned the honour of being regarded as a model governor-general. Before he quitted the government, the crown testified its approbation of his services by advancing him a step in the peerage, by which he became Earl Minto. This honour, apparently the only reward which he received, he was not permitted long to enjoy, as he died in 1814, a few months after his arrival in this country. With the termination of his administration, a new era in the history of British India commenced. The twenty years for which the Company's charter was renewed by Act 33 Geo. III. c. 52, expired on the 1st of March, 1814, and with a view to this event, the three years' notice to which the Company were entitled, was given in the beginning of March, 1811. An account of the important discussions which preceded the renewal of the charter, and the terms on which it was ultimately granted, must be reserved to form the appropriate commencement of a new volume.

Index

- Abbas Kuli Khan, 280, 300
 Abd-ul-Karim, 650
 Abdul Hakim Khan, 306
 Abercromby, Robert General
 (Sir), 770, 772-73, 780, 838-
 39, 855, 863
 Abington, Major, 647
 Addington, Mr., 936
 Addington, Lord Sidmouth,
 1019
A Eneid, 165
 Ahilya Bai, 239, 943-44
 Ahmed Shah Abdali, 842, 858
 Ahmuty, Colonel, 559
 Ahteram-ul-Daulah, 399
 Akbar, Shah II, 1054-55
 Alexander, Captain, 351
 Ali Hussain, 917-18
 Ali Jah, 854, 866, 874
 Ali Reza Khan, 309, 340, 745,
 789, 912-13
 Alivardi Khan, 236
 Allan, Major, 894
 Amir Singh, 908-10
 Ambaji Ingolia, 975, 1014
 Amir-ul-Umara, 917
 Amir Khan, 945, 1004-08, 1010-
 11, 1014, 1046-48
 Amrit Rao, 583
 Anand Rao Rastea, 288, 944
 Anderson, Mr., 473, 597
 Andrews, Mr., 358-60
 Anwar-ud-din, 330
 Apaji Ram, 669
Arabian Nights, 178
 Archibald, Campbell, Sir, 798
 Aristotle, 156
 Arya Bhatta, 160-61
 Asaf-ud-Daulah, 497-98, 538,
 681, 693-94, 857
 Asaph Jah Bahadur, 900
Asiatic Journal, 69
Asiatic Researches, 71, 86, 157
Astronomie Indienne et Orientale,
 157
 Assad Ali, 768, 775
Atharva-Veda, 23
 Atkinson, Mr., 728
 Auber, 313, 317, 320-21, 502
 Auchmuty, Sir Samuel, 1075
 Aumout, Monsieur, 331
 Auriol, J. P., 544
 Azim-ul-Daulah, 917, 919
 Babu Begum, 497
 Baillie, Colonel, 617-21, 633,
 640, 673, 893
 Baird, Colonel (General), 785,
 893-94, 897, 933
 Baji Rao, 841, 854, 906, 942,
 946, 948, 974, 1042
 Bakht Singh, 1049
 Balaji Khnjar, 957
 Balaji Rao, 284, 288, 294, 841
 Balaram Seth, 1046

- Balwant Singh, 680, 706
 Bao Begum, 694
 Bapuji Sindhia, 1004, 1010
 Barker, Sir Robert, 383-84,
 411-12, 416-17, 425-26
 Barlow, Sir George, 812, 1023,
 1025-27, 1036-37, 1039, 1049-
 50, 1057-58
 Bamford, Lieutenant, 559
 Barrow, Author of *Life of Lord*
 Macartney, 723
 Barwell, Daniel, Octavius, 538,
 544-45, 681, 718
 Barwell Richard, 446, 449, 465,
 467, 469, 479, 496, 527,
 536, 550, 553, 555, 568
 Basalat Jung, 299, 604-5, 612,
 614, 621, 743
 Bashir, Khan, 497
 Beatson, Colonel, 890, 897
 Becher, Mr. Richard, 542
 Bellecombe, M., 602, 608
 Benfield, Paul, 504-05, 721, 723,
 728-29
 Bentinck, Lord William, 1030,
 1057, 1062
 Berki Venkat Rao, 281
Bhagavat Gita, 176
 Bhaskara, 160-61
 Bhonsla Raghui, 941
 Bihar Ali Khan, 697-98
 Boigne, De, 844, 853
 Boles, Major, 1065, 1070
 Bonaparte, 882-83, 933
 Bouchier, Mr., 320-21
 Bristow, Mr., 497, 550, 706
 Brooke, Captain, 348, 357-58
 Browne, Colonel, 584, 587,
 595
 Braithwaite, Col., 609, 616,
 638-39, 647, 673, 817
 Bruce, Captain (Colonel), 590,
 657
 Buchanan, author of *Journey*
 from Madras etc., 201, 228
 Buddha, 101
 Burgoyne, Col., 432, 434, 436-
 37, 439
 Burke, Edmund, 615, 701-02,
 728, 818-20
 Burn, Col., 990
 Bussy, M., 641-42, 651, 654,
 656, 658-60
 Buswapa Naik, 301
 Bute, Lord, 267-68
 Calvert, Captain, 330-31
 Camac, Major (Col), 596-97,
 684, 843
 Campbell, Col. Donald, 342-43
 387, 661, 664-66, 671,
 960-61
 Campbell, Sir Archibald, 750
 Capper, Col., 1065-66
 Carey, 1079
 Cradock, Sir John, 1030,
 1061-62
 Carnac, Major Jacob, 589
 Carnac, John, 574-77, 579-80
 Cartier, Mr. 364, 366, 390, 393
 Cassini, 157
 Castlereagh, Lord, 1018-19
 Cathcart, Col., 656
 Cay, Col., 576
 Chaitanya, 92
 Chait Singh, 687, 689-90, 695,
 704-06, 822
 Chalmers, Colonel (Lieutenant)
 786-88, 1059-60, 1066

- Chambers, Robert, 450
 Champion, Col., 419-24, 468-69
 Cham Raj, 901
 Chanda Sahib, 304, 309, 362
 Chandu lal, 1043-44
 Chatham, Lord, 368
 Chen Busveia, 301-02
 Chimnaji, 854
 Christopher Wren (Sir), 191
 Clavering, General, 465-66,
 475, 479, 483, 491, 534,
 536, 538, 545, 548-50, 681
 Clive, Lord, 108, 265-68, 273,
 275-76, 278, 322, 334-35,
 368, 380, 387, 389, 393-94,
 399, 432-33, 435-37, 439-40,
 865, 914-15, 918, 936, 938,
 1030
 Close, Col. Barry, 872, 898,
 904, 913, 948, 1013, 1069
 Cockburn, Lieutenant, 576-77,
 579
 Cockerell, Col., 754
 Colebrooke, Mr., 146, 161,
 165, 210
 Collins, Col., 950
 Cornwallis, Admiral, 817
 Cornwallis, Lord, 230, 720,
 729-31, 733-35, 737, 739-42,
 744-47, 751-53, 762, 764-68,
 770-73, 775-78, 780, 783-93,
 795-96, 798-99, 803-09,
 811-12, 815, 817-18, 835-37,
 839-40, 848, 859, 863-64,
 909, 1016, 1019-21, 1035
 Coote, Sir Eyre, 500, 550-51,
 581, 588-89, 621-23, 625-36,
 638, 642-49, 651-53, 655,
 673, 676-77, 772, 833
 Cosby, Col., 616, 621
 Cossigny, M., 641, 654, 664
 Cuppage, Col., 1059-60, 1066
 Dakshinacharis, 97
 Daniel, Ensign, 238
 Dalrymple, Col., 884, 907
 Dariao Singh, 1049-50
 Daulat Rao Sindhia, 848, 854,
 877, 906, 941, 944, 978
 1020
 Davis, Captain, 623
 Day, Sir John, 558
 Daylesford, Lord, 821
 Delambre, 161
 Deria Daulat Bag, 784
 Dev Raj, 283-87
 Dhondu Pant Gokla, 907, 938
 Dhundia Waugh, 906
 Dick, Captain, 960
 Dilawar Khan, 294
 Diophantus, 160-61
 Dirom, Major, 773
 d'Orves, M., 626
 Don, Col., 982, 990, 994
 Donald, Col. Campbell, 342
 Doveton, Captain (Major),
 839-40, 878, 880-81, 913,
 1046
 Draper, Daniel, 514
 Drury, Admiral, 1074
 Dryden, 164
 Dubois, author of *Description of
 the Character*, etc., 21
 Duff, author of *History of the
 Mahrattas*, 63, 464, 570, 577,
 594, 846, 969
 Duncan, Mr., 231, 865
 Dundas, Henry, 701-02, 704,
 708, 714, 719-20, 723, 729-

- 33, 738, 741-42, 795, 799, 806-07, 816, 819, 821, 824, 829, 837-39, 863
 Dunlop, Col., 893
 Dunning, Mr., 563
 Dupleix, 267-68, 271, 281
 Dupre, 717
 Eeendels, General, 1075
 Egerton, Col, Charles, 575-77
 Elliot, Mr., 572
 Elphinstone, Mr., author of *History of India*, 42, 74, 114, 117, 123, 144, 222, 253, 1056
Essay on the Architecture of the Hindus, 182
 Etoji (Wittuji) Holkar, 946
 Faizulla Khan, 421, 466, 469, 691
 Fancourt, Col., 1028
 Farmer, William Gamul, 578-79, 586
 Fateh Mahmud Khan, 279-80
 Fateh Naik, 279
 Fateh Singh, 516, 522, 582, 584, 586, 588, 598
 Fergusson, author of *The Illustrated Handbook of Architecture*, 186-87, 189, 191-92
 Ferguson, Col., 960-61
 Fitzgerald, Major, 353-54, 357
 Fletcher, Col., 619
 Floyd, Col. (General), 757-59, 765, 789, 817, 886-87
 Forbes, James, author of *Oriental Memoirs*, 585, 588
 Forde, Col., 370
 Fowke, Francis, 538, 550, 553
 Fowke, Joseph, 479, 538
 Fox, Mr., 702, 710-11, 728, 730, 822, 824, 827, 1037
 Francis, Dr. Buchanan, 197
 Francis Philip, 446, 474-76, 480, 485, 491, 496, 526, 530-33, 536-38, 544, 548-50, 554-55, 568 801-02, 822, 824
 Francis, Sir Russell, 236
 Fraser, Major (Lieutenant), 673, 990, 992
 Fullarton, Col., 659, 667-70
 Fyzulla Khan, 855
 Gambier, Mr., 461
 Ganga Bai, 459, 571
 Gangadhar Jaswant, 943
 Ganesh Pant, 587-88
 Gentil, M. le, 157
 George, Thomas, 1051
 Ghazi Khan, 328, 333
 Gholam (Ghulam) Ali, 789, 791, 867, 912-13, 1057
 Ghulam Kadir, 845-46
 Ghulam Muhammad Khan, 855
 Gibbs, Col., 1069
 Gillespie, Col., 1028-29, 1075
 Gita Govinda, 177
 Gleig, author of *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, 386, 390
 Goddard, Col., (General), 572-74, 579, 581-88, 591-95, 843
 Golam Kadir Khan, 734
 Golama Bai, 942
 Gopal Hari, 288, 295
 Gopal Singh, 1049
 Gordon, Captain, 577
 Gordon, Robert (General), 463
 Goring, Mr. 473
 Gotama, 149, 151, 156

- Govind Rao Gaikwar, 512, 516
586
Govind Singh, 99
Gowdie, Major, 777
Graham, (Sir) Thomas, 398,
471, 538
Grant, Mr., 473
Griffith, 169
Grueber, Col., 1005
Gurdass (Gourdas), Raja, 399,
473, 475, 491, 551
Hafiz Rahmat Khan, 384, 413,
420-22, 466
Harcourt, Col., 961
Hari Har, 776
Hari Pant Phadke, 459, 514-15,
577, 594-95, 597, 773, 775-
76, 789, 796
Hari Singh, 287
Harland, Sir Robert, 375-77
Harper, Col. 503, 505
Harpur, Col., 606, 612
Harris, General, 872-73, 882,
884, 886, 888-89, 891-92,
898, 904
Hartley, Col., 591, 593, 755,
763
Hastings, Mrs., 388
Hastings, Warren, 385, 387-90,
393, 397-98, 408, 412, 414-
17, 422, 440, 449, 465, 534-
39, 541-48, 550-54, 561-62,
568, 571-72, 597, 674, 676-
85, 687-97, 699, 700, 702-04,
706-08, 717-18, 721, 729,
735-37, 800-02, 808, 820-21,
823, 827-36, 865, 929-30,
1005
Heber, Bishop, 254, 609
Herodotus, 203
*Historical and Descriptive Account
of British India*, 158
*Historical Sketches of the South of
India*, 201
Hitopadesa, 178
Hobart, Lord, 859, 862
Holmes, Mr., 579
Holland, Mr. (Hollond), 605,
721, 750, 753, 755-56
Holwell, Mr., 236, 242
Homer, 164
Hornby, Mr., 462, 582
Hughes, Sir Edward, 507, 628,
641-44, 646, 653-55, 657-58
Humberstone, Col., 647-48, 660
Hunter, Captain, 784
Hussain, Ali, 275-76, 763
Hyat Sahib, 641
Hyder Ali, 281-83, 285-323,
325-48, 350-63, 375-79,
452, 458-59, 575, 607-08,
611, 613-35, 639-40, 644-48,
650-51, 653, 660, 673, 675,
781, 787, 900, 902
Hyder Beg Khan, 706, 733-34,
765, 855
Hyder Naik, 312, 337-38,
Ibrahim Sahib, 279-80, 344
Imhoff, Sir Charles, 390
Impey, Sir Elijah, 450, 479,
483-84, 489-91, 559, 561-62,
564-65, 695, 697, 809, 825
Institutes of Manu, 3-5, 9, 11, 16-
7, 24, 32-3, 59, 75, 77-9,
82, 108, 113-14, 118, 123,
127, 132, 214, 235, 260
Ismael Beg, 845
Jameson, Captain, 591

- Jaswant Rao Holkar, 942, 944-47
 Jawan Bakht, 381-82
 Jaya Deva, 177
 Jenkins, Mr., 1011, 1013, 1015, 1021
 Jivan Bhakt Bahadur Shah, 734
 Jiwar Ali Khan, 697-98
 John, General, St., 962, 971
 Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 492
 Jones, Sir William, 164, 812
 Kabir, 89
 Kadir Khan, 782
 Kalidasa, 177
Kalika Purana, 44
 Kalyan Singh, 407
 Kamal-ud-din, 479
 Kanade, 149, 151, 156
 Kantu Babu, 493-94
 Kapila, 146, 154
 Karim Sahib, 617
 Karam Ali, 1057
 Kasi Rao, 944-45
 Kasyalpa, 183
 Kaye, Mr., author of *Administration of the East India Company*, 240
 Keating, Thomas, 513-16, 518, 1073
 Kelly, Col., 756
 Kennaway, Sir John, 744, 789, 791
 Kennedy, Vans Colonel, author of *Researches*, etc., 32
 Kirkpatrick, Major 875, 898
 Khoja Basant, 498
 Knox, Col., 783-84
 Krishna Raja Udraver Bahadur, 901
Kuddum Bandi, 942
 (Kumma) Kummer-ud-din, 760, 786-87, 900
 Kundi Rao, 283, 285-87, 289-91, 293, 297-98, 312, 945
Kurma Purana, 32
 Kutub-ud-din, 745
 Lake, Lord, 951, 961-63, 965-73, 975, 679-84, 986-91, 994, 996-97, 1000, 1007-08, 1013-15, 1020-21, 1024-25, 1027, 1050
 Lakshman Dawa, 1041-42, 1048
 Lally, M., 291, 500, 620, 640, 664
 Lang, Colonel, 353-54, 634
 Lansdowne, Lord, 742
 Law, M., 359
 Lawrence, Major (General), 273, 451
 Leger, Col., St., 1059-60
 Leslie Col., 569-71
Life in Ancient India, 129
 Lilavati, 161
 Lindsay, Sir John, 373-76, 999
 Little, Captain, 776
 Loubere M. de la, 156
 Louis XVI, 763
 Lubin, Chevalier, St., 566-67, 570
 Lucan, Lieutenant, 984
 Macartney, Lord, 634, 638, 642-43, 645, 652-53, 655, 667-69, 674, 676-78, 721-22, 839
 Macaulay, Col., 1058-59
 Macaulay, Lord, 825
 Macdowall, General Hay, 1061, 1064-65, 1070
 Macleod, Col. (Brigadier) 372, 660, 665-66, 668, 672

- Macleod, Lord, 617
 Maclean, Col., 540-43, 545-47
 Macpherson, Mr., 372
 Macpherson, Sir John, 708, 717-20, 722, 731, 836
 Macrae, Col., 999
 Madho Rao 305-08, 311, 313, 315, 320-21, 381, 384, 413, 456-57, 517
 Madhu Rao Narain, 461, 571, 578
Mahabharata, 5, 40-41, 171, 176
 Maha Mirza Khan, 622
 Mahboob Ali Khan, 499
 Mahadaji Sindhia, 381, 577, 585, 597, 640, 690, 840-44, 848, 943
 Mahavira, 103
 Mahmud, 1056
 Mahmud Ali, 279
 Mahmud Buhlul, 279
 Mahmud Welli, 279
 Mahmud Yusuf, 271, 274, 286
 Maistre, Stephen le, 450
 Makhdum Sahib, 285, 287-88, 292, 294-95, 308, 312, 343
 Malartic, General 868-69
 Malet, Sir Charles, 752
 Malcolm, Captain (Col.), 876, 884, 889, 891, 898, 932, 1067
 Malcolm, Sir John, 100, 239, 841, 840, 861, 875, 901, 932, 987, 1044, 1055
 Malhar Rao Holkar, 841
 Manu, 165
 Maan Vicran Raj, 309
 Mansa Ram, 680
Manasara, 182, 184
 Mansfield, Lord, 369, 563
 Marshman, 1079
 Markham, Mr., 686
 Martindale, Col., 1049-50
 Matthews, Captain (General), 347, 660-62, 667
 Maxwell, Mr, 473, 760-61, 772, 778, 785, 956-57
 Meadows, General, 754-55
Meghdoot, 177
 Melville, Lord, 701
 Menon, 933
 Metcalfe, Mr., 1053
 Middleton, Mr., 397, 401, 466-69, 550, 694, 696
 Mill's *History of British India*, 403, 422, 916
Mimansa, 146
 Minto Lord, 1036, 1040, 1043-45, 1047-49, 1052-55, 1070, 1072, 1074, 1076, 1079
 Mir-Abdul-Kasim, 745
 Mir Alam, 775, 789, 854-55, 1043
 Mir Ali Reza, 308
 Mir Jafar, 400, 437, 439, 528
 Mir Kassim, 399
 Mir Sahib, 319, 345
 Mirza Jehangir, 1054
 Mohan Prasad, 482
 Moiz-ud-din, 1031
 Moleville, Bertrand de, 763
 Monakji, 454
 Monro, Captain (Major), Sir Thomas, 898, 939, 1062-64
 Monro, Sir Hector, 601, 609, 616-19, 621, 638
 Monson, Col., 465, 475-76, 480, 485, 491, 496, 534, 543, 802, 963, 985-87, 989, 992, 1002, 1008

- Montague, Major, 779
 Moore, Major, 292
 Montesquieu, 536
 Montresor, Col., 885, 1067
 Moraba Fadnavis, 568-69
 Morgan, Captain, 960-61
 Morgan, Col., 596
 Mornington, Lord, 870-72,
 874-75, 877-81, 889, 891
 Mostyn, Mr., 457, 568, 575-76
 Mubarak-ud-Daulah, 367, 552,
 554
 Mudaji Bhonsla, 517, 523, 571,
 574, 582, 622, 640
 Muhammad Ali, 266, 271-72,
 282, 296, 318, 323, 331, 333-
 34, 337, 347, 349, 373, 408,
 452, 459, 464, 604, 607-08,
 615, 622-23, 855, 858-59,
 915
 Muhammed Beg, 844
 Muhammed Najib Khan, 918
 Muhammed Reza Khan, 392,
 395-401, 406-10, 475, 484,
 492, 551-52, 554
 Muhammed Shah, 680
 Muir, Col., 596-97
 Mukhdom Ali, 641, 647
 Mulhar Rao Holkar, 942-45,
 947
 Munni Begum, 400, 409, 475,
 477, 482, 552
 Munnu Bappu, 976
 Munro, Sir Thomas, 115
 Murad Ali, 1057
 Murari Rao, 301, 308, 343-44,
 347
 Murray, Col., 959, 984
 Musgrave, Col., 762
 Mustafa Beg, 1034
 Muza-ud-din, 790
 Najif Khan, 423, 497-98, 994
 Nana Fadnavis (Farnavis), 459,
 568, 570, 575, 583-84, 586,
 593-94, 597, 599, 796, 843,
 846-47, 854, 909, 944, 946
 Nanak, 101
 Nanak Shah, 99
 Nanda Kumar, 396, 398-99,
 407, 409, 473-76, 478-81,
 483-86, 488-89, 491-93, 525,
 551, 556, 561, 831
 Narain Rao, 457-58, 517, 522
 Naylor, Mr., 559
 Nazir Jung, 281
 Nelson, Lord, 877
 Nesbitt, Col., 779
New Testament, 80
 Niyaya School, 146-47, 149,
 152
 Nixon, Captain (Col.), 355,
 638
 Nizam Ali, 269, 275, 278, 306,
 311, 315-16, 319-23, 325,
 327-29, 331, 333-34, 336,
 338, 341, 347, 458, 460,
 523, 572, 604, 606-07, 612,
 614, 621, 676, 743-46, 752,
 768, 771, 775, 780, 796, 846,
 853, 898
 Norford, Captain, 992
 Nujif Khan, 383
 Nujit-ud-Daulah, 381-82
 Nunjiraj, 282-84, 286-87, 289-
 91, 299, 311, 321
 Oakley, Sir Charles, 797, 839,
 909
 Oldham, Col., 758

- Omdut-ul-Omrah (Umara), 379-80, 859, 912, 914-15, 917
 Orton, Captain, 354, 356
 Owen, Col., 636
 Palk, Mr. 275-78
 Palmer, General, 842
 Parasara, 158
 Parker, Col., 499
 Parshuram Bhow Patwardhan, 594-95, 773, 775-77
 Patanjala (Patanjali), 95, 146, 156
 Peach, Col., 333
 Pedron, M., 963-64
 Perring, Mr. 614, 702
 Perron, M., 874, 876, 962-64, 969
 Peshwa Rao Pandit Pardhan Bahadur, 900
 Picton, Col., 1059
 Pigot, Governor, 272, 275, 500-11, 674, 717
 Pimorin, M., 620
 Pitt, Mr., 710-11, 723-24, 729-30, 745, 807, 819, 821, 823-25, 863-64, 1019, 1036-37
 Playfair, Prof., 160-61
 Pohlman, Monsieur, 955
 Popham, Captain (Major) William, 588-90, 688-89, 843
 Pre, Mr. Du, 452
Puranas, 42, 235
Purva Mimansa, 147
 Pythagoras, 156
 Raffles, Sir Stamford, 1075
 Raghuba, 457-63, 500, 512-15, 517-18, 520, 522-24, 567, 569, 572-73, 575, 577-78, 583, 586, 598
 Raghuji Bhonsla, 944, 949-52, 975, 977-78, 1045-46
 Raghunath Rao, 457
 Rainier, Admiral, 933
 Ramanand, 89
 Ramanuja, 88,
Ramayana, 5, 39-40, 165, 171, 176
 Ramchander Ganesh, 593
 Rumley Captain, 673
 Ram Raz, 182
 Rana Khan, 842
 Ranjit Singh, 994, 1052-55
 Ranoji Sindhia, 841
 Rao Holkar, (Mahipat) 1046
 Raymond, M., 775, 840, 853-54, 874
 Reza Ali Khan, 304
 Richardson, Mr., 1041
Rig Veda, 23, 45, 196, 213
Ritusanhara, 177
 Roberts, Colonel, 876
 Robert, Sir (General), 763
 Robinson, Captain, 356
 Rous, Mr. 563
 Rumbold, Sir Thomas, 509
 Russell, Mr. 505
 Sadasheo Bhow Bhaskar, 986 994, 1010
 Sadat Ali, 498, 856-57, 861, 921
 Sadlier, Mr., 664, 668-70
 Saif-ud-Daulah, 367
 Sakuntala, 178
 Salabat Jung, 268
Sama-Veda, 23
 Sambaji, 668
 Sambhunath, 683
Sankhya, 147, 152, 154-56

- Sampson, Lieutenant, 673
 Sumru (Begum), 990
 Sankara Acharya, 94
Sankhya Karika, 153
 Sayyid Sahib, 757
 Scott, Major (Col.), 819, 919, 930
 Seton, Captain, 1057
 Seyed Sahib, 651, 653, 669
 Shah Alam, 380-83, 410-12, 414, 417, 497, 734-35, 743, 822, 831, 842, 844-46
 Shah Shuja, 1056
 Shuja (Sujah) Daulah, 335, 382, 418, 421
 Shamser Bahadur, 974
 Shaw, Col., 888-89
 Sheik Ayaz, 641
 Shitab Roy, 392, 398, 407, 410
 Shore, Sir John, 531, 803, 807, 837, 839-40, 848-54, 856, 858, 862, 910
 Sidmouth, Lord, 936
 Sikandar (Secunder) Jah, 953, 1042-43
 Sirji Rao Ghatka, 1025-26
 Siraj-ud-Daulah, 387, 439
 Sirdar Khan, 639, 647
 Sivaji, 572, 587
 Skinner, Captain, 1006
 Smith, Adam, 536
 Smith, Col. (General), 321-29, 331-33, 341-50, 354, 357-61, 364, 379, 452, 622, 1005-07
 Smith, Nicholas Hankey, 1057
 Stevenson, Col., 907, 950-51, 953-54, 957, 976-77
 Stewart, Sir James, 536, 576, 586, 594
 Stormont, Lord, 742
 Staunton, Mr., 664, 668, 670
 Stuart, (Col.) General, 505, 556, 651, 655-57, 659, 673-74, 757-58, 784-86, 885, 889-90, 962
 Sudder-al-Hak, 553
 Suffrein, Admiral, 641, 644, 646, 654, 657-58, 787-88
 Suja-ud-Daulah, 691, 693, 857, 929
 Sukaram Bapu, 519-21, 569
 Sullivan, Mr., 430, 432, 547, 643
 Sultan Petta Tope, 889
 Suraj Mal, 993-94
Surya Sidhanta, 4, 158-60
 Swanston, Mr., 559
 Swartz, Rev., 609-11, 613, 667, 670, 908-09
 Sykes, Mr. 364, 389
Tantras, 98
 Teg Bahadur, 99
 Tejwant Singh, 768, 775
 Tipu Sultan, 328, 333, 344, 357, 617, 649-50, 660, 662-65, 667, 669, 671, 673, 719, 743-44, 747, 750-53, 755, 757, 759, 761-69, 772, 777, 781, 783, 786-88, 790, 792-94, 797-98, 839, 848-50, 853, 866-71, 873, 878-79, 882-86, 889, 894, 896, 898, 900-02, 906-07, 912-13, 916, 1029, 1031-32,
 Tod, Col., 191, 332, 993
 Townsend, Mr., 704
Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, 146

- Travels in Western India*, 191
 Trimbak Rao Mama, 460
 Tronjolly, M., 601
 Tukaji Holkar, 381, 523, 586,
 594-95, 842, 844, 848, 946
 Tuki Ali Khan, 918
 Tulaji, 454, 908
 Tulasi Bai, 1046
 Upton, Lieutenant Colonel,
 519-23
Uttara Mimansa, 147
 Vailu Tambi, 1058
 Vallabha Acharya, 90
 Vamacharis, 97
 Vansittart, Mr., 370, 388, 393,
 479-80, 543
Veda, 6, 9-11, 14, 16-7, 23-5, 29,
 33, 35, 54, 56, 67, 80-1, 85,
 104, 109, 152, 164-65, 171,
 203, 212, 235
 Vedanta School, 147-48, 152-53
 Verelst, Mr., 364, 366
 Vernon, Sir Edward, 601
 Virgil, 164
 Visaji Kishen, 381, 383, 842
 Visaji Pundit, 295-96
 Vizir Ali, 856-57
 Von Orlich, author of *Travels*
 in India, 213
 Vyasa, 146,
 Wallace, Col., 991, 1046
 Wallace, Professor, 161
 Wallaja (Muhammed Ali), 914
 Wangenheim Col., 659
 Ward, author of *Account of the*
 Writings, etc., 21-2, 98
 Ware, Col., 1079
 Ward, General, 962, 971
 Watson, Commodore, 464
 Webbe, Mr., 913
 Wedderburn, Mr., 718
 Wellesley (Duke of Wellington),
 884, 934, 936, 958, 1015-19
 1023, 1042, 1076
 Wellesley, Arthur, 887, 889,
 897-98, 927-34, 937-39, 950,
 952-59, 962, 975-77, 1009,
 1013, 1035
 Wheler, Mr., 546, 548, 550,
 553, 568
 Whitehill, Mr., 622, 702
 Wilkins, Mr., 178
 Wilks, Col., 201-02, 226-28,
 240, 269, 273, 303, 324, 329,
 334, 616, 620, 659, 672, 766,
 769, 774, 830, 870
 Willoughby, J. P., 233
 Wilson Professor, 178-79, 236,
 422, 916, 1032
 Wood, Col., 324, 331-32, 341,
 344-45, 347-54
 Woodington, Col., 959
 Wynch, Mr., 500
Tajur-Veda, 23
 Zabita Khan, 381, 383-84, 735,
 842, 845
 Zeman Shah, 858, 867, 917,
 932, 1056